A.M. No.

00-7-09-CA

March 27, 2001

IN RE: DEROGATORY NEWS ITEMS CHARGING COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

DEMETRIO DEMETRIA WITH INTERFERENCE ON BEHALF OF A SUSPECTED DRUG QUEEN:
COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor, probity,
fairness, prudence and discretion. Magistrates of justice must always be fair and
impartial. They should avoid not only acts of impropriety, but all appearances of
impropriety. Their influence in society must be consciously and conscientiously
exercised with utmost prudence and discretion. For, theirs is the assigned role of
preserving the independence, impartiality and integrity of the Judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to "refrain from influencing in
any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency."1 The slightest form of interference cannot be
countenanced. Once a judge uses his influence to derail or interfere in the
regular course of a legal or judicial proceeding for the benefit of one or any of the
parties therein, public confidence in the judicial system is diminished, if not
totally eroded.
Such is this administrative charge triggered by newspaper accounts which
appeared on the 21 July 2000 issues of The Manila Standard, The Manila
Times, Malaya, The Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today. The national dailies
collectively reported that Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G.
Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk
Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and out of prison to play in a Manila casino. 2
That same day, 21 July 2000, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., issued
a Memorandum to Justice Demetria directing him to comment on the derogatory
allegations in the news items. 3 On 24 July 2000, Justice Demetria submitted
his Compliance. Subsequently, Chief State Prosecutor (CSP) Jovencito R. Zuo,
who disclosed to the media the name of Justice Demetria, and State Prosecutor
(SP) Pablo C. Formaran III, a member of the Task Force on Anti-Narcotics Cases
of the Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecuting the case of the suspected
Chinese drug queen, filed their respective Comments on the Compliance of
Justice Demetria.4
On 8 August 2000, the Court En Banc ordered an investigation and designated
Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino as Investigator and Court Administrator

Alfredo L. Benipayo as Prosecutor. An investigation then commenced on 22

August 2000 and continued until 16 November 2000.
The Prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely, CSP Zuo, SP Formaran
III, Agnes P. Tuason, secretary of SP Formaran, III, and Jose H. Afalla, an
employee from the Office of Asst. CSP (ACSP) Leonardo Guiyab, Jr. The
defense on the other hand presented ten (10) witnesses: respondent Justice
Demetria, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor (ACSP) Severino Gaa, Jr., Senior State
Prosecutor (SSP) Romeo Daosos, Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai, MTC Judge
Orlando Siapno, Peter Young, Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok,
Danilo J. Mijares, bodyguard of Go Teng Kok, and Luisito Artiaga, official of the
Philippine Amateur Track and Field Association (PATAFA).
The facts as borne out by the evidence presented by the prosecution are quite
clear. In an Information dated 9 December 1998, SP Formaran III charged Yu
Yuk Lai, together with her supposed nephew, a certain Kenneth Monceda y Sy
alias William Sy, before the RTC of Manila, Br. 18, 5 with violation of Sec. 15, Art.
III, RA 6425, as amended, for "conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, with deliberate intent and without authority of law . . . (to) willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to a poseur-buyer three (3) kilograms,
more or less, of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), which is a regulated
drug."6 Accused of non-bailable offense, both Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth Monceda
were held at the detention cell of the PNP Narcotics Group in Camp Crame,
Quezon City. On 25 June 1999, accused Yu Yuk Lai filed a Petition for Bail on
the ground that the evidence of her guilt was not strong.
On 10 November 1999, upon receiving information that the accused, especially
Yu Yuk Lai, had been seen regularly playing in the casinos of Heritage Hotel and
the Holiday Inn Pavilion, SP Formaran III filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Transfer the Detention of the Accused to the City Jail.7 On the same day, Judge
Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr., granted the motion and ordered the immediate
transfer of the two (2) accused to the Manila City Jail. 8
On 18 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., concluded that "the evidence standing
alone and unrebutted, is strong and sufficient to warrant conviction of the two
accused for the crime charged" and denied the petition for bail of accused Yu
Yuk Lai for lack of merit. 9 Consequently, both accused filed a Joint Motion for
Inhibition arguing that the trial court's actuation "do not inspire the belief that its
decision would be just and impartial."10 On 28 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr.,
believing that the joint motion was utterly without merit but considering the
gravity of the offense and for the peace of mind of the accused, inhibited
himself.11

The case was re-raffled to Branch 53, presided by Judge Angel V. Colet.
Accused Yu Yuk Lai then filed a Motion to Order the Confinement of the
Accused in a Hospital. Before Judge Colet could resolve the motion, the case
was handled by the Branch's Pairing Judge Manuel T. Muro.
On 15 May 2000 Judge Muro granted accused Yu Yuk Lai's motion and allowed
her to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital for a period not exceeding
seven (7) days,12 contrary to the recommendation of Dr. Jose Estrada Rosal,
Chief of the Health Services of the Manila City Jail, that Yu Yuk Lai be confined
at the Philippine General Hospital.13
On 5 June 2000 Judge Muro granted Yu Yuk Lai's Urgent Motion for Extension
of Medical Confinement "for a period of one (1) month, or until such time that she
is fit to be discharged from the said hospital." 14 On 7 July 2000 Judge Muro also
granted Yu Yuk Lai's Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence with
Motion to Admit Demurrer to Evidence.15 Soon, rumors circulated in the Manila
City Hall that Judge Muro was partial towards accused Yu Yuk Lai.
The rumors did not end there. On 6 July 2000 unidentified employees of the RTC
Manila calling themselves "CONCERNED COURT EMPLOYEES" wrote the
Secretary of Justice, copy furnished the Chief State Prosecutor, the
Ombudsman, and Judge Muro. The letter alleged that Judge Muro ordered the
hospitalization of Yu Yuk Lai "even if she (was) not sick and there (was) already
a rumor circulating around the City Hall, that the notorious Judge had given the
go signal to the counsel of the accused to file the Motion to Quash, which
(would) be granted for a consideration of millions of pesos and the contact
person (was) allegedly the daughter of the Judge, who is an employee in the
said branch."16
Accordingly on 14 July 2000, SP Formaran III filed a Motion for Inhibition praying
that Judge Muro inhibit himself "from further handling this case and/or from
resolving the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused Yu Yuk Lai as well as
any other pending incidents therein."17
On 16 July 2000, at around 7:30 o'clock in the morning, while she was supposed
to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital, accused Yu Yuk Lai was arrested
inside the VIP room of the Casino Filipino at the Holiday Inn Pavilion, Manila,
while playing baccarat. She was unescorted at the time of her arrest.
On 18 July 2000, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, the Motion for Inhibition of
Judge Muro was heard and submitted for resolution. Later, at around 11:30
o'clock, when SP Formaran III arrived in his office from the hearing, he was

informed by his secretary, Agnes Tuason, that the staff of Court of Appeals
Justice Demetrio Demetria had called earlier and said that the Justice wanted to
speak with him. The caller requested for a return call. As requested, SP
Formaran III immediately returned the call of Justice Demetria but the Justice
had already gone out for lunch.
Later in the afternoon, between 1:30 and 2:00 o'clock, Justice Demetria, PATAFA
President Go Teng Kok and Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok and a
close friend of Justice Demetria, went to the office of SP Formaran III in the DOJ
which SP Formaran III shares with SP Albert Fonacier. Apparently, Justice
Demetria was not familiar with SP Formaran III as he greeted SP Fonacier
"Kamusta ka, Prosecutor Formaran?"18
Soon the visitors were seated. Go Teng Kok immediately pleaded with SP
Formaran III to withdraw his motion to inhibit Judge Muro as this would
purportedly delay the resolution of the case. Go Teng Kok also expressed his
apprehension that if Judge Muro would inhibit, a new judge might convict his
friend, accused Yu Yuk Lai, who was then already receiving bad publicity.
Justice Demetria then asked about the status of the case. SP Formaran III
informed the Justice that a motion for inhibition has been submitted for
resolution, one basis of which was the unsigned letter of the concerned court
employees. Justice Demetria opined that it was a bit dangerous to anchor the
inhibition of a judge on an unsigned, anonymous letter. The Justice then advised
Go Teng Kok who was becoming persistent to "keep his cool" and asked SP
Formaran III if he could do something to help Go Teng Kok. Apparently, prior to
18 July 2000, Go Teng Kok had already been asking SP Formaran III to go slow
in prosecuting accused Yu Yuk Lai. 19 SP Formaran III at first politely declined the
request. But later, "just to put an end to (the) conversation," 20 he told them that
he would bring the matter to CSP Zuo. "Iyon pala," Justice Demetria replied.
The Justice then stood up, bade good bye and left. Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok
followed closely behind.21
Thereafter, SP Formaran III went to see CSP Zuo and informed the latter of
what had transpired. CSP Zuo replied, "No way!" SP Formaran III also told
ACSP Guiyab, Jr., who gave the same reply.22
At around 3:00 o'clock that same afternoon, CSP Zuo received a call from
Justice Demetria who requested him to instruct SP Formaran III to withdraw the
motion for inhibition of Judge Muro so that the Judge could already issue an
order. "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na i-withdraw na iyong
kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa na ng Order si Judge Muro ,"

Justice Demetria was quoted as saying.23 Politely, CSP Zuo said that he would
see what he could do. "Tingnan ko po kung ano ang magagawa ko."24

latter consulted the Chief State Prosecutor about the visit of the Justice and Go
Teng Kok impliedly asking him to withdraw the motion.

