Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
The first is that the deposition-taking will take place in "a foreign
jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of its 'oneChina policy.'" This is inconsequential. What matters is that
the deposition is taken before a Philippine official acting
by authority of the Philippine Department of Foreign
Affairs and in virtue of a commission duly issued by the
Philippine Court in which the action is pending, and in
accordance, moreover, with the provisions of the
Philippine Rules of Court pursuant to which opportunity
for cross-examination of the deponent will be fully
accorded to the adverse party.
Dasmarias also contends that the "taking of deposition is a
mode of pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action
comes to trial." Not so. Depositions may be taken at any
time after the institution of any action, whenever
necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits
deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before
it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after
pre-trial. Indeed, the law authorizes the taking of depositions of
witnesses before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment
of a Regional Trial Court "to perpetuate their testimony for use in
the event of further proceedings in the said court" (Rule 134,
Rules of Court), and even during the process of execution of a
final and executory judgment (East Asiatic Co. v. C.I.R., 40 SCRA
521, 544).
Dasmarias further claims that the taking of deposition under
the circumstances is a "departure from the accepted and usual
judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where
the demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" that it is
"inherently unfair" to allow APL, "a foreign entity suing in the
Philippines, to present its evidence by mere deposition of its
witnesses away from the 'penetrating scrutiny' of the trial Judge
while petitioner is obligated to bring and present its witnesses in
open court subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of
the Judge."
Of course the deposition-taking in the case at bar is a
"departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of
examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could
be observed by the trial judge;" but the procedure is not on that
account rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken,
inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the exceptions
where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of
deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and
testimony of the deponent in open court and without
being "subject to the prying eyes and probing questions
of the Judge." This is allowed provided the deposition is taken
in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Rules of
Court and the existence of any of the exceptions for its
admissibility e.g., "that the witness if out of the province and
at a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of
trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears
that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or . . . that the witness is unable to attend to testify
because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment, etc." (Sec.
4 Rule 24, supra, emphasis supplied) is first satisfactorily
established (See Lopez v. Maceren, 95 Phil. 754).
The Regional Trial Court saw fit to permit the taking of the
depositions of the witnesses in question only by written
interrogatories, removing the proponent's option to take them
by oral examination, i.e., by going to Taipei and actually
questioning the witnesses verbally with the questions and
answers and observations of the parties being recorded
stenographically. The imposition of such a limitation, and the
determination of the cause thereof, are to be sure within the
Court's discretion. The ostensible reason given by the Trial Court
for the condition that the deposition be taken "only upon
written interrogatories" is "so as to give defendant
(Dasmarias) the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by
serving cross-interrogatories." The statement implies that
opportunity to cross-examine will not be accorded the defendant
if the depositions were to be taken upon oral examination,
which, of course, is not true. For even if the depositions were to
After several motions for change of venue of the depositiontaking, Concepcions deposition was finally taken on March 9,
2001 at her residence
On certiorari, the CA reversed the RTC holding that there was a
defect in the respondents petition by not impleading the People
of the Philippines, an indispensable party. This notwithstanding,
the appellate court resolved the matter on its merit, declaring
that the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present
case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The
latter provision, said the appellate court, only applies to civil
cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119,
Concepcions deposition should have been taken before the
judge or the court where the case is pending, which is the RTC of
Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus,
in issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly committed grave
abuse of discretion.
ISSUES: WON Rule 23 on depositions in civil actions may apply
in the present criminal action?
HELD: No. It is basic that all witnesses shall give their
testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the
judge. This is especially true in criminal cases in order
that (1) the accused may be afforded the opportunity to
cross-examine
the
witnesses
pursuant
to
his
constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to
face. (2) It also gives the parties and their counsel the
chance to propound such questions as they deem
material and necessary to support their position or to
test the credibility of said witnesses. (3) Lastly, this rule
enables the judge to observe the witnesses demeanor.
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23
to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different
modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to
an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate
the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In
criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on
December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both
the defense and prosecution witnesses.
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a
prosecution witness, who, according to the petitioners, was too
sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of
Rule 119 thus comes into play.
Petitioners contend that Concepcions advanced age and health
condition exempt her from the application of Section 15, Rule
119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the
application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The contention does not persuade.
The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt
Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at once the
ground which places her squarely within the coverage of
the same provision. Rule 119 specifically states that a witness
may be conditionally examined:
1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or
2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite
date of returning.
Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken,
had she not been too sick at that time, her motion would have
been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the
trial court, she would have been compelled to appear before the
court for examination during the trial proper.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the
case at bar. It is thus required that the conditional examination
be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also
necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend
the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after
said persons are all residents of the United States and may not
therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify since the court
had no jurisdiction over them.
HELD: No. The Court has ruled in a previous case that the scope
of immunity offered by the PCGG may vary. It has discretion to
grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending on the
situation of the witness and his relative importance to the
prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in
this case, to conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient to
induce cooperation.
her shorts and panty. He then removed his pants, went on top of
her and inserted his penis into her vagina. Appellant removed
his penis after he ejaculated and told her not to report what had
happened. Appellant forced her and she was not able to resist
because she was still young during that time. She reported the
incident to her mother and the police.
Final Note
June 5, 2013
In the case at bar, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found AAA to be a credible witness and her testimony worthy of
full faith and credit. After a careful review of the records of this
case, we find no reason to deviate from the findings of the lower
courts.
10
Under the old rape law which is applicable in this case, the
death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
under certain enumerated circumstances which would designate
the crime as qualified rape. One such particular circumstance is
when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The minority of
the victim and her relationship to the accused were duly proven
by her birth certificate. However, due to the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 9346, otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the trial
court correctly imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as successorin-interest of ASIAN BANK CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HON.
EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON. FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR.
and HON. RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA (in their capacities as
Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Second Division of
SANDIGANBAYAN) and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 169677 | February 18, 2013 (1D)
Facts:
11
12
RULES 33 38:
[G.R. No. 143370. ]
MARIO J. MENDEZONA and TERESITA M. MENDEZONA,
LUIS J. MENDEZONA and MARICAR L. MENDEZONA and
TERESITA ADAD VDA. DE MENDEZONA, petitioners, vs.
JULIO H. OZAMIZ, ROBERTO J. MONTALVAN, JOSE MA.
OZAMIZ, CARMEN H. OZAMIZ, PAZ O. MONTALVAN, MA.
TERESA O.F. ZARRAGA, CARLOS O. FORTICH, JOSE LUIS O.
ROS, PAULITA O. RODRIGUEZ, and LOURDES O. LON,
respondents.
13
Held: No. A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly
discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is
concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (a) the evidence
had been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have
been discovered and produced during trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is
material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or
impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would
probably alter the result. All three (3) requisites must
characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at the new
trial.
The requirement of reasonable diligence has not been met by
the petitioners. As early as the pre-trial of the case at bar, the
name of Judge Durias has already cropped up as a possible
witness for the defendants, herein respondents. That the
respondents chose not to present him is not an indicia per se of
suppression of evidence, since a party in a civil case is free to
choose who to present as his witness. Neither can Judge Durias
testimony in another case be considered as newly discovered
evidence since the facts to be testified to by Judge Durias which
were existing before and during the trial, could have been
presented by the petitioners at the trial below. The testimony of
The RTC ruled that the alleged sale between Meer and Bunquin
was fraudulent. However, petitioners Sps. Mesina were adjudged
buyers in good faith and hence, entitled to the possession of the
property.
Meer filed an Appeal with the RTC which court reversed the
ruling of the MeTC. The CA affirmed on appeal.
14
COURT:
COURT:
ATTY. MIRAVITE:
Your honor, we respectfully ask for a resetting, for
leave of court to file demurrer to evidence
(underscoring supplied).
COURT:
On what ground?
ATTY. MIRAVITE:
On the ground that the prosecution failed to elicit the
fact where the checks were issued and where they
were actually dishonored. This is material, your
honor, for purposes of determining jurisdiction. Also,
your honor, as we mentioned in our comments to the
evidence presented by the prosecution, there has
been no valid notice of dishonor of the subject checks
upon the accused. So, upon those grounds, we
believe that the prosecution has not duly made out a
case against the accused, and we feel those are
sufficient for the dismissal of the case as against the
accused.
COURT:
So as to avoid reviewing the records, would you admit
that there is no proof where the checks were issued
and where they were dishonored?
PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:
No, we would not admit that, your honor. They were
dishonored actually in Manila, but the check was
deposited in the bank of PAR CREDIT ENTERPRISES in
Quezon City, and it was naturally forwarded to PNB
where the same was returned to the bank of PAR
CREDIT ENTERPRISES here in Quezon City.
COURT:
15
PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:
Yes, your honor. First, is the oral testimony of the
witness, that it has not been paid; second, exhibits 1
and 1-1, which is the Complaint Affidavit of the
witness.
