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MonitoringofAgreements
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By
JulianOuellet

FollowBeyondIntractability:

November2003

Inmanyinternationalagreements,fromtheKyotoProtocolongreenhousegasemissionstothe1993
ArushaAccordsonpeaceinRwanda,therearestrongincentivestonotcomplywiththeagreement.(The
Prisoner'sDilemmaisagoodmetaphorforthesesituations.)Thereareseveralwaysofovercomingthese
problems.Oneistousethirdparties,whohelpensuresuccessfulnegotiationsandcanlaterhelpmonitor
andverifycompliancewithanagreement.Thisessayfocusesonmonitoringagreements,andmethods
thathelpensurecompliancewithanagreement.

Whatismonitoring?

Thekeyissuesthatmustbe
designedintoanagreementare
standardizedmeasuresof
compliance,transparency,
methodsofsharinginformation,
andfluidityinenforcement
mechanisms.

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Peaceagreementscanbelethalinstrumentswhentheyarepoorlydesignedandpoorlyenforced.Forexample,the1994Tutsigenocidein
RwandaoccurredafterthefailureoftheArushaAccords,partiallybecauseofaninabilitytomonitorthetermsoftheagreement.[1]
Onekeytotheabilitytoenforceapeaceagreementisthedesignoftheagreementitself.Onecannotseparatethetermsofpeacefromthe
realizationofthoseterms,soprovisionsformonitoringpeaceagreementsarequiteimportant.[2]AccordingtoBoulden,monitoringshouldbe
dividedintotwodistinctareas:[3]
1.monitoring,whichcanbeeitherhighlygeneralizedorhighlydirectedactionstogatherinformation,and
2.verification,"theprocessbywhichcomplianceofthepartiestothetermsof[peace]accordsisjudged."

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Confusingly,accordingtoBoulden,bothmonitoringandverificationaresubdefinitionsofmonitoring.Athirdsubdefinitionofmonitoring,as
informationgathering,willbereferredtoasobservation.
Wecanthinkofmonitoringintermsofincreasinglevelsofinvolvement:
Atthelowestlevel,observation,wehavepurepassivewatchingandinspection.Atthislevel,monitorslackthemandatetojudgethe
actionsofthepartiesbeingmonitoredtheysimplyobservewhatisgoingon.
Asinvolvementincreases,monitorswillbegintojudge,toverifycompliancewiththetreaty.Inthissituation,partiesmaynotonlyobserve
actionsinrelationtotheagreement,butalsojudgeandreportviolations.Thisisverification.
Thelastlevel,onethatBouldendoesnotreferto,isenforcement.Atthislevel,monitoringofanagreementinvolvesnotmerelyobserving
andcompliancewiththetreaty,butalsoenforcingthetermsoftheagreementthroughpositiveandnegativeincentives.
Inthiscontext,howisagreementmonitoringactuallyrealized?Wecanlookattypesofinvolvement,butweshouldalsoexplorethespecific
monitoringprovisionsthatcanstabilizeanagreement.

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Anapologyisthesuperglue
oflife.Itcanrepairjust
aboutanything.
LynnJohnston

Whydoweneedit?
Monitoringandverificationcanbeunderstoodinmultiplecontexts.Attheinternationallevel,monitoring
canapplytoeverythingfromenvironmentalandtradeagreementstopeaceagreements.However,
provisionsformonitoringwillberemarkablysimilarfromoneagreementtoanother.
Atalllevelsofinvolvement,oneofthechiefstrengthsofmonitorsbetheythirdpartiesorotherwiseisto
increasetheamountofinformationsharedamongtheparties.Itisgenerallythoughtthatrationalpeople,
sharinginformation,willbebetterabletoagreeandcoordinateactionsthanthoseininformationpoor
environments.[4]Afterviolentconflicts,whentrustandinformationarescarce,itiseasierformediatorsto
increasetrustbyincreasinginformationflow,thanviceversa.