On 20 July 2000, The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that a "Supreme Court
Justice . . . and an outspoken sports person and leader" 25 had been exerting
"undue pressure" on the DOJ to go slow in prosecuting re-arrested drug queen
Yu Yuk Lai. That same afternoon, the names of Justice Demetria and Mr. Go
Teng Kok were disclosed to the media to clear the name of the Supreme Court
justices who might have been affected by the erroneous news report. The
following day, 21 July 2000, several newspapers named Justice Demetria and
Go Teng Kok as "drug lawyers."
Also on 20 July 2000 the DOJ received a copy of an Order dated 19 July
2000 of Judge Muro inhibiting himself from further hearing the case of Yu Yuk Lai
and Kenneth Monceda.26

In defense of respondent Justice, Atty. Paas stated that it was actually he, not
Justice Demetria, who later called up CSP Zuo to inquire about the latter's
decision regarding the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit since SP Formaran III
had earlier told Go Teng Kok that the matter would be taken up with his
superiors.

Respondent Justice Demetria, for his part, vehemently denied having interceded
for Yu Yuk Lai. While he admitted that he indeed visited the DOJ on 18 July
2000, he went there to "visit old friends" and his meeting Go Teng Kok whom he
did not know until that time was purely accidental. Expectedly, Atty. Paas and Go
Teng Kok corroborated the claim of respondent Justice.
Justice Demetria explained that he merely requested SP Formaran III "to do
something to help Go Teng Kok about the case" without ever specifying the kind
of "help" that he requested. He averred that it was purely on the basis of
erroneous impression and conjecture on the part of SP Formaran III that he
impliedly asked him to withdraw the motion "because that is what Mr. Go Teng
Kok was appealing and requesting."27 Respondent claimed that the "help" he
was requesting could well be "within legal bounds or line of duty."
Justice Demetria claimed that if ever he said anything else during the discussion
between Go Teng Kok and SP Formaran III, such was not a form of intervention.
He only admonished Go Teng Kok "to cool it" when the discussion between the
prosecutor and Go Teng Kok became heated. While he asked about the status of
the case this, he said, demonstrated his lack of knowledge about the case and
bolstered his claim that he could not have possibly interceded for Yu Yuk Lai.
Respondent Justice likewise argued that the bases of his identification by CSP
Zuo as the Justice exerting undue pressure on the DOJ were all hearsay.
Respondent submitted that CSP Zuo based his identification from a newspaper
account, from the statement of his secretary that it was he (Justice Demetria)
who was on the other end of the telephone and from SP Formaran III when the

In fine, respondent Justice Demetria maintains that it is inconceivable for him to

ask SP Formaran III whom he just met for the first time to do something for Go
Teng Kok whom he claims he just likewise met for the first time. Neither did he
know Yu Yuk Lai, a claim Yu Yuk Lai herself corroborated. It would be
unthinkable for him to intercede in behalf of someone he did not know. Indeed
respondent Justice asserted that his meeting Go Teng Kok on 18 July 2000 at
the DOJ was purely coincidence, if not accidental.
So, did respondent Justice Demetria really intercede in behalf of suspected drug
queen Yu Yuk Lai?
Investigating Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino believes so. In her Report dated 5
January 2001, she found respondent Justice Demetria "guilty of violating Rule
2.04, Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct" and recommended that "appropriate
disciplinary action be taken against him by this Honorable Court." 28
Only rightly so. The evidence is clear, if not overwhelming, and damning. Thus,
even the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, after a hearing,
found that "there was a conspiracy to commit the following offenses on the part
of CA Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria and PATAFA President Go Teng Kok
and Miss Yu Yuk Lai: obstruction of justice punishable under PD No. 1829 and
Article 3(a) of RA 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." 29
While Justice Demetria vehemently denied interfering with the criminal case, his
denial cannot stand against the positive assertions of CSP Zuo and SP
Formaran III,30 which are consistent with natural human experience. To accept
the testimony of the defense witnesses that it was Atty. Paas who telephoned
CSP Zuo, and not Justice Demetria, and that the "help" the respondent Justice
was requesting SP Formaran III was something "within legal bounds or line of
duty" other than the withdrawal of the motion is to strain too far one's
imagination.

The testimony of CSP Zuo is plainly unambiguous and indubitably consistent

with the other facts and circumstances surrounding the case
CSP Zuo: As far as I could recall Justice Demetria said, "Pakisabi mo
nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang
Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro." 31
In his discussion with Go Teng Kok and Justice Demetria, SP Formaran III said
that he would consult his superiors regarding the proposal to withdraw the
motion. The timely telephone call to CSP Zuo was thus a logical follow-up. And
no one could have made the call except respondent Justice since it is not
uncommon for anyone to believe that CSP Zuo would recognize the voice of
respondent Justice who was CSP Zuo's former superior in the DOJ. Thus, the
confident utterance "[p]akisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na
iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si
Judge Muro" could not have come from anyone else but from respondent Justice
who had moral ascendancy over CSP Zuo, he being a Justice of the Court of
Appeals and a former Undersecretary and at one time Acting Secretary of the
DOJ.
Even the requested "help" for Go Teng Kok, whom respondent Justice claims he
did not know and met only that time, could not have meant any other assistance
but the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro. True, Justice Demetria
never categorically asked SP Formaran III to withdraw his Motion. But when
respondent Justice Demetria asked the state prosecutor at that particular time
"to do something . . . to help Mr. Go Teng Kok," the latter was pleading for the
withdrawal of the motion, and nothing else. That was the only form of "help" that
Go Teng Kok wanted. The subtle pressure exerted simply pointed to one
particular act. Thus, subsequently respondent Justice called CSP Zuo to ask for
just that the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro.

"hi."33 SSP Daosos, denied seeing him and claimed that it was only Atty. Paas
who peeped into his room.34 Suspiciously, it was really in the office of SP
Formaran III, whom respondent Justice Demetria did not know, where Justice
Demetria, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok decided to "stay a while." 35
Thus, as found by Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, the Investigating
Justice, Justice Demetria and company could not have been there to exchange
pleasantries with SPs Formaran III and Fonacier since they were not acquainted
with each other. Prior to this incident, Justice Demetria did not personally know
either SP Formaran III or SP Fonacier, a fact corroborated by respondent
himself.36
All of these contradict and belie respondent Justice Demetria's
earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief Justice that "[b]ecause
Prosecutor Formaran is also a friend, we decided to drop by his office . . . (and) I
stayed a while."37
As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, respondent Justice was there "to join
forces with Go Teng Kok in arguing for the withdrawal of Formaran's Motion for
Inhibition of Judge Muro, which was the real purpose of their visit to SP
Formaran and to the DOJ. The uncanny coincidence in the timing of Justice
Demetria's visit to SP Formaran's office, and that of Go Teng Kok, could not have
been 'accidental' but pre-arranged." 38 And, "visiting old friends" only came as an
afterthought. The circumstances simply show that Justice Demetria and Atty.
Paas, together with Go Teng Kok, did not go to the DOJ to see Sec. Tuquero, but
to visit, if not "pressure," CSP Zuo and SP Formaran III.
Justice Demetria also claimed that it is inconceivable for him to help Yu Yuk Lai
and Go Teng Kok, both of whom he did not personally know, and more
unthinkable that he would be asking help from SP Formaran III whom he had just
met for the first time.

Justice Demetria also claimed that he, together with Atty. Paas, went to the DOJ,
first, to see Secretary Artemio Tuquero and seek assistance in the appointment
of Atty. Paas to the Court of Appeals, and second, to "visit old friends," 32 and that
the meeting with Go Teng Kok was purely accidental. But respondent Justice
never mentioned in his earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief
Justice that his primary purpose in going to the DOJ was to see Sec. Tuquero,
and since Sec. Tuquero was not in, he instead decided to see some
officials/prosecutors whom he had not visited for a long time.

The argument cannot be sustained. It is admitted that respondent is a very close

friend of Atty. Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok. And, it is not necessary that
respondent Justice Demetria be acquainted with Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai or SP
Formaran III for him to intercede in behalf of the accused. It is enough that he is
a close friend of the lawyer of Go Teng Kok, who has been helping the accused,
and that he wields influence as a former DOJ Undersecretary and later, Acting
Secretary, and now, a Justice of the Court of Appeals.

We find this assertion difficult to accept. For, even his very own witnesses belied
his alibi. ACSP Gaa, Jr. testified and confirmed that Justice Demetria only said

In sum, we find the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses convincing and

trustworthy, as compared to those of the defense which do not only defy natural

human experience but are also riddled with major inconsistencies which create
well-founded and overriding doubts.
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice is circumscribed with the heavy of responsibility. His at all
times must be characterized with propriety and must be above suspicion. 39 His
must be free of even a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the
performance of his judicial duties, but also his behavior outside the courtroom
and as a private individual.

HEIRS OF THE LATE JUSTICE JOSE B. L. REYES, complainants,

vs.
JUSTICES DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, RAMON A. BARCELONA, and
ROBERTO A. BARRIOS [Special Third Division]; ATTY. TERESITA R.
MARIGOMEN, Division Clerk of Court, Special Fourth Division and MR.
EFREN R. RIVAMONTE, Special Sheriff, Mailing Section, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:

Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed failed to live up to

this expectation. Through his indiscretions, Justice Demetria did not only make a
mockery of his high office, but also caused incalculable damage to the entire
Judiciary. The mere mention of his name in the national newspapers, allegedly
lawyering for a suspected drug queen and interfering with her prosecution
seriously undermined the integrity of the entire Judiciary.
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position
exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness tha a seat in
the Judiciary.40 High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be
maintained, without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary so
indispensable in orderly society cannot be preserved. 41 There is simply no place
in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial
conduct and integrity.42
WHEREFORE, we sustain the findings of the Investigating Justice and hold
Justice Demetrio G. Demetria GUILTY of violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or reappointment to any
government office, agency or instrumentality, including any government owned
or controlled corporation or institution.SO ORDERED.

