Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts

Brett Belcastro
Reasoning and Intelligence

THESIS XII
A Philosophical Review

14

Matt Luz
On the Formulation of Successful Ad Baculum
Arguments

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Volume 22 Number 1

J. Stanley Yake

May, 2016

Friends

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INSIDE THIS ISSUE:

Matt Silliman
The Is-Ought Non-Problem

David Kenneth Braden-Johnson

The Problem with the Is-Ought Non-Problem
Reply to Silliman

Matt Silliman

Gerol Petruzella

With famous and characteristic irony, Hume

lampoons a particular form of reasoning:

Must Ought Imply Can?

Reply to Vranas

Paul Nnodim
Utilitarian Dilemmas in the Literature of
Scapegoats

The Is-Ought Non-Problem

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In every system of morality, which I have hitherto

met with, I have always remarkd, that the author
proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or
makes observations concerning human affairs;
when of a sudden I am surprizd to find, that
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is,
and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not
connected with an ought, or an ought not. This
change is imperceptible, but is, however, of the last

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consequence. For as this ought, or ought not,

expresses some new relation or affirmation, tis
necessary that it shoud be observd and
explaind; and at the same time that a reason
shoud be given, for what seems altogether
inconceivable, how this new relation can be a
deduction from others, which are entirely
different from it. (A Treatise of Human Nature,
Bk. III, pt. 1, sect. 1)

To do this risks unsoundness, however, for we

might well identify at least a single
counterexample (a particularly heinous mother,
who actually tried and failed to murder person
Y at birth, and has done everything else in her
power to undermine person Ys subsequent
life). This singular example, however rare in
real life, falsifies the categorical supplied
premise. Better I think to treat the original
argument as a very strong induction. It becomes
cogent if we individuate the first premise (say
that I am person Y and my mother is person X),
without the need for supplied premises. Of
someone who refuses to accept it, we might
well say that she simply fails to understand the
actual significance of the term mother as we
use it in normal human discourse.

I will offer a brace of arguments to suggest that,

while formally problematic in certain highly
artificial or abstract examples, such reasoning is
quite natural and, interpreted with a modicum
of charity, seldom if ever fallacious in itself.
Taken together, I think these arguments give us
good grounds for not worrying much about
Humes problem.

(2) My second argument for deriving oughtstatements from is-statements begins by

observing a tacit normativity in the selection of
premises from among an indefinite field of
potentially salient facts. My reasoning looks
like this:

(1) My first argument rests on the observation

there is robust, though tacit, morally normative
content, properly and naturally understood,
embedded in most ordinary language of human
consequence (including Humes
observations concerning human affairs
above). Take the following argument:

1. There is an effectively unlimited number

of facts (articulable states of affairs)
2. A nontrivially large subset of these facts
is potentially salient in reasoning toward any
substantive conclusion of human concern.
(sub- conclusion)
3. A reasoner must bring perceptivity and
judgment to bear on the process of selecting
among potentially salient facts to employ as
premises in an argument of human concern.
4. Perceptivity and judgment are irreducibly
laced with normativity.
5. Therefore, all substantive reasoning of
human concern has an irreducibly normative
component.

1. Person X is person Ys mother.

2. Therefore, Person Y has obligations (of
gratitude, respect, patience, etc.) toward
person X.
Here a merely factual premise yields a strong
inductive, and morally normative, conclusion
without fallacy, since the term mother
describes a complex biological, affective, and
normatively charged relationship out of which
such obligations almost always flow. We could,
if we chose, treat it as enthymemic, and render
it deductively valid by supplying the missing
premise:

One may well object here that I have here

conflated epistemological with moral
normativity, and thus that my argument turns on
an equivocation. I plead not guilty, on the

1 All persons have obligations toward their

mothers.
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grounds that (at least) when a matter is

consequential to humans, the epistemological
process by which we determine the salience or
relevance of facts is itself imbued with at least
some moral normativity. Perhaps developing
the Pythagorean Theorem was an epistemically
pure process, but as soon as we employ it to
design a building, which might (if our
calculations are careless) collapse and injure
someone, moral significance has entered the
room.

that my mother has an exaggerated fear of

injuries from falling, in response perhaps to a
childhood trauma, and thus that she will be
excessively worried about my taking risks with
this crumbly rock, may or may not be a relevant
fact in my calculation of what I ought to do in
this circumstance. How heavily should I weight
the fact of my mothers fears in this
deliberation? The difficulty (though not, I think,
impossibility) of answering this question
illustrates just the sort of deliberative judgment
that imbues almost all apparent pure-fact
reasoning with irreducible normativity.

I argue, then, that determination of salience is a

normative process in the relevant sense, and
irreducibly so. A full spelling-out of the criteria
by which we select among possible facts
plausibly yields robust (if tacit) premises
expressing normativity ought-statements that
will not go away, and without which the
argument itself is pointless. Of course, if any of
the operative terms are of the type in my first
example (e.g.: mother), this is fairly obvious,
but I hope I have shown that it is subtly the case
even in apparently purely factual examples.

David Braden-Johnson raises a challenge to

what I have said so far, on the grounds that
Humes concern is only with deductive
arguments, so my inductive treatment of the
argument about motherhood would be beside
the point. But Hume himself rejects induction
altogether as an instance of reason. He views
what we call induction as belief based on past
experience which (since reason gives no
guarantee that the future will resemble the past)
is not sanctioned by reason at all. Perhaps this
is a merely antiquarian point, since Hume is
most probably mistaken about induction. It
does, however, sharpen Humes position: on his
account, no genuine (i.e.: deductive) reasoning
process can get us from purely descriptive
premises to prescriptive conclusions. I contend
that this may be true in the abstract, but as there
are no purely descriptive premises
concerning human affairs, it is a moot and
uninteresting point.

Here is another example of the sort of reasoning

Hume finds altogether inconceivable (though
I am not certain that word means precisely what
he thinks it does):
1) This rock is crumbly.
2) (therefore) We ought not to climb on this
rock.
This argument might seem to Hume to require
some tacit premises (to the effect that crumbly
rock can be dangerous, that one ought not take
unnecessary risks, etc.). But no one in a context
where this would be a normal thing to say
would fail to understand the reasoning on offer.
There are of course many other potential
premises which are evidently not germane
that the sun is 93 million miles away, for
example but quite a few others nearer to hand
about which it is not so easy to say. The fact

I intend my second argument above to show,

not that Hume is mistaken about pure
deduction, supposing there is such a thing, but
that the question is moot in practice. By the
definition of deduction, nothing can emerge in
the conclusion that was not already contained in
the premises, so unless there are at least tacitly
normative elements in the premises, a
normative conclusion will be invalid. Fair
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enough. I contend, however, that due to the

irreducibly normative process of determining
the salience of premises, selected from an
indefinitely large pool of potentially salient
facts, the requisite normative background
already tacitly infects the premises of any
interesting argument.

questions, and hence of its reasoning about

them. Traditional biologys deductions may
have been valid, but they were only notionally
free of humanly consequential normative
content.
Matt Silliman teaches philosophy at MCLA

To illustrate by analogy, consider early-modern

claims of scientific research to be free of extrascientific values. Biologists, for example,
presented themselves as simply studying the
world of life that was before them, answering
the questions that nature posed (carving nature
at its joints, a carnivorous image from Platos
Phaedrus much beloved by Roger Bacon).
Professional training effectively determined,
paradigmatically, what sorts of questions and
research techniques would receive support and
approval within the biology community. Such
selectivity is at once inevitable and a principal
reason for the success of the discipline as a
science, lending it the specialization and focus
to make progress. Equally inevitable, however,
is the exclusion of legitimate biological
questions that lie too far outside the paradigm
shared by the community. Consider, for
example, Harvard biologist Ruth Hubbards
remarkable work on the
historical/sociological/biological reasons for
male-female size difference in modern humans
a question that never came up (it was taken,
wrongly as we now know, as a biological given,
not as a question in need of explanation) when
all prominent professors of biology were men.

