Critical Theory Today: A Polemic

R. G. Tepper

It is well known that, in the Anglo-American academy, analytical philosophy predominates.

Correspondingly, philosophical thought of any other pedigree is of diminished stature. Indeed, the very
term used as a catch-all for non-analytical philosophy indicates a virtual expatriation of other forms of
philosophical reflection. The term 'Continental', in referring to the european continent, relegates socially,
culturally, psychologically and politically oriented philosophical reflection dictates that this mode of
reflection, from the perspective of the entrenched academy, is foreign in nature. In accepting and adopting
this descriptor, we are to a degree complicit in our alienation. To my knowledge, the reasons for this
alienation are not well-understood, and have not been subject to intense scrutiny. Thus, we ask threefold
question:

(1) Why the hegemony of apolitical philosophy, supposedly pure philososphy, which in its 'disintrestedness'
and 'purity,' bears no urgency. Nuclear war could break out; the world could become embroiled in endless
turmoil; this would not have the slightest effect upon philosophers or the philosophy of 'disinterested',
'pure' and 'logical' thought. Furthermore, and equally unsettling is the question of (2) why this hegemony
has not been subject to serious examination and why it is seen as equitable to partition the domain of
philosophy into 'analytical' and 'continental.' This leads further toward our final question: (3) Is ‘pure’
philosophy, indeed, possible at all, and if not, why is ‘purity’ an aim of philosophy?

The answer to these questions is in actuality one and the same. My use here of the singular is perhaps a bit
misleading. I should rather say that the answers to each of these questions have all the same root. This is to
say, more specifically, that the dominance of apolitical, purely ‘theoretical’ philosophy derives from socio-
political praxis. This question of the theory-praxis relation is central to what is known as critical theory; it
is the centerpiece to the thought of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Louis Althusser, as well as Gilles
Deleuze and Michel Foucault, thinkers whose affinity to the Frankfurt school has been frequently noted.
Furthermore, and quite intriguingly, the selfsame question has been posed by philosophers of the political
right as well, such as Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger. I will draw upon the theory of both opposing
schools in this essay and outline a number of theses regarding this relationship and its significance for
philosophy. Then I will examine the peculiar status of the Anglo-American aversion to socio-politically
informed philosophy and a forteriori, critical theory.

Thesis I: THE NATURE OF THE THEORY-PRAXIS RELATIONSHIP PROHIBITS ABSOLUTE

PURITY OF PHILOSOPHY. Philosophy may attempt to rid itself of socio-political referents, however, insofar as
thought itself is ‘pure’ its genesis and reception are socially and politically conditioned.(Max Horkheimer, The Social
Function of Philosophy, Eclipse of Reason) Moreover, Deleuze, in conversation with Foucault, points out that
the theory-praxis relationship is complex and localized, and forms a network of theory-praxis relationships
in place of a totalized relation, and as such is subject not only to a single social-political referent, but to an
entire network of them. This is what Foucault calls micro-politics, innumerable focal points of power
relationships govern not only social and political relationships, but all cultural and philosophical products
that emerge in that locale.

Thesis II: PURITY OF PHILOSOPHY IS A RUSE. The philosopher who claims absolute purity of thought without
first acknowledging the specific socio-political conditions that may have affected the work, but have been filtered out, and who
claims absolute disinterest has something to gain from that claim. Carl Schmitt, a non-Marxist thinker if there ever
was one, cites Hegel in defining the bourgeois, a definition equally well fitted to the ostensibly apolitical
thinker: “The bourgeois is an individual who does not want to leave the apolitical riskless private sphere.
He rests in the possession of his private property, and under the justification of his possessive
individualism he acts as an individual against the totality… Consequently he wants to be spared bravery
and exempted from the danger of a violent death.”(Carl Schmitt – The Concept of the Political, pp 62-63) The
allegedly pure philosopher is the bourgeois of thought. The philosopher risks nothing, and as such, gains
little if anything aside from security. The ‘pure’ philosopher is one for whom the putative risks of socio-
political criticism outweigh the possible gains or even merely the benefits of debate.

Thesis III: CORROLARY TO THE CONCLUSIONS OF THESIS II, THE ALLEGEDLY PURE
PHILOSOPHY ARISES IN SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATIONS IN WHICH GENUINE CHANGE
BEARS GREAT RISKS OR IS SEEN AS IMPOSSIBLE. This, perhaps helps to explain why critical theory and
socio-politically informed philosophy is predominantly present in continental Europe, especially Germany and France. In both
France and Germany, the political system is eminently mutable; in the past two-hundred-odd years France
has had five republican constitutions in addition to monarchial governments. In the same period, Germany
has been unified, territorially reduced, divided, re-unified and has had innumerable governments prior to
unification and since unification, a monarchial state, two republican constitutions and a dictatorship. This is
in stark contrast to the great monotonous continuity of government in the United Kingdom and the
United States. At no point were the fundamental governing principles dramatically altered in the same
period. Juridical thought in the United States turns upon fidelity to a document written over two-hundred
years ago, and as such, juridical thought is merely interpretation. Even during civil war, governmental
procedure was preserved under modification. This constitution, furthermore has only been amended with
great infrequency, with the most recent politically significant change occurring nearly a century ago with
the modification of the electoral process for Senators. Likewise, in the United Kingdom, juridical thought
consists of an accumulation of laws and acts, without ever a radical change in form-of-governance. These
observations are obviously limited by the nature of this essay, but I believe that these are critical
observations.

Furthermore, the ostensible enfranchisement of oppositional groups and a political system composed of
two large parties inhibits socio-politically informed philosophical reflection because views that do not
conform to the party-line stand no chance of being enacted, whereas the ideal of an open system in which
anyone may form a political party diverts energies that could form a cogent critique, into the formation of
political organizations whose attempts at action will be immediately rebuffed.

Thesis IV: DISINTERESTED THOUGHT IS NOT DEVOID OF INTEREST. IT HAS AS ITS

INTEREST THE PRESERVATION OF THE STATUS QUO. Once again a corollary to Thesis II, the
ostensibly disinterested thinker has an interest in not perturbing the establishment because he is provided
for and allowed to work in peace. ‘Pure’ philosophy is impossible in times of turmoil. However, the ‘pure’
philosopher writing on ‘impure’ topics will disclaim said writing as ‘non-philosophical.’

Thesis V: THE PARTITION OF PHILOSOPHY INTO TWO BROAD FIELDS SERVES THIS
INTEREST BY STIFLING ARGUMENT OVER WHAT CONSTITUTES PHILOSOPHY. In essence,
there are two fields claiming the name of philosophy, in many institutions constituting separate
departments, between whom communication is difficult, if not impossible. ‘Continental’ philosophers
often end up in departments of Political Science, English, Comparative Literature, Humanities, etc. Would
it not be more fruitful for the development of philosophy if debate were more intense and this division
abolished?

As noted in the title to this essay, this is intended more to stimulate argument than to settle it. In fact, were
this to be the final word on this issue, we should be sorely disappointed. I should hope simply that this
provokes thought and demonstrates that ‘pure’ and ‘disinterested’ thought is of
 (E)utopian Divinity: A Manifesto

There is little difference between agnosticism and the deist conception to which I can assent. If we
consider consciousness to be an epiphenomenon of the complexity neural electrical activity and structures
such as consciousness as founded on complexity, we may consider any system of sufficent complexity as
having a structure corresponding to human consciousness. Levels of consciousness can then be seen as the
result of complexity crossing successive thresholds. Thus, the often reported phenomenon of cities or
countries having 'characters' or 'personalities' might not be merely be metaphorical. Thus by definition, the
universe, as the most complex and ordered (contrary to the opinion of the cosmos as chaos, the universe
as a totality would be the most ordered of things because as totality it would constitute both laws and
exceptions in a law-governed manner) would have a consciousness correlate to which we can attach the
name 'god,' 'dieu,' 'deus.' I prefer the latter. However, despite the increased complexity's possibility of new
forms of consciousness, the evolution of consciousness in animals has shown that no matter the increase
in consciousness, consciousness has no direct means of affecting its constituent parts (neurons, neuronal
connections). This would be an impotent, impersonal deus, a deus born with the universe and brought to
self-consciousness through its experience of the nullity preceding its birth and the growing nothingness
within of entropy. Its own presence-absence immanent within it, deus grows more conscious and
omniscient (omniscience admits of degrees) in the phase of universal growth. However, this is no creator
deus; deus is bound by the laws of physics in the same manner as the laws of physics dictate the behavior
of the brain on the neural level. The second law of thermodynamics indicates that while the full presence
of deus is immanent in the birth of the universe, deus' progressive decline and death is also immanent.
After the first eschaton of the greatest complexity and order of the universe, the universe begins to decay
into chaos and heat death - whether or not time turns out linear or cyclical - the second eschaton, the death
of deus is indicated by a negative crossing of the same thresholds of complexity and consciousness. Deus
slowly becomes limited, insensate, falls asleep and enters into an eternal coma and dies without he universe.
At that point time comes to an end or else the universe is reborn and deus with it.

Deus or god cannot be an empty signifier. This is why I cannot be content with mere agnosticism. Despite
the fact that deus is indemonstrable, it is ultimately a moot point and becomes a mere narrative choice and
an act of signification in the affirmation of its possibility. In affirming agnostic deism I affirm the
possibility of deus and produce a signified to the signifier deus or god. At the same time, human possibility
is affirmed at the same time, as we would be the neurons of deus.

Deus also comes to stand for utopia if we assume that we have not reached the pleroma of the universe's
aphelion of complexity and consciousness. In producing great social complexity we contribute to this
impersonal, implanetary, immanent pleroma. We are also bound to the metastability of society -
equilibrium, not stasis - progress and the leap into the future achieved through the militant optimism of
human possibility and action. Without us, the full presence of utopia can not come to pass!

Thus we may reclaim and resignify deus or god in the wake of his death as the christian god. We reclaim
and resignify in the name of a utopian future. A utopia that may one day, through our action, become not a
utopia but a eutopia. Utopia is only u-topos in the present, it may be our very topos in the future if we but
imagine it.
 Toward a General Economy of Pleasures

Let us take as a starting point the position of Georges Bataille, the position of an ontology of
becoming and energy. This is to say that the universe, both physical and human is comprised of energy,
which importantly cannot remain in stasis, even for a moment. Following Nietzsche, being is but a vapor
and an empty fiction. Therefore, to understand human activity, it must be viewed as a series of energy
flows and accumulations. A person is an accumulation of energy that takes in energy and lets out energy in
all activities. Further, we borrow from Bataille the notion that we, as subjects or objects are always in a state
of excess. The energy output generally exceeds energy intake. This can be excepted with the caveat, that
complying with the laws of thermodynamics, for this to be possible, order must generally decrease. With
an appropriate ontology established, we may proceed to the issue at hand. What is really at stake in legal
and religious interdictions on certain behaviors and activities, notably sex and drugs. Michel Foucault has
dealt with this issue from another perspective, but, in his conclusions I agree that these interdictions arise
from the fact that when engaged in these prohibited activities, one is not a ‘productive member of society.’
This is to say, ones expenditures, in this case, of energy to not further the aims of legitimate society. I wish
not to contradict Foucault’s conclusion, but radicalize it and explicitly show why there is a hierarchy of
prohibitions, and why, in contemporary society illicit substances and deviant sexual activities compose the
most violently prohibited acts.
Every activity is a channel of energy. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari consider it (somewhat)
metaphorically as machines hooked into other machines. However, I will avoid the machinic description to
emphasize the excessive and (for figures of authority) terribly free aspects of the flux of energy. Eating is
an intake of energy, movement and the pursuit of sustenance or pleasure constitute expenditures of
energy. Licit actions, generally speaking, are actions that aim at the conservation of energy and the
promotion of order. Whether working to obtain food, eating the food, or maintaining ones house or
building new structures, these licit acts have in common the intake of energy or the expenditure of energy
to produce order. Frowned upon activities, in general, are those which merely expend energy or do not
promote order. We must recall that in certain varieties of Christianity, Calvinism as a perfect exemplar, all
leisure activity is discouraged. Sexuality should be aimed only at procreation (a net gain of energy and
order) and at no other aim. Life should be austere and never in excess of needs. I assert that this is merely
the extreme example of this principle. This is an essential rule of civilization: entropy and excess are
threats to the common weal and must be prohibited and stamped out.
In recent times these interdictions have lessened in strength, and in certain cases become almost
extinct. The sexual prohibition, while ostensibly still in effect in an attenuated form weakens over time. Sex
for pleasure is now acceptable. However, as Foucault notes in Discipline and Punish, “as soon as the
economic levy on sexual pleasure is carried out more efficiently by the sale of contraceptives, or obliquely
through publications, films or shows, the archaic hierarchy of prostitution loses much of its former
usefulness.”(D&P 306) Sexual activity becomes useful to the social order as an economic resource and thus
becomes incorporated into legitimate society. However, deviant sex, sex that does not employ economically
useful prophylactic; these become even more strongly prohibited than sex itself was originally prohibited.
To frame the issue in the ontology sketched out initially, an accepted, tolerated expenditure of energy must
contribute some of that energy to society itself. Money, as the crystallized form of the exchange value of
things, is but another form of energy flow. No wonder sales taxes are ubiquitous, acquisition of objects is
an expenditure of energy, society must take its tithe.
Thus we are in a position to see why drugs and prostitution are two of the most profoundly
prohibited activities. Drug use and sexual activity are pleasures that are solely dissipative – they expend
energy that is never recouped. Furthermore, the black market of drugs and prostitution exact an economic
levy on these activities that is not contributed to the social body. This is to say, they are doubly prohibited because
the expenditure of energy is both dissipated and contributed to an other social body. The legitimate society
is the beneficiary of neither. Thus, these acts, under the guise of being ‘harmful to society’ are doubly
prohibited because they deny society its ‘due’. The harm, however, is merely a privation, despite the
panicked arguments otherwise by social conservatives. Ideology is the dogmatic law of energy exchange.
Were it not for ideology, society, no doubt would have already harnessed these illicit acts for more energy
resources, and possibly extend its apparatus to every level of the social fabric.
 28:06:42:12: to nun kairo
or: the time that is left to the teenage Messiah
an interpretation of Donnie Darko

Rowan G. Tepper, M.A.

Instructions for Use

To be read shaken, not stirred.

More to the matter at hand, these are a few guidelines that should be kept in mind while reading this essay.
First, as a matter of critical principle, I regard this film, like all films, works of art and texts, as a text
divorced from its author. While there may be an intended meaning, the task for interpretation is not to
discover this meaning. Just ask the author if you’re concerned with authorial intent. Second, the categories
used herein are drawn from all areas of the philosophical tradition, however, I am drawing most
significantly upon Benjamin, Agamben, Nietzsche and Heidegger. I will attempt to thematize my
interpretation in terms of these thinkers, however, undoubtedly many possible connections that I do not
address.

Comments and discussion are welcomed.

Finitude and Concealment: The Dialectic of Authenticity and Inauthenticity

Shortly after the opening of Donnie Darko, we see a brief shot of a sign for the Halloween Carnival. This
seemingly innocuous and inconsequential sign sets the social/ cultural framework in which the film takes
place. Halloween carnivals were the inventions of people concerned with the moral implications of
celebrating Halloween, an originally pagan holiday. Halloween carnivals were invented to shunt celebration
of the holiday into a controlled form that most importantly detracted from the amount of celebration on
Halloween itself. This is suggestive of the nature of the inauthentic, “they”-pole of the dialectic of
Authenticity in the film. This is to say that the thrown, fallen world in which the film is set is a society
greatly concerned with propriety and morality, a society exemplified in the false messianic figure Jim
Cunningham.1 To this extreme figure of inauthenticity is opposed the character of Donnie Darko, one to
whom authentic experience in the Heideggerian sense is most proper and inescapable. Indeed, one could
argue that Donnie’s entire experience in the course of the film is dominated by the mood that Heidegger
describes as Angst, a dread without specific object, which is, however, revelatory of Being, or of the truth
of being. In a similar manner, I propose, the characters of Frank and Roberta Sparrow are opposed, being
instead opposing aspects of “god”, the finite, negative and destructive as opposed to the infinite, positive

1 One should note the initials, J.C., a symbol that, nigh universal in western literature, is seldom used unintentionally or
with other intent than connoting a messianic figure. In this aspect then, the symbol is here used ironically.
and redemptive. Thus, in the film we have a dialectic of authenticity and inauthenticity, concealment and
un-concealment. However, if the world is largely inauthentic and this inauthenticity constitutes itself as a
concealment, what is concealed in the inauthenticity of the they? Precisely that which is revealed to
Donnie, i.e. human and cosmic finitude, revealed through Frank, the figure of human and divine finitude.
This finitude is revealed as the radical solitude of being unto death, the fact that “everyone dies alone”.
This solitude is radically opposed to the “being-with” of the inauthentic. Authentic being-unto-death tears
us from the company of the they and throws us into an intimate relation with oneself and with ones own
finitude “If the sky were to suddenly open up, there would only be you and your thoughts, your memories
and the choices you’ve made, there would be no law, just you…” This is precisely that which “everyone”
conceals from themselves in everyday existence, this is what the false positivity of the false messiah wishes
to cover over. He urges us to eradicate and overcome fear, while fear is a necessary ontic modification of
the ontological angst which colours our existence in the experience of being unto death. The false messiah
essentially urges us to render ourselves forever incapable of authenticity. Thus Donnie is rendered forever
incapable of inauthenticity by his constant proximity to the experience of radical finitude; and in following
Frank’s instructions, he works to shatter the calm complacency of the inauthentic world.

Cosmic Finitude/Messianic Time

As insinuated by this essay’s title, the time proclaimed to Donnie by Frank that indicates the time of the
end of the world should be seen not as a chronological interval, but as the time in which it takes the world
to come to an end. This end should not, however, be seen in the customary apocalyptic sense. This end
should be seen in light of Walter Benajmin’s Theses on the Philosophy of History, in which Benjamin describes
the redeemed world as not another world, but this world only with a slight alteration. I assert that this
slight alteration between worlds in the Benjaminian sense is the life of Donnie Darko himself. The death
of Donnie Darko is to the outside world but an instant, but to him, it takes four weeks and six hours.
These durations correspond despite their disparate durations, for according to Giorgio Agamben,
messianic time is characterized as a contracted time, time no longer in the regular chronological mode. 2 As
such, we can construe the entire duration of the film’s events one “now”, and as one moment, in the sense
of the term Augenblick in Nietzsche and Heidegger as opposed to Moment.3
In this “messianic interval”, Donnie is in dialectical opposition to the everyday world and Jim
2 Giorgio Agamben, “The Time that is Left” in Epoche Volume 7, Issue 1 (Fall 2002), 1-14.
This is suggested in the film by the increasing frequency of screens indicating the date and the amount of time left of the
“messianic interval”.
3 Thus the significance of the affirmations of existence expressed by Donnie and Gretchen. If the duration is considered
to be the Augenblick of the Eternal Recurrence or the Augenblick of authentic time, then these affirmations acquire an
entirely new stratum of significance, and this interpretation is furthered by Donnie’s speech about “Destruction as a form
of creation,” with it’s Niezschean-Dionysian overtones.
Cunningham. He must negate them because of his own experience of radical finitude and thus his
authenticity; he cannot slip back into being with others anymore than he ever was with others.
Furthermore, Frank, the specter of finitude and the negativity of the cosmos, prevents any slippage back
on his part. His actions indeed attempt to draw the world into an authentic experience, however, this
always is halted, there’s always a blockage, a stopping-short.
This blockage and stopping short is exemplified by the repetition of a car nearly hitting Roberta
Sparrow, the interference of Frank in the discovery of Donnie’s activities, etc. Thus, on both sides of the
dialectic of Authenticity a blockage occurs, and it is Donnie’s task to remove this blockage. The removal of
this blockage can be seen as the messianic event and the difference between the two aions. This is suggested
by the final moving tableau of people awake in bed, seemingly startled, upset or in tears. That which is
intimated there is that in the moment corresponding to the entire prior duration of the film, each character
has an experience of authentic being toward death, notably even the false messiah, to whom it seems to
have the most impact. Thus, in the end, the messianic event is accomplished and the dialectical standstill
ended. Thus, the world has ended, and yet it continues.
The Tombs and Sepulchers of God

Just as Jim Cunningham and Donnie Darko are opposed, so are Frank and Roberta Sparrow. The finite,
negative and destructive aspect of the cosmos/”god” as opposed to the infinite, positive and redemptive
aspect. One should note at the outset that the only words spoken by the latter are consonant with the
actions and message of the former, “Every living creature on this earth dies alone”. Thus, the truth and
significance of the radical solitude of being unto death is doubly affirmed. It is significant to note the
history of Roberta Sparrow, once a nun, then a philosopher and scientist, and now author of a book that
offers Donnie “truth”; blind, alone and nearly mute, the figure of god, paralyzed after his own death
evoked by Jean-Luc Nancy in his essay “Dei Paralysis Progressiva.” 4 This brings us back once again to the
Nietzschean themes, this time, however, to the theme of the death of God. Importantly, the death of God
is either prerequisite for or concomitant to the experience of the Eternal Recurrence. 5 Furthermore, with
this incarnated deus absconditas, we may see the radical urgency of Donnie/Frank’s message that one must
face ones death in radical solitude, because the infinite, transcendent answer is forever shut off to us. Thus
we can see Donnie’s mission almost a false sacrifice, because in the end, in going to Roberta Sparrow’s
basement, he finds the final impetus toward his end in what can be called in consonance with Nietzsche,
the “tomb and sepulcher of god.” And with this, the blockage is removed by the swerving car not stopping

4 In Jean-Luc Nancy The Birth to Presence,

5 One should note that there is no indication that either moment, the one in which Donnie lives the end of his world for 28
days or the singular moment, are ontologically or otherwise prior to one other. Thus there is no reason to believe that the
events of the film are singular and non-repeatable in the sense of Eternal Recurrence – this is to say, that if one were to
recur, both would.
short, but this time missing the paralyzed figure of “god” and causing the death of an innocent; the first
sacrifice, which is immediately followed by the second, that of Frank, and then the third, that of Donnie
and his world.6 Thus through these sacrifices, Donnie enacts Benjamin’s messianic redemption through a
Nietzschean cruelty. And with this, the first world comes to an end and the dialectical blockage removed
for the world.

6 Compare to Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil #55