How Do Leaders Make Decisions?

: A Poliheuristic Perspective
Author(s): Alex Mintz
Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 1, The Poliheuristic Theory of
Foreign Policy Decision Making (Feb., 2004), pp. 3-13
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3176265
Accessed: 19-05-2016 16:18 UTC
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How Do Leaders Make Decisions?

A POLIHEURISTIC PERSPECTIVE

ALEX MINTZ
Department of Political Science
Texas A&M University
United Nations Studies

Yale University

Poliheuristic theory (PH) bridges the gap between cognitive and rational theories of decision making. PH
postulates a two-stage decision process. During the first stage, the set of possible options is reduced by
applying a "noncompensatory principle" to eliminate any alternative with an unacceptable return on a critical, typically political, decision dimension. Once the choice set has been reduced to alternatives that are
acceptable to the decision maker, the process moves to a second stage, during which the decision maker uses
more analytic processing in an attempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits. In this article, the author
applies poliheuristic theory to individual, sequential, and interactive decision settings. Subsequent articles in
this issue offer theoretical extensions and multiple tests of the theory using multiple methods (formal, statis-

tical, experimental).

Keywords: Decision analysis; poliheuristic theory; multimethod approach

How do foreign leaders, such as Yasser Arafat and Bashir Assad, make decisions?

How did American presidents, such as George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, Dwight
Eisenhower, and Ronald Reagan, decide to use force or to refrain from using force?
The leading decision paradigm in international relations is the rational actor, expected
utility theory. According to this theory, nations are led by rational, forward-looking

leaders who seek to maximize the expected gains of policy choices in a holistic and
compensatory (additive) fashion (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992).'
This special issue offers an alternative to the expected utility (EU) theory of decision and other rational-analytic decision models. Poliheuristic (PH) choice theory
postulates a two-stage decision process in which the menu for choice is narrowed initially by a noncompensatory analysis that eliminates options by the use of one or more

heuristics (cognitive shortcuts). Remaining alternatives are then evaluated in an

attempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits (Mintz 1993). Examples of the
noncompensatory heuristic that guides the elimination of options are threats to a
leader's political survival and political constraints on the use of force.
1. Other important decision theories are bureaucratic politics, cybernetic theory, and prospect theory.
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 48 No. 1, February 2004 3-13
DOI: 10.1177/0022002703261056

? 2004 Sage Publications

3

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4 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

TABLE 1

Types of Decisions Studied by Poliheuristic Theory

Author

Type of Decision
Use of force
Nonuse of force

Mintz (1993)
DeRouen (2003)

Diversionary uses of force

DeRouen (2001)

Tests of nuclear weapons

Sathasivam (2003)

Initial crisis reaction

War termination

DeRouen and Sprecher (2004)

Mintz and Geva (1998)

Coalition formation

Mintz (1995)

Intraparty rivalry
Level of force used in a crisis

Mintz (1995)
Redd (2002)

Learning

Yang (2003)
Redd (2002)

Influence of advisers

War and peace decisions

Framing
Military uprising

Astorino-Courtois and Trusty (2000)

Taylor-Robinson and Redd (2003)
Mintz and Mishal (2003)

Defection and retaliation

Clare (2003)

Decisions by experts and novices

Negotiation

Dacey and Carlson (2004)

Eisenband (2003)

Conflict resolution

Astorino-Courtois and Trusty (2000); Mintz and Mishal (2003)

By focusing on a two-stage process, poliheuristic choice theory integrates elements

of the cognitive psychology school of decision making with elements of the rational

choice school. The first stage of poliheuristic theory involves a noncompensatory,

nonholistic search. It uses decision heuristics and primarily corresponds to the cogni-

tive school of decision making. The second stage involves analytic processing of surviving alternatives. It corresponds to rational choice theory. Cognitive heuristics are
more important in the first stage of the decision, whereas rational choice calculations

are more applicable to the second stage of the poliheuristic decision process.
The poliheuristic model is applicable to single decisions, group decisions, sequential decisions, and decisions in strategic settings. Poliheuristic theory focuses on both

the process of decision making and the outcome of decisions and explains why and
how decisions are made by world leaders. A key premise of poliheuristic theory is that

policy makers use a mixture of decision strategies when making decisions, including
strategies that are suboptimal (Mintz et al. 1997).

