Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction, Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to Symbolic Interaction
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Sociological Introspection
and Emotional Experience
Although social constructionists now study emotions,
they neglect what emotion feels like and how it is experienced. This paper argues that social constructionists can
and should study how private and social experience are
fused in felt emotions. Resurrecting introspection (conscious awareness of awareness or self-examination) as
a systematic sociological technique will allow social constructionists to examine emotion as a product of the
individual processing of meaning as well as socially
shared cognitions. Examining introspection as a sociological process, this paper argues that introspection can
generate interpretive materials from self and others useful for understanding the lived experience of emotions.
Findings from four studies-one, self-introspective, and
the other three, interactive introspective examinations
with co-investigators-provide information about the
subjective part of emotion. They demonstrate the advantages of introspection in dealing with the complex, ambiguous, and processual nature of emotional experience.
Carolyn Ellis"
Of
South Florida
Sociologists, including symbolic interactionists, have been accused of neglecting emotions (Adler and Adler 1980; Meltzer, Petras, and Reynolds
1975; Stryker 198 1). Even now with the renewed emphasis on emotion,
sociologists continue to ignore what emotion feels like and how it is
experienced. This paper argues that sociologists can and should study
how private and social experience are fused in felt emotions. Resurrecting
introspection (conscious awareness of awareness or self-examination) as
a systematic sociological technique will allow sociologists to examine emotion as a product of the individual processing of meaning as well as socially
shared cognitions.
*Direct all correspondence t o Carolyn Ellis. Department of Sociology. University of South Florida.
Tampa, FL 33620.
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
24
Carl calls to tell me that since I cannot go to the party, he is taking another
woman. A twinge ricochets through my body. My stomach retracts as though
it is rolling over a ball placed in the middle of my abdomen. I recognize this
response as indicating jealousy. I have felt it before. Memories of similar situations
fight to get into my mind, not just the details, but also the emotions that went
along with them. Im not ready to think about what all this means, or even to
acknowledge yet that I am feeling jealous. Instead, I focus on getting information
that will tell me what is going on here.
Who is she? I inquire. A friend, he responds. Someone I used to date.
Were you ever sexual? No,he replies. Are you interested in being? No.
My gut relaxes; I seem to think more clearly. He continues, Listen, dont worry.
This is nothing. I just wanted to introduce her to some people. I want you to
come too.
Is he telling the truth? I dont know, but I feel relieved. I respond rationally,
No,I really have too much work to do. Saying these words makes me feel
more in control.
I hang up and think through what just happened. Was I really jealous? I feel I
was. I remember the questions I asked, the suspicion that lingered as I listened
for contradictory evidence, as,for example, a tone of voice indicating something
was going on. I tried to remember what it felt like-bodily tightening, mental
confusion, and a vague overall feeling of being on alert. Recognizing at this
moment that I had been feeling jealous then made the feeling ripple through
me again.
It wasnt totally unpleasant. I rather liked being reminded that 1 cared about
whether Carl was interested in other women. 1 even liked the adrenalin rush, the
moment of being out of control-it felt challenging, intense-although I feared
it at the same time.
I tell myself that there is no reason to be jealous. 1 know from past experience
that Carl would rather be with me. Besides I want to give him room to try out
other relationships. The jealousy starts to dissipate (Self-Introspective Fieldnotes
1988).
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
25
This example demonstrates the private processing-in this case, of memory, detail, feeling, recognition, physiological response, language, cognition, and tone of voice-that weds to sociocultural socialization of norms
of possession. The potency of these norms is documented by the subjects spontaneous and intense entry into jealousy mode in response to
a simple statement, one that is not threatening to this relationship. As the
process in the example shows, introspection varies from the descriptive
end of the continuum-where events, feelings, and thoughts are described
-to the analytic end-where the subject examines what she felt, why she
felt it, and whether such feeling is justified.