"Justice Malcolm aptly described ideal judges as men who have a mastery of
the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are
permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and
who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal
and coordinate to the other two departments of government. Those who wield
the judicial gavel have the duty to study our laws and their latest wrinkles. They
owe it to the public to be legally knowledgeable for ignorance of the law is the
mainspring of injustice."1
The Case
The case before the Court is a verified complaint 2 of the heirs of the late Justice
Jose B. L. Reyes, represented by Adoracion Reyes, and the heirs of Dr.
Edmundo A. Reyes, namely, Ma. Teresa P. Reyes and Carlos P. Reyes against
Justices Demetrio G. Demetria,3 Ramon A. Barcelona and Roberto A. Barrios,
Court of Appeals, Atty. Teresita R. Marigomen, Division Clerk of Court, Special
Fourth Division, Court of Appeals and Mr. Efren R. Rivamonte, Special Sheriff,
Court of Appeals, for violation of Section 11, Rule 59 and Sec. 8, Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of court, Sections 3.01 and 3.08 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment.
The Antecedent Facts
The instant administrative complaint arose from a simple ejectment case filed by
complainants against Metro Manila Builders, Inc. (Manila Builders).

A.M. No. CA-01-32

January 23, 2002

Pursuant to a contract executed on November 30, 1976, complainants

predecessors-in-interest leased a parcel of land with an area of more than one
(1) hectare situated along Taft Avenue, Pasay City to Manila Builders for twenty
five (25) years at a rental rate of P15,000.00 to P30,000.00 a month. Under the

lease agreement, Manila Builders would cover all present and future
improvements on the property with insurance against certain risks and maintain
the premises in good, sanitary and tenantable condition at all times.
However, Manila Builders violated the terms and conditions of the lease
agreement. Exercising the right to unilateral rescission, 4 complainants sent
notice to Manila Builders terminating the lease and demanding that they vacate
and surrender the premises subject of the lease agreement, which Manila
Builders ignored.
On February 3, 1997, complainants filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasay
City, Branch 45 a complaint for unlawful detainer based on the breach of the
contract of lease,5 which the trial court decided on May 9, 1997 in complainants
favor. The trial court ordered Manila Builders evicted from the premises.
On May 16, 1997, complainants filed with the trial court a motion for execution of
the judgment of eviction. Meanwhile, Manila Builders appealed to the Regional
Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch 113; however, the appeal was subsequently
dismissed for failure to file an appeal memorandum on time.
On November 5, 1997, Manila Builders elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals.6 On November 26, 1997, the trial court granted complainants motion
for execution, which order was correspondingly issued on December 1, 1997.
On December 8, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued an order restraining the
execution of the ejectment judgment.7
On February 7, 1998, the Court of Appeals allowed the withdrawal of appeal filed
by Manila Builders. Simultaneously with the withdrawal of the appeal, Manila
Builders filed with the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch 231 an action for
annulment of the ejectment judgment 8 due to the court a quos lack of jurisdiction
and prayed for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to
enjoin the execution of the decision. However, the regional trial court did not
issue an injunction against the trial court.

respondents Justices Demetria, ponente, and Barcelona, concurring. Justice

Amin, member, did not sign.
On April 14, 1998, in Civil Case No. 98-0366, the Regional Trial Court, Pasay
City, Branch 231 dismissed the action for annulment of judgment on the ground
that Manila Builders remedy is appeal in due time, which when withdrawn, was
effectively abandoned.12
On August 21, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay
City in Civil Case No. 113-97 dated May 9, 1997 is SET ASIDE and the orders
dated March 23, 1998 and April 14, 1998, issued in Civil Case No. 98-0366 are
likewise SET ASIDE. Private respondent is hereby ordered to restore the subject
property in the possession of petitioner and are hereby permanently enjoined
from further committing acts disturbing physical possession of the subject
property by petitioner until after the expiration of the Contract of Lease." 13
On the same date (August 21, 1998), Manila Builders filed a very urgent exparte motion for execution pending appeal.
On September 14, 1998, complainants filed with the Supreme Court a petition
for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals. 14 On September
17, 1998, complainants filed with the Court of Appeals their consolidated
comment on the very urgent motion for execution pending appeal, with motion to
defer consideration due to the pendency of their petition with the Supreme Court.
Despite the pending petition with this Court, on September 18, 1998, the Court
of Appeals issued a resolution granting the motion for execution, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"Accordingly, this Court hereby RESOLVES to grant the instant petition.

On March 23, 1998, Manila Builders filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and mandamus questioning the regional trial courts "sub-silencio"
denial of its application for injunctive relief.9

"1. A writ of Execution Pending Appeal of the Decision of this Court dated
August 21, 1998 is hereby issued.

On the same day, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution 10 restraining the
enforcement of the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 113-97, MTC, Pasay City,
Branch 45.11 Only two (2) members of the division signed the resolution,

"The Division Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to furnish a certified true copy
of this resolution and the decision of this Court dated August 21, 1998 to the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, and Regional Trial Court, Branch 231 both
of Pasay City.

"2. Private respondents and their counsel are hereby adjudged guilty of indirect
contempt of this Honorable Court and are hereby sentenced to pay a fine of
P30,000.00. Private respondents and counsel are also directed to make a
completer restoration to petitioner of the subject property." 15 [Emphasis supplied]
On September 21, 1998, the Court of Appeals (Second Division) issued a
resolution reading:

"WHEREAS, on August 21, 1998, a Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal was filed by petitioner.
"WHEREAS, on September 18, 1998, a resolution was issued and promulgated
by the Former Special Third Division, the decretal portion of which reads:
Accordingly, this Court hereby RESOLVES to grant the instant motion.

"In view of the letter of Justice Demetrio G. Demetria (Ponente) dated

September 21, 1998, the Chief of the Mailing Section is hereby directed to
appoint a special sheriff to execute the decision of this Court dated August 21,
1998."16

1. A writ of Execution Pending Appeal of the Decision of this Court dated

August 21, 1998 is hereby issued.
The Division Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to furnish a certified
true copy of this resolution and the decision of this Court dated August
21, 1998 to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, and Regional Trial
Court, Branch 231 both of Pasay City.

On the same date, respondent Efren R. Rivamonte, process server at the

mailing section of the Court of Appeals, was appointed special sheriff to enforce
the writ. Accordingly, 2nd Division Clerk of Court Caroline G. Ocampo-Peralta
issued a writ of execution as follows:

2. Private respondents and their counsel are hereby adjudged guilty of

indirect contempt of this Honorable Court and are hereby sentenced to
pay a fine of P30,000.00. Private respondents and counsel are hereby
directed to make a complete restoration to petitioner of the subject
property.

"WRIT OF EXECUTION
"TO
MR.
(Designated
by
the
Court of Appeals, Manila)

EFREN
Special
Mailing

RIVAMONTE
Sheriff
Section,

G R E E T I N G S:
WHEREAS, on August 21, 1998, a decision was issued by Special Third Division
of this Court, promulgated on August 25, 1998 the dispositive portion of which
reads: (p. 485-486, Rollo)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay
City in Civil Case No. 113-97 dated May 9, 1997 is SET ASIDE and the Orders
dated March 23, 1998 and April 14, 1998, issued in Civil Case No. 98-0366 are
likewise SET ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby ordered to restore the
subject property in the possession of petitioner and are hereby permanently
enjoined from further committing acts disturbing physical possession of the
subject property by petitioner until after the expiration of the Contract of Lease.

SO ORDERED.
"NOW THEREFORE, You are hereby commanded, pursuant to resolution dated
September 18, 1998 which granted petitioners Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal, to enforce this Writ in accordance with the decision issued on August 21,
1998 by ordering private respondents to restore petitioners of the possession of
the subject property, and to make a return of this Writ to this Court within five (5)
days from date, with your proceedings endorse thereon.
"WITNESS, the Honorable RAMON A. BARCELONA, Acting Chairman,
Honorable DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, and Honorable ROBERTO A. BARRIOS,
Members, Associate Justices of the FORMER THIRD DIVISION, this 21st of
September, 1998, Court of Appeals, Manila.
"Respectfully yours,
[Sgd.]

SO ORDERED.

"CAROLINE
"Division
"Second Division"17

G.
Clerk

of

OCAMPO-PERALTA
Court

Also on the same date, respondent Rivamonte evicted complainants from the
premises and restored possession to Manila Builders.
The Administrative Charges
Aggrieved by irregularities in the proceedings in CA-G. R. SP Nos. 47158 and
47720, on September 15, 2000, complainants filed with the Supreme Court the
instant administrative complaint against respondent justices and employees of
the Court of Appeals. Complainants alleged that they lost possession of the
subject property due to the "malicious, deliberate and unlawful issuance" of
Justices Demetria and Barcelona of the March 23, 1998 restraining order.
Justices Demetria, Barcelona and Barrios further perpetrated an injustice when
they promulgated the decision of August 21, 1998, and issued the writ of
execution pending appeal dated September 21, 1998, despite the pendency of
appeal with the Supreme Court. Complainants charged respondent justices,
particularly the ponente, Justice Demetria, with violating pertinent provisions of
the Code of Judicial Conduct.
On May 4, 2001, the Court required respondents to file their respective
comments on the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt. 18
On May 31, 2001, respondents Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Roberto A.
Barrios, and Division Clerk of Court Teresita R. Marigomen filed a joint comment
claiming innocence of the charges against them.19 On June 21, 2001,
respondent Justice Demetria filed his comment asserting good faith and
basically adopting the defenses and arguments of his co-respondents. 20 On
October 4, 2001, respondent Rivamonte filed his comment stating that he only
complied with the orders of his superiors.21
With regard to the resolution of March 23, 1998, respondent Justice Barcelona
alleged that his concurrence in the issuance of the temporary restraining order
was done "in good faith and in deference to the discretion of
theponente," respondent Justice Demetria, "who has knowledge of the
soundness and factual merits of the case." We find this a wrongful approach to
the issue. Concurrence must be based on the justices conviction after mature
deliberation, not deference to the ponente. Obviously, the procedure adopted
showed that there was no due deliberation on the case by the justices of the
division. After the division members signed the resolution, the division members