Although poliheuristic theory has been in existence only since 1993, the PH
research program has already received considerable attention in such leading journals
as the American Political Science Review, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and Interna-

tional Studies Quarterly, as well as in book chapters, edited volumes, and numerous
conferences, including those sponsored by the American Political Science Association (APSA), International Studies Association (ISA), Midwest Political Science

Association (MPSA), Peace Science Society International (PSSI), and the International Society for Political Psychology (Redd 2003, 101).

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Mintz / HOW DO LEADERS MAKE DECISIONS? 5

TABLE 2

The Poliheuristic Decision Calculus in American Foreign Policy

President

Crisis

Author

Eisenhower Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam (1954) DeRouen (2003)

Eisenhower Guatemala (1954) Taylor-Robinson and Redd (2003)

Reagan Grenada (1983) DeRouen (2001)
Bush Sr. Iraq (1991) Mintz (1993)
Clinton Kosovo (1998) Redd (2000)

Poliheuristic theory has been applied to a rich menu of decisions in international

relations: decisions on the use of force, nonuse of force, initial reaction to crisis, crisis

escalation, crisis termination, framing, learning, negotiation, peace, rivalry termination, and conflict resolution (see Table 1 and articles in this issue).
Table 2 lists cases of poliheuristic decision making by American presidents (Eisen-

hower, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton) previously analyzed by DeRouen (2001, 2003),
Mintz (1993), Redd (2000), and Taylor-Robinson and Redd (2003). There is evidence
for the use of the noncompensatory principle of poliheuristic theory in all of these
cases.

Goertz (2004) provides additional examples of noncompensatory, poliheuristic

decision making by American presidents:
1. The U.S. political establishment wanted to return the Panama Canal to Panama. The
treaty "was negotiated under Henry Kissinger and Gerald Ford and supported by the
Carter administration. However, public opinion polls showed little support for this
move. As a result, there was much hesitation in the Senate regarding ratification"

(Goertz 2004, 20-21).

2. "Realists, such as Eisenhower, Nixon, and Kissinger, considered using nuclear weapons
in war but were constrained by public opinion" (Goertz 2004, 27).

Several scholars have applied poliheuristic theory to decisions by leaders in the

Middle East: the late President Hafez al-Assad of Syria (see Astorino-Courtois and
Trusty 2000), former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan (see Sathasivam 2003),
former President Saddam Hussein of Iraq (see Mintz 2000), and Chairman Yasser
Arafat of the Palestinian Authority (see Clare 2003; Mintz and Mishal 2003). Clare
(2003), Mintz (1995), and Mintz and Mishal (2003) have also applied elements of the
theory to cases involving Israeli prime ministers (Shamir, Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu,
and Sharon). These case studies are listed in Table 3. Obviously, noncompensatory
political constraints in nondemocratic societies are different from those imposed on
democratic leaders.

Poliheuristic theory has also been used to explain other theories of international
relations. For example, DeRouen (2001, 70) claimed that diversionary theory is consistent with the noncompensatory principle of poliheuristic choice theory "for the
president is unlikely to select any alternative in which the political dimension is not

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6 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

TABLE 3

Poliheuristic Studies of Decisions by Leaders in the Middle East

Leader Country/Entity Decision Author

Hafez al-Assad Syria Syria's peace and war decisions

vis-a-vis Israel
Yasser Arafat Palestinian Patterns of conflictual and

Astorino-Courtois and Trusty

(2000)
Clare (2003)

Authority cooperative interactions

with Israel

Yasser Arafat Palestinian Decisions during the Palestinian

Authority Intifada of 2000-2002

Mintz and Mishal (2003)

Saddam Hussein Iraq Gulf War of 1991

Mintz (2000)

Netanyahu, Peres, Israel Decisions before and after the

Clare (2003)

Rabin Oslo Accord of 1993

Yitzchak Shamir Israel Decisions on coalition formation

Mintz (1995)

in 1992, 1994
Nawaz Sharif Pakistan Pakistan's decision to test the

Sathasivam (2003)

bomb in 1998
Ariel Sharon

Israel

Decisions during the Intifada

Mintz and Mishal (2003)

satisfied for fear of political repercussions." Mintz and Geva (1993) showed that the
noncompensatory principle of poliheuristic theory helps explain the democratic peace

phenomenon because leaders of democracies refrain from attacking another democracy because it is politically too costly. However, no such constraint is placed on demo-

cratic leaders when the opponent is nondemocratic (Mintz and Geva 1993). The
authors also showed that the noncompensatory principle played a role in President

Bush's 1991 war termination decision not to pursue Saddam Hussein in Baghdad
when then-president Bush was enjoying very high levels of public approval (Mintz

and Geva 1998).