The Problem with the Is-Ought NonProblem

Reply to Silliman
David Kenneth Braden-Johnson

Contra (most interpretations of) Hume, Matt

Silliman offers two arguments for deriving
ought-statements from is-statements, or, in the
common parlance of the debate, bridging the isought gap. He claims that reasoning in this
fashion is quite natural and seldom if ever
fallacious in itself. In the end, he advises us
not to worry too much about Humes
problem.
I think there is much to worry about here, not
the least of which is the prospect of falling
silent before those who would fallaciously
derive ethical justifications from convention,
Gods will, popularity, the nature of things,
and the like. But my more immediate worry is
that Silliman fails to grasp the axiomatic status
of Humes problem, and so unwittingly
employs the very position he condemns. I
suggest, therefore, that both of Sillimans
arguments fail, and for the same reason: by
insisting on the tacit normativity of premises
designed to provide support for any interesting
argument, each assumes (pace Hume) the very
unbridgeable gap he hopes to traverse or
ignore.1

My point is not to criticize science such

systematic focus on some questions to the
exclusion of others is both necessary and
salutary for the process of scientific inquiry
though it is equally healthy and indispensable
that it learns to listen to those affected or
neglected by its exclusions. I only indicate by
way of illustration the serious normative import
of biologys process of selecting methods and

1 I take the issue to be that we cannot derive a nonvacuous, action-directing normative conclusion
from any set of purely descriptive (that is, nonmoral, non-normative) claims. The qualification
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2. Therefore, person Y has obligations

toward person X.

In addition, there is a permanent tension at the

heart of Sillimans analysis: it remains unclear
whether he intends to offer counterexamples to
Hume (that is, non-fallaciously bridge the isought gap), or merely to eliminate the gap from
all or most human discourse. At any rate, in
what follows, I will argue that he fails to
accomplish the former and ought not to pursue
the latter.

Being a mother, he writes, is a normatively

charged relationship which typically involves
obligations. The tacit normative content
emerges as we parse the term mother, and can
be made explicit in the following way:
A1:
1. Person X is person Ys mother.
2. All persons have obligations to their
mothers.
3. Therefore, person Y has obligations to
person X.

The First Argument

Sillimans first argument rests on the
observation that the premises of any
interesting argument contain tacit, normative
content providing an inferential bridge to a
normative conclusion without fallacy. He
provides this example:
A1:
1. Person X is person Ys mother.

Recognizing the deductive and potentially

unsound character of A1 (given the remote
possibility of a mother toward whom no one
has obligations), Silliman suggests that we
would be on stronger ground to interpret A1
inductively and with reference to a specific
person, as in the following version:
A1
1. Y is Matts mother.
2. Therefore, Matt has obligations to Y.

non-vacuous follows from the many successful

efforts, beginning with Prior (1960) validly to
provide clever (yet apparently vacuous, noninstructive, or non-action-guiding (see Guevara,
2008) counterexamples to Hume. This previous
sentence is a bit box-y. Can you split it into two
sentences or simplify it? For example:1. Either the
moon is made of cheese or you ought to respect
your mother
2. The moon is not made of cheese.
3. Therefore, you ought to respect your mother.
The argument is formally valid (Either A or B/notA//B), and appears to derive an ought-statement
from a set of is-statements; yet the argument offers
no compelling basis for accepting the normative
conclusion beyond the insistent formal mechanisms
of logic. Furthermore, we may freely substitute any
(repugnant or particularistic) ought-statement for B
without loss of validity:
1. Either the moon is made of cheese or you ought
to insult your mother.
2. The moon is not made of cheese.
3. Therefore, you ought to insult your mother.

But this presents us with a puzzle. A1 remains

deductive in tone and (beyond those familiar
with the particulars of Matts life), logically
indistinguishable from A1. The assumption is,
of course, that Matt has an obligation-saturated
relationship to his mother, supplying the tacit
normativity of premise #1 made explicit in a
new premise #2:
A1
1. Y is Matts mother.
2. Matt has obligations to his mother.
3. Therefore, Matt has obligations to his
mother.
But A1 is both deductive and circular,
effectively eliminating premise #1, the
purported source of the arguments tacit
normativity.
Alternatively, rephrasing A1 as an induction,
we have:
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A1
1. Y is Matts mother.
2. Most persons have obligations to their
mothers.
3. Therefore, Matt probably has
obligations to his mother.

was invoked in the first instance as means of

getting from exclusively is-statements to an
ought-statement, while no bridge is required to
infer ought-claims from a mix of claims
containing, tacitly or explicitly, other oughtclaims.

While A1 avoids overt circularity and

deduction, the argument (like A1 before it)
fails to deliver the promised goods; that is,
provide us with an argument for deriving
ought-statements from is-statements.2 It is,
plainly enough, an argument that (fallibly,
inductively) derives an ought statement from
another ought statement. Bridging is and ought
is, apparently, impossible in the absence of an
ought on both sides of the bridge, whether that
structure is inductive or deductive.3 But now
our metaphor has lost all sense, since the bridge

The Second Argument

Sillimans second argument for bridging the
gap is related to but somewhat distinct form the
first in which the tacit normativity of the
premise(s) eliminated the need for a bridge (and
so validated Humes view). Now Silliman
locates the normativity not (merely) in the
premises themselves, but in the very selection
of premises. The basic idea is that the
epistemological process by which we
determine the salience or relevance of facts is
itself imbued with at least some moral
normativity. He proffers on this basis that all
substantive reasoning of human concern has an
irreducibly normative component.

2 Though I wont pursue the issue further

here, the inference fails the test of ethical
non-vacuity as well (see footnote 1).
3 In an earlier paper (1995) which Silliman
references, I argue that the is-ought gap is clearest
when attempting to get from is to ought in
deductive contexts (a process I called get-D),
while suggesting that one might get-ND (get in
some nondeductive non-deductive? sense) from
one to the other (in an explanation, for instance). I
never mention induction in that earlier work, but
assume that abduction (which only some take to be
a species of inductive inference) may at times
appear to bridge the gap, where, for instance,
actually having obligations to ones mother best
explains some other observed phenomenon. But in
these cases, the bridging occurs not on the basis of
some tacit normativity in the premises, but in the
process of clarifying an otherwise unexplained
observation. Peirce first described abduction (later
dubbed retroduction) as involving some very
curious circumstance, which would be explained by
the supposition that it was the case of a certain
general rule, and thereupon adopt that supposition
(1998, p. 189). Here is his attempted formalization
of abduction:1. The surprising fact, C, is observed.