COURT:
Alright, in view of the objections, and in view of the
manifestations of the private prosecutor, the defense
grounds for demurrer, the same not being well taken
is hereby DENIED (underscoring supplied). You will
now present your evidence.
ATTY. MIRAVITE:
If your honor please, may we just ask for a
reconsideration (underscoring supplied)?
COURT:
If you will waive your right to present your evidence,
the Court will give you a period to file a demurrer to
evidence. And, if you dont present your evidence
now, you will be considered to have waived your right
to present evidence (underscoring supplied).
xxxx
ATTY. MIRAVITE:
If your honor please, we would like to reiterate our
motion to file a demurrer to evidence (underscoring
supplied)?
COURT:
But you have already orally made that demurrer
which has been denied (underscoring supplied).
ATTY. MIRAVITE:
In which case your honor, if there is no leave of court,
we will be filing our demurrer to evidence, your honor
(underscoring supplied).
COURT:
That is tantamount to postpone (sic) this case. The
Court considers that motion dilatory (underscoring
supplied).
ATTY. MIRAVITE:
Your honor, I think within the option of the parties to
take remedies and at this point, we did prepare for
our purposes, that instead of presenting the accused
or presenting our witnesses, we would just prefer to
move for a demurrer to evidence (underscoring
supplied).
COURT:
You may include that in your motion for
reconsideration. Alright, the prosecution having
rested, and the defense having been considered to
have waived his right to present his evidence, this
case is deemed submitted for decision. Set the
promulgation of this case to June 6, 1994 at 8:30 o
clock in the morning.
16
17
Facts:
18
Issue: Whether or not the YEES timely filed their petition for
relief
Held: No
19
be
supplemented
by
additional
rules
promulgated by this Court through resolutions
or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of
Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals allows the remedy of petition
for relief in the Court of Appeals.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
20
21
22
against him. She explained that appellant did not actually rape
her, as there was no penetration. She added that she charged
appellant with such crimes only upon the prodding of her
mother and maternal grandmother.
of
Acts
of
23
the
act
of
sexual
intercourse
24
The attempt that the RPC punishes is that which has a logical
connection to a particular, concrete offense; and that which is
the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of
the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and
consummation. In the instant case, the primary question that
comes to the fore is whether or not appellants act of removing
AAAs pants constituted an overt act of Rape.
HELD: No. AAA testified that on November 24, 2000, while AAA
and her brothers were sleeping inside their parents bedroom,
appellant entered and asked AAA to have sex with him. When
AAA refused, appellant forcibly removed her clothes and boxed
her right buttock. As she still resisted, he took a bolo, which he
poked at her. Appellant desisted from committing further acts
because of the timely arrival of AAAs grandmother. With these,
appellant was charged with Other Light Threats in Criminal Case
No. 1650; Attempted Rape in Criminal Case No. 1651; Unjust
Vexation in Criminal Case No. 1652; and Maltreatment in
Criminal Case No. 1653.
Neither can we hold appellant liable for Other Light Threats for
threatening AAA with a bolo; for Unjust Vexation for undressing
her without her consent, causing disturbance, torment, distress,
and vexation; nor for Maltreatment for boxing the right side of
AAAs buttocks. Although all of the above acts were alleged in
the Information for Attempted Rape in the Order dated
September 24, 2004, Criminal Case Nos. 1650, 1652 and 1653
involving the above crimes were dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence based on the demurrer to evidence filed by appellant.
25
Later, PBCom filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money
against Go and his wife, Elvy T. Go (Spouses Go), alleging that
Spouses Go defaulted on the two (2) promissory notes, having
paid only three (3) installments on interest paymentscovering
the months of September, November and December 1999.
Consequently, the entire balance of the obligations of Go
became immediately due and demandable. PBCom made
repeated demands upon Spouses Go for the payment of said
obligations, but the couple imposed conditions on the payment,
such as the lifting of garnishment effected by the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) on Gos accounts.
Spouses Go filed their Answer with Counterclaim denying the
material allegations in the complaint and stating, among other
matters, that:
8. The promissory note referred to in the complaint
expressly state that the loan obligation is payable within the
period of ten (10) years. Thus, from the execution date of
September 30, 1999, its due date falls on September 30,
2009 (and not 2001 as erroneously stated in the complaint).
Thus, prior to September 30, 2009, the loan obligations
cannot be deemed due and demandable.
