SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 166579 : February 18, 2010

JORDAN CHAN PAZ, Petitioner, v. JEANICE PAVON PAZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the 9 August 20042 and 26 November 20043 Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80473. In its 9 August 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed
petitioner Jordan Chan Paz's (Jordan) appeal of the 13 May 2003 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 69 (trial court), which granted respondent Jeanice Pavon Paz's (Jeanice) petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. In its 26 November 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
Jordan's motion for reconsideration.
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The Facts
Jordan and Jeanice met sometime in November 1996. Jeanice was only 19 years old while Jordan was
27 years old. In January 1997, they became a couple and, on 10 May 1997, they were formally
engaged. They had their civil wedding on 3 July 1997, and their church wedding on 21 September
1997. They have one son, Evan Gaubert, who was born on 12 February 1998. After a big fight, Jeanice
left their conjugal home on 23 February 1999.
On 15 September 1999, Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jordan.
Jeanice alleged that Jordan was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of
marriage. According to Jeanice, Jordan's psychological incapacity was manifested by his uncontrollable
tendency to be self-preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his predisposition to become violent and
abusive whenever his whims and caprices were not satisfied.
Jeanice alleged that Jordan had a tendency to lie about his whereabouts and had the habit of hanging
out and spending a great deal of time with his friends. Since Jordan worked in their family business,
Jordan would allegedly just stay home, tinker with the Play Station, and ask Jeanice to lie to his
brothers about his whereabouts. Jeanice further alleged that Jordan was heavily dependent on and
attached to his mother. After giving birth to their son, Jeanice noticed that Jordan resented their son
and spent more time with his friends rather than help her take care of their son. Jordan also
demanded from his mother a steady supply of milk and diapers for their son.
At the early stage of their marriage, Jeanice said they had petty fights but that the quarrels turned for
the worse and Jordan became increasingly violent toward her. At one point, Jordan threatened to hurt
her with a pair of scissors. Jeanice also alleged that on 22 February 1999, Jordan subjected her to
verbal lashing and insults and threatened to hit her with a golf club. Jeanice added that Jordan has not
provided any financial support or visited their son since she left their conjugal home.
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was afflicted with "Borderline Personality
Disorder as manifested in his impulsive behavior, delinquency and instability." 5 Gates concluded that
Jordan's psychological maladies antedate their marriage and are rooted in his family background.
Gates added that with no indication of reformation, Jordan's personality disorder appears to be grave
and incorrigible.
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Jordan denied Jeanice's allegations. Jordan asserted that Jeanice exaggerated her statements against
him. Jordan said that Jeanice has her own personal insecurities and that her actions showed her lack
of maturity, childishness and emotional inability to cope with the struggles and challenges of
maintaining a married life.
Jordan also objected to the psychological report offered by Jeanice. Jordan pointed out that he was not
subjected to any interview or psychological tests by Gates. Jordan argued that Gates conclusions were
mere speculations, conjectures and suppositions from the information supplied by Jeanice. Jordan
alleged that it was patently one-sided and is not admissible in evidence as it was based on hearsay
statements of Jeanice which were obviously self-serving. Jordan said he wants Jeanice back and
prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 13 May 2003, the trial court granted Jeanice's petition. The trial court declared that Jordan's
psychological incapacity, which was specifically identified as "Borderline Personality Disorder," deprived
him of the capacity to fully understand his responsibilities under the marital bond. The trial court
found that Jordan was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage, particularly Articles 686 and 707 of the Family Code. The trial court also declared that
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Jordan's psychological incapacity, being rooted in his family background, antedates the marriage and
that without any sign of reformation, found the same to be grave and incurable.
The dispositve portion of the trial court's 13 May 2003 Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner
Jeanice Pavon Paz and respondent Jordan Chan Paz celebrated on July 3, 1997 and September 21,
1997 as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code with all the effects provided by law. The couple's absolute
community of properties [sic] shall be dissolved in the manner herein provided. And the custody over
Evan shall remain with the petitioner, without regard to visitation rights of the respondent as the
father of the child. Furthermore, the parties are jointly responsible for the support of their minor child
Evan Guabert Pavon Paz.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of Quezon City and Pasig City
respectively as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO, CRP, Legal Department) EDSA, Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.8

