World Development Vol. 75, pp.

2645, 2015
0305-750X/ 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.01.010

Diverging Visions on Political Conditionality: The Role

of Domestic Politics and International Socialization
in French and British Aid
DAMIANO dE FELICE*
London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom
Summary. This article shows that and explains why the United Kingdom has internalized political conditionality to a larger extent
than France. The assessment part is based on the analysis of policy documents, international agreements, and two hard cases
(Mozambique and Zimbabwe). Variation between the two countries is explained by the existence of clearer lines of accountability for
British aid decision-makers, stricter scrutiny by British media, and stronger social pressure from Nordic donors. Evidence does not
support the explanatory power of material interests, party politics, level of parliamentary control, and socialization processes within
the Commonwealth (versus the International Organization of La Francophonie).
2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Key words aid, political conditionality, human rights, Europe, United Kingdom, France

1. INTRODUCTION

raise political governance issues through its dialog on budget

support with partner governmentswith the clear focus on
commitment to fundamental values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (European Scrutiny Committee,
2011).
This article shows that and explains why the UK has internalized political conditionality to a larger extent than France.
Assessment of internalization is based on a three-fold measurement framework (policy statements, legal texts and state
behavior). The analysis of around 70 strategy papers and
international agreements is corroborated by the examination
of two hard cases (Mozambique and Zimbabwe). Explanation of internalization combines a Most Similar Systems
Design with process-tracing. In order to test the relative
explanatory power of material interests, domestic politics,
international socialization pressures, and organizational cultures, information from primary sources (such as independent
newspapers articles, government evaluation reports and
diplomatic cables) was triangulated with semi-structured interviews with more than 100 ocials who are working or have
worked for French and British institutions, and aid practitioners who are working or have worked for other donors or for
development/human rights NGOs. 2
The article oers two main contributions to the existing literature on aid, human rights, and democracy. First, it enlarges

After the end of the Cold War, France and the United Kingdom (UK) were among the rst donors to signal parallel policy changes in favor of political conditionality, that is, the
norm by which the allocation and disbursement of bilateral
development assistance should depend on respect for human
rights and democratic principles by recipient governments.
On June 6, 1990, the British Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Aairs Douglas Hurd stated that governments which persist with repressive policies, corrupt management, wasteful and discredited economic systems should
not expect us to support their folly with scarce aid resources
(quoted in Robinson, 1993a, p. 88). On June 20, 1990, the
French President, Francois Mitterand (1990a), concluded the
Franco-African Summit at La Baule by arming that France
will bind all its [aid] contributions to the eorts that will be
made to move towards more freedom.
This novelty was not to be an ephemeral moment for the
donor community; political conditionality was subsequently
hailed as the core of the post-Cold War international aid
regime (Gibbon, 1993, p. 36), a strongly coercive trend
(Baylies, 1995, p. 328), and a new standard in development
cooperation (Arts, 2000, p. 1). In 2007, Carey (2007, p. 460)
commented that international norms still legitimize and even
encourage such donor behavior.
Against this background, it is puzzling to discover that
today Paris and London hold strikingly dierent views with
respect to political conditionality. In 2011, during the consultation on the Green Paper The future of European Union
(EU) budget support to third countries, the European
Commission (2011) explicitly asked: should budget support
programs make more use of political governance conditionality?. 1 The French government argued that budget support
cannot be conceived as an instrument to promote values and
policy objectives, except if you want to divert the purpose,
that is, to support the national strategies to ght against
poverty, elaborated by partner countries (French Ministry
of Foreign, 2011b). In contrast, the UK stressed the need to

* Earlier versions of this article were presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions
of Workshops in Mainz, Germany, in March 2013, and at the EISA PanEuropean Conference on International Relations in Warsaw, Poland, in
September 2013. I am extremely grateful to the participants in these events
for their helpful commentsin particular to Karen Del Biondo, Jonathan
Fisher, Christine Hackenesch, Wil Hout, Svea Koch and Clara Portela.
Advice and support from Sebastian Dellepiane, Jorg Faust and Nadia
Molenaers have been invaluable, and I would like to thank them sincerely
too, together with Karen E. Smith, Chris Alden, Roberto Roccu, Benedetta Voltolini and three anonymous reviewers. Finally, I would like to
thank the numerous British and French ocials who responded promptly
and thoroughly to my persistent questions. All errors are my own.
26

DIVERGING VISIONS ON POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY

the scope of investigation to the analysis of international

agreements and policy documents. Past research on political
conditionality has given almost exclusive attention to the
behavioral aspect of this norm. Quantitative researchers have
explored whether human rights records have inuenced
donors decisions on (a) who their recipient governments
should be and (b) how much aid these governments should
receive (for instance, on US aid allocation see Abrams &
Lewis, 1993; Apodaca & Stohl, 1999; Cingranelli &
Pasquarello, 1985; Poe & Meernik, 1995; Schoultz, 1981).
Qualitative studies have concentrated on specic cases when
donors applied (or did not apply) aid sanctions (Renard &
Reyntjens, 1995; Schulte Nordholt, 1995; Stokke, 1995;
Waller, 1995). In contrast, comparative research on political
conditionality and international agreements is non-existent,
and only a couple of researchers have looked at the policy
agendas of dierent donors on a comparative basis (Barratt,
2008; Crawford, 2001).
Second, past studies have shown that some donors apply
political conditionality more consistently than others. For
instance, numerous statistical analyses have contrasted the
inuence of human rights concerns on aid allocation by dierent donors (Berthelemy, 2006; Carey, 2007; Clist, 2011; Dollar
& Levin, 2006; Hoeer & Outram, 2011; Neumayer, 2003;
Younas, 2008; Zanger, 2000), and qualitative researchers compared donors responses to specic cases of human rights
violations and democracy setbacks (Crawford, 2001, pp.
163181). However, while variation was established, no eort
was made to explain it. This article builds on the only study
that has explored why (not only that) donors internalize political conditionality to dierent degrees (Cumming, 2001), but
expands its analysis to 2012 and tests new relevant hypotheses
(for instance, Cumming overlooked the potential inuence of
organizational cultures and international social pressures from
like-minded donors and international organizations).
The article is structured as follows. The second section justies the selection of France and the UK. The third section
compares the two donors on the basis of (1) endorsement of
political conditionality in policy documents, (2) inclusion of
human rights clauses in international agreements, and (3) willingness to adopt aid sanctions in response to human rights
violations or democratic setbacks in recipient countries. The
fourth section embraces analytic eclecticism and tests four
dierent hypotheses that can explain variation across the
Channel. The conclusion summarizes the main ndings of
the article and recommends a potential avenue for future
research.
2. SELECTION OF FRANCE AND THE UK
The Most Similar Systems Design (or Mills Method of Difference) suggests comparing cases that are as similar as possible, except with regard to the dependent variable. The
ambition is to keep constant the highest possible number of
independent variables (Anckar, 2008; Yin, 2009, pp. 6467).
Bearing this in mind, the selection of donors for this research
was narrowed down through a two-step process.
To begin with, the universe of potential cases was restricted
to EU Member States. The EU as a whole is one of the most
enthusiastic devotees of political conditionality. Since 1990,
the Commission and EU Member States have consistently
inserted a human rights clause in all their development
agreements with third countries (Bartels, 2004; Horng,
2003). In addition, EU aid has been suspended, redirected,

27

or withdrawn in 56 cases, an average of three times per year

(see Table 1).
Strong internalization of political conditionality by EU
institutions encourages a similar position to be held by France
and the UK for two main reasons. On the one hand, aid sanctions are usually decided through unanimous agreement within the Council. This means that when EU aid is suspended,
reduced or redirected, Member States have agreed on the
appropriateness of these measures. Second, the academic literature on Europeanization has persuasively demonstrated
the harmonizing power of EU institutions with respect to
member States politics and policies (Featherstone &
Radaelli, 2003; Ladrech, 2010), even in areas complementary
to foreign aid, including foreign policy (Tonra, 2001; Wong
& Hill, 2011).
Within the EU, the article selected France and the UK
because of their similarities as middle-ranking powers, nuclear-weapon States, permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council, former colonial empires and human rights
homelands. Moreover, in 1998 the Heads of State and
Government of the two countries met in Saint-Malo, and
agreed on a declaration putting an end to Anglo-French rivalry in Africa (Chafer & Cumming, 2010). This initiative established the basis for . . . harmonizing policies and the overall
approach toward the continent (Jones-Parry, 2011, p. x),
and led to initiatives like cooperation between Heads of Mission in individual countries and informal dialog within European fora (including the Africa Working Group and the
General Aairs and External Relations Council, that is, where
political conditionality is discussed) (Cumming, 2011, p. 59).
As Africa represents by far the most recurrent target of European aid sanctions, Saint-Malo should have led to enhanced
understanding between both countries.
3. ANALYSIS OF VARIATION
Assessing the signicance of human rights norms in the foreign policy of a specic country is a dicult exercise. As highlighted by Brysk, some countries claim more than they
produce . . . in order to gain international reputation. Conversely, principled promoters often under-assess their own
eorts, discounting modest gains relative to unfullled aspirations (2009, pp. 1920). Past literature in IR oers little help.
For instance, Cortell and Davis commented that scholars
repeatedly conclude that domestic salience is crucial to many
cases of states compliance with international norms, but they
rarely provide denitions or operational measures for the concept and, instead, merely assert that the norm in question was
salient (2000, p. 67).
This article argues that, if we accept the denition of a norm
as a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given
identity (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 819), norm internalization has three fundamental indicators when applied to
donor countries:
1. Policy documents. Since a norm is a standard of appropriate behavior, and appropriateness is communicatively
shared, a salient norm is referred to by the State to justify
its behavior.
2. Legal texts. Since a norm is a standard of appropriate
behavior, a salient norm is institutionalized into the documents that regulate development cooperation.
3. State actions. Since a norm is a standard of appropriate
behavior, a salient norm is acted upon by the State (for a
similar three-fold measure, see Farrell, 2001, p. 79). 3