Unfortunately, this last claim is equivocal

between (a) seeing the process of selecting
premises (in any interesting context) as
essentially normative, and (b) seeing the
logical functioning of premises in an argument
as essentially normative. At times Silliman
seems to be suggesting both; yet in the context
of non-fallaciously deriving ought-statements
from is-statements, we rightly concern
2. But, if H were true, C would be a matter of
course,
3. hence. There is reason to suspect that H is true.
(p. 231).
Most commentators agree that, in affirming the
consequent, abduction resists successful
formalization. Ill leave it to the reader to solve
these and other riddles of abduction and to apply
the results to Sillimans examples.No period of
capitalize s. (see Plutynsky for a list of worries
attending the formalization and justification of
abduction).
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ourselves exclusively with the latter.4

Furthermore, the normativity of (a) is logically
distinct from (b). To see this is so, we need
only reflect momentarily on the very example
Silliman provides of the (epistemically pure)
development of the (no doubt interesting and
substantive) Pythagorean Theorem. The typical
normative epistemic imperatives that determine
the salience or relevance of facts (be careful, be
systematic, avoid contradiction, etc.) that
govern argument construction and direct our
inquiries have no bearing on the normativity of
the argument or its components. That is, no
amount of selectivity, focus, bias, salience, or
any other purportedly normative characteristic
of the process of argument formation has any

determinative impact on the normativity of the

argument. Indeed, Silliman seems to admit as
much as he claims that normativity associated
with the theorem enters the inferential scene
only as we apply it, with the proper care of
course, when designing a building. That we
generally care about the safety of homes is
undeniable, as is the value we place on
consistency and deductive certainty, when we
claim that, for any right triangle, the square of
the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the
squares of the other two sides.5 That we ought
to be careful when arguing, that the contextual
application of arguments in science and
elsewhere can be for good or ill, or that, in
general we care about the content and
construction and application of our arguments,
are all equally obvious.

4 Silliman at least momentarily appears to

agree: By the definition of deduction,
nothing can emerge in the conclusion that
was not already contained in the premises,
so unless there are at least tacitly normative
elements in the premises, a normative
conclusion will be invalid. Serving as a
clear example of the permanent tension I
note above, he prefaces this Humean
insight with this contradictory assertion:
on [Humes] account, no genuine (i.e.,
deductive) reasoning process can get us
from purely descriptive premises to
prescriptive conclusions. I argue to the
contrary, even in the case of deduction, at least
in real-world reasoning. (emphases
mine). Notice that the final proviso
regarding real world reasoning, in
underscoring either the tacit normativity of
premises or the processes of argument
construction which, in his words, imbues
reasoning with irreducible normativity,
does not violate but actually presupposes
Humes position on the is-ought gap.

Putting aside these equivocations, have we any

reason to suppose that the normativity of
argument construction produces or amounts to a
normativity of content (reflected in at least one
premise) that might serve to bridge the
inferential gap between is and ought? Silliman
offers but one brief example:
A2
1. This rock is crumbly.
2. Therefore, we ought not to climb on this
rock.
He suggests that, to any clear-headed reader,
the choice of premise #1 has been directed by
some interested party, and so, despite all
appearances to the contrary, is not a pure fact.
Its impurity bespeaks its (tacit) normativity.

5 And not, as the newly embrained yet still

incompetent scarecrow in the The Wizard
of Oz would have it: "The sum of the
square roots of any two sides of an
isosceles triangle is equal to the square root
of the remaining side."
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Note that what Silliman claims is true not of the

premise, but the argument as a whole
understood as a kind of cryptic, hypothetical
imperative (If you want to remain safe, you
ought not to climb on unsafe rocks!). Let us
agree that premise #1 either is or is not a pure
fact. If it is notif it tacitly contains some
element of normativitythen Humes is-ought
gap remains untouched as we proceed validly to
infer an ought from an ought. Hume gap is
bridged only where the premise set remains
exclusively empirical or pure. Ignoring for
the moment Sillimans apparent suggestion that
we (as in A1 and its progeny above) argue for
premise #1s contextual or holistic impurity in
light of the intentions of its author, let us
assume that it remains a pure, empirical, nonnormative fact. Only in that way might we
offer a counterexample to Hume. The key, as
Silliman suggests, is in the selection process.
Was this pure fact chosen for some interested
reason? No doubt it was, as a rational means
to secure the intended end a safe climb. I
reconstruct the fuller argument as follows:
A2
1. This rock is crumbly.
2. Crumbly rock is unsafe for climbing.
3. We want to be safe.
4. Therefore, we ought not to climb on this
rock.

of the conclusion is parasitic, not on any kind of

tacit normativity of the premises (there is
none), but on the unstated rationality of
choosing an effective means to ones desired
ends (something that is missing from, and the
source of the invalidity of, A2). That is, this is
not an instance of moral reasoning at all, but an
example of prudential reasoning from a
hypothetical desired end to an effective means
of securing that end: desiring, or valuing X, and
seeing Y as the best or only means of acquiring
X, I ought to do Y. If you want to be healthy,
you should eat your vegetables. If you want a
safe climb, and if you ought to do whatever
keeps you safe, then you should stay off those
rocks: if both A and B then C. The conclusion
has binding normative content only for those
who accept the italicized antecedent of the
conditional claim. And, once we do, we commit
ourselves to an explicitly normative premise.
Once again, Silliman has not been able to forge
a successful inferential bridge from is to ought.
A command or bit of prudential reasoning is not
an argument. A2, therefore, is either a
hypothetical imperative (you ought to do Y if
you want X) dressed up to look like an
inference, or an inference with an explicitly
normative premise. I began with the suggestion
that Sillimans arguments vacillate between
bridging and denying the importance of Humes
gap, and that neither approach held out much
promise. I hope to have shown that A1 and A2
and their extensions either assume, pace Hume,
an unbridgeable gap or substitute commands,
explanations, contextual applications, or a
notion of means-end rationality for arguments.
Given the axiological nature of the is-ought gap
when applied to logical derivations, Humes
problem is our problem, too.

Premise #2 links crumbliness with lack of

safety, and #3 introduces our desire to find a
safe place to climb. Note that all three premises
remain purely descriptive; in particular, #1
remains a pure fact, despite its role in making
the conclusion seem attractive. So, while no
tacit normativity infects the premise set, the
explicit normativity of the conclusion seems to
gather some kind of support from the purely
empirical premises. Have we, in A2, finally
discovered a viable is-ought bridge? Not at all.
As it stands, the inference is clearly invalid,
since none of the premises assert or
(individually or collectively) entail one ought
not to climb on the rock. The normative force

References
Guevara, D. (2008). Rebutting Formally Valid
Counterexamples to the Humean Is-Ought Dictum.
Synthese, 164, 1.
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Johnson, D. K. (1995). The Ought-Is Question:

Discovering the Modern in Postmodernism. Inquiry:
Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 14, 4.
Peirce, C. (1998). The Essential Peirce: Selected
Philosophical Writings, Volume 2. Peirce Edition
Project. Bloomington: Indiana University Press
Plutynsky, Anya. (2011). Four Problems of Abduction:
A Brief History. HOPOS: The Journal of the
International
Society for the History of Philosophy of
Science, 1
Prior, A. N. (1960). The Autonomy of Ethics.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 38.

ability plus
opportunity: If -ing is a
potential action of an agent, then the agent can
.
Thus:
(OIC) Obligations "correspond" to ability
plus opportunity: If an agent (S at a given
time t) has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation
to , then the agent (at that time) can (i.e.,
has both the ability and the opportunity to) .

David Kenneth Braden-Johnson teaches philosophy at

Vranas also does much good work in "clearing

the field", deftly undercutting several purported
grounds for attacking OIC - legal arguments
(199), psychological arguments about
obligations to feel (174), arguments based upon
natural-language confusions of the sense of
"ought" (178), exotic hypotheticals involving
moral luck (179), and arguments which fail to
realize that the grounds for rejecting OIC are
also grounds for rejecting the ought-implieslogically-possible principle (187).

MCLA

Must Ought Imply Can?

A Response to Vranas
Gerol Petruzella

Introduction
Is morality too demanding - "requiring us to do
things that we literally cannot do, things that go
beyond our abilities"? Peter Vranas finds this
claim "hard to swallow" (Vranas 197) and so
defends a version of the ought-implies-can
principle, OIC, against several objections,
including arguments based upon putative
counterexamples, as well as conceptual
arguments.
Vranas does excellent work in building
definitional clarity into his treatment of the
issue. He articulates OIC as synchronic and
time-indexed, since its elements (obligations,
abilities, opportunities) are, an analysis which
seems right to me. He offers a clear deductive
argument supporting OIC:

For all his rigor in defining and addressing the

problem, however, Vranas does not apply the
same standard of linguistic precision to a
crucial relation in his core argument "corresponding to". In his primary expression
of the argument (171-172), he appears to define
"correspondence" in terms of deductive
entailment (as expressed in if-then statements).
[Compare Plato's difficulty with metechein, to
partake of.] I believe this leads Vranas into
difficulties which his article leaves
unaddressed, and which leave the door open for
continued critique of OIC.
After identifying Vranas's argumentative flaw, I
will offer an argument against OIC which relies
on a simple, real-world counterexample, rather
than exotic thought experiment scenarios
involving brainwave monitors, morally
confused Nazis, superhuman typists, or
strangling canaries.

(P1) Obligations "correspond" to reasons

for action: If an agent has an obligation to ,
then the agent has a reason to .
(P2) Reasons for action "correspond" to
potential actions: If an agent has a reason to
, then -ing is a potential action of the agent.
(P3) Potential actions "correspond" to
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greater
than the scope of human potential.
(or, All A are P.)

Vranas's Error
By implicitly defining "corresponding to" as
logical entailment, Vranas necessarily commits
himself to the deductive consequences of his
premises as stated. Unfortunately, this
commitment makes his accounts of potential,
reasons for action, and ability too restrictive to
account for certain real-world counterexamples.

This seems plausible. Surely, it would be

nonsensical to claim that human acts could
somehow extend beyond humans' own
capacities.
We also presume that
(G2) The scope of moral responsibility
extends to at least some consequences of
human action. (or, Some C are R.)

Specifically, I want to take a closer look at

Vranas' (P2). Vranas himself recognizes this
premise as a likely locus of contention (173),
but believes that he has mustered sufficient
argumentative merit to defend it. I disagree.

That is, we can properly ascribe moral

responsibility to not only the immediate acts
which human agents perform, but also (in at
least some cases) to the consequences of those
acts, particularly when the agent acts
intentionally and with foreknowledge of those
consequences.

First, let's express (P2) formally for purposes of

clarity. The premise
(P2) Reasons for action "correspond" to
potential actions: If an agent has a reason to
, then -ing is a potential action of the agent.

Now, what is interesting about (G1) is that it is

false, or at least in need of clarification. Human
agents are in many cases capable of engineering
causal chains leveraging ordinary human
capacities or potentials to cause "superhuman"
effects. For example, I have the (ordinary
human) capacity to break a small glass vial by
dropping it to the pavement on a New York City
sidewalk; depending upon the contents of that
vial, my action (which, again, itself falls well
within the scope of ordinary human potential)
has the direct effect of killing billions of
humans, an effect which far exceeds ordinary
human potential, but for which nevertheless I
am morally responsible.

can be simplified to
If R, then P.
or
All R are P.
Of course, then, the logically equivalent forms
are equally true:
Contrapositive: All non-P are non-R.
Obverse: No R are non-P.
Some Moral Intuitions

(G2) prompts us to realize that it is not just that

I am morally responsible (and blameworthy) for
the act of dropping the vial; I am also morally
responsible for the consequent deaths of
billions, even though it is not within my human
potential to kill billions. We live in a world
where humans in the aggregate can act to cause

Now, let's consider two intuitions regarding

moral agency and human potential. A common,
though unstated, intuition may be that
(G1) The scope of human action is no
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tremendous, morally significant effects; but

given our technologies, such possibilities arise
not just in the aggregate, but for the individual
agent. The push of a button can launch a
nuclear firestorm; a computer keystroke can
disable communications networks for entire
nations; and so on. While human potential is
limited, we have the creative capacity to place
ourselves into causal relations with effects
which are effectively unlimited. At the very
least, any adequate account of moral
responsibility must be prepared to account
somehow for human moral responsibility for
effects which surpass human potential actions,
particularly when those actions are taken
intentionally and with foreknowledge of the
consequences.
Let's now compare these intuitions with
Vranas's (P2) and its logical consequences.
Again, (P2) states that "if an agent has a reason
to , then -ing is a potential action of the
agent," which we have expressed formally as
"All R are P." If we unpack the contrapositive
of this statement into natural language similar
to Vranas's, we see that Vranas is necessarily
also committed to the claim that

married by boarding an airplane elsewhere at

8:30am. To maintain his claim that OIC holds
true, Vranas claims that while it is "natural" to
say that the man is blameworthy for failing to
show up, strictly speaking, the man is not
blameworthy for violating his obligation to
show up, but rather for violating "the obligation
to avoid doing anything that would make him
fail to show up". This is a curiously convoluted
and ad hoc explanation of the involved
obligations.
In a similar vein, in 4.2.4 (182), Vranas bites
the bullet and accepts that OIC does entail that
people can sometimes get rid of unwanted
obligations, with the "compensatory"
understanding that, to make it more palatable,
there are "residual" obligations that
(necessarily?) arise. Such residual obligations
are such as to "make up for" the failure to meet
the earlier obligation, but within the newlyconstrained capacities of the agent - being
obliged to apologize for having not shown up
for the wedding.
In general, Vranas's attempt in 4.2 to account
for situations in which an agent becomes unable
to fulfill an obligation falls short of
completeness, as he acknowledges:

(P2-C) "If -ing is not a potential action of

an agent, then the agent does not have a reason
to ."

"Admittedly this does not establish that no

cases exist in which the obligation persists
after the inability sets in, but it does shift the
burden of proof to those who would insist that
such cases exist." (178)

How does this stack up with our earlier

discussion?
It seems that (P2-C) presumes some version of
(G1), that is, that there is some necessary
conceptual alignment between the scope of
potential action and the scope of human choicemaking.

I am happy to take up that burden. In the

following section, I describe a realistic case in
which a moral obligation persists after the
agent's inability sets in. I argue, therefore, that
since such a case does exist, it is an effective
counterexample to OIC.

Vranas's Responses to Agents Becoming

Incapacitated
In 4.2.2 (179), Vranas addresses the scenario in
which a man makes himself unable to fulfill a
moral obligation to be in Boston at 9am to get

The Drunken Pilot Scenario

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Aero Flight 311, also known as the Kvevlax

disaster, was a crash in 1961 which resulted in
the deaths of 25 people on board a domestic
passenger flight in Finland (Wikipedia).
Investigation found that the airplane had been
airworthy, but autopsies revealed that the
captain, Lars Hattinen, had a blood alcohol
content of 0.20, while his copilot Paavo Halme
had a blood alcohol content of 0.156. It is
reasonable to ascribe the crash, and deaths, to
the pilot's and co-pilot's intoxication.

At time T0, the beginning of the flight, the pilot

and copilot both have a moral obligation to fly
the airplane safely, and they both have the
ability to fulfill that obligation. However, at
time T1, about 6 hours into the flight, both the
pilot and the copilot decide to drink large
quantities of alcoholic beverages, such that they
are both physiologically impaired. The blood
alcohol content of both individuals exceeds
0.15; the CDC describes the predictable effects
of this level of BAC as "substantial impairment
in vehicle control, attention to driving task, and
in necessary visual and auditory information
processing"
(http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/impair
ed_driving/bac.html). Let us stipulate that the
physiological effects of the alcohol on both
pilot and copilot are the predictable effects.

Let us imagine a similar case - well within the

realm of realistic possibility6 - which allows us
to sharpen the focus of certain relevant features
to consider the moral implications of our
current discussion.
Cathay Pacific Airlines schedules a 15-hour
nonstop flight between San Francisco and Hong
Kong. The vast majority of the flight path is
over the open waters of the Pacific Ocean. The
pilot and copilot begin the flight as fully
qualified and competent moral agents, taking
off from San Francisco with a full passenger
manifest.

By time T2, about 7 hours into the flight, we

stipulate that the pilot and copilot have both
become physiologically unable to fulfill the
obligation to fly the airplane safely. The pilot
remains conscious but deeply impaired; the
copilot passes out. We further stipulate that no
other individual on board the airplane has any
greater ability to fly the airplane safely. We can
bring this about in any number of ways:
perhaps the passengers are all minors, or
physically or mentally disabled; or perhaps in
their drunken state the pilot and copilot have
locked themselves in the cockpit and broken the
lock mechanism. Feel free to fill in whatever
details you like. The plane carries sufficient
fuel to complete the flight under normal
circumstances; however, there is not sufficient
fuel to allow the pilot to stay in the air until he
can sober up.

6 See, e.g. the case of David Hans Arntson,

charged with flying two Alaska Airlines
flights under the influence of alcohol in
2014
(http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la
-me-ln-pilot-charged-drunkenly-flyingalaska-airlines-20160121-story.html); or the
as-yet unidentified American Airlines pilot
stopped on the tarmac from flying under
the influence of alcohol this year after
failing a Breathalyzer test
(http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/n
ationworld/midwest/ct-american-airlinespilot-arrested-breathalyzer-20160327story.html).

The Key Question

At time T2, does the pilot have a (current)
moral obligation to fly the airplane safely?
Vranas would say no, since ex hypothesi he no
longer has the ability to do so. He might say
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that he has some "residual" obligation instead.

But in this situation, what possible residual
obligation is available to perform? The ability
to land the plane safely is the same ability as
that necessary to fly the plane safely, and so the
pilot cannot "fall back" to an obligation to
perform an emergency landing. We have
stipulated ex hypothesi that no other available
moral agent can fly the plane any more safely,
and so he cannot have the obligation to "hand
over" the controls to a more capable individual.
To simply step out of the cockpit and leave the
plane on autopilot will, if anything, be more
likely to cause harm, and so this course of
action cannot be a residual moral obligation
unlike a drunk driver, the pilot cannot just stop
driving. Perhaps Vranas would maintain that
the only remaining moral obligation the pilot
owes to the passengers is to offer a heartfelt
apology.

One source of strangeness is perhaps that the

moral weight of obligations is mismatched
between the original obligation (which is to
preserve many peoples safety and keep them
from dying) and any possible compensatory
obligation which one might ascribe at T2
(which is, at most, to offer regret). Remember,
the pilot chose knowingly to incapacitate
himself from performing his obligation; no
compensatory obligation available to him at
T2 seems comparable in seriousness. He seems
to have traded down, releasing himself from a
serious moral obligation in exchange for
assuming a less onerous moral obligation.
A second source of strangeness is that the
morally relevant situation is ongoing not past,
and not time-limited; the situation persists, with
an odd emptiness where the relevant moral
agency used to be. In most ordinary
circumstances of moral agency, when agent A is
responsible for act R, our standard assumption
is that As agency is active so long as R is
ongoing, and so long as R is in effect, As
responsibility is also in effect. (If I am
responsible for stealing from my grandmothers
bank account, so long as the theft is ongoing,
my moral responsibility continues.) But even
when a situation continues in the sudden
absence of the original morally responsible
agent, we presume both that the moral agent
has ceased to exist, and the availability of some
moral agent to pick up the mantle of moral
responsibility: if a professor suffers a heart
attack and cannot continue teaching a course,
we presume that the college bears the
responsibility to the students to get the course
taught. The current scenario blocks both of
these avenues. We are not accustomed to a
morally significant circumstance persisting
beyond the agency of the agent who bears
moral responsibility for it.

Perhaps, following his strategy in dealing with

the wedding scenario, Vranas might claim that
while it is "natural" to say that the pilot is
blameworthy for failing to fly safely, strictly
speaking, he is not blameworthy for violating
his (past) obligation to fly safely, but rather for
violating "the obligation to avoid doing
anything that would make him fail to fly
safely". So perhaps, at T2, the pilot is morally
culpable for having failed to avoid making
himself incapable, but is not culpable for failing
to fly safely. How realistic is this workaround?
Lets assume that Vranas is correct, and that at
time T2, the pilot does not have a current moral
obligation to fly the airplane safely, because he
does not have the ability to do so. We have
stipulated that no other moral agent has the
ability to fly the airplane safely. Therefore, at
time T2, no one has a moral obligation to fly
the airplane safely. This seems prima facie
strange; but I would like to figure out why,
exactly.
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relevant moral consequence driverless.

Humans can take actions which have
consequences which are irreversible to us. This
is not a profound revelation; but we have
perhaps not fully appreciated its implications.
The key relevant implication: the consequences
of our actions often escape the boundaries of
our capabilities. And so if our moral
responsibilities are capped by the boundaries of
our capabilities, as OIC articulates, we must
bite the bullet and acknowledge that, contrary
to our G2 intuition above, our moral
responsibilities do not, in fact, always extend to
the consequences of our actions; and that we
can game the system of moral responsibility
itself, by causing situations for which we know
we cannot properly be held morally responsible
(hence blameworthy); situations in which we
will bear some lesser, compensatory moral
obligation, within our merely human capacities
to fulfil.

Note to Readers
Thesis XII: A Philosophical Review is published biannually as
an open forum promoting respectful philosophical exchanges
among students, faculty, alumni, and the public. Submissions
reflect a diversity of disciplinary perspectives, philosophical
approaches, and topics. Those new to the discipline are
especially encouraged to participate.

Address all correspondence to:

Dr. David K. Braden-Johnson, Editor

Thesis XII: A Philosophical Review
Department of Philosophy, IDS, and Modern Languages
Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts
North Adams, Massachusetts 01247

Many thanks to my colleagues David Braden-Johnson,

Paul Nnodim, and Matthew Silliman for their critical
feedback in this ongoing conversation.

Email: d.johnson@mcla.edu.

Associate Editor: Dr. Matthew R. Silliman

References

Email: m.silliman@mcla.edu

Vranas, Peter B. M. "I Ought, Therefore I Can."

Philosophical Studies 136.2 (2007): 167-216. Web.
Wikipedia contributors. "Aero Flight 311."
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. 25 Oct. 2015. Web.
5 May. 2016.

A third source of strangeness is that a persistent

and ongoing process of huge moral
consequence (life or death of individuals) can
be morally driverless. The pilot brought about
the morally significant consequence through his
action; but he cannot take any action which can
undo the consequence. In such a case, OIC
absolves him of the moral responsibility, and at
most, attempts to backfill our moral intuitions
with talk of compensatory obligations to
account for our intuitions of the pilots ongoing
blameworthiness. But this still leaves the core,

Gerol Petruzella is the Assistant Director of Academic

Technology and teaches philosophy at MCLA

Utilitarian Dilemmas in the Literature

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wilderness. 7 The scapegoat then was a goat

upon whose head the priest symbolically placed
the sins of the people before letting the animal
escape into the wilderness. This ritual was part
of the Hebrew ceremony of Yom Kippur or the
Day of Atonement.8

of Scapegoats
Paul Nnodim

The scapegoat problem

Im about to take issue with those critics of
classical utilitarianism who employ extreme
scapegoat scenarios to demonstrate inherent
weaknesses in the system. Since Im one of
those critics, it appears I might be, at least
tangentially, arguing against myself. But how
does one argue against oneself without
intentionally weakening ones proffered claims?
Obviously, in many instances, we do not freely
choose our beliefs, but are socially conditioned
to accept them. Our personal beliefs can be
predicated on prejudice, sweeping
generalizations, oversimplification, false
dilemmas, etc. Thus, it is hardly surprising to
see many of us struggle to grasp the idea behind
raising hypothetical objections to our
considered judgements of what is true,
plausible, or morally acceptable. But this is
what reflective thinking is all about. However,
my goal in this paper is not to celebrate the
power of self-criticism or self-denial, but
genuinely to take a closer look at the utilitarian
enterprise and to see if there are compelling
reasons for a rethink.

Critics of classical utilitarianism often find

unconventional allies among fiction and
nonfiction scapegoat writers. As wideranging as these storytellers may be in style and
scope, they share one thing in common: Their
stories are disconcerting, gruesome, and to the
joy of their philosophical appropriators, antiutilitarian.
Classical utilitarianism
Classical utilitarianism is the principle of the
greatest happiness or good for the greatest
number. Thus, it is an aggregate-maximizing,
hedonistic, and consequentialist ethics, since it
teaches that the end of human conduct is
happiness and the discriminating norms for
distinguishing a right behavior from a wrong
one are pleasure and pain. Jeremy Bentham
(1748 1832) was perhaps the earliest scholar
to articulate the principles of the doctrine in a
more systematic and coherent manner.
Utilitarianism as a form of ethics does capture
the imagination of rational individuals. It only
says we all ought to be happy by seeking and
maximizing the pleasurable while minimizing
the un-pleasurable or the painful. According to
Rawls, It is natural to think that rationality is
maximizing something and in morals it must be
the good. Indeed, it is tempting to suppose that
it is self-evident that things should be arranged
so as to lead to the most good. 9 Critics of the
system, however, argue that utilitarianism could

The term scapegoat possibly has its origin in

the Hebrew word -( Azazel) found in the
Pentateuch. The original meaning of Azazel is
hard to figure out, but Im willing to accept, if
only momentarily, William Tyndales 1530
translation of the Hebrew Bible. There, he
seems to break the term into ez (the goat) and
azel (that escapes), hence, the [e]scapegoat:
And Aaron shall bring the goat upon which
the Lords lot fell and offer him for a sin
offering. But the goat on which the lot fell to
escape, he shall set alive before the Lord to
reconcile with and to let him go free into the

7 Leviticus, Ch.16, Tyndales Old Testament,

1992, 172. Yale University Press; Modern
Spelling ed edition.
8http://www.johnpratt.com/items/docs/lds/meri
dian/2009/scapegoat.html#fn2
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permit gross inequalities if such acts produce

the best consequences for the majority of the
people. Some of these detractors cite fictional
works, such as Ursula Le Guins The Ones
Who Walked Away from Omelas, Edgar Allan
Poes The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of
Nantucket or a real-life story, such as the
Mignonette,10 to illustrate the utilitarian
jeopardy. Here are synopses of the stories.

antipathy or any roiling of conscience. If we

release the child from the cellar, they reason,
she is already too degraded to know any real
joy. She has been afraid for too long and would
not rid herself of fear. Other times, a few,
sensible residents would visit the child and
choose not to return home. They would walk
through the main street of the city, pass the city
gate, and head silently to some unknown place.
Each one goes alone, youth or girl, man or
woman. They leave Omelas, they walk ahead
into the darkness, and they do not come back.11
Since classical utilitarianism seeks to maximize
the aggregate utility (pleasure) of the largest
number of people, it would seem morally
permissible to abuse the rights of one innocent
child, the scapegoat, for the greater happiness
of the many.

Omelas
In Le Guins story, for example, Omelas
(Salem, Oregon written backwards) is an
exhilarating, quixotic, and idyllic utopian city: a
place distinguished by its grandeur, magnificent
buildings, and fairytale-like summer festivities.
At the first glance, everything seems to work
perfectly well in this city. The inhabitants are
happy-go-lucky, wealthy, and affable. However,
a closer look at Omelas reveals an odious
incongruity. In the cellar of one of its buildings
lives a malnourished, neglected, and griefstricken child. This child used to scream for
help, but now only whines, her voice apparently
muffled by fatigue and despair. The child sleeps
on her excrement and the sores all over her
body have become septic. The cellar where they
keep the unfortunate child is as malodorous as a
fetid pile of garbage. People know about the
existence of the woebegone child, but no one
dares to help her; otherwise, as they believe,
their good fortunes go with the wind.
Sometimes, a group of Omelas residents would
visit the gruesome cellar to inform themselves
about the childs fate. Initially, they would feel
some disgust. But as time passes by, they adopt
evasive stances to dampen any feelings of

A Tale of Two Richards

In Edgar Allan Poes 1838 novel, The Narrative
of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket, the crew
of a ship called Grampus find themselves cast
away and starving to death. In order to survive,
they would have to kill one of their members,
eat his flesh and drink his blood. They cast a lot
and it falls on Richard Parker, a former
mutineer. They quickly slaughter him and the
rest of the crew feeds on his body until rescue
comes.
In what appears to be one of the most bizarre
coincidences in literature, 46 years later and
more than three decades after the death of Poe,
a cabin boy, also named Richard Parker,
became a victim of castaway cannibalism. But
this time, the story is real. In 1884, an English
ship called the Mignonette sank in the South
Atlantic, possibly en route to Australia. Its four
Englishman crew survived treacherous days
and nights at sea on a lifeboat. Within a couple
of days, their meager rations ran out and they

9 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford:

Oxford University Press 1971, 24-25.
10 Both stories also can be found in Michael
Sandels Justice: Whats The Right Thing To
Do? New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
2009, 31-35, 40-41. See also The Illustrated
London News, September 20, 1884

11 Ursula K. LeGuin, The Winds Twelve

Quarters, New York: Perennial, 2004, 283-284.
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were starving to death. Now, the cabin boy,

Richard Parker who was an orphan had fallen
ill. The other crewmen conspired against poor
Richard, murdered him, ate his flesh, and drank
his blood. As they crew was anticipating whom
next to kill for food, a passing boat found and
rescued them. Upon their return to England, the
men went on trial for murder. Two of them
served minor sentences, while one even walked
away free.12 As Sandel notes, the strongest
argument for the defense was a utilitarian one:
given the dire circumstances, it was
necessary to kill one person in order to save
three. Had no one been killed and eaten, all four
would likely have died. Parker weakened and
ill, was the logical candidate, since he would
soon have died anyway. he had no
dependents. His death deprived no one of
support and left no grieving wife or children.13

defend itself successfully against such critics,

since their goal is to show in whatever way
possible that the normative standpoint of
utilitarianism is unsound. However, if we were
to see classical utilitarianism as an applied
ethical practice, then marginal cases would
constitute weak analogies against it. While the
main thrust of normative ethics is to explore, in
general, what moral lives we ought to live,
applied ethics concerns itself with the particular
instantiations of those oughts. We, the critics,
tend to ignore this distinction.
Notes
(1) Stolnitz, Jerome. "On the Origins of "Aesthetic
Disinterestedness"" The Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism 20.2 (1961): 131-43. JSTOR. Web. 12 Sept.
2013.
(2) Zangwill, Nick. "Aesthetic Judgment." Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University, 28 Feb.
2003. Web. 12
Sept. 2013.
(3) Slater, Barry H. "Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy." Aesthetics. N.p., 25 July 2005. Web. 12
Sept.
2013.

Conclusion
The central idea of these stories is founded on a
certain supposition. If we were offered a world
in which the majority is kept enduringly happy
on the condition that they deny some innocent
citizens their inalienable rights, would it not be
an offensive conduct? Critics of classical
utilitarianism draw on such extreme
suppositions to chide the system. But wouldnt
it be clear to most rational and moral agents,
including utilitarians themselves, that torturing
an innocent child or eating a sick cabin boy to
maximize the aggregate pleasure of other
people is a bad idea? As a normative ethical
principle, classical utilitarianism may not

Paul Nnodim teaches philosophy at MCLA

Reasoning and Intelligence

Brett Belcastro

Sentience and other measurements of sufficient

intellectual complexity are the essential
foundations for a criteria of moral status (1).
This challenges ethicists to define the
observable empirical conditions of sentience,
the most important of which is a demonstrable
intelligence. But the identification of
intelligence relies on the distinction between
entities which are capable of reasoning and
those that are not, and if reasoning is
synonymous with logic, then the distinction
becomes impossible and the project of
sentience fails before it can even begin.

12 See Michael Sandel 2009, 31-33, as well as

Edgar Allan Poe, The Narrative of Arthur
Gordon Pym of Nantucket Wiley and Putnam
(1838), and the following link:
http://mentalfloss.com/article/30093/edgarallan-poes-eerie-richard-parker-coincidence.
13 Michael Sandels Justice: Whats The Right
Thing To Do? New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2009, 32.

Traditional definitions of logic often conflate it

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with reasoning and inference, as when Patrick

Hurley defines logic as the organized body of
knowledge, or science, that evaluates
arguments. (2) If an inference represents the
movement from premises to conclusion, then it
appears possible to provide a comprehensive
definition of argumentation without reference
to reasoning at all.

computers normative value than that they are

inorganic, then the question of personhood
obtains to digital constructs. Parsons' and
Harman's definition of reasoning therefore has
a direct implication on the conditions of
sentience and opens the possibility of an ethics
which must take an artificial intelligence
seriously.
Notes

Is it necessary that an intelligence is also a

reasoning agent? A pocket calculator follows a
system of logic, arranges electrical signals to
model a set of beliefs, and makes inferences to
produce the output of its equations; what is to
stop an observer from saying that the calculator
is properly intelligent, and on those grounds to
consider it for moral status?

Silliman, Matthew R. Sentience and Sensibility. Las

Vegas: Parmenides, 2006.
Hurley, Patrick J. A Concise Introduction to Logic.
Belmont:
Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2006.
(3) Parsons, Terence. What Is an Argument? The
Journal of Philosophy 1996: 93.4 164-185.
(4) Harman, Gilbert. Practical Reasoning. The Review
of Metaphysics 1976: 29.3 431-463.
(5) Dreyfus, Hubert L. What Computers Still Can't Do.
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994.

Logicians such as Terence Parsons describe

reasoning structures, (3) spaces within which
inferences occur. This structure follows the
evolution of inferences from one to the next
like the points that form a geometric line. For
Parsons, reasoning is the series of relationships
which inferences have to each other, and at all
times a reasoning agent is located at some point
on the line of inference. This is similar to
Gilbert Harman's assertion that reasoning is
the process of modifying antecedent beliefs
and intentions. (4) A pocket calculator, though
capable of using inferences to produce output,
is not capable of cognizing its inferences, only
of repeating them: 2 + 2 = 4 + 2 = 6 + 2 = 8

Brett Belcastro is a student at MCLA

On the Formulation of Successful Ad

Baculum Arguments
Matt Luz

Hurley explains that ad baculum arguments

occur whenever an arguer poses a conclusion
to another person and tells that person
implicitly or explicitly that some harm will
come to them if he or she does not accept the
conclusion.14 I agree with most of Hurleys
definition, except that the arguer does not state
a conclusion. Instead of stating a conclusion,
the arguer uses a threat to coerce the audience
into engaging in the behavior suggested by the
arguer.

An implication of Parsons' criteria is that a

more sophisticated calculator could occupy the
line of inference. The distinction is between a
calculator which only accepts input and one
which possesses a project, which recognizes its
inferences as steps in a wider sequence towards
the achievement of a valuable end. A computer
which is capable of programming itself (5), and
thereby demonstrating its agency and project,
closes the gap between itself and entities with
moral status. If there is no better reason to deny

The audiences response to the threat is based

on various factors, which include: (i) the
arguers use of insufficient evidence, (ii) the
credibility of the threat, (iii) the proximity of
14 Hurley, P. J. Concise Introduction to
Logic. 9th Edition. Cengage Learning. Print.
113.
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danger, and (iv) the ability to easily avoid harm.

The arguers goal through the use of ad
baculum arguments is to convince the audience
to engage in the behavior suggested by the
arguer. I argue that these four components are
necessary conditions for structuring a
successful ad baculum argument.

others. It also shows to be more compelling

when the insufficient evidence provided in the
case is strong. This provides the audience with
a stronger inclination toward the likelihood of
the unwanted consequence actually occurring.
The American Psychological Association
defines fear as a rational reaction to an
objectively identified external danger that may
induce a person to flee or attack in selfdefense.18 Based on this definition, I would
like to address the concept of danger with the
same concepts in this definition, for one fears
the possibility of danger. Danger necessarily
involves perceived outcomes based on rational
behavioral-reactions, proximity to the audience,
and the degree to which one would engage in
self-defensive strategies to avoid it.

Insufficient evidence provides a claim, which

implements an emotional appeal, and is
constructed by the arguer in order to manipulate
the audiences behavior. The arguer uses
insufficient evidence when they cannot provide
a logical reason as to why the audience should
comply with what they want, and so the arguer
will use insufficient evidence to convince the
audience not to behave as the arguer wants
them to.15 In other words, insufficient evidence
is used to support poor reasoning. In ad
baculum arguments, the insufficient evidence
appeals to fear. If the arguer is to say, If you
tell the boss I missed work yesterday, I will lose
my job. Furthermore, my family will go
hungry, it would qualify as an appeal to pity.16
This is another form of insufficient evidence
because it involves appealing to emotions.
Instead of appealing to fear, it appeals to guilt.17

The presence of danger poses a threat to selfsustainment and/or some part to existence, or
existence as a whole. Danger is the threat
operating on the threat and they are dependent
on perception and emotional reactions. Pfau
references Aristotles claim that emotions are
permeated by reason in his essay.19 If one
experiences an event where danger is proximal,
chances are that they would not wish to
experience that same event again, for when one
faces the possibility of danger, one perceives it
as a threat and experiences psychological
discomfort. When talking about danger and its
influence on the audience, it is important to

If ad baculum arguments are to be successful,

they must appeal emotionally to the audience
by delivering a threat. For threats to be
effective, they must identify with psychological
discomfort and an unwanted outcome against
the interest of the audience. The threat presents
the audience with a choice, to either engage or
not engage in the behavior the arguer wants
them to. This decision to comply with the
arguers request is based on the credibility of
the threat. Force is a necessary component in
delivering an effective and appealing threat; its
proper use makes some threats stronger than

18 American Psychological Association

Glossary of Psychological Terms. APA.
APA, 2002. Web. 27 March 2016:
http://www.apa.org/research/action/glo
ssary
19 Pfau, M. W. Whos Afraid of Fear
Appeals? Contingency, Courage, and
Deliberation in Rhetorical Theory and
Practice. Philosophy & Rhetoric 40.2
(2007): 216-237.

15 Childress, J. F. Appeals to Conscience.

Ethics 89.4 (1979).
16 See note 1: 114.
17 See note 1: 114.
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May, 2016 Vol. 22 No. 1

identify what I am talking about. I refer to this

object which presents danger as the fear-object.
Fear-objects introduce danger to the audience.
These fear-object are anything (events, persons,
etc.) which the audience perceives to be
dangerous. When the audience is confronted
with danger, one tailors their behaviors in order
to avoid presupposed consequences which the
danger underscores.

The hills pass by in radiant dress.

The Indian Summer sun
Bejewels the softened contours of these friends.
Their scattered oranges
Set the darkened greens to rest.
Their yellow greens lay open doors;
They beckon as we past.
We stop a while for track repairs.
A moving freight
For minutes draws a horizontal line
And sets afloat those colored invitations.
The gentle shoreline soon returns
And natures softness quickens as we move.

Harm is the permanent loss of some aspect of

ones existence, whether it is bodily functioning
or the continuation of a positive experience
significant to ones existence. From this, harm
appears to always, in every case, allude to an
unwanted consequence. Harm is something I
believe one will tailor any actions towards
eliminating the thought of, and in doing so is
behaving rationally. Wittes research indicated
that fear appeals can be effective, but only
under two conditions: (1) the threat must be
credible, so that the respondent takes it as a real
danger to him or her, and (2) the action
recommended to deter the threat must be
perceived by the respondent as feasible and
easy to carry out.20

But West Point squares the shoreline meant for

trees,
For gentle lines and natural grace.
Its flat, wide walls and perfect angles
Drive the concrete down and up
And back and forth on every side.
No graceful rooting here;
No going where the goings good
For self-fulfillment.
No luck personal growth
From soil enriched by fruits of former years,
By moving toward the sun, or toward the water,
Or toward the other good we need to save our
lives.
No. Here the concrete buttresses against attack
Stake out the boundaries of the world:
The place the flags unfurled.
These are not the Palisades,
The natural comfort of the river guest.
These are not the stolen parks
That structure evening trysts
For timid wanderers.

When the audience sees that the fear is both

relevant to them and also harm is easy to avoid,
they are more likely to comply with the arguer.
In this moment, the arguer is either victorious
or fails in convincing the audience of their
argument. If the ad baculum argument is
successful, the audience will comply with the
arguer.
Matt Luz is a student at MCLA

No.--This is the call to arms!

The definition of the enemy
Just outside the walls.
This is protection from the man-made!
But who or what protects from the protection?
These golden, gorgeous hills

Friends
J. Stanley Yake

20 Walton, D. N. Practical Reasoning and

the Structure of Fear Appeal Arguments.
Philosophy & Rhetoric 29.4 (1996): 304.
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May, 2016 Vol. 22 No. 1

It covers oer the reckless growth of shoots,

Protects from definitions strife.

Invite the strangers in,

Provide some warmth to passers by
And sustenance to rooted trees.
What warmth could come from definitions?
What strength when social roots are sheared
By concrete slabs,
When flags exclude and push away?

Ill take these shaded, green and golden hills,

These Palisades, this flowing rivers open
doors.
Ill take the invitation every time.
Ill take the splendor in the grass,
The Wordsworth joy at natures call.
Ill move with strangers through the pass,
And live with them outside the wall.

The Indian Summer sun

Bejewels our social roots
With colored warmth and synergistic life.

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