Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
1.
Facts: The M/V P. Aboitiz left Hong Kong for Manila at about 7:30
in the evening of October 29, 1980 after securing a departure
clearance from the Hong Kong Port Authority. The departure was
delayed for two hours because he (Capt. Racines) was observing
the direction of the storm that crossed the Bicol Region. He
proceeded with the voyage only after being informed that the
storm had abated. The M/V P. Aboitiz sank at about 7:00 p.m. of
October 31, 1980.
Justo Iglesias, meteorologist of PAGASA, testified in both cases that
during the inclusive dates of October 28-31, 1980, a stormy
weather condition prevailed within the Philippine area of
responsibility, particularly along the sea route from Hong Kong to
Manila, because of tropical depression "Yoning."
Petitioners Allied and Equitable refuted the allegation that the M/V
P. Aboitiz and its cargo were lost due to force majeure, relying
mainly on the marine protest filed by Capt. Racines under scale
No. 4 that describes the sea condition as "moderate breeze," and
"small waves becoming longer, fairly frequent white horses."
Monarch and Tabacalera are insurance carriers of lost cargoes.
They indemnified the shippers and were consequently subrogated
to their rights, interests and actions against Aboitiz. Because
Aboitiz refused to compensate Monarch, it filed two complaints
against Aboitiz. In its answer with counterclaim, Aboitiz rejected
responsibility for the claims on the ground that the sinking of its
cargo vessel was due to force majeure or an act of God.
Aboitiz had repeatedly failed to appear in court, it then allowed
Monarch and Tabacalera to present evidence ex-parte. The
survey established that on her voyage to Manila from Hong
Kong, the vessel did not encounter weather so inclement
that Aboitiz would be exculpated from liability for losses.
The survey added that the seaworthiness of the vessel was in
question especially because the breaches of the hull and the
serious flooding of two (2) cargo holds occurred simultaneously in
"seasonal weather."
In due course, the trial court rendered judgment against Aboitiz. It
was appealed to the Court of Appeals but the appeal was
dismissed for its failure to file appellant's brief.
Consequently, Monarch and Tabacalera moved for execution of
judgment. The trial court granted the motion and issued separate
writs of execution. However, Aboitiz, invoking the real and
was further held by the Board that said fortuitous event was the
proximate and only cause of the vessel's sinking.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent MGG should be held liable.
HELD: No. [Common carriers, from the nature of their business
and for reasons of public policy, are mandated to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the
safety of the passengers transported by them. Owing to this high
degree of diligence required of them, common carriers, as a
general rule, are presumed to have been at fault or negligent if
the goods transported by them are lost, destroyed or if the same
deteriorated.
However, this presumption of fault or negligence does not arise in
the cases enumerated under Article 1734 of the Civil Code:
Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only:(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or
other natural disaster or calamity;(2) Act of the public enemy in
war, whether international or civil;(3) Act or omission of the
shipper or owner of the goods;(4) The character of the goods or
defects in the packing or in the containers;(5) Order or act of
competent public authority.]
[In the case at bar, the issues may be narrowed down to whether
the loss of the cargo was due to the occurrence of a natural
disaster, and if so, whether such natural disaster was the sole and
proximate cause of the loss or whether private respondents were
partly to blame for failing to exercise due diligence to prevent the
loss of the cargo.
The parties do not dispute that on the day the M/V Peatheray
Patrick-G sunk, said vessel encountered strong winds and huge
waves ranging from six to ten feet in height. The vessel listed at
the port side and eventually sunk at Cawit Point, Cortes, Surigao
del Sur.
The Court of Appeals, citing the decision of the Board of Marine
Inquiry in the administrative case against the vessel's crew (BMI-646-87), found that the loss of the cargo was due solely to the
existence of a fortuitous event, particularly the presence of strong
winds and huge waves at Cortes, Surigao del Sur on March 3,
1987:
5.
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA VS.
ASIAN TERMINALS
On November 9, 2002, Macro-Lito Corporation, through M/V
DIMI P vessel, 185 packages of electrolytic tin free steel,
complete and in good condition.
The goods are covered by a bill of lading, had a declared value
of $169,850.35 and was insured with the Insurance Company of
North America (Petitioner) against all risk.
The carrying vessel arrived at the port of Manila on November
19, 2002, and when the shipment was discharged therefrom, it
was noted that 7 of the packages were damaged and in bad
condition.
On November 21, 2002, the shipment was then turned over to
the custody of Asian Terminals. Inc. (Respondent) for storage and
safekeeping pending its withdrawal by the consignee.