28

WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Table 1. European Union aid sanctions during 19912013
Aid sanctions decided by the Council after consultations under a human rights clause
Central African Republic
Union of the Comoros
Republic of Cote dIvoire
Republic of Fiji
Republic of Guinea
Republic of Guinea-Bissau
Republic of Haiti
Republic of Liberia
Republic of Madagascar
Islamic Republic of Mauritania
Republic of Niger
Republic of Togo
Republic of Zimbabwe

2003
2000
2000 and 2001
2001 and 2007
2005 and 2009
2011
2001
2002 and 2003
2010
2006 and 2009
1996, 1999, 2010
1998 and 2004
2002
Aid sanctions decided by the Council

Republic of Belarus

1997
Aid sanctions decided by the Commission

Republic of the Union of Myanmar

Republic of Burundi
Kingdom of Cambodia
Central African Republic
Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros
Republic of the Congo
Republic of Croatia
Republic of Djibouti
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Republic of Equatorial Guinea
Republic of The Gambia
Republic of Guatemala
Republic of Haiti
Republic of Honduras
Republic of Kenya
Republic of Malawi
Republic of Mali
Republic of Mozambique
Republic of Nicaragua
Federal Republic of Nigeria
Republic of Peru
Republic of Rwanda
Russian Federation
Republic of Serbia
Republic of Sierra Leone
Syrian Arab Republic
Republic of Tajikistan
Togolese Republic
Republic of Uzbekistan
Zanzibar

1991
1993 and 1997
1997
1996
1995
1997
1995
1991
1992
1992
1994
1993
1991 and 1997
2009
1991
1992
2012
2009
2009
1993 and 1995
1992 and 2000
1994
2000
1998
1997
2011
1998
1992
2005
1997

Sources: Bakari (2001), Bartels (2008), Bradley (2005), Brandtner & Rosas (1998), Brown (2005), Crawford (2001), da Camara & Ferreira (2001),
European Commission (2000), Fierro (2003), Hayman (2011), Hazelzet (2001), Ihonvbere (1997), Kreutz (2005), Laakso et al. (2007), Portela (2010),
Saltnes (2013), Smith (2013), Uvin (1993) and Zimelis (2011).

(a) Analysis of variation in policy documents and legal texts

At the discursive level, internalization of political conditionality is deep when ministerial speeches and strategy papers
habitually refer to respect for human rights as a pre-condition
for aid allocation and disbursement. Internalization is moderate in case of doubts about the eectiveness of aid sanctions.
For instance, donors may worry about the negative consequences of reducing resources in favor of the poor population,
or favor the strategy to strengthen economic and political links
with repressive regimes thus engendering a process of internal
change (Lavin, 1996; Smith, 1998). Internalization is shallow

when non-compliance is explicitly justied by reference to

the inappropriateness of the norm. For example, new donors
reject political conditionality as an act of neo-imperialism
(Barya, 1993).
As regards legal texts, international agreements with recipient countries oer the opportunity to establish reciprocal obligations and clarify the conditions for the implementation of
development projects. Deep internalization of political conditionality pushes donors to systematically include a human
rights clause which species that lack of respect for human
rights and fundamental democratic principles can lead to suspension or cancelation of aid programs. As an example, the

DIVERGING VISIONS ON POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY

standard format for program support agreements signed by

the Government of Denmark plainly arms that respect
for human rights, democratic principles, including free and
fair elections . . . constitute essential elements of the instrument, and that in case of violation of the essential elements
. . . the Government of Denmark reserves the right to suspend
with immediate eect further disbursements to the implementing partners (Government of Denmark, 2010).
(i) France
The discourse by Mitterand at La Baule on June 20, 1991
seems to indicate strong support of political conditionality.
However, its signicance should not be overestimated. At a
press conference organized the day after the event, Mitterand
claried that each country should set the terms and pace of
its own reform (Mitterand, 1990b). At the 1992 FrancoAfrican Summit, the French Prime Minister Pierre Beregovoy
privately explained that among potentially conicting goals,
security ranked rst, development should be pursued second
and only then could democratization be tackled (Renou,
2002, p. 18). In 1993, the French Minister of Foreign Aairs,
Roland Daums, stated that economic reform should have
priority over democratization (Sadie, 2002, p. 60).
The 2006 strategy paper Governance Strategy for French
Development Assistance, approved by the International
Interministerial Cooperation and Development Committee
(CICID), oers compelling evidence of disinclination against
political conditionality. French policy-makers explicitly
acknowledge deep internalization of the norm by the UK:
other bilateral agencies have broadened their concerns to
encompass a democratic agenda promoting a sound internal
political base as a prerequisite for more successful development programs. These agencies place great emphasis on governance issues, as can be seen in the latest white paper on
poverty and governance by Britains Department for International Development (French Ministry of Foreign, 2006, p. 3).
In contrast, conditionality is expressly ruled out in French
development cooperation. The basic idea is that a turnkey
human rights and democratic development model becomes
contradictory if it means that local choices are pre-empted.
As such, the quality of cooperation should not be measured
so much by its ability to lay down universal standards
manipulated in the abstract through conditionality as it should
be assessed by its ability to provide each partner with specic
experience and expertise to enable them to develop their own
policies (French Ministry of Foreign & European Aairs,
2006, p. 16). 4
This position was subsequently conrmed by numerous policy documents. For instance, French budgetary aid is dispensed on the basis of a Doctrine for the use of general
budget support in foreign States adopted in February 2007.
Recipient countries should meet three conditions in order to
be eligible for general budget support: a sound and sustainable
macroeconomic policy, a growth and poverty-reduction strategy in line with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
and a favorable assessment of the public nancial management system (CICID, 2007). No human rights pre-requisite
is included.
In 2011, the French government adopted its rst long-term
policy strategy: Development Cooperation: A French
Vision. The document reiterated that France decided to
move from a development assistance policy which implies
an asymmetrical donorbeneciary relationship over to a policy of cooperation with developing countries (French
Ministry of Foreign, 2011a, p. 6). This entails that cooperation policy . . . should not use an unequal balance of power

29

to impose a particular form of governance on its partners.

Support for good governance comes up against the limits,
encountered by any outside party, of non- interference in the
political and social balance of a sovereign country (French
Ministry of Foreign & European Aairs, 2011a, p. 33).
As far as development agreements are concerned, France
mainly concludes three types of legal instruments with recipient countries:
 Friendship and Cooperation Treaties,
 Partnership Framework Documents, and
 Debt Reduction and Development Contracts.
One of the most detailed Friendship and Cooperation
Treaty between France and a developing country was signed
with Afghanistan in January 2012. This instrument, which
covers development cooperation, mentions human rights in
the preamble with the Parties concluding the agreement by
rearming their commitment to the principles of national
sovereignty, democracy, human rights and equality between
men and women enrolled in their Constitution. However, this
reference is evidently weak, not only because of its marginal
place (the preamble has no hard law eects), but also for
the juxtaposition of the concept of national sovereignty.
Democratic governance and rule of law are also considered,
but only as elds to be supported, not as conditions of the
agreement (Article 8). The lack of any political conditionality
is conrmed by the scant termination clause: this treaty may
be terminated in writing by either of Parties with three
months notice through diplomatic channels (Article 13).
In 2004, the CICID institutionalized the preparation of
Partnership Framework Documents (Documents Cadre de
Partenariat, DCP) in order to set the priorities of French aid
in its priority countries. DCPs are signed by both France
and the recipient government for a ve-year term, and are
drafted in accordance with the partner countrys development
strategy. French DCPs never include human rights clauses.
When reference to human rights is present, this is only to mention projects related to the enhancement of the rule of law. For
instance, the DCP signed with Ethiopia in 2006 includes a section (4.2.1.1) titled Support to the judiciary and law
reforms, under which France committed to contribute to
the following activities to strengthening of democracy, the private sector and access to justice: . . . to support the training
institute for judges and prosecutors.
Debt Reduction and Development Contracts (C2Ds) are
Frances bilateral instrument for reducing debt incurred as
part of development assistance. They are signed and implemented after the completion point of the multilateral Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries initiative and are added to the debt
cancelations granted through the Paris Club. Since 2000,
numerous countries under human rights scrutiny have signed
C2Ds, including Uganda (2002), Mauritania (2003 and
2006), Madagascar (2005) and Cameroon (2006). None of these contracts and none of the relevant reports submitted to the
National Assembly have ever mentioned human rights.
(ii) United Kingdom
Since the end of the Cold War, British governments from
both sides of the political spectrum have recurrently endorsed
political conditionality. In 1997, the newly elected Labour
government created the Department of International Development (DfID). The rst DfID white paper expressly requested
recipient governments to pursue policies which promote
responsive and accountable government, recognizing that governments have obligations to all their people [and] promote
the enjoyment of civil, cultural, economic, political and social
rights (DfID, 1997, p. 39). In 2005, DfID, the Treasury and

