SUSTAINABLE OPTIONS FOR STABILIZATION IN THIS MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRY

Wilson Gu
SEST 676: Conflict Stabilization
December 14, 2015

Introduction
The strategy to effectively stabilize this Middle Eastern country must apply lessons from
past efforts. Interventions to stabilize conflict in the past have a mixed record with unsuccessful
cases in Iraq and Afghanistan contrasted with successes in Bosnia and Colombia. While this
paper will refer to these cases, it will not be a case study. Rather, it will recommend different sets
of actions and important considerations necessary to achieve successful stabilization.
Furthermore, this paper will focus on whether or not actions will produce long-term and
sustainable results. Other papers can address on other decision criteria such as cost or political
feasibility.
The important lesson of sustainability has emerged as the key lesson from past U.S.
stabilization efforts. The U.S. must be willing to stay involved for a long period of time. While
the country may stabilize sooner than expected, that will not happen if the U.S. adopts a shortterm mentality. Such a mentality will lead to inadequate support for a sustainable outcome. A
sustainable outcome, after all, is the desired result so that the U.S. can withdraw without the
country devolving back into conflict. Therefore, among all decision criteria, sustainability will be
the critical criterion in this paper. The paper presents actions within different aspects of
stabilization: security force assistance, partnering, reforms, democratization, economic
assistance, and human rights. Each action will receive a preliminary sustainability assessment.

Security Force Assistance

Security force assistance is the most crucial aspect of successful stabilization. Fearon and
Laitin (2003) show that one major determinant of the outbreak of an insurgency is the lack of
police and military capabilities. While the reasons for why civil wars start are not the same for
why they end, Fearon and Laitin (2007) in another study show that civil wars rarely end in
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negotiated settlements and more often end in the victory of the government or rebels. Therefore,
security force assistance is needed, because it contributes to the creation of a military and police
capable of defeating an insurgency. It also decreases the likelihood of renewed conflict, if the
current one is resolved, because the military and police will be more capable.
For security force assistance to have an impact, it must be overwhelming and in the form
of a shock, according to Fearon and Laitin (2007). Any U.S. intervention should adhere to this
idea. The massive increase in aid, the majority of which went to security force assistance, under
Plan Colombia in the early 2000s was a decisive factor in the decrease in violence. In the ten
years preceding Plan Colombia, the average amount of aid per year was $134 million. In the ten
years after the initiation of Plan Colombia, that amount was $856 million per year1. That large
increase lends support to Fearon and Laitins conclusions on the efficacy of shocks. It also shows
the possibility of security force assistance leading to stabilization. For Colombia, that assistance
came in the form of new equipment like helicopters that multiplied Colombian forces
capabilities, training for new elite units targeting drug cartels and rebel groups, and advisers on
strategy and administration of the armed forces.
U.S. support for Colombia falls under the broader category of direct support for the
military which includes training, fire support, and equipment. American advisers are used to
implement this support and are especially helpful in coordinating between the military, the
civilian government, and the U.S. government. They can also provide intelligence collected
through superior U.S. technical capabilities. Advisers also send information on what is
happening on the ground to the U.S. government so that it knows whether or not the support is
appropriate.

1 USAID Greenbook. https://www.usaid.gov/developer/greenbookapi

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Some aspects of direct support for the military are sustainable, such as training on
strategy, tactics, and use of equipment. They increase the capability of the armed forces to
conduct future campaigns, although the increases in abilities depend on advisers willingness to
encourage local armed forces to take ownership in designing and conducting missions. Other
aspects like fire support and providing equipment are not sustainable. The U.S. should only
provide this type of support if it is absolutely crucial to a successful stabilization. But in the end,
material goods like equipment or the availability of American air support do not matter if there is
no more insurgency. The risk lies in a dependence on American support and an inability to end
the conflict. That is why a shock is so important.
Overall, direct support for the military, if conducted within a genuine partnership with
government armed forces, can lead to sustainable gains in defeating the insurgency and can set
up the government to counter future threats more ably.
The U.S. can also provide security force assistance in the form of capacity building for
the civilian government on military affairs. This gives civilians increased capabilities to provide
oversight on the military to match the increase in materials and resources provided to the
military. The civilian government thus becomes more capable in carrying out all of the
underlying duties that support the military, like procurement, logistics, budgeting, and
administration. Depending on the current structure of the bureaucracy and relations between the
government and military, the U.S. can push for reforms to decentralize (or centralize) and to
simplify (or complicate) the bureaucracy. Capacity building is sustainable because governments
learn the systems and processes on how to manage their military. As long as the U.S. respects the
domestic governments sovereignty and proposes effective reforms, capacity building is a
recommended course of action due to its gains in sustainable change.

Also part of the menu of options for security force assistance is police training. However,
the police have often not received the necessary support in past stabilization efforts. Part of the
problem lies in coordination issues between the State Department and Department of Defense.
The State Department often has the funds, but trainers come from the Department of the
Defense. This results in less training for the police who are actually more capable of combating
insurgencies given their constant presence in populated areas. Reconciling this lack of
communication and providing proper support for the police is crucial to stabilizing a conflict.
Due to their roots in the local community, police serve a paramilitary function of providing
constant security and containing the movements of insurgents, all tenets of counterinsurgency
doctrine that emphasizes protection of the population.
A well-trained police force is a sustainable option. Every state requires a police force that
can catch criminals, charge them with crimes, and sentence them to prison. It is likely that the
insurgents also are dissatisfied with the current enforcement of law and order, possibly citing
inequality or corruption. Therefore, in order for police training to be effective, the entire law and
order system needs improvement. Because this country already has a functioning, albeit
imperfect, legal system, it will be difficult for the U.S. to propose reforms under the guise as a
stabilizing force. Such reforms would infringe upon the countrys sovereignty. Instead, the U.S.
should limit itself to just providing counterinsurgency training and equipment to the police.
Similarly to the military, this effort will involve improving the bureaucratic capacity of the police
to ensure proper allocation and use of resources when the U.S. withdraws its support. This does
not address larger issues in the judicial system, but the goal of stabilization requires a strong
police force. It does not require an exemplary judicial system.

Conducting security assistance entails numerous risks. One risk is the principal-agent
problem where the principal, the U.S. government, and the agent, the armed forces, have
divergent interests. The military may actually be interested in perpetuating the instability as this
may lead to more resources for the military. This problem is compounded by corruption where
military officers often benefit privately from government resources going to the military. In spite
of all these problems, the U.S. can use conditions attached to its military support to counteract
the principal-agent problem. Corruption will happen, and the U.S. should push against it when
possible. But the U.S. should also understand that the goal is not to fix the entire country but
rather to shift the tide through a shock in security force assistance to bring stability through a
clear.

Partnering
Partnering is important because as a foreign intervener, the U.S. cannot possibly have a complete
understanding of the context and intricacies of this Middle Eastern country. Partners provide the
necessary knowledge to devise an effective strategy and implement it. This knowledge can be
about tribal relations, strengths and weaknesses of the insurgency, potential allies, or the viability
of strategies and tactics. Not only do partners provide knowledge, they also add capabilities and
forces to the shared effort of attaining stabilization. This minimizes risk to U.S. personnel by
preventing the need for too active of a role for Americans. The main groups with which the U.S.
can partner are: militias, tribal groups, civil society, and religious movements.
Militias (partnering with the formal military is already covered) are any armed group that
is not the police or army but are still connected to the formal armed forces. They are often paid
by the government but usually begin as a community arming themselves to provide security.
They are useful because they have a unique ability to collect intelligence due to their proximity
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to the insurgents and deep knowledge of the environment. For example, the Al Anbar police
captured or killed twice as many insurgents as the Iraqi National Army at one point during the
war, and in Afghanistan, locals find 40% of IEDs or arms caches (Malkasian October 29, 2015).
If given the right incentives, militias also provide substantial contributions to fighting insurgents,
because they are defending their communities and families. They have a higher stake in the fight
than the national army sent in from the central government.
Despite the potential for success in partnering with militias, a sustainable peace earned
through militia involvement is dependent on whether or not the militias are incorporated into the
future political structure and/or are provided jobs. Often, militias fight for the pay, and if militias
are used, the government should gradually demobilize them while providing benefits or job
training. This is often not the case, and rapid demobilization once a threat disappears with no
source of further income for militia members leads to further instability. Militias may then begin
fighting the government. Due to these sustainability risks, partnering with militias is not an
immediate solution and should only be explored if the government forces are unable to defeat the
insurgency.
Tribes are familial groups (strict or loose) that function as informal, local political entities
outside the formal government structure. They often form their own armed groups or militias, but
their political dimension also deserves attention as potential partners. A country with an
insurgency by default has a weak state. Tribes fill this power vacuum at the local level and instill
order through the provision of goods and services by tribal leaders to tribe members. The U.S.
and the Middle Eastern country government can provide the goods and services that tribal
leaders seek, whether that be access to smuggling routes or government jobs. In return, tribes can

provide security in their areas and provide intelligence on insurgents that the armed forces or
militias can use.
The sustainability of working with tribal partners is low, because tribal cooperation is
completely due to outside support. However, the U.S. must work with tribes because of their
influence at the local level and understanding of what is happening. The U.S. may be tempted to
help the central government bring tribes underneath the governments authority. However, that is
not the U.S.s goal. The U.S.s goal, stabilization, merely requires tribal support and cooperation,
and to attain that, the U.S. and the Middle Eastern country government should increase whatever
goods and services they need. As long as this relationship is managed and the tribes do not
receive too much that could embolden them take on the government, then there is the opportunity
for a working relationship. The U.S. should partner with tribes.
Partnering with civil society gives access to the space between public and private sector
and space distinct from tribes and religious movements. Civil society provides services for
citizens and function as a check against government. Examples include labor unions, NGOs in
education or health, or civic action groups. They hold expertise and capability in specific areas,
and those organizations with a higher public profile can attract attention to put pressure on the
government (or other actors) to change. For the U.S., supporting civil society is often viewed as
more palatable than supporting a militia or a tribe because of civil societys more explicit goals
of serving the entire country.
Civil society achievements are highly dependent on the willingness of the government to
provide space for civil society to operate. In non-democracies like this Middle Eastern country,
governments frequently refuse to allow civil societies to function due to the potential of civil
society to challenge the government for power and influence. They do this through a tedious

registration process, harassment by security forces, and restricting funding. As a result, civil
society relies on funds from outside sources. In stabilizing this Middle Eastern country, civil
society may achieve short-term gains, but the U.S. should not expect those gains nor the
organizations that achieved them to exist much longer after the U.S. leaves. Still, short-term
gains are valuable and the U.S. should support civil society as long as the stabilization effort
continues.
Religious movements are also a potential partner. They pursue political goals but use
religion as a shared identity. Religion is unique because of its ability to unify seemingly disparate
groups behind a powerful value-based standard, since most religions advocate for justice and
resistance to oppression. As a result, religious organizations provide money and charity and are
willing to work towards stability. On the other hand, religious organizations do not want to be
viewed as puppets of the government, so any attempt to work with religious movements must be
tactful. They are a good option that provides sustainable results due to their devotion to
principles and values. The U.S. should explore this option immediately and maintain it
throughout the stabilization effort.
The main risk for all partnering is the principal-agent problem, elaborated more here than
in the section on security force assistance. The principal-agent problem arises when the principal
asks an agent to perform the task, but due to different interests, the agent does not perform the
task to the satisfaction of the principal. Often, the principal-agent problem will turn into a moral
hazard where the agent knows the principal needs help, so the agent does not perform adequately
without fear of penalty. The principal, the U.S., will become locked in with a partner, the agent,
because the principal fears that withdrawing cooperation from the agent before stabilization is
achieved will make stabilization completely impossible. Conditions on the relationship and

monitoring of the agent can counteract some of the ill effects. These are costly and inefficient,
but the potential gains from partnering far outweigh these costs.
There is also the risk of having many disparate partners who have too many differing
interests. This will make it difficult to unite behind one effort and introduces the possibility of
spoilers. Therefore, partnering should be done within an overarching framework so that all
partners buy into one solution. The framework should also remain flexible to partners different
interests and exhibit resiliency if partners decide to stop partnering.

Reforms
It is important to remember that the goal of the intervention is not an effectively governed
country with a government completely accountable to its people. Rather, the goal is stabilization,
and any reforms proposed by the U.S. should not be too ambitious and should work first towards
stabilization.
That said, reforms are useful because they address grievances. Grievances arise when a
group of citizens feel the government has intentionally harmed that group. Groups can include
ethnicities, religions, or rural communities. Grievances, admittedly, are common in every
country, and studies have shown that there is no direct link between grievances and outbreak of
civil war (Collier 2007, 24). That does not mean that grievances are irrelevant, and it is hard to
believe that they play no role in the formation of insurgencies. Reform of government policies is
one way to mollify those who join an insurgency due to grievances.
Reforming such a wide organization as a government must first start with institutions.
Institutions are the rules that guide interactions between citizens and the governments. The legal
system is one institution that often needs reform, and an unfair legal system is often cited as a
grievance for numerous insurgent groups. The U.S. can carefully urge the Middle Eastern
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countrys government to reform legal codes, provide adequate courts, punish human rights
offenders, and fairly charge and sentence criminals. While maintaining the understanding that
monumental changes cannot happen overnight, the U.S. should make it clear that small gains
take away from the legitimacy of rebel movements and ultimately bring the country one step
closer to stabilization. Other reforms can be made to open up space for civil society to advocate
for citizens needs (addressed earlier) and opening up participation in government through local
councils and democratic reforms (addressed later in this paper). In the end though, the U.S.
should understand that reforms are only a small part of the solution, and it should not infringe too
far on the countrys sovereignty in pursuing them.
If the U.S. can convince the government to implement reforms, there are several
preconditions for sustained turnarounds from bad governance to good (Collier 2007, 72).
Progress to sustained turnarounds is more likely if the country has a high income, a large
population, and a greater proportion of its population educated. It is less likely to progress if
leaders have been in office for a long time or if the country has recently emerged from a civil
war. The latter is especially troubling, because this country will be a country that has recently
emerged from a civil war. A careful political analysis is needed to see what conditions for a
sustained turnaround are present in this Middle Eastern country, and insight gained from that
analysis should inform future decisions on pushing reform.
To counteract the risk of governance reforms reverting, Collier (2007, 114) cites the
sustained use of aid in the form of technical support in the early phases of a turnaround as a
potential solution. That realization should inform U.S. policy as it both urges governments to
reform and to provide aid for a long enough period of time for sustained turnarounds to happen.

Economic Assistance
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While no study has shown a clear link between economic growth and the end of conflict,
studies have shown that low income and poverty are preconditions for conflict. In addition to
police and military capabilities, the reach of government institutions into rural areas is an
important determinant of prospects for insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The reach of
government institutions can be thought of as economic assistance in the form of infrastructure,
access to finance, or other investments. Collier (2007, 20) also presents linkages between lack of
economic growth and persistence of conflict. Slow growth and stagnation make a country prone
to civil war, because low income means no options other than violence and low growth means
hopelessness in the current situation. Therefore, any attempt to stabilize a country already in
conflict must take into account economic assistance promoting growth as a tool to stop conflict.
To achieve growth, the U.S. can provide economic assistance in the form of aid.
However, the effect of aid on growth is highly dependent on the state of governance and policies
in the country like a capable bureaucracy, transparent decisions, and absence of corruption
(Collier 2007, 105-106). This Middle Eastern state does not have good governance, and it will
likely worsen as the conflict continues. The U.S. should not provide aid right now. When the
conflict ends, the government will require time to rebuild its institutions and governance
capacity. Only once the effective governance environment exists will any supplied aid be
effective in raising growth rates. That is when the U.S. should supply aid, and it must do so for
an extended period of time.
Economic growth is not a requirement for stabilization, according to the literature. Aid
can be delayed until the conditions conducive for aid effectiveness are present. Even then,
growth will remain slow in the years immediately following a conflict. Aid is not a viable option

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currently, and it should be used in the future with the understanding that it is only a small part of
the equation for growth.

Democratization
Democratization should not be a major consideration for a country that already has a
functioning government as does this Middle Eastern country. However, the U.S. can encourage
good governance reforms by adopting some democratic principles such as citizen participation
and accountability of the government to its citizens, all of which can contribute to less violence.
Democracy is useful because it allows the people with grievances to air their grievances. It
provides a way for society to collectively solve problems in a nonviolent manner. A democratic
government is chosen by the people, so it has legitimacy to make decisions on behalf of the
people. A violent opposition does not have that legitimacy, because it uses violence to coerce
acquiescence. Finally, elections in a democracy provide those who are not in power with a
nonviolent avenue to come into power, making violence a less attractive option.
Despite these advantages, democratization is controversial, and there are several reasons
for why it does not lead to reductions in violence. Collier (2010) posits that in a democracy, a
leader cannot easily squash an opposition that decides to organize and obtain weapons. He also
accepts Fearon and Laitins conclusions that the only way to win a civil war is to defeat the
opposition, thus putting any democratic leader in a bind as he or she cannot use repression to
enforce peace. Finally, democracy is not accountable or legitimate in poor countries. Democracy
may in fact lead to more violence. On a parallel note, if the U.S. provides security force
assistance, it must also understand that this will likely make democratization more difficult. A
stronger security force has higher potential to crush individual freedoms and rights.

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As stated earlier, the U.S. should not promote democracy. It is too ambitious, has a low
likelihood of reducing violence, and infringes on the countrys sovereignty. Finally, U.S.
domestic politics matter, too. Promoting democracy through an intervention is risky given the
short election cycle of U.S. politics. Democratization is intensive and requires a sustained effort,
and there may not be a long enough timeframe for political support to carry out an effective
democratization process. Keeping the intervention focused on stability and not on overhauling an
entire political system will ensure that actions do not become too dispersed and resources are
used wisely.

Human Rights
Human rights issues arise during conflict stabilization when both government forces and
insurgents expand the confines of a just and legal war. Kalyvas explains how in a civil war, it is
difficult to control an area due to a shortage of manpower (Malkasian October 22, 2015). The
only way to maintain control is through brute force. Therefore, both the government and rebels
need to act viciously in their operations. Insurgencies also dissolve the boundaries between
civilians and combatants, and this lack of clarity results in both rebels and government forces
targeting civilians. The violence easily spirals out of control and can only be stopped with
overwhelming use of force. In this backdrop, human rights abuses abound.
To prevent human rights abuses, the U.S. can employ a variety of methods. Advisers
working on security force assistance are in the ideal position to monitor and check abusive
tendencies. They are on the ground and work closely with security forces and can provide
information on whether or not abuses are actually helping. The U.S. can also work with alliances
of groups such as human rights advocates, journalists, NGOs, and government ministries. While
this may be difficult in this Middle Eastern country due to its restrictive environment for civil
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society, it still has a somewhat free media. The media can publicize abuses and galvanize public
opinion to oppose them.
Sustainable changes in a countrys approach towards human rights take years to solidify.
Ultimately, this is a cultural issue and cannot be boiled down into a set of programs to raise
awareness and curb behavior. It is still a moral duty to try, though, but it is also wise to not have
too high expectations. Stability has been achieved in the past in spite of human rights abuses.
Acknowledging that human rights abuses will occur despite American efforts to prevent them,
the U.S. should start laying the groundwork for a robust and fair transitional justice regime. This
will help the country overcome any traumas the country will go through. Preventing human
rights abuses now will make transitional justice easier in the future, as that process tends to be
complex and drag on well after a conflict ends. The U.S. should make a moderate effort to
prevent human rights abuses, but due to the limited number of partners with which it could work
with on this issue, it should not make preventing abuses a priority.

Conclusion
This paper focused on the sustainability of actions within the major aspects of conflict
stabilization: security force assistance, partnering, reforms, democratization, economic
assistance, and human rights. Sustainability is only one perspective, and other factors like cost
and political viability are also important. Focusing on sustainability, however, shows how
tentative stabilization can be and how the U.S. must take actions that result in more solid results.
When crafting the final stabilization intervention strategy, that lesson cannot be forgotten.

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Fearon, James and David Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American
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Fearon, James and David Laitin. 2007. Civil War Termination. Paper presented at the 2007
Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 30September 2, 2007.
Malkasian, Carter. 2015. Building Security Forces. Lecture presented in Conflict Stabilization
course at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., October 29, 2015.
Malkasian, Carter. 2015. Human Rights and Security. Lecture presented in Conflict
Stabilization course at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., October 22, 2015.

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