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DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
ECONOMICS 227, EUROPEAN ECONOMIC HISTORY
FALL 2009-10
Instructor:
Professor Ran Abramitzky, ranabr@stanford.edu, office hours by email appointment.
Class time and location:
Tuesday, Thursday, 9:00 10:50am, Econ 218
Course Description:
European Economic History: covers topics in European Economic History from the
Middle Ages to the twentieth century (but does not cover detailed economic history of
particular European countries). Topics include competing hypotheses in explaining long
term trends in economic growth and cross-country differences in long-term economic
growth; the formation, function, and persistence of institutions and organizations; the role
of institutions and organizations (for example, apprenticeship, servitude, partnerships,
cooperatives, social networks, share cropping, and communes) as solutions to contractual
problems; the economics of migration; the changing economic role of the family. The
course will highlight the use of economic theory in guiding hypothesis testing, as well as
the construction of new datasets and the execution of empirical analysis.
A main goal of the course is to involve students in research, from identifying and posing
interesting research questions in economic history and in other applied economic fields,
to presenting these ideas.
Course Requirements:
A 35 minutes presentation of research papers: 30% of grade. Classes will generally be a
mix of a lecture followed by a student presentation. Each student should pick a paper
listed as papers to be presented by students. Papers will be assigned based on a first
comes first served basis, so pick your paper early. Please email me your presentation at
least 4 days before your presentation. I will read it and give you feedback to make sure
your presentation is clear and will benefit the rest of your class. The presentations should
teach you how to present research papers in academic seminars. Presentation is an
important part of the research process, often underestimated by students. I attach a
template of how a presentation in the class should look you just have to fill out those
slides with the content of the paper you are presenting This is basically how a seminar
presentation should look.
Class participation: 20% of grade. You are only expected to read one paper per class,
the paper presented by your fellow student. But you are expected to read it carefully, and
to come up with 3 discussion slides on each paper.
After your fellow students presentation, I will randomly call one of you to give your 3slide discussion of the paper. The idea is to encourage an active discussion and to create a
seminar-like environment that will help you feel comfortable asking questions in real
seminars.
Presentation of term paper proposal: 20% of grade. The presentation should pose and
motivate a research question related to European economic history (broadly defined),
discuss the related literature, as well as approaches to address these questions and
potential data sources. This will give you an opportunity to get early feedback from your
classmates and me on your term paper. Please feel free to send me your slides in advance
if you want feedback before your presentation.
Term paper: 30% of grade. You will be required to submit a term paper of 12-18 pages
(ideally based on your proposal) by September 1, 2010.
Readings:
While you are only expected to read one paper per class (discussed above), you will
benefit more from the class if you read in advance more papers from the reading list. The
readings for each class are detailed in this syllabus. Of course you are not expected to
read all of the reading list before class - it is simply designed to give you references to
more reading on each topic. Papers that are available online can be accessed from the
course website. A course pack of required readings (that cannot be accessed online) will
be made available for photocopying and will be placed on reserve at Econ 252 (Kelly
Carson).
Schedule of Readings and Assignments
1. Introduction: why economic history? What is this course about? (Tue, Sept 22,
2009)?
What are the big questions in economic history? What can economics learn from
economic history, and what can economic history learn from economics? Are there
jobs in economic history? What are the advantages and disadvantages to becoming an
economic historian? We will also discuss: what is this class about? How should an
academic presentation look like? Presentation tips, etc.
Students presentation: Boyer, George R. Malthus Was Right After All: Poor
Relief and Birth Rates in Southeastern England, Journal of Political Economy,
97(1), pp. 93-114 (1989). [link]
Clark, Gregory, Land Rental Values and Agrarian Economy: England and
Wales, 15001914, European Review of Economic History, 6(3), pp. 281308
(2002). [link]
Flora, Peter, F. Kraus, and W. Pfenning, State, Economy and Society in Western
Europe 18151975, vol. 1. St. James Press, Chicago (1983).
Fogel, Robert, The Escape from Hunger and Premature Death, 1700-2100:
Europe, America, and the Third World, Cambridge University Press, (2004).
Wrigley, Edward and Roger Schofield, The Population History of England 1541
1871: A Reconstruction, Harvard University Press (1981).
3. Why did growth start in England/Europe and why in the late 18th century? (Tue,
Sept 29, 2009)
What factors improved living standards so much starting in the 18th century? What
caused the drop in fertility and demographic transitions? How did the drop in fertility
affect economic growth? What was the role of the industrial revolution in sustaining
economic growth? What exactly was the industrial revolution? Why did the industrial
revolution occur in Europe, and why in England? And, why did it happen in the 18th
century rather than earlier or later?
Mokyr, Joel, The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy.
Princeton University Press (2002).
Galor, Oded and Moav, Omer, Natural Selection and the Origin of Economic
Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), pp. 11331192 (2002). [link]
Rosenberg, Nathan and L Birdzell, Jr., How the West Grew Rich: the Economic
Transformation of the Industrial World. Basic Books (1987). [link]
Lucas, Robert, The Industrial Revolution: Past and Future, In Robert E. Lucas,
Lectures on Economic Growth (Harvard, 2002) and The Region (May 2005).
[link]
4. Why are some countries rich and others poor? Geography, institutions, and
culture (part 1) (Thu, Oct 1, 2009)
Are there ultimate reasons that explain why US and Europe are so rich while Africa is
so poor? Can better geography, ecology, and factor endowment explain this? Can
better institutions in Europe and US explain why they are so much richer than African
countries? Can the inheritance of better European institutions explain the relative
development in countries that were European colonies? Can differences in work
attitudes and the quality of labor explain the wealth of countries?
Geography:
Diamond, Jared, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, pp. 5392, W. W. Norton and Company (1997).
Gallup, John, Andrew Mellinger, and Jeffrey Sachs, Geography and Economic
Development, NBER Working Paper #6849 (1998). [link]
Institutions:
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, The Colonial Origins
of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, American Economic
Review, 91(5), pp.1369-1401 (2001). [link]
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, The Rise of Europe:
Institutional Change and Economic Growth, American Economic Review, 95(3),
pp. 546-579 (2005). [link]
Greif, Avner, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from
Medieval Trade, Cambridge University Press, Chapter. 2, pp. 29-55 (2006).
5. Why are some countries rich and others poor? Geography, institutions, and
culture (part 2) (Tue, Oct 6, 2009)
Culture:
6. The economics of marriage and the family and their changing nature (Thu, Oct 8,
2009)
What does economics have to say about marriage, divorce, family, and career? How
responsive are marriage, divorce, family, and career to economic incentives? How have
these changed over time? How have these contributed to and been influenced by the
demographic transition and economic growth?
Students presentation: Goldin, Claudia and Lawrence Katz, The Power of the
Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Womens Career and Marriage Decisions, Journal
of Political Economy, 110(4), pp. 730-70 (2002). [link]
Lundberg, Shelly and Robert Pollak, The American Family and Family
Economics, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(2), pp. 3-26 (2007). [link]
Stevenson, Betsey and Justin Wolfers, Marriage and Divorce: Changes and Their
Driving Forces, Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(2), pp. 27-52 (2007).
[link]
Goldin, Claudia and Lawrence Katz, Career and Marriage in the Age of the Pill,
American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings, 90(2), pp. 461-65 (2000).
[link]
Angrist, Joshua, How Do Sex Ratios Affect Marriage and Labor Markets:
Evidence from Americas Second Generation. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
117, pp. 997-1038 (2002). [link]
Abramitzky, Ran, Adeline Delavande and Luis Vasconcelos, Marrying Up: the
Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching, SIEPR Working Paper (2008). [link]
Weiss, Yoram, The Formation and Dissolution of Families: Why Marry? Who
Marries Whom? And What Happens Upon Divorce, in The Handbook of
Population and Family Economics, Mark R. Rosenzweig and Oded Stark, ed.
Amsterdam (1993). [link]
7. The economics of migration and its role in economic growth (Tue, Oct 13, 2009)
The last 300 hundreds years have been characterized by mass migration from Europe
to the new world, especially between 1850-1913. Migrants bring their human capital,
which can be important to economic growth. What drives migration? Are immigrants
positively or negatively selected in their skills from their origin country? How do
immigrants perform in the host country? What is the effect of migration on the sending
and receiving countries?
Students presentation: Ferrie, Joseph and Jason Long, A Tale of Two Labor
Markets: Intergenerational Occupational Mobility in Britain and the U.S. Since
1850, NBER Working Paper #11253 (2008). [link]
Or,
Hatton, Timothy and Jeffrey Williamson, The Age of Mass Migration: Causes
and Economic Impact, Oxford University Press (1998). [link]
8. The economics of book translations (by Izi Sin, an advanced grad student) (Thu,
Oct 15, 2009)
Izi will talk about her dissertation project. The (great!) idea is that translations are one
measure of the flow of culture, ideas and knowledge between linguistically distinct
societies. The transmission of these things between societies could have important
implications for economic growth, development and cultural understanding, but we
know little about the effects and determinants of these flows.
You should all prepare a 3-slide discussion and one of you will present his/her
discussion.
9. Migration of indentured servants from Europe to the Americas (Tue, Oct 20,
2009)
Indentured servitude, under which emigrants would become servants in the colonies
for a few years, was the most important form of migration from Europe to the
Americas in the 17th and 18th centuries, a period where the mainland and the West
Indies still had similar incomes. Who were these migrants? What determined the
length of their servitude? Did the relative quality of migrants human capital play a
role in the subsequent relative economic performance of the mainland and the West
Indies?
Abramitzky, Ran and Fabio Braggion, Migration and Human Capital: Self-Selection
of Indentured Servants to the Americas, Journal of Economic History, 66(4), pp.
882-905 (2006). [link]
Galenson, David, White Servitude and the Growth of Black Slavery in Colonial
America, Journal of Economic History, 41(1), pp. 39-47 (1981). [link]
Galenson, David, The Market Evaluation of Human Capital: The Case of Indentured
Servitude, Journal of Political Economy, 89(3), pp. 446-467 (1981). [link]
Galenson, David, The Rise and Fall of Indentured Servitude in the Americas: An
Economic Analysis, Journal of Economic History, 44(1), pp. 1-26 (1984). [link]
Grubb, Farley, Fatherless and Friendless: Factors Influencing the Flow of English
Emigrant Servants, Journal of Economic History, 52(1), pp. 85-108 (1992). [link]
Grubb, Farley, The Market Evaluation of Criminality: Evidence from the Auction of
British Convict Labor in America, 1767-1775, American Economic Review, 91(1),
pp. 295-304 (2001). [link]
Abramitzky, Ran, The Limits of equality: Insights from the Israeli Kibbutz,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(3), pp. 1111-1159 (2008). [link]
Gurven Michael, To give and to give not: The behavioral ecology of human food
transfers, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27, pp. 543-583 (2004) [link]
Holmstrom, Bengt, Moral Hazard in Teams, The Bell Journal of Economics,
13(2), pp. 324-340 (1982). [link]
11. Englands open fields and enclosures: the role of insurance (Thu, Oct 29, 2009)
For a few hundred years, medieval peasant families held land that was scattered in
strips to assure equality, and much of the land was held commonly without exclusive
private property (open fields). Land was eventually privatized (enclosed) in the 18th
century. Why did the seemingly inefficient open fields persist for so long? What was
the role of insurance in the rise and fall of the open field system?
Allen, Robert, Enclosures and the Yeoman: The Agricultural Development of the
South Midlands, 1450-1850, Oxford University Press, pp. 171-187 (1992).
12. Testing contract theory in historical data: insurance and incentives (Tue, Nov 3,
2009)
We have seen that organizations/institutions often emerge as (not necessarily efficient)
solutions to various contractual problems related to moral hazard and adverse selection
(e.g. kibbutzim, indentured servitude). Before examining other important institutions
(apprenticeship, partnerships, cooperatives, social networks, share cropping) and how
they solved these problems, we review the main empirical challenges facing tests of
contract theory. Well see that historical data often provide a great testing ground for
contract theory.
Greenwald, Bruce and Robert Glasspiegel, Adverse Selection in the Market for
Slaves: New Orleans, 1830-1860, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(3), pp.
479-499 (1983). [link]
Hilt, Eric, The Negative Tradeoff between Risk and Incentives: Evidence from
the American Whaling Industry, NBER Working Paper #11960 (2006). [link]
Pritchett, Jonathan and Richard Chamberlain, Selection in the Market for Slaves:
New Orleans, 1830-1860, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(2), pp. 461-473
(1993). [link]
Alston, Lee and Robert Higgs, Contractual Mix in Southern Agriculture Since
the Civil War: Facts, Hypotheses, and Tests, Journal of Economic History,
42(2), pp. 327-353 (1982). [link]
Elbaum, Bernard, Why Apprenticeship Persisted in Britain But Not in the United
States, Journal of Economic History, 49(2), pp. 337-349 (1989). [link]
14. A. Credit cooperatives and associations: insurance and incentives (Tue, Nov 10,
2009)
Credit cooperatives were widespread in Germany throughout the 19th century. As
micro-credit institutions in todays developing world, they lend to borrowers who cant
get loans elsewhere because they are able to solve the problems of asymmetric
information and enforcement by means of monitoring and peer pressure.
Besley, Timothy, Stephen Coate, and Glenn Loury, "The Economics of Rotating
Savings and Credit Associations," American Economic Review, 83(4), pp. 792810 (1993). [link]
Guinnane, Timothy and Maitreesh Ghatak, The Economics of Lending with Joint
Liability: Theory and Practice, Journal of Development Economics, 60(1), pp.
195-228 (1999). [link]
Garicano, Luis and Thomas Hubbard, Specialization, Firms and Markets: the
Division of Labor Within and Between Law Firms, Journal of Law, Economics,
and Organization, (May 2008). [link]
Abramitzky, Ran, Aprajit Mahajan, and Zephyr Frank, Inside the Black Box:
Business Partnerships in Rio De Janeiro 1870-1891, Working paper (2009).
[link]
Hilt, Eric, and Katherine OBanion. The Limited Partnership in New York,
1822-1858: Partnerships without Kinship. Journal of Economic History (2009):
forthcoming.
Levin, Jonathan and Steve Tadelis, Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional
Partnerships, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(1), pp. 131-171 (2005). [link]
15. Game theory and economic history (Thu, Nov 12, 2009)
What institutions facilitated long distance trade? How did merchants solve the inherent
commitment problem (to not behave opportunistically) intrinsic to merchant/agent
relationship? How could merchants trust oversee agents to sell their products? We will
study these issues with a methodological emphasis on how to use game theory in
economic history.