Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science

Volume 9, Number 3, 2011 Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.

DOI: 10.1089/bsp.2011.0023

Modernizing Confidence-Building Measures

for the Biological Weapons Convention
Gregory D. Koblentz and Marie Isabelle Chevrier

The Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention in December 2011 provides an opportunity to
modernize the treaty to better address the challenges of the 21st century. The key to this modernization is to redesign the
treatys Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), the only formal mechanism for increasing transparency and demonstrating compliance with the treaty, to address changes in the global scientific, health, and security environments since the
end of the Cold War. The scope of the CBMs should be expanded beyond state-run biological warfare programs to
encompass a broader array of threats to global security, such as biological terrorism, laboratory accidents, dual-use
research, and disease pandemics. Modernizing the CBM mechanism to take into account these new risks would extend
the transparency-enhancing benefits of CBMs to a range of new and important topics, such as biosafety, laboratory
biosecurity, and dual-use research oversight; make the CBMs and the treaty itself more relevant to the concerns and
priorities of more states; and build on progress made during the recent series of intersessional meetings. To accomplish
this, the CBMs need to be revised to shift their focus from hardware, the dual-use capabilities relevant to the treaty, to
software, the political and legal institutions that govern the development and use of these capabilities. A more modern
CBM mechanism should encourage greater participation in the confidence-building process, improve international
cooperation against the full spectrum of biological risks, and promote the goal of universal membership in the treaty.

ew action is required to strengthen the Biological

Weapons Convention (BWC) in the face of growing
concerns about the possible misuse of biology and the inability of member states to agree on a legally binding protocol to the treaty. The BWC was written during the Cold
War, when the primary biological threat to international
security was perceived to be biological weapons developed
by states. Today, in addition to government-sponsored
biological weapons programs, states face a broader array of
biological risks, including biological terrorism, laboratory
accidents, the misuse of dual-use research, and naturally
occurring infectious diseases.1 The failure of the BWC to

keep pace with changes in the global scientific, health, and

security environments since the end of the Cold War is
reflected in the struggle to boost the number of states that
have joined the treaty. The BWC has the lowest participation rate of the 4 multilateral disarmament or nonproliferation treaties governing nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons.2
The treatys next review conference, scheduled for
December 2011, holds the potential for bringing the
BWC into the 21st century by strengthening the role of
the treaty in promoting international cooperation to
combat the full spectrum of biological risks. The treatys

Gregory D. Koblentz, PhD, is an Assistant Professor and Deputy Director of the Biodefense Program, Department of Public and
International Affairs, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia. Marie Isabelle Chevrier, PhD, is a Professor of Public Policy &
Administration, Rutgers University, Camden, New Jersey.
1

MODERNIZING CBMs FOR THE BWC

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) are the only formal,

politically binding mechanism for increasing transparency
and demonstrating compliance with the treaty. These CBMs
focus on state-based biological threats. The profound changes
in geopolitics, science, and public health since the end of the
Cold War are not reflected in the scope and content of the
CBMs. Modernizing the CBM mechanism to take into account these new risks would increase transparency in key areas, make the CBMs and the treaty itself more relevant to the
concerns and priorities of more states, and build on progress
made during the recent series of intersessional meetings. A
more modern CBM mechanism should encourage greater
participation in the confidence-building process, improve
international cooperation against the full spectrum of biological risks, and promote the goal of universal membership in
the treaty. Modernizing the CBMs is both practical and
necessary to address todays most pressing biological threats.
The United States is poised to exercise leadership in
strengthening the treaty and has indicated an interest in
improving the CBMs. In its 2009 National Strategy to
Counter Biological Threats, the Obama Administration
pledged to revitalize the BWC by promoting confidence in
the implementation of the treaty and compliance by its
members, promoting universal membership in the treaty,
advancing a substantive agenda that emphasizes topics with
the potential to enhance global health security, engaging
with allies and like-minded members of the treaty, and
encouraging stronger partnerships between the security and
public health communities.3 Modernizing the CBM
mechanism along the lines proposed in this article would
contribute to achieving all of these goals.