Few sociologists have examined lived emotional experience of this kind,
or looked into the details of the process by which people come to feel
the way they do. Hochschild ( 1983), in her insightful study of flight attendants, warns that we must not ignore the subjective aspects of emotions.
But she does not go as far as one could in examining the subjective process
of feeling management and redefinition of self. Do attendants blindly follow
emotion rules? What private arguments or self-dialogues occur as they
take on emotions? How do they actually feel? What is the process of
feeling management and redefinition of self?
Subjective processing must take into account physiological response,
another neglected part of emotional experience (Kemper 1 98 1; Scheff
1985). Physiological elements of lived experience are often ignored by
strong constructionists or regarded by moderate constructionists as
ingredients to be socially shaped (Armon-Jones 1986; Hochschild 1990;
Kemper 198 1). Harre ( 1 986:5), for example, is willing to admit only that
there might be leakages into consciousness from raised heartbeat,
increased sweating, swollen tear ducts and so on. Yet, the physical act
of sobbing uncontrollably after losing a loved one is more than just an
adjunct event. It is likely to be an important physiological cue for confirming
the authenticity of and thus intensifying the deep grief being experienced.
Scheff ( 1 985) suggests further that coarse emotions, such as grief and
fear, may even involve internal sequences that impact external expressive
signals.
Unfortunately, as Denzin ( 1985) observes, those few sociologists who
do examine the biological part of emotions, tend to sever the body from
the lived experience (see Wentworth and Ryan forthcoming, for an exception). But it is important to examine the role of physiological feeling in
lived experience, for example, in our embracing of feeling rules, and to
look at how people label physiological response or ignore it. Emotional
experience, including the physiological, is also essential to the authenticating process as a clue to self-knowledge/self identity (Hochschild 1983;
Morgan and Averill, forthcoming).
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
26
Emotions result from applying personal interpretations of collectivelycreated rules to the situations in which we find ourselves (David Franks,
personal communication). Although what transpires individually and privately is appropriated from the public-collective realm (Wood 1986:197),
how the public-collective or social definition gets translated into the individually realized is a subject that can be penetrated deeply by introspecting
about our own experiences. In introspection, collective symbols become
embodied by individuals involved in continued interpretive apprehension
and transformation of these symbols (Rosaldo 1984:140). The meaning
they take on is a product of the mental-social complex and known to us
only through consciousness (Cooley 1 926:68).How social actors process
or appropriate the public into their personal autobiographies (Sarbin 1986)
to make sense of what is going on provides the private part of our emotion.
In some cases, constructionists are willing to examine emotion as private
as well as social experience, but they move quickly to the social part of
emotion, playing down its private essence as belonging to psychology?
Still, there is nothing unsociological in saying that individually lived experience includes subjective feelings and physiology which play a crucial part
in emotions (Kemper 1 98 1 ). Examining the private processing of feeling
does not have to imply irreducibility or an individualistic orientation (see,
for example, Gordon 1989). Furthermore, to argue that we can know our
emotions through introspection is not to counter the importance of context
and behavior in determining emotion (Bedford 1 986; Armon-Jones 1986).
N o r does it deny that our knowledge of emotions as well as the sentences
we use to describe them are enabled by culture (Solomon 1984).
Such would be true only for the over-psychological perspective on
introspection that deals with experience as if it was a solely internal
phenomenon, instead of an appropriation from the public order. Culture,
as Rosaldo ( 1984:1 50) says, is the very stuff of which our subjectivities
are created. Or, as Mead expressed it, the locus of mind (or the field of
which it is part) must indeed be social, but the focus lies within the individual
(Goff 1980).
The first step in studying this fusion of private and social is to acknowledge introspection, whether our own or that of others, as a sociological
technique that can provide access to private experiences. This paper
examines introspection as a sociological process and argues that it can
generate interpretive materials from self and others useful for understanding the lived experience of emotions. Findingsfrom four studies-one, selfintrospective, and the other three, interactive introspection examinations
with co-investigators-provide information about the subjective part of
emotion. They demonstrate the advantages of introspection in dealing with
the complex, ambiguous, and processual nature of emotional experience.