Additionalinsightsintothe
monitoringofagreementsare
offeredbyBeyondIntractability
projectparticipants.

Howismonitoringdone?
Therearenohardandfastrulesfordesigningmonitoringagreements.Ifonelooksatenvironmentalagreements,onewillfindaplethoraof
methodsandrulesformonitoring,verification,andenforcement,butitisnotclearthattheserulesapplytopeaceagreementsortrade
agreements.Likewise,lookingatpeaceagreementsdoesnotimmediatelyinformanenvironmentalistaboutmethodsofmonitoring
agreements.Ifoneislookingforgeneralizedrulesforhowtomonitor,verify,orenforceagreements,itisdifficulttofindacomprehensiveand
generalizedsource.
Itishelpfultocompareissueareas,andtogeneralizesomerulesofthumbfordesigningmonitoringprocedures.Table1comparesrulesfor
monitoringenvironmentalstandards,aslaidoutbytheCanadianCouncilofMinistersoftheEnvironment,toruleslaidoutbytheU.N.

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PeacekeepingOperationsforDisarmament,Demobilization,andReintegration.Whilethiscomparisonisfarfromcomprehensive,itprovides
goodexamplesoftasksthatmightbeincludedinmonitoringprocedures.

Environmental

Disarmament&DemobilizationMonitoringStandards6

GeneralizedMonitoringRules

Transparentandopen
communicationof
information

Developmonitoringplanspriortoimplementation

Transparency

Respectmandatesand
jurisdictions

Disputantpartieshaverighttooverseemonitoring

Openinvolvementofallparties

Sharedresponsibilityfor
implementation

MilitaryobserversusedforD&DCivilianpolicemonitorsfor
publicsecurity

Thirdpartyaccessto,provisionof,
verificationofdataregarding
compliance

MonitoringStandards5

Verifycomplianceby
Timelysharingofdata
betweenparties

Datacrosschecking
Reportingnoncompliance
Supplementaryactionbysanctionedmilitaryforcesin
search,seizure,anddestruction

Openaccesstoandcrosscheckingof
databyallinvolvedparties.

Thirdpartyaccesstodata

Crosscheckdatawithdisputantpartiesandindependent
sources

Useopenandstandardizedmeasures
forcompliance

Protectionofproprietary
information

Proceduresshouldbetransparent

Takeactiveroleagainstspoilers

Useofscientific
standards

Flexiblemethods:shiftbetweenselfenforcementandsearch& Allowfluidshiftbetweenobservation,
seizure
verification,andenforcementroles

Standardizeddataand
datamanagement

Persistentnoncomplianceshouldbereferredtojointmonitoring
commissioncontainingrepresentativesfromdisputantparties

Publicaccountability
transparency

Includedisincentivesfornoncompliance

Reciprocalnoticeincase
Forciblydisarmspoilers
oftermination

Grantamnestyperiod
Instituterules&proceduresforbearingarms

Theguidelinessummarizedinthethirdcolumnrepresentbasicprioritiesthatareimportanttomostagreements.Inparticular,monitoring
agreementsrequirethetransparency,flexibility,andlevelofcommunicationimpliedbythoseguidelines.

PeacekeeperMonitoringandVerification

Verifyingdisarmamentanddemobilizationcansometimesmovebeyondsimpleobservationof
thecombatants'followingtheprovisionsofthepeaceagreement,totheactivepursuitof
compliancewiththepeaceagreement.[5]Secondgenerationpeacekeepersaredefinedby
theirabilitytomovebeyondobservationrolesandtowardactiveintervention.Theyaremore
likelytobeactivelyinvolved,notjustmonitoringdisarmamentanddemobilization,butinaiding
theprocess.Forexample,NATOpeacekeepersinBosniaHerzegovinaundertookenforcement
aswellobservationandverification.[6]OnerequirementoftheBosnianceasefirewasthe
withdrawalofSerbiannationaltroopsfromBosnia.BombingcommencedwhenSerbiafailedto
withdraw,andtheNATOmissionrolechangedfrompassiveobserverstoactivecombatants,
usingmilitaryinterventionforenforcementofthepeaceagreement.

SelfEnforcementandtheWTO
IntradeunionssuchastheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO),monitoringisoftenselfenforcing.Thatis,theWTOitselfistheoreticallyneutralit
pursuesjusticethroughinternationallawanditisinthebestinterestofeverystateandindustrytomonitorthepracticesofitscompetitors.Ina
stateofperfectcompetition,itisintheinterestofeachactortocheatandtocatchcheaters.Putmoresimply,inanysituationitislogicalto
maximizeyourabilitytobenefitfrombreakingtherules,whilepreventingyouropponentfromdoingthesame.TheWTO,andthestructureof
competitionwithinit,essentiallyencouragesallparticipantstoreportothers'noncompliancewithbasicagreements.
Yettradeagreements,whilecertainlycontentious,donotholdthesamerisksaspeaceagreements.Thefailureofatradeagreementdoesnot
leadtowarinthesamewaythatthefailureofapeaceagreementdoes.Thus,whileselfenforcementisonemethodofmonitoringagreements,
itisonlyuseableinareasoflowintensityconflictwithminimalriskofviolentreprisal.Becausetradeagreementslackoutsideobserversand
enforcementmechanisms,theyarealsodifficulttoenforce.Thiscanbeseenintheattempttocontrolthetradein"conflict"diamonds.[7]Inthe
caseoftheWTO,whilemonitoringisselfenforced,sanctionsandjudgmentsarehandeddownbytheWTOitself.Putmoregenerally,evenin
selfenforcingmonitoringagreements,anoutsidesourcemayberequiredtoenforcesanctionsbasedonverifiedviolations.

EnvironmentalMonitoringProblemsandtheKyotoProtocol
Itisdifficultforenvironmentalagreementstobeselfenforcingbecauseofthenexusofactorsinvolved.Corporations,interestgroups,andother
nongovernmentalorganizationsareimportantnotonlyincommunicatinginformation,butinactuallydesigningandimplementingthe
agreements.Environmentalagreementsaredifficulttoenforceandmonitor,forthesamereasonsthattheyaredifficulttoagreeto.Agreements
involvingmultipleanddiverseactorstendtobemoredifficulttomonitorbecausetheycreateamultiplicityofinterpretationsandenforcement

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protocols.Effectiveagreementswillspecifyintheirdesignthemeansofenforcementandthestandardsbywhichcomplianceisjudged.[8]
ThesuccessoftheMontrealProtocolandthefailureoftheKyotoProtocolaretwoillustrationsofthisbasicprinciple.Onereasonthatthe
MontrealProtocolwassuccessfulwasthattherewasabasicagreementontheseverityoftheproblemandtherequirementsforsuccessfully
dealingwiththeproblem.Widespreadagreementontheissuecanleadtowidespreadagreementonthemethodsofmonitoringand
enforcement.Intheendwithenvironmentalissues,theagreementsmustlargelybeselfmonitoredwithineachnation.Anotherimportantissue
associatedwiththesuccessoftheMontrealProtocolistherelativelylowcostofcompliance.
WecanseeintheKyotoProtocolafundamentalfailureonalloftheseaccounts.Thescopeandnatureoftheproblem,carbondioxide
emissions,iswidelydisagreedupon.Ifagreementontheproblemisimpossible,agreementonhowtomonitorcompliancetoanyameliorative
agreementiscertaintobeimpossibleaswell.Additionallycomplyingwiththeagreementimposeshigheconomiccostsforbothdevelopingand
developedcountries,makingcomplianceunlikelyandmonitoringdifficult.