9. Contrary to the plaintiffs proferrence, defendant Jose C.
Go had made substantial payments in terms of his monthly
payments. There is, therefore, a need to do some
accounting works (sic) to reconcile the records of both
parties.
10. While demand is a necessary requirement to consider
the defendant to be in delay/default, such has not been
complied with by the plaintiff since the former is not aware
of any demand made to him by the latter for the settlement
of the whole obligation.
11. Undeniably, at the time the pledge of the shares of
stock were executed, their total value is more than the
amount of the loan or at the very least, equal to it. Thus,
plaintiff was fully secured insofar as its exposure is
concerned.
12. And even assuming without conceding, that the present
value of said shares x x x went down, it cannot be
considered as something permanent since the prices of
stocks in the market either increases (sic) or decreases (sic)
depending on the market forces. Thus, it is highly
speculative for the plaintiff to consider said shares to have
suffered tremendous decrease in its value. More so, it is
unfair for the plaintiff to renounce or abandon the pledge
agreements.
On September 28, 2001, PBCom filed a verified motion for
summary judgment, which was opposed by the Spouses Go. The
RTC granted the motion and a decision was rendered for the
plaintiff.
On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court finding that the
supposed admission are insufficient to justify a rendition of
summary judgment in the case for sum of money, since there
were other allegations and defenses put up by Spouses Go in
their Answer which raised genuine issues on the material facts
in the action.
ISSUE: WON Summary Judgment was proper?
HELD: No. The Court agrees with the CA that "[t]he supposed
admission of defendants-appellants on the x x x allegations in
the complaint is clearly not sufficient to justify the rendition of
summary judgment in the case for sum of money, considering
that there are other allegations embodied and defenses raised
by the defendants-appellants in their answer which raise a
genuine issue as to the material facts in the action."
The CA correctly ruled that there exist genuine issues as to
three material facts, which have to be addressed during
trial: first, the fact of default; second, the amount of the
outstanding obligation, and third, the existence of prior
demand.
26
Answer
6.
Defendants
deny
the
allegations in paragraphs 8, 9,
10 and 11 of the Complaint;
xxx
8. The promissory notes
referred to in the complaint
expressly state that the loan
obligation is payable within
the period of ten (10) years.
Thus, from the execution date
of September 30, 1999, its
due date falls on September
3o, 2009 (and not 2001 as
erroneously stated in the
complaint). Thus, prior to
September 30, 2009, the loan
obligations cannot be deemed
due and demandable.
In conditional obligations, the
acquisition of rights, as well as
the extinguishment or loss of
those already acquired, shall
depend upon the happening of
the event which constitutes
27
Answer
10. While demand is a
necessary
requirement
to
consider the defendant to be
in delay/default, such has not
been complied with by the
plaintiff since the former is not
aware of any demand made to
Answer
9. Contrary to the plaintiffs
preference, defendant Jose C.
Go has made substantial
payments in terms of his
monthly payments. There is
therefore, a need to do some
accounting works just to
reconcile the records of both
parties.52
Clearly then, when taken within the context of the entirety of the
pleading, it becomes apparent that there was no implied
admission and that there were indeed genuine issues to be
addressed.
As to the attached March 3, 2000 letter, the Court is in
accord with the CA when it wrote:
The letter dated March 3, 2000 is insufficient to support the
material averments in PBComs complaint for being equivocal
and capable of different interpretations. The contents of the
letter do not address all the issues material to the banks claim
and thus do not conclusively establish the cause of action of
PBCom against the spouses Go. As regards the letter dated April
7, 2000, the trial court itself ruled that such letter addressed to
PBCom could not be considered against the defendantsappellants simply because it was not signed by defendantappellant Jose Go.
In this case, Spouses Go are not disclaiming knowledge of the
transaction or the execution of the promissory notes or the
pledge agreements sued upon. The matters in contention are, as
the CA stated, whether or not respondents were in default,
whether there was prior demand, and the amount of the
outstanding loan. These are the matters that the parties
disagree on and by which reason they set forth vastly different
allegations in their pleadings which each will have to prove by
presenting relevant and admissible evidence during trial.
Furthermore, in stark contrast to the cited cases where one of
the parties disclaimed knowledge of something so patently
within his knowledge, in this case, respondents Spouses Go
categorically stated in the Answer that there was no prior
demand, that they were not in default, and that the amount of
28
discussed
29
The trial court can determine a genuine issue on the basis of the
pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits or counter
affidavits submitted by the parties. When the facts as pleaded
appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or
genuine issue or question as to any fact and summary judgment
called for. On the other hand, where the facts pleaded by the
parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary
judgment cannot take the place of a trial. The evidence on
record must be viewed in light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion who must be given the benefit of all
favorable inferences as can reasonably be drawn from the
evidence.
