In re LAURETA

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.

WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPTPROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLAILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON.
INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATE COURT, ET AL
G.R. No. L-68635May 14, 1987
Facts:
Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of
the her case (aland dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre
claims that it was an unjust resolutiondeliberately and knowingly promulgated by
the 1
st
Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyondthe limits of legal and judicial
ethics.
Illustre also threatened in her letter that, there is nothing final in this world. This
case is far from fi
nished
by a long shot. She threatened that she would call for a press conference.Illustres
letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It
was established
that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and
counsel for theopponents.The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC
clarified that when the minute-resolution was issued,the presiding justice then was
not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and thatJustice
Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also made
clear thatJustice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case.Still, Illustre wrote
letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again
with more threats to exposethe kind of judicial performance readily constituting
travesty of justice.
True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan,
charging the Justiceswith knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice
Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also chargedof using their influence in the First
Division in rendering said Minute Resolution.Atty LAURETA was the counsel of
Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press, without anycopy furnished
the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were
chargedwith graft and corruption.The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint.Now, the
SC is charging them with contempt.They claim that the letters were private
communication, and that they did not intend to dishonor thecourt.
Issue
: WON privacy of communication was violated
Held

: The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the
entire court.
There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Courts authority and duty under
the premises is
We re not convinced that Atty Laureta had nothing to do with Ilustres letters, nor
with the complaint filedwith the tanodbayan. Atty Laureta repeated disparaging
remarks such as undue influence, powerful
influence in his pleadings. This was bolstered by the report that Laureta distributed
copies of the complaint to the newspaper companies in envelopes bearing his
name. He was also heard over the radio.
Lastly, as Illustres lawyer, he had control of the proceedi
ngs.SC resolutions are beyond investigation from other departments of the
government because of separationof powers. The correctness of the SC decisions
are conclusive upon other branches of government.

MONTESCLAROS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS1

EN BANC [G.R. No. 152295. July 9, 2002] CARPIO, J.
FACTS: Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections and Barangay elections were not held as scheduled as it
was operationally very difficult to hold both elections simultaneously in May 2002.
Subsequently, Congress enacted R.A. No. 9164, which provides that voters and candidates for
the SK elections must be at least 15 but less than 18 years of age on the day of the election.
Under the Local Government Code of 1991, membership in the SK is limited to youths at least
15 but not more than 21 years old. Petitioners, who are all 20 years old, filed the petition on
their own behalf and on behalf of other youths similarly situated, to prevent both the
postponement of the SK elections and the reduction of the age requirement for membership in
the SK.
ISSUE:

WON Congress can lower the prescribed maximum age requirement under the Local
Government Code of 1991 for membership in the SK to the disenfranchisement of about 7
million youths

RULING: Yes. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under
Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Under RA No. 9164, Congress merely
restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the
maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. The Court cannot
restrain Congress from amending or repealing laws, for the power to make laws includes the
power to change the laws.
RATIO:

Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership. One who is
no longer qualified because of an amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of
a proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can contest,

based on a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in
the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right protected by the Constitution
because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law.

Philippine Association of Colleges

and Universities vs Secretary of
Education
On December 4, 2011
Political Law Civic Efficiency
The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by
Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional,
because: A.) They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and
parents of liberty and property without due process of law; B.) They deprive parents
of their natural right and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and C.) Their
provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion
to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative
power. Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure a
permit from the Secretary of Education. Petitioners reason out, this section leaves
everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of Education or his
department. The Secretary of Education is given the power to fix the standard. In
plain language, the statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the exclusive
authority of the legislature to formulate standard . . . Also, the textbooks to be
used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the government shall be
submitted to the Board (Board of Textbooks) which shall have the power to prohibit
the use of any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to offend
the dignity and honor of the government and people of the Philippines, or which it
may find to be against the general policies of the government, or which it may
deem pedagogically unsuitable.
HELD: Petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or
interfered with their operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to assail
neither the validity of the power nor the exercise of the power by the Secretary of
Education. No justiciable controversy has been presented to us. We are not
informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the
petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger
of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.