would not know the completeness of the signatures in the resolution since its
release was ordered by the ponente, not by the Division Chairman. Hence, the
division members would not know if the resolution was promulgated without the
required number of signatures.22
On the other hand, respondent Justice Demetria maintained that the issuance of
the March 23, 1998 resolution temporarily restraining the enforcement of the writ
of execution in Civil Case No. 113-97 has sound basis in law and jurisprudence
and was made after a thorough study by him.
Respondent Marigomen noted nothing erroneous or anomalous upon seeing
only two (2) signatures in the resolution of March 23, 1998, as it is legally
permissible for a single justice to issue restraining orders, citing Rule 58, Section
2,23 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 3, Section 9, 24 Revised Internal
Rules of the Court of Appeals, as amended.25
The Courts Ruling
Respondents submissions are patently without merit. There is no question
regarding the authority of the Court of Appeals to issue a preliminary writ of
injunction or temporary restraining order pending the resolution of petitions and
appeals within its jurisdiction, especially in meritorious cases. What is
questionable is the irregular procedure by which the March 23, 1998 resolution
was arrived at and served on the parties.
As it is, only two members of the Court of Appeals, Special Fourth Division,
respondents Justices Demetria,ponente, and Barcelona, member, concurring,
signed the resolution. Justice Omar U. Amin, member, did not sign. Hence, the
resolution may not be received for filing, much less served on the parties. The
clear intent of the division members was for the three members to act on the
resolution. It is true that under the rules, a member of the Court of Appeals may
issue a temporary restraining order. However, he shall advisedly use such power
sparingly, in case of extreme necessity where there are compelling reasons to
abate or avoid a grave injury to a party. And, such issuance must be submitted to
the Court for ratification at the very next session of the Court.
In light of the foregoing, we find that Justice Demetria, as ponente, disregarded
existing rules of procedure. Considering that what he violated were the same
rules of procedure he was expected and required to observe, such failure to
comply was inexcusable. When the law transgressed is elementary, the failure to
know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.26

As regards respondent Marigomen, we find her explanation deferential to the

views of respondent justices. As division clerk of court, she is bound by the
prevailing rules of procedure of the Court of Appeals. Among her duties and
responsibilities, she shall maintain the records of the Division in an orderly
manner and keep watch over the status and progress of cases assigned to the
Division.27 She is expected to immediately report to the Justice assigned to study
the case the failure of any party or parties to comply with any resolution or order
of the Court within the period prescribed therefor.28 She should have called the
attention of the ponente upon seeing the incomplete signatures on the
resolution. It should have been obvious that the resolution issuing a temporary
restraining order was intended as a collegiate act, not the order of a single
justice. She should not have released and allowed the said resolution to be
served on the parties.
Respondent Justice Barcelona may be absolved of administrative complicity
regarding the issuance of a temporary restraining order. He had no knowledge
about the lack of the requisite third signature before the resolution was
promulgated. After affixing his signature, the resolution was not submitted to the
Chairman for promulgation and release by the Division Clerk of Court.
However, we find it grossly appalling that the Court of Appeals former Special
Third Division (Barcelona, Demetria and Barrios, JJ.) immediately enforced its
decision pending appeal. Worse, the Court of Appeals (2nd Division, Cui,
Barcelona and Demetria, JJ.) directed the Chief of the Mailing Section to appoint
a special sheriff to carry out the writ of execution pending appeal. The Court of
Appeals has no authority to issue immediate execution pending appeal of its
own decision. Discretionary execution under Rule 39, Section 2(a), Revised
Rules of Court, as amended, applies to a judgment or final order of the trial
court, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. 29
Respondents Justices Barcelona and Barrios state that they were impressed by
the good reasons posited by Manila Builders, that is, deprivation of income and
its mounting obligations and liabilities. On the other hand, respondent Justice
Demetria explained that there is no prohibition, whether expressed or implied,
regarding the authority of the Court of Appeals to issue immediate execution
pending appeal of its own decision.
We find no merit in respondents ratiocinations. Rule 51, Section 11, Revised
Rules of Court expressly provides that the judgment of the Court of Appeals shall
be remanded to the lower court for execution ten (10) days after entry of
judgment, unless notice is given that the decision would be appealed to the
Supreme Court. By requiring the remand of the records to the lower court after

the entry of judgment, the rules completely cut off any authority of the Court of
Appeals to directly undertake the execution of the final judgment, much less the
authority to order its execution pending its finality.
The Court cannot permit any act or omission, which yanks public faith away from
the judiciary,30 for a judges utter lack of familiarity with the rules undermines
public confidence in the competence of the courts. 31 In fact, the Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates that judges must be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence. He must have the basic rules at the palm of his hand
and be proficient in the interpretation of laws and procedural rules. 32
Respondent justices argue that they did not have prior knowledge about the
pendency of the petition before the Supreme Court, for had they learned about
it, they would not have allowed the execution of the judgment.33The record
belies such pharisaical stance. In the first place, the Court of Appeals was
furnished with a copy of the petition. Secondly, the petitioners filed a
manifestation expressly opposing execution pending appeal because they had
elevated the case to the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals ignored
petitioners protestations. Thirdly, the dispositive portion of the September 18,
1998 expressly acknowledged that the decision was not final,to wit:
"Accordingly, this Court hereby RESOLVES to grant the instant petition.
"1. A writ of Execution Pending Appeal of the Decision of this Court dated
August 21, 1998 is hereby issued.
"x x x."34
A scrutiny of the record reveals that respondent Justice Barrios did not take part
in the appointment of respondent Rivamonte as special sheriff. The Court
(Second Division, Cui, Barcelona and Demetria, JJ.) by minute resolution dated
September 21, 1998, directed the Chief mailing section to appoint a special
sheriff.35
Indeed, respondent Justice Demetria has shown keen interest in the immediate
execution of the decision despite the Court of Appeals lack of authority to
appoint a special sheriff. The appointment of a special sheriff, in the person of
respondent Rivamonte, encroached on the authority of the Supreme Court as
the appointing power ofall officials and employees of the judiciary.36 The
Court of Appeals has no authority to appoint or to direct any of its employees to
appoint a special sheriff,37 who was not even bonded as required by law.38

With regard to respondent Rivamonte, considering that he relied on the belief

that he was performing a ministerial duty of carrying out the orders of his
superiors, which he thought to be lawful and valid, and in the absence of malice
and bad faith, he may be absolved of administrative liability. However, as the
assigned task was not within the scope of his duties as process server in the
mailing section, prudence and caution dictated that he declines to perform the
assignment. He is hereby warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts
would be meted out with the appropriate penalty.

The Court DISMISSES the complaint against respondent Teresita R. Marigomen

with admonition and warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would
be dealt with more severely.
Finally, the Court DISMISSES the complaint against respondent Efren R.
Rivamonte with admonition and warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

With regard to the allegation that respondent Justices Demetria, Barcelona and
Barrios knowingly rendered an unjust judgment against complainants in the
certiorari petition, a review of the record would reveal insufficient evidence of bad
faith or ill motive on the part of the magistrates concurring in the ponencia. At
most, there was a lack of deliberation on the issues presented. This would not
automatically warrant administrative sanctions against the justices, 39 in the
absence of a showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. 40
In order to discipline a judge, it must be clearly shown that the judgment or order
is unjust as being contrary to law and that the judge rendered it with conscious
and deliberate intent to do an injustice. 41 Judges cannot be subjected to liability
civil, criminal or administrative for any of their official acts, no matter how
erroneous, so long as they act in good faith. It is only when they act fraudulently
or corruptly, or with gross ignorance may they be held criminally or
administratively responsible.42 An erroneous decision or order is presumed to
have been issued in good faith in the absence of proof to the contrary.43
We find it apt to stress before we close that it is the duty of the members of the
bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity
of the judiciary.44 Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial
decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness,
impartiality and integrity.45 For, the conception of good judges has been, and is,
of men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in
accordance with law.46
Respondent Rivamonte may be absolved of administrative liability but must be
admonished and warned to be more cautious in the discharge of his duties.
The Judgment
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent Justice Demetrio G. Demetria
guilty of gross misconduct and imposes on him a fine of P20,000.00.

A.M. No. RTJ-01-1629

March 26, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. 99-731-RTJ)
HILARIO DE GUZMAN, JR., complainant,
vs.
JUDGE DEODORO J. SISON, Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Dagupan
City, respondent.

E.] The Supreme Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a Judge may not
be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he
renders.6
On March 16, 1999,7 the Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Office-OCAD, Docket
and Clearance Division, advised complainant to file a formal complaint against
respondent judge. Accordingly, complainant filed a formal complaint on May 14,
1999,8 attaching thereto the pertinent documents9 in support thereof.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a letter dated December 16, 1998 a copy of which was received by the Office
of the Chief Justice on December 23, 1998,1 complainant Hilario De Guzman,
Jr., the winning mayoralty candidate for San Jacinto, Pangasinan in the May 11,
1998 elections, called the Court's attention to alleged irregularities in the
adjudication of the election protest filed by his rival, which was docketed as Elec.
Case No. 31-982 and assigned to Branch 40, Regional Trial Court of
Pangasinan, presided by respondent judge.
The letter was subsequently indorsed 3 by the Chief Justice to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), which, on January 25, 1999, 4 required respondent
judge to comment within ten (10) days from receipt.

