World Development, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp.

195-209, 1986
Printed in Great Britain

0305-750X/86 $3 .OO+ 0.00

0 1986 Pergamon Press Ltd

A Methodological
Analysis of Dependency
Theory: Explanation in Andre Gunder Frank
LAWRENCE H. SIMON and DAVID F. RUCCIO*
University of Notre Dame, Indiana
Summary.

-The
explanatory structure of Andre Gunder Franks version of dependency theory
is analyzed in terms of three forms of explanation:
structural,
functional.
and intentional.
Structural explanation is further analyzed in terms of a six-fold warrant that might serve as the
basis of an assessment of the success of any such explanation.
The nature and legitimacy of
functional explanation
is examined in reference to current philosophical debates. Finally. the
arguments of an important methodological critic of Frank. Robert Brenner. are discussed as a
means of further clarifying issues concerning the explanatory structure in Frank.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Methodological
considerations
cover a wide
range of topics: the nature and marshalling
of
evidence, analysis of techniques of measurement,
examination
of theoretical
assumptions,
the
constitution
of concepts
and formation
of
theories, and the nature of justification,
among
others. In general, methodological
investigations
concern all that an inquirer in a given area of
study does (and should do) to generate systematic and justifiable
explanations
and knowledge
claims appropriate
to the object domain under
investigation.
Given that there is no longer a
consensus among philosophers
and social scientists concerning
the nature and proper form of
explanation,
this issue is especially
important.
Thus, a critical assessment of the adequacy of a
theory requires that one clarify the nature of the
explanatory
claims put forward.
In this essay, we examine
the explanatory
structure
of the version of dependency
theory
(hereafter,
DT) developed
by Andre Gunder
Frank. As an important
school within development economics,
DT presents fertile ground for
methodological
study.
In its opposition
to
neoclassical
theory,
DT
represents
a
methodological
departure as well as a substantive
break from the dominant approach.
In part as a
consequence
of this opposition to the neoclassical
position, some theorists who work in DT have a
certain
degree
of
methodological
selfconsciousness.
This is apparent in debates among
the various positions that fall within the rough
boundaries of DT. Yet, since dependency
theor19s

ists are, understandably,

more concerned
with
developing
their substantive
positions than with
exploring
the methodological
implications
of
their approach,
methodological
issues have not
been adequately
explored.
We have chosen to look at the work of Frank
for several reasons. Frank is often credited with
formulating
the original version of DT. His
Capitalism
and Underdevelopment
in Latin
America, written in the early 1960s and published
in English in 1967, can be taken to be the opening
salvo in the debate over DT that continues to this
day. Franks writings are central to this debate.
Second, as mentioned
above, Frank has developed a theoretical
model that lends itself to
methodological
scrutiny, especially in regard to
questions of explanation.
Frank employs what we
take to be a rather complicated
explanatory
structure.
Yet there is no explicit discussion of
this matter in the literature. Third, many of the
different versions of DT employ more or less the
same modes of explanation.
Their methodological differences
have to do primarily with questions concerning
the adequacy of the particular
concepts used by different theorists. If that is the
case, then our analysis of Frank will have
implications
more far-reaching
than just for his
theoretical

position.

*We would like to thank Charles Wilber.

Vaughn
McKim,
Kenneth Jameson, and Rhoda Halperin
for
their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
The research on this article was supported in part by a
grant from the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal
Arts of the University of Notre Dame.

WORLD

1%

DEVELOPMENT

Our discussion proceeds as follows. In Section

2 we present a brief summary of Franks project
and his theoretical
model. We then turn to the
question of the forms of explanation
employed
by Frank. According to our analysis, Frank uses
three distinct modes of explanation:
structural
explanation,
functional
explanation,
and in a
more subsidiary
role, intentional
explanation.
Each of these modes of explanation
is analyzed,
respectively.
in Sections 3, 3, and 5. In Section 6
we discuss
Robert
Brenners
methodological
criticism of Frank. Brenner raises points relevant
to the issue of explanation
and by critically
examining his objections,
we help clarify not only
the nature of Franks methodology
but also
indicate a direction in which the methodological
debate should proceed.

2. FRANKS

THEORETICAL

MODEL

What is the explanatory

structure and force of
Franks theory? What forms of explanation
does
he utilize? In order to answer these questions,
it
is necessary to keep in mind the nature of his
project.
On the first level. of course,
Frank
presents his theory as a contribution
to development economics,
and as such, he wants it to be
seen alongside neoclassical theories. structuralist
theories, and traditional
Marxist theories, all of
which he interprets
as competitors
for the best
account of roughly the same phenomenon,
namely, the present condition
of the less-developed
nations. This presupposes,
of course, that there is
a shared object of investigation,
All of these
theoretical
approaches
can
perhaps agree on an initial specification
of their
object domains. But as soon as we press a little
further.
it becomes
clear that the different
theoretical
approaches
characterize
their objects
of study very differently.
They would, for instance, disagree as to which of the economic and
social conditions are relevant to the characterization of the general phenomenon
in question as
well as over how best to define and describe these
conditions.
What needs to be noted is that the
object of investigation
is not simply given to the
theory, but rather is constructed
largely in terms
of the theory used to explain it.j When this is
appreciated,
it becomes clear that the different
theoretical
approaches
can no longer be said to
be accounting for the sar?ze thirzg. Thus to be clear
as to what the explanatory
project of Frank is. we
have to be careful
to specify correctly
the
particular
object of his investigation.
In the Preface to Dependent Accumulation
and Underdevelopment.
Frank clearly states his
project: This book is an attempt to approach an

explanation
of underdevelopment
through the
analysis of the production and exchange relations
of dependence
within the world process of capital
accumulation
(Frank, 1979, p. xi). That is, the
object for which Frank is to provide an account is
something
called underdevelopment.
and his
account of underdevelopment
will center on the
notion of dependency.
Frank begins with a basic theoretical
concept,
underdevelopment.
Underdevelopment.
as
used by Frank.
picks out a condition
that
characterizes
the less-developed
countries today,
but it is not a condition
that is identical vvith
nondevelopment
in general. In particular, Frank
asserts that [t]he now developed countries were
never urrrlerdeveloped,
though they may have
been undeveloped
(Frank, 1969b, p. 4). It is
important to note that this starting point stands in
sharp contrast to that of neoclassical
theory.
Franks theory is best understood
in terms of a
model and is used to characterize
the nature of
the relations
between
developed
and underment. Dependency
is the key concept
in the
model and is used to characterize
the nature of
the relations
between
developed
and undcrdeveloped nations. These are relations of povvcr
and control. such that the course of development
in the underdeveloped
nations. or satellites.
as
Frank calls them, is determined
by that of the
developed
nations, or metropoles.
The metropoles exert their power via a chain of monopolistic and extractive exchanges. The consequence
of
these relations
for the satellite is that certain
problems, such as poverty and distorted development, are exacerbated,
and the satellite is further
disadvantaged.
Thus.
the central
thesis
of
Franks theory is that the structures
of depcndency cause underdevelopment.
The scope of Franks theoretical
model is the
world capitalist
system. Nation-states
arc the
primary units of this world system, but the system
extends down to encompass
structures
in the
remotest corners of the world. Capitalism
as
used by Frank, refers to a system of market
exchange
relations,
with production
oriented
towards exchange.
Since dependency
relations
are typical capitalist
relations
for Frank,
it
follows that capitalism is in the first instance a
system of power exercised through market exchange relations. This structure of power typifies
not only nation-nation
relations, but all capitalist
exchanges.
Thus. Franks theoretical
model can
be seen as a series of steps. each reiterating the
same relational structure. Although the relations
between nations may at first seem very different
from that between an owner of a latifundia and a
Frank
nonetheless
dependent
sharecropper,
maintains
that they share the same essential

A METHODOLOGICAL

ANALYSIS

structure.5
This claim indicates the theoretical
nature of Franks descriptions,
since it can only
be appreciated
by viewing
the relationships
through the lens of the appropriate
theory, i.e..
Franks.
What,
then, is the explanatory
nature
of
Franks project? In what sense does he explain
underdevelopment?
Frank is never very explicit
as to this aspect of his methodology.
According
to our analysis of his theory,
however,
he
employs three different forms of explanation
at
different points in his model. Thus, to be clear as
to the explanatory structure, we need to examine
each of these forms, structural,
functional,
and
intentional explanation,
and see how they fit into
Franks overall project.