On November 29, 2002, prior to the withdrawal of the
shipment, a joint inspection of the said cargo was conducted. The
examination report showed that an additional 5 packages were
found to be damaged and in bad order.
On January 6, 2003, the consignee, San Miguel Corporation
filed separate claims against both the Petitioner and the
Respondent for the damage caused to the packages.
The Petitioner then paid San Miguel Corporation the amount of
PhP 431,592.14 which is based on a report of its independent
adjuster. The Petitioner then formally demanded reparation
against the Respondent for the amount it paid San Miguel
Corporation.
For the failure of the Respondent to satisfy the demand of the
Petitioner, the Petitioner filed for an action for damages with the
RTC of Makati.
ISSUE/S:
1.) Whether or not the trial court committed an error in
dismissing the complaint of the petitioner based on the one-year
prescriptive period for filing a suit under the COGSA to an arrastre
operator? YES.
2.) Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to recover actual
damages against the Respondent? YES, but only PhP164,428.76
HELD:
The term carriage of goods covers the period from the time
when the goods are loaded to the time when they are discharged
from the ship. Thus, it can be inferred that the period of time when
the goods have been discharged from the ship and given to the
custody of the arrastre operator is not covered by the COGSA.
The Petitioner, who filed the present action for the 5 packages
that were damaged while in the custody of the respondent was not
forthright in its claim, as it knew that the damages it sought,
based on the report of its adjuster covered 9 packages. Based on
the report, only four of the nine packages were damaged in the
custody of the Respondent. The Petitioner can be granted only the
amount of damages that is due to it
6.
INC.
VS.
PROVIDENT
articles or to have its name included in the bill of lading. Shin Yang
also alleged that MOF failed to present supporting documents to
prove that it was Shin Yang that caused the importation or the one
that assured payment of the shipping charges upon arrival of the
goods in Manila.
ISSUE: The issue for resolution is whether a consignee, who is not
a signatory to the bill of lading, is bound by the stipulations
thereof.
HELD: Corollarily, whether respondent who was not an agent of
the shipper and who did not make any demand for the fulfilment
of the stipulations of the bill of lading drawn in its favor is liable to
pay the corresponding freight and handling charges.
The bill of lading is oftentimes drawn up by the shipper/consignor
and the carrier without the intervention of the consignee.
However, the latter can be bound by the stipulations of the bill of
lading when a) there is a relation of agency between the shipper
or consignor and the consignee or b) when the consignee
demands fulfilment of the stipulation of the bill of lading which
was drawn up in its favor. [12]
In sum, a consignee, although not a signatory to the
contract of carriage between the shipper and the carrier, becomes
a party to the contract by reason of either a) the relationship of
agency between the consignee and the shipper/ consignor; b) the
unequivocal acceptance of the bill of lading delivered to the
consignee, with full knowledge of its contents or c) availment of
the stipulation pour autrui, i.e., when the consignee, a third
person, demands before the carrier the fulfilment of the stipulation
made by the consignor/shipper in the consignees favor,
specifically the delivery of the goods/cargoes shipped. [16]
In the instant case, Shin Yang consistently denied in all of its
pleadings that it authorized Halla Trading, Co. to ship the goods on
its behalf; or that it got hold of the bill of lading covering the
shipment or that it demanded the release of the cargo. Basic is the
rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies upon him who
asserts it, not upon him who denies, since, by the nature of things,
he who denies a fact cannot produce any proof of it. [17] Thus,
MOF has the burden to controvert all these denials, it being
insistent that Shin Yang asserted itself as the consignee and the
one that caused the shipment of the goods to the Philippines.
14. EDGAR COKALIONG SHIPPING LINES, INC., PETITIONER,
VS.
UCPB
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY,
INC.,
RESPONDENT.
The liability of a common carrier for the loss of goods may, by
stipulation in the bill of lading, be limited to the value declared by
the shipper. On the other hand, the liability of the insurer is
determined by the actual value covered by the insurance policy
and the insurance premiums paid therefor, and not necessarily by
the value declared in the bill of lading.