Villarosa vs. HRET

G.R. No. 143351, September 14, 2000
FACTS:

Quintos contested the proclamation of Amelita Villarosa. Issue: whether JTV votes
should be counted in favor of Villarosa. JTV is the nickname of Villarosas husband,
who is the incumbent representative of Occidental Mindoro.
HELD:
Villarosas use of JTV as her nickname was a clever ploy to make a mockery of the
election process. HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
only issue for its determination was whether "JTV" votes or variations thereof should
be counted in favor of VILLAROSA and in ruling that such votes are stray votes.

PCGG vs Desierto
G.R. No. 140231
July 9, 2007
Facts:
On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No.
13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
(Committee) which was tasked to inventory all behest loans, determine the parties
involved and recommend whatever appropriate actions to be pursued thereby.
On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61
expanding the functions of the Committee to include the inventory and review of all
non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest.
The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a "behest loan,"
to wit: "a) it is undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is undercapitalized; c)
a direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of
marginal notes; d) the stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation
are identified as cronies; e) a deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose
intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-feasibility of the project for
which financing is being sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the loan
release was made."
Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group (TWG)
were the loan transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.
After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan
transactions, the Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as
behest because of NOCOSII's insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals.
Specifically, the Committee's investigation revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained
loans by way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII was able to
get 155% loan value from the offered collateral or an excess of 85% from the
required percentage limit; that the plant site offered as one of the collaterals was a

public land contrary to the General Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note
of then President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was allowed to use the
public land as plant site and to dispense with the mortgage requirement of PNB;
that NOCOSII's paid-up capital at the time of the approval of the guaranty was only
P2,500,000.00 or only about 6% of its obligation.
Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents.
Petitioner alleges that respondents violated the following provisions of Section 3 (e)
and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the Ombudsman,
prompting Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the
case based on the available evidence. In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in
OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo recommended the dismissal of the case on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against the
respondents and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved the
recommendation on May 21, 1999. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated July 9, 1999, which was
approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999.

Issue:
Whether respondents violated the following provisions of Sec 3 (e) and (g),
specifically corrupt practices of public official, of Republic Act No. 3019 or the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act?
Held:
On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
finding that no probable cause exists against respondents, it must be stressed that
the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with
the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily
interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of
powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts will not interfere in
its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman,
but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the
functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be
swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public

prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by

a private complainant.
While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in the prosecution
of cases, such as, (1) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when
there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) when the acts of the officer
are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid
law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7)
where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case of
persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie
case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied,
none apply here.
After examination of the records and the evidence presented by petitioner, the
Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Ombudsman.
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave abuse of
discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The herein assailed Orders being supported by substantial evidence, there is no
basis for the Court to exercise its supervisory powers over the ruling of the
Ombudsman. As long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsman's ruling,
that decision will not be overturned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Except as to prescription, the assailed
Resolution dated May 21, 1999 and Order dated July 23, 1999 of the Ombudsman in
OMB No. 0-95-0890 are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

RADIOWEALTH, INC. VS AGREGADO

(1950)
FACTS:
1. A Webster Teletalk and Webster Telephone Speaker were bought for Pho 585 and
installed in the second and third floor of the Malacanang Annex which houses the
Supreme Court.
2. The Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee (appointed by the President)
disapproved of the purchase and its installation invoking EO 302 which discontinues
open market purchases.

3. Petitioners also contend that Judicial functions do not include purchase of property.
4. Radiowealth, Inc. (vendor) is now requesting that the payment be approved however,
the Auditor of the SC refused to countersign the warrant for payment.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Judicial Dept can make purchases without the prior approval of
the Executive?
HELD: YES, they can.
RD:
Found in a ruling in Tarlac VS Gale
All three departments are co-equal and co-important, each is independent from
the other and cannot control or interfere with each other in the exercise of special
functions.
Judiciary has the power to maintain its existence and do whatever is necessary to
preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity and ensure effectiveness in the
administration of justice.
Officials of the government who owe duty to the court under the law cannot deprive
the courts of anything vital to their functions.
Officials and boards are duty-bound to construct or purchase offices or court rooms
and furnish them. They also have to insure that the character of these rooms
would permit the court to exercise its functions in a reasonably effective
manner.
In case of conflict to, the court shall overpower the officials as they will be
the ultimate judge in determining what is necessary for its efficiency.
Officials have the power to assign a particular room or court room to the Court of First
Instance and change the assignments provided that the new rooms are reasonable
adequate.
Courts have the power to refuse dispossession of the room if they deem that the new
room would be inadequate in the exercise of their duties.
If board refuses to furnish the articles mentioned by law, then the court would have
the power either to purchase things directly or by proper proceedings to
compel the officials to perform their duties to the law.
Executive does not have power over the purchase of books and other office
equipment needed for the convenient transaction of its business.
Court could not maintain its independence and dignity if it executive could
determine what the courts should have. They are of equal footing when it
comes to the requisition of for fixtures, equipment and supplies.