Current Confidence-Building Measures

The BWC was opened for signature in 1972 and entered
into force in 1975. It was the first international treaty to
outlaw an entire class of weapons. The BWC, however,
does not contain any measures to verify compliance, such as
legally binding declarations of biological capacity or on-site
inspections of facilities. Efforts to strengthen the treaty have
made incremental progress through the adoption of CBMs
intended to improve the transparency of civilian and defensive biological activities. In the absence of verification
measures, state parties developed these CBMs to enhance
their confidence that other parties to the treaty were in
compliance and to reassure others of their own compliance.
The CBMs, adopted at the 1986 and 1991 Review Conferences, consist of 7 measures, A to G:

CBM C: Encouragement of publication of results and

promotion of use of knowledge
CBM D: Active promotion of contacts
CBM E: Declaration of legislation, regulations, and
other measures
CBM F: Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or
defensive biological research and development programs
CBM G: Declaration of vaccine production facilities
Since the CBM mechanism was instituted, however, the
majority of states have participated inconsistently or not at
all, and the quality of the submitted information has been
uneven.4 Outreach and assistance provided by the Implementation Support Unit (ISU), established following
the 2006 Review Conference to help administer the BWC,
has contributed to an increased level of participation in the
CBM mechanism. While 2010 witnessed the highest-ever
participation in the CBM process, with 70 states submitting declarations, this still amounted to only 43% of state
parties.5
It is unclear why more states do not participate in the
CBM process. One theory is that states do not participate
because they do not regularly track the information asked
for and have other priorities for the resources that would be
needed to gather the information. Another theory is that
some states do not see any benefit either from providing the
information or receiving it from other states. A third theory
is that the CBMs were a popular concept during the Cold
War and important to the large states in the Eastern and
Western blocs, but they were not relevant to nonaligned
states. Finally, some states may decline to participate because they have something to hide and providing the information requested by the CBMs could lead to the
exposure of secrets. The lackluster participation in the
CBMs is likely due to a combination of reasons and not
necessarily the same reasons for all states. Nevertheless, the
factors that the international legal scholars Abram and
Antonia Chayes observe about international agreements in
generalthe principal source of noncompliance is not
willful disobedience, but the lack of capability or clarity or
prioritylikely influence noncompliance with the CBM
obligation.6(p22)

Rethinking the Purpose of the CBMs

CBM A Part 1: Exchange of data on research centers and

laboratories
CBM A Part 2: Exchange of information on national
biological defense research and development programs
CBM B: Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins

Despite the dramatic changes in geopolitics, public health,

and the life sciences that have taken place since the end of
the Cold War, the BWCs CBMs have not been updated
since 1991. Between 1995 and 2001, the BWC state
parties conducted negotiations on a legally binding protocol to strengthen compliance and improve implementation of the treaty. In 2001, the U.S. announced that it
would not support the draft protocol, destroying any
chance for a consensus agreement. The Obama Administration has reaffirmed the decision of the preceding

