The One and the Many

Author(s): Gareth B. Matthews and S. Marc Cohen

Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Jun., 1968), pp. 630-655
Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.
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THE ONE AND THE MANY

GARETH B. MATTHEWS AND S. MARC COHEN

X he Platonic

argument

1079a9)x

(990b13;

that Aristotle

calls "The One Over Many"

like this as its key
something

had

doubtless

premiss:

of some

virtue

The

following
:
premiss
are

We

or more

two

Whenever

to which

one

sentence

can

things

from

be

that

F-ness,

thing,

Plato's

in the habit
of assuming
we give
the same name.2

one

said
properly
are properly

to be

Form

F.

such

suggests

Republic

for each

is by

it

F,

called

they

set of many

things

x and y are round.

It
The pattern of reasoning
is familiar,
their
in
virtue
of
be in virtue of roundness
(or
participating
said to be round.
in roundness)
that they are properly
Exactly
is
what
that matter,
what
is established
by the reasoning?for
one way,
in
not
Taken
to
obvious.
be
established?is
supposed
us with
than a
of Forms presents
Plato's
nothing more
Theory
manner
is
of
that
Instead
Socrates
of speaking.
wise,
saying
is wise we can now say, backed by
is wise and Thucycides
Pericles
must

that each partakes

of wisdom.
the One-Over-Many
Argument,
is a man,
and Cal
Instead of saying that Callias is a man, Coriscus
in manhood.
licles is a man, we can say that all participate
But

if we

take Plato's

theory
There

that give rise to it.

that lead to a doctrine
perplexities
plexities

1
Aristotle.

Line

references,

unless

otherwise

this way, we
ignore the per
are at least two distinguishable
One perplexity
is
like Plato's.3

identified,

are

to

the

works

of

2
from Plato
596A.
Translations
and Aristotle
of passages
Republic
our own.
3
are things
as they are?"
two questions,
and
Cf. David
Pears's
"Why
we
we
name
as
in
are
do?"
to
his
in
able
article,
"Universals,"
things
"Why
ed. by A. Flew
and Language
(2nd series),
(Oxford,
1953),
pp. 51-64.
Logic
are

631

THE ONE AND THE MANY

fall into kinds?

The
is it that things naturally
Why
to
the
that
life
it is this perplexity
gives
especially
How
is
The puzzle
this:
linguistic.4
Argument?is
One-Over-Many
can it be that many
To
things are properly called by one name?
to
take this puzzle seriously we must
(1) the inclination
indulge
ontological:
other?and

take the case of one name for each thing named

(i.e., the case of
as the paradigm
an ideal proper name)
case of a name,
and also
to
'Pericles
and
that
in
is
wise'
'wise'
the
inclination
suppose
(2)
If we go along with these
'aman'
in 'Callias is a man' are names.
then the puzzle, How can it be that many
inclinations,5
things are
name ?, becomes
real.
properly called by one
And now the One-Over-Many
offers, not just a pro
Argument
manner
of speaking,
but a resolution
of the
lix and circuitous
It abets inclinations
(1) and (2) above and (apparently)
the puzzle in harmony with them.
For Plato is now seen
are names all right;
to be saying that 'wise' and 'aman'
further
a
are
names
more
in
not
too
from
the
in
different
way
way
they
are
names.
names
What
which
'wise'
'Socrates' and 'Callias'
(or
puzzle.
resolves

is something

all wise
things
are
properly
they

in, by virtue of
participate
called
And what
"wise."
participation
men
all
is
refers
'aman' names
to)
in,
(or
something
participate
said to be a man.6
each is properly
by virtue of which
as a manner
of Forms
of speaking Plato's
Although
Theory
refers

to)

which

causes no trouble, as a way of coming to understand

over the One and the Many, the difficulties
worries
are notorious.
identified and discussed
Plato himself

and deal with

it gives
many

rise to
of these

It is not, however,
difficulties with candor and perspicuity.
Plato's
to assess here.
that we want
Instead we
candor or his perspicuity
answer
to the One-Over
shall concern ourselves with Aristotle's
we
shall
discuss
Aristotle's
Cate
Specifically
Many Argument.

use of a form of the One-Over-Many

Plato
sometimes
makes
Though
not
most
is
that
in the
Argument
expressly
linguistic,
notably,
perhaps,
from
the Parmenides,
132A-B.
Third Man passage
5
have
these
rather
identified
inclinations
We
without
aseptically
or intensify
to activate
them
in the reader.
not
But
this does
attempting
we consider
mean
them either
jejune or inconsequential.
*
in these
of participating
". . . it is by virtue
that other
[Forms]
things
have

their

names,"

Parmenides,

130E

and

Phaedo,

102B.

632

GARETH

B. MATTHEWS

AND

S. MARC

COHEN

as an answer

to Plato.
to try to show that the
We want
on at least one plausible
offers a more
Categories,
interpretation,
answer
to
Plato
than
has
to be the
been
thought
usually
general
some comments
case. We
shall then make
toward assessing
the
gories

and weaknesses

strengths

philosophical

of this Aristotelian

answer.

The

theme
is not

predication

one might
of Aristotle's
say, is that
Categories,
such a simple affair as Plato, with his One-Over
takes it as his
have us think.
Aristotle
would

Argument,
to sort out and clarify
task in the Categories
in which
be properly
said to
may
something
The first kind of case Aristotle marks
off is the
that he is a cat, or of Nellie that
say of Fenimore

Many

major
ways
we

the variety of
so-and-so.

be

case

in which
she is a cow.

and Nellie are primary

substances;
jargon, Fenimore
are secondary
seems to
What
Aristotle
substances.
want
to bring out with his terminology
is this.
There being
the
a
cats
cat is matter
of there being
individual
substance
secondary
not be cat
and the rest.
There would
Felix, Felicia,
?Fenimore,
some individual
cat or other.
there being
But neither
without
In Aristotle's
cat and cow

are not

individual
somethings-or
individual men,
etc.
cows,
cats,
other, e.g.,
an
so
is
individual
And
such
individual
such-and-such.7
the
Every
is also the being or substance
of an individual
and-such
(o&ria) of
it
what
the
is
individual
is.
the individual;
are
of primary
In a way the notions
substance
and secondary
could

there

be

that

individuals

individual

individual

for

correlative,

is no

there

individual

and no such-and-such

such-and-such,
vidual such-and-such.

7
1961),

Cf. G. E. M.
pp.

identifying,
denies
that
such"
sophical

(p.

7-8.

Anscombe

Miss

rather
"one
10).

Quarterly,

and

contrasts

A.
16

a
identify
C. Lloyd,
(July

individual

P. T. Geach,
Three
Philosophers
this an epistemological
about
identity.
point

thing without
"Aristotle's

1966),

an

there being an indi

individuals with their

Anscombe
makes
a metaphysical
than

can
Cf.

Yet Aristotle

is not

that
without

pp.

identifying
Categories

258-267,

espec.

(Oxford,
about
point
Thus
she
it as a such-and

Today,"
p. 264.

The

Philo

THE ONE AND

633

THE MANY

and the rest second

the first primary

species and genera by calling

so?
ary substances.
Why

Here we have our first clue to the importance

I say that Nellie is a cow
When
on
a
classification
chart.8
The
locating Nellie

Aristotle attaches
I am, so to speak,
chart is built up

to classification.

the individuals

from

it is individuals
the

that

that

individuals

by calling
Already we have

emphasized

fact that, ultimately,

out by calling
is brought
The correlative
of
character
is
and their species or genera
The

classifies

substances.

primary
between

the distinction

it classifies.

the chart

individuals

them all substances.

the beginning
Plato wants

of an answer

to Plato's

One

us

to suppose
that it is by
Argument.
Over-Many
that both Fenimore
and Felix are properly called
virtue of cathood
is something
cats.
"over against" Felix and Feni
But if cathood
must
Felix
and
Fenimore
be
more,
apart from cathood.
something
or Fenimore

be apart from cathood?

There is a natural Platonic
rejoinder to this rhetorical question.
It is to reject the principle
legitimate.
required to make the question
The principle
is this: For x to be able to bear any relation, R, to
in its own right, independ
else, y, x must be something
something
ent of its bearing R to y. The Platonic
is to reject this
rejoinder
And what

would

principle
reflections

and

tional.

either Felix

to justify
and shadows

Schubert's

to things
its rejection
by pointing
or
that are essentially
constitutively
shadow, e.g., would
certainly not be what
Schubert's

Schubert's

shadow

could

like
rela
it is
not

(viz.,
shadow)?indeed
it
the shadowing
relation
from its bearing
be said to exist?apart
in
what
it
bears to Schubert.
fact
Schubert's
shadow's
is,
being
tied to its bearing
the relation
its very existence,
is essentially
it
to
Schubert.
bears
the need for this rejoind
We might
stop to notice that making
er clear does a great deal to undermine
the force of the One-Over
to be
That argument,
let us recall, is supposed
Many Argument.
an argument
the existence
general

for the existence

of Forms.

of Forms by an extrapolation
terms.
it generalizes
In particular,

8
See,

e.g.,

2b7-22

and

2b29-3&7.

It allegedly
establishes
from proper names to
on the relation

between

634

GARETH

a proper
embrace

name

AND

B. MATTHEWS
it names

and what

COHEN

as to be able

a way

in such

a general

S. MARC

to

term

it "names"
and what
a
to
be
this
is
non-circular
If
its meaning).
argu
argument
then we must be able to under
for the existence
of Forms,
a proper name and what
it names with
the relation between

(i.e.,
ment
stand

the relation

between

to the Theory of Forms.

to look very dubious
indeed.
a proper name and what
it

out antecedent
commitment
But can we do this?
To understand
names clearly

It begins
the relation between

what
the correct application
includes understanding
name consists
And
that
in.
surely involves understand
to Plato)
about the (according
relational
ing something
essentially
A dark spot on the
of the bearers
of proper names.
character

of a proper

has gone home

is not Schu
that stays put after Schubert
ground
on
is
the
hulk
lifeless
the pallet
bert's shadow.
Nor, perhaps,
lying
If the bearer of a proper name is nothing
of
Socrates.
independent
a certain

bearing

that we

to suppose
proper name and what
that there are Forms.
able

Argument
of

to

relation

a certain

can

Form,

understand

then

it seems

unreason

the relation

between

it names without

the antecedent
assumption
And if this is so, then the One-Over-Many
for the existence
fails to provide a non-circular
argument

Forms.

to Ari
rejoinder
just argued that a certain Platonic
the force of the One-Over
stotle itself has the effect of weakening
to suggest
that Aristotle
But we do not mean
Many Argument.
We

have

this dialectical
Rather Aristotle
strategy against Plato.
employed
that primary
substances
took the much more direct line of denying
are relational
To adapt
entities
such as Felix and Fenimore
(8a16).
we
an Aristotelian
of
from the Categories
say
way
might
arguing,
there
said to be Felix (or the Felix)
of anything;
. Aristotle
are not "relatives"
fore Felix and Fenimore
(Ta tco?c ti)
some secondary
about whether
substances might
certainly worried
to
But
it
him
be "relatives"
seemed
(8a13f.).
quite clear that
that Felix

substances

primary

9
We
that

is not

not.9

little
did very
add that Plato
might
substances
Aristotle
called)
primary
the
how
he never
(say)
explained
of cathood.
off from
the Fenimore
(say)

(what

particular
marked

are

to make
good
are relational
Felix

of

his

cathood

suggestion
In
entities.
could

be

635

THE MANY

THE ONE AND

and Fenimore

If Felix

and Felicia
as before.

are not

relational

entities,
be what he is
the perplexity
remains
stand in. But how can he
of any relations he may
independent
a certain
be, if his being a cat is supposed to consist in his bearing
to cathood?
relation
then

In place
and
primary

of Plato's

Felix must

relational

account

substance

offers

secondary
what
it is for Felix

Aristotle's
doctrine
a non-relational
way

of
of

to be a cat.

is
Every individual
For Felix to be an individual
is already
so-and-so.
for him to be a cat. And for Socrates to be an individual
is already
for him to be a man.
To be sure, being an individual
and being
a cat are not, in general,
the same thing.
is
that means
But what

understanding
an individual

of being an individual without

being an
or
means
it
other.
is
What
that, for any
something
can
one
an
be
individual without
substance,
given secondary
being
an individual
is for him to
that. But for Felix to be an individual

not

that

is a way

there

individual

And for Socrates

cat.
be an individual
to be an individual man.10

to be an individual

is for

him

So far we

have
F

and

substance

talked

about x's being

secondary

substance.

the case

x is a
primary

F, where
Let

us

now

say

a word

some

in which
is the differentia
of
(as,
species
Aristotle
in 'Callias is rational').
says very firmly that differ
are not in a subject
like substances,
but unlike qualities,
entiae,
And
classes
with
differentiae
substances
he
in another
(3*21-2).
a
too.
He
that
the
definition
of
like
the defini
differentia,
says
way,
a quality,
unlike
but
tion of a secondary
the
definition
of
substance,
about
e.g.,

of that of which

is predicated
Classing

differentiae

with

the differentia

is said

(3a25-6).
rather than
substances,
secondary
for Aristotle's
scheme.
categorial

qualities, makes
problems
here.
shall not try to discuss these problems
on
how
differentiae
commenting
understanding

with
We

with

what

Rational

has already been said about Aristotle's

So Callias is rational
is the differentia
of man.

10

the
John

The
of these
ideas
significance
of recent
of
discussions
light
R. Wallace,
"Sortal
Predicates

Philosophy,

But

LXII (1965), pp. 8-13.

it is worth

this way fits in

answer to Plato.
and Cori

can perhaps
in
be better
appreciated
"sortal"
Cf.
predicates.
especially
and Quantification,"
The
Journal
of

636

GARETH

scus is rational.

B. MATTHEWS

AND

S. MARC

COHEN

But we must

as something
not think of rationality
and
in
which
Coriscus,11
against"
something
they
to participate.
For rationality
to
could both be thought
is essential
a
man.
a man's
to
To
is
Callias
to
be
be
and
be
rational,
being
or Coriscus
or some
is to be some man or other?Callias
rational
Callias

"over

one.

F is either a secondary substance or the differentia

of
x to be F and for y to be F is not
what
it
is
for
species,
explain
to F-ness.
ed by saying that x and y bear some relation
it
Rather
to the idea of a completely
is to be explained by reference
funda
The fundamental
mental
classification.
character of this classifica
out
tion is brought
that, instead of simply ordering
by saying
So where

some

that have been

individuals

somehow

this classification
viduals,
provides
are said and seen to be individuals.

previously
the terms

marked

off as indi

in which

individuals

II
that Aristotle
lists in his Categories,
Of the ten categories
it is what he calls secondary
substance
and what he calls quality
in the application
of the One-Over
that are perhaps most
important
said
about
sub
So, having
secondary
something
Many Argument.
us
now
turn
to
most
of
the
devote
let
We
shall
stances,
qualities.
rest of the discussion

to that topic.
have already seen that, where F is a secondary
substance,
x
a
as
F
is
clas
of
that
it
conceives
basic
saying
making

We
Aristotle

I
When
substance.
But suppose F is not a secondary
am
I
Feni
that
Fenimore
is
for
grey,
say
again classifying
example,
It may seem so. After all, cats can be classified
more?
according
from what
to their color.
But classification
is here rather different
it was in the case of our saying that Fenimore
is a cat. For in that
sification.

11
in two

One

of
might,
different

entirely

of
independence
however,
Aristotle,
entiae
of genera
also

different

any

course,
expect
classification
individual

that

would
differentia
appear
a certain
achieve
thereby
one
of these
schemes.
by only
when
he
"Differ
says,
possibility

classified

this
denies
explicitly
that are different
and not

in kind"

(lb16-7).

a single
and

schemes

subordinate

one

to another

are

THE ONE AND THE MANY

637

case to say of x that it is F is, so to speak, to pick out two items in

a classification
chart such that x is something
in a direct line under
even Fenimore's
Now of course grey, perhaps
F.
exact shade of
a
a
in
classification
But
chart
of colors
chart.
grey, may appear
in which
Fenimore's
not be a chart
shade of grey appears would
in which

Fenimore

So saying
(or any other cat) appears.
not
that he is grey is
of Fenimore
in the way
Fenimore
classifying
that saying of him that he is a cat is classifying
him.
A natural
to this sort of consideration
would
be to
response
a
is
'Fenimore
is
for
that
'Fenimore
is
say
grey
elliptical
grey'
one might
the symmetry,
This will preserve
cat'.
for in
suppose;
a classification
as a species,
table in which
it
'grey cat' appeared
would
for the name of an individual grey cat, like
be appropriate
to

Fenimore,

appear

himself

as well.

this move
consider
But it is
explicitly.12
an
on
out
his
behalf.
easy enough
appropriate
reply
as a grey cat (in much
the
If we could really classify Fenimore
a
we
as
a
then
for
cat
to
him
cat
b
and
be
both
cat),
way
classify
would
be for them to be the same grey cat.13 But, of
Fenimore
Aristotle

does

not

to figure

have his hair bleached.

Then cat a (Feni
course, Fenimore might
more with grey hair)
and cat b (Fenimore with
bleached
hair)
would both be Fenimore,
without
being the same grey cat.
I say that Fenimore
is grey, it is not Fenimore
So when
I am
His color.
Fenimore's
What
then?
color, according
classifying.
is one of the things that is in Fenimore,
to Aristotle,
it is
though
as subject.
not said of Fenimore
notion of being in a subject, as
That brings us to Aristotle's
a
not
to
in
and the associated
distinction
subject,
being
opposed
Before
said, of a subject.
said, and not being
we must
to
further
about
these
any
say
try
something
proceeding
two distinctions.
a technical
that he is assigning
Aristotle warns us immediately
a
a
"I
'in
He
call
'in
to
is
says,
subject.'
meaning
subject' what
a
as
not
and
to
it
cannot exist
in something,
which
part,
belonging
between

being

12

At

later works
13
Cf.
1957),

p.

not
in the Categories.
relevant.
are, of course,
Three
p.
Philosophers,
69.
least

Discussions
(Cf. Metaphysics
8; P. T. Geach,

of

unity
Z4-5.)
Mental

of

definition

Acts

(London,

in

638

GARETH

apart from what

in understanding

B. MATTHEWS

it is in" (la24-5).
the notion of being

AND

S. MARC

COHEN

But he offers us no such help

said of a subject.
It is natural

to conclude
has in mind with
this idea is not
that what Aristotle
a technical notion.
to assume that,
it is natural
More specifically,
x is a subject, 9 is said of x if and only if, x is said to be 9.
where
For at 2a32 Aristotle
But this will not do.
agrees that a body is
<xw?jia
And
what he goes on
said to be white
(^euxov y?p
Xeyexai).14
as
a
to say entails that white
he
is not said of
subject. What
body
never
be predicated
of white will
goes on to say is that the definition
And he has said earlier that
of the body (2a32-4).
said of a subject both its name and its definition

is
if something
are necessarily

of the subject
(2a19-21).
predicated
So what
is it to say something
of a subject?
At 2a19 we learn
two necessary
If 9 is said
and perhaps jointly sufficient conditions.
a
name
of 9 and the definition
of 9
of
subject, x, then both the
clear
Aristotle makes
be predicated
of x.
(i.e., predicable)
of the
that the part about the name being predicable
is the weaker
two conditions.
is
The name of (the color) white,
viz.,
'white',
swan
a
swan
when
I
of
"The
is
white"),
(as
say,
though
predicable
is not predicable
of the
the name of beauty,
say, (viz.,
'beauty')

will

But not even in

(for I cannot say, "The swan is beauty").
is the definition
the case of the color, white,
predicable.
seems to be this.15 9 is said of a subject, x,
notion
Aristotle's
That is, 9 is said
if and only if, x is said to be a 9 (or a kind of 9).
16
as a 9. Thus, man is
of a subject, x, if and only if, x is classified
one says of him that he
said of the individual man as subject when
swan

as subject when one

is said of grammar
And knowledge
a
But
kind
of
is not said
is
white
that
grammar
says
knowledge.
even
as
a
to
for
of
be white;
though the body is said
subject
body
a body is not a white
either).
(or a kind of white
If x is classified as a 9, then the definition
of 9 will be predicable
and they
and
the definition
differentiae
of x, because
gives species
no body
are always predicable
since
of inferiors
But
(lb10-25).
is a man.

14

ence,"

Cf. G. E.
Or perhaps
in color"
).
( Xeuxov
"light
X
Pronesis,
(1965),
p. 98.
15
Contrast
185a32.
In the Categories.
Physics
16
in an absolutely
of course,
fundamental
"Classified,"

L.

Owen,

way.

"Inher

THE ONE AND THE MANY

639

as a white, we cannot expect the definition

of 'white'
to be predicable
of any body.
Aristotle marks
off the fol
with
these distinctions
Equipped
a
not in any
of
said
but
four
classes:
(1) things
subject
lowing
a
not
in
but
said
of
any subject;
(2) things
subject
subject;
is classified

(4) things
(3) things both said of a subject and in a subject;
neither
said of a subject nor in a subject.
The following will serve as examples to illustrate what Aristotle
this classification
scheme.
(1) Cat is
may have had in mind with
I say that Fenimore
is a cat), but cat
said of a subject
(as when
is not in any subject.
(Feni
(2) This bit of grey is in a subject
not
is
said
of
but
it
,
any subject, for I do not say of Fenimore
more)
(3) Grey is said
else) that he is a this-bit-of-grey.
(or anything
a subject when
said
is
of
of a subject and is also in a subject;
grey
a
if Fenimore
Fenimore
is grey, and grey is in
I say that charcoal
in a subject nor said of
is himself neither
is grey.17
(4) Fenimore
a subject.
The second depends
The first part is obvious.
upon
or a kind of
is said to be a Fenimore,18
the fact that nothing
Fenimore.19

in these examples,
secondary
unit
to class (2), universal
(1),
qualities
In order
to class (4).
qualities to class (3) and primary substances
we
need
to justify our use of this rather traditional
interpretation
to say something more about classes
(2) and (3).
Aristotle's
First, a remark about class (3).
only immediate
he
in
is
this
class
of
Knowledge,
knowledge.
something
example
a
a
said
and
the
of
is
in
both
soul,
says,
subject, grammar
subject,
an item in this class is
the subject which
(lbl-3).
Presumably
the interpretation
substances belong to class
On

embodied

said of, will always be different from the subject or subjects it is in.
Grey, for example, will be said of the subject, charcoal grey, but it
17

is a paronymous
relation
between
what
is in a
is said to be by virtue
that in it: e.g.,
of having
thing
of having
in him
is said to be brave by virtue
(10a27-9).
bravery
18
true.
cat that he is a
I can say of my
This
is not, of course,
strictly
and mean
that he is among
the cats called
Aristotle
Fenimore
"Fenimore."
in this sort of case.
is not
interested
19
from G. E. L. Owen's
is very different
claim
will
This
that "Aristotle
to occur
not allow
of a primary
substance
in the predicate
the designation
subject
a man

position."

In general
and what

op.

cit.,

there

the

p.

97.

640

AND

B. MATTHEWS

GARETH

S. MARC

COHEN

More generally,
is in, say, Fenimore.
grey will be said of a color,
It may be said of the color of a body, but it
but will be in a body.
be to classify the
will not be said of the body (for to do so would
body

as a color).
should now
We

on class (2) and on the rela

can do this by way of
classes
tion between
(2) and (3). We
the already cited paper, "Inherence,"
discussing
by G. E. L. Owen.
about
In his paper Owen sets out to "nail" a "fashionable
dogma"
like to comment

to which
"the only item from any category
that
Aristotle
according
sense
can be present
in
the
of
in an individual
subject,
requisite
one
determinate
but
that
not
is
is
non-recurrent;
'in',
only quite
case against this
a unit property
in Russell's
sense" (p. 99). Owen's
Aristotle
When
is completely
says that
convincing.
"dogma"
in an individual body"
"color is in body, and therefore
(2bl-2) he
to be saying just what he says.
surely means
to Aris
in rejecting
the "dogma"
that, according
However,
Owen
substances,
totle, only unit properties
may be in primary
seems also to be rejecting
alto
the idea of individual
properties
means
at
what
of
Aristotle
Or
least, his notion
by an
gether.
a
in the category of quality
is such that
shade
individual
particular
of color would

illustrate

what

Aristotle

has

in this blue brooch.

this bit of blue

say,
this way:

in mind

Owen

rather

supports

his

than,
case

'Animal'
is
with
the predicate
'colour'.
the predicate
'animal'
are
and
'man'
of man,
'animal'
in turn predicable
of
and
His
is just that he, or his name,
the individual.
individuality
less general;
and
since
of anything
he is an
is not predicable
further,
in the way
in any individual
that he is not
found
individual
substance,
are
sizes
found
their
and
and
in
that
colours
possessors.
shapes

Compare

predicable
Socrates

on

'Colour'
'pink'
those
number
specimen
quality,

are

the
in

shades

hand,

is discriminated
shade
analogous

convincing.

of pink,
and
'colour'
and
of pink?any
shade
of
any particular
a finite
to prove
that only
is ready
Call
the
(Sens.
445b20-446a20).
sight
vink
is an individual
of
in the category

is predicable

of
predicable
Aristotle
of which

As an account
is not

other

turn

'vink'.

by
Then

to Socrates

of what

goes
For Aristotle

in the

category

in class
speaks

of

substance.20

(2) this line of reasoning

of things in class (2)21 as

30

Ibid.,
p. 98.
some
of them.
Or perhaps
But
Aristotle's
only
although
him
to the view
that all members
not commit
of class
(2) are
21

does

language
individual

THE ONE AND THE MANY

641

"individual and one in number"

(toc ?"co|jiaxoa Iv ?ptSaw) ,22 A
as
of
such
Owen's
shade
Professor
color,
vink, is something
given
And
universal
and therefore not something
that is one in number.
seem to be an
not vink, but this bit of vink, would
therefore
in a subject that is not said of any subject.
example of something
Of course one might
"one in num
suppose that, for Aristotle,
being

to that which
is not
is here simply another way of referring
said of any subject.
Then a specifi
shade of color like vink might
be called one in number
simply because no (shade of) color is said
to be (i.e., none is classified
The following
passage
as) a vink.

ber"

the Metaphysics

from

might

seem

to support

this reading

'one

of

in number':
. . . there
vidual'.
'universal'

is no
For

by
what

difference

between

we mean
'individual'
is [said or predicated]

'one

saying
what
of

in number'

is one
individuals.

'indi

and

in number,

and

by

(999b33-1000al)

of this interpretation
It would be a consequence
that, accord
to
in
this
and
the
in that rib
the
ribbon
color
color
Aristotle,
ing
were
would also
bon, provided
indistinguishable,
qualitatively
they
seem
But nowhere
does Aristotle
identical.
have to be numerically
even implicitly.
to agree to any such doctrine,
In fact, just before
the passage
run
seems
to
counter
that
something

cited

above,

to this

Aristotle
of

says
'one

interpretation
letters and syllables;
and he says
in number'.
He is discussing
that being one in kind (t<?>e?oet) is a necessary,
but not a sufficient
condition
for numerical
and their con
among
identity
syllables
He is thus using the contrast between what
stituent letters.
is one
in number and what
is one only in kind to mark what philosophers
distinction.
today refer to as the token-type
a
a
in
token
of a given word
letter
is, in the
Presumably
like a color in a piece of ribbon.
relevant respect,
seems quite clear that for Aristotle
it is this vink

to make
sense of the suggestion
in number,
it is difficult
that perhaps
are and some are not.
22
are not said of any
that are individual
and one
in number
"Things
some
but
of them
from
in a
whatsoever,
nothing
prevents
subject
being
bit of grammar
is among
in a subject."
This
the things
(lb6-9)
subject.

and

one

If so, then it
in this ribbon

some

Cf.

4a10-21.

642

B. MATTHEWS

GARETH

AND

S. MARC

COHEN

in that ribbon
and
(like this 'a' in this token word
'a' in that) that are individual
and one in number,
and not
the letter type 'a'.
vink tout court, or, of course,
to Aris
Professor Owen is surely right to insist that, according
totle, pink, and not merely
vink, can be in a given piece of ribbon.
is just for some
In fact for pink to be in a given piece of ribbon
and that vink
that

shade of pink to be in it. But Owen's

of
understanding
particular
is for Aristotle makes
what a color-individual
that the end of Aris
totle's

story,

on

whereas

our

reading

Aristotle

wants

to go

on

and

to have the shade it has is just

say that for this piece of ribbon
for this very bit of color it has in it to be in it.
an analogy.
his dog is Boso.
Consider
Callias has a dog;
a dog, is (in
to
him
For Callias to be a dog-owner,
for
have
i.e.,
a dog and
this case)
for him to have Boso.
Of course having
having Boso are not
have some particular

the same thing.

Still, to have
or
And in Callias's
other.
dog

a dog is just to
case the dog is

Boso.

talk of individual
colors that are one in number
to
conceive
of something's
suggests
ought
being pink (or
the
lines
of
For this particular
Callias's
having a dog.
grey) along
piece of ribbon to be pink is just for it to have in it the bit of pink
that it has.
To be sure, being pink is not, in general,
the same as
Aristotle's

that we

But for a thing to be pink is just for it to

this bit of pink.
having
some
have in it
particular bit of pink or other.
a par
is the relation between
The question may arise, what
this bit of pink
Or between
ticular bit of pink and pink in general?
be a mistake
and that?
it would
the first question,
Concerning
as being something
of a given color-individual
independ
ent of the shade of color it exemplifies,
such that it could bear a
to it. The very existence
is cor
relation
of the color-individual
to think

relative with
from

individuals,

just the shade of color it does.

And apart from there being
as this one, there would
be no universal

its exemplifying
it is nothing.

Apart
color

such

colors

its color

either.

this bit of pink and that, let us

suppose that this bit of pink is in x and that bit is in y. Then this
bit is x's way of being pink and that bit is y's way of being pink.
not as two "bare bits"
The two bits are related to one another,
As

for the relation

between

THE ONE AND THE MANY

643

in the same thing, pinkhood,

but rather as two ways of
a
two
of
viz., having Boso
ways
being
being pink (cf.
dog-owner,
and having Fido).

partaking

Ill
Let us see exactly how
that we are reconstructing
One-Over-Many
fore (according

this understanding
of quality attribution
from Aristotle's
bears on the
Categories
there
is grey, Felix is grey;
Fenimore

Argument.
to the One-Over-Many

be
there must
Argument)
are
virtue
of
which
said
both
greyness,
something,
by
they
properly
answers that that by virtue of which
to be grey.
the two
Aristotle
to
cats are both properly
be
is
this
bit
for
said
of grey
Feni
grey
more and that bit for Felix.
Fenimore's
having his bit of grey in
him is what makes him grey, just as Callias's
is what
dog, Boso,
a dog-owner.

couldn't have his bit of grey

Fenimore
or
some par
be
grey without
being grey
having
Callias
couldn't
ticular bit of grey in him.
have
Boso
(Compare:
or
a
a
be
without
without
dog-owner,
dog-owner
being
having
some particular dog.)
Fenimore
and Felix are both grey; but each

makes

him

in him without

cat's greyness

accrues

to him by virtue

of his own particular

bit of

grey.

of quality attribution
is a natural
Clearly this understanding
extension
of the Aristotelian
of
substantial
conception
predication
we discussed
in section I. Both arise from the idea of basic clas
In the case of substantial predication,
sification.
to say of x that it
to classify x; in the other case, to
to Aristotle)
is F is (according
x
our
is
F
to classify
it
is
of Aristotle)
of
that
(on
say
reading
x.
in
of
that we
Both
something
analyses provide ways
denying
or
to
to
reference
F-ness
it is
what
make
understand
should,
need,
for x to be F.
that we need or should make
refer
But the point in denying
ence to F-ness
to understand
what
it is for x to be F differs in the
two cases. Where
F is a secondary
the point is to avoid
substance,
the dilemma,
either Felix is what he is independent
of participating
in cathood
that might
(and is therefore a bare individual, whatever
to be) or else he is a mere
be thought
relational
(like a
entity
shadow

or

a reflection,

or,

to use

an Aristotelian

example,

a thresh

644

GARETH

B. MATTHEWS

AND

S. MARC

COHEN

to
existence
that owes its identity and continued
(1042b26))
non-relational
the relation
else.
Aristotle's
it bears to something
account goes between
the horns of this dilemma.

old

a quality
'F' attributes
to x, the point
is
Where,
however,
same
will
not
This time there
be the
about
worry
quite different.
x is supposed to be whatever
of
it is independent
what
(or whether)
with
differentiae
sub
F-ness.
Since Aristotle
groups
secondary
as qualities
stances rather than with qualities, what he recognizes
can lose without
be things an individual
losing its identity or
to
with conundra
that
to
time
is
deal
this
exist.
The
ceasing
point
arise from the notion of F-ness being in some thing or other. Among
about how one Form can
the many places in which Plato worries

will

the most
is Parmenides
interesting
perhaps
be in the
that the Form must
Plato argues
a
as
a
or
as
whole
in
If
then the
it
in
either
is
whole,
part.
things
If in part, then other paradox
Form will be separate from itself.
in x will be smaller
ical results will follow, e.g., that the smallness
in many
130E-131E.

be

things,
There

than Smallness

itself.

if we insist with Aristotle

that it is
a mistake
to think of F-ness as a thing apart from the F-ness
in x,
in x
to be in x is for something
in y (etc.).
the F-ness
For F-ness
to be properly classified as an F. And so for F-ness to be in several
We

avoid

this conundrum

to be parceled out among

them, let alone
things is not for F-ness
in
its
for F-ness to be somehow mysteriously
given
entirety to each.
x
to
be
in
for
in each
both
and
is
F-ness
for
Rather,
y
something
as an F.
to be properly classified
A Platonist will want to object that the plausibility
of all this
It is all very well comparing
Fenimore's
is quite specious.
being
a
But
and
what
Callias
with
Callias's
makes
grey
dog.
having
a com
is not a matter
of their owning
Coriscus
both dog-owners
a matter
mon dog;
of one
rather it is (the Platonist
continues)
man's
By
with

property having
Fenimore's
analogy,
Felix's

in common with another man's.

something
in common
color must
have something

color.

on Aristotle's
to the notion
behalf,
already objected,
and
Fido
have
that Boso
(Coriscus's
(Callias's dog)
dogness
dog)
that notion
is the suggestion
in common.
One thing wrong with
somehow
be something
of
that Boso and Fido might
independent
We

have

THE ONE AND THE MANY

645

A similar
in which
the dogness
participate.
they both allegedly
point could be made about the particular bit of grey Felix has and
the particular
bit Fenimore
has. We
cannot, without
absurdity,
in common
For it would
either.
suppose these to have greyness
to think

be ridiculous

bit of grey and Feni

of Felix's particular
as somehow quite distinct and separate

particular bit of grey

in which
from the greyness
the Platonist
Doubtless

more's

they both allegedly participate.

will not be so easily put down.

It

to speak of classification,
But clas
is all very well
he may
say.
or
else it is arbitrary.
sification must be based upon something,
If
x and y are both
as F, it must be because
classified
properly
they
have something
in common.
a given
about whether
classification
is
system
problem
an
But
and
is, indeed,
interesting
important
question.
arbitrary
a good first thing to say about this
is that platonic realism
problem
I decide to call each of the next
is quite irrelevant to it. Suppose
cer
ten people Imeet
The
classification,
tenpod, would
tenpods.
The

to keep me from
be arbitrary.
But there would
be nothing
to
this
situation
and
the
Argument
applying
One-Over-Many
of
that
it
is
virtue
that
these
announcing
by
tenpodity
people are
tainly

all to be called
Or consider

tenpods.
the question

of what

colors

are

It
primary colors.
to argue that a classification
scheme
is, to be sure, quite possible
with blue, green, yellow and red as primary colors is less
arbitrary
than one in which
are the prim
and yellow-red
purple, blue-green
ary colors.
psychology,
to do with

turn on questions
would
of physics,
argument
and
art.
it
But
would
have
language
perhaps
nothing
the One-Over-Many
Argument.
The

if Felix
surely, the Platonist may insist as a final protest,
are the exact same shade of grey, then, according
and Fenimore
to
But

classification
any non-arbitrary
scheme,
they will have the same
a
reason
will
and
be
the
that
have
color,
they
completely
specific
and determinate
shade of grey in common.
shades of pink arranged on a color chart
Imagine ten different
in spectral order such that there is no discriminable
shade of pink
on
two
between
shades
the
chart.
if
I
Now
decide to call
any
lying
or
of
shades
7
10
and
of shades
1, 4, 5,
anything
anything
"plink"
2, 3, 6, 8 or 9 "pfink"

then my

classification

scheme will

certainly

646

GARETH

B. MATTHEWS

AND

S. MARC

COHEN

are
the demands
of Platonic
realism
be arbitrary?even
though
x
are
met.
realism
demands
of
Platonic
for
if
is
(The
easily met,
x
no
matter
if
1
is
and
is
of
of
is
shade
shade
and
10,
y
y
plink
plink,
we can always say that it is by virtue of plinkity
that they are to be
called plink.)
But if I decide

to call a ribbon of shade 6 "pfink" and some

to be of the same shade "psink,"
I recognize
it
will not be the case that my color classification
arbi
is even more
It will not be the case that my color classification
trary than before.
is arbitrary at all, for my calling one ribbon "pfink" and another
other

that

ribbon

to be of the same shade "psink" will simply

that I recognize
a
at all. Not being color classifica
case of color classification
not be
either.
tion it will not be arbitrary color classification
ribbon

IV
reasons for rejecting
the
Aristotelian
as
like
be
to
statements
it
might
Argument
One-Over-Many
applied
is a cat' and 'Felix is a cat'.
On Aristotelian
'Fenimore
reasoning
as something
to think of cathood
"over against"
it is a mistake
be applied
Felix and Fenimore.
(A similar point, as we saw, might
In part

I we

considered

as well.)
seems
from what
In part II we considered Aristotelian
reasons,
reconstruction
of
the
for reject
to be the most plausible
Categories,
as applied
to
like
statements
the
Argument
One-Over-Many
ing
This time Aristotle's
view
is grey' and 'Felix is grey'.
'Fenimore
turns on the notion
of queer entities
like
(on our interpretation)
to differentiae

this bit of grey in Fenimore and that bit of grey in Felix.

But this

a philosopher's
bit of grey is surely as much
entity as is Plato's
are
reasons
at least two
for saying this.
There
Form, greyness.
state
We might
suppose that the following,
non-philosophical,
use

ments

make
?qualities :

of

something

1) The color of Felix

2)

John's

3)

The

generosity

like

the Aristotelian

is a dark grey.
is his outstanding

shape of that mirror

is convex.

virtue.

idea of unit

647

THE ONE AND THE MANY

intro
as it may be to suppose that these statements
Tempting
on
reflection
us
unit
Aristotelian
to something
like
duce
qualities,
remove
that temptation:
statements will surely
the following
4)

Felix's

color has

recently

5)

John's

generosity

has

6)

The

What

turned

shape of that mirror

these

turned

will

statements

last

into mere
change

to speak of the quality

as itself an individual
has,
thing
the
inclined to speak as though

indulgence.
under

is that

show

inclined

darker.

extreme

insofar

as we

heat.
are

or
person
to that extent we are also

some

that

individual

thing,
individualized

quality could itself

For only in
in the face of Aristotle.
that is one in number
he says, can something
flies

This

undergo
change.
the case of substance,
receive contraries
(4a10-21).

unit qualities
that Aristotelian
There is another way of showing
are not embodied
In the
in our non-philosophical
ways of talking.
above we said that, where x is a
of secondary
substance
discussion
if x is F and also
substance
and F a secondary
substance,
with y, then x and y are the same F.
(E.g., Tully and
should hold for
Cicero are the same man.)
Something
analogous
a
we
use
same color',
do
have
for
Now
'the
qualities.
certainly
But
'the same shape', etc. in non-philosophical
consistent
prose.
primary
identical

unit qualities
itwould be only of, say,
of Aristotelian
that I could say
of this ribbon on two different occasions
never of the color of two different
ribbons.
color"?and

the notion

with

the color
"same
Yet

the

use

non-philosophical

allows

condition'

of Aristotelian

23

unit

talk of qualities,

sophical

Cf. Wittgenstein's
have
the same

'two

books

can't

have

the

same

colour,

'same

'same

color',

shape',

'same

to say of the color of two different

to say of the shape of two different
vases,

(etc.)
"same color,"
ribbons,
to say of
"same shape,"
"same condition"
patients,
notion

of

us

the

condition

of

two

different

heart

This brings out clearly that the

is not embedded
in non-philo
qualities
that it is rather a philosopher's
notion.23

Blue

(etc.).

Book

colour',
because,

: "We use
the phrase
1958)
(Oxford,
we
could
well
say:
'They
perfectly
after all, this book has
its own
colour,

but

GARETH B. MATTHEWS AND S. MARC COHEN

648

notion
To say that it is a philosopher's
is not to damn the con
to
But
it
is
of
unit
indicate
that the philosopher
ception
qualities.
to make use of this notion
to be in a position
who wants
ought
to sell us on its merits.

In fact this paper could be considered

the
a
we
such
sales
II
effort.
III
of
In
and
tried
part
parts
preliminary
to show that one can tell a plausible
philosophical
story in terms
But to show that this philosophical
of unit qualities.
story has a
and plausibility
is only the first step in selling us
certain coherence
on its merits.

the idea that there are individuals

like
For, whereas
and Nellie
'and Socrates
is a preanalytic
in
terms
given,
are first stated, the idea that
of which
the philosopher's
problems
there are individuals
like this bit of grey in Fenimore
and this bit of

Fenimore

in terms of the light it

needs to be justified
bravery in Alcibiades
on
statements
sheds
like 'Fenimore
is grey' and 'Alci
preanalytic
it
biades is brave'.
shed?
does
What
light
the greatest
attribution

illumination
shed by this Aristotelian
way
on
of conceiving
is shed
the connection
e.g.,
between,
'John's ball is crimson'
and 'John's ball is red'.
Aristotle
rejects
as x's having
some
the notion
that x's being F is to be understood
to the F-ness
that all things that are F have in common.
relation
Instead he says that x's being F is to be understood
either as a
Perhaps

of x or else

classification

as a classification

of something
in x.
makes
it clear why
'Socrates is a
is also an animal;
it also makes
clear

to the idea of classification

Appeal
entails
man'

that Socrates

'John's ball is crimson'

entails that John's ball is red.
why
By
'x is F' leaves these relation
contrast, Plato's way of understanding
ships of entailment
entirely mysterious.
seem that we are being
too hard on Plato.
It may
Surely
are
and Coloredness
Plato can suppose that Crimsonness,
Redness
to one another

related

that is crimson
conceive
might
Thus
inclusion.

and

the

other

grammatical
usage"

(p.

book
rule?a

55).

in such a way as to guarantee

that anything
is also red and anything
red is also colored.
Plato
as one of
of the relationship
between
these Forms
anything

has
rule,

its own

that participates

colour

incidentally,

too'.
not

in Crimsonness

This

also

in accordance

would
with

he
our

would

stating
ordinary

THE ONE AND THE MANY

have

thereby

649

to participate
in Redness;
and anything
that partic
would have to participate
in Coloredness.

in Redness

ipates
Yet

this

the meanings

is not
of

enough.

'crimson',

It is by virtue
and

'red',

'colored'

of a relation
that

between

'x is crimson'

that x is red and

'x is red' entails that x is colored.

To
for this meaning
that
'crim
relation, Plato must
suppose
from referring?not
son', say, gets its meaning
just to the Form,
to the relation
Crimsonness?but
also (somehow)
of inclusion
that obtains between Coloredness,
and
Crimsonness.
Redness,
entails

account

Of course, Plato might

to agree to all this, but not
be brought
without
his giving up the over-simplified
notion
of meaning
that
the One-Over-Many
its
basic
The
gives
Argument
plausibility.
let us recall, arises from a puzzle about
Argument,
One-Over-Many
It leads us to
things can be called by one "name."
one
that
is
there
virtue
all
of which
suppose
thing, F-ness,
by
can
to
unum
F
said
be
F.
Unum
be
called
nomen,
things properly
nominatum.
But now if we are to think of this "name" as referring

how many

a
to a Form in that Form's
relation to various other Forms,
puzzle
more puzzling
than the original puzzle will
How can a
appear.
to many
single "name" refer to one thing in its relation
things?
can
at
find
who
himself
with
this
last
peace
Anyone
puzzle will not
find

the original One-Over-Many

attractive.
Argument
I say that both x
another point.
Sometimes
when
Consider
and y are F, it will be conceivable
that x and y are distinguishable
with
if x and y are both red it will be
Thus,
respect to F-ness.
x
even
and y may be distinguished
with
conceivable,
likely, that
to redness
This
(e.g., x may be a darker red than y).
a
on
out
feature
of
familiar
classifications.
But
Plato's
point brings
How could the
analysis of 'x and y are F' it becomes mysterious.
of their having
fact that x and y are both red be a matter
redness
x and y are distinguishable
to
when
with
in common,
respect
respect

redness?

V
notion of
In the last section we pointed out that the Aristotelian
seem to be the conception
that finds expression
unit qualities might
'John 'sgener
like 'the color of Felix',
in phrases of ordinary English

650

GARETH

AND

B. MATTHEWS

S. MARC

COHEN

on to argue
But we went
and 'the shape of that mirror'.
osity',
and
that these phrases do not, in fact, express Aristotle's
notion,
notion.
notion is, instead, a technical, philosophical
that Aristotle's
There is often, of course, real point in introducing
technical,
philo
that
and we tried to offer several considerations
sophical notions;
give point to this one.
One might wonder,

that finds
the notion
whether
however,
of Felix',
of
'the
color
like
ordinary English
expression
etc. would not itself offer a good basis for deal
'John's generosity',
about the One and the Many, and if so, just how
ing with problems
an account
based upon
this notion would
of quality
attribution
in locutions

The remainder
an
account.
such

from Aristotle.

differ

to sketch
attempt
F-ness
Where

of

this

paper

will

be

an

to be in some primary
sub
is said by Aristotle
in Fenimore)
it will be the case that there
stance, s, (e.g., greyness
is some generic quality 9 (e.g., color)
such that to say of s that it
is F is to classify either a 9 of s, or else the cpof s. Thus to say
that he is grey is to classify the color of Fenimore
of Fenimore
(or,
at least, a color of Fenimore).
is to classify a vice of Nellie.

To say of Nellie that she is stubborn

to say of that mirror
that it is
round is to classify the shape of that mirror.
and
Suppose we call the color of Fenimore, " the vice of Nellie,
A
individuals.
the shape of the mirror
quality individual,
"quality
as we shall use the expression
is simply a quality under a
here,
the
the form 'a cpof s' or 'the cpof s'?where
having
description
a
name
of
for
will
be
the
and
the
generic
quality
'cp'
replacement
some primary
substance.
for V will designate
replacement
And

should be called
One may wonder why the color of Fenimore
a quality
is
not
it
that
the
color
of Fenimore
individual.
be
May
of
Felix?
the
color
identical with the color of something
else, say,
And is it not then a universal
rather than an individual?
Of course

the color of Fenimore may be identical with the color

the cpof s (or a cpof s) may be identical
And in general
s and t are two different primary
with the cpof t (or a cpof t), where
is universal
and is
In this respect a quality individual
substances.
a
an
individual
individual.
ill-named
What
therefore
gives
quality
some claim to being called an individual
is the fact that it can
of Felix.

undergo

change?"receive

contraries,"

in Aristotle's

phrase.

The

THE ONE AND THE MANY

651

at one time and grey at another.

may be white
we
a quality
are
what
individual
respect
calling
clearly
individual outside the category of sub
differs from the Aristotelian
For Aristotle
stance, what we have been calling a "unit quality."
says that:
of Fenimore

color

In this

a color
nor will

is one

that
the

and

same

for other
one
and

similarly
something

the

action,

same

in number

one

in number,
that are not

things
the same

in number

will
be

not
both

substance.
that can

be white
bad

and
But

receive

and

black;
and

good;
substance

is

contraries.

(4a14-18)
What we want to call here a quality individual could hardly be
one the Avay Aristotle wants to say that "this
said to be numerically
is that
But the point to emphasize
bit of black" is one in number.
can
we
a
are
and
individual
what
undergo
change;
calling
quality
"this bit of black" cannot.
Aristotle's
indi
about the fact that quality
There is nothing mysterious
can undergo
to
Felix
For
the
of
color
undergo
change.
a change
change is nothing more nor less than for Felix to undergo
in color?to
be, say, now light grey and later dark grey, or now

viduals

white

and later black.

that a quality individual would

have to
or
shade of grey,
else this bit of grey
be either,
be
the former would
On Owen's
here.
reading of the Categories,
an example of an Aristotelian
non-substantial
On our
individual.
But what we are now
be.
the latter would
reading of Aristotle,
have seemed
say, a particular

It might

to this third account

is a third alternative.
According
considering
not
to be a read
in
is
meant
Aristotelian
flavor,
(which, although
an
the
of
in
individual
of
Aristotle)
category
ing
quality is simply
a quality under a certain kind of description.
mean

in supposing
to follow Aristotle
that, where F-ness
to say of x that it is F is to
and x a primary
substance,
individual.
viz., what we are calling a quality
something,
classify
here.
We have said that the
But there is an apparent difficulty
We

is a quality

quality

individual,

of Felix, may
the color of Fenimore.
Do we not have to agree
the color

individual,
quality
in fact, identical.
color of Felix I am eo ipso also classifying
if to say of Felix that he
And therefore

be

identical

with

the

the two

are,
Suppose
that in classifying
the
the color of Fenimore?

is grey

is to classify

the

652

GARETH

B. MATTHEWS

AND

S. MARC

COHEN

of Felix,
in saying of Felix that he is grey, am I not thereby
of
Fenimore
that he is grey?
saying
Surely to claim that would be

color

absurd.

One

supplied
opaque.
color of Felix
with

out

this difficulty
is to insist that the context
. . .' is
am
'I
like
by expressions
classifying
referentially
case
And therefore
that I am classifying
it can be the
the
way

the color

of

and also the case that

of Fenimore

without

the color
its being

of Felix
the case

also classifying
the color of Fenimore.
There may seem to be another difficulty.
We
now
can
But
individual
undergo
quality
change.
color

of Felix

is grey.

This
color

apparent
of Felix were

Surely grey
difficulty would
identical

with

cannot
indeed

is identical
that I am

have

said that a

suppose

that the

undergo
change.
be a serious one
But

if the

What we
is for the color of

it is not.

grey.
is that for Felix to be grey
Felix to be properly
Since being
classified as grey (or as a grey).
classified as grey is not the same thing as being identical with grey,
we may
the the color of Felix has changed,
and that the
suppose
have

been

suggesting

color

of Felix

then

committed

was

that grey
grey, without
supposing,
absurdly,
itself has changed.
We
allowed?even
insisted?that
the color
have, however,
Are we not
of Felix may be identical with the color of Fenimore.
Felix

changes
The first

to the equally absurd conclusion

that the color of
the
color
of
and
Fenimore
if,
changes?
only if,
is that there might
be
thing to say to this objection

that the color of Felix changes

absurd about the conclusion
nothing
as
if, and only if, the color of Fenimore
(even assuming,
changes
we have been assuming,
that Felix is not identical with Fenimore).
in fact, be warranted
if either one of the
This conclusion
would,
following

conditions

obtained:

a) The color of Felix at tm is identical with

more at tn and the color of each never changes.

the color

of Feni

The color of Felix and the color of Fenimore

all
change
but
and
in
the
that
the
color
way
synchronized
right,
always
only
to change.
chameleons might
be thought
of a pair of Siamese-twin
a
are
Jed
such
that Ted and
and
(Suppose
pair of chameleons,
that Ted changes
in color when,
and only when,
and in exactly the
same way as, Jed changes.
There will be no time at which Ted and
b)

THE ONE AND THE MANY

653

in color, even though there will be times during

It would
of each changes.
then be quite correct
the color of Ted changes
and
if,
only if, the color

Jed differ

which

the color

to say
of Jed

that

changes.)
The

to say to this objection

is that in addition to
of identifying
the color of
the possibility
the color of Felix with
Fenimore
is true of one will be true
(so that whatever
simpliciter
second

thing

one with
there is also the possibility
of identifying
a temporal qualification.
That is, the color of Felix
of his life, might
be said to
today, or during the first three weeks
or
be identical with
the color of Fenimore
the
yesterday,
during
If they are identified
month
of August.
in
this
only
temporally
of the other),
the other with

then of course there will be no reason to say that

qualified way,
the color of Felix changes
if, and only if, the color of Fenimore
no
about
and
the fact that we cannot say this.
worry
changes,
notion
of a unit quality bears on this old conun
Aristotle's
or universal?
in Fenimore
drum:
individual
If
Is the greyness
can
can
how
it
be
in
Fenimore?
If
how
the
universal,
individual,
in Fenimore
be something
Fenimore
has in common with
greyness
answers

Aristotle

Felix?

and numerically
particular
it is properly
certain kind;
in both Felix
that

and Fenimore

as a greyness.
classified
of a quality
individual

is properly
The notion

so by breaking
and a universal.

too.
It does
an individual
Austin

that the greyness

in Felix is something
one.
But it is also something
of a
as a greyness.
classified
is
Greyness
because there is something
in each one

that

suggests

down

the terms

bears

on this conundrum,
contrast between

the absolute

In his Sense
'sense-data'

and Sensibilia,
John
'material things'
is spurious
is not

and

"live by taking in each other's washing?what

one term of the pair, but the antithesis
itself."24
remarks
in a footnote:

Austin

adds these

or
and
is similar
in
'individual',
'particular',
not
of course
in all.
In philosophy
it is often
though
one member
of a putative
where
good policy,
pair falls under
suspicion,
as well.25
to view
the more
party
suspiciously
innocent-seeming
case

The

some

'universal'

of

respects

24
25

Oxford,
Ibid.

1962,

p.

4.

654

GARETH
The

conundrum

B. MATTHEWS
loses

above

its force

AND

S. MARC

once we

COHEN

come

to think

are in
which
that there may be things like the color of Fenimore
a certain respect individual,
and in a certain respect universal.
The
is individual
insofar as it is subject to change.
color of Fenimore
himself
in color.
It changes,
in fact, if and when Fenimore
changes
a
insofar as the color of Fenimore
It is universal
certain
time,
(at
or simpliciter)
the color of Felix.
may be identical with
a quality individual count as a relative for Aristotle
and relations?
between
the distinction
threaten
qualities
seem
so.
the
Felix
is
color
The
color
of
of something;
might
is the shape of something.
the shape of that mirror
Would

and
It

thus

and

is surely 'No'
But the proper answer to the question
Accord
two
the
Aristotle
in
of
to
broader
definitions
the
that
presents
ing
a
to
said
relative is something
be just what
the Categories
(6a36)
it is of other things.
Thus, a father is said to be father of something
and a double is said to be double of something.
But
(or someone)
nor a horse, horse of any
aman is not said to be man of anything,
said to be a color;
Now the color of Felix
is, of course,
thing.
to
But it is a color
be
color
is
said
it
the
indeed,
of something.
of the form 'a <pof s' or 'the <p
individual only under a description
And the color of Felix is certainly not the-color-of-Felix
of s\
of
the color of Felix is not a relative and, more
Therefore
anything.
are not relatives.26
quality individuals
generally,
that quality
individuals
To say this is not to deny, of course,
and ontologically
have a status that is both
dependent.
logically
of a
insofar as the designation
Their status is logically dependent
a
of
individual
includes
the
substance
designation
primary
quality
for example,
the name of Felix),
includes
('the color of Felix',
a primary

whereas

26

The

a relative

substance

following
in Aristotle's

Aristotelian
sense,
father

may

be designated

without

be instructive.
may
parallel
it is said to be what
it is
in Aristotle's
of Socrates
is not,
for

But
the
of something.
for it is not said to be what
tive,
a double
is a relative
Similarly,
(a double)
of something.
it is?the
said to be what
be gleaned
would
call
of

s* need

designat

father

a
(i.e.,
sense,

is

father)
a rela

of Socrates)
it is (i.e.,
father
of anything.
for Aristotle,
it is said to be what
since
it is
of five is not a relative,
But
for it is not
the double
to
The general
double
of five?of
point
anything.

from
if V
these
is this. Even
examples
a relative,
and
it is said to be a p because
a relative.
not denote

denotes
it is the

what
<pof

Aristotle
s,

'the

<p

THE ONE AND THE MANY

655

Their status is ontologically

of a given quality
individual
existence
of
the
the
presupposes
substance,
appropriate
primary
But all this fits perfectly under
though not the other way around.
the Aristotelian
"If there were no primary
there
motto,
substances,
ing any particular
quality individual.
as the existence
insofar
dependent

could not be anything

else" (2b5-6).
It is easy to see that the notion of a quality individual
sketched
above leaves unaltered
the Aristotelian
point that quality attribution
is classification.
This means
that the philosophical
advantages
own
to
account
Aristotle's
will also fall to this account
assigned
of quality
to Plato will
attribution.
the basic answer
Moreover,
as before.
to the One-Over-Many
it
According
Argument
is by virtue of the one thing, greyness,
that the many
things, Felix,
can be properly
Fern and Felicia,
called grey.
Fenimore,
No, we
can say with Aristotle,
it is not by virtue of any one thing "over
the
that
all
these cats are properly called grey.
It is
many
against"
remain

rather by virtue of the fact that the color of each one is properly
as a grey that they are all to be called grey.
classified
Greyness,
is a classification.
And there being a clas
like man and animal,
sification
of a certain sort is a fact correlative with
there being
the classification
in the way
in question would
things classifiable
classify

them.
University

of Minnesota.