Facts:
Sometime on December 11, 1991, Nestor Angelia delivered to the
Edgar Cokaliong Shipping Lines, Inc. (now Cokaliong Shipping
Lines), [petitioner] for brevity, cargo consisting of one (1) carton of
Christmas decor and two (2) sacks of plastic toys, to be
transported on board the M/V Tandag on its Voyage No. T-189
scheduled to depart from Cebu City, on December 12, 1991, for
Tandag, Surigao del Sur. [Petitioner] issued Bill of Lading No. 58,
freight prepaid, covering the cargo. Nestor Angelia was both the
shipper and consignee of the cargo valued, on the face thereof, in
the amount of P6,500.00. Zosimo Mercado likewise delivered
cargo to [petitioner], consisting of two (2) cartons of plastic toys
and Christmas decor, one (1) roll of floor mat and one (1) bundle
of various or assorted goods for transportation thereof from Cebu
City to Tandag, Surigao del Sur, on board the said vessel, and said
voyage. [Petitioner] issued Bill of Lading No. 59 covering the cargo
which, on the face thereof, was valued in the amount of
P14,000.00. Under the Bill of Lading, Zosimo Mercado was both
the shipper and consignee of the cargo.
When the vessel left port, it had thirty-four (34) passengers and
assorted cargo on board, including the goods of Legaspi. After the
vessel had passed by the Mandaue-Mactan Bridge, fire ensued in
the engine room, and, despite earnest efforts of the officers and
crew of the vessel, the fire engulfed and destroyed the entire
vessel resulting in the loss of the vessel and the cargoes therein.
The Captain filed the required Marine Protest.
2.
3.
16. FABRE VS. CA (259 SCRA 426 G.R. NO. 111127, JULY 26,
1996)
FACTS: Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a
Mazda minibus. They used the bus principally in connection with a
bus service for school children which they operated in Manila. It
was driven by Porfirio Cabil.
On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World
Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with the petitioners for
the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from
Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private
respondent paid petitioners the amount of P3,000.00.
The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen,
Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair, so
that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his
first trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour through the
town of Ba-ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night,
petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway. The road
was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was
loss or damage to the goods if no suit is filed within one year after
delivery of the goods or the date when they should have been
delivered. Under this provision, only the carriers liability is
extinguished if no suit is brought within one year. But the liability
of the insurer is not extinguished because the insurers liability is
based not on the contract of carriage but on the contract of
insurance. A close reading of the law reveals that the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act governs the relationship between the carrier on
the one hand and the shipper, the consignee and/or the insurer on
the other hand. It defines the obligations of the carrier under the
contract of carriage. It does not, however, affect the relationship
between the shipper and the insurer.
21. SPOUSES ONG V CA
FACTS: Spouses Ong sustained injuries when Inland Bus, which
was owned by Inland Trailways under a Lease Agreement with
Philtranco, slowed down to avoid a cargo truck but was hit from
behind by another bus, owned and operated by Philtranco. The
court ruled, base on the police report, that the proximate cause of
the accident was the bumping of the bus from behind hence
ruled against Philtranco and awarded damages. However, this
police report was contested as it was formally offered as evidence
but merely as an annex to Inlands answer.
ISSUE: Whether damages were properly awarded.
HELD: The fundamental principle of the law on damages is that
one injured by a breach of contract (in this case, the contract of
transportation) or by a wrongful or negligent act or omission shall
have a fair and just compensation, commensurate with the loss
sustained as a consequence of the defendant's acts. Hence, actual
pecuniary compensation is the general rule, except where the
circumstances warrant the allowance of other kinds of damages.
Actual damages Actual damages are such compensation or
damages for an injury that will put the injured party in the position
in which he had been before he was injured. They pertain to such
injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of
measurement. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party
is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
as he has duly proven. To be recoverable, actual damages must be
pleaded and proven in Court. No such proof was offered to the
P10,000 claim of damages. At the most, documentary evidence
showed P3, 977 only as damages. Moral Damages and Diminution
of use of arm A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or
her body, and if that integrity is violated, damages are due and
assessable. However, physical injury, like loss or diminution of use
of an arm or a limb, is not a pecuniary loss. Indeed, it is nor
susceptible of exact monetary estimation. Thus, the usual practice
is to award moral damages for physical injuries sustained. In the
case at bar, it was sufficiently shown during the trial that Francia's
right arm could not function in a normal manner and that, as a
result, she suffered mental anguish and anxiety. Thus, an increase
in the amount of moral damages awarded, from P30,000 to
P50,000, appears to be reasonable and justified. Renato also
suffered mental anxiety and anguish from the accident. Thus, he
should be separately awarded P30,000 as moral damages.