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science

KOBLENTZ AND CHEVRIER

administration and declared that it is not interested in

returning to protocol negotiations.3 It is now critical that
the CBMs evolve in 2 ways to better support the overriding objective of the BWC: to exclude completely the
possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins
being used as weapons.
First, the CBMs need to provide greater insight into
how biological capabilities are used and regulated, not
just whether they are present within states. The current
CBMs require states to provide information on maximum biocontainment (biosafety level 4, or BSL-4)
laboratories, human vaccine production facilities, and
biodefense research and development (R&D) programs.
The current CBMs remain useful for increasing the
transparency of capabilities relevant to the BWC, but
they do not illuminate the intent that motivates the development and use of these capabilities. Due to the dualuse dilemma that characterizes biotechnology, the material, facilities, and knowledge used for peaceful purposes
such as pharmaceutical production and biodefense programs can also be used for hostile purposes, such as
biological weapons development and bioterrorism. Intent,
therefore, becomes vital to understanding whether a
countrys activities are legitimate or illicit and whether
they are being conducted in a safe and secure manner. In
order to gain better insight into the intent underlying these
types of capabilities, the CBMs should broaden their focus
from hardware to software. Software refers to the political
and legal institutions that govern the development and use
of this technology and the administrative capacity of states
to exercise this oversight function. While the current CBMs
address national legislation to implement the BWC, they do
not explicitly cover the laws, regulations, institutions, policies, and enforcement mechanisms relevant to laboratory
biosafety, laboratory biosecurity, oversight of dual-use research and biodefense programs, or commitments under
other relevant international agreements, such as the World
Health Organizations 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) or United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1540.
Exchanging information about the laws, regulations,
institutions, policies, and enforcement mechanisms that
govern biological capabilities would provide another means
of increasing transparency, demonstrating compliance, and
reassuring others about a states intentions. Describing intentions, and the administrative capacity of states to follow
through on their intentions, would not remove all uncertainty, but it would give other states a firmer basis upon
which to make judgments. Equally important, it would
provide states with a greater appreciation for the extent to
which capability or clarity or priority is responsible for
states failures to develop and implement measures to address laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, dual-use research
and biodefense oversight, and disease surveillance capacity.
Understanding the domestic sources of this behavior is
necessary to organize international assistance to overVolume 9, Number 3, 2011

come these obstacles to more effective participation and

implementation.
Second, the CBMs need to address a broader array of
challenges in addition to state-run bioweapons programs.
Since the end of the Cold War, 4 trendsadvances in
science and technology, the emergence of new diseases,
globalization, and the changing nature of conflicthave
converged to increase the risks posed by natural disease
outbreaks and the accidental, inadvertent, or deliberate
misuse of biotechnology by non-state actors.1 Since 2003,
the annual meetings of the BWC have engaged a diverse
group of governments, nongovernmental organizations,
private firms, and international organizations on a wide
array of topics such as disease surveillance, laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, and oversight of dual-use research.
Revising the CBMs to address the full spectrum of biological risks would build on these valuable discussions and
provide a means of institutionalizing the information
sharing that occurred during these meetings. According to a
2007 survey conducted in 47 countries, people in different
states place quite different priorities on public health
compared to other issues such as terrorism, crime, illegal
drugs, and pollution. Not surprisingly, people in states
outside the Middle East and Western Europe view HIV and
other infectious diseases as a more serious problem than
terrorism.7 The Obama Administrations 2009 National
Strategy to Counter Biological Threats recognizes that the
plurality of perspectives in the international community as
to the severity of the risk and mitigative actions that nations
should take presents a challenge to risk management.3(p19)
By providing a forum for the discussion of the full spectrum
of biological threats, the BWC would become more relevant to the concerns and priorities of more states. This
could potentially increase the number of states who find it
useful to participate in the CBM process and facilitate efforts to increase membership in the treaty.
It would also be beneficial if the revised CBMs could be
structured to provide states with an opportunity to acknowledge and be recognized for steps they are taking for
public health or biosecurity reasons, such as improving
disease surveillance, enhancing dual-use research oversight,
and the like. Compliance in the broader context of global
health security requires actions outside of the traditional
scope of the BWC. Standards for laboratory biosafety,
laboratory biosecurity, and public health emergency preparedness are set by other international organizations.
Nonetheless, these standards, and the extent to which states
are in compliance with them, have a direct bearing on the
ability of states to reduce the risks posed by the spectrum of
biological threats.
Revising the CBMs will be a lengthy and complex process. The revisions proposed here are not exhaustive or
definitive. The goal of this article is to provoke debate on
this important topic by providing a vision for modernizing
the CBMs into a mechanism better suited for reducing the
biological risks facing the world today.
3