30

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

the Foreign and Commonwealth Oce (FCO) jointly adopted

a document titled Partnerships for poverty reduction:
rethinking conditionality, and set out the circumstances in
which the UK would consider modifying existing aid commitments. The three ministries argued that an eective aid partnership should be based on a shared commitment to three
objectives:
1. reducing poverty and achieving the MDGs;
2. respecting human rights and other international obligations; and
3. strengthening nancial management and accountability
(DfID, 2005, pp. 1, 8).
The option of reducing or interrupting aid has to be considered when, among other conditions, countries are in signicant violation of human rights or other international
obligations (DfID, 2005, pp. 3, 9).
Since 2005, the conditionality policy has been continuously
rearmed (see DfID, 2008, 2009). Importantly, this approach
has also been conrmed by the most recent Coalition government. In July 2011, DfID published a Technical Note on
Implementing DfIDs strengthened approach to budget support. In considering whether to give budget support, the
UK will continue to assess governments against the three
commitments, and it will place even more emphasis on
domestic accountability (DfID, 2011, p. 1).
Besides embracing political conditionality in policy documents, the UK has consistently inserted a reference to the
existence of shared commitments to respect human rights
in its international agreements with developing countries
(including overarching bilateral partnership arrangements
and joint minutes of aid talks). For instance, the UK have
signed several Development Partnerships Agreements
(DPAs) with developing countries, among which Afghanistan (2005), Vietnam (2006), Zambia (2006), Yemen (2007)
and Uganda (2007). Development Partnership Arrangements
(DPAs) are international agreements that set out the annual
volume of aid that DfID expects to allocate to a partner
country over a ten-year period. All of these DPAs include
a human rights clause within the Basis of the Partnership,
which reads as follows: Our development partnership in
[Country X] is based on commitment to the following three
objectives: (i) Reducing poverty and achieving the MDGs in
[Country X]; (ii) Respecting human rights and other relevant international obligations; (iii) Strengthening nancial
management and accountability and reducing the risk of
funds being misused through weak administration or corruption.
Unlike DPAs, Bilateral Memoranda of Understanding with
developing countries do not feature a standardized formula
for the human rights clause. However, the large majority is
based on a mutual pledge to respect human rights. For
instance, in 2006 the Governments of the UK and Rwanda
jointly committed themselves to, inter alia, the promotion
and protection of the full range of human rights of all Rwandans (Article 6). Article 8 and 9 expressly regulate the termination of the agreement in case of alleged human rights
violations: [s]hould either Government believe that the other
has taken or plans to take action incompatible with a commitment within the MoU, then the parties will meet to formally
record the concern, draw attention to the potential implications of a failure to honor a commitment, and discuss what
remedial action might be taken. If after substantive discussions either party continues to have signicant concerns, then
the UKs program of assistance to the Government of
Rwanda may be recongured or, in extreme circumstances,
terminated.

(b) Analysis of variation in behavior

History oers innumerable examples of divergence between
words and deeds. Following the argument that the preferences of policy-makers are revealed by the choices governments make about resource allocation (Barratt, 2008, p.
208), many researchers have used econometric techniques to
investigate the inuence of potential recipients human rights
performance on aid allocation by bilateral donors, including
France and the United Kingdom. Table 2 oers a comprehensive overview of their results.
As can be seen, there is almost unanimous consensus that
human rights matter less in France than in the UK.
These ndings oer a useful starting point to assess the
application of political conditionality. However, statistical
analyses rely upon imperfect measures of aid sanctions. 5 This
means that in an area as complex as aid, it is very possible
that considerations can have important eects that are not
easily captured in aggregate analyses . . . Perhaps the most
direct way of looking at the nuanced ways that a consideration
such as human rights can have an eect is by looking at individual decisions themselves (Barratt, 2008, p. 116; see also
Crawford, 2001, p. 8). This is particularly true also because
qualitative analysis provides important insights into how
norms shape both events (donors may oer dierent reasons
to suspend aid, such as human rights abuses or macro-economic imbalances) and non-events (only some donors may
justify the non-application of the norm, thus implicitly
acknowledging its salience) (Checkel, 1999, p. 87).
Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986, pp. 766769)) argued long
ago that norms serve as reasons for action rather than immediate causes, and that any explanation that seeks to invoke
norms must do more than point to the existence of norms
on the one hand, and norm-consistent behavior on the other.
Past qualitative research strongly suggests that France has
been less willing than the UK to apply political conditionality.
Uvin found that, in comparison with other major donors, the
French policy toward political conditionality is much more
modest . . . Generally spoken, its position continues to be
one of silent support for the prevailing regimes in its former
colonies (Uvin, 1993, p. 66). Cumming concluded that in
the 1990s there was a radical shift with the introduction of
political conditionality, but this has gradually been watered
down by France, and, to a lesser extent, the UK
(Cumming, 2001, p. 340).
Space constraints preclude for a comprehensive analysis of
numerous qualitative studies. Since past research has already
oered preliminary support to the thesis of the article, the
remaining part of this section limits itself to oer some conrmatory evidence from the brief analysis of two additional cases. Research design rules suggest selecting the hardest possible
cases where one would expect conrmation of the starting
hypothesis that the UK is more willing than France to apply
aid sanctions. These cases oer the strongest possible evidence
that the hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence
(Bennett, 2004; King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994).
First, the article focuses on Mozambique, a recipient country where both France and the UK are considered to be key
donors (Manning & Malbrough, 2010, p. 149). The similarity
of the donorrecipient relationships makes Mozambique an
exceptional case where Paris and London can be directly contrasted one against the other. In addition, Mozambique is frequently cited as a best case of donor harmonization (Brutsch,
2014, p. 219). High levels of donor coordination enhance the
expectation that the two donors should have behaved in
similar ways.

Table 2. Findings of past quantitative studies on determinants of aid allocation by France and the United Kingdom
Article

Scope

Relevant variable(s)

Svensson (1999)

Sample restricted to the 1990s Democracy

Alesina and
Dollar (2000)
Zanger (2000)

From 1970 to 1994

From 1991 to 1995

From 1985 to 1997

Berthelemy and
Tichit (2004)

From 1980 to 1999

Dollar and
Levin (2006)
Carey (2007)

From 1990 to 1994,

from 1995 to 1999,
from 2000 to 2003
From 1978 to 2003

Younas (2008)

From 1992 to 2003

Clist (2011)

From 1982 to 2006

Hoeer and
Outram (2011)

From 1980 to 2004

United Kingdom
The relationship between aid ows and
democracy is signicantly positive

One of the strongest positive responses to

democratic institutions
Democracy, democratization and
Countries that moved toward democracy
human rights abuses
beneted from more aid during 199195; in addition,
the UK gives less aid the more human rights
violations in a country. However, those countries
with extremely bad human rights records
appear to receive more aid
Personal integrity rights, and civil
Higher share of aid to countries with Higher share of aid to countries with a
and political rights
a good record in personal integrity
good record in both personal integrity rights,
rights. Yet, the opposite is true for
and civil and political rights
civil and political rights
Signicantly positive parameters for the democracy dummies
Civil and political rights
Negative parameters for the
democracy dummies. This bias has
receded in the 1990s
Democracy
The relationship between aid ows
The relationship between aid ows and democracy levels is
and democracy levels is signicantly always signicantly positive
positive only during 200003
Absolute levels and improvements of Four times more likely to give aid to Twice as likely to give aid to a country with widespread
personal integrity rights,
a country that substantially improved repression compared with a country with no life integrity
violations. However, the UK was more likely to choose
democracy and democratization
its respect for human rights; in
democratic countries as recipients
addition, more likely to choose
democratic countries as recipient.
However, France did not stop giving
aid when the human rights situation
worsened. Moreover, France did not
reward human rights improvements
with larger aid ows
Civil and political rights
The relationship between aid ows
Only donor for which the relationship between aid ows
and human rights is not signicant
and human rights is signicant
Personal integrity rights, and civil and The level of recipient governance is
The level of recipient governance is not a major
political rights
not a major determinant of aid ows determinant of aid ows
Personal integrity rights, and civil and France places little importance on
The UK allocates more aid to countries with higher
political rights
recipient merits
democracy scores and fewer human rights abuses

DIVERGING VISIONS ON POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY

Neumayer
(2003)

Democracy

France
The relationship between aid ows
and democracy is signicantly
negative
No attention to democracy levels in
receiving countries
No democracy or human rights
variable has any eect on aid ows

31

32

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

Second, the article focuses on a recipient country with a special relationship with the UK. Such a case represents a hard
test because the hypothesis is that the UK has internalized
political conditionality to a larger degree than France. If the
UK applies political conditionality in a case where it has
strong interests to defend, the adoption of the norm can be
considered particularly strong. If France is against the application of political conditionality in a case where it has less pressing objectives to pursue, the adoption of the norm can be
considered particularly weak. Between Fiji and Zimbabwe
the two former British colonies which have been subject to
EU aid sanctions under the human rights clausethe article
concentrates on Zimbabwe because of the larger size of both
British and French aid programs in this country.
(a) Mozambique 6
A couple of months before the 2009 Mozambican elections,
a new political party, the Democratic Movement of Mozambique, was barred from running in nine of the thirteen parliamentary regions (Astill-Brown & Weimer, 2010, p. 8;
Manning, 2010, p. 156). In addition, on the day of the elections, independent observers documented widespread irregularities, including ballot stung and tabulation frauds (Hanlon,
2010, p. 92; Lloyd, 2012, pp. 25). In response to these events
(but also as a consequence of wider economic and political
concerns), in December 2009, the Group of 19 budget support
donors (G19) went on strike, freezing all contributions for
2010 (Aid Strike in Maputo, 2010).
Even though all G19 countries signed the letter that
informed the Mozambican government of the donor strike,
heated discussions took place on the appropriate course of
action. Foreign diplomats report that the hardliners included
the Nordics, Netherlands, UK, Ireland, Switzerland, and
Canada. On the other end of the spectrum were Spain, Italy,
France, and Portugal. 7
The most important news agency in Maputo conrmed
Frances adoption of a soft stance: some of the smaller budget support contributors (such as Portugal, Italy and France)
have made it clear that they are not in favor of withholding
funds (Government & Donors Claim Consensus, 2010).
Local commentators also interpreted a trip of the French Secretary of State for Foreign Trade, Anne-Marie Idrac, to
Maputo at the beginning of March 2010 as an indication that
France, like Portugal and Italy, does not regard the donor
strike as a useful tactic (No Indication That Donors Will
End Support, 2010).
With respect to the UK, the willingness to apply aid sanctions is conrmed by a diplomatic cable from the US Ambassador, who reported that the UK High Commissioner, along
with the DFID representative, were rm in supporting the
immediate declaration of a breach, an announcement of a reallocation of some amount of budget support to other projects,
and the commencement of negotiations with the government
of Mozambique to reach an agreement on steps which must
be taken to restore the totality of budget support
(Wikileaks, 2009, para. 4). Interestingly, for the UK the strike
did not mean only the temporary suspension of disbursements.
At the ceremony when aid commitments were eventually delivered, the G19 announced that several donors could have
increased their budget support but chose not to; newspapers
singled out Britain and the Netherlands (No Budget
Support Received So Far This Year, 2010). In June 2014 Britain even announced that DfID would not disburse general
budget support to Mozambique any more (Aid Row
Escalates, 2014). There would instead be new forms of aid,

tied to indicators on good governance (Mozambique: UK

Ends Direct Budget Support to Mozambique, 2014).
(b) Zimbabwe
In 2000, Robert Mugabe proposed a constitutional referendum to grant himself the right to stand as President for another
two terms and permit the conscation of white-owned land
without compensation (Sachikonye, 2002; Scarnecchia, 2006).
The failure of the referendum represented a watershed moment
for future human rights violations and electoral irregularities in
the country. Since then, Mugabe fastened the illegal processes
of land acquisition and worsened human rights abuses against
political opponents (Hellum & Derman, 2004; HowardHassmann, 2010). Mugabe also blatantly rigged the subsequent parliamentary and presidential elections, in 2000 and
2002 respectively (Bush & Szeftel, 2002; Raftopoulos, 2002).
In response to these events, the EU adopted aid sanctions
against Zimbabwe. The EU decision-making process presents
a surprising situation. The UK, which is the former colonial
power with vested interests in the country, lobbied in favor
of the application of appropriate and restrictive measures
(Taylor & Williams, 2002, p. 555). On the contrary, France
(which had never been a large donor in Zimbabwe) adopted
a welcoming approach (Chafer, 2002, p. 352; Cilliers, 2001,
p. 124). The International Crisis Group conrms that the
EU has had diculty speaking with one voice on Zimbabwe: some Member States (the Scandinavians, the Dutch,
and the UK) wanted to act quickly and increase pressure on
Mugabe; others, like France and Belgium, insisted that time
for action was not yet ripe (International Crisis Group,
2002, p. 15).
Variation between France and the UK is also evident if one
looks at their bilateral relationships with the country. According to Addison and Laakso, the UK has been most active in
applying diplomatic pressure against Mugabe (Addison &
Laakso, 2003, p. 468). Since 2001, DfID had stopped all
operations with the government, and channeled all aid
through multilateral organizations or NGOs (International
Development Committee, 2010, Chapter 4). In contrast,
France extended bilateral development cooperation with
Zimbabwe at the same time most of the other EU countries
were drastically reducing cooperation (Grebe, 2010, p. 13).
The soft stance adopted by France is conrmed by other
researchers: EU Member States and the EC delegation have
coordinated their positions through Heads of Missions
(HOMs) meetings. The UK, for example, organized regular
meetings during its Presidency . . . Such cooperation excludes
some Member States: most importantly France, which today
is one of the largest creditors to Zimbabwe (Laakso,
Kivimaki, & Seppanen, 2007, p. 71). In its resolution of
September 6, 2001, the European Parliament took the uncommon step to directly criticize the French government, stating
that whereas most [EU] Member States have substantially
cut or suspended their nancial support and development
aid to Zimbabwe, . . . France had signicantly increased its
engagement, and called on Paris to adhere to the line taken
by the other Member States (European Parliament, 2001). 8
4. EXPLANATION OF VARIATION
(a) Analytic eclecticism
The complexities of aid decision-making defy simple
explanations. In one of the most acclaimed overviews of

DIVERGING VISIONS ON POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY

contemporary aid, Lancaster (2007, p. 9) denied the possibility

of creating an overarching framework to explain development
assistance explicitly because there are too many interacting
variables to justify a model that would be both parsimonious
and insightful. Chafer and Cumming (2011, p. 9) similarly
argued that French and British bilateral cooperation cannot
be understood without disaggregating the state[s] and including strong focus on the perceptions, interest and ideas of elite
policy-makers, not to mention institutional constraints and
other domestic variables.
These comments pushed the author to go beyond paradigmatic boundaries and adopt analytic eclecticism. Analytic
eclecticism acknowledges the complexities and messiness of
everyday politics and explores how diverse mechanisms posited in competing paradigm-bound theories might interact with
each other (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010, p. 10). This does not
imply that anything goes: eclectic work needs to be assessed
in relation to available evidence and alternative arguments.
However, analytic eclecticism avoids the risk that a lack of
integration among multiple paradigms can become a hindrance to understanding (Hirschman, 1970, p. 329).
The article concentrates on four factors that can explain a
dierent attitude to political conditionality across the Channel: material interests, international socialization processes,
domestic politics and organizational cultures. 9 Table 3 lists
all relevant hypotheses. The section that follows elaborates
on their theoretical basis.
(b) Hypotheses
(i) Realism
Scholars adhering to rationalist and materialist schools of
thought such as realism argue that norms constitute nothing
but ex post rationalizations of strategic interests such as security and/or wealth (Gilpin, 1983; Waltz, 1979). Following this
line of reasoning, a countrys approach to political conditionality would be the consequence of pre-determined priorities in
terms of (1) favorite recipients and/or (2) sanction decisions. A
donor would appear to internalize political conditionality if
the recipient countries that are suggested by its material interests are in the majority good human rights performers, and/or
if sanction decisions (which are in reality dictated by its material interests) can be masked through normative language. In
both cases, political conditionality would merely represent
window-dressing (for two materialist accounts of aid motivations, see Hook, 1995; Liska, 1960). 10

(ii) International constructivism

In contrast with the realist focus on materiality and rationality, international constructivism argues that the behavior of
states is norm-driven (not goal-oriented) and that norms are
constructed (as well as deconstructed) through social interaction at the international level (Ruggie, 1998; Wendt,
1999). 11 Foreign policies are similar (or dissimilar) when
states construct their identities (and therefore internalize the
norms dictated by these identities) together with (or against)
each other (Boekle, Rittberger, & Wagner, 2001). Variation
between France and the UK can be explained by reference
to the fact that the two donors belong to groups of states
which assign dierent levels of importance to political conditionality. Options include:
 the Nordic Plus group (which encompasses the UK but
not France), and
 the Commonwealth of Nations versus the International
Organization of La Francophonie (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, OIF).
(iii) Liberalism
Unlike realism and international constructivism, and
against long-lasting assumptions dismissing the inuence of
domestic accountability on foreign policy decisions
(Almond, 1950; Lippmann, 1922), liberalism proposes that
states are autistic (that is, they interact badly with the
material and social international environment). Their foreign
policies are therefore primarily determined by the interests of
dominant local actors (Moravcsik, 1997). 12 Past research has
shown that domestic politics play an important role in aid
decision-making (Jorg Faust, 2008; Milner & Tingley, 2010;
Ruttan, 1996), Scholars working on political conditionality
have specically suggested four variables that can inuence
the application of this norm:
 Parliamentary scrutiny. According to Zorbas, aid ocials
in Rwanda insisted that their support was not unconditional, for one simple reason: We are accountable to our Parliament and our public (Zorbas, 2011, p. 109; see also
Walldorf, 2008, pp. 841).
 Media pressure. Barratt commented that donors become
especially sensitive to their obligation to protect these rights
elsewhere when violations are widely publicized (2008, p.
15; van Belle & Hook, 2000, p. 342).
 Right-wing governments. Faust, Leiderer and Schmitt
suggested that the conservative governments which came
to power in Europe in 2009 and 2010 soon began to assign

Table 3. List of hypotheses to explain variation in the degree of internalization of political conditionality by France and the UK
Research tradition

Hypothesis/hypotheses

Realism

The UK has internalized human rights to a larger extent than France (1) because the most important recipients
of British aid are better human rights performers than the most important recipients of French aid, and/or (2)
because the application of political conditionality could be used by British decision-makers to mask the pursuit of
strategic interests in specic countries

International constructivism The UK has internalized human rights to a larger extent than France because it is the object of stronger social
pressure (through persuasion and/or imitation) within (1) the Nordic Plus Group and/or (2) the Commonwealth
of Nations (versus the International Organization of La Francophonie)
Liberalism

33

The UK has internalized human rights to a larger extent than France because British aid decision-makers are under
stricter domestic scrutiny than their French counterparts

Sociological institutionalism The UK has internalized the norm of political conditionality to a larger extent than France because the
organizational culture of DfID presents a more fertile ground than the organizations cultures of the French
Ministry of Foreign Aairs and/or the French Development Agency

34

WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Table 4. Scores of top 30 recipients of French and British aid on political rights and civil liberties (Freedom in the World) during 200011
United Kingdom

France

Recipient

Average score
20002011

Recipient

Average score
20002011

Nigeria
India
Iraq
Tanzania
Bangladesh
Afghanistan
Ethiopia
Pakistan
Ghana
Uganda
DRC
Sudan
China
Malawi
Zambia
South Africa
Kenya
Mozambique
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Serbia
Nepal
Zimbabwe
Vietnam
Indonesia
Somalia
Cameroon
Yemen
Myanmar
Cambodia
Average Top15
Average Top30

4,17
2,5
6,08
3,5
3,83
5,83
5,17
5,17
1,83
4,71
5,96
7
6,5
3,67
3,79
1,75
3,75
3,42
5,71
3,5
2,25
4,25
6,17
6,21
2,92
6,75
6,04
5,33
6,96
5,54
4,65
4,68

Morocco
Cote dIvoire
Nigeria
Cameroon
Congo, Rep.
DRC
Tunisia
Senegal
China
Iraq
Egypt
Vietnam
Algeria
Madagascar
Indonesia
Lebanon
Turkey
Kenya
Mali
Burkina Faso
Gabon
Niger
Mexico
Pakistan
South Africa
Mozambique
Guinea
Mauritius
Brazil
Ghana
Average Top15
Average Top30

4,63
5,79
4,17
6,04
5,13
5,96
5,5
2,83
6,5
6,08
5,63
6,21
5,5
3,67
2,92
4,83
3,33
3,75
2,33
4,04
4,92
3,71
2,42
5,17
1,75
3,42
5,54
1,42
2,29
1,83
5,10
4,24

Source: Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data (http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world).

more importance to political conditionality and the democracy objectives of the instrument (2012, p. 456; see also
Brech & Potrafke, 2014, p. 73).
 Strong human rights NGOs. Spence argued that criticism
from civil society organizations matters for policymakers
because it can strengthen domestic opponents of the foreign
aid program and may even jeopardize the political survival
of elected ocials (2014, p. 419).
(iv) Sociological institutionalism
Sociological institutionalism emphasizes the role of culture
in explaining the behavior of large organizations (DiMaggio
& Powell, 1991, pp. 141). IR scholars exploited this research
tradition to explore puzzling dierences between organizations
with similar functions in similar countries, such as the army
(Kier, 1995; Legro, 1997). Past research suggests that this
argument can be adapted to aid organizations, and that the
degree of resonance of international norms with specic organizational cultures can explain the inuence of human rights
norms on development practices. For instance, Sarfaty
showed that organizational culture represents one of the main
obstacles to the integration of human rights in the World
Bank (Sarfaty, 2012). Extensive ethnographic research
brought to surface a dominant subculture of economists, both
normatively and practically reluctant to integrate political
and/or legal conceptions into the Banks operations. The

general conclusion is that the ways norms become adopted

and ultimately internalized in an institution largely depend
on their t with the organizational culture (Sarfaty, 2009,
p. 649).
(c) Empirical evidence
(i) Realism
The realist hypothesis is parsimonious. However, it is
unconvincing to explain variation between France and the
UK. As shown in Tables 4 and 5, the top 15 and 30 recipients
of British aid generally have lower scores on personal integrity
rights as well as political rights and civil liberties than the top
French recipients. 13
Since it is London, not Paris, that delivers the larger part of
its assistance in countries with repressive regimes, there is no
material justication for British decision-makers to pay lip service to political conditionality and pretend consistent application of aid sanctions.
This simple test is in line with the results of past statistical
studies. Quantitative analyses have shown that France has
applied political conditionality to a smaller extent than the
UK even if one controls for the confounding eects of economic, strategic, and post-colonial interests. For instance, Alesina and Dollar claried that their ndings are obtained
holding colonial past as constant. Therefore they cannot be

DIVERGING VISIONS ON POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY

35

Table 5. Scores of top 30 recipients of French and British aid on personal integrity rights (Political Terror Scale) during 200011
United Kingdom

France

Recipient

Average score
20002011

Recipient

Average score
20002011

Nigeria
India
Iraq
Tanzania
Bangladesh
Afghanistan
Ethiopia
Pakistan
Ghana
Uganda
DRC
Sudan
China
Malawi
Zambia
South Africa
Kenya
Mozambique
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Serbia
Nepal
Zimbabwe
Vietnam
Indonesia
Somalia
Cameroon
Yemen
Myanmar
Cambodia
Average Top15
Average Top30

3,88
3,88
4,75
2,63
3,75
4,79
3,71
4,13
2,52
3,79
4,83
4,96
4,00
2,54
2,95
3,08
3,42
2,96
3,13
2,79
2,00
4,13
3,75
2,67
3,54
4,33
3,25
3,73
4,29
2,96
3,81
3,57

Morocco
Cote dIvoire
Nigeria
Cameroon
Congo, Rep.
DRC
Tunisia
Senegal
China
Iraq
Egypt
Vietnam
Algeria
Madagascar
Indonesia
Lebanon
Turkey
Kenya
Mali
Burkina Faso
Gabon
Niger
Mexico
Pakistan
South Africa
Mozambique
Guinea
Mauritius
Brazil
Ghana
Average Top15
Average Top30

2,71
3,79
3,88
3,25
2,87
4,83
2,83
2,48
4,00
4,75
3,58
2,67
3,71
2,50
3,54
2,92
3,42
3,42
1,79
2,33
2,42
2,54
3,33
4,13
3,08
2,96
3,17
1,79
3,92
2,52
3,43
3,17

Source: Political Terror Scale Ratings (http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/download.php).

explained by the fact that dierent colonizers have more or less

democratic regimes in former colonies (Alesina & Dollar,
2000, p. 49).
A close look at the case studies presented in the previous
section conrms the weaknesses of the realist hypothesis.
Laakso et al commented that while the UK had a larger concentration of interests in Zimbabwe than any other EU Member State, its approach did not stem from those interests but
rather from principles and values of the Cotonou Agreement.
The British business in the country, for instance, has not
beneted from the smart sanctions (2007, p. 70; see also
Gallagher, 2011, p. 54; Taylor & Williams, 2002, p. 552). On
the opposite side, France had limited material interests in Zimbabwe. Yet, this was sucient to resist the application of sanctions. The International Crisis Group reported that France
did not wish to antagonize Mugabe because his support
was important for the Kabila government in Kinshasa
(International Crisis Group, 2002, p. 15). Some critics even
suggested the relevance of new (but not at all considerable)
commercial deals, such as the lease of aircraft to Air Zimbabwe (Shumba, 2003a, 2003b).
Mozambique oers a similar picture. New discoveries in
coal and gas have driven the boom of the Mozambican economy (Cuvilas, Jirjis, & Lucas, 2010; Hatton & Fardell, 2012)
which in turn has meant that both French and British rms
have shown an increasing interest in the country. For example:

Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie and BNP Paribas

were directly involved in the establishment of the controversial
Empresa Mocambicana de Atum (Korby, Burkhardt, &
Pronina, 2013; Roy, 2013); British-Australian Rio Tinto
bought extensive assets in the country during 201012
(Marais, 2011; Roberts, 2011); British multinational British
Petroleum (BP) has pulled out of ve countries in Southern
Africa (namely, Namibia, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, and
Botswana) but still invests in order to grow its market share
in Mozambique (Reuters, 2010). Notwithstanding similar
interests, France adopted a soft stance during the donor strike,
while the UK took the leadership of it. A realist approach is of
little help to explain this situation.
(ii) International constructivism
The Nordic Plus Group. Past research has shown that Northern European donors (such as, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Norway, and Sweden) not only set the highest standards in
terms of aid sanctions against repressive regimes (Noel &
Therien, 1995; Stokke, 1989), but also deliberately trigger processes of persuasion and imitation at the international level.
Nordic countries directly act as norm entrepreneurs or
mentor states (Herman, 2006; Ingebritsen, 2002). In addition, they consciously see their role in the aid process as
one of seeking . . . to reform and correct the aid process by
example (Lumsdaine, 1993, p. 66).

36

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

In case of human rights or democratic crises, the UK nd

itself under stronger pressure than France to take similar positions to Nordic donors for two main reasons. First, normative
anity. UK representatives feel much closer to their likeminded counterparts than French ocials do (Olsen, 2011,
p. 98). A DfID ocial highlighted that, even though the
UK and the Nordics might disagree on the appropriate
response to specic abuses, I always trust them to share our
own values and objectives. This is why I pay attention to what
they say. 14 Second, closer coordination. The UK and Nordic
countries strictly coordinate on development issues, so much
so that harmonization has been formalized with the creation
of the Nordic Plus Group. 15
British examples in support of the international constructivist hypothesis can be found at all levels: policy documents,
development agreements, and aid sanctions. Policy synchronization between the UK and Nordic donors goes back to
the end of the 1990s, when the Ministers for Development
Cooperation in the Netherlands, Germany, Norway and the
UK were all women, and created the Utstein Group
(Lawry-White, 2003, p. 4). At that time, the anity between
Clare Short, the UK Secretary of State for International
Development, and the other Development Ministers meant
that the newborn DfIDeager to position itself as a leader
in the development sectorrecurrently looked at the policies
of the Nordic countries to draw inspiration. At the level of
international arrangements, the Joint Financing Arrangement
promoted by the Nordic Plus Group explicitly included a
human rights clause (Nordic Plus, 2007, p. 11). The same is
true (under specic instruction from the Netherlands) for the
Nordic Plus Groups template for arrangements on delegated
cooperation (Nordic Plus, 2006, p. 37). In case of abuses,
almost all interviewees emphasized a good level of harmonization with Nordic countries. For instance, in Maputo the main
group for donor coordination is the G19. However, in reality,
the informal coordination among Nordic Plus countries has
more cohesion. An aid ocial commented: the donors which
participate in the Nordic Plus Group adopted a similar stance
both during the donor strike and in response of the EMATUM deal. This is not surprising if you think that we consider
ourselves to be obvious collaborators in numerous circumstances. 16
Interviewees and other researchers conrm the absence of
any similar natural partnership between France and Nordic
countries. Nordic diplomats often mention French unwillingness to coordinate and be coordinated. A foreign diplomat
in Madagascar shared his surprise when the new French
Ambassador in Antananarivo, who arrived in the middle of
the political crisis, showed no interest in knowing what other
local diplomats thought about the crisis and how they would
have reacted to the unilateral French decision to continue
development assistance to Rajoelina. 17 During the Swedish
Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2009, a number
of Francophone countries were on the agenda. The Presidency
found it very dicult to nd common ground among the
member states for policy initiatives directed toward these four
countries and noted that Swedish decision-makers in general
consider France as a dicult partner to work with in an African context (Olsen, 2012, p. 416).
Lack of persuasion due to poor coordination is accompanied by limited chances for imitation. The French diplomats
interviewed have never demonstrated any deference to the
Nordic approach. Even when they acknowledged that Nordic donors score better than anybody else in most rankings
of aid quality, they dierentiated France on the basis of the
argument that we are a much greater power, with larger

interests. In the end, the only interest of Nordic countries

is to be at the top of these rankings. It is not a fair comparison. 18
The International Organization of La Francophonie versus
the Commonwealth of Nations. France and the UK manage
their relationship with former colonies (and a few additional
recipient countries) through separate international organizations: the OIF and the Commonwealth. In the case of gross
human rights abuses and grave violations of democratic
principles, both the OIF and the Commonwealth can apply
aid sanctions (and, more generally, suspend repressive
regimes from membership). In addition, Canada (which is
a strong supporter of political conditionality) plays a signicant role in both organizations, thus at least partially
counterbalancing the hegemonic position of the former colonial empires.
Notwithstanding these similarities, two factors make
socialization in favor of political conditionality more likely
for the UK within the Commonwealth than for France within the OIF. To begin with, while both organizations ocially
support human rights and democratic institutions among
their members, there is no doubt that the Commonwealth
has a much stricter policy in this respect (Srinivasan, 1997,
p. 513). The dierent degree of importance given to democracy and human rights issues is conrmed by the way in
which the two organizations reacted when Cameroon applied
for membership in both of them in 1989: the countrys democratic transition was monitored far more closely and critically
by the Commonwealth than by the OIF (Torrent, 2011, p.
611).
Second, while both organizations are signicantly inuenced
by the former colonial powers, the OIF is heavily Francecentered. For instance, Paris is by far the largest contributor
to its budget. The Commonwealth is more balanced. The
budget is evenly distributed, and the organization includes
other relevant players (not only Canada, but also Australia
and New Zealand) (Sanders, 2014, p. 25). In addition, there
are no permanent members in the Commonwealth of Nations
leadership. In the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group
(CMAG), created to be a kind of executive for the Commonwealth, no nation is assured of a place, not even the United
Kingdom (Kirby, 2011, p. 56).
The problem with the OIF versus Commonwealth
hypothesis is that, as a matter of fact, the Commonwealth
has not played a signicant inuence over British aid decisions. In the case of Zimbabwe, for example, the Commonwealth suspended the country from the organization in 2002
(Abraham, 2004). However, it was Britain itself that pushed
for the imposition of international sanctions against Mugabe
(Taylor, 2005, p. 373; Williams, 2004, p. 916). After the 2006
Fiji coup, the Commonwealth did inuence the UK position
in favor of aid sanctions. However, several interviewees pointed to the fact that it was mainly due to the willingness to follow Australia rather than the Commonwealth that Britain
acted so quickly. 19 At the policy level too, it is often Britain
which leads the human rights activities of the organization.
For instance, it was the UK that lobbied for the expansion
of the CMAG remit to address human rights abuses beyond
unconstitutional overthrows of governments (Williams, 2005,
p. 383), and it was the UK that put the issue of gay rights
on the agenda of the organization in 2011 (BBC, 2011).
In sum, the analysis of the case studies and the interviews
with their protagonists do not warrant the conclusion that
France and the UK dier in the internalization of political
conditionality because the former belongs to OIF and the
latter to the Commonwealth. 20

DIVERGING VISIONS ON POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY

(iii) Liberalism
When interviewees were asked to suggest the most important factor behind the dierent attitude to political conditionality by France and the UK, there was almost unanimous
consensus (from both capitals and local oces) in favor of
domestic politics. The case study of Zimbabwe conrms this
interpretation. According to Vines, it was domestic pressure
that forced the [UK] government to take action proactively
against the regime of President Mugabe (Vines, 2011, p. 28.
see also Porteous, 2005, p. 291). Taylor and Williams commented that few events in Africa in recent years have so excited British opinion on foreign aairs as the downward spiral of
Zimbabwe under President Mugabe (Taylor & Williams,
2002, p. 547).
However, not all the variables suggested by previous
research (and summarized in the previous sub-section on
hypotheses) are supported by sucient evidence. For instance,
the hypothesis that conservative governments should have
been more in favor of political conditionality than left-wing
executives has to be rejected because the favorable British attitude was actually driven by the New Labour, at the same time
when the right-wing presidencies of Chirac and Sarkozy
neglected the norm. 21 The hypothesis based on the strength
of NGOs is also unconvincing. Most British development
NGOs have never supported a strict application of political
conditionality (fearing double punishment of the poor
population). 22
The two crucial domestic variables are media pressure and
aid decision-making structure (the latter being something not
explored by previous research). To begin with, national media
dedicates much more attention to aid in the UK than in
France (Van Belle, Rioux, & Potter, 2004, p. 73). British newspapers (including popular tabloids) frequently cover scandals
of money disbursed to repressive regimes (see the examples
of Groves, 2014; Kelly & Ford, 2012; Oborne, 2010), and
recurrently call for aid cuts at times of austerity or national
disasters (Chapman, 2013; Clark, 2013). The British governments attempt to sell its ethical foreign policies (both at
home and abroad) has also opened the policy process up to
new levels of scrutiny (Gaskarth, 2006, p. 53; Williams,
2004, p. 910). The result is that the potential for a strong
domestic reaction to an overseas development is always there
and policymakers must factor that potential into their thinking (Coles, 2000, p. 111).
This is not the case on the other side of the Channel. Even
though in the middle of the 1990s numerous legal investigations into the aairs of some leading gures of African networks and Frances role in the Rwandan genocide seemed to
wake up the French public toward the fate of Sub-Saharan
Africa (Kroslak, 2007; S. Smith & Glaser, 1997), a senior ocial at the French Development Agency commented that aid is
still rarely mentioned in newspapers headlines and the electorate is largely ignorant about who does and who takes
what. 23 Numerous scholars have lamented the lack of transparency, and the fact that that the media and public opinion
are more often than not kept out of the game and bypassed (Bovcon, 2013, p. 16; Renou, 2002, p. 10).
With respect the decision-making structure, British aid
responsibilities squarely fall on the shoulders of one single
individual, the Secretary of State for International Development, and a few senior ocials within one single department,
the Department for International Development (Ireton, 2013,
p. 50; see also Fisher, 2015). This situation considerably
enhances domestic accountability. For example, former UK
Secretary of State for International Development Andrew
Mitchell waited until his last day in oce to restore 16 m

37

of aid to Rwanda in September 2012 (Hale, 2012). In contrast,

France lacks a high-level political gure as Minister of Development Cooperation. In addition, joint management of the
aid budget by the Ministry of Foreign Aairs, the Ministry
of Economic Aairs and AFD, and the signicant (but often
hidden role) played by the President make it extremely dicult
to assign clear-cut political responsibilities. 24 Naudet (1997, p.
176) commented that French aid lacks transparency and
accountability partly as a result of the dispersal of the administrative structures involved . . . the interventions are spread
between agencies according to their own specic objectives
and there are insucient overviews available to the public
which attempt to place overall activities within a coherent
framework.
In a similar vein, the UK is a parliamentary democracy
where decision-makers are directly accountable to the Parliament. Institutional accountability adds up to political accountability. DfID decisions are examined by the House of
Commons International Development Committee, a serious
discussion over the aid budget takes place every year, and
Members of the Parliament (MPs) often conduct in-depth
review of specic aid programs (see House of Commons,
2013, pp. 219227). For instance, in 2012 Andrew Mitchell
was grilled by MPs over his decision to restore British aid
to Rwanda notwithstanding general concerns about the
human rights record of the countrys government (Mulholl,
2012). In contrast with British parliamentary form of government, France is a semi-presidential system where those in
charge of foreign policy and high-level aid decisions respond
to the President, not to the Parliament. According to Medard,
the Parliament has never played any important role in African policy. Moreover, there has never been a real public
debate in Parliament on French policy. The budget of the
Ministry of cooperation was voted on without any serious discussion (Medard, 2004, p. 42). The absence of formal
accountability channels is exacerbated by the low level of
interest shown by MPs, as conrmed by the absence of a specic committee dedicated to aid issues (development assistance
is discussed within the more general foreign policy committee)
(Lancaster, 2007, p. 164).
(iv) Sociological institutionalism
Notwithstanding the performance of similar functions, the
institutions managing French and British development assistance oer signicantly dierent organizational cultures.
French aid is dominated by economists and diplomats. The
pivot actor of the French aid system is the French Development Agency (AFD), whose sta is mainly composed of economists who eagerly repeat that AFD is a bank and operates
as a bank. 25 Meimon conrms that AFD is not a political
organ but rather takes a banking approach to development
issues (2007, p. 47; Ranot, 1998, p. 477). The remaining part
of French bilateral aid is managed by diplomats within the
Ministry of Foreign Aairs (Gabas, 2005, p. 253). In theory,
diplomats might be more inclined than economists to assign
due consideration to a political issue like respect for human
rights. Yet, several interviewees suggested that this is not the
case. To begin with, French diplomats value continuity over
disruption, partnership over imposition. 26 As claried by the
former Secretary of State for Cooperation and La Francophonie, Alain Joyandet (2010), France speaks to regimes that
are not perfect democracies. . . . This is a diplomacy of
positive inuence: we want to talk with everyone to bring
them to our values. The more we talk with these countries,
the greater the possibilities of advancing these values. Moreover, diplomats are educated under a Gaullist consensus,

38

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

which supports the idea that Africa acts as the guarantor of

French standing in world politics. Rupture of any signicant
relationship with African countries is almost never contemplated (Bourmaud, 2000).
In principle, DfID oers a more favorable terrain to
human rights concerns. First, the existence of a dedicated
Department in charge of development assistance insulates
aid decisions from political pressures to downplay human
rights in favor of strategic and economic interests (Killick,
2005, p. 675; Porteous, 2005, p. 282). Second, DfID is extensively staed with individuals who share a strong ethical purpose (as conrmed by the popularity of the Department in
voluntary application to the Civil Service and the large number of recruits with work experience in NGOs) (Vereker,
2002, p. 136). Nevertheless, a cultural explanation of variation between France and the UK presents two serious weaknesses. First, decisions over aid sanctions are taken at
ministerial level, not by DfID sta. Second, historical
accounts of decision-making over aid sanctions indicate that
the Department which often takes the hardest stance on
human rights is the FCO, not DfID. For example, at the
beginning of the last decade the FCO came to feel that
Short was not paying enough attention to human rights
and democratization in countries like Rwanda and Uganda
(Porteous, 2005, p. 286). Rwanda fomented strife also more
recently. When Mitchell reinstated aid to the country, most
people in the Foreign Oce [thought] the time [had] come to
take a really tough stand (Groves, 2012).
The result is that, as suggested by several interviewees, a cultural perspective is more useful to explain which are the hard
cases for aid sanctions (that is, those recipient countries to
which a donor nd more dicult to apply political conditionality) rather than the general attitude toward the norm itself.
A Nordic ocial commented: Look at the countries where
France has not applied sanctions: Madagascar, Niger, etc.
Then, look at the countries where the UK has been reluctant
to apply sanctions: Ethiopia, Rwanda, etc. In the case of
France, strategic interests overcome human rights; in the case
of the UK, development successes overcome human rights. 27
5. CONCLUSION
Comparative research on political conditionality has excessively focused on behavior over discourse, and on assessment
over explanation. This article advances this strand of research
by (1) adopting an original three-fold framework (comprised
of policy documents, international agreements and aid sanctions) to measure the degree of internalization of political conditionality, and (2) executing a rigorous Most Similar Systems
Design (or Mills Method of Dierence) in order to explain
variation between France and the UK.
The rst part of the article showed that the two donors dier
signicantly. While Paris generally opposes political conditionality and almost never includes a human rights clause in
international treaties, London considers respect for human
rights to be a fundamental pre-requisite for long-term partnerships with developing countries and species this condition in
development agreements. The analysis of two hard cases
(Mozambique and Zimbabwe), in combination with past
quantitative and qualitative ndings, corroborated that aid
behavior usually reects the dierences highlighted in policy
documents and legal texts. 28
The second part of the article avoided paradigmatic boundaries and tested four dierent hypotheses to explain variation

between France and the UK. The UK has internalized political conditionality to a larger extend than France because
national media dedicate more attention to aid decisions in
London than in Paris, and because British aid responsibilities
squarely fall on one single individual, the Secretary of State for
International Development, and a few senior ocials within
one single department, DfID. These factors ensure the existence of stricter political accountability. In addition, normative resonance and closer coordination mean that British
decision-makers are subject to higher social pressure than their
French counterparts when Nordic countries adopt policy positions in favor of political conditionality, insert human rights
clauses in joint nancing agreements and apply aid sanctions
in response to human rights abuses and democratic setbacks.
Evidence was not suciently strong to support the plausibility
of explanations based on material interests or Commonwealth
inuence. Dierent organizational cultures are not capable of
explaining the degree of internalization of political conditionality, but help detect the recipient countries against which political conditionality is not applied.
As a synthesis of these arguments, and knowingly running
the risk of over-simplication, one can conclude that while in
France foreign aid is framed as development cooperation (as
the Minister in charge of development assistance was called
until a few years ago), in the UK it is perceived as development assistance. In the former case, the relationship with
developing countries cannot be jeopardized by idiosyncratic
problems (such as human rights abuses) that are best
addressed through long-term engagement. In the latter case,
disbursement of taxpayers money must be suspended or
withdrawn to respond signicant misbehavior by recipient
governments. 29
In addition, while both countries undeniably use aid also
as an instrument to foster their national interests (in addition
to the agship goal of reducing poverty), their objectives are
dierent: locally oriented inuence for Paris, globally oriented inuence for London. While France aims to become a
trusted partner to politicians and businessmen in recipient
countries in order to play a signicant role in local, regional
and international fora, the UK aims to be perceived as a
principled actor that follows value-based standards in order
to assume a leadership role in global debates (for a dierent
but complementary argument, see Gallagher, 2009). A strict
application of human rights conditionality obviously endangers the goal of the former but can support the ambition
of the latter. 30
Future research should explore additional factors that can
explain dierent levels of internalization of political conditionality by bilateral donors. Some interviewees suggested the relevance of aid modalities. Legal and economic aspects make
loans more dicult to suspend and/or cancel than grants.
First, a loan is often based on a contract with a third party.
As human rights clauses are rarely included in project-level
agreements, aid sanctions would lead to controversial breaches
of contractual obligations. Second, discontinuing a loan inevitably entails an unforeseen loss for the development agency. A
related argument proposes that widespread use of general budget support (in contrast with project aid) should be accompanied by higher levels of political conditionality. First, the
instrument does not entail the presence of workers on the
ground, and is therefore easy to suspend. Second, the fact that
money is disbursed directly into the hands of the recipient government calls for stricter duciary safeguards (Faust et al.,
2012; Hayman, 2011; Molenaers, 2012; Molenaers, Gagiano,
Smets, & Dellepiane, 2015).

DIVERGING VISIONS ON POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY

39

NOTES
1. Budget support is aid channeled directly to a countrys budget, to be
disbursed according to its own allocation, procurement, and accounting
systems.
2. Interviewees are anonymous because the commitment not to
disclose specic identities was important in order to obtain candid
perspectives.
3. Because of space constraints, the assessment of internalization focuses
only on the negative aspect of political conditionality, that is, aid
sanctions. However, the author acknowledges that conditionality can
mean more than just the enforcement of sanctions . . . Conditionality can
infuse the regular decision-making process over aid allocations, whereby a
countrys inow is maintained, increased or reduced from previous years
(Burnell, 1994, p. 487). A more detailed theorization of aid conditionality
is oered by Koch (2015).
4. This strategy is in line with aid eectiveness commitments promoting
increased harmonization of development programs. This suggests that, as
highlighted by Del Biondo, international norms on development assistance may be contradictory (for instance, political conditionality versus
country ownership) (Del Biondo, 2015).
5. Comparative studies based on statistical techniques present at least
three serious aws (for a complementary argument, see Lancaster, 2007,
p. 9). To begin with, they are based on OECD gures that are reported
on an annual basis. This leads to overlook important information. For
instance, what if a recipient government harshly represses the opposition
in February, development grants are reduced or canceled in April, the
situation improves in September, and disbursements are restored in
December? OECD gures would inevitably be silent in this case. Second,
the dependent variable of all past statistical studies is the total amount of
aid in favor of a specic recipient country. However, when a recipient
government violates human rights, donors often decide not to suspend or
diminish aid, but to earmark it for specic human rights programs, or
shift disbursement through international or non-governmental
organizations working within the repressive State. These options aect
the modalities of disbursement, but not the total amount of aid. Lastly,
mere menaces to suspend, cut, or cancel foreign aid are occasionally
sucient to obtain policy concessions by recipient governments. In this
case, aid gures are not aected. However, development nancing is
conditioned on respect for human rights. More detailed gures from the
AidData project can signicantly improve statistical studies in this
respect (Tierney et al., 2011).
6. An anonymous reviewer rightly observed that a comprehensive
explanation of divergences should take into account the potential
inuences related to characteristics of the recipient countries (for an
example of research on political conditionality that looks at the interaction
between donor and recipient characteristics, see Hackenesch, 2015). This is
why the two cases of Mozambique and Zimbabwe contrast French and
British behavior not only one against the other, but also against the
actions of other relevant donors in the countries. This strategy is intended
to overcome the problems related to the idiosyncratic feasibility of aid
sanctions: it would be unfair to judge France and Britain for rejecting aid
sanctions if no other country adopted them; instead, it is interesting to
discover whether, in those cases when sanctions are possible (as
demonstrated by the behavior of other donors), the two countries
applied them or not.
7. Interviews with foreign diplomats in Mozambique, AugustSeptember
2014.

8. The article does not examine former French colonies because they
represent easy cases: it would not be surprising to nd that France is
often against the idea of severing its post-colonial aid relationships.
Indeed, anecdotal evidence supports this view. Emmanuel used the
behavior of France in Cameroon as a agship example of what he called
donor-patrons, that is, critical aid providers that refuse to exercise their
leverage and force the recipient to undergo political change (Emmanuel,
2010; see also Ebolo, 1998). After the 2009 coup in Madagascar, France
not only did not fully suspend direct development cooperation and
continued some aid disbursement (Connolly, 2013, p. 6; Vivier, 2010, pp.
126, 162), but also strongly encouraged the international community to
take account of realities on the ground and called for the continuation
of some development aid to address the declining socio-economic
conditions (Dewar, Massey, & Baker, 2013, p. 13; see also
International Crisis Group, 2010, p. 6).
9. Cumming explained variation between France and the UK in the rst
half of the 1990s through the existence of strong personal and aective ties
between French decision-makers and African leaders. La Francafrique,
that is, the informal network of connections between French and African
politicians and businessmen, was contrasted with the strong emphasis that
Britain placed on the formal institutions involved in the formulation of
development policy (Cumming, 2001, Chapter 9). This article intentionally
avoids the emotional factor emphasized by Cumming because, even
though it has not completely faded away, it possesses weaker explanatory
power in the new Millennium (Machet, 2012, p. 4). According to Gounin,
whether the critics of Francafrique like it or not . . . Frances policies
toward Africa today are led by a new generation of ocials whose ethos is
that of IMF and EU technocracy, not that of lAfrique de Papa, and
who have had increasing success in normalizing the France-Africa
relationship (Gounin, 2010). In addition, the Francafrique regime has
already received ample coverage by other scholars and journalists
(Bourmaud, 1996; S. Smith & Glaser, 1997).
10. For the sake of clarity, it is important to specify that this article does
not explore whether material interests aect donors (un)willingness to
apply aid sanctions against some recipient countries and not others (which
has already been demonstrated to be the case: Nielsen, 2013). The article
tests whether material interests aect the degree of donor internalization of
political conditionality in general terms.
11. I call this approach international constructivism in order to
distinguish it from unit-level constructivism, whose focus lies on the
relationship between local/domestic norms and the identities, interests and
actions of states. The distinction was rst proposed by Reus-Smit (2002;
for an example, see Katzenstein, 1996).
12. The version of liberalism proposed by Moravcsik is dierent from the
strand of research which goes under the name of neo-liberalism. Neoliberalism is similar to neo-realism (it is a rational and material theory),
but emphasizes the role played by international regimes and institutions in
facilitating cooperation in an anarchic environment (Keohane, 1984).
Since neo-liberalism is mainly focused on cooperation failures in a goaloriented world, it is not considered to be relevant to explain variation in
the internalization of political conditionality.
13. This statement may seem in contradiction with the general argument
of the article. It is important to remind that the list of top recipients does
not take into account the potential ways in which aid is disbursed (for
instance, through NGO channels when the recipient country has a
repressive government). The list is used only to give a rough indication of
favored recipients.

40

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

14. Interview with DfID ocial, May 19, 2014.

22. Interview with director of UK development NGO, March 24, 2014.

15. At the beginning of the 2000s, the four Nordic donors (Denmark,
Sweden, Finland, and Norway) plus Ireland, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom formally joined forces under the heading of the Nordic
Plus Group. Since then, the group has gained in importance. In 2006,
Selbervik and Nygaard argued that the Nordic Plus group appears as a
more important point of reference than the Nordic countries per se
(Selbervik & Nygaard, 2006, p. 51).

23. Interview with AFD ocial, March 19, 2014.

16. Interview with aid ocial in Mozambique, August 22, 2014.

17. Interview with foreign diplomat in Madagascar, September 16, 2014.
18. Interview with French diplomat, March 21, 2014.
19. Interview with foreign diplomat in Fiji, August 28, 2014.
20. As suggested by an anonymous reviewer, social pressure from the US
is another potentially relevant variable. Political scientists have already
explained French behavior in francophone Africa as a response to
increased competition from the US (J. F. Clark, 2002; Schraeder, 2000). In
addition, the US government has taken a principled stance in numerous
cases. For instance, the 2001 Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic
Recovery Act instructed US ocials in international nancial institutions
to oppose and vote against any extension by the respective institution of
any loan, credit, or guarantee to the government of Zimbabwe (Ploch,
2011, p. 23). However, signicant organizational dierences between UK
and US aid-managing institutions (Chhotray & Hulme, 2009; Harrigan &
Wang, 2011), as well as low levels of formal aid coordination between the
two countries, justify a stronger focus on social pressure from Nordic
donors and OIF/Commonwealth.
21. DfID ocials commented that New Labours value-based foreign
policy did not signicantly inuence the level of internalization of political
conditionality in the UK. International norms are contradictory with
respect to the appropriateness of aid sanctions (for instance, conditionality
runs against the principles of country ownership and donor harmonization), and DfID could have easily opted for stronger emphasis of
alignment with recipients priorities. Political conditionality also risks
punishing the poor population twice, an argument which could have
resonated well with the left-wing orientation of Tony Blairs party.
Interview with DfID ocial, March 28, 2014.

24. Interview with AFD ocial, March 19, 2014.

25. Interview with AFD ocial, March 16, 2014.
26. Interview with French diplomat, March 19, 2014 (this view is
conrmed by Jacquemot, 2012, p. 53).
27. Interview with Nordic diplomat in Mozambique, September 5, 2014.
28. It is important to stress that the article makes no claim about the
normative validity or the practical eectiveness of political conditionality
(for an early debate, see Barya, 1993; Robinson, 1993b). For instance, as
already acknowledged in previous endnotes, political conditionality runs
against other good international norms regarding aid harmonization
and country ownership. As a consequence, the argument of this article is
that British decision-makers think that political conditionality is more
appropriate then their French counterparts, not that British policies are
value-based while French ones are not. Moreover, the article focuses on a
relative comparison between France and the UK. The argument is that
UK abides by the norm of political conditionality more consistently than
France, not that it complies with it in a perfect manner (as Nigeria and
Ethiopia, to name just two cases, are there to remind us).
29. It is interesting to note that French aid is more similar than UK aid
to development assistance from new donors (including China, Brazil,
India and South Africa). These donors mainly focus on project aid
(instead of budget support), and often rely on tied aid and mixed credits
(Brautigam, 2011; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 2011). In addition,
new donors are generally against the application of political conditionality
(Mawdsley, 2014; Woods, 2008).
30. Again, there is no claim here that one of the two approaches is
inherently better than the other. The French approach might be pursued
to steer local development practices in favor of increased human rights
protection, but also as a bribe to obtain political or economic
concessions. The British vision might be seen as an attempt to steer
global development discourses in favor of vulnerable individuals, but also
as a hypocritical position which provides little benet on the ground.

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