3. STRUCTURAL

EXPLANATION

of
Franks
explanation
of
The
core
underdevelopment
consists of the construction
of
what he considers to be a plausible theoretical
model, the outline of which we have just presented. This model displays the mechanisms
by
which the condition that he ultimately wants to
account for, underdevelopment.
is generated.
The mode of explanation
is structural in that the
theoretical
model exhibits what are posited as
being the underlying
structures
(processes
and
relations) that causally produce the condition to
be
explained,
explanandum,
underthe
development.
With structural
explanation,
the explanatory
emphasis is on the causal mechanisms
or structures, not as in nomothetic
explanation,
on
empirical generalizations
or laws. Laws, or at
least high-level empirical generalizations,
may be
involved in or derivable
from the theoretical
models used, but they play a secondary role from
the point of view of explanation.
Explanatory
force is not acquired by subsuming a particular
under a properly
supported
nomic regularity,
thus demonstrating
the inevitability of the phenomenon in those conditions.
Rather, the explanatory brunt is borne by establishing
that there
were mechanisms
operating
in those particular
circumstances
sufficient
to cause the phenomenon in question.
Thus, when Frank argues
that dependency
causes underdevelopment,
he is
not invoking a nomic regularity but rather in a
shorthand
fashion is saying that the structures
that comprise the condition of being dependent
are such as to produce the condition of being
underdeveloped.
What is the warrant for this sort of explana-

OF DEPENDENCY

THEORY

197

tion? How is the success of a structural explanation to be determined?

We would argue that in
the case of Frank, and more generally in relation
to the use of structural explanations
in the social
sciences, the warrant is at least sixfold, involving
scope, fertility, prediction,
plausibility,
pragmatic considerations,
and acceptability
of theoretical concepts. Each of these aspects of the warrant
deserves some discussion.
we mean the success of the
BY scope
explanatory
model in being extended
to an
increasing number of possible instances of the
phenomenon
that could come within its purview.
Franks early work was centered
primarily on
Chile and Brazil, for which he provided fairly
detailed
histories in terms of his model. The
success of the explanatory
model is measured in
part by the acceptability
of his accounts of Chile
and Brazil, but also by the models ability to
generate
acceptable
histories
of other underdeveloped nations. The warrant for the explanation grows to the extent that the model can
generate new histories of additional
cases that
others
find persuasive.
Agreement
here
is
elusive, since those predisposed
to otherwise
reject
the model
on the grounds
that its
theoretical
assumptions
and conceptions
are
inadequate would tend not to find additional case
studies convincing. Nonetheless,
the ability of an
explanatory
model to account for. in its own
terms. a larger number of instances is certainly a
factor in its favor. This form of warrant might be
called retroductive.
that is. reasoning
from
observed
effect,
suitably
described.
back to
postulated
cause.
A second criterion involved in assessing the
success of explanations
of the sort Frank is using
is fertility.
This aspect of the explanatory
warrant is closely related to the first. Scope refers
to widening the set of instances of what is taken
to be the same phenomenon
that are explained.
Fertility refers to broadening
the range of phenomena that can be explained
by consistently
elaborating
the theoretical
model. For example,
Franks model not only claims to account for
underdevelopment
but also has definite implications for the type of political developments,
and
in particular.
for the nature of class structure,
that one can expect to accompany the development of underdevelopment.
It does not necessarily follow that a theory
that has as its
immediate
explanandum
economic phenomena,
such as underdevelopment.
need also account for
political phenomena.
To the degree that the
theory can be extended
to these other phenomena in a convincing way, however,
it adds
explanatory
power to its warrant. In this regard,
a test of Franks explanatory
model would be to

IYX

WORLD

DEVELOPMENT

assess how well major social and political developments,

such as changes in the state formation and in class structures,
are explained within
the parameters
of the theory.
The third aspect of the warrant is predictive
power. Certain empirical consequences
can be
derived from the model that can provide a test of
the models explanatory
force. Frank is quite
explicit
about
this.
In
Lntin Americu:
Unclcrtievelopmcrlt or Kevolutim he lists five
hypotheses
that are generated
from his model
and that are open to empirical testing. These
hypotheses
involve predictions
(and retroductions) concerning both future and past events, for
instance, conditions
under which satellites have
in the past and will in the future experience their
greatest economic development.
or correlations
between
past conditions
of dependency
and
present conditions
of underdevelopment.
Frank
admits that *[t]he evidence to test these hypotheses is not open to easy general inspection and
requires
detailed
analyses
of many
cases.
Nonetheless.
he asserts,
some
important
confirming evidence is available (Frank, 1969b,
p. 14). To the extent that further
research,
historical as well as further contemporary
analysis, confirms these hypotheses.
the explanation
provided by the theoretical model gains support.
The fourth way in which the warrant for the
explanation
can be measured
is through
an
overall assessment
of the plausibility
of the
model. For example, is the model consistent and
coherent? Beyond these more formal constraints,
however,
arc more general
considerations
of
plausibility. Theories in the social sciences refer
to social institutions and human activities. Theoretical concepts must allow us to make sense of
the institutions
and activities involved in terms
consistent with basic beliefs we have concerning
the social and psychological
natures of people. In
addition, any theoretical
model that deals with
some particular
set of social relations does so
against
the implicit
background
of a more
encompassing
theory
of social reality.
There
might be tensions or inconsistencies
between a
particular
theoretical
model and ones more
general understanding
of social relations.
One might, for instance. reject as not plausible
a model that attempted to explain underdevelopment in terms of institutions that required people
constantly to act in ways that were clearly against
their interests,
especially
if no account were
offered of physical or ideological
coercion that
might enforce such action. On the other hand,
one might reject as implausible
an explanatory
model that required
an overly high degree of
rationality
or motivational
self-interest
on the
part of all individuals engaged in relations that

fall within the scope of the theory. In this latter

case, one might argue that these requirements
do
not cohere with other beliefs one has concerning
the nature of individuals and social relations in
general in the society to which the model is
meant to apply. The notion of fit or coherence
here is not a logical notion, but rather more like
the one used when we talk of a certain behavior
attributed to an individual not fitting in with what
we believe about that persons personality
in
general.
The fifth criterion we suggest is the pragmatic
one of the ability of a theory to generate policies
that lead to the alteration
of conditions
considered undesirable
or problematic
within the
terms of the theory.
According
to Frank, his
theory has clear policy directives
and political
implications:
as long as they remain within the
world capitalist system. underdeveloped
nations
can expect only the continuation
of their present
conditions.
Thus to overcome
underdevelopment. they must overcome their participation
in
capitalist
the
system.
Franks
policy
recommendation
is that this can only be achieved
The value of his theory,
through revolution.
then, can be measured,
at least in part, in terms
of the correctness
of this policy recommendation
and in terms of the usefulness of the theory to the
achievement
of that recommendation.
Thus for
Frank, there is a certain unity of theory and
practice, or as he puts it, scientific study has a
political
and ideological
value.
While this
criterion of explanatory
adequacy raises, in our
minds, a number of interesting
methodological
issues, it would take us too far afield to do more
than mention it here.
The last criterion
is the adequacy
of the
theoretical
concepts
employed
in the explanation. This criterion is of a somewhat
different
status from the preceeding five in that it does not
directly address the strength or success of the
explanation
as much as its acceptability
for the
subject-matter
at hand.
Acceptability
here
implies a comparative judgment to the effect that
the concepts used in an explanation
are the most
adequate.
given alternative
sets of concepts put
forward by rival accounts of what is taken to be
the same phenomenon.
Conditions
of adequacy
in this regard are extremely difficult to pin down,
and arguments over which set of rival concepts is
the most adequate involve a host of considerations. Can the concepts be operationalized?
Are
they internally consistent?
Do they accord with
background
principles and theories assumed by
the explanation?
Are certain recognized aspects
of the phenomenon
not sufficiently
weighted?
These sorts of considerations
can occur at various
levels of disagreement.
depending on how much

A METHODOLOGICAL

ANALYSIS

(or little) the rival sets of concepts

share in
common. For instance, different versions of DT
share a great deal despite
real differences
concerning how to construct the proper concepts.
On the other
hand,
DT shares
very little
conceptually
with neoclassical
accounts, and so
quarrels occur on a much more basic level.
In debates among dependency
theorists, critics
of Frank engage him, for the most part, on the
level of the adequacy of his concepts. The growth
of DT into different,
rival approaches
is less a
matter of disagreements
concerning
the general
form of explanation
used than of disagreements
concerning
the concepts
employed
in the explanatory
model.
As we have presented it, the evaluation of the
warrant for a structural explanation
is complex at
best. We have discussed six possible criteria that
might be included in such an evaluation,
and as
we read Frank, these six are acknowledged
in his
arguments,
to various
degrees,
explicitly
or
implicitly. There may well be others, however,
that we would wish to countenance
as also to the
point. How to combine and weigh the various
considerations
is a problem
to which. in our
there
is no mechanical
solution.
opinion,
Furthermore,
it is important to note that the very
meaning and application
of the various criteria
are open to interpretation.
So, for example, two
rival theorists,
especially
if they
disagree
concerning how to best characterize
the object of
investigation,
might well dispute just what factors
should be accepted as relevant considerations
of
plausibility or scope. In light of these difficulties,
we endorse
as apposite
the spirit of Kuhns
discussion of the characteristics
of a good scientific theory: Individually
the criteria are imprecise: individuals
may legitimately
differ about
their application
to concrete cases. In addition.
when deployed together,
they repeatedly
prove
to conflict with one another
(Kuhn, 1977, p.
322). Nevertheless,
we would maintain that the
criteria we have discussed are. again in the words
of Kuhn, individually important and collectively
sufficiently varied to indicate what is at stake
(ibid., p. 321).

4. FUNCTIONAL

EXPLANATION

The second of the three forms of explanation

used by Frank is functional explanation.
As we
have said, Frank explains his specific object of
study, underdevelopment,
by way of a structural
explanation.
The success of that explanation
is
measured
in terms of his ability to provide a
convincing, coherent,
and generalizable
account
of the mechanisms,
the normal operation
of

OF DEPENDENCY

THEORY

199

which would
bring about
the existence
of
underdevelopment.
But having provided
that
account,
Frank is faced with an additional
question:
How and why did the structures
that
generate
underdevelopment
come about?
In
other words, the structural
explanation
shows
how, given the existence in place, so to speak, of
the structures
stipulated
within Franks model,
normal behavior of those structures result in the
condition of underdevelopment
obtaining. But in
order
to have a complete
explanation
of
underdevelopment,
we might still feel the need
to understand
how and why those structures
came into place. It is in answer to this last
concern
that Frank resorts
to a functional
explanation.
That Frank should resort to a functional
explanation
to answer this question makes sense
if we remember that the scope of his theoretical
model is what he calls the world capitalist system.
Within this system, metropolitan
and satellite
forms of development
are seen to be interrelated
as two aspects of the same phenomenon.
But
in Franks view, they are not equal aspects.
Rather,
the development
of the metropolis,
which is the site of the fundamental
capitalist
accumulation
process, is the primary aspect of
development.
and it is the dynamic
of the
metropolis
that accounts for the development
and nature of underdevelopment
in the satellite.
The existence of underdevelopment.
then, is to
be understood
in light of the function it plays in
the accumulation process. That is why Frank sees
his ultimate task as accounting for the capitalist
world system, for only from that perspective can
he understand
the development
of the systemic
needs that enter into the level of functional
explanation
of underdevelopment.
Frank uses a form of functionalist
explanation,
then. to account for the existence of the structures that, as elaborated
within his theoretical
model,
bring
about
the
existence
of
underdevelopment.
Frank does not explicitly say
that he is using a functional explanation
in this
way, but we think that it is clearly implied in a
number of places where he discusses the relationship between underdevelopment,
on the one
hand, and the accumulation
process and the
world capitalist system. on the other.
In addition to its use on this general level,
functional explanation
enters on a more specific
level in Franks model. When accounting for the
different
paths of development
followed
by
different colonies or countries, especially in cases
where there are two colonies or countries that
appear initially to have had similar characteristics
at some early stage of development,
Frank claims
that one must look at the function
that the

200

particular
ist world

WORLD

colony or country
system.

DEVELOPMENT

played in the capital-

The modes of production

associated
with this
process
of
world
and
metropolitan
capital
accumulation
differed from one set of colonies to
another
according
to their respective
places and
funcfions in that stage of the development
of the
worldwide
mercantile
capitalist
system.

Thus Frank uses a form of functional explanation

to account
for differences
in developmental
patterns, between for instance, New England and
Brazil. Different developmental
paths occurring
in two areas where there seem to be initial
similarities
are to be explained
in terms of the
particular and different,
as opposed to shared,
initial conditions,
and/or in terms of the different
times in which the two areas entered the world
capitalist system, and the specific function within
the world system that the colony could fulfill,
given that time and those conditions.
If it is the case that Frank does use functional
explanation,
then certain questions are indicated.
What is the proper form of functional explanation? Is such explanation
legitimate in the social
sciences?
What is its warrant?
The topic of
functional
explanation
is a complex and controversial one, and these questions are receiving
a good deal of attention in recent literature in the
philosophy
of the social sciences.
We cannot
attempt to summarize.
no less develop, here the
issues involved.
In general, however, and as an
initial approximation.
it can be said that a thing
(the exy/unund~m,
for our purposes
a social
phenomenon.
e.g., a social practice or institution) is explained functionally
if and when it is
shown that the phenomenon
has a beneficial
effect for some group (or structure or system),
and that the phenomenon
in question was not
intentionally
produced because it has that effect,
but rather, that it has the effect is not recognized
as such by the group benefited.
For instance, a
practice
(the classic example
is a rain dance
ceremony)
engaged in by a community might be
explained functionally
if it has the consequence
of increasing
the social solidarity of the community, and if the community does not intentionally engage in the practice because it has that
effect, and if the community
does not even
recognize
that their social solidarity
is so increased.
One of the major issues of contention concerning the status of functional
explanation
in the
social sciences has to do with a further requirement on successful explanation.
In the view of
some, a successful functional
explanation
need
only demonstrate
that there is a correlation
of
some significant degree between the existence of

the need (and hence the possibility of a certain

effect being beneficial) and the appearance of the
phenomenon
that produces
that effect.
The
correlation
can be used to support a general
lawlike statement
to the effect that whenever
some institution or behavior would have beneficial effects, it is in fact observed.
This form of
general lawlike statement,
it is argued, provides
sufficient support for functional
explanations.
In opposition
to this view, other philosophers
argue for a stronger relation between the existence of a certain need and a social phenomenon
(the explanandum)
that produces
a beneficial
effect that would satisfy that need. The sort of
relation demanded
is that a successful explanation must demonstrate
that there is a causal
feedback mechanism
whereby the phenomenon
that produces that effect is maintained because it
produces
that effect: in other words, that the
beneficial
effect is causally implicated
in the
production
or maintenance
of the phenomenon
in question.
In lieu of demonstrating
the existence of such a causal mechanism, it is argued, it is
difficult to distinguish
lawlike from accidental
correlations.
Moreover,
without the demonstration of a causal mechanism.
one cannot
be
certain that the correct explanatory
variable has
been isolated. In other words, just because an
institution performs a certain function. it cannot
be claimed that the institution
exists becuuse it
performs
that function.
The existence
of the
institution may be due to some other factor, and
its function (providing a certain beneficial effect)
may be a contingent
and nonexplanatory
factor.
That is. it may he true that. whenever

an item I
[e.g., an institution] would have bcncficial effects. I
occurs.Rut it may still be false that i occurs because
it has beneficial effects. For thcrc may be a third
item that produces
both i and is dispktion
to
product
beneficial
effects.
According
to this latter
position,
therefore,
to
explain the existence of a practice (e.g., a rain
dance ceremony),
one would have to demonstrate that the beneficial effect of the practice
(e.g., increased social solidarity)
is part of the
causal chain that results in the reproduction
of
the practice in just those situations
where the
effect would be beneficial.
Our digression
into the somewhat
technical
terrain
concerning
the status
of functional
explanation
is relevant for an evaluation of the
nature
of explanation
in Frank and in DT
generally.
While we do not wish to take a
position
here on the correct requirements
on
functional explanation
in the social sciences. we
do want to point out an implication of the above
debate. If it is correct that a functional explana-

A METHODOLOGICAL

ANALYSIS

tion requires
the demonstration
of a causal
mechanism
of the sort mentioned
above (the
mechanism view), then, given this strong requirement, instances of successful functional explanation in the social sciences are probably quite rare.
In particular,
many theorists within the Marxist
tradition
(and here we can, at least for the
moment and for this purpose, consider Franks
work part of that tradition) are probably guilty of
misusing
and overusing
functional
explanations.
On the other
hand, if a successful
functional
explanation
can be sufficiently
supported merely by the sort of correlation
and
general lawlike statement
discussed above (the
correlational
view), then Franks use of this form
of explanation
has at least primu fucie better
support.
It will be recalled that according to our analysis
of Frank, he uses functional explanations
at two
places in his overall explanatory
framework.
On
a general
level, he functionally
explains
the
development
of underdevelopment.
or rather, of
the structures
that produce
the condition
of
underdevelopment.
On a more specific level. he
functionally explains divergent paths of development in colonies
that begin with apparently
similar conditions.
What would Frank need to
warrant his use of these explanations,
given the
debate
over the requirements
for functional
explanation?
To take the general level first, if the correlational view of functional explanation
is correct,
then what Frank must show is that there is a
correlation
between
the occurrence
of certain
needs on the part of metropolitan
capital, for
instance, problems in the accumulation
process
due to a falling rate of profit or to realization
crises, and the creation or alteration
of conditions of underdevelopment.*
Frank would have
to show as well that this creation or alteration of
the conditions
of underdevelopment
produced
beneficial
effects that went some distance
to
solving the problem,
satisfying the needs mentioned in the account. There are obvious difficulties in establishing this correlation:
for example,
problems in time lag. in specifying the changes in
the conditions of underdevelopment
so that two
instances
can be said to be the same phenomenon, and in establishing
enough instances to
support the correlation
in the first place. While
Frank does not talk explicitly in terms of such a
correlation,
it seems clear that he thinks one
exists and that more work needs to be done to
establish it adequately.
What if, however,
the mechanism
view of
functional
explanation
is correct? In this case,
Franks task is more difficult. He has to establish
a causal feedback
mechanism
between the be-

OF DEPENDENCY

THEORY

201

neficial
effects
of underdevelopment
to the
metropolitan
accumulation
process
and the
creation
and continuation,
or alteration
and
continuation
in the new form, of the structures of
underdevelopment.
How might he do this? The
most obvious way is to resort to a model of
market mechanisms
whereby
macro problems
(on the level of the accumulation
process) are
translated into individual decisions that in effect
and unintentionally
produce
the structures
of
underdevelopment.
The problem here is to produce a powerful enough model to account for all
the different
instances
that Frank claims to
explain within his theory. Moreover,
one would
have to demonstrate
that this model of market
mechanisms
is not merely an abstract, possible
representation
of what happened,
but that in
some stronger sense it reconstructs
what really
happened
historically,
acknowledging
that this
reconstruction
itself is in terms of Franks general
theory. The claim would be, that is. that there is
a causal mechanism suitable to the task at hand
that is both consistent
with Franks theory and
that represents,
from the point of view of his
theory, a real, as opposed to merely possible,
mechanism.
The employment
of functional explanations
on
the other level on which they occur in Frank, the
level that we have called the specific, has a
somewhat different status. On this level. Frank
wants to explain the developmental
path followed by a specific area or colony, and contrast it
with that of a different area or colony, in terms of
the function
each area fulfilled in the world
accumulation
process. The initial difficulty here
is that the focus is on particular histories. and it is
not clear whether,
and if so. what kind of. a
general correlation
can be established.
By contrast. on the general level, Frank wants to explain
all cases of underdevelopment
in terms of the
same account, and so all cases are part of the set
of instances
covered
by the correlation.
One
might argue that what Frank needs to do on the
specific
level
is classify
all instances
of
underdevelopment
into subclasses
of different
developmental
paths, each subclass serving as the
set for a general
correlation
supporting
the
explanation of that particular path. This strategy,
however, would probably result in an insufficient
number of cases on which to establish the various
correlations,
and in any case. it strikes us as an
artificial resort since what Frank is concerned
with on this level is more particular histories than
general explanations.
The question then becomes.
how does functional explanation
operate
in the context
of
particular
histories,
especially
where relevant
general correlations
are lacking? This is a diffi-

202

WORLD DEVEl.OPMENT

cult issue. and to pursue it adequately,

we would
have to enter into a discussion of the nature of
explanation
in general,
something
we cannot
undertake here. Suffice it to say,then, that what
Frank needs to do is supply convincing
case
histories of the particular areas or colonies with
which he is concerned.
These case histories, to be
convincing as functional explanations,
need to do
at least two things. First, they need to identify the
specific functions (the production of some beneficial effect)
performed
by the structures
of
underdevelopment
at the different points in their
development.
Second,
the case histories
must
demonstrate
that there was a causal mechanism
that related the beneficial
effect back to the
production or reproduction
of the structures that
produced the effect. That is to say, the stronger
version of functional explanation
must be used to
frame each particular
case history. This is because merely showing that a structure produced a
beneficial
effect in one concrete
case is insufficient support for a functional explanatory
hypothesis: certainly it is less support than showing
that there is a number of relevantly similar cases.
Only by showing the particular causal links in
each cast can functional
explanation
be maintained for specific case histories.
Thus, if Frank is to explain functionally
the
contrasting courses of development
in, for example, New England and Sao Paulo. he must first
provide a detailed case history of each, describing the initial conditions
and their subsequent
courses of development.
He must then relate the
major stages (structural changes) in the development of each area to the world accumulation
process such that each structural change can be
understood
in terms of a function
it fulfilled
rG-d-G the accumulation
process. And lastly, hc
must demonstrate
concretely
in each instance
that the change came about because it fulfilled
this function; that is. he must show the causal
mechanism
by which the fact that the change
could satisfy the need helped bring about the
change. If this could be done. then Frank could
claim, in our opinion,
to have explained
the
divergent
paths of underdevelopment
functionally. The task is a large one and although Franks
later work begins to cover the necessary ground,
his overall project is insufficiently developed.
To
claim any explanatory
success at this level would
at best be premature.

5. INTENTIONAL

EXPLANATION

In addition
to structural
and functional
explanation,
Frank makes use of a third form.
intentional explanation.
This form of explanation

plays a subsidiary, but interesting,

role in Franks
overall
explanatory
framework.
Intentional
explanation
involves what is sometimes
called
rationalizing
an action.
This process involves
displaying
the reasons,
generally
taken to be
beliefs and desires, that the agent had for acting
as he or she did. We are said to have explained an
action when we can understand
it as the reasonable outcome
for the agent, given his or her
configuration
of beliefs and desires. In somewhat
different terms, intentional
explanation
involves
making sense of an action by showing that it was
an attempt to achieve a particular goal on the
part of the agent, a goal that can be understood
in terms of the desires of the agent and the beliefs
he or she has concerning how best to satisfy those
desires. From this point of view,
[clxplaining behavior intentionally
is equivalent to
showing that it is intentional
behavior, i.e., behavior conducted in order to bring about some goal.
We explain an action intentionally
when we are
able to specif the future state it was intcndcd to

bring about: ,Y

How does intentional

explanation
enter into
Franks model? We mentioned
in the discussion
of the fertility
criterion
of the warrant
for
structural
explanation
that Franks model has
implications
for explanations
of the political
developments
that parallel
economic
underdevelopment.
Frank needs to be concerned with
political developments
in order to show how
the structures
of underdevelopment
get implemented
on a local level. especially
after a
nation ceases to be a colony under direct metropolitan
control.
His explanation
of political
development
is in terms of classes, understood
in
relation to structural interests around which they
cohere, and of struggles among classes to control
the state. Classes vie to dominate
the political
sphere so that they can implement
policies that
forward their economic interests. These policies.
according to Frank. are just those that reproduce
and alter when necessary
the structures
that
produce
the conditions
of underdevelopment.
That local ruling classes act in this way can be
taken to be part of the causal mechanism,
if one
can be specified,
that links those effects of
underdevelopment
beneficial
to the accumulation process back to the reproduction
and alteration of the structures that produce underdevelopment. In that sense, then, the existence of local
ruling classes. implementing
the types of policy
that they do, would be explained functionally by
Frank.
Frank points out. however. a sort of paradox
concerning
these classes. At the same time and
through the same behaviour that has the effect of

A METHODOLOGICAL

ANALYSIS

helping to satisfy the needs of the accumulation

process in the metropolis,
the local ruling classes
are a party to their own exploitation
by the
ruling class of the metropolis.
It may be a
functional requirement
of the overall structure of
underdevelopment
that there be a class or group
that serves this function,
but why should the
people in this position acquiesce in their own
exploitation?
Franks answer is an obvious
one, even if it could be questioned:
the local
ruling class, because of its relative position in the
chain of metropolis-satellite
links, stands to gain
more by exploiting
those beneath it, even at
the cost of being exploited by those above it in
the chain, compared with the alternative
which
would
involve
breaking
out of the chain
altogether,
at the cost of the local ruling class
jeopardizing
its monopoly
situation.
As Frank
writes,
[t]he reason
they [the most powerful
interest
groups of the Chilean metropolis]
accepted.
and
championed,
their own exploitation
is that they
were thereby able to continue their exploitation
of
the people in the Chilean periphery.
of whom the
Chilean metropolis
itself was an exploiter.
(Frank.
1969a. p. 95)

Franks account, as witnessed

in this quotation, is ambiguous
in an interesting
way. The
question is: are members of the local ruling class
aware of their options; are they aware of them in
the terms used by Frank to describe them; and do
they intentionally
choose to perpetuate
the structures and policies of underdevelopment,
knowing
that this choice is also a choice to continue their
own exploitation?
Or alternatively,
do members of the ruling class act according to beliefs
and desires that have nothing to do with the
terms in which their situation and options are
described by Frank? More simply put, is the local
ruling class aware as such of the role it is playing
in the
perpetuation
of the
structures
of
underdevelopment?
Does it choose
its role
knowingly and intentionally?
In the above quote
by Frank,
the term
reason is ambiguous
as between these questions. If reason is interpreted
as meaning in a
general sense cause or explanatory
factor,
then it would seem that Frank is saying that the
most powerful groups in Chile were not aware of
their options in the terms used by Franks theory.
Their behavior was not intentional at this level of
description.
In that case, the form of explanation
suggested by that sentence is a functional one. If,
however, reason is interpreted
to mean conscious and intentional reason, then Frank would
seem to be saying that the members of the ruling
class were aware more or less that they were

OF

DEPENDENCY

THEORY

203

acting in a way that would perpetuate

their
position as both exploiters
and exploited,
and that they acted so as to maintain
this
position. Obviously,
they could not have been
aware of their situations and the implications
of
their actions in just the terms used by Frank, for
those descriptions
were not available until the
formulation by Frank of his version of DT. But a
judgment could be made that they were aware of
their role and function in terms more or less
congruent
with Franks theory.
In this case,
Frank would be using a form of intentional
explanation
to account
for local ruling class
behavior and acquiescence
to the metropolitansatellite chain.
Although
Frank is not explicit on this point,
since he does not raise the methodological
issue
of explanation as such, various things he does say
indicate that he believes that the local ruling
classes, at least at certain points in the history of
underdevelopment,
knew fairly well what they
were doing in terms that are consonant
with
Franks description.
For instance,
according to
Frank, [s]ome Chileans living at the turn of the
century were well aware of much that was going
on, how the metropolis was appropriating
Chiles
economic
surplus (Frank,
1969a. p. 86). Of
course, the behavior of the ruling classes was
affected by larger economic forces beyond their
understanding
or control.
It is a matter for
investigation
to establish how often and to what
degree local ruling classes were aware of their
role in the chain of dependency
relations.
Our
purpose here is only to point out that to the
degree Frank assigns this kind of consciousness
to these classes, and to the degree that he uses
the conscious reasons that inform their behavior
to explain how and why they fulfill the role that
they do in the history of underdevelopment,
to
this degree Frank is incorporating
a level of
intentional
explanation
into
his theoretical
model.
On the other hand, to the degree that Frank
does not attempt
to explain
by way of an
intentional
explanation
the fact that local ruling
classes do fulfill a function within his model. to
the degree,
that is, that he explains this fact
functionally,
the question of what the members
of the ruling class thought
they were doing
remains outstanding.
How is it that they always
(or at least for the most part) acted so as to fulfill
their function, given that they did not intentionally do so? That is, even where Frank does not
resort to intentional explanation,
there remains a
place in his theoretical
model where such an
explanation
is appropriate
if not required.
To summarize
to this point, we have argued
that Frank utilizes a complex explanatory
struc-

ture to explain the occurrence

and maintenance
of underdevelopment.
Underdevelopment,
a
condition
that Frank claims is properly understood only in terms of his theoretical
model, is
explained on the first level in terms of a structural
explanation
that displays the generative
mechanisms of that condition.
We suggested
and
discussed a variety of warrants for this form of
explanation.
The existence of those mechanisms
that figure in the structural
explanation
are in
turn explained
functionally
in relation to their
role in what for Frank is the world capitalist
system. Frank also employs a functional explanation to account for differences
among various
instances of underdevelopment
that one might
initially expect to have followed similar courses
of development.
We presented some of the issues
surrounding
functional explanation in the current
philosophical
literature
as a way of indicating
how one might go about beginning an assessment
of the legitimacy and success of Franks use of
this explanatory
form. Finally, we briefly discussed a third form of explanation.
intentional
explanation,
that figures into Franks overall
project. To complete our analysis of Frank, we
now turn to the work of one of the chief critics of
Frank. Robert Brenner.
who raises important
methodological
objections
against Franks project and his approach
to explanation.

6. BRENNER
AS A METHODOLOGICAL
CRITIC OF FRANK
Franks version of DT has stimulated
a large
number of critical responses covering all aspects
of his theory.
While most of the discussion of
Frank in the literature is substantive
rather than
methodological.
there has heen some interesting
methodological
criticism.
In particular,
Robert
Brenner has raised issues that are directly relevant to the assessment
of Franks modes of
explanation.
Brennera
criticism
ranges
from
questions about Franks use of concepts such as
capitalism and class to differences over historical
data. For our purposes. however, what is of most
interest is the fact that Brcnner questions
the
order
in which Frank explains
the relevant
phenomena
and. by implication,
the mode of
explanation
used by Frank.
Our purpose in discussing Brenner is not, in
the first instance, to endorse his criticisms, but
rather to note the sorts of issues raised. Nor do
we claim that his criticisms exhaust the field.
Rather.
we take him to be among the more
interesting
methodological
critics
of Frank,
representative
of the sort of discussion that needs
to bc carried on if DT is to attain a greater

methodological
sophistication
selfand
consciousness.
Brenner (lY77) concedes at the beginning of
his article
that Franks
descriptions
of the
mechanisms
of surplus transfer from the underdeveloped
periphery to the developed
core and
of the resulting distortion of the economies of the
periphery
clearly capture important
aspects of
the functioning
reality of underdevelopment
(Brenner,
lY77, p. 83). But in Brenners opinion,
while Franks
account
may have descriptive
adequacy,
it fails to explain
the origins of
underdevelopment.
That is. Brenner
rejects
Franks
thesis
that
the
development
of
underdevelopment
is part of and necessitated
by
the development
of capitalism in the metropolis.
In contrast to Franks explanatory
model. Brenner offers a very different mode of explanation of
underdevelopment.
In order
to appreciate
Brenners
argument.
we first have to situate
Brenners general criticism of Frank and outline
his own position.
Most of Brenners
article
is aimed
more
directly against the work of Sweezy and Wallerstein rather than Frank. Since, however. Brenner sees Wallerstcins
project of discovering the
roots of development
in the core as a contlnu:ltion of and complement
to Franks work, the
criticisms can be taken to apply to both theorists.
The miljor problem Brenner has with the FrankWallerstein position has to do with the definition
of capitalism it assumes. Frank (as does Wallerstein) conceptualizes
capitalism
in terms of a
system
of power
exercised
in and through
pi-oduction oriented towards profit in the market.
The essential relation marking an economy as
capitalist, the point at which power is in the first
instance exercised.
is a certain type of market
exchange within a world srtem of metropolissatellite
dependency
relations.
According
to
Brenner. it follows from this conceptualization
of
capitalism that the accumulation
process is ccntrally concerned with the generation
of absolute
surplus value, value that is extracted by casting a
wider and more intensive net over the commodity labor power. It nlso follows from this starting
point, according to Brcnner, that the issue of the
origins and development
of capitalism primarily
concerns the rise of a world commercial network
and an expanding
world market.
In addition,
Brenner argues that Franks and
Wallcrsteins
model of capitalism Irads them to
understand
class structure
as determined
in ;I
rather mechanistic
fashion by. market relations.
Market opportunities
determine
the nature of
economic development
in a given area, and in
particular. the nature of production.
The rcsulting requirenicnt4
on production.
in turn. dcter-

A METHODOLOGICAL

ANALYSIS

mine the nature of the class structure. The classes

that arise are .structured by the dominant production process,
and the production
process that
arises is the one best suited in a given area at a
given time to allow the maximum extraction of
absolute surplus value by the ruling class. This
model and the explanation
of both development
and underdevelopment
that it supports
is,
according to Brenner,
theoretically
inadequate
and leads to empirically
false explanations.
To appreciate
why Brenner takes the FrankWallerstein
position
to be theoretically
and
explanatory
inadequate,
it is necessary to contrast it with Brenners
own understanding
of
capitalism. For Brenner. the defining and unique
characteristic
of capitalism is its tendency,
not
simply to develop,
but to do so by way of
expanding the productive forces. In other words,
capitalism is a system of production
centered on
the accumulation
of what Brenner calls relative
Expansion
of productivity
surplus
value.2h
through technical innovation,
Marxs revolutionary expansion
of the forces of production,
can
occur only where it is possible to move labor in
and out of the production process as best suits the
available technology.
But this form of labor
mobility, according to Brenner,
can only occur
within a certain class structure,
namely,
one
where labor is free wage labor that is at the mercy
of market forces, or in other words, where labor
power is a commodity.
Thus, in Brenners view,
capitalism
as a system of production
oriented
towards a specific form of accumulation
necessitates a specific class structure.
In contrast
to the Frank-Wallerstein
view,
Brenners
position is that capitalism
does not
create the class structure
it requires.
Rather,
capitalism can only exist within the confines of
this class structure. The initial emergence of this
class structure is thus a necessary condition for
the emergence
of capitalism,
and the reproduction of this class structure is a necessary condition
for the continued reproduction
of capitalism. The
problem of the origins of capitalism for Brenner,
then, is not the development
of a world market
system as it is for the Frank-Wallerstein
position.
Rather, the problem for Brenner is the emergence of the necessary class structure. or in other
words, the origins of labor power as a commodity.
Brenners model of capitalism,
then. leads to
the result that the crucial explanatory
variable is
the class structure.
Capitalism
can exist only
where the class structure accommodates
it. And
what ultimately determines the class structure are
the outcomes of class struggles. The outcomes of
class struggles, however, according to Brenner,
cannot be determined
in advance;
it is not a

OF DEPENDENCY

THEORY

205

matter of a mechanistic,
deterministic
process,
or, even less, of free individual decision-making.
Rather. in each instance under study, the particular conditions
of class conflict,
especially
the
opportunities
available to the ruling class to
exploit labor through extraction
of either absolute or relative surplus value, must be analyzed in
order to understand
the possibilities
inherent in
the situation that could, but do not have to be,
realized. Market opportunities
do not determine
class. as in the Frank-Wallerstein
view. Rather,
the outcome
of class struggle conditions
what
kind of market relations are to be engaged in. for
example, whether profit maximization
is to be
pursued.
On Brenners
view, and contrary
to
Frank and Wallerstein,
neither economic development nor underdevelopment are direcrly dependent upon, caused by, one
another.
of class

Each is the product of a specific evolution

relations,
in parr determined historically
relationship
with
outside
capitalism,
in
noncapitalist
modes. (Brenner.
1977. p. 61. emphasis in the original)

Development
and underdevelopment.
thus,
are explained by Brenner in terms of the particular opportunities
for surplus extraction
made
possible by the different class configurations,
free
wage labor, in the case of development,
and
forced feudal or slave labor, at least initially, in
the case of underdevelopment.
It is important to
emphasize that the central explanatory variable is
a contingent
and external one, the outcome of
class struggle.
Such an outcome
cannot
be
determined
in advance;
or at least,
the
determination
of the outcome of class struggles
falls outside of the theoretical model in question.
One result of this difference
between Brenners and Franks models is that each in the end
uses a different form of explanation
to account
for the emergence of capitalism and the development of underdevelopment.
Frank, as we have
seen, explains the development
of underdevelopment in terms of generalizable
explanations.
functional
and structural.
Brenner,
however,
cannot do this since he utilizes a contingent,
external variable, the outcome of class struggles.
Therefore.
given Brenners model of capitalism,
the explanation
of the emergence
of capitalism
and of underdevelopment
must be explained on a
country-by-country,
or area-by-area.
basis. in
each case explaining the outcome as the result of
the particular
configuration
of economic
and
noneconomic
conditions.
At best. Brenner can
attempt to generalize across cases, but given the
nature of his model, he cannot fall back on
anything like a general lawlike statement.
What his model does do, so it would seem

206

WORLD

DEVELOPMENT

Brenner would claim, is to provide first of all, a

set of correctly defined concepts,
which when
applied
will correctly
organize
the subjectmatter, and second, a guide to how the different
phenomena
organized by the concepts connect to
each other,
thereby
allowing the appropriate
questions to be raised. The form of explanation
suggested by his argument might best be called a
narrative or historical explanation
rather than a
structural
one.
We have, then, two contrasting
models and an
important
difference
in the form of explanation
involved in each. How might one decide between
them? We cannot give a complete answer to this
question
here. However,
part of the answer
would surely
involve
closely
examining
the
nature of the criticisms that Brenner makes of the
Frank-Wallerstein
position.
There
are three
overall types of criticisms that he makes: criticism
concerning
empirical adequacy. conceptual
adequacy, and explanatory
adequacy.
Given our
focus in this essay, we will discuss only the last.
As we have seen. Brenner charges that the
mechanistic
and deterministic
form of functional
explanation
that Frank and Wallerstein
use
distorts the nature of the phenomenon
in question. Brenner also has problems with an assumption presupposed
by what we take to be the
Frank-Wallerstein
structural explanatory
model.
Frank and Wallerstein,
it is claimed, argue that
the form of production
and the organization
of
labor best suited to the prevailing market conditions obtains, given only the assumption
of the
profit motive on the part of the ruling class. This
assumption is then incorporated
into a functional
explanation
when it is placed in the context of a
world capitalist
system that requires continual
to fuel the accumulation
input of surplus
process.
Brenner notes the key role of the assumption
of the profit motive
m Franks explanatory
model. The model, Brenner contends,
assumes
that the individuals
who control the means of
production
have the motivation,
the rationality,
and the freedom to pursue profit maximization.
That is. as Brenner
interprets
it, the model
assumes the extra historical universe of honro
of individual
profit maximizers
oec~on0tnicu.s.
competing on the market, outside of any system
of social relations
of exploitation
(Brenner,
1977. p. 58).
But there are at least two related problems
with this assumption.
In the first place, this
assumed universe is not some abstract,
extrahistorical realm as much as it is the world of
capitalism.
The conditions
specified
by this
model exist in, and only in, the capitalist market.

Insofar as this model is used to explain the initial

emergence
of capitalism.
and insofar
as it
assumes in its explanatory
framework conditions
that only exist within capitalism, it obviously begs
the question.
The second problem
with the assumption
is
that it reflects Franks and Wallersteins failure to
understand
adequately
the relations
between
individuals
and social structures,
in particular,
class structures. In Brenners view. the individual
is much more produced
by and constrained
by
class structures than Frank or Wallerstein
seem
to allow. This criticism
is of a piece with
Brenners contention
that Frank and Wallerstein
do not accord class structure its proper explanatory role as a variable. As Brenner reads them,
Frank and Wallerstein
make class structure
(reflected first of all in the relations of production) a consequence
of the behavior of rational
individuals in the market. For Brenner. this view
has the relationship
completely backwards. Individual rationality
and behavior must be understood as conditioned
and constrained
by the
existing class structure. To not see the relation in
this way, Brenner
implies,
is to have a fundamental mistake at the very basis of ones social
theory.
In the terms of our discussion of the
warrant for structural explanation,
this last criticism amounts to questioning
the plausibility of
the explanatory
model.
This discussion does not exhaust the criticisms
Brenner makes of the Frank-Wallerstein
model,
to say nothing of methodological
criticisms made
by other commentators
in the debates over DT.
The criticisms we have mentioned
do reflect,
however, some of the levels on which the issues
are joined
and the kinds of methodological
considerations
that enter into the debates.

7. CONCLUSION
Methodological
investigation
can intend to be
either prescriptive
or descriptive.
The former
approach
lays down rules and standards
that
to follow.
The latter
practitioners
ought
approach limits itself to explicating the methods
used by some instance or other of a science. Of
course, this distinction
is not sharp, and each
approach
involves elements
of the other. Our
analysis of Frank,
however.
is clearly more
descriptive
than prescriptive.
We have limited ourselves to this approach for
two reasons. First, in Frank, and in virtually all
the work of dependency
theorists,
methodological considerations
are not developed sufficiently
to allow clarity about what is going on in the

A METHODOLOGICAL

ANALYSIS

various theories. If anything, this is more true as

concerns the modes of explanation
employed.
Thus, the obvious
initial task that requires
attention is that of explication and clarification.
Only then can one turn to critical assessments.
There is an important second reason, however.
Prescriptive methodological
analyses in the social
sciences are a dangerous undertaking.
Almost all
aspects of methodology
are up for philosophical
debate in the social sciences. There is no clear
consensus,
even on such basic questions as the
relation of theory to facts and evidence or the
proper nature of explanation.
Thus to prescribe
is to invite challenge on the most basic philosophical levels.
In this situation,
the type of methodological
study of Frank that we have presented is helpful
in at least two areas. First, clarifying the nature
of Franks explanatory
structure
can aid in
evaluating
his overall theoretical
position,
and
thus further the debates within DT and between
DT and other general approaches
in development economics.
For instance, if our analysis is
accepted, one can begin to measure the warrant
for Franks explanations,
and also begin to assess
what might need to be done to advance his
research program. Moreover,
if one rejects our
analysis of Frank, then one must counter it with a
different
account.
The ensuing
second-order
methodological
debate will undoubtedly
sharpen
up various first-order
theoretical
disputes.

OF

DEPENDENCY

THEORY

207

At the same time, analyzing methodological

issues can help pinpoint areas of agreement
and
disagreement
between
different
approaches
to
DT. Without clarity on these matters one might
confuse differences of method with differences of
substance.
On the other hand, if two positions
agree on matters of explanation
and on methodology in general, then it might be necessary to
look at assumptions made and conditions presupposed in order find the source of disagreement.
In any case, sensitivity to methodological
issues
prevents one from making the simple error of
seeing all theoretical
disagreements
in terms of
straightforward
empirical refutation of one or the
other theories.
Second, the sort of analysis presented
here is
relevant
to the larger task of methodological
inquiry and argument
in the philosophy
of the
social sciences.
If, as we mentioned
above,
methodological
issues are hotly disputed,
then
one way of extending the debates is to explore
the methods used by a variety of theorists who
are influential
in different
areas of inquiry. If
nothing else, this sort of strategy will highlight
differences
and raise the level of sophistication
and self-consciousness
in the debate. Given the
present state of methodological
disarray,
that
itself would be a worthy accomplishment.

NOTES
1. But see Cardoso (1977) who, it should be noted,
differs somewhat from this view.
2.
Franks
other
major
works
include:
Latin
America:
Underdevelopment
or Revolution (1969);
Lumpenbourgeoisie:
Lumpendevelopment
(1972);
World Accumulation
1492-I 789 ( 1978) ; Dependent
Accumulation
and Underdevelopment
(1979); and
Critique and Anti-Critique (1984).

3. For examples of this, see Frank (1969a), pp.

145-147 and 22G224. Here, in the introductions to two
of his essays on the development of underdevelopment
in Brazil, Frank contrasts how standard neoclassical
dualist accounts, as opposed to his model. structure
their problem.
It is clear that the two theoretical
approaches characterize
their objects of investigation
differently.
Where the dualist sees discontinuity between supposedly developed and undeveloped areas of
Brazil, Frank sees continuity within the structures of
underdevelopment.
Where the dualist sees large parts
of Brazilian agriculture as still traditional.
Frank sees
it all as capitalist.
And these differences
make a
difference in terms of what is to be explained.
For

instance, the dualist sees areas such as Sao Paulo as

developed and thus as not in need of explanation.
For
Frank, Sbo Paulo is a regional marketplace within the
chain of metropolitan-satellite
links. and as such. its
development to this position is as much an object for
explanation as is an account of conditions in remote.
nonindustrialized
regions.
4.

See also Frank

5.

See,

(1969a).

for instance,

Frank

pp. 3-6.
(1969a).

p. 16.

6. There is some controversy concerning the nature

and status of structural explanation.
Is it, for instance.
best regarded
as a special
case of deductivenomological
explanation,
or as a separate form of
explanation? For a discussion of structural explanation
and how it differs from the more common nomothetic
explanation,
see McMullin (1978 and 1984). Also, see
Miller (1984), Chapter 7: Replacing
positivism.
It
should also be noted that although Frank is nowhere
explicit about the form of explanation
he utilizes, he
does
talk
about
his historical
and
structural
approach.
See Frank (1969b).
p. 9.

208
7. See
209-212.

WORLD
the

discussion

in

McMullin

(1984).

8. See for instance.

Franks
discussion
(1969a), p. 94 and Frank (1979). p. 123.

DEVELOPMENT
pp.

in Frank

9. Frank (1969b). pp. 9-15. Also see Frank (1969a).

pp. 11-12. According
to Frank (1969b. p. 9). [tlhe
hypotheses
are derived from the empirical observation
and theoretical
assumption
that within this worldembracing
metropolis-satellite
structure
the metropoles tend to develop
and the satellites
to underdevelop.
10. Andre
Gunder
Frank,
What is the scientific
value of the study of the development
of underdevelopment? None! in Frank (1984). p. 4.
11. See Ernest0
Laclaus early and important
criticism of Frank in this regard in Laclau (1971) and
Sanjaya
Lalls
criticism
of Franks
concept
of
underdevelopment
in Lall (1975).
12. Kuhn (1977). p. 321. Kuhn. of course. is discussing a different set of five criteria in relation to theory
choice in the natural sciences. While there are some
similarities between Kuhns criteria and ours. they are
by no means identical.
This is as one would expect
given that we are discussing the warrant for structural
explanation
as opposed to theory choice per se. and in
the context of the social, as opposed to the natural,
sciences.
13. See for instance, Frank (196Ya). pp. 8-i-12. Frank
has an essay in which he discuascs the differences
between
functionalism
and dialectics,
as hc calls his
approach.
His criticism of Parsonian
functionalism
is a
substantive
one for the most part. but Frank does not
disavow the general form of functional
explanation.
and it may be inferred from what he dots say that he
endorses
the
need
for
such
explanation.
See
Functionalism
and dialectics,
in Frank (196Yb). pp.
95-107.
14. Frank (1979), p. 17 (emphasis
for a similar statement.

added).

explanation
without endorsing it as the proper explanatory form for all social elements. See Cohen (1978). pp.
283-285.

See p. 60

15. An interesting
and important
exchange concerning the status of functional
explanation
in the social
sciences is taking place among three philosophers:
Jon
Elster, G. A. Cohen,
and Philippe van Parijs. Set
Elster (1979) and Elster (1983); Cohen (lY78); and van
Parija (IYXI). Explaining
Technical Change contains a
partial
bibliography
of some of the many articles
involved in this exchange.
It should bc noted here that the use of functional
eplanation
does not imply functionalism.
Functionalism
is generally taken to be a social theory that postulates a
holistic view of society in which all elements of society
arc explained
in terms of their contributions
to the
maintenance
of the whole.
The use of functional
explanation
involves no such commitments.
While a
functionalist
would use functional
explanation.
one
might explain certain aspects of society via a functional

16. To talk of a structure or system as being able to be

the recipient of a beneficial effect. or as having needs,
is, of course. to violate the principle of methodological
individualism.
This is a criticism often made against
those who. like Frank, use functional
explanation
to
account for institutions
as satisfying system needs. Part
of the debate between Cohen and Ester involves the
status of methodological
individualism.
17. Elster, (1983). p. 64. Elster is here summarizing
the position of Cohen who maintains that these general
lawlike statements,
or consequence
laws. can supply
sufficient
backing
for functional
explanations.
See
citations
listed in Note 15 above and an article by
Cohen
(1982). For a critical discussion
of Elsters
criticism of Cohen, see Walt (1984).
18. Walt (lY84). p. 686. Walt here is summarizing
Elsters position,
which is critical of Cohens use of
consequence
laws. Walt goes on to criticize Elsters
arguments.
1Y. For a comment
to this effect. see Elster (1983).
pp. 59-61. One of the aims of Cohens project in Cohen
(1978) is to defend the use of functional explanation
in
the context of a reinterpreted
historical materialism,
so
the debate between them concerning explanation
in the
social sciences has important
implications
for at least
certain kinds of Marxists.
20. Note that what Frank is taking for granted here.
and need not account for nor defend at this lcvcl, is his
particular
interpretation
of Marxs theory of capital.
profit
and the accumulation
process.
This theory
provides him with the theoretical background
ncccssary
to analyze the existence of the needs experienced
by
metropolitan
capital.
21.
It might be objected that general correlations do
come into the picture bccausc such correlations
are
neeeded to support the causal claims involved in tracing
the causal mechanism.
The issue then begins to look
like the old one of the role of causal laws and
explanations
in history. Whether causal claims need to
be supported
by lawlikc generalizations.
however. is a
much contested
point at the moment.
22. This phrase
Actions,
reasons,
pp. F-10.

is due to Donald
Davidson.
Set
and causes. in Davidson
(IYSO),

23.
Elster (I983), p. 70. For a somewhat
dtffcrent
account of intentional explanation,
set MacDonald
and
Pettit (1981). pp. 62-66.
24. For a relatively
comprehensive
bihliography
of
criticisms of Frank. see his An answer to critics, in
Frank (1984). This essay is an updated version of an
article that appeared
in World fkvrlopmenf.
Vol. 5
(iY77).

A METHODOLOGICAL

ANALYSIS

25. In particular,
Brenner is concerned with Sweezys
exchange with Dobb over the question of the transition
from feudalism to capitalism
in Europe.
See Sweezy
(1976). The major work of Wallerstein
with which
Brenner is concerned
is Wallerstein
(1974). Also see
Wallerstein
(1979).
26.

See,

for instance,

Brenner

(1977).

OF DEPENDENCY

THEORY

209

Wallerstein all guilty of this same fundamental

mistake,
as well as guilty of sharing individualist-mechanist
presuppositions
with Smith,
that he labels them
neo-Smithians.
They are neo-Smithians
with a twist,
however,
for they invert Smiths progressivist
thesis
into
an account,
not of development.
but of
underdevelopment.

p. 30.

27. Brenner makes this point in several ways and in

several
places,
directed
variously
against
Smith,
Sweezy, Wallerstein,
and Frank. See, for examples,
Brenner (1977). pp. 34, 45, 55, 58, 67, and 83. This
criticism was. of course, first made by Marx of Adam
Smith. It is because Brenner finds Sweezy, Frank, and

28. Brenner
See Brenner

also makes this criticism in various

(1977). pp. 48-50 and 79-82.

29. David Thomas discusses

implications
for the philosophy
Thomas (1979). pp. 9-12.

ways.

this distinction
and its
of the social sciences in

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Henrique,
The consumption
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