MODERNIZING CBMs FOR THE BWC

The CBMs remain a useful tool for increasing transparency

and providing states with a means of demonstrating their
compliance and assuring others of their benign intentions.
Individual CBMs need to be revised, however, to maximize
their utility for achieving these objectives.
CBM A Part 1 regarding the exchange of data on
maximum biocontainment laboratories should be expanded to include the provision of information on the
biosafety and laboratory biosecurity laws, regulations, policies, and institutions governing these facilities. Emerging
infectious disease, fear of bioterrorism, and the economic
opportunities presented by the biotechnology revolution
have triggered a construction boom in high-security biocontainment labs. There are at least 24 BSL-4 laboratories
currently in operation around the world with another
dozen under construction in the U.S. and Europe.8,9 A
major biosafety concern is that a laboratory accident could
reintroduce a contagious disease that has already been
eradicated or otherwise contained. The last known cases of
smallpox and SARS were caused by laboratory exposures,
and both viruses were able to spread from infected researchers to individuals outside of the laboratory.10 The
proliferation of such facilities also raises concern about the
security of the pathogens and toxins stored there. There
are international, voluntary guidelines for laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, but no mechanism exists for states
to demonstrate that they are implementing such measures
or to exchange information on best practices in these
fields.
This revised CBM would complement similar efforts
under way via UNSCR 1540 to strengthen national controls over nuclear, biological, and chemical materials that
could be misused by non-state actors. Notably, far fewer
states have measures in place to control the spread of
pathogens than nuclear material or chemical agents. This
disparity is likely due to the existence of more robust international legal and institutional frameworks governing
nuclear and chemical weapons.11 A review of national
declarations provided pursuant to UNSCR 1540 found
that these documents provided little understanding of a
states capacity to administer and implement national legislation designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons.12 This revised CBM
would strengthen the international legal framework governing biological materials that could be used for hostile
purposes and provide another venue for states to demonstrate that they have adopted the appropriate legislative and
administrative measures to manage the risks posed by biological research on their territory.
CBM A Part 2 regarding the exchange of information on
national biological defense R&D programs should be expanded to include the sharing of information on the laws,
regulations, policies, and procedures in place to ensure that
these programs are in compliance with the BWC. The

number of countries with declared biodefense programs has

increased dramatically, from 13 in 1993 to 25 in 2007.13
The growth of biodefense R&D programs has placed new
pressure on the prohibitions contained in Article I, which
prohibits the development and production of biological
weapons. There is a growing recognition that state parties
engaged in biodefense R&D activities must take active steps
to ensure their own compliance with the convention and to
effectively reassure others of their compliance. A number of
state parties to the BWC have already established mechanisms for reviewing the compliance of their biodefense
R&D programs with the treaty.14 Sharing information
about best practices on vetting biodefense programs to
ensure their compliance with the BWC could lead states
without sufficient oversight on biodefense to initiate such
measures.
CBM B regarding the exchange of information on unusual outbreaks of disease and similar occurrences caused
by toxins has been largely overtaken by recent developments in the global health arena. Several global health
surveillance systems monitor official and unofficial sources
of information for reports of disease outbreaks.15 In addition, the 2005 IHR requires states to report to WHO all
public health emergencies of international concern, including those that are unusual or unexpected.16 A more
useful role for the BWC would be to provide a forum for
states to provide updates on their progress in implementing
the commitments undertaken under the IHR to develop
core competencies to detect, assess, notify, report, and respond to public health risks. As it now stands, CBM Bs
contribution to transparency and global health is marginal.17 It would be more useful, and certainly more timely, to
know how other states participate in the existing disease
surveillance and reporting systems.
Some states have opposed WHO taking a stronger role in
global health security out of concern that the organizations
core mission of public health will be compromised.18 These
states may also object to the inclusion of IHR in the BWCs
CBMs as an unwarranted intrusion of international security
concerns into the realm of global health. These same states,
however, tend to be the strongest proponents of stronger
implementation of Article X of the BWC, which encourages international cooperation on the peaceful use of the life
sciences and biotechnology. This revised CBM could also
include information on the types of assistance states have
provided, or could provide, to assist other states in implementing the IHR. Such capacity-building assistance
would clearly fall under Article X. By providing a means for
states seeking assistance and states able to provide assistance
to identify one another, this CBM could contribute
simultaneously to improved implementation of the IHR
and Article X.
This revised CBM would not usurp WHOs role as the
lead international organization on global health or interfere
in its efforts to implement the IHR. Rather, it would reinforce the importance of IHR for improving global health