Bengzon v. Drilon
G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Facts:
On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and
the Lower Courts General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by
the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill

provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the
Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission.
Issue:
whether the President may veto certain provisions of the General Appropriatons Act
Held:
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a
constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides
limitations to its exercise. The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she is,
therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for
this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the item veto power to avoid inexpedient
riders from being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure. What was
done by the President was the vetoing of a provision and not an item.
Doctrine: Pocket Veto Power
Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto power,
i.e., disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to communicate his
veto of any bill represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof automatically causes
the bill to become a law.
This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto
messages long after he should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what new
laws are in force.
When is it allowed?
The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the
President power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The
veto in such case shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

VARGAS VS. RILLORAZA

security of tenure

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Sec 14 of the Peoples Court Act.
Section 14 provides: SEC. 14. Any Justice of the Supreme Court who held any office or position under the

They claim that:

Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic may not sit and vote in
any case brought to that Court under section thirteen hereof in which the accused is a person who held any
office or position under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic or any
branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof.
"If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds of disqualification of judges, in Rule
126, section I of the Rules of Court, or on account of illness, absence or temporary disability the requisite
number of Justices necessary to constitute a quorum or to render judgment in any case is not present, the
President may designate such number of Judges of First Instance,Judges-at-large of First Instance, or
Cadastral Judges, having none of the disqualifications set forth in said section one hereof, as may be
necessary to sit temporarily as Justices of said Court, in order to form a quorum or until a judgment in said
case is reached."

(a) It provides for qualifications of members of the Supreme Court, other than those provided in
section 6, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution.
"(b) It authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme Court who do not possess the
qualifications set forth in section 4, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution.
"(c) It removes from office the members of the Supreme Court by means of a procedure other
than impeachment, contrary to
Article IX, of the Philippine Constitution.
"(d) It deprives the' Commission on Appointments of Congress of its constitutional prerogative to
confirm or reject appointments to the Supreme Court.
"(e) It creates two Supreme Courts.
"(f) It impairs the rule making power of the Supreme Court, contrary to section 13, Article VIII,
of the Philippine Constitution.
"(g) it is a Bill of Attainder, for it punishes by disqualification members of the Supreme Court who
rendered said public service during the Japanese occupation.
"(h) it denies the equal protection of the laws
"(i) It is an ex post pacto legislation.
"(j) it amends the Constitution by a procedure not sanctioned by Article XV, of the Philippine
Constitution.
"(k) It destroys the independence of the Judiciary, and it permits the 'packing' of the Supreme
court in certain cases, either by Congress or by the President."

The Solgen countered that:

"1. Power of Congress to enact section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682.
"2. Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 does not and is not intended to provide an
additional qualification :for members of the Supreme Court, much less does it amend section 6,
Article VIII, of the Constitution of the Philippines.
"3. Qualifications of members of the Supreme Court prescribed in section 6, Article Vill of the
Constitution 'apply to permanent "appointees"--not to temporary 'designees.'
"4. Section 5, Article Vill of the Constitution is not applicable to temporary designations under
section 14, commonwealth Act No. 682.
"5. It does not remove but merely disqualifies the members of the Supreme Court affected to sit
and vote in the particular class of cases therein mentioned.
"6. It does not create an additional 'Special Supreme Court,'
"7. It does not impair the rule-making power of the - Supreme Court but merely supplements the
Rules of Court.
"8. It is not a bill of attainder.
"9. It is not an ex post pacto law.
"10. It does not deny equal protection of the laws either to the Justices of the Supreme Court
affected or to the treason indictees; concerned.
"11. It does not amend any constitutional provision.
"12. It does not destroy the independence of the judiciary or curtail the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court."