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
27
FROM A PSYCHOLOGICAL TO A
SOCIOLOGICAL INTROSPECTION
Sociological insight has been built on the introspective methods of its
forebears in philosophy and psychology (Heidegger,Husserl, Kulpe, Mead,
Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Titchener, Wundt). Yet modern social constructionists have neglected Cooleys affective orientation (Stryker 1981) and
introspective method for Meads more cognitive emphasis and technique
of understanding humans by studying what they do (Charon 1985).Many
researchers examining the development of modern sociology suggest
that in the post-Civil War era sociology was trying to prove itself a science
and claim scientific legitimacy apart from the physiologically-based behaviorism of psychologists (Camic 1986; Hinkle and Hinkle 1954; Ross
1979). Introspection as a method had already been rejected by the behaviorist psychologists as nonscientific (Grover 1982; Watson 19 13).
Grover ( 1982:206),for example, went so far as to say that with the advent
of Watsonian radical behaviorism in the 1900s, introspection became an
embarrassment to those psychologists aspiring to scientificrespectability.
For sociologists to have embraced introspection then would have hindered
the case for sociology as science.
Rosenberg ( 1988) suggests further that the sociological paradigm of
social factism-that sociologists must study social facts that exist outside
of individual consciousness-along with the more recent social behaviorist
paradigm prevented sociologists from dealing with self-concept, which
he defines as the totality of the individuals thoughts and feelings with
reference to the self as an object (3).The rejection of introspection as a
technique, along with the neglect of introspection as an object of study in
the form of thoughts and feelings, comes then from the idea that sociology
should define as its territory rational action (see Camic 1986) and social
facts (see Rosenberg 1988):
In theory, the gate in sociology has never been closed entirely to introspection. Some sociological and philosophical traditions closely allied with
sociology have maintained that understanding the meaning of ones own
experience and empathically interpreting meaning in the experience of
others constitute bases for inquiry? Along with ethnographic, feminist,and
hermeneutic approaches, social constructionism-including symbolic interaction, phenomenology, existential sociology, and, more recently, textual analysis-continue laying the groundwork for investigating emotions,
thoughts, and subjective meaning. Yet, social constructionists have not
attempted to use introspection in any systematic fashion to understand
social life.
Nevertheless, most researchers, and especially social constructionists,
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
28
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
~~~~
29
INTROSPECTION AS A SOURCE OF
INTERPRETIVE MATERIALS
For the most part, social constructionists who look at emotions fail to
examine their own responses and, instead, view emotions as feelings that
other people have. Even when they use their own experiences, they do
so in an emotionally detached way (e.g. Goffman 1959; Kotarba 1983),
or they hide reactions in an array of participant observation data (e.g.
Denzin 1987). Sociologists, however, can generate interpretive materials
about the lived experience of emotions by studying their own self-dialogue
in process. Who knows better the right questions to ask than a social
scientist who has lived through the experience?Who would make a better
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
30
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
31
Emphasison
Private Processingof
Thoughts and Feelings
I
Separation of
Subject/
Researcher
I
B
Surveys
Questionnaires
Experiments
Verbal reports
A
Diaries
Journals
Free-writing
-------- -------Integration of
Subject/
Researcher
Emphasison
Social Aspects of
Thoughts and Feelings
Intensive interviews
Oral histories
C
(Self-Introspection)
D
(Interactive Introspection)
Fieldnotes
Narratives
Conversations
~~~
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
32
APPLICATIONS OF
INTROSPECTIVE RESEARCH TO THE
SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTIONS
The following illustrates the results of four preliminary examinations of the
lived experience of emotion, an arena of study particularly amenable to
the introspective technique. I study felt experience, not as an internal state,
but as emotional process recognized internally and constructed externally.
In the three inquiries where I used interactive introspection, I acknowl-
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
33
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
34
Her inner experience, given only through her own introspective capacities,
is crucial for understanding her lived emotions.
On the other hand, it is possible through introspection for people to
acknowledge emotions that they might not be willing to admit to under
other circumstances. For example, in my introspective journal, I wrote
about my dying partner: In actuality I now want him to die. There I said
it. I am fucking ready for him to die. Likewise, a professional woman told
me about how she gave in to depression: Life is very tiresome and any
thoughts of suicide are really rooted in the desire to find some kind of
hold button. The overwhelming desire is to collapse and be taken care
of. One of my co-investigators discussingsadomasochismacknowledged:
Iam a feminist. It is hard to admit, even to myself sometimes, that I enjoy
rape fantasies and the thought of being sexually controlled or of controlling. Then she hastily added, This doesnt mean that I want this to happen
in reality. Thats another sphere entirely.
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
35
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
36
That the same emotional processes may occur in quite different settings
even when the objects of the emotions differ becomes visible in introspective narratives. What seems to vary is the meaning attached to the emotions
and the subjects definitions of the situation (Smith-Lovin 1990). For example, narratives from my experience of dealing with death in a doctors
office surprisingly showed stages similar to those Rambo Ronai wrote
about dancing in a strip bar (Ellis and Rambo Ronai 1988). In the first
phase, we both described unreality and then multi-realities. Second, we
juxtaposed responses such as laughter and anger, expressed feelings of
helplessness and power, intensity and numbness, acceptance and denial,
fatalism and hope. Third, we used emotion work to shield ourselves from
the common thread of ambiguity in the situation. We called up other
feelings, such as anger and sincerity, to protect ourselves from our primary
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
37
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
30
found out after the deaths that her husband had had continuous affairs
for ten years with a number of women. She said, I cannot feel grief. All I
feel is anger and hate. I guess the griefs inside somewhere, but Im not
ready to deal with it yet.
An emotional label often covers different experiences. One of my coresearchers wrote about two kinds of depression:
There is a first type, which is fused with sadness, that occurs when 1 experience
failure or loss.This sort can usually be reversed by stepping back and approaching
the issue rationally. The second type of depression usually comes on slowly
and subtly. It seems to be a combination of anxiety and gloom. Its a constant
sense of foreboding, as if the sun has been eclipsed permanently. By the time I
recognize this type of depression, I am usually sleeping twelve hours a day and
I am only comfortable when Im in bed with the cover over my head. Interaction
is very difficult because it takes so much energy and, in turn, provides unwanted
stimulation.
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
39
to people and reflecting about my own control, I became aware that the
tremendous diversity in emotional management gets lost when we lump
people into categories and look for mean responses, or even when we
just observe behavior, since much of what occurs is internal.
Some people have rational control over their emotions. Those in control
may have few feelings to keep in check, as the following introspective
report from a man demonstrates:
I don't feel intense emotion. I feel emotion, but I immediately get control of it.
I try to show more affect, but I don't know how to do it.. .When you talk about
being inside an emotion, I don't know what you are talking about.. .My partner
is very emotional. I tell her to deal with it, and she just looks at me like she
doesn't understand what I am talking about. She says 1 don't really feel. Maybe
she is right.
Others may feel as much as anyone, but have strong control mechanisms
available. These may be voluntary, as another man describes: "I feel the
emotion side, then I think through the rational side. Then I talk to myself.
Often the rational side can't get through the emotional walls. There can
then be a tiny event, and then the rational side wins." Or the mechanisms
may be somewhat involuntary, as the following man implies: "I sometimes
feel an emotional chunk, but I can rationalize the shit out of it. I was
penalized for giving into emotions in the past. Now I have trouble giving
into passions."
The other end of the control continuum was expressed by a woman
who wrote:
At some point, I just give in to depression. It's as if the filters through which we
organize experience are rearranged to let through only negative events and
feelings. Trying to reorganize the experience rationally doesn't work. It's as if the
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
40
link between the cognitive life and the emotional life is broken, because you
cant pull yourself out of it with mental processes.
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
41
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
42
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
43
Introspective stories from self and others will allow social scientists to get
information about the processual complexities of emotions, such as those
described briefly above. This information will make it possible to re-evaluate
the relationship among "true" emotions, stance toward emotion, emotion
work strategies, and control.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have built a case for looking at emotion as a product of
the individual processing of meaning as well as socially shared cognitions.
I have argued that we need to underrtand the complexity of the lived
experience of emotions and consider sociological introspection as a
technique for doing so.There is risk in studying emotion only as behavior
that is socially constructed. Writing about feelings as though our behavior
is all that matters (Bedford 1986) ignores the finding that many Westernized persons regard inner experience as just as important, if not more
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
44
so, than our outer display (e.g. Davis 1983). In treating emotion as a
product of context (Bedford 1986), management (Hochschild 1983), or
culture (Solomon 1984), social scientists also must take into account
the individuals private role in the interpretation of processual emotional
details that are both determined by and, in turn, aggregate to action
and feeling.
To bring emotion into the sociological study of human behavior (Ellis,
forthcoming), we have to address the descriptive and analytical task of
precisely detailing the moments in the complex process through which it
is experienced. Otherwise, it isnt the whole of emotion we are bringing
into our sociological studies, but a severed, edited version of emotion. As
we saw in the last part of this paper, theorists thus far have underestimated
the complexity and ambiguity of the emotional process. Asking ourselves
and our subjects to process out loud-to acknowledge the complexity
of feelings at any one time and elaborate the details of feelings in the
order they are experienced-will provide details about possible connections of whats out there to whats in here.
Particular sociologists may well choose not to focus on the private and
felt aspects of emotion. But if the field as a whole ignores lived experience,
our interpretations of emotions will be as incomplete as was our understanding of social life before we took emotions into account. And, the
tendency will be to discuss emotions as rational constructions that can be
explained by simplistic rational models of human behavior.
Why have sociologists neglected the intersection of internal and social
experience of emotions? Perhaps this is partly a result of turf-defense and
boundary-maintainingmechanisms. Admitting to the internal role of emotion might be viewed, however erroneously, as challenging the basic social
constructionist position that emotion is socially determined. Acknowledging the physiological feeling of lived emotion might threaten to give its
study over to the psychophysiologists. Likewise, describing the subjective
aspects of emotion may appear to place the study of emotions more
accurately under the auspices of cognitive psychology. In looking at the
feeling aspects of emotion, sociologists are also reminded that they lack
methodological techniques to handle feeling in all its richness and depth.
This suggests, then, that the arts and humanities with their more intuitive
and less rigid scientific approaches to human experience might be the
best arena in which to study emotions.
Sociologists studying emotion are only now fine-tuning how to study
emotions. Thus far, the methods available have determined the questions
asked and the answers given. Many sociologists turned initially to familiar
surveys and questionnaires to ask subjects to account for how they remem-
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
~~
45
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
46
/ Number 1 / 1991
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Special thanks to David Franks. I also acknowledge the following people who assisted
with former drafts of this article: Patricia Adler, Peter Adler, Gerard Brandmeyer, Candace Clark, Norman Denzin, Harvey Farberman, Michael Flaherty, Candace Hinson,
Arlie Hochschild, Danny Jorgensen, Doug McAdam, JohnMcCarthy, Marilyn Myerson,
Marco Orru, Naomi Rosenthal, Lynn Smith-Lovin, JimSperry, and Judith Tanur.