TwoImplementationRegimes
Timingisalsoanimportantissueinmonitoring.Indesigningmonitoringplans,asagreementsoverall,onemustchoosebetweensinglestage
andmultistageimplementation.Eachhasitsstrengthsandweaknesses.Singlestageimplementationislesssusceptibletospoilers,butmore
likelytofailinintractableconflicts.Itisanallornothingpropositionthepeaceagreementwilleitherworkandbeimplementedaccordingly,orit
willfail.Multistageagreementsallowmoreflexibilityintermsofcontentandtrustbuilding,butbecauseoftheirextendedtimeframe,theyallow
muchmoreroomforspoilerstodisrupttheprocess.

Summary
Formalagreementsaregeneratedwhencooperationisnecessaryandcommunicationandtrustarescarce.Lowlevelsoftrustand
communicationarealsotheconditionsmostlikelytosabotagetheagreement.Monitoringagreementsisonewaytobuildtrustand
communicationwhileenactingtheprovisionsofanagreement.
Thekeyissuesthatmustbedesignedintoanagreementarestandardizedmeasuresofcompliance,transparency,methodsofsharing
information,andfluidityinenforcementmechanisms.Partiesmustagreeonwhatconstitutescompliance.Theymustalsobetransparentnot
onlyincollectingdata,butincompilingandjudgingthemeaningofthedatathattheycollect.Thedatamustbesharedwithallinvolvedparties.
Aneffectiveagreementwillalsobeabletomovefluidlybetweenobservation,verification,andenforcementasneeded.
Lastly,differentconflictsrequiredifferenttimehorizonsforsuccessfulimplementation.Aslevelsofintractabilityrise,itbecomesmorenecessary
toextendthetimehorizonoftheimplementationregime.However,asthetimehorizonextendstomultistageprocesses,thethreatofspoilers
andstagnationincreases.Agreementmonitoringisvitaltoasuccessfulagreement,buttheguidelinesforimplementationwillvaryasthelevel
ofintractabilityincreasesordecreases.
[1]Khadiagala,Gilbert."ImplementingtheArushaPeaceAgreementonRwanda,"inStephenJohnStedman(Editor),DonaldRothchild(Editor),
ElizabethM.Cousens(Editor)EndingCivilWars.Boulder,CO:LynneRiennerPublishers(December2002)
[2]James,Alan.ThePoliticsofPeaceKeeping(NewYork:PraegerPress,1969).
[3]Boulden,Jane.TheVerificationandMonitoringofPeaceAccords.UnitedNationsInstituteforDisarmamentResearch.Availableat:
http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdfart133.pdf
[4]Milner,Helen.Interests,institutions,andinformation:domesticpoliticsandinternationalrelations.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,
1997.
[5]PeacekeepingTasks.JohnHopkinsUniversity:PaulH.NitzeSchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudies.JohnsHopkinsUniversity:PaulH.
NitzeSchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudies,ConflictManagementProgram.Availableat:http://legacy2.saisjhu.edu/cmtoolkit
[6]Disarmament,DemobilizationandReintegrationofExCombatants(op.cit.)
[7]"BloodDiamondsareForNever,"availableat:http://www.onesky.ca/diamonds/diamonds_campaign/about.html,and"ConflictDiamonds:
SanctionsandWar"availableathttp://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html(NolongeravailableonUNwebsite.SeeLevy,ArthurV.(2003)
"DiamondsandConflict:ProblemsandSolutions,"Chapter4forUNGeneralAssemblyResolutionon"ConflictDiamonds."Availableat:
http://books.google.com/books?
id=4kNErbPSzUUC&pg=PA73&lpg=PA73&dq=Conflict+Diamonds:+Sanctions+and+War&source=bl&ots=i_jqVlrEQu...)
[8]CCMEStatement(op.cit.)
Usethefollowingtocitethisarticle:
Ouellet,Julian."MonitoringofAgreements."BeyondIntractability.Eds.GuyBurgessandHeidiBurgess.ConflictInformationConsortium,
UniversityofColorado,Boulder.Posted:November2003<http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/monitoringagreements>.

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