ISSUES:
1) Whether the Congress had power to add to the pre-existing ground for disqualification of
a Justice.
2) Whether a person may act as Justice of the SC who has not been duly appointed by the
President and not confirmed by the CA, even only as DESIGNEE
3) Whether the manner of designation by the President can constitutionally sit temporarily
as Justice of the SC.

SC:
NO. NO. NO.
1. NO. If section 14 were to be effective, such members of the Court who held any office or
position under the Philippine Executive Commission, would be disqualified from sitting and
voting in the instant case, because the accused herein is a person who likewise held an
office under the PEC. In other words, what the constitution ordained as a power and a duty
to be exercised and fulfilled by said members of the Court, the challenged law would
prohibit them from exercising and fulfilling. IN short, what the constitution directs, the
section 14 prohibits. This is a clear repugnancy to the fundamental law.
Whatever modification the legislature may propose must not contravene the provisions of
the constitution.
Thus, the disqualification added by Sec 14 to those already existing at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution is arbitrary, irrational and violative of the constitution.
2. NO. No person not so appointed by the President WITH the consent of the CA, may act as
Justice of the SC. The designation made by Section 14 does not comply with the
requirement of appointment. An additional disqualifying circumstance of the designee is
the lack of confirmation or consent by the CA. So, it may happen that a designee under
Sec 14 sitting as a substitute Justice of the SC, and participating therein in the deliberations
and functions of the SC, does not possess the qualifications of regular members of the SC.
NO temporary composition of the SC is authorized by the Constitution. The phrase unless
otherwise provided for by law does NOT authorize any legislation that would alter the
composition of the SC, no matter how brief a time it may be imagined. In principle, what
matters is not the length or shortness of the alternation of the constitutional composition of
the Court, but the very permanence and unalterability of that constitution so long as the
constitution which ordains it remains permanent and unaltered.
3. NO. No matter how brief or temporary the participation of the judge, there is no escaping
that he would be participating in the deliberations of the the SC, and his vote would count
as much as that of any regular Justice. A temporary member thereof is a misnomer, for
that is not a position contemplated by the constitution. The Constitution is clear that the CJ
and the Justices who compose the SC have to be appointed by the President and confirmed
by the CA. Mere designation under Sec 14, does not satisfy said requirement.
The designees cannot be such members in view of the fact that they have not been
appointed nor confirmed.
SEC 14. NULL AND VOID.

GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, et.al. vs.

MANUEL ALBA, et.al.
GR No. L-57883

12 March 1982

FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition, seeking ti enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the

Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action
implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts
from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA,
unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered
separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for
petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security
of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUES: W/N BP 129 is unconstitutional for impairing the security of tenure of the
justices and judges in this case?
RULING: It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor
separation of the incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is
deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The rule that the abolition of an office
does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order
to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the
office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is
in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict
law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.

NITAFAN vs. COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 284
FACTS:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19
and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all
with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court,
from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as
judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the
provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during
their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is
anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said
Constitution."
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter
administratively in response to representations that the Court shall direct its Finance

Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the

Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, it was reaffirmed by the Court en banc.
ISSUE:
Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.
HELD:
No. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional
provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that
the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make
the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is
but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in
the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in
ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.
The ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a
dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution", in Perfecto vs. Meer, as
affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded. The framers of the
fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and
unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987
Constitution that they have adopted
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the
discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens
should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should
share the burden of general income taxation equitably. Therefore, the petition for
Prohibition is hereby dismissed.

Mantruste Systems, Inc. vs Court of Appeals

179 SCRA 136

Facts: Mantruste Systems, Inc. (MSI) entered into an interim lease agreement
dated August 26, 1986 with the Development Bank of the Philippines, the owner of
Bayview Plaza Hotel. The agreement provides that MSI would operate the hotel for
a minimum of three months or until such time that the said properties are sold to
MSI or other third parties by DBP.
During the said period, the President issued Proclamation No. 50 entitled Launching
a Program for the Expeditious Disposition or Privatization of certain Government
Corporations and/or the (acquired) assets thereof and creating a Committee on
Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust. The Bayview Hotel has been one of

the identified assets for privatization and it was transferred from DBP to APT for
disposition.
The DBP notified MSI that it was terminating the interim lease agreement. It has
been agreed that 30 days from the signing of the Certification, the lease contract
will be considered as terminated; the Bayview Hotel will be made available for
inspection at all times by other bidders; and said property will be ready for delivery
to any new owners 30 days from signing the Certification.
A letter granting an extension of 30 days was sent by APT to MSI. This is to allow
the latter to wind up affairs and to facilitate a smooth turn-over of the facilities to its
new owners without necessarily interrupting the hotels regular operation.
After 15 days, MSI informed APT that since its lease on the hotel properties has
been for more than one year now, its lessee status has taken the character of a long
term one. As such MSI as the lessee has acquired certain rights and privileges
under the law and equity. It also contends that it has acquired a priority right to
purchase said properties above other interested parties.
APT, on a reply said that it has not found any stipulation tending to support MSIs
claim and since the Pre-Bidding Conference has been conducted, for APT to consider
the request of MSI would not be in consonance with law, equity and fair play.
The MSI then wrote a letter to APT informing the latter of the alleged legal lien over
the hotel which amounts to P10,000,000 . It also demanded that APT consider MSI
as very preferred bidder. MSI also submit its bid to APT for P95,000,000 in cash or
P120,000,000 in installment terms.
MSI also asked APT to clarify the following: 10 whether APT has a clean title over
the property; 2) whether the Trust knew the hotel had back taxes; 3) who should
pay the tax arrears; and 4) whether MSIs advances made in behalf of DBP would be
treated as part of the bid offer.
In the view that MSI has been disqualified from the public bidding, the property was
eventually awarded to Makati Agro Trading and La Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation.
MSI filed a petition for preliminary injunction with the lower court. The said court
granted the petition but the Court of Appeals nullified the lower courts ruling for
being violative to Section 1 of Proclamation No. 50 which provides:
No court or administrative agency shall issue any restraining order or injunction
against the trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets
transferred to it. Nor shall such order or injunction be issued against any purchaser
of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking possession of any
assets purchased by him.
The CA rejected the lower courts opinion that said proclamation is unconstitutional,
rather it upheld that it continues to be operative after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution by virtue of Section 3 Art. XVIII. It also noted that MSI has not been
deprived of its property rights since those rights are non-existent and its only
property right was the alleged reimbursable advances made to DBP, which it may
sue to collect in a separate action. It further held that the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction by the lower court against APT may not be justified as a valid
exercise of judicial power for MSI does not have a legally demandable and
enforceable right of retention over the said property.

The MSI then filed this petition for certiorari with this Court.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that MSIs rights to the property are
non-existent except its right to use the refund of its alleged advances; and in not
declaring unconstitutional Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50.
Ruling: The Court upheld the ruling of the CA. It affirmed the Court of appeals
finding that MSIs claim to a patent contractual right to retain possession of the
Bayview Hotel until all its advances are paid is non-existent; and as the right of
retention does not exist, neither does the right to the relief demanded. A mere
lessee like MSI is not a builder in good faith, hence the right of retention given to a
possessor in good faith pending reimbursement of his advances for necessary
repairs and useful improvements on anothers property is not available to a lessee
whose possession is not that of an owner. The Court stated that it is a settled rule
that lessees are not possessor in good faith because they know that their
occupancy of the premises continue only during the life of the lease, hence they
cannot recover, as a matter of right, the value of their improvements from the
lessor, much less retain the premises until they are reimbursed thereof.
The Court also ruled that Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50 does not impair the
inherent powers of the courts to settle actual controversies which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government. It also noted that the power of
the courts over the other branches and instrumentalities of the government is
limited only to the determination of whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the exercise of their
authority and in the performance of their assigned tasks. There can be no
justification on judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency
except when it violates a citizens constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of
discretion, or acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.
The petition is dismissed.

Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R.

Penachos, Jr., et.al.
GR No. 86995

03 September 1992

Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications,
Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26
and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the
construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the
last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2,

1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3
o'clock in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction
and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification
documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana
submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not
allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against
the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to
their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting
of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They
also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be
directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from
conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift
the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such
order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government
infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the
preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the
bidding had been awarded and closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the
petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be
constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling
within the coverage of the subject law.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the
provisions of PD 1818?
RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as
follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled
corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special
charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies
or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the

monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is
therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality.
First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of
the State, a priority program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of
the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the
ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be
audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third,
heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or
transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus,
equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared
without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M
had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also
decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would
henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the
prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the
transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the
award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).