1 . Denzins (1984, 1985, 1987) work is an exception in its emphasis on the lived
experience. Following Derrida ( 1978), Denzin ( 1988) takes the position that one
cannot study lived experience directly, but can study only the texts that express
that lived experience.
2. For example, Armon Jones ( 1986: 46) approaches emotions from a constructionist
and phenomenological perspective, but then concludes that emotion can be
adequately characterized without appealing to qualia or to physiological factors
as necessary constituents of the total emotion event. She reaches this conclusion
because she sees subjective feeling as implying irreducibility and having individualistic implications (see also Harre, 1986).
3. Camic ( 1986) discusses the exclusion of the concept of habit by sociologists as a
result of their revolt against behaviorism. He notes that sociologists rejected the
Watson approach that made habit virtually everything in social life ( 1072). But,
instead of restating the position that habit is a part of social action, they then
rejected habit completely. The same is true of introspection.
4. Cooley ( 1 926), in particular, advocated sympathetic introspection, a process by
which one comes to understand others by sympathetically ascribing to them ones
own response in similar situations. Compare also Diltheys ( 1 900/1976) symbolic
understanding; Webers ( 1949) verstehen; Maclvers ( t 93 1 ) sympathetic reconstruction; Schwartz and Schwartz ( 1955) sympathetic identification; and
Znanieckis ( 1934) humanistic coefficient among others.
5. See, however, Evert and Bijkerk ( 1987) where the therapist and patient introspect
about their experiences in therapy.
REFERENCES
Adler, P. and P. Adler. 1980. Symbolic Interactionism. Pp. 20-6 1 in Introduction to
the Sociologies of veryday Life, edited by jack Douglas et al.
. 1987. The Past and the Future of Ethnography. journal of Contemporary
Ethnography 16:4-24.
Armon-Jones,C. 1986. The Thesis of Constructionism. Pp. 32-56 in Social Construction of Emotions, edited by Rom Harre. New York: Basil Blackwell.
Averill, j. 1974. An Analysis of Psychophysiological Symbolism and Its Influence on
Theories of Emotion, lournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 4: 147- 1 90.
. 1980. On the Paucity of Positive Emotions. Pp. 7-45 in Assessment and
Modification of Emotional Behaviour, edited by K.R. Blankstein, R. Pliner and J . Polivy.
New York: Plenum Press.
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
47
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
4a
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
49
Linden, R. Forthcoming. Making Stories, Making Selves: Jewish ldentities AFter the
Holocaust. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press.
Maclver, R.M. 193 1. Is Sociology a Natural Science? Americanlournal of Sociology
25:25-35.
McDougall, W. 1922. Prolegomena t o Psychology. Psychological Review29: 1-43.
Mead, G.H. [ 19341 1962. Mind, Self and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social
Behaviorist. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Meltzer, B., 1. Petras, and L. Reynolds. 1975. Symbolic hteractionism: Genesis, Varieties
and Criticisms. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Mill, J.S. 1879. A System of Logic ( 1 0th ed.), Book V. On the Logic of the Moral
Sciences., London: Longmans. Green, and Co.
Morgan, C. and J.R. Averill. Forthcoming. True Feelings, The Self, and Authenticity:
Social Perspectives. In Social Perspectives on Emotions, Vol. I , edited by David
Franks and Viktor Cecas, Greenwich, CT: )A1 Press, Inc.
Peirce, C.S. 1958. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Vols. 7 and 8, edited
by C. Hartshorne and translated by P. Weiss. Cambridge. MA: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press.
Polkinghorne, D. 1983. Methodology for the Human Sciences: Systems of Inquiry.
Albany: SUNY Press.
Radford,J. 1974.Reflections on Introspection. American Psychologist29:245-250.
Rambo Ronai, C. 1987. Turn-ons For Money. Unpublished Masters Thesis. University
of South Florida. Tampa. FL.
Reinharz, S. 1979. On Becoming a Social Scientist. San Francisco: jossey-Bass.