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On 6 June 2003, Jordan filed a Notice of Appeal.9 The trial court promptly approved Jordan's appeal.
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On 10 February 2004, Jeanice filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal with the Court of Appeals. 10 In her
motion, Jeanice sought the immediate dismissal of Jordan's appeal on the ground that Jordan failed to
comply with Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC11 which provides:
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Sec. 20. Appeal.

(1) Pre-condition. No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the appellant has filed a motion
for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice of judgment.
On 9 August 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jordan's appeal. According to the Court of Appeals,
the rules state in mandatory and categorical terms that the filing of a motion for reconsideration or
new trial is a pre-condition before an appeal from the decision is allowed. The Court of Appeals added
that when the law is clear and unambiguous, it admits no room for interpretation but merely for
application.
Jordan filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 26 November 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the motion.
Hence, this petition.
In a minute Resolution dated 22 June 2005, we denied Jordan's petition for failure to sufficiently show
that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged resolutions as to warrant
the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction. 12
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On 18 August 2005, Jordan filed a motion for reconsideration. While Jordan admits that he failed to
file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's 13 May 2003 Decision, Jordan submits that Section
20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC should not have been strictly applied against him because it took effect
only on 15 March 2003, or less than two months prior to the rendition of the trial court's 13 May 2003
Decision. Moreover, Jordan enjoins the Court to decide the case on the merits so as to preserve the
sanctity of marriage as enshrined in the Constitution.
Jeanice also filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration on 1 September 2005. 13

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In a minute Resolution dated 19 September 2005, we granted Jordan's motion for reconsideration and
reinstated the petition.14
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Jeanice filed a motion for reconsideration. In a minute Resolution dated 5 June 2006, we denied
Jeanice's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 15
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On 7 August 2006, Jeanice filed a second motion for reconsideration.

In a minute Resolution dated 20 September 2006, we denied Jeanice's second motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit and reminded Jeanice that a second motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading.16
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The Issue
The only issue left to be resolved is whether Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

Jeanice Failed to Prove Jordan's Psychological Incapacity
Jeanice's petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code
which provides:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial antecedence; and (c) incurability. It must be confined "to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage."18
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In Dimayuga-Laurena v. Court of Appeals, 19 the Court explained:

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(a) Gravity It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Judicial Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.20
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In granting Jeanice's petition, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of Gates to support its
conclusion that Jordan was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. Gates declared that Jordan was suffering from "Borderline Personality Disorder" as
manifested by his being a "mama's boy" and that such was "grave and incurable," "rooted in his family
background, [and] antedates the marriage."
Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be
personally examined by a physician or a psychologist, there is nevertheless a need to prove the
psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the person alleging said
disorder. 21
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Correspondingly, the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of
the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity. 22
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In this case, the Court notes that the report and testimony of Gates on Jordan's psychological
incapacity were based exclusively on her interviews with Jeanice and the transcript of stenographic
notes of Jeanice's testimony before the trial court. 23 Gates only diagnosed Jordan from the
statements of Jeanice, whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. Gates did not actually
hear, see and evaluate Jordan. Gates testified:
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Q- As a last question Madam witness. So all in all your conclusions here on page 1 to page 5 of your
Report are all based on the statement and perception of the petitioner (Jeanice) on the respondent
(Jordan)?
A- Yes Mam.24

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Consequently, Gates report and testimony were hearsay evidence since she had no personal
knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying on. 25 Gates testimony should have thus been
dismissed for being unscientific and unreliable. 26
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Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Jordan's alleged psychological incapacity was not
shown to be so grave and so permanent as to deprive him of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond. At best, Jeanice's allegations showed that Jordan was
irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally immature. The incidents cited by Jeanice do not show that
Jordan suffered from grave psychological maladies that paralyzed Jordan from complying with the
essential obligations of marriage.
What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity is
downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. 27 The mere showing of
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" does not constitute psychological
incapacity.28
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In Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris,29 we said:

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As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with
certain personality disorders, there is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
marriage.30
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Furthermore, Gates did not particularly describe the "pattern of behavior" which showed that Jordan
indeed suffers from Borderline Personality Disorder. Gates also failed to explain how such a personality
disorder made Jordan psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband.
Likewise, Jeanice was not able to establish with certainty that Jordan's alleged psychological incapacity
was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Gates testimony on the matter was vague and
inconclusive. Gates testified:
Q - Now is this disorder curable?
A - If it's continuing to the present therefore its persevererative behavior. Then the possibility of
countering the same might be nil.31
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Gates did not adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that Jordan's condition was
incurable.
In sum, the totality of the evidence presented by Jeanice failed to show that Jordan was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations and that such incapacity
was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of the solemnization of their marriage.
In Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio,32 we said:
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The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected
by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity
of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.33
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WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 9 August 2004 and 26 November 2004
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. We REVERSE the 13 May 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 69. The marriage of Jeanice Pavon Paz to Jordan Chan Paz subsists and remains
valid.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Endnotes:
1
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Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rollo, pp. 35-38. Penned by Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine, with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Noel G. Tijam,
concurring.
2

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3
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4
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5
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6
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Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 103-114. Penned by Judge Lorifel Lacap Pahimna.
Records, p. 123.
Article 68 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 68. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support.
7
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Article 70 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other
conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of
their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligation shall be satisfied from
their separate properties.
8
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9
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Rollo, pp. 103-114.

Id. at 115.

10
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Id. at 117-121.

Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages which took effect on 15
March 2003.
11

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12
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Rollo, p. 171.

In a minute Resolution dated 9 November 2005, the Court resolved to "note without action" Jeanice's Opposition to the
Motion for Reconsideration.
13

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14
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15
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16
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17
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18
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19
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20
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21
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Rollo, p. 182.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 330. See Section 2, Rule 52 in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
310 Phil. 21 (1995).
Id. at 40.
G.R. No. 159220, 22 September 2008, 566 SCRA 154.
Id. at 162.
Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, 27 February 2008, 547 SCRA 123; Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose,

G.R. No. 168328, 28 February 2007, 517 SCRA 123.

22
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23
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24
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25
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26
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27
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Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009, 579 SCRA 193.
TSN, 15 November 2000, pp. 9-11, 21-24.
Id. at 52.
Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, 14 August 2009; Bier v. Bier, supra note 21.
Najera v. Najera, G.R. No. 164817, 3 July 2009, 591 SCRA 541; Bier v. Bier, supra note 21.
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997, 268 SCRA 198.

28
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29
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30
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31
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32
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33
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Id.
G.R. No. 162368, 17 July 2006, 495 SCRA 396.
Id. at 401.
TSN, 15 November 2000, p. 18.
G.R. No. 171042, 30 June 2008, 556 SCRA 711.
Id. at 727.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 165321 : August 03, 2010]
RICARDO P. TORING, PETITIONER, VS. TERESITA M. TORING AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Ricardo P. Toring from the May 31, 2004 decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. The CA reversed the August 10, 2001 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106 of
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-36662,[2] nullifying Ricardo's marriage with respondent Teresita M. Toring on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
THE FACTS
Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in 1978 at his aunt's house in Cebu. Teresita was then his cousin's teacher in Hawaiian
dance and was conducting lessons at his aunt's house. Despite their slight difference in age (of five years), the younger
Ricardo found the dance teacher attractive and fell in love with her. He pursued Teresita and they became sweethearts
after three months of courtship. They eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get
Ricardo to marry her.
Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the City Court of Quezon City. They
begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.
On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the RTC.
He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at
the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. He asked the court to declare his marriage to Teresita
null and void.
At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the psychological evaluation and signature of his expert
witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albaran's respective testimonies. Teresita did not file any
answer or opposition to the petition, nor did she testify to refute the allegations against her.[3]
Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the trial that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer. He was an
overseas seaman, and he regularly sent money to his wife to cover the family's living expenses and their children's tuition.
Teresita, however, was not adept in managing the funds he sent and their finances. Many times, Ricardo would come home
and be welcomed by debts incurred by his wife; he had to settle these to avoid embarrassment.
Aside from neglect in paying debts she incurred from other people, Teresita likewise failed to remit amounts she collected
as sales agent of a plasticware and cosmetics company. She left the family's utility bills and their children's tuition fees
unpaid. She also missed paying the rent and the amortization for the house that Ricardo acquired for the family, so their
children had to live in a small rented room and eventually had to be taken in by Ricardo's parents. When confronted by
Ricardo, Teresita would simply offer the excuse that she spent the funds Ricardo sent to buy things for the house and for
their children.
Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and suspected that she was pregnant with another man's child. During one of
his visits to the country, he noticed that Teresita's stomach was slightly bigger. He tried to convince her to have a medical
examination but she refused. Her miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo
alleged that the child could not have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with Teresita were characterized by
"withdrawals"; other than these, no other sexual contacts with his wife transpired, as he transferred and lived with his
relatives after a month of living with Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors that his wife represented herself to
others as single, and went out on dates with other men when he was not around.
Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding person, who mostly had her
way in everything; had a taste for the nightlife and was very averse to the duties of a housewife; was stubborn and
independent, also most unsupportive, critical and uncooperative; was unresponsive to his hard work and sacrifices for their
family; and was most painfully unmindful of him.[4] He believed that their marriage had broken down beyond repair and
that they both have lost their mutual trust and love for one another.[5]
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to the demise of the marriage was Teresita's Narcissistic
Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations. To quote Dr.
Albaran:
Teresita, the respondent[,] has [sic] shown to manifest the following pervasive pattern of behaviors: a sense of entitlement
as she expected favorable treatment and automatic compliance to her wishes, being interpersonally exploitative as on
several occasions she took advantage of him to achieve her own ends, lack of empathy as she was unwilling to recognize
her partners [sic] feelings and needs[,] taking into consideration her own feelings and needs only, her haughty and
arrogant behavior and attitude and her proneness to blame others for her failures and shortcomings. These patterns of
behavior speaks [sic] of a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which started to manifest in early adulthood. The disorder is
considered to be grave and incurable based on the fact that individuals do not recognize the symptoms as it is ego syntonic
and they feel there is nothing wrong in them. Because of that[,] they remain unmotivated for treatment and impervious to
recovery.[6]
She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from her psychological evaluation on Ricardo and Richardson
(Ricardo and Teresita's eldest son). She admitted, though, that she did not personally observe and examine Teresita; she

sent Teresita a personally-delivered notice for the conduct of a psychiatric evaluation, but the notice remained unanswered.
In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that there was no basis to
declare Teresita psychologically incapacitated. It asserted that the psychological evaluation conducted on Ricardo (and his
son Richardson) only revealed a vague and general conclusion on these parties' personality traits but not on Teresita's
psychological makeup. The OSG also argued that the evidence adduced did not clinically identify and sufficiently prove the
medical cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Neither did the evidence indicate that the alleged psychological
incapacity existed prior to or at the time of marriage, nor that the incapacity was grave and incurable.
The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and annulled his marriage to Teresita. In short, the RTC believed Dr. Albaran's psychological
evaluation and testimony and, on the totality of Ricardo's evidence, found Teresita to be psychologically incapacitated to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. The OSG appealed the decision to the CA.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that the trial court's findings did not satisfy the rules and guidelines set by this
Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.[7] The RTC failed to specifically point out the root illness or defect that
caused Teresita's psychological incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity already existed at the time of
celebration of marriage.
The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albaran's psychological evaluation do not appear to have been drawn from
well-rounded and fair sources, and dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and rumors. Likewise, the CA found that Ricardo's
allegations on Teresita's overspending and infidelity do not constitute adequate grounds for declaring the marriage null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code. These allegations, even if true, could only effectively serve as grounds for legal
separation or a criminal charge for adultery.
THE PETITION AND THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
Ricardo faults the CA for disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, particularly the expert testimony of Dr. Albaran,
and submits that the trial court - in declaring the nullity of the marriage - fully complied with Molina.
In its Comment,[8] the OSG argued that the CA correctly reversed the RTC's decision, particularly in its conclusion that
Ricardo failed to comply with this Court's guidelines for the proper interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code. Reiterating its earlier arguments below, the OSG asserts that the evidence adduced before the trial court failed to
show the gravity, juridical antecedence, or incurability of the psychological incapacity of Teresita, and failed as well to
identify and discuss its root cause. The psychiatrist, likewise, failed to show that Teresita was completely unable to
discharge her marital obligations due to her alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Ricardo's Reply[9] reiterated that the RTC decision thoroughly discussed the root cause of Teresita's psychological incapacity
and identified it as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. He claimed that sufficient proof had been adduced by the psychiatrist
whose expertise on the subject cannot be doubted. Interestingly, Ricardo further argued that alleging the root cause in a
petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary, citing Barcelona v. Court of Appeals.[10]
These positions were collated and reiterated in the memoranda the parties filed.
THE COURT'S RULING
We find the petition unmeritorious, as the CA committed no reversible error when it set aside the RTC's decision for
lack of legal and factual basis.
In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[11] we held that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to
annul a marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage."[12]
We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code in Molina and laid down definitive guidelines in the interpretation
and application of this article. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability established in the Santos case, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis,233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted

as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6)The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.[13]
Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these basic guidelines to varying factual situations, thus
confirming the continuing doctrinal validity of Santos. In so far as the present factual situation is concerned, what should
not be lost in reading and applying our established rulings is the intent of the law to confine the application of Article 36 of
the Family Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these are the disorders that result in the utter
insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she contracted.
Furthermore, the psychological illness and its root cause must have been there from the inception of the marriage. From
these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply
recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place because the affliction - already then existing - was so grave
and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he
or she was to assume or had assumed.[14]
In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the petitioner's evidence to be insufficient to
prove that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife. As already mentioned, the evidence
presented consisted of the testimonies of Ricardo and Dr. Albaran, and the latter's psychological evaluation of Ricardo and
Richardson from where she derived a psychological evaluation of Teresita.
a. Dr. Albaran's psychological evaluation and testimony
Dr. Albaran concluded in her psychological evaluation that Teresita suffers from Narcissistic Personality Disorder that
rendered her psychologically incapacitated to assume essential marital obligations. To support her findings and conclusion,
she banked on the statements told to her by Ricardo and Richardson, which she narrated in her evaluation. Apparently
relying on the same basis, Dr. Albaran added that Teresita's disorder manifested during her early adulthood and is grave
and incurable.
To say the least, we are greatly disturbed by the kind of testimony and evaluation that, in this case, became the basis for
the conclusion that no marriage really took place because of the psychological incapacity of one of the parties at the time
of marriage.
We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the results of
the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, already constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion
that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. This Court has long been negatively critical in considering
psychological evaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely from one-sided sources, particularly from the spouse
seeking the nullity of the marriage.
In So v. Valera,[15] the Court considered the psychologist's testimony and conclusions to be insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the finding of respondent's psychological incapacity because the facts, on which the conclusions
were based, were all derived from the petitioner's statements whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be discounted. In
another case, Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,[16] the Court declared that while the various tests administered on the
petitioner-wife could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement could
not be made with respect to the respondent-husband's psychological condition. To our mind, conclusions and
generalizations about Teresita's psychological condition, based solely on information fed by Ricardo, are not any different in
kind from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence. [17]
To be sure, we have recognized that the law does not require that the allegedly incapacitated spouse be personally
examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.[18] This recognition, however, does not signify that the evidence, we shall favorably
appreciate, should be any less than the evidence that an Article 36 case, by its nature, requires.
Our recognition simply means that the requirements for nullity outlined in Santos and Molina need not necessarily come
from the allegedly incapacitated spouse. In other words, it is still essential - although from sources other than the
respondent spouse - to show his or her personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of marriage; the root cause of
the inability to appreciate the essential obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence and incurability of the
condition.
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close
friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse's condition at or about the
time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of
marriage.
In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever asked to give statements for purposes of
Teresita's psychological evaluation was Richardson, the spouses' eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a
witness in an Article 36 case because he could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have
been expected to know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth.
We confirm the validity of this observation from a reading of the summary of Richardson's interview with the pyschologist:
Richardson's statement occupied a mere one paragraph (comprising eleven sentences) in the psychological evaluation and
merely recited isolated instances of his parents fighting over the foreclosure of their house, his father's alleged
womanizing, and their differences in religion (Ricardo is a Catholic, while Teresita is a Mormon). [19]
We find nothing unusual in these recited marital incidents to indicate that Teresita suffered from some psychological
disorder as far back as the time of her marriage to Ricardo, nor do we find these fights to be indicative of problems
traceable to any basic psychological disorder existing at the time of marriage. For one, these points of dispute are not
uncommon in a marriage and relate essentially to the usual roots of marital problems - finances, fidelity and religion. The
psychologist, too, never delved into the relationship between mother and son except to observe their estranged
relationship due to a previous argument - a money problem involving Ricardo's financial remittances to the family. To state
the obvious, the psychologist's evaluation never explained how the recited incidents, made by one who was not even born
at the time of the spouses' marriage, showed a debilitating psychological incapacity already existing at that time.
Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardo's cause, is the failure of Dr. Albaran's psychological evaluation to fully
explain the details - i.e., the what, how, when, where and since when - of Teresita's alleged Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. It seems to us that, with hardly any supporting evidence to fall back on, Dr. Albaran simply stated out of the blue

that Teresita's personality disorder manifested itself in early adulthood, presuming thereby that the incapacity should have
been there when the marriage was celebrated. Dr. Albaran never explained, too, the incapacitating nature of Teresita's
alleged personality disorder, and how it related to the essential marital obligations that she failed to assume. Neither did
the good doctor adequately explain in her psychological evaluation how grave and incurable was Teresita's psychological
disorder.
Dr. Albaran's testimony at the trial did not improve the evidentiary situation for Ricardo, as it still failed to provide the
required insights that would have remedied the evidentiary gaps in her written psychological evaluation. In fact, Dr.
Albaran's cross-examination only made the evidentiary situation worse when she admitted that she had difficulty
pinpointing the root cause of Teresita's personality disorder, due to the limited information she gathered from Ricardo and
Richardson regarding Teresita's personal and family history. To directly quote from the records, Dr. Albaran confessed this
limitation when she said that "[t]he only data that I have is that, the respondent seem [sic] to have grown from a
tumultuous family and this could be perhaps the [sic] contributory to the development of the personality
disorder."[20] Dr. Albaran's obvious uncertainty in her assessment only proves our point that a complete personality profile
of the spouse, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, could not be determined from meager information coming only
from a biased source.
b.

Ricardo's testimony

Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a squanderer and an adulteress. We do not, however, find Ricardo's
characterizations of his wife sufficient to constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere
"difficulty," "refusal, or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different
from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. [21]
Ricardo's testimony merely established that Teresita was irresponsible in managing the family's finances by not paying
their rent, utility bills and other financial obligations. Teresita's spendthrift attitude, according to Ricardo, even resulted in
the loss of the house and lot intended to be their family residence. This kind of irresponsibility, however, does not rise to
the level of a psychological incapacity required under Article 36 of the Family Code. At most, Teresita's mismanagement of
the family's finances merely constituted difficulty, refusal or neglect, during the marriage, in the handling of funds intended
for the family's financial support.
Teresita's alleged infidelity, even if true, likewise does not constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent's unfaithfulness must be
established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the
essential obligations of the marital state;[22] there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively
incapacitated her from complying with the obligation to be faithful to her spouse. [23]
In our view, Ricardo utterly failed in his testimony to prove that Teresita suffered from a disordered personality of this
kind. Even Ricardo's added testimony, relating to rumors of Teresita's dates with other men and her pregnancy by another
man, would not fill in the deficiencies we have observed, given the absence of an adverse integral element and link to
Teresita's allegedly disordered personality.
Moreover, Ricardo failed to prove that Teresita's alleged character traits already existed at the inception of their marriage.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.[24] In the absence of this element, a
marriage cannot be annulled under Article 36.
Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be
alleged in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of
the Family Code
Citing Barcelona,[25] Ricardo defended the RTC decision, alleging that the root cause in a petition for annulment under
Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary. We find this argument completely at variance with Ricardo's main
argument against the assailed CA decision - i.e., that the RTC, in its decision, discussed thoroughly the root cause of
Teresita's psychological incapacity as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. These conflicting positions, notwithstanding, we see
the need to address this issue to further clarify our statement in Barcelona, which Ricardo misquoted and misinterpreted to
support his present petition that "since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological
incapacity."[26]
In Barcelona, the petitioner assailed the bid for annulment for its failure to state the "root cause" of the respondent's
alleged psychological incapacity. The Court resolved this issue, ruling that the petition sufficiently stated a cause of action
because the petitioner - instead of stating a specific root cause - clearly described the physical manifestations
indicative of the psychological incapacity. This, the Court found to be sufficiently compliant with the first requirement
in the Molina case - that the "root cause" of the psychological incapacity be alleged in an Article 36 petition.
Thus, contrary to Ricardo's position, Barcelona does not do away with the "root cause" requirement. The ruling simply
means that the statement of the root cause does not need to be in medical terms or be technical in nature, as the root
causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science. It is enough to merely allege the physical
manifestations constituting the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Section 2, paragraph (d) of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (Rules)[27] in fact provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
x x x x
(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specially allege the complete facts showing that
either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages
at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
As we explained in Barcelona, the requirement alleging the root cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the
Family Code was not dispensed with by the adoption of the Rules. What the Rules really eliminated was the need for
an expert opinion to prove the root cause of the psychological incapacity. The Court further held that the Rules, being
procedural in nature, apply only to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.
To sum up, Ricardo failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that Teresita suffered from psychological incapacity;
thus, his petition for annulment of marriage must fail. Ricardo merely established that Teresita had been remiss in her
duties as a wife for being irresponsible in taking care of their family's finances - a fault or deficiency that does not amount
to the psychological incapacity that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. We reiterate that irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselveswarrant a

finding of psychological incapacity, as the same may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the
obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses. [28]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71882. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales, (Chairperson), Bersamin, *Abad, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Endnotes:

Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, per
Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
*

[1]

Rollo, pp. 18-29.

[2]

RTC rollo, pp. 1-6.

[3]

Rollo, p. 19.

[4]

RTC rollo, p. 4.

[5]

Id. at 5.

[6]

Id. at 51.

[7]

335 Phil. 664 (1997).

[8]

Rollo, pp. 43-52.

[9]

Id. at 58-62.

[10]

G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003, 412 SCRA 41, 49-50.

[11]

310 Phil. 21 (1995).

[12]

Id. at 40.

[13]

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 7, at 676-678.

See So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 319; Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738,
August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 157.
[14]

[15]

Supra note 14.

[16]

Supra note 14.

[17]

Ibid.

[18]

Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755.

[19]

RTC rollo, p. 50.

[20]

Id. at 157.

[21]

Navales v. Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 272.

Santos v. Santos, supra note 11; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919, 931-932 (1999); Dedel v. Court of
Appeals, 466 Phil. 226, 233-232 (2004).
[22]

[23]

Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009.

[24]

Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra note 11.

[25]

Supra note 10.

[26]

Id. at 50.

[27]

Effective March 15, 2003.

[28]

Supra note 21, at 288.