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religious) coherence and mobilization was a primary reason why the Muslim armies in the space of a hundred
years were able to establish the largest pre-modern empire until that time. The estimates for the size of the Islamic Caliphate suggest it was more than thirteen million
square kilometers (ve million square miles), making it
larger than all current states except the Russian Federa[7]
The resulting empire stretched from the borders of China tion.
and India, across Central Asia, the Middle East, North
Africa, Sicily, and the Iberian Peninsula, to the Pyrenees.
Edward Gibbon writes in The History of the Decline and 1 Background
Fall of the Roman Empire:
See also: RomanPersian Wars, ByzantineSassanid
Wars, ByzantineSassanid War of 602628, and Siege
of Constantinople (626)
Under the last of the Umayyads, the Arabian empire extended two hundred days journey from east to west, from the connes of
Tartary and India to the shores of the Atlantic
Ocean. [...] We should vainly seek the indissoluble union and easy obedience that pervaded the government of Augustus and the
Antonines; but the progress of Islam diused
over this ample space a general resemblance of
manners and opinions. The language and laws
of the Quran were studied with equal devotion
at Samarcand and Seville: the Moor and the Indian embraced as countrymen and brothers in
the pilgrimage of Mecca; and the Arabian language was adopted as the popular idiom in all
the provinces to the westward of the Tigris.
2 Military campaigns
2.1
MILITARY CAMPAIGNS
2.2
2.3
ceived them as Gods punishment visited on their fellow Christians for their sins.[22] Early Muslim historians
viewed them as a reection of religious zeal of the conquerors and evidence of divine favor.[23] The theory that
the conquests are explainable as an Arab migration triggered by economic pressures enjoyed popularity early in
the 20th century, but has largely fallen out of favor among
historians, especially those who distinguish the migration
from the conquests that preceded and enabled it.[24]
There are indications that the conquests started as initially disorganized pillaging raids launched partly by nonMuslim Arab tribes in the aftermath of the Ridda wars,
and were soon extended into a war of conquest by the
2.6
3
Indus valley occurred when the general Muhammad bin
Qasim invaded Sindh in 711 after a coastal march through
Makran.[35] Three years later the Arabs controlled all of
the lower Indus valley.[35] Most of the towns seem to have
submitted to Arab rule under peace treaties, although
there was erce resistance in other areas, including by the
forces of Raja Dahir at the capital city Debal.[35][36] Arab
incursions southward from Sindh were repulsed by armies
of Gurjara and Chalukya kingdoms, and further Islamic
expansion was checked by the Rashtrakuta empire, which
gained control of the region shortly after.[36]
MILITARY CAMPAIGNS
it was put to use in a pillaging raid of Cyprus, soon followed by a second raid in 650 that concluded with a treaty
under which Cypriots surrendered many of their riches
and slaves.[47] In 688 the island was made into a joint dominion of the caliphate and the Byzantine empire under
a pact which was to last for almost 300 years.[48]
dered with agreements to pay tribute and local aristocracy retained a measure of former inuence.[43] By 713
Iberia was almost entirely under Muslim control.[42] The
events of the subsequent ten years, whose details are obscure, included capture of Barcelona and Narbonne, and
a raid against Toulouse, followed by an expedition into
Burgundy in 725.[42] The last large-scale raid to the north
ended with a Muslim defeat at the Battle of Tours at the
hands of the Franks in 732.[42]
2.8
further military progress.[54] The wars produced diminishing returns in personal gains and ghters increasingly
left the army for civilian occupations.[54] The priorities of
the rulers have also shifted from conquest of new lands to
administration of the acquired empire.[54] Although the
3.1
Socio-political developments
notables of Iran, who at rst had almost complete autonomy, were incorporated into the central bureaucracy by
the Abbasid period.[61] The similarity of Egyptian and
Khurasanian ocial paperwork at the time of the caliph
al-Mansur (75475) suggests a highly centralized empirewide administration.[61]
Aftermath
Main articles:
Caliphate
3.1
Socio-political developments
3 AFTERMATH
7
sages from the Quran.[75] Taxation-related grievances of
non-Arab Muslims contributed to the opposition movements which resulted in the Abbasid revolution.[76] Under the new system that was eventually established, kharaj
came to be regarded as a tax levied on the land, regardless
of the taxpayers religion.[74] The poll-tax was no longer
levied on Muslims, but the treasury did not necessarily
suer and converts did not gain as a result, since they had
to pay zakat, which was probably instituted as a compulsory tax on Muslims around 730.[77] The terminology became specialized during the Abbasid era, so that kharaj
no longer meant anything more than land tax, while the
term jizya was restricted to the poll-tax on dhimmis.[74]
The inuence of jizya on conversion has been a subject of
scholarly debate.[78] Julius Wellhausen held that the poll
tax amounted to so little that exemption from it did not
constitute sucient economic motive for conversion.[79]
Similarly, Thomas Arnold states that jizya was too moderate to constitute a burden, seeing that it released them
from the compulsory military service that was incumbent
on their Muslim fellow subjects. He further adds that
converts escaping taxation would have to pay the legal
alms, zakat, that is annually levied on most kinds of movable and immovable property.[80] Other early 20th century scholars suggested that non-Muslims converted to
Islam en masse in order to escape the poll tax, but this
theory has been challenged by more recent research.[78]
Daniel Dennett has shown that other factors, such as desire to retain social status, had greater inuence on this
choice in the early Islamic period.[78]
3.3
ligions and made an eort to enlist support from Christian Arab elites.[84] There is no evidence for public display of Islam by the state before the reign of Abd alMalik (685705), when Quranic verses and references
to Muhammad suddenly became prominent on coins and
ocial documents.[85] This change was motivated by a
desire to unify the Muslim community after the second
civil war and rally them against their chief common enemy, the Byzantine empire.[85]
A further change of policy occurred during the reign
of Umar II (717720).[86] The disastrous failure of the
siege of Constantinople in 718 which was accompanied
by massive Arab casualties led to a spike of popular animosity among Muslims toward Byzantium and Christians in general.[86] At the same time, many Arab soldiers
left the army for civilian occupations and they wished to
emphasize their high social status among the conquered
peoples.[86] These events prompted introduction of restrictions on non-Muslims, which were modeled both on
Byzantine curbs on Jews, such as prohibitions against
building new synagogues and giving testimony against
Christians, and on Sasanian regulations that prescribed
distinctive attire for dierent social classes.[86]
In the following decades Islamic jurists elaborated a legal framework in which other religions would have a protected but subordinate status.[85] Islamic law followed the
Byzantine precedent of classifying subjects of the state
according to their religion, in contrast to the Sasanian
model which put more weight on social than on religious
distinctions.[86] In theory, like the Byzantine empire, the
caliphate placed severe restrictions on paganism, but in
practice most non-Abrahamic communities of the former Sasanian territories were classied as possessors of
a scripture (ahl al-kitab) and granted protected (dhimmi)
status.[86]
Mark R. Cohen writes that the jizya paid by Jews under Islamic rule provided a surer guarantee of protection
from non-Jewish hostility than that possessed by Jews in
the Latin West, where Jews paid numerous and often unreasonably high and arbitrary taxes in return for ocial
protection, and where treatment of Jews was governed by
charters which new rulers could alter at will upon accession or refuse to renew altogether.[87] The Pact of Umar,
which stipulated that Muslims must do battle to guard
the dhimmis and put no burden on them greater than
they can bear, was not always upheld, but it remained a
steadfast cornerstone of Islamic policy into early modern
times.[87]
4 See also
Ghazw
History of Islam
Spread of Islam
5
5.1
References
Citations
REFERENCES
[11] Liska, George (1998). Projection contra prediction: Alternative futures and options. Expanding Realism: The
Historical Dimension of World Politics. Rowman & Littleeld. p. 170. ISBN 0-8476-8680-9.
5.1
Citations
[70] Cahen (1991, p. 560); Anver M. Emon, Religious Pluralism and Islamic Law: Dhimmis and Others in the Empire of Law, p.98, note 3. Oxford University Press, ISBN
978-0199661633. Quote: Some studies question the
nearly synonymous use of the terms kharaj and jizya in the
historical sources. The general view suggests that while
the terms kharaj and jizya seem to have been used interchangeably in early historical sources, what they referred
to in any given case depended on the linguistic context. If
one nds references to a kharaj on their heads, the reference was to a poll tax, despite the use of the term kharaj,
which later became the term of art for land tax. Likewise,
if one ns the phrase jizya on their land, this referred
to a land tax, despite the use of jizya which later come
to refer to the poll tax. Early history therefore shows that
although each term did not have a determinate technical
meaning at rst, the concepts of poll tax and land tax existed early in Islamic history. Denner, Conversion and the
Poll Tax, 310; Ajiaz Hassan Qureshi, The Terms Kharaj
and Jizya and Their Implication, Journal of the Punjab
University Historical Society 12 (1961): 2738; Hossein
Modarressi Rabatab'i, Kharaj in Islamic Law (London:
Anchor Press Ltd, 1983).
[71] Cahen (1991, p. 560)
[72] Cahen (1991, p. 560); Hoyland (2014, p. 99)
[73] Cahen (1991, p. 560); Hoyland (2014, p. 199)
[78] Tramontana, Felicita (2013). The Poll Tax and the Decline of the Christian Presence in the Palestinian Countryside in the 17th Century. Journal of the Economic and
Social History of the Orient (Brill Academic Publishers) 56
(4-5): 631652. doi:10.1163/15685209-12341337. Retrieved 2016-02-03. The (cor)relation between the payment of the poll-tax and conversion to Islam, has long
been the subject of scholarly debate. At the beginning
of the twentieth century scholars suggested that after the
Muslim conquest the local populations converted en masse
to evade the payment of the poll tax. This assumption has
been challenged by subsequent research. Indeed Dennetts
study clearly showed that the payment of the poll tax was
not a sucient reason to convert after the Muslim conquest and that other factorssuch as the wish to retain
social statushad greater inuence. According to Inalcik
the wish to evade payment of the jizya was an important
incentive for conversion to Islam in the Balkans, but Anton Minkov has recently argued that taxation was only one
of a number of motivations.
[79] Dennett 1950, p. 10. Wellhausen makes the assumption
that the poll tax amounted to so little that exemption from
it did not constitute sucient economic motive for conversion.
10
REFERENCES
& Robinson Ltd. p. 59. ... but this jizyah was too moderate to constitute a burden, seeing that it released them
from the compulsory military service that was incumbent
on their Muslim fellow-subjects. Conversion to Islam was
certainly attended by a certain pecuniary advantage, but
his former religion could have had but little hold on a convert who abandoned it merely to gain exemption from the
jizyah; and now, instead of jizyah, the convert had to pay
the legal alms, zakt, annually levied on most kinds of
movable and immovable property. (online)
Lapidus, Ira M. (2014). A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521-51430-9.
5.2
Sources
Vaglieri, Laura Veccia (1977). The Patriarchal and Umayyad caliphates. In Holt, P. M.;
Lambton, Ann K. S.; Lewis, Bernard. The Cambridge History of Islam Volume 1A: The Central Islamic Lands from Pre-Islamic Times to the
First World War. Cambridge University Press.
doi:10.1017/CHOL9780521219464.005.
ISBN
9780521219464.
11
6.1
Text
6.2
Images
12
6.3
Content license