Rosaldo, M. 1984. Toward an Anthropology of Self and Feeling. Pp. 137- 157 in
Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Selt and motion, edited by R. Shweder and R.
Levine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosenberg, M. 1 988. Self-concept Research: A Historical Overview. Revised version
of a paper presented at the Southern Sociological Society, Nashville. Tenn.
Ross, D. 1979. The Development of the Social Sciences. Pp. 107-1 38 in The Organization ofKnowledge in Modern America, 1860-1 920, edited by Alexandra Olesen
and John Voss. Baltimore: johns Hopkins University Press.
Sarbin, T. 1986. Emotion and Act: Roles and Rhetoric. Pp. 83-97 in The Social
Construction of Emotions, edited by Rom Harre. NY: Basil Blackwell.
Scheff, T. 1985. Universal Expressive Needs: A Critique and A Theory. Symbolic
lnteraction 8(2):241-262.
Schwartz, M. and C. Schwartz. 1955. Problems in Participant Observation. American
lournal of Sociology 60:343-354.
Shott, 5. 1 979. Emotion and Social Life: A Symbolic lnteractionist Analysis. American
lournal of Sociology 84: 13 17-1 333.
Smith, D. 1979. A Sociology for Women. Pp. 135-1 87 in The Prism of Sex: &says
in the Sociology of Knowledge, edited by Julia A. Sherman and Evelyn T. Beck.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Smith-Lovin, L. 1990. Emotion as Confirmation and Disconfirmation of Identity. Pp.
238-270 in Research Agendas in motions, edited by Theodore D. Kemper.
NY: SUNY.
Solomon, R. 1984. Getting Angry: The JamesianTheory of Emotion in Anthropology.
Pp. 238-254 in Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self and Emotion, edited by R.
Shweder and R. Levine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stacey, J. and B. Thorne. 1985. The Missing Feminist Revolution in Sociology. Social
Problems 32:30 1-3 16.
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
50
~~
/ 1991
Stearns, C. and P. Stearns. 1 986. Anger: The Struggle formotional Controlin America's
History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Stone, G. and H. Farberman. 1970. Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction.
NY: John Wiley and Sons.
Stryker, S. 198 1. "Symbolic Interactionism: Themes and Variations." Pp. 3-29 in Social
Psychology: Sociological Perspectives, edited by Morris Rosenburg and Ralph
Turner. NY: Basic.
Sudnow, D. 1978. Ways of the Hand. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Thoits, P. Forthcoming. "Emotional Deviance: Research Agendas." Pp. 180-203 in
Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions, edited by Theodore D. Kemper,
Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Van Maanen, J . 1988. Tales of the Field. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Watson, J.B. 1913. "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It." Psychological Review
20:158-177.
Weber, M. 1949. The Methodology of the Social Sciences, edited and translated by
E. Shils and H. Finch. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
Wentworth, W.M. and J. Ryan. Forthcoming. "Balancing Body, Mind and Culture: The
Place of Emotion in Social Life," In Social Perspectives on motions, edited by David
Franks and Viktor Gecas. Greenwich, CT: JAl Press, Inc.
Weigert, A. and D.Franks. 1989. "Ambivalence: A Touchstone of the Modern Temper."
Pp. 205-227 in The Sociology of Emotions: Original fssays and Research Papers,
edited by David Franks and E. Doyle McCarthy. Greenwich, CT: JAl Press, Inc.
White, C. 198 1. "Jealousy and Partner's Perceived Motives for Attraction to a Rival."
Social Psychology Quarterly 44:24-30.
Wood, L. 1986. "Loneliness." Pp. 184-208 in The Social Construction of motions,
edited by Rom Harre. NY: Basil Blackwell.
Znaniecki, F. 1934. The Method of Sociology. New York: Farrar and Rinehart.
This content downloaded from 128.122.149.145 on Mon, 09 May 2016 09:00:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms