Beruflich Dokumente
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LEGAL ETHICS
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
LETICIA A. ARIENDA vs. EVELYN A. MONILLA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 4, LEGAZPI CITY
A.M. No. P112980, June 10, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Respondent Court Stenographer Monilla prepared an extra judicial settlement of estate for the
complainant Arienda and her siblings. In ruling that the respondent is guilty of simple misconduct, the
Supreme Court held that the preparation of an extrajudicial settlement of estate constitutes practice
of law as defined in Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 (1991) to wit: Practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experience.
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint for conduct unbecoming a court employee and abuse of
authority filed by complainant Leticia A. Arienda against respondent Evelyn A. Monilla, Court
Stenographer III of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4 of Legazpi City. In her lettercomplaint
dated October 8, 2008, complainant alleged that respondent and Atty. Zaldy Monilla, respondents
husband (together referred to as the spouses Monilla), went to complainants house on January 13,
2002 and offered their services in settling the estate of complainants deceased mother. According
to the spouses Monilla, they would prepare an extrajudicial settlement for complainant and the
latters siblings, while respondents brother, Engineer Matias A. Arquero, would conduct the survey
of the estate.
In her comment dated May 23, 2009, respondent denied that it was she and her husband
who offered complainant their services in settling the estate of complainants deceased mother.
According to the respondent, complainant and her siblings, already wishing to partition their
deceased parents estate out of court, pleaded that respondent prepare an extrajudicial settlement.
Respondent declined to get involved at first because complainant and her siblings were
represented by a lawyer in the partition case before the RTC, but complainant and her siblings said
that they had no more money to pay for the continued services of their lawyer. Because of this,
respondent prepared and finalized the extrajudicial settlement and handed the said document to
complainant and her siblings.
In a Resolution dated June 23, 2010, the Court referred the instant administrative matter to
Vice Executive Judge Pedro R. Soriao (Investigating Judge Soriao) of RTC, Branch 5 of Legazpi City,
for investigation, report, and recommendation. After evaluation of Investigating Judge Sariaos
report, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted to the Court its Memorandum dated
July 14, 2011, recommending that respondent be found guilty of simple misconduct.
Issues:
1. Whether respondent Monilla engaged in unlawful practice of law
2. Whether respondent Monilla is guilty of simple misconduct
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Issue:
Whether or not the acts of Respondent Moya II constituted grave misconduct.
Ruling:
Yes, the acts of Moya II amounts to grave misconduct.
Moya II was charged for having failed to pay his debts and for issuing worthless checks as
payment for his loan from Wong and the latters friends. He did not deny these allegations but he
contended that he committed neither a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility nor any
dishonesty, immoral or deceitful conduct because he never denied his debts and he was only unable
to pay them on time due to financial constraints.
In Lao vs. Medel, the Court expressed that the issuance of worthless checks by a lawyer
constituted violation of Canon 1 of the Code as such act amounts to gross misconduct. In Cuizon vs.
Macalinao, the issuance of checks which were later dishonored indicates a lawyers unfitness for
the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render him unworthy of public confidence. In Sanchez vs. Somoso, the persistent
refusal to settle due obligations despite demand manifests a lawyers low regard to his commitment
to the oath he has taken when he joined his peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of
the profession he should, instead, hold in high esteem.
Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the
same constitutes such wilful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public
confidence in the legal profession. He cannot justify his act of issuing worthless checks by his dire
financial condition. Moya II should have contracted debts which are beyond his financial capacity to
pay. If he suffered a reversal of fortune, he should have explained with particularity the
circumstances which cause his failure to meet his obligations. His generalized and unsubs-tantiated
allegations as to why he reneged in the payment of his debts promptly despite repeated demands
and sufficient time afforded him cannot withstand scrutiny.
Lastly, the Court finds unmeritorious the justification of Moya II as to his failure to
immediately deliver to Wong the payment made by Diwa for the satisfaction of a judgment. Moya
IIs failure to explain such delay cannot be excused by his likewise bare allegation that the same had
already been transmitted to Wong.
WALTER WILKIE vs. ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS
A.C. No. 7505, October 24, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The Court have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been
drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on
her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public
confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of
respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order. It
also manifests a lawyers low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her
peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem.
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Issue:
Whether or not the findings of the IBP Board of Governors, that Atty. Elayda was negligent
of his duties to his clients, is correct.
Ruling:
After a careful review of the records of the instant case, this Court finds no cogent reason to
deviate from the findings and the conclusion of the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Elayda was
negligent and unmindful of his sworn duties to his clients.
It is undisputed that Atty. Elayda did not act upon the RTC order submitting the spouses
Arandas case for decision. Thus, a judgment was rendered against the spouses Aranda for a sum of
money. Notice of said judgment was received by Atty. Elayda who again did not file any notice of
appeal or motion for reconsideration and thus, the judgment became final and executory. Atty.
Elayda did not also inform the spouses Aranda of the outcome of the case. The spouses Aranda
came to know of the adverse RTC judgment, which by then had already become final and executory,
only when a writ of execution was issued and subsequently implemented by the sheriff.
Evidently, Atty. Elayda was remiss in his duties and responsibilities as a member of the legal
profession. His conduct shows that he not only failed to exercise due diligence in handling his
clients case but in fact abandoned his clients cause. He proved himself unworthy of the trust
reposed on him by his helpless clients. Moreover, Atty. Elayda owes fealty, not only to his clients,
but also to the Court of which he is an officer.
On a final note, it must be stressed that whenever a lawyer accepts a case, it deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether or not it is for a
fee or free. Verily, in Santiago v. Fojas, the Court held:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He
must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters
cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of
his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that
nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an
attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects
the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar,
and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.
RE-ADMISSION TO THE BAR
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA vs. ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW
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iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
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Issue:
Whether Judge Ubiadas is guilty of gross inefficiency in the conduct of court business and
violations of existing SC circulars.
Ruling:
Judge Ubiadas is guilty of gross inefficiency in the conduct of court business and of
violations of existing SC circulars.
The Constitution provides that lower courts have three (3) months within which to decide
cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution. Moreover, the Code of Judicial Conduct
enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the required period.
In addition, this Court laid down guidelines in SC Administrative Circular No. 13 which
provides, inter alia, that judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII,
Section 15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted
in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from
date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of
three months to do so.
Judge Ubiadas failed to decide 15 cases and 33 motions which were beyond the
reglementary period to decide/resolve. Here were also other matters that were not acted upon. In
affirming the OCA recommended penalty, we took into consideration Judge Ubiadas health. We also
noted that his caseload then was1,300 more or less and that during his tenure, as in his letter, he
has done [his] best and in utmost good faith to serve the ends of justice and perform [his] duties as
a judge. However, previous administrative sanctions imposed upon him must likewise to given
appropriate weight. Aware of the caseload of judges, the Court has viewed with understanding
requests for extension made by judges. Hence, should a judge find himself unable to decide cases
within the 90-day period for doing so, he can ask for an extension of time for deciding the
same. Such requests are generally granted.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO, former Clerk of
Court LUIS C. BUCAYON II, Court Stenographers THELMA A. MANGILIT, CECILIO B. ARGAME,
MARICAR N. EUGENIO, and RADIGUNDA R. LAMAN and Interpreter PAUL M. RESURRECCION,
all of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, Muntinlupa City
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1952, December 24, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
As a trial judge, respondent is the visible representation of law and justice. Under Canon 1.01
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, she is expected to be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. Judges are expected to keep abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence. He
should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the
personification of justice and the Rule of Law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his
office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be gross ignorance of the law.
Facts:
A judicial audit was conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in all seven
(7) branches of the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City, including Branch 276 then presided by
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Prosecutor Visbal averred that he was never informed of the date of the promulgation and
that he was surprised to learn that respondent judge promulgated the decision in Criminal Case No.
2000-10-580 with Prosecutor Sabarre appearing in his behalf. The OCA found respondent judge
administratively liable for rendering a decision beyond the 90-day period in violation of Section 15,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Garrido rendered the decision beyond the 90-day period in violation
of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
Ruling:
Yes.
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case
within the reglementary period of 90 days, to wit:
(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the
Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates as follows:
Rule 3.05 A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods.
Indeed, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable
to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period
within which to decide cases is mandatory. The Court has consistently emphasized strict
observance of this rule in order to minimize the twin problems of congestion and delay that have
long plagued our courts. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives
the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case, for, not only does it magnify the cost of
seeking justice, it undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it to disrepute.
As readily gleaned from the records, the last pleading submitted i.e., the Memorandum for
the Prosecution, was filed on August 10, 2005. Thus, the case was deemed submitted for decision on
that date. Accordingly, the decision should have been rendered not later than November 8,
2005. However, respondent issued it only on December 12, 2005 which was more than four months
after the case had been submitted for decision.
Respondent did not proffer any tenable justification for the delay in rendering the
decision. He insisted that it was proper and procedural to first resolve the parties' memoranda
before the case may be considered submitted for decision. He, thus, would want the Court to
consider his Order dated September 13, 2005 resolving the memoranda of the parties and declaring
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Atty. Aguilar assumed her judicial position on February 8, 2006. She accomplished another
PDS for submission to the Supreme Court on March 6, 2006. In the said PDS, she denied having been
formally charged, guilty of any administrative offense and convicted of any crime or violation of any
law, decree, ordinance or regulation by any court or tribunal.
On March 6, 2006, the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) received Ligayas undated letter,
bringing to the attention of said office two criminal cases still pending against Judge Aguilar. Then
Chief Justice Panganiban endorsed Ligayas letter to the JBC. Upon the recommendation of
succeeding Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao, the administrative matter was referred to the
Court of Appeals.
Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores submitted her report, finding Judge Aguilar guilty of
dishonesty. She further recommended that the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of
all benefits except earned leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. On May 6, 2009, the
OCA, concurred with the findings of Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Aguilar is guilty of dishonesty
Ruling:
Yes. The Court agrees with the reports of the OCA and Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores
adjudging Judge Aguilar guilty of dishonesty in filling out her PDS, but modifies the recommended
penalty of dismissal to suspension of six (6) months given the attendant circumstances.
The accomplishment of the PDS is a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and
Regulations for employment in the government. Since truthful completion of PDS is a requirement
for employment in the Judiciary, the importance of answering the same with candor need not be
gainsaid.
Judge Aguilars failure to disclose OMB-L-A-03-0718-G in her PDS filed upon her
assumption of office when she already had notice of the adverse decision therein constitutes
dishonesty, considered a grave offense under the Administrative Code of 1987, as well as the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Civil Service Rules), with the
corresponding penalty of dismissal from service even for the first offense.
Nonetheless, Rule IV, Section 53 of the Civil Service Rules also provides that in the
determination of the penalties to be imposed, extenuating, mitigating, aggravating or alternative
circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be considered. Among the
circumstances that may be allowed to modify the penalty are (1) length of service in the
government, (2) good faith, and (3) other analogous circumstances.
Drawing on the same compassion displayed by the Court in the foregoing catena of cases,
the Court should take into consideration the following mitigating circumstances existent in the case
at bar:
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Issue:
Whether or not the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was sufficiently proven by
substantial evidence.
Ruling:
Indeed, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office
of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. In administrative and
quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or
against a party.
The well-established doctrine of due process in administrative proceedings as follows:
In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the
person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements
of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.
Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal
principles: (1) the respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and
submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial
evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the
tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and
must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in
such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved.