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science

Revising the CBMs

KOBLENTZ AND CHEVRIER

and enable states to earn extra credit for the security

benefits of their investments in public health. Since IHR is
now the fulcrum for improving the capabilities of public
health systems around the world to prepare for the full
range of natural and man-made disasters, it is relevant to
acknowledge the security benefits of these activities. This
revised CBM would reinforce the reality that the best defense against a biological attack is a strong public health
system.19 Enhancing disease surveillance systems is crucial
because early detection of disease outbreaks is the key to
mitigating their consequencesregardless of whether the
outbreak is intentional, accidental, or natural. The United
Nations Secretary-Generals High-Level Panel described an
improved global disease surveillance and response capability as triply imperativeas a means of fighting new
emerging infectious disease, defending against the threat of
biological terrorism and building effective, responsible
States.20(p29) This revised CBM should not impose an
undue burden on state parties since they are already required to supply similar information to WHO. Providing
this information via the BWC would foster the objective of
improved collaboration between the health and security
communities and help educate policymakers in the security
realm about the benefits of strengthening public health
systems. By providing another means of acquiring assistance to fulfill IHR commitments, this revised CBM would
provide an incentive for states to become parties to the
BWC if they have not already done so.
CBM C regarding publications relevant to the BWC
should be revised to focus on national laws, regulations,
policies, and institutions relating to dual-use research, including oversight, education, awareness raising, codes of
conduct for researchers, research proposal review, and prepublication review. CBM C is archaic in the era of the Internet when scientific articles are available on a global basis
and in a more timely manner. A number of states, international organizations, and private entities are engaged in a
wide range of activities to prevent the misuse of the life sciences.21 A more useful role for a revised CBM is to serve as a
forum for states to report on these activities and as a platform
for stakeholders to share lessons learned and best practices.
Some of these topics already fall under CBM Form E,
which allows states to report if they have implemented domestic legislation criminalizing violations of the BWC and
promulgated laws on the import and export of dangerous
pathogens and toxins to fulfill their obligations not to assist
other states in developing biological weapons. CBM Form E
has 2 major weaknesses. First, it does not encompass dualuse research or biodefense program oversight, disease
surveillance, or public health emergency preparedness activities. Second, the declarations submitted under CBM
Form E provide only cursory information on relevant laws
and regulations, with little or no information regarding
implementation or the administrative capacity of the responsible agency or agencies. The revisions described above
for CBM A Part 1 and CBM C would provide clearer
Volume 9, Number 3, 2011

guidance to states about the types of activities and implementation measures that are viewed as relevant to the treaty.

Implementation
Beyond the trust-building value of CBMs, deepening the
reporting requirements to include information on how
states are implementing their international commitments is
a key step for devising strategies and policies to improve
such implementation. The importance of having robust
administrative capacity at the national level to follow
through on commitments made at the international level
has long been recognized.22 For managerial regimes that
lack enforcement capabilities (as does the BWC), scholars
studying international environmental treaties have found
that treaties with a system for implementation review can
improve implementation. A system for implementation
review is an institution through which the parties share
information, compare activities, review performance, handle noncompliance, and adjust commitments.23(p3) This
type of system is similar to the accountability framework
proposed by Canada that would provide a mechanism for
state parties to review each others activities to implement
the provisions of the BWC.24,25 The objective of this type
of arrangement is not solely to point out gaps and shortcomings, but to highlight areas that need improvement and
provide guidance or resources to improve implementation.
Establishing an effective accountability framework or
system for implementation review for the BWC will require
a strengthened Implementation Support Unit with the
capacity and authority to take a more active role in the
CBM process. Although the ISU has already made valuable
contributions to the implementation of the treaty, the unit
has a limited mandate, a primarily administrative role, and
only a 3-person staff. Introducing new reporting requirements will create a greater demand from state parties for
substantive support in preparing their declarations. While
individual countries and regional organizations can play a
role in providing such support, the ISU is the logical candidate to shoulder more of that burden. The ISU can also
assist state parties with transforming the data in these revised declarations into useful information. For example, the
ISU could host workshops where states compare their
declarations for specific CBMs to exchange best practices
on laboratory biosecurity or dual-use research oversight or
identify areas of potential collaboration. Finally, the ISU
will need the resources to take advantage of new opportunities to improve global biosecurity by coordinating technical and expert assistance to states that desire to improve
their administrative and regulatory capacity for governing
life sciences, biotechnology, and biodefense activities. The
International Atomic Energy Agency organizes teams of
nuclear experts to assess Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
member states national regulatory infrastructure for nuclear safety and security and provide suggestions for
5

MODERNIZING CBMs FOR THE BWC

enhancing its effectiveness.26 The ISU could play a similar

role in the context of building capacity to implement the
CBMs or related international commitments such as
UNSCR 1540. At present there is no international organization designated by the 1540 Committee to provide
assistance to states in implementing the biological weaponrelated provisions of UNSCR 1540.27
The ISU would not be empowered to verify compliance
with the CBMs; instead, it would be responsible for assisting states in developing their capability to comply. The
ISU would play the role of a collaborative capacity
builder to ensure the sharing and synthesis of knowledge
and best practices among state parties.28

Conclusion
The 2011 Review Conference offers a golden opportunity
to update the BWC regime to take into account global
developments in security, science, and public health. States,
academics, and nongovernmental organizations are developing proposals to update the treatys CBMs.29 Simply
making the existing CBMs more user-friendly will not be
sufficient to boost participation in the CBM process or
contribute to the universalization of the treaty. Instead,
revising the CBMs to address the current concerns and
priorities of state parties will strengthen the treaty and enhance international cooperation against all biological risks.
This proposal to modernize the CBMs and strengthen
the ISU would address 3 of the 4 potential reasons why
states dont participate in the current CBM process. Revising the CBMs to address issues of immediate concern to
state parties, such as disease surveillance and laboratory
biosafety and biosecurity, should elevate the priority that
states accord to the CBMs. Empowering the ISU to provide
substantive assistance to states in complying with the CBMs
would reduce the costs of doing so and enable states to gain
a clearer picture of what is expected of them. Modernizing
the CBMs is essential to changing the calculations of states
regarding the costs and benefits of contributing to the information exchanges at the heart of the CBM process.
The CBMs are a politically binding obligation of state
parties. Nevertheless, unless they become more relevant to
the political, scientific, and security changes that have occurred since their inception, they risk becoming a relic of
the Cold War. The state parties to the BWC have the
responsibility to ensure that the CBMs once again become
meaningful and live up to their billing as measures that
build confidence in states compliance with the prohibitions contained in the treaty.

Notes and References

1. Koblentz GD. Biosecurity reconsidered: calibrating biological threats and responses. Int Secur 2010;34(4):96-132.
6

2. As of June 2011, the BWC had 177 members (164 ratifications

and 13 signatories); the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) had 190 members; the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) had 190 members (188 ratifications and 2 signatories);
and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) had 182
members (154 ratifications and 28 signatories).
3. National Security Council. National Strategy for Countering
Biological Threats. Washington, DC: The White House;
2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/National_
Strategy_for_Countering_BioThreats.pdf Accessed July 13,
2011.
4. Chevrier MI, Hunger I. Confidence building measures for
the BTWC: performance and potential. Nonproliferation
Review 2000;7(3):24-42.
5. Implementation Support Unit. 2010 Report of the Implementation Support Unit, BWC/MSP/2010/2. November
23, 2010.
6. Chayes A, Chayes AH. The New Sovereignty: Compliance
with International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 1995.
7. Kaiser Family Foundation and Pew Global Attitudes Project.
A Global Look at Public Perceptions of Health Problems,
Priorities, and Donors: The Kaiser/Pew Global Health Survey.
Menlo Park, CA: Kaiser Family Foundation; 2007. The
survey did not include U.S. participants.
8. Gronvall GK, Bouri N. Biosafety laboratories. Biosecur
Bioterror 2008;6(4):299-308.
9. Butler D. European biosafety labs set to grow. Nature 2009
Nov 12;462:146-147.
10. Heymann DL, Aylward RB, Wolff C. Dangerous pathogens
in the laboratory. Lancet 2004 May 15;363:1566-1568.
11. United Nations Security Council. Letter dated 8 July 2008
from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) addressed to
the President of the Security Council. S/2008/493. New
York: United Nations; 2008:40-58.
12. Andemicael B, Bosch O, Cerini AM, et al. Comprehensive
Review on the Status of Implementation of Resolution 1540
(2004): Specific Element (a) Assess the Impact of Resolution
1540, Including Through Measures Taken After the Adoption
of Resolution 1540. New York: United Nations; 2009.
13. Lentzos F. Preparing the Ground for the CBM Content Debate: A Study on the Information Exchange That Builds Confidence between States Parties to the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BTWC). London: BIOS Centre, London School of Economics; 2008.
14. Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation; Center for
International and Security Studies at Maryland; Center for
Science, Technology and Security Policy at the American
Association for the Advancement of Science; and the Center
for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at National
Defense University. Ensuring Compliance with the Biological
Weapon Convention: Meeting Report. Washington, DC:
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation; July 2009.
15. Hitchcock P, Chamberlain A, Van Wagoner M, Inglesby
TV, OToole T. Challenges to global surveillance and response to infectious disease outbreaks of international importance. Biosecur Bioterror 2007;5(3):206-227.
16. Baker MG, Fidler DP. Global public health surveillance
under new international health regulations. Emerg Infect Dis
2006;12(7):1058-1065.
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science

KOBLENTZ AND CHEVRIER

17. Zmorzynska A. Neither Here Nor There: Disease Outbreak
Data in the Confidence Building Measures under the Biological
Weapons Convention and in Open Sources. Occasional Paper
No. 4. Hamburg, Germany: Research Group for Biological
Arms Control; 2007.
18. Aldis W. Health security as a public health concept: a critical
analysis. Health Policy Plan 2008;23(6):369-375.
19. Katz R. Public health preparedness: the best defense against
biological weapons. Wash Q 2002;25:69-82.
20. United Nations Secretary-Generals High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change. A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility. New York: United Nations; 2004.
21. Rappert B, ed. Education and Ethics in the Life Sciences.
Canberra: Australia National University Press; 2010.
22. Chayes A, Chayes AH. On compliance. International Organization 1993;47(2):193-195.
23. Victor DG, Raustiala K, Skolnikoff EB. Introduction and
overview. In: Victor DG, Raustiala K, Skolnikoff EB, eds.
The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice. Cambridge:
MIT Press; 1998.
24. Canada. Towards the Sixth BTWC Review Conference: An
Accountability Framework. BWC/CONF. VI/PC/INF.1.
Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations; 2006.
25. Sims NA. Midpoint between review conferences: next steps
to strengthen the BWC. Disarmament Diplomacy 2009;91.
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd91/91bwc.htm. Accessed
July 13, 2011.

Volume 9, Number 3, 2011

26. International Atomic Energy Agency. Integrated Regulatory

Review Service (IRRS). http://www-ns.iaea.org/reviews/rsreviews.asp. Updated December 13, 2010. Accessed July 13,
2011.
27. 1540 Committee. Relevant Assistance Provided by International Organizations and Other Arrangements. Undated. http://
www.un.org/sc/1540/relevantassistance.shtml. Accessed July
13, 2011.
28. Weber EP, Khademian AM. Wicked problems, knowledge
challenges, and collaborative capacity builders in network
settings. Public Adm Rev 2008;68(2):334-349.
29. One of the authors, Marie I. Chevrier, participated in meetings
organized by the Geneva Forum and the Foreign Ministry of
Germany to examine and make recommendations on CBMs.
Their report is not yet final, but a number of their recommendations are likely to overlap with those in this article.
Manuscript received May 9, 2011;
accepted for publication July 10, 2011.
Address correspondence to:
Gregory D. Koblentz, PhD
George Mason University
Public and International Affairs
4400 University Drive, MS3F4
Fairfax, VA 22030
E-mail: gkoblentz@gmail.com