Justice Kapunan

3. The following justices voted for the dismissal of the case and rendered opinion on
the dismissal of the equal protection clause
a) Justice Kapunan opined that IPRA law does not violate the Due Process clause.
a.1) Petitioners argue that the inclusion of private lands in the ancestral lands and
ancestral domains violates the due process clause. Petitioners contention is
erroneous.
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) expressly provide that the definition of ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are "subject to Section 56," which reads: Sec. 56. Existing
Property Rights Regimes. Property rights within the ancestral domains already
existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and
protected.
Petitioners, however, contend that Section 56 aims to protect only the vested rights
of indigenous peoples, but not those who are not members of such communities.
Following their interpretation, IPRA, under Section 56, recognizes the rights of
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains, subject to the
vested rights of the same communities to such ancestral lands and
ancestral domains. Such interpretation is obviously incorrect.
The "property rights" referred to in Section 56 belong to those acquired by
individuals, whether indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Said provision makes no
distinction as to the ethnic origins of the ownership of these "property rights." The
IPRA thus recognizes and respects "vested rights" regardless of whether they
pertain to indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Where the law does not
distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. 163 What IPRA only requires is that
these "property rights" already exist and/or vested upon its effectivity.
a.2) Petitioners questioned sections of IPRA on the composition and powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP167 and the application of customary law, violate the due
process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioners concerns are unfounded. The fact that the NCIP is composed of
members of the indigenous peoples does not mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or
will appear to be so incapable, of delivering justice to the non-indigenous peoples. A
persons possession of the trait of impartiality desirable of a judge has nothing to do
with his or her ethnic roots. In this wise, the indigenous peoples are as capable of
rendering justice as the non-indigenous peoples for, certainly, the latter have no
monopoly of the concept of justice.
In any case, there are sufficient checks in the law against any abuse by the NCIP of
its quasi-judicial powers. Section 67 states that the decision of the NCIP shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals by petition for review. The regular remedies

under our rules of procedure are likewise available to any party aggrieved by the
decision of the NCIP.
Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domains, suffice it to say that such is allowed under paragraph 2, Section
5 of Article XII of the Constitution. Said provision states, "The Congress may provide
for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in
determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains." Notably, the use
of customary laws under IPRA is not absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy
of use.176 The IPRA prescribes the application of such customary laws where these
present a workable solution acceptable to the parties, who are members of the
same indigenous group. This interpretation is supported by Section 1, Rule IX of the
Implementing Rules which states:
Petitioners contend that the NCIP will not appear to be impartial, because a party
who is not a member of an indigenous cultural community "who must defend his
case against [one who is] before judges who are all members of [indigenous
peoples] cannot but harbor a suspicion that they do not have the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge." In addition, petitioners claim that IPRA prescribes that
customary laws shall be applied first in disputes involving property, succession and
land,173 and that such laws shall likewise be used in disputes involving indigenous
peoples.174 They assert that "[w]hen the dispute involves a member of an
[indigenous cultural community and another who is not], a resolution of such a
dispute based on customary laws. . . would clearly be a denial of due process. . .
[because those who are not indigenous peoples] do not know what these customary
laws are."175