Phividec v. Velez 199 SCRA 405 [Counsel-Arbiter]GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

Respondent filed in the RTC a complaint for the foreclosure of mortgage against
Petitioner. Petitioner moved to dismiss because of a PD stating that all disputes,
claims and controversies solely between or among the departments, bureaus,
offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the Government xxx arising from the
interpretation and application of statutes, contracts or agreements, shall henceforth
be administratively settled or adjudicated
xxx. Court denied the dismissal and declared it unconstitutional.
Held: Reversed.
D: Laws that prescribe administrative procedures for the settlement of certain types
of disputes between Government offices do not diminish the jurisdiction of courts
and hence not unconstitutional

Fortich vs Corona 398 SCRA 685

The Office of the President modified its decision which had already become final and
executory.
FACTS:
On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President (OP) issued a win-win Resolution

which reopened case O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424. The said Resolution substantially
modified its March 29, 1996 Decision. The OP had long declared the said Decision
final & executory after the DARs Motion for Reconsideration was denied for having
been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
The SC then struck down as void the OPs act, it being in gross disregard of the rules
& basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
The respondents contended in their instant motion that the win-win Resolution of
November 7, 1997 is not void since it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling, hence,
the March 29, 1996 decisioncould not as yet become final and executory as to be
beyond modification. They further explained that the DARs failure to file their
Motion for Reconsideration on time was excusable.
ISSUE:
Was the OPs modification of the Decision void or a valid exercise of its powers and
prerogatives?
1. Whether the DARs late filing of the Motion for Reconsideration is excusable.
2. Whether the respondents have shown a justifiable reason for the relaxation of
rules.
3. Whether the issue is a question of technicality.
HELD:
1.
No.
Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987, mandates that
decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shallbecome
final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of a copy therof xxx unless a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
The respondents explanation that the DARs office procedure made it impossible
to file its Motion for Reconsideration on time since the said decision had to be
referred to its different departments cannot be considered a valid justification. While
there is nothing wrong with such referral, the DAR must not disregard the
reglementary period fixed by law, rule or regulation.
The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made subservient
to the internal office procedure of an administrative body.
2.
No. The final & executory character of the OP Decision can no longer be disturbed or
substantially modified. Res judicata has set in and the adjudicated affair should
forever be put to rest.
Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard
since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the
administration of justice. The Constitution guarantees that all persons shall
have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.
While a litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted
in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly &
speedy administration of justice. The flexibility in the relaxation of rules was

never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity.
A liberal interpretation & application of the rules of procedure can only be
resorted to in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances.
3.
No. It is a question of substance & merit.
A decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or tribunal which is
declared void on the ground that the same was rendered Without or in Excess of
Jurisdiction, or with Grave Abuse of Discretion, is a mere technicality of law or
procedure. Jurisdiction is an essential and mandatory requirement before a
case or controversy can be acted on. Moreover, an act is still invalid if done in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
In the instant case, several fatal violations of law were committed. These grave
breaches of law, rules & settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of
technical nature.
When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested
rights were acquired by the petitioners, and all others who should be benefited by
the said Decision.
In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Videogram Regulatory
Board vs CA, et al., just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of his/her case.

Fernando Lopez vs Gerardo Roxas

Constitutional Law Judicial Power Defined
Lopez and Roxas were the candidates for VP in the 1965 elections. Lopez won the
election. Roxas appealed his lost before the PET. The PET was created by RA 1793. It
is provided in the law that There shall be on independent Presidential Electoral
Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the Vice-president elect of the
Philippines. In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss.
Lopez assailed the law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding
with the case. Lopez averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided
for in the constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the
other ten members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly appealed
before the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is
appealed before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.
HELD: Pursuant to the Constitution, the Judicial power shall be vested in one SC
and in such inferior courts as may be established by law
This provision vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely some
specified or limited judicial power, but the judicial power under our political

system, and, accordingly, the entirety or all of said power, except, only, so much
as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to judge
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the
fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral
Tribunal, respectively.
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes
involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or
the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The proper exercise of said
authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable
rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first
instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that Congress
shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.
The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely
added the courts jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It
merely conferred upon the SC additional functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This
is valid because the determining of election contests is essentially judicial.