Subsequently, on October 12, 1999,10 complainant wrote a letter to the OCA

praying for the early resolution of the case, and submitted therewith a copy of
the decision of the COMELEC's 2nd Division dated October 5, 1999 11 in EAC
No. A-20-98, entitled, "Rolando P. Columbres, Protestant-appellee versus Hilario
De Guzman, Jr., Protestant-appellant," reversing the ruling of respondent judge
in Election Case No. 31-98. This decision of the COMELEC's 2nd Division was
subsequently affirmed by the COMELEC sitting en banc. 12
In a Resolution dated December 1, 1999, the Court noted the above-mentioned
letter of complainant and referred the case to Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon
of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation within
ninety (90) days from notice.13
On March 8, 2000, respondent judge filed his comment, 14 substantially reiterating
the arguments he raised in the earlier comment he filed on March 4, 1999.

On March 4, 1999, respondent judge filed his comment 5 averring that:

A.] The unverified letter states no cause of action.

In accordance with the directive of the Court, Investigating Justice Marina L.

Buzon submitted a Report dated May 23, 2000 where she summed up the
pertinent factual antecedents of the controversy thus:

B.] The questioned judgment is supported by evidence; hence valid and lawful.
C.] The letter writer has availed of the legal remedy of appeal with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC); and so, the matter continues to be of
judicial concern. In fact, the case folder has already been forwarded to the
COMELEC.
D.] The questioned judgment speaks for itself. It is characterized by judicial
objectivity dictated only by the highest interest of truth and justice. The Presiding
Judge resolved the case according to his conscience and to his perception of the
applicable law. The case was decided on the basis of merit, not on extraneous
considerations. Since the Presiding Judge was guided by the evidence adduced,
then, no other conclusion is apparent but to render the questioned judgment.

Complainant Hilario de Guzman, Jr. was proclaimed as the duly elected

Mayor of San Jacinto, Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections,
garnering 4,248 votes as against 4,104 votes obtained by Rolando E.
Columbres.
Columbres filed an election protest against the complainant, docketed as
Election Case No. D-13-98, which was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 40, Dagupan City, presided over by respondent Judge
Deodoro J. Sison. On December 7, 1998, a decision was rendered by
respondent finding that the revision and physical counting of
votes/ballots in forty two (42) precincts contested by Columbres showed
that the latter won the mayoralty elections of San Jacinto, Pangasinan,
garnering 4,037 votes as against complainant's 3,302 votes.

In a letter dated December 16, 1998 addressed to the Honorable Chief

Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., complainant charged the respondent with
manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law in the appreciation of
the ballots in Election Case No. D-31-98, as shown by the following:

overwhelming documentary evidence against him but he failed to do so; that

complainant appealed the decision to the COMELEC; and that a judge may not
be held administratively liable for every erroneous order or decision rendered by
him.

1. Respondent nullified all the votes in his favor in Precinct Nos. 35 and 35A in
Barangay Casibong for failure of the Election Chairman to countersign the
ballots, citing Batas Pambansa No. 222 and Section 36 of Comelec Resolution
No. 1539, as well as the case of Bautista vs. Castro.15 Complainant argued that
B.P. 222 and Comelec Resolution No. 1539 and the case of Bautista vs. Castro
refer to the barangay elections in 1982 and that the law governing the 1998
elections is the Omnibus Election Code and the Comelec General Instructions
for the May 11, 1998 elections.

A verified complaint with annexes, dated May 7, 1999, was filed by

complainant on May 10, 1999 charging respondent with gross ignorance of the
law and irregularities in connection with Election Case No. D-31-98, to wit:

2. Respondent nullified the ballots with undetached stubs despite the provision in
Section 211 (27) of the Omnibus Election that failure to remove the detachable
coupon from a ballot does not annul such ballot.
3. Respondent nullified ballots with "X" marks, lines and similar marks despite
the provision in Section 211 (21) of the Omnibus Election Code that circles,
crosses or lines placed on spaces on which the voter has not voted shall be
considered as signs of desistance from voting and shall not invalidate the ballot.
Complainant further alleged that respondent prematurely terminated the
presentation of his evidence and declared the case submitted for decision
because of the absence of his lawyer at the hearing on December 1, 1998; that
the motion for execution of the decision filed by Columbres was set for hearing
by respondent despite the fact that he was not furnished with a copy thereof and
said motion did not contain a notice of hearing; and that he appealed the
decision to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent stated that his decision is
supported by the evidence and his perception of the applicable law. He claimed
that the invalidated ballots were accomplished by more than one person or were
prepared by persons other than the registered voters as shown by the identical
handwriting strokes or were prepared in longhand and in print and in the same
sequence of candidates, or contained distinctive marks or irrelevant words that
could identify them or were not signed at the back by the Chairman of the Board
of Election Inspectors and had no Comelec watermark or red and blue fibers in
the ballots; that signatures and thumbmarks in the voter's registry record (CE
Form No. 1) are different from those in the computerized list of voters (CE From
No. 2); that complainant was given adequate opportunity to refute or dispute the

1. The decision nullifying 946 votes in his favor is contrary to the facts and the
law for the following reasons:
a) 416 ballots with "X" marks or horizontal or vertical lines placed over empty
spaces after the name of the last candidate written by the voter are not marked
ballots, as such markings merely indicate desistance of the voter from voting and
do not invalidate the ballots (Section 211 [21] of the Omnibus Election Code);
b.) 267 ballots with undetached coupons are valid as the failure to remove the
detachable coupon from a ballot does not annul such ballot (Section 211 [27],
Omnibus Election Code);
c.) 181 ballots which were not signed by the Chairman of the Board of Election
Inspectors were invalidated on the basis of Section 14 of B.P. 322 (sic), Section
36 of Comelec Resolution No. 1539 and the case of Bautista vs. Castro, despite
the fact that the 1998 national and local elections were governed by the
Omnibus Election Code and Comelec Resolution No. 2962 and the applicable
case is Punzalan vs. Comelec;
d.) 82 ballots were allegedly filled out by more than one person or that only one
person filled out several ballots on the basis of the voters' registration record and
voting record but he was not allowed to present an expert to validate/corroborate
said findings;
2. Respondent exhibited manifest partiality in the conduct of the proceedings in
violation of his right to due process, as shown by the following:
a) Respondent declared the case submitted for decision although he was not yet
through with the presentation of his evidence;
b) Respondent did not act on his motion for partial determination;

c) Respondent scared his witnesses and angrily stopped his counsel from asking
questions to his witnesses;
d) Respondent denied his motion to post a supersedeas bond;
e) Respondent admitted the memorandum of Rolando Columbres although it
was filed beyond the period;
f) Respondent accepted payment of the bond for the revision of contested ballots
made beyond the period within which to do so;
g) His counsel was served with a copy of the Order dated November 26, 1998
only on December 1, 1998 barely three (3) hours before the scheduled hearing;
h) His motion dated November 26, 1998 was never set for hearing;
i) Respondent did not wait for his formal offer of evidence;
j) Respondent was seen with Mr. and Mrs. Rolando Columbres and Noli
Caramat at Northern Paradise Resort in San Jacinto, Pangasinan in the
afternoon of the day he issued the writ of execution pending appeal, a shown by
the picture and affidavit of the photographer, Mrs. Rosario Omictin; and
k) Respondent was in the municipal building of San Jacinto, Pangasinan with
Rolando Columbres when the writ of execution pending appeal was
implemented by the NBI Agents as shown by the affidavit of Emmanuel Hipolito;
3. Respondent issued the writ of execution pending appeal without good reasons
therefor;xxx
xxx
xxx
In his Comment on the verified complaint dated May 7, 1999,
respondent reiterated the Comment earlier filed by him and claimed that any
error in his decision is correctable by appeal and not through an administrative
complaint, absent any showing of malice or bad faith on his part. He denied that
he met with Columbres on December 18, 1998 at the Northern Paradise and that
he was at the municipal building of San Jacinto, Pangasinan on December 21,
1998.
Replying thereto, complainant argued that respondent did not merely
commit an error in judgment considering that the latters' appreciation of the
contested ballots was based on non-existent rules and that he will present

pictures showing that respondent was at the Northern Paradise Resort on

December 18, 1998.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Investigating Justice found respondent
Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and manifest partiality and
recommended that he be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and privileges with prejudice to reemployment in any
government agency or instrumentality, reasoning thus:
In the case at bench, it would seem that respondent deliberately applied
B.P. 222 and Section 36(f) of Comelec Resolution No. 1539 to justify his
nullification of the ballots which did not bear the signature of the Chairman of the
Board of Election Inspectors at the back thereof, in order to favor Rolando
Columbres as a number of such ballots were cast in favor of complainant.
Respondent then disregarded Section 211 (27) of the Omnibus Election Code,
which provides that ballots with undetached coupons are valid, in order to nullify
267 such ballots in favor of complainant as against only 52 such ballots in favor
of Columbres. On the other hand, respondent took note of Section 211(23) of the
Omnibus Election Code in nullifying ballots allegedly filled out by two (2) persons
before it was deposited in the ballot box during the voting. In other words,
respondent considered only Section 211(23) of the Omnibus Election Code
because it supported his nullification of the ballots in favor of complainant, and
when he could not find other provisions in said Code that would support the
nullification of the ballots in favor of complainant, respondent applied B.P. 222
and Comelec Resolution No. 1539, although the same referred exclusively to the
election of barangay officials. Thus, respondent's refusal to apply the pertinent
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code in the appreciation of some ballots
which would have resulted in finding the same as valid votes for complainant,
rendered his actuation highly dubious. As pointed out in Ortigas and Co., Ltd.
Partnership vs. Velasco (277 SCRA 342, 367-368), this is not a case of not
knowing or failing to understand legal principles and relevant doctrines but of a
deliberate disregard of them. Such deliberate disregard by respondent of the
pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Election Code and his application of B.P.
222, which is already obsolete, cannot be explained away as an honest mistake
of judgment or an innocent error in the exercise of discretion. It can only be
viewed as an attempt, through misuse of judicial processes, to give a semblance
of merit to a clearly unmeritorious cause and accord undeserved benefits to the
party espousing and promoting said cause.xxx
xxx
xxx

On the other hand, the picture (Exhibit "C") allegedly taken by

complainant's witness, Rosario Omictin, at the Northern Paradise Resort in San
Jacinto, Pangasinan on December 18, 1998 only shows respondent with Mr. and
Mrs. Manuel Caramat and an unidentified woman. While said witness testified
that she saw Columbres leaving the resort upon her arrival thereat, it has not
been shown, however, that Columbres was in the company of respondent on
said date. However, said witness also testified that she saw respondent together
with Columbres waving at the balcony of the municipal building of San Jacinto,
Pangasinan in the morning of December 21, 1998 on the occasion of the latter's
assumption of office as Mayor. The presence of respondent at the terrace of the
municipal building between 9:00 and 9:30 in the morning of December 21, 1998
prior to the service of the writ of execution on complainant, was likewise testified
to by Emmanuel Hipolito. As pointed out by complainant in his Memorandum, the
trial calendar for December 21, 1998 (Exhibits "9" and "9-a") submitted by
respondent showing that he had sixteen (16) cases set for hearing in the
morning of said date does not prove that respondent actually conducted said
hearings. The trial calendar only lists down the cases scheduled for hearing on a
particular date. The best evidence that respondent was actually present in his
court and conducted hearings in the morning of December 21, 1998 would have
been the minutes of the proceedings and the Orders issued in the cases
calendared on that day. Thus, the denial of respondent that he was in the
municipal building of San Jacinto, Pangasinan in the morning of December 21,
1998, cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of complainant's witnesses, in
the absence of competent evidence to prove that he conducted hearing on said
time and date. The presence of respondent in the municipal building of San
Jacinto on the day that the writ of execution pending appeal, which was
personally signed by him, was implemented, and his act of joining Columbres in
waving at the balcony only opened him to suspicion of partiality in favor of
Columbres.

Ethics, they are required to be studious of the principles of law and to administer
their office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,
remembering that they are not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under
the sanction of law. (Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, 237 SCRA 1, 21 [1994]).

In the Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 151, 157) of Senior Deputy Court

Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez to the Honorable Chief Justice, it was pointed
out that respondent was admonished for ignorance of the law in RTJ-90-532,
and that in A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, respondent was found guilty of ignorance of the
law and grave abuse of discretion and was meted a fine of P20,000.00 with a
warning that a commission of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely. Obviously, respondent did not take heed of said warning, as well as the
admonition to Judges in Bayog vs. Natino (271 SCRA 268, 273), to wit:

. . . [I]t is given that a member of the bench must keep himself abreast of
legal and jurisprudential developments, bearing in mind that his learning
process never ceases even as it is so indispensable in the correct
dispensation of justice.20 When the law violated is elementary, the failure
to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.21

"We have time and again stated that judges are called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. We
have reminded them that under Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial

Judges of trial courts, either of limited or general jurisdiction, should

never forget that they are in the forefront in the sacred task of administering
justice. Any decision or order causing injustice or resulting in oppression or
failure of justice would have a negative effects in the Judiciary itself. Judges
must not allow this to happen. . . ."
The Court agrees with the foregoing findings of Justice Buzon. The culpability of
respondent Judge Sison has been established not just by substantial evidence
which suffices in an administrative investigation,16 but by an overwhelming
preponderance thereof.
The subject case involved an election protest relative to the Mayoralty Elections
of 1998. At that time up to the present, such elections were governed by the
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, 17 the Electoral Reforms Law of
1987,18 and the Synchronized Elections Law of 1992.19
Clearly, B.P. Blg. 222 and Section 36 of Comelec Resolution No. 1539 invoked
by respondent in the resolution of Election Case No. D-31-98 were inapplicable
because they applied to the election of barangay officials in 1982 and they have
already been repealed and rendered obsolete. It is, thus, perplexing why
respondent judge insisted in applying B.P. Blg. 222 which pertained only to the
election of barangay officials in 1982 instead of B.P. Blg. 882, enacted on
December 3, 1985, which expressly governs mayoralty elections including those
held in 1998.

In other words, judges should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments

in law and jurisprudence, and regard the study of law as a never-ending and
ceaseless process.22 Elementary is the rule that when laws or rules are clear, as
in this case, it is incumbent upon respondent to apply them regardless of
personal belief or predilections. To put it differently, when the law is

unambiguous and unequivocal, application not interpretation thereof is

imperative.23
When asked to explain why he decided the election case contradictory to
existing law and controlling jurisprudence, respondent judge, pleading good
faith, argued that whenever ballots contain obvious markings visible on their
faces, the presumption is that said markings on the ballots were placed thereat
by the voters themselves, thus nullifying the said ballots.
The reason given by respondent is not well-taken. It contradicts the norm
enshrined in the Code of Judicial Conduct which enjoins judges to be faithful to
the law and to maintain professional competence. 24 The Court has consistently
held that laws and statutes governing elections contests especially the
appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities.25 Respondent's proffered excuse in nullifying the ballots cast in
petitioner's favor was thus fittingly overruled by the Comelec en banc in its
Resolution dated January 25, 2000 in EAC A-20-98:
We disagree. The movant is relying on an erroneous and misleading
presumption. The rule is that no ballot should be discarded as marked unless its
character as such is unmistakable. The distinction should always be between
marks that were apparently carelessly or innocently made, which do not
invalidate the ballot, and marks purposely placed thereon by the voter with a
view to possible future identification, which invalidates it. The marks which shall
be considered sufficient to invalidate the ballot are those which the voter
himself deliberately placed on his ballot for the purpose of identifying it
thereafter. In other words, a mark placed on the ballot by a person other than the
voter himself does not invalidate the ballot as marked.
There is no legal presumption that the alleged markings were deliberately made
by the voter himself and for the purpose of identifying it thereafter. In the
absence of any circumstance showing that the intention of the voter to mark the
ballot is unmistakable, or any evidence aliunde to show that the words or marks
were deliberately written or put therein to identify the ballots, the ballot should
not be rejected. In other words, the ballots should be read with reasonable
liberality, so that the reading be in favor of the will of the voter, rather than in
favor of the inefficiency of the ballot by reason of technical causes.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Moreover, as a rule, slight variations in writing are not sufficient to show that the
ballot was prepared by two hands and where there is doubt as to whether the
names were written by two persons, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the
validity of the ballot. Ergo, the declaration by the Commission (Second Division)
of the validity of the questioned 111 ballots.
On the other hand, where the ballot shows distinct and marked dissimilarities in
writing of the names of some candidates from the rest, the ballot was written by
two hands and hence void. And therefore, the invalidation by the Commission
(Second Division) of the 13 ballots found with dissimilar handwritings. 26
Rendering an erroneous or baseless judgment, in itself, is not sufficient to justify
an erring magistrate's dismissal from the service. There must be proof that such
judgment was rendered with malice, corrupt motives, improper considerations or
bad faith.27 However, "[a]lthough a judge may not always be subjected to
disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative
immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing
his adjudicatory prerogatives. If judges wantonly misuse the powers vested in
them by law, there will not only be confusion in the administration of justice but
even also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process." 28
Respondent's bad faith is aptly pointed out by the Comelec's Second Division in
its Resolution dated October 5, 1999 in EAC No. A-20-98:
The trial court's findings after its appreciation of the contested ballots is
not only absurd but a complete disappointment and evinces the inadequacy of
the court a quo in matters of jurisprudence and the proper application of Section
211 of the Omnibus Election Code. Every ballot is presumed valid unless there is
a clear and good reason to justify its rejection, so the provision states. Whether
or not a ballot is written by one or two persons or spurious or marked or
defective because of certain infirmities can be determined by a close scrutiny of
the face of the ballot and the validity or invalidity thereof can be deduced from
the manner the voters prepared their ballots. On this score, the trial court failed.
In a long line of cases decided by the Supreme Court . . . the High Court
opined that "it is a well settled rule in election contests that the marks which shall
be considered sufficient to invalidate the ballots are those which the voter
himself deliberately placed on his ballot for the purpose of identifying it
thereafter." In Exhibits "R", "R-1" to "R-28", "R-30" to "R-38", "R-40", "R-42" to
"R-44", "R-46", "R-49 to "R-125", a total of 120 ballots for the protestee, the court
a quo nullified these ballots because of markings both on the face thereof and
the reverse side. Close scrutiny, however, reveals that these so-called markings

were placed by the person or persons other than the voters themselves as can
be discerned from the strokes and flourishes of the handwriting considering that
most, if not all, of the voters are clearly unlearned and the color of the inks
undoubtedly differ from that used by the voters. Conversely, the court a quo did
not nullify Exhibits "R-29", "R-39", "R-41", "R-45", "R-47" & "R-48" which upon
examination contain the same identical markings as the other exhibits and
written thereon by the same person or persons.
Corollarily, the court a quo invariably mistook the dots (colored pigmentations) on
the faces of the ballots as deliberate markings. Unknown to all and sundry, this is
one of the security precautions adopted by the Commission to insure that only
authentic and official ballots reach the hands of the voters.
The actuation of the court a quo exemplify the highest degree of prejudice
bordering on the criminal if not a gross display of utter ignorance of the law and
existing jurisprudence. While it is a truism that the findings of facts by the trial
court may not be disturbed on appeal, its appellate jurisdiction allows the
Commission to review these findings if there is a showing that the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight
and substance that would have affected the result of the case. In the case at
bench, the court committed not only a serious oversight but deliberately
misapplied the law and derailed jurisprudence.29 (Emphasis ours)
The presumption of good faith and the regularity in the performance of judicial
functions on respondent's part are negated by the foregoing circumstances on
record. We agree with the Investigating Justice that given the foregoing
circumstances, this is not a case of not knowing or failing to understand legal
principles and relevant doctrines but a deliberate disregard of them. Such an
omission by respondent of the pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code and his application of B.P. Blg. 222 and Section 36 of Comelec Resolution
No. 1539, which are applicable exclusively to the election of barangay officials
and which are already obsolete, can not simply be brushed away as an honest
mistake of judgment or an innocent error in the exercise of discretion. It can only
be seen as a deliberate attempt, through the misuse of judicial processes, to
give a semblance of merit to a clearly unmeritorious cause and to accord
undeserved benefits to the party espousing and promoting the same.
To reiterate, observance of the law which he is bound to know is required of
every judge.30 When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to
simply apply it;31 anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance
of the law.32 A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.33 It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the

law and the changes therein for ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound
to know, excuses no one, not even judges.34 Indeed, it has been said that
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a
judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and the
title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.35
The foregoing disquisitions likewise support the charge of manifest partiality
because, assuming arguendo that respondent can not be faulted for gross
ignorance of the law, he deliberately misapplied and twisted the law in order to
favor protestant Rolando Columbres.
There is evidence aliunde which have been adduced to show respondent's bias
or partiality in Columbres' favor, referring to two (2) incidents which occurred
after the promulgation of respondent's assailed decision on December 7, 1998.
In the first incident, complainant's witness Rosario Omictin testified that on
December 21, 1998 she saw respondent together with Columbres waving to the
public from the balcony of the San Jacinto Municipal Hall on the latter's
assumption of office as Mayor.36 Witness Emmanuel Hipolito likewise confirmed
the presence of respondent at the terrace of the municipal building between 9:00
and 9:30 in the morning of December 21, 1998 prior to the service of the writ of
execution on complainant.37
Respondent denied his presence in the municipal building on the date
mentioned, claiming that "in all of [his] 67 years of life, [he has] never stepped in
the municipal building of San Jacinto, Pangasinan." 38 In support of this denial,
respondent offered the testimony of Sheriff Leo Beltran, his branch sheriff, and
the trial calendar for his sala on December 21, 1998. 39
However, Beltran's testimony does not refute the claims of Hipolito and Omictin
that they both saw respondent at the San Jacinto Municipal Hall in the morning
of December 21, 1998. Beltran went to the municipal building much later,
particularly at 11:00 a.m. after he had first served the writ of execution on
complainant at the church of San Jacinto, Pangasinan. 40 It was actually about
noontime when Beltran went to the municipal hall to implement the service of the
writ because he had to wait for the church wedding rites to finish, 41 and he
admitted that he never went to the municipal hall until "after the service of the
writ."42

Likewise, the trial calendar for December 21, 1998 will not extricate respondent
from his predicament. It does not clearly show that respondent actually
conducted hearings in the morning of December 21, 1998 and, if so, for how
long and what time he started and ended such hearings. What is worse is that
said calendar shows that all cases were reset except for only one, which was
heard ex parte. It was not even indicated whether said ex parte hearing was
conducted by respondent judge himself or merely by the branch clerk of court. At
any rate, the better evidence to show how long and up to what time respondent
conducted the hearings in the morning of December 21, 1998 are the minutes of
the morning session of that day, which the respondent did not produce.
The second incident allegedly occurred on December 18, 1998 at the Northern
Paradise Resort in San Jacinto, Pangasinan, where respondent judge was again
seen with Columbres. Witnesses Rosario Omictin and her daughter, Risacris
Mae Omictin, positively identified respondent judge at the Northern Paradise
Resort in the "late afternoon" of December 18, 1998. 43 In her testimony, Rosario
Omictin more specifically put the time at around 6:00 in the afternoon. 44 Upon
questioning by the Investigating Justice, Rosario Omictin explained that when
she arrived at the Northern Paradise Resort, she saw Columbres leaving the
place,45 although upon reaching the resort gate she saw Columbres talking to the
respondent.46 Just as damaging is the picture 47 taken by Rosario Omictin of her
daughter Risacris with respondent and the Caramat spouses in the background,
which was identified by both mother and daughter. Most damning of all is the
unrebutted testimony of Rosario Omictin that she was summoned by respondent
and Columbres and reprimanded for taking the picture and executing the
affidavit.48
To controvert the foregoing declarations of Rosario and Risacris, respondent
again denied having been at the Northern Paradise Resort, 49 and offered the
testimony of Noli Caramat as well as the trial calendar for December 18, 1998 in
support thereof.

Judge Sison was not there because I was not there too, sir.
ATTY. BAUTISTA:
Do you also mean to say that Judge Sison was never
there in any day in December 1998 or only Mayor Columbres?
WITNESS:
No. Either Mr. Columbres was not there also.
ATTY. BAUTISTA:
Anytime in December 1998?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. BAUTISTA:
You are able to say that because you were there and
your wife was also there everytime that the resort was open in December 1998?
WITNESS:
No, sir.
ATTY. BAUTISTA:
So, how are you able to say that then?
WITNESS:
Actually Attorney, we are not the ones who are opening the
resort. It is our employees. We drop [by] at the resort very minimal[ly] because
we have to attend to our other businesses, sir.51

The foregoing renders Mr. Caramat's statement that respondent was not in the
Northern Paradise Resort on December 18, 1998 purely hearsay. Worse, while
Caramat vaguely implied in his affidavit 52 that respondent judge was not in the
resort "on any day after the May 1998 elections," he later made a volte face in
his testimony53 which only added further to the confusion.
The trial calendar of respondent's court on December 18, 1998 54 is likewise
inconclusive to show that he was not at the Northern Paradise Resort. For one
thing, the calendar indicates that there were only two (2) cases scheduled for
2:00 p.m. on said date. Moreover, there is nothing in the calendar which even
remotely hints that hearings were actually held in the afternoon of the said date.
Indeed, by respondent's own admission, 55 the Northern Paradise Resort is only
forty (40) minutes away from his sala. He does not even remember how long he
held the sessions on December 18, 1998, but he declared that he usually leaves
his office at 5:00 p.m.56
The Canons of Judicial Ethics provide that:

An assiduous examination of Caramat's testimonial declarations, however,

leaves the Court unconvinced of his credibility as a witness. On direct
examination, he categorically declared that the picture which shows respondent
was taken in June 1998. 50 Upon being grilled by complainant's counsel, he made
the following revealing statements:

Rule 2.00 A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of

impropriety in all activities.

ATTY. BAUTISTA:
My only question, Mr. Caramat is, if you were not in the
resort the whole day of December 18, 1998, how are you able to say that Judge
Sison was not there at any time on December 18, 1998?
WITNESS:

It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial; he must

also appear to be impartial. Hence, the judge must, at all times, maintain the
appearance of fairness and impartiality. His language, both written and spoken,
must be guarded and measured lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. 57 A

Rule 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

judge's conduct must be above reproach. 58 Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not
only be pure but above suspicion. 59 A judge's private as well as official conduct
must at all times be free from all appearances of impropriety and be beyond
reproach.60
Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. 61 It was, thus, held that it is
improper for a judge to meet privately with the accused without the presence of
the complainant.62 Needless to state, privately meeting with a litigant in a resort
and later being seen with him waving to the public while his judgment in favor of
said litigant was being implemented seriously undermines even more the
people's faith and confidence in the judiciary.

times unsullied and worthy of the people's trust. 74 For this the Court believes that
the recommended penalty is warranted.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison
is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and manifest partiality, and is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and
privileges and with prejudice to reemployment in any government agency or
instrumentality.
SO ORDERED.

The Court notes that aside from this case, respondent has been charged seven
(7) other times.63 Of these cases three (3) have been dismissed, 64 while two (2)
are still pending.65 The court also notes that respondent has been repeatedly
charged with gross ignorance of the law and has been penalized or sanctioned
on two (2) occasions. Indeed, in A.M. No. RTJ-90-532, respondent was
admonished while in A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, he was fined P20,000.00 and sternly
warned that a commission of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely. It need not be overemphasized the such an unflattering record only
erodes further the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary.
Case law repeatedly teaches that judicial office circumscribes the personal
conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon which he must
pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in the administration of
justice.66 A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal
conduct beyond which he may not freely venture. 67 He must conduct himself in a
manner that gives no ground for reproach. 68The irresponsible or improper
conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary.69 It is thus the duty
of all members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the
image and integrity of the judiciary.70
A.M. No. MTJ-94-921 March 5, 1996

This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional
trial court judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners
who have direct contact with the litigating parties. 71 They are the intermediaries
between conflicting interests and the embodiment of the people's sense of
justice.72 Thus, judicial conduct should remain free from any appearance of
impropriety and should be beyond reproach.73

DR. AMPARO A. LACHICA, complainant,

vs JUDGE ROLANDO A. FLORDELIZA, MCTC, Jose Abad SantosSarangani, Davao del Sur, respondent.

In the case at bar, respondent has shamed the judiciary by deliberately applying
not only patently inapplicable but also already repealed laws. He tainted the
image of the judiciary to which he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it at all

In the instant case, this Court once again deals with the standard of behavior
and decorum expected of magistrates of the law.

In an affidavit-Complaint 1 dated October 7, 1993, Dr. Amparo A. Lachica, the

Municipal Health Officer of Jose Abad Santos, Davao del Sur, charged the
respondent, Judge Rolando A. Flordeliza of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Jose Abad Santos-Sarangani, Davao del Sur, with abuse of judicial position and
intimidation, for allegedly compelling her to sign a death certificate even though
she was not the attending physician.
Due to the conflicting averments in the Complaint-Affidavit, respondent's
Comment/Discussion and complainant's Reply to Comment, along with their
respective annexes consisting of affidavits of witnesses, this Court, thru its First
Division, issued a Resolution on May 11, 1994 referring the case to Judge
Magno C. Cruz 2 for investigation, report, and recommendation. The latter
submitted his Report and Recommendation 3 dated July 24, 1995, based on the
documentary evidence and submissions of the parties, consistent with the
summary mode of procedure they had earlier agreed to adopt in order to
facilitate the speedy disposition of this case.
The Antecedent Facts
Since the findings of fact as contained in said Report and
Recommendation are substantiated by the evidence on record, the same are
herein adopted, to wit:
That on the morning of 12 August 1993, while complainant was at the
Tomasa Lachica District Hospital, Dina Masaglang and Norma Puton were
referred to her for the signing of the Death Certificate of Hilario Kiawan. Knowing
the importance of a death certificate and considering that the deceased was not
her patient and that she has no personal knowledge of the cause of his death,
she refused to sign the certificate and told them that the attending physician in
General Santos City should sign the same. Complainant politely explained her
reasons for refusing but the two women insisted that complainant sign it because
General Santos is very far and the Municipal Judge will no longer be around
after the Fiesta. Despite their repeated insistence, complainant did not sign the
Certificate.
Later in the afternoon, the two women returned to the hospital, handed
over to complainant the death certificate and arrogantly demanded "Pirmahan
mo daw sabi ni Judge Flordeliza." Again, complainant refused.
Complainant did not pay much attention. to the aforesaid incidents, thinking that
the two women were engaged in name-dropping. However, later in the evening,
during the Municipal Employees Night Party, Judge Flordeliza, through the
Municipal Assessor, invited Dr. Lachica to sit next to him. When she was seated,

Judge Flordeliza, who was drunk, told her in an angry manner: "Bakit hindi mo
pinirmahan ang Death Certificate?" Complainant tried to explain her reasons but
no to avail. After exchanges of words, respondent threatened complainant that
he will file an administrative case against her if she will refuse to sign the death
certificate.
Complainant further avers that on 13 August 1993, on her way to the Health
Center, she again met Dina Masaglang and Norma Puton and without saying
anything, the latter handed to her the Death Certificate. She (complainant) again
refused and advised the two women to let the attending physician of General
Santos sign the Certificate.
Respondent, in his comment, dated 13 December 1993, denied all the
accusations against him and narrated his version of the story. He avers that he
did not order said two women to force complainant to sign the death Certificate;
that he has no interest in the case; that the two women are not his relatives nor
even casual friends; that during the Municipal Employees Night Party, he could
not have been drunk when he talked with complainant because the conversation
took place shortly after his arrival (accompanied by P02 Tayong) and the drinks
were served only after the end of the program; that the incident took place after
he was offered to join the table occupied by Mayor Jeol [sic] Lachica and his
group: that upon seeing Dr. Lachica, respondent invited her for a conversation
which she accepted; that in a casual conversation, in good faith and without
malice, he inquired casually why complainant refused to sign the certificate when
it should be signed in Jose Abad Santos where the deceased died; that after the
conversation and before rejoining her group, complainant requested respondent
to inform the two ladies to see her at the Health Center the following day.
Respondent claims that the allegations of Dr. Lachica are contrary to human
experience. It is not usual for a stranger like him to coerce, intimidate and
threaten complainant in the presence of her influential relatives like Mayor Joel
Lachica, Municipal Kagawad David Lachica, Jr., and Dr. Ignacio Matbagan.
To substantiate respondent's allegations, he submitted Affidavits of Lolita
Pardios, Interpreter, Norma Puton, P02 Nestor Branzuela, Domingo Ambaan,
Jr., and P02 C. Tayong.
In her reply, complainant denied the allegations of respondent and reiterated her
charges against him, saying that respondent lied when he said that they talked
at a table with Mayor Lachica. Mayor Lachica attested (Annex "A" Rollo, p. 29)
that he was not with them at their table during the incident; that if Judge
Flordeliza has really no interest in the case, he would not have summoned

complainant to his table and lectured her on the importance of the death
certificate.

judge with a group of persons who were drinking beer, and with said respondentJudge clearly inebriated.

In rebuttal, complainant submitted a copy of at the "Daily Disposition of Troops of

Jose Abad Santos Police Station" (Annex "B" of the reply) to show that P02
Tayong was not with the group of the Judge, thus, he could not have witnessed
the incident. She likewise submitted an Affidavit of David Lachica who was with
Judge Flordeliza in a drinking spree hours before the party. (Rollo, p. 35).

Even without going over each and every affidavits (sic) and counter-affidavits
(sic) filed by both parties, it is very evident that the imputation of misconduct by
the respondent-Judge have (sic) been proven by substantial evidence which is
the quantum of proof required in administrative cases. Granting that the
respondent-Judge has not intimidated or coerced the complainant in issuing a
Certificate of Death precipitating the filing of this Complaint, we cannot see our
way clear why said respondent-Judge should be interested in such trivial matter
which could be well attended to by the Prosecutor in the case where said
Certificate is a subject of inquiry. A judge is not supposed to be an active
combatant in court proceedings and must leave it to the parties themselves to
secure their evidence and argue their respective positions on any matter without
his participation. It should be recognized that the Judge's role is to decide and
not to litigate. (Emphasis supplied)

The Issue: Credibility

The investigating judge summed up the issue posed for resolution as being a
factual question of whether respondent-judge is guilty as charged of abuse of
judicial position and intimidation amounting to violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. He added, "The resolution of this issue hinges mainly on credibility."
The investigating judge made the following evaluation of the evidence on
record: 4
The original affidavit complaint of Dr. Amparo Lachica, as well as, her Comment
to the Reply of the respondent-judge to said affidavit, cannot be taken lightly. On
the other hand, the comment to the affidavit-complaint by the respondent-judge
is replete with denials of his alleged act of coercing and intimidating said lady
physician for refusing to sign a Death Certificate of a deceased person involved
in a case pending in his Court. The counter-affidavits of the respondent's
witnesses, more particularly, those witnesses who were allegedly present during
the incident were all belied by the affidavits executed by persons who are not
expected to fabricate the same for purposes of lending credence to the
complaint of the complainant-physician.
One of them was the incumbent Mayor of Jose Abad Santos, Davao del Sur,
Hon. Joel Lachica, who appears to be related to both the complainant and the
respondent. Likewise, the affidavit of P02 Louie C. Tayong (Exhibit "5"), has
been belied by the excerpts of the Daily Disposition of Troops of the Jose Abad
Santos Police Station, to show that said alleged witness to the incident could not
have been present during said date.
It is worthy to note that no counter-affidavit has been submitted by the
respondent-judge as regards Exhibit "I" and sub-markings, which show a
photograph taken during the pre-fiesta celebration at Jose Abad Santos, Davao
del Sur, on August 13, 1993, the date of the incident, showing the respondent-

Summing up, the Investigating Judge made the following recommendation:

CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING, the undersigned
Investigator respectfully recommends to hold respondent JUDGE ROLANDO A.
FLORDELIZA administratively liable for Violation of Canons 1 and 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct and impose on him a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
PESOS, with a stern warning that a repitition (sic) of the same or similar acts in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
The Court's Ruling
As noted by the Investigating Judge, this is yet another occasion for reminding
members of the bench to conduct themselves beyond reproach, not only in the
discharge of their official duties, but in their private lives as well.
Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provide as follows:
Canon 1. A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary.xxx xxx xxx
Canon 2. A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all activities.
On the other hand, item 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics reads:
3. Avoidance of Appearance of Impropriety.

A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and
his personal behaviour, not only upon the bench and in the performance of
judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
From all the foregoing, as well as the evidence on record, this Court is convinced
that the charge of misconduct against the respondent judge has been
established by substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in
administrative cases. 5 His undue interest in having complainant sign the Death
Certificate is highly questionable, to say the least. Further, his inebriated
demeanor and incoherent behavior during the festivities, as attested to by a
witness 6, is reprehensible in a judge and should be subjected to disciplinary
action. As previously held by this Court:
The undue surrender of respondent Judge to the proddings of his selfdefined pleasure failed him in his duty to conduct himself within the confines of
propriety and to behave in a manner shorn of reproach. When he yieled to the
strength of the "spirit", losing judicial composure and acting like an uninhibited
drunkard in the streets and public places, he not only stripped himself of his
dignity as a man but disrobed the court of the respect of the people it serves.
Such act demeans his judicial office and elicits suspicion of his capacity to
discharge justice. The apprehension may lie where such suspicion may be
stretched too far by the people themselves and may unduly include the whole

judicial machinery. And that would lay the way for the people to weaken, if not
lose, their faith in the administration of justice. 7
A similar pronouncement
Pagorogon 8:

was

made

in

the

case

of Arcenio

vs.

. . . as we have often stated, "(a)lthough every office in the government

service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. A
magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such manner that his
conduct, official or other wise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public
that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice" (Dia-Anonuevo vs.
Bercasio, 68 SCRA 81, 89 [1975]).
WHEREFORE, in view of the above considerations, respondent Judge
ROLANDO A. FLORDELIZA is hereby HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE for
violation of Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as well as item 3 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics and is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of
this decision be spread on the records of the respondent judge.SO ORDERED.