A reading of the RTC Order dated January 16, 2001 readily shows
that the trial court did not take into account any of the
considerations or tests before summarily dismissing Civil Case
No. Br. 23-632-2000. The reasoning of the RTC that similar
cellular base stations are scattered in heavily populated areas
nationwide and are not declared nuisances is unacceptable. As
to whether or not this specific cellular base station of petitioner
is a nuisance to respondents is largely dependent on the
particular factual circumstances involved in the instant case,
which is exactly why a trial for threshing out disputed or
contested factual issues is indispensable. Evidently, it was the
RTC which engaged in speculations and unsubstantiated
conclusions.
30
31
32
33
Facts:
34
ERMELINDA
C.
MANALOTO,
AURORA
J.
CIFRA,
FLORDELIZA
J.
ARCILLA,
LOURDES
J.
CATALAN,
ETHELINDA J. HOLT, BIENVENIDO R. JONGCO, ARTEMIO R.
JONGCO, JR. and JOEL JONGCO, Petitioners, vs. ISMAEL
VELOSO III, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171365 | October 6, 2010 (1D)
Facts:
35
36
it by the
tradition.
immemorial
Facts:
Constitution
and
by
37
38
a new copy upon a claim that they lost their owners duplicate
copy. Armando and Adelia wrote Godofredo and Carmen
complaining about their acts, but the latter did not reply. Thus,
Armando and Adelia filed a complaint for specific performance.
Armando and Adelia amended their complaint to include the
following persons as additional defendants: the spouses Arnulfo
Savellano and Editha B. Savellano, Danton D. Matawaran, the
spouses Delfin F. Espiritu, Jr. and Estela S. Espiritu, and Elizabeth
Tuazon (Subsequent Buyers). The Subsequent Buyers, who are
also petitioners in this case, purchased from Godofredo and
Carmen the subdivided portions of the Subject Land. The
Register of Deeds of Bataan issued to the Subsequent Buyers
transfer certificates of title to the lots they purchased.
In their answer, Godofredo and Carmen and the Subsequent
Buyers (collectively petitioners) argued that the action is
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Petitioners pointed
out that there is no written instrument evidencing the alleged
contract of sale over the Subject Land in favor of Armando and
Adelia. Petitioners objected to whatever parole evidence
Armando and Adelia introduced or offered on the alleged sale
unless the same was in writing and subscribed by Godofredo.
Petitioners asserted that the Subsequent Buyers were buyers in
good faith and for value.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of Armando and
Adelia.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, however, it
affirmed the findings of the RTC. Hence, this Petition for Review
under Rule 45.
Issue: Whether the alleged sale of the Subject Land in favor of
Armando and Adelia is valid and enforceable.
Held: The petition is without merit.
In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, this Court
reviews only errors of law and not errors of facts. The
factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on
this Court. This applies with greater force when both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals are in complete agreement on
their factual findings.
In this case, there is no reason to deviate from the findings of
the lower courts. The facts relied upon by the trial and appellate
courts are borne out by the record. We agree with the
conclusions drawn by the lower courts from these facts.
The contract of sale between the spouses Godofredo and
Carmen and the spouses Armando and Adelia was a perfected
contract. A contract is perfected once there is consent of the
contracting parties on the object certain and on the cause of the
obligation [Article 1318, Civil Code]. In the instant case, the
object of the sale is the Subject Land, and the price certain is
P15,000.00. The trial and appellate courts found that there was
a meeting of the minds on the sale of the Subject Land and on
the purchase price of P15,000.00. This is a finding of fact that is
binding on this Court. We find no reason to disturb this finding
since it is supported by substantial evidence.
The contract of sale of the Subject Land has also been
consummated because the sellers and buyers have performed
39
being the secretary of the agency, had control over its business,
is not only non sequitur but has no evidentiary basis.
An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal
recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his
employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously
participated in illegal recruitment. Settled is the rule that the
existence of the corporate entity does not shield from
prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and
intentionally causes the corporation to commit a crime.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove appellants active participation in the illegal
recruitment activities of the agency.
While we strongly condemn the pervasive proliferation of illegal
job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people
anxious to obtain employment abroad, nevertheless, we find the
pieces of evidence insufficient to prove the guilt of appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. They do not pass the requisite moral
certainty, as they admit of the alternative inference that other
persons, not necessarily the appellant, may have perpetrated
the crime. Where the evidence admits of two interpretations,
one of which is consistent with guilt, and the other with
innocence, the accused must be acquitted. Indeed, it would be
better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the
crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he
did not commit.
[G.R. No. 127473. December 8, 2003]
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, JUDY AMOR, JANE GAMIL, minors GIAN CARLO
AMOR represented by ATTY. OWEN AMOR, and CARLO
BENITEZ
represented
by
JOSEPHINE
BENITEZ,
respondents.
Absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion or any palpable
error in its findings, this Court will not question the probative
weight accorded by the lower courts to the various evidence
presented by the parties.
Facts: Private respondents filed with the RTC-Sorsogon, a
complaint for damages against PAl due to the latters failure to
honor their confirmed tickets.
It was alleged that private respondent Judy Amor purchased 3
confirmed plane tickets for her and her infant son, Gian Carlo
Amor; her sister Jane Gamil for the May 8, 1988, 7:10 a.m. flight,
PR 178, bound for Manila.
On May 8, 1988, Judy with Gian, Jane and another minor Carlo
Benitez, nephew, arrived at the Legaspi Airport at 6:20 a.m.
Carlo Benitez was supposed to use the confirmed ticket of a
certain Dra. Emily Chua.
They were accompanied by Judys husband Atty. Owen Amor and
the latters cousin, Salvador Gonzales who fell in line at the
check-in counter with four persons ahead of him and three
persons behind him while plaintiff Judy went to the office of the
station manager to request that minor plaintiff Carlo Benitez be
allowed to use the ticket of Dra. Chua.
While waiting for his turn, Gonzales was asked by Lloyd Fojas,
PALs check-in clerk on duty and wrote: late check-in 7:05.
When Gonzales turn came, Fojas gave him the tickets of private
respondents Judy, Jane and Gian and told him to proceed to the
cashier to make arrangements.
Salvador then went to Atty. Amor and told him about the
situation. Atty. Amor pleaded with Fojas, pointing out that it is
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only 6:45 a.m., but the latter did not even look at him or utter
any word. Atty. Amor then tried to plead with Delfin Canonizado
and George Carranza, employees of petitioner, but still to no
avail. Private respondents were not able to board said flight and
the plane left at 7:30 a.m., 20 minutes behind the original
schedule.
Private respondents went to the bus terminals hoping to catch a
ride for Manila. Finding none, they went back to the airport and
tried to catch an afternoon flight. Unfortunately, the 2:30 p.m.
flight, PR 278, was cancelled due to aircraft situation. Private
respondents were told to wait for the 5:30 p.m. flight, PR 180.
They checked-in their bags and were told to hand in their
tickets. Later, a PAL employee at the check-in counter called out
the name of private respondent minor Carlo Benitez. Plaintiff
Judy approached the counter and was told by the PAL personnel
that they cannot be accommodated.
Manuel Baltazar, a former Acting Manager of petitioner in
Legaspi City in May 1988, testified that based on his
investigation, the private respondents, although confirmed
passengers, were not able to board in the morning of May 8,
1988 because there were go-show or waitlisted and non-revenue
passengers who were accommodated in said flight. He also
noted that there was overbooking for PR 178.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment upholding the evidence
presented by private respondents.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA but the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of the RTC. Hence, the present petition of
PAL.
Issue: WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE LATE CHECKEDIN PASSENGERS AND WHETHER THE FAILURE OF AN AIRLINE TO
ACCOMMODATE A PASSENGER WHO CHECKED IN LATE IS
ACTIONABLE SO AS TO ENTITLE THEM TO DAMAGES.
Held: In support of the issue, petitioner argues that while
ordinarily, the findings of the CA are accepted as conclusive,
there are instances when the SC may make its own findings
such as when the appellate court based its findings on
speculation, surmises or conjectures.
It is inevitable and most crucial that we first determine the
question whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC ruling
that private respondents were late in checking-in. Both issues
call for a review of the factual findings of the lower courts.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the general rule is that only questions of law may be
raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court. Factual
findings of the appellate court are generally binding on us
especially when in complete accord with the findings of the trial
court. This is because it is not our function to analyze or weigh
the evidence all over again.
However, this general rule admits of exceptions, to wit: (a)
where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the finding
is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (c) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when the judgment of the
Court of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts; (e)
when the factual findings are conflicting; (f) when the Court of
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