Studies of poliheuristic theory have thus far only used case studies and experimen-

tal analysis. The contributors to this special issue offer multiple tests of poliheuristic

theory with multiple methods (formal, statistical, and experimental).

WHAT IS POLIHEURISTIC DECISION MAKING?

The term poliheuristic can be broken down into "the roots poly (many) and heuristic (shortcuts), which alludes to the cognitive mechanisms used by decision makers

to simplify complex foreign policy decisions" (Mintz et al. 1997, 554). "Poli" also
refers to the notion that political leaders measure gains and losses in political terms.
Poliheuristic theory postulates that when making decisions, policy makers employ a
two-stage decision process consisting of (a) rejecting alternatives that are unacceptable to the policy maker on a critical dimension or dimensions and (b) selecting an
alternative from the subset of remaining alternatives while maximizing benefits and

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Mintz / HOW DO LEADERS MAKE DECISIONS? 7

minimizing risks (see Mintz 1993, 2003; Mintz and Geva 1997; Mintz et al. 1997;
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993).2
Poliheuristic theory sees domestic politics as "the essence of decision." High politi-

cal audience costs are nonadditive. Avoiding major loss is noncompensatory (see also
Goertz 2004). Domestic political audience costs are an integral part of foreign policy
decision making. Policy makers are political actors whose self-interest in political sur-

vival is paramount (Russett and Barzilai 1992; Sathasivam 2003). Consequently, policy makers are likely to reject outright any alternative that poses potentially very high

political costs, even if that same alternative also yields potentially high benefits on

other dimensions (although military and strategic considerations are also noncompensatory under certain conditions).
TWO-STAGE GAMES

Poliheuristic theory identifies a process by which leaders make decisions by first

simplifying complex foreign policy decisions while focusing on the dimensions of the

decision. They then evaluate remaining alternatives using analytic processing. The set
of alternatives is reduced to a more manageable size by employing a noncompensatory

decision analysis. Sathasivam (2003, 57) therefore argued that poliheuristic theory
goes beyond previous attempts to predict foreign policy decisions that used "rational

actor" or "bureaucratic politics" models by looking not only at why decisions were
made but also at how these decisions were made (see also Christensen and Redd 2004).
Whereas several theories of political decision making originated in economics, PH is a
theory of political decision making because it specifically postulates that leaders avoid

major political loss and that such a loss is noncompensatory for political decision
makers.

Poliheuristic theory is compatible with a host of contingency theories of decision

and judgment that attribute to the decision maker sufficient flexibility in adapting the

decision process to changing problems and conditions (Beach and Mitchell 1978;
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993; Tetlock 1992). The main characteristics of the
theory are as follows:
* Poliheuristic theory is dimension based, noncompensatory, nonholistic, satisficing, and

order sensitive (Mintz, Geva, and DeRouen 1994). This set of characteristics distinguishes it from other theories of decision making (expected utility theory, cybernetic theory, prospect theory).

* In strategic settings, such as those that characterize many war and peace decisions (see
Morrow 1997), the poliheuristic decision maker eliminates, in the first stage, not only his

or her noncompensatory alternatives but also alternatives perceived to be politically

infeasible for an opponent (for an example, see Astorino-Courtois and Trusty 2000). The
reduced choice sets can then be subjected to a standard game-theoretic analysis in the
second stage of the decision (Mintz and Astorino-Courtois 2001).

2. Experimental studies have shown that analytic decision models, such as expected utility, are most
likely to be employed by decision makers when the number of alternatives available to the leader is small.

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8 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

* In sequential settings, each decision in the sequence of decisions is a two-stage poliheuristic decision. Thus, Saddam Hussein's decisions in fall 2002 and spring 2003 can be
viewed as a sequence of poliheuristic decisions on whether to cooperate (minimally) with
United Nations inspectors.
* In sequential and interactive (strategic) situations,3 each decision is part of a sequence of
decisions by both players in a strategic interaction, each employing poliheuristic calculations in each decision node in a strategic setting (see Eisenband 2003). According to this
thesis, Saddam Hussein and George Bush have engaged in a sequential and interactive
poliheuristic game consisting of numerous mini-decisions.

Because it uses decision shortcuts and rules of thumb, poliheuristic theory can
explain complicated foreign policy decisions. It is unique in its ability to deal with
multiple players, multiple alternatives, and multiple dimensions, such as those charac-

terizing N-adic arms races, N-nation alliance decisions, and environmental decisions.
It is inherently built on the assumption that policy makers simplify complicated deci-

sion problems by first using simple cognitive shortcuts and then applying an analytic
decision calculus to arrive at a choice.

Poliheuristic theory can be refuted and falsified by finding the decision process to

be compensatory, alternative based, holistic, or order insensitive. As the authors of

articles in this issue show, however, the theory is quite robust.

AN EXAMPLE OF

PO,IHEURISTIC DECISION MAKING

At the core of the poliheuristic theory is the noncompensatory principle of decision

making. It serves to eliminate alternatives in the first stage of the decision process. For

example, on March 1, 2003, the Turkish parliament vetoed the proposed deployment
of 62,000 U.S. troops to Turkey as a launching pad for a possible attack against Iraq.
This decision was reportedly due to strong public opposition to deployment of U.S.
troops on Turkish soil despite promises from the United States for a huge economic aid

package, worth $30 billion in grants and loan guarantees, and U.S. pressure on the
Europeans to accept Turkey into the European Union. Although the economic and military benefits associated with cooperation with the United States were huge, the political costs for the Turkish parliament were apparently negative and noncompensatory.

The move by the Turkish parliament is a good example of the use of the noncompensatory principle of poliheuristic theory in decisions by state leaders and other

politicians. Despite a very high score on the economic aid dimension, a low score on
the political (public opinion) dimension did not compensate for the expected eco3. In these situations, the poliheuristic (PH) model resembles the logic of the iterated dominanceelimination procedure in game theory, yet the PH model specifically predicts that the political dimension is
noncompensatory, assumes a two-stage process rather than an iterated elimination process consisting of several steps, uses decision weights, and is also applicable to very complex decision situations with multiple
players with multiple options. In dynamic situations, the PH model often predicts outcomes that are different
from those reached using games of strategic interactions that are based on rational choice because in such
settings, PH eliminates from the outset unacceptable alternatives (such as doing nothing), and these alternatives do not reappear during the decision process.

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Mintz /HOW DO LEADERS MAKE DECISIONS? 9

nomic benefits, and the deployment of force alternative was not approved by members

of the parliament. In noncompensatory terms, there were no substitution effects or

trade-offs between the political and economic dimensions of the decision.4

Turkey has been torn between widespread public opposition to a war against a
fellow Muslim state and intense pressure from Washington. At the time the decision

was made, the expectations, according to Reuters (March 1, 2003), were that Ankara
would, "almost certainly, lose an almost concluded financial aid package amounting to

some $6 billion in U.S. grants and up to $24 billion in loan guarantees." The proposal
for deployment of U.S. forces was rejected by the Turks, even in face of a massive aid
package from the United States and military-strategic commitment to Turkey from the

United States and Great Britain. Opposition leader Deniz Baykal welcomed the outcome and said, "This has shown again that the whole world now has to give importance

to national [public] opinion and show understanding of parliament when approaching

Turkey" (Reuters, March 1, 2003).

Once the option to deploy U.S. forces on Turkish soil had been rejected by parliament, the Turkish government evaluated the remaining alternatives that advanced to
the second stage of the decision process and decided, in an attempt to minimize further

costs and maximize benefits, to allow air passage over Turkey's airspace to coalition
planes.
The noncompensatory political loss aversion variable in poliheuristic theory can be
operationalized in several ways as follows:
? Threat to a leader's survival

? Significant drop in public support for a policy

? Significant drop in popularity

? The prospects of an electoral defeat

? Domestic opposition
? Threat to regime survival
? Intraparty rivalry and competition
? Internal or external challenge to the regime
? Potential collapse of the coalition, government, or regime
? Threat to political power, dignity, honor, or legitimacy of a leader
? Demonstrations, riots, and so forth
? The existence of veto players (e.g., pivotal parties in parliamentary government)

NEXT STEPS IN THE POITHEURISTIC

RESEARCH PROGRAM

The next steps in the PH research program are as follows:

* Apply poliheuristic theory to key issues and puzzles in international relations: decisions
on alliance formation and dissolution, deterrence decisions, armament and disarmament
4. A reviewer of this article has pointed out that a much larger amount of economic aid to Turkey might

have eventually "compensated" for domestic opposition to the deployment of U.S. troops.

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10 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

decisions, diversionary uses of force, counterterrorism, enduring rivalry, and so on.

Apply PH to other important domains in international relations-e.g., International

Political Economy (IPE)-while analyzing economic aid and trade decisions, environmental decisions, financial decisions, and so on. Apply PH decision making to the coalition formation process and to bargaining.
* Develop empirical criteria to identify (a) "key" decision dimensions, (b) the cutoff point
for when the noncompensatory (avoid major loss) principle applies, and (c) the conditions under which decision makers switch from the first stage of decision making to the

second stage in the PH decision calculus.

* Automate poliheuristic theory and PH decision rules. This will make it easier for scholars
to apply and test the theory using different data sets on a variety of geographical and historical contexts.

* Identify poliheuristic equilibria, that is, spell out the conditions under which players in a
strategic setting reach an equilibrium in an interactive two-stage poliheuristic process.

* Compare PH conceptually and empirically to cybernetic and expected utility models of

the use of force. For example, compare PH findings to Ostrom and Job's (1986) and

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's (1992) findings.

* Assess whether bureaucratic/organizational political constraints or domestic political
constraints are more salient and influential as noncompensatory domestic dimensions of
decision making.

* Examine the impact of framing and marketing on poliheuristic choice. In contrast to

expected utility, PH is order sensitive. Is it also affected by the way alternatives, dimen-

sions, and implications are framed? Examine the link between affect and PH decision
making.

* Extend the PH model to group decision making and sequential decision making, which
characterize many foreign policy situations. The simplest representation of PH is as a sin-

gle individual making choices based on the noncompensatory decision principle. However, political choices in bureaucratic or democratic settings are often the product of
group and societal processes in which an individual leader must interact with others to
make and implement choices.

MULTIMETHOD TESTS OF THE THEORY

As pointed out above, most studies of poliheuristic theory have thus far employed

case studies and experiments in studying leaders' decisions. The contributors to this
special issue go beyond the case study method and process-tracing analysis in present-

ing multiple tests of poliheuristic theory with multiple methods (statistical, formal,
experimental).5
Stoll (forthcoming) points out that research that relies on any one methodology is
usually inferior to research that makes use of several methods. It is a rare situation in

which "one method is so superior that the others can safely be ignored." The use of a
multimethod approach in international relations is rare (but see Maoz et al., forthcom-

ing, for a multimethod analysis of conflict management and conflict resolution, as

well as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's 1992 work applying multiple methods to
decisions to initiate wars).

5. Consistent with the policy of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, articles in this issue were reviewed
by at least two anonymous referees.

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Mintz /HOW DO LEADERS MAKE DECISIONS? 11

A multimethod approach to foreign policy analysis can

1. cross-validate results based on different methods of inquiry,
2. help generalize results beyond a specific case,
3. contribute to theory development because different methods (e.g., formal, case study)
may uncover unexpected findings that may be reincorporated into a refined theory and
retested,

4. enhance confidence in results and substantiate or refute theory,

5. identify differences and similarities in results based on methods used,
6. lead to robust and standardized results, thus contributing to scientific advancement in
international relations (Mintz 2003).

Specifically, in this special issue, Goertz (2004) uses formal theory and spatial
analysis to formalize and extend poliheuristic theory. Dacey and Carlson (2004) use a
formal model to compare decision making of experts and nonexperts in foreign policy.

DeRouen and Sprecher (2004) use probit analysis on a data set of N-nations' initial
reaction to international crisis. Christensen and Redd (2004) and Mintz (2004) use
experimental tests of the theory, and Stern (2004) provides a qualitative overview of
poliheuristic theory relating it to other emerging theories of foreign policy decision

making: problem representation, decision units, and cognitive constructivism.

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