In the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not complied with. Reyes was
not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the bases of
petitioners decision that found him guilty of grave misconduct. While Pealoza acknowledged in his
counter-affidavit his participation in the illicit transaction complained of, he pointed to Reyes as the
main culprit. Pealoza thereafter submitted the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza as witnesses
who would substantiate his accusations. However, the records reveal that only the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao and Acero were furnished copies of the said affidavits. Thus, Reyes was able
to respond only to the affidavit of Acero. It would appear that Reyes had no idea that Pealoza, a corespondent in the administrative case, would point an accusing finger at him and even supply the
inculpatory evidence to prove his guilt. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes was
furnished with, or had otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of Pealoza, Amper and
Valdehueza, whether before or after the Decision dated September 24, 2001 was issued. Thus, it
cannot be said that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the
accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto.
It is true that, in the past, this Court has held that the right to due process of a respondent in
an administrative case was not violated if he was able to file a motion for reconsideration to refute
the evidence against him. In the instant case, petitioner plainly disregarded Reyes protestations
without giving him a similar opportunity, to be belatedly furnished copies of the affidavits
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Issue:
Whether or not Benedictos is guilty of dishonesty for falsifying her DTRs/Bundy cards.
Ruling:
Yes, Benedictos is guilty of dishonesty.
Benedictos silence on a principal charge against her is admission, especially considering
that she was given ample opportunity to deny the same. Benedictos refusal to face the charges
against her head-on is contrary to the principle in criminal law that the first impulse of an innocent
person, when accused of wrongdoing, is to express his or her innocence at the first opportune time.
Moreover, as a result of its own analytical study of the evidence on record, the Court is convinced
that Atty. Ortegas signatures appearing on Benedictoss bundy cards for August and October 2004
were indeed forged. The marked differences between Atty. Ortegas purported signatures on
Benedictoss bundy cards for August and October 2004, on one hand, and Atty. Ortegas admitted
genuine signatures on Benedictoss bundy cards for September and November 2004, on the other,
are easily discernible even to the naked eye.
In determining the appropriate penalty, the Court deems Benedictos falsification of her
bundy cards tantamount to dishonesty. However, in several administrative cases, the Court
refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. There were
several cases, particularly involving dishonesty, in which the Court meted a penalty lower than
dismissal because of the existence of mitigating circumstances.
In the case at bar, this is Benedictoss first administrative case in her 19 years in government
service, for which six months suspension is already sufficient penalty. The Court bears in mind
Benedictos failure to submit her comment, which constitutes clear and willful disrespect, not just
for the OCA, but also for the Court, which exercises direct administrative supervision over trial
court officers and employees through the former. In fact, it can be said that Benedictoss noncompliance with the OCA directives is tantamount to insubordination to the Court itself. Benedictos
also directly demonstrated her disrespect to the Court by ignoring its Resolutions.
A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, and should be
complied with promptly and completely. Benedictoss insolence is further aggravated by the fact
that she is an employee of the Judiciary, who, more than an ordinary citizen, should be aware of her
duty to obey the orders and processes of the Supreme Court without delay. For her non-compliance
with the show cause order and nonpayment of the fine imposed upon her in the Supreme Court
Resolutions, Benedictos is ordered to pay an additional fine of P2,000.00, in addition to the original
fine of P1,000.00.
RE: REPORT ON FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED AT MCTC, SANTIAGO-SAN ESTEBAN, ILOCOS
SUR
A.M. No. P-11-2950, January 17, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
"A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, [and] should be
complied with promptly and completely." Such "failure to comply betrays not only a recalcitrant
streak in character, but also a disrespect for the Courts lawful order and directive." Furthermore, this
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1. Whether or not Judge Bayona is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law,
gross misconduct and violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 12 dated June 30, 1987
for requiring the Office of the City Prosecutor to submit the Jarder Resolution to the
court despite the reversal thereof.
2. Whether or not City Prosecutor should be disbarred.
Ruling:
1. No.
One of the guidelines for the documentation of a resolution by an investigating prosecutor,
who after conducting preliminary investigation, finds no probable cause and recommends a
dismissal of the criminal complaint is that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, the
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1. Whether or not Valente is liable for neglect of duty, for her failure to furnish a copy of
the notice of hearing to Panaligan,
2. Whether or not Valente is liable for dishonesty, for relaying to Judge Barte that she
personally gave a copy of the notice of hearing to Panaligan.
Ruling:
1. Yes.
The Court takes note of Panaligans consistent statement that she did not receive any notice
setting Civil Case No. 2-P for hearing. Court personnel confirmed that no notice of hearing was
served upon the parties in Civil Case No. 2-P. Court records are also totally bereft of any proof of
service upon and receipt by Panaligan of such a notice. In contrast, the Court is faced with Valentes
bare allegation that she was able to personally give a copy of the notice of hearing to Panaligan
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Moreover, records show that complainant did file an appeal before the Court of Appeals.
Said appeal, is still pending before the appellate court. An administrative complaint against a judge
cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by his
erroneous order or judgment. Administrative remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to
judicial review where such review is available to aggrieved parties and the same has not yet been
resolved with finality. For until there is a final declaration by the appellate court that the challenged
order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether respondent
judge is administratively liable.
2. Judge Sario can be held guilty for unreasonable delay.
However, evidence on record satisfactorily establish respondents guilt for undue delay in
resolving Civil Case No. CEB27778 and in acting upon complainants Notice of Appeal.
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with the
lower courts must be decided or resolved within three months from the date they are submitted for
decision or resolution.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or
certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless
delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules
are regarded as mandatory. Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to promptly act upon cases and
matters pending before their courts. Canon 6, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary dictates that judges shall perform all duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. Administrative Circular No. 1 dated
January 28, 1988 once more enjoins all magistrates to observe scrupulously the periods prescribed
in Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution, and to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory
matters pending before their courts.
Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and
responsibility that his position requires. Complainant had already submitted his Memorandum in
Civil Case No. CEB27778 on November 11, 2008, yet, respondent rendered a decision in the case
only on December 28, 2009. Indeed, respondent failed to decide Civil Case No. CEB27778 within the
three-month period mandated by the Constitution for lower courts to decide or resolve cases.
Records do not show that respondent made any previous attempt to report and request for
extension of time to resolve Civil Case No. CEB27778. Respondent, without providing a reasonable
explanation for the delay, is deemed to have admitted the same.
As if to rub salt into complainants wound, it took RTC Branch 20 of Cebu City, presided over
by respondent, 10 months to approve and act upon complainants Notice of Appeal. The Court is not
convinced by respondents excuse that his court was understaffed. Even with just one clerk of
record in charge of both civil and special proceedings cases, 10 months is an unreasonable length of
time for photocopying and preparing records for transmittal to the Court of Appeals. Judges, clerks
of court, and all other court employees share the same duty and obligation to dispense justice
promptly. They should strive to work together and mutually assist each other to achieve this goal.
But judges have the primary responsibility of maintaining the professional competence of their
staff. Judges should organize and supervise their court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient
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In the present case, the Court takes into account the afore-quoted survey of cases together
with the number of cases Judge Baluma failed to decide within the reglementary period (23 cases
upon his retirement) and the lack of effort on his part to proffer an explanation or express remorse
for his offense but considering as well that he is suffering from depression and that he has no prior
infraction, the Court finds that a fine of P20,000.00 is adequate.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. DESIDERIO W. MACUSI, JR., Sheriff IV,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Tabuk City, Kalinga
A.M. No. P-13-3105, September 11, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Sheriffs and their deputies are the frontline representatives of the justice system, and if,
through their lack of care and diligence in the implementation of judicial writs, they lose the trust
reposed on them, they inevitably diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary As such, the Court
will not tolerate or condone any conduct of judicial agents or employees which would tend to or
actually diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
Facts:
Criselda M. Paligan (Paligan) was the plaintiff in Civil Case entitled Ms. Criselda M. Paligan v.
Spouses Cornelio and Leonila Tabanganay, an action for collection of sum of money with damages,
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Tabuk City, Kalinga. In a letter dated July 23,
2009, addressed to the Presiding Judge, MTCC, Tabuk City, Kalinga, Paligan inquired as to the status
of the writ of execution issued on September 10, 2008 by the MTCC, since she had not received any
report or information whether the said writ had already been served. Paligan also furnished the
Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, of Tabuk City, Kalinga, a copy of her letter.
Judge Victor A. Dalanao (Dalanao), MTCC, Tabuk City, Kalinga, through a 1st Indorsement
dated July 29, 2009, referred Paligans letter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
appropriate action. Judge Dalanao reported that the writ of execution, issued on September 10,
2008, was received by the Office of the Provincial Sheriff on September 19, 2008. A return was
made on October 30, 2008 informing the court that the writ was returned unserved. Thereafter,
no other report on the writ was made. Judge Dalanao further observed that a lot of cases are
similarly situated, where not even a report has been submitted as prescribed by the Rules of Court.
In his letter dated November 16, 2009, Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr. (Macusi), Sheriff IV, RTC
Branch 25, Tabuk City, Kalinga, defended himself by calling attention to the fact that he was
appointed as Sheriff only in 2006, while some of the writs of execution in Judge Dalanaos inventory
of cases were issued as early as 1997. While admitting that in some cases, there were late reports
or no reports at all on the writs of execution, Macusi argued that the rule states that the Sheriff
must act with celerity and promptness when they are handed the Writs of Execution yet, the rule
also states that when party litigants, in whose favor the Writs, have been issued, frustrate the
efforts of the Sheriffs to implement those Writs, the latter are relieved from such duty and incur no
administrative liability therefor. Macusi additionally wrote that he did not report regularly despite
the presence of the rules since he relied on the dictates of practicality so as not to waste supplies.
Rules, accordingly are there to guide but they are not absolute, what matters is what one
accomplishes. Macusi then informed the OCA that he had been, in fact, sued before the courts
because of his accomplishments as a Sheriff. As for his failure to submit his estimate of expenses for
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Sheriffs and their deputies are the frontline representatives of the justice system, and if,
through their lack of care and diligence in the implementation of judicial writs, they lose the trust
reposed on them, they inevitably diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. It cannot be
overstressed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of
the personnel who work there, from the judge to the lowest employee. As such, the Court will not
tolerate or condone any conduct of judicial agents or employees which would tend to or actually
diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
Macusis prayer for dismissal of the present case for being moot is baseless. Macusis
constructive resignation from service through filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for the 2010
Local Elections does not render the case against him moot. Resignation is not a way out to evade
administrative liability when a court employee is facing administrative sanction.
HEIRS OF CELESTINO TEVES REPRESENTED BY PAUL JOHN TEVES ABAD ELSA C. AQUINO and
FELIMON E. FERNAN vs. AUGUSTO J. FELICIDARIO, SHERIFF IV, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF
COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA,
A.M. No. P-12-3089, November 13, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro
When a sheriff takes advantage of an erroneous increase of his parcel of land which was
unknown to the true owners by keeping silent on the error, securing a new title reflecting such
increase and afterwards destroying the boundary and improvements of the rightful owners, he is
guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the service, even if the act is not related to his official
functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his public office, the
corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or employee.
Facts:
The Heirs of Celestino Teves filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the Court
Administrator accusing Augusto Felicidario, Sheriff of RTC Manila, of grave misconduct, dishonesty
and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court. The Heirs alleged that they are the successorsin-interest of the late Celestino Teves to two parcels of land (Lots 263 and 264) distributed under
the Department of Agrarian Reform DAR) Resettlement Project. Lots 263 and 264 measured 965
square meters and 648 square meters, respectively, or 1,613 square meters combined. The late
Celestino Teves and complainants have been in possession of Lots 263 and 264 since 1960. Lots
263 and 264 are adjacent and contiguous to Lot 268, which has been occupied by Felicidario and
with an area of 838 square meters. In May 2003, upon the approval of a new subdivision plan, Lots
263 and 264 were clustered into one lot, designated as Lot 190; while Lot 268 was designated as
Lot 189.2 Under the same plan, the area of Lot 189 was erroneously increased from 838 square
meters to 941 square meters. Felicidario knew of this error but being dishonest, he concealed it
from the DAR. Respondent was eventually issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. M-01182 for
Lot 189, with a total area of 941 square meters. On the basis of OCT No. M-01182 Felicidario started
to unlawfully and forcibly acquire 117 square meters of complainants Lot 190 (disputed area) by
(a) altering and installing concrete boundaries; (b) destroying the riprap and cyclone wires which
served as boundary between Felicidarios Lot 189 and complainants Lot 190; (c) destroying the
comfort room, dirty kitchen, warehouse, and trees in the disputed area; and (d) constructing a
concrete fence with steel gate around Lot 189 and the disputed area. The Heirs were helpless in
preventing Felicidario from performing the aforementioned acts as he bragged that he is a Sheriff of
the RTC of Manila and threatened the Heirs with bodily harm.
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The Heirs had filed with the DAR a complaint against Felicidario, which ruled in their favor.
The DAR conducted an investigation and found that under the Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) based on the new survey in 2003, 117 square meters were erroneously added to
Felicidarios property, which belonged to the Heirs. The CLOA of the latter have not yet been issued
and the heirs were not aware of the changes until Felicidario destroyed the riprap and cyclone
wires which served as the boundary of the heirs.
Felicidario prayed for dismissal of the case as the acts subject thereof are not related with
his official actions as sheriff. The OCA recommended that Felicidario be found GUILTY of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and be SUSPENDED for three (3) months without pay.
Issue:
Should Felicidario be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and grave misconduct?
Ruling:
Felicidario is guilty of simple dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, but not of grave misconduct.
Dishonesty is "intentionally making a false statement on any material fact[;]" and "a
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray."
It is true that Felicidario did not have a hand in the re-survey conducted by the DAR in 2003
which resulted in the increased land area of his Lot 189. Nonetheless, his actuations thereafter
displayed his lack of honesty, fairness, and straightforwardness, not only with his neighbors, but
also with the concerned government agencies/officials.
The Heirs of Teves and Felicidario had been awarded and occupying their respective
properties under the DAR Resettlement Program since 1966, yet, Felicidario did not express
surprise and/or bafflement that the land area of his Lot 189 was significantly increased from 838
square meters to 941 square meters after the 2003 re-survey. Honesty, fairness, and
straightforwardness, as well as good faith and prudence, would have impelled Felicidario to bring
the matter to the attention of complainants and the DAR, and inquire and verify with the DAR his
entitlement to the increased land area, especially when he was well-aware that complainants had
been in possession of the disputed area, and had, in fact, introduced substantial improvements
thereon, for almost four decades. Instead, Felicidario, undeniably benefitting from the increased
land area of Lot 189, held his peace and already proceeded to secure a certificate of title in his name
for Lot 189, with a land area of 941 square meters. When Felicidario was finally issued OCT No. M01182, he invoked the same as justification for occupying the 117-square meter disputed area,
destroying the Heirs improvements thereon, and enclosing Lot 189 (inclusive of the disputed area)
within a concrete fence and steel gate.
Whether or not an error was indeed committed by the DAR officials during the 2003 resurvey, resulting in the increased land area of Lot 189, Felicidario evidently took advantage of
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However OCA later issued a memorandum of its findings and found that Judge Bustamante
had decided 33 out of the 35 cases for decision in his court. Of the 33 cases decided by Judge
Bustamante, 13 were still within the reglementary period while 20 were already beyond the
reglementary period. Of the 20 cases Judge Bustamante had decided beyond the reglementary
period, 10 were decided more than a year after their respective due dates (ranging from 1 year and
8 days to 4 years and 7 months beyond the due dates) and 10 were decided within a year after their
respective due dates (ranging from 5 days to 6 months beyond the due dates).
Judge Bustamante had also resolved 6 out of the 23 cases with pending incidents in his
court, all of which were resolved beyond their respective reglementary periods (ranging from 5
days to 3 years, 8 months, and 16 days after the due dates). As for the 17 other cases with pending
incidents in his court, Judge Bustamante reasoned that (a) the motions require further hearing (b)
there is a need to await the resolution of other cases pending before other courts and (c) oversight.
The OCA noted, though, that Judge Bustamante failed to submit any order setting the pending
incidents for hearing or holding in abeyance the resolution of the same until the related cases
before other courts have already been decided.
Unconvinced by Judge Bustamantes explanations/reasons for his delay in deciding cases
and resolving pending incidents, the OCA recommended that retired Judge Borromeo R.
Bustamantebe fined in the amount of P20,000 for gross inefficiency.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Bustamante is guilty of undue delay in rendering decisions and
resolutions pending amounting to gross inefficiency.
Ruling:
Yes. Judge Bustamante is guilty of undue delay in rendering decisions and resolutions
pending amounting to gross inefficiency.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a
member of the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a primary aim of the judiciary
so the ends of justice may not be compromised and the judiciary will be true to its commitment to
provide litigants their constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of their cases.
The Constitution, Code of Judicial Conduct, and jurisprudence consistently mandate that a
judge must decide cases within 90 days from submission. As the Court summed up in Re: Report on
the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Br. 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar, A judge is mandated to
render a decision not more than 90 days from the time a case is submitted for decision. Judges are
to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the period specified in the
Constitution, that is, 3 months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum. Failure to
observe said rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge,
absent sufficient justification for his noncompliance therewith.
Yes. The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA that respondent Sahi is administratively
liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties. The charge that
respondent Sahi was remiss in her duties as court interpreter has been duly proven. Not only do the
complainants corroborate one another, but the documentary evidence supports the charge. The
foregoing incidents demonstrate respondent Sahis indifference to her work and lack of effort to
improve despite already receiving unsatisfactory performance ratings for the first and second
semesters of 2008.
Respondent Sahis general denial carries little weight. As the preceding paragraphs will
show, there are specific charges against her, supported by documentary evidence, which she had
the opportunity to directly address and explain, but she merely glossed over. Her allegations that
complainant Judge Alano was merely retaliating against her after she filed an administrative case
against him; that the other complainants are mere stooges, subservient to complainant Judge Alano;
that Judge Alano had been pressuring employees to leave the court; and that complainant Judge
Alano gave her unsatisfactory performance rating because he did not like her from the very
beginning, are all uncorroborated and self-serving.
In contrast, complainants have adequately shown that respondent Sahis unsatisfactory
performance ratings were warranted in view of the error-filled output she had consistently
produced and her indifferent attitude towards her work. While it is true that respondent Sahi is
merely human and may commit mistakes, there is simply no excuse for making the same mistakes
repeatedly despite her superior constantly calling her attention to correct them. Granting that
respondent Sahi was not good at using computers in the beginning, she should have taken steps to
learn and hone her computer skills which were essential to her work.
As the Court pronounced in Judge Domingo-Regala v. Sultan:
No other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral
righteousness and uprightness from an employee than the judiciary. The conduct and
behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice,
from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Public officers must be accountable
to the people at all times and serve them with the utmost degree of responsibility and
efficiency. Any act which falls short of the exacting standards for public office, especially on
the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced.
It is the imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good
name and standing as a true temple of justice.