Unrealized Income Protesting the deletion of the award for
Francia's unrealized income, petitioners contend that Francia's
injuries and her oral testimony adequately support their claim. The
Court disagrees. Although actual damages include indemnification
for profits which the injured party failed to obtain (lucro cesante or
lucrum cesans), the rule requires that said person produce the
"best evidence of which his case is susceptible. The petitioners
failed to do so, as she could have returned to work despite the
plaster in her arm. Attorney fees Counsel's performance, however,
does not justify the award of 25 percent attorney's fees. It is wellsettled that such award is addressed to sound judicial discretion
and subject to judicial control. Only a 10% attorneys fee is
awarded. Art. 2197.
22. AUGUSTO LOPEZ v. JUAN DURUELO, G.R. No. 29166.
October 22, 1928.
port where the accident occurred as provided for Article 835 of the
Code of Commerce.
Issue: Whether the motorboat Jison is a vessel provided for by
Article 835 of the Code of Commerce?
Held: The word vessel as used in the third section of tile IV, Book
III of the Code of Commerce, dealing with collisions, does not
include all ships, craft or floating structures of any kind without
limitation. The said section does not apply to minor craft engaged
in a river and bay traffic.Therefore, a passenger on boat like the
Jison, is not required to make protest as a condition precedent to
his right of action for the injury suffered by him in the collision
described in the complaint.Article 835 of the Code of Commerce
does not apply.
23. LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION VS. COURT OF
APPEALS (156 SCRA 169)
Facts: A maritime collision occurred between the tanker CAVITE
owned by LSCO and MV Fernando Escano (a passenger ship)
owned by Escano, as a result the passenger ship sunk. An action in
admiralty was filed by Escano against Luzon. The trial court held
that LSCO Cavite was solely to blame for the collision and held
that Luzons claim that its liability should be limited under Article
837 of the Code of Commerce has not been established. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The SC also affirmed the CA.
Upon two motions for reconsideration, the Supreme Court gave
course to the petition.
Issue: Whether or not in order to claim limited liability under
Article 837 of the Code of Commerce, it is necessary that the
owner abandon the vessel
Held: Yes, abandonment is necessary to claim the limited liability
wherein it shall be limited to the value of the vessel with all the
appurtenances and freightage earned in the voyage. However, if
the injury was due to the ship owners fault, the ship owner may
not avail of his right to avail of limited liability by abandoning the
vessel.
The real nature of the liability of the ship owner or agent is
embodied in the Code of Commerce. Articles 587, 590 and 837 are
intended to limit the liability of the ship owner, provided that the
owner or agent abandons the vessel. Although Article 837 does
not specifically provide that in case of collision there should be
abandonment, to enjoy such limited liability, said article is a mere
amplification of the provisions of Articles 587 and 590 which
makes it a mere superfluity.
The exception to this rule in Article 837 is when the vessel is
totally lost in which case there is no vessel to abandon, thus
abandonment is not required. Because of such loss, the liability of
the owner or agent is extinguished. However, they are still
personally liable for claims under the Workmens Compensation
Act and for repairs on the vessel prior to its loss.
In case of illegal or tortious acts of the captain, the liability of the
owner and agent is subsidiary. In such cases, the owner or agent
may avail of Article 837 by abandoning the vessel. But if the injury
is caused by the owners fault as where he engages the services of
an inexperienced captain or engineer, he cannot avail of the
provisions of Article 837 by abandoning the vessel. He is
personally liable for such damages.
In this case, the Court held that the petitioner is a t fault and since
he did not abandon the vessel, he cannot invoke the benefit of
Article 837 to limit his liability to the value of the vessel, all
appurtenances and freightage earned during the voyage.
for two million pesos. However on January 25, 1984, the M/V
Seven Ambassador sank, resulting in the loss of petitioners logs.
Pursuant to the loss, petitioner filed a claim with South Sea Surety
and Insurance for the insured amount of the logs, but the latter
refused, denying liability under the policy. Petitioner likewise filed
a formal claim against Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation for the
value of the lost logs, but the latter likewise denied their claim.
The trial court found for the plaintiff, holding South Sea
and Seven Brothers liable for the loss. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed in part the decision of the trial court. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the liability of South Sea Surety and Assurance
but exonerated Seven Brothers, stating that the latter is a private
carrier therefore the provisions on common carriers is not
applicable to their contract. Hence the present appeal.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in upholding the validity of the stipulation in the
charter party executed between petitioner and Seven Brothers
exempting the latter from liability of loss arising from the
negligence of its captain.
Held: The decision of the Court of appeals is correct. The contract
between petitioner and Seven Brothers is one of Private Carriage
hence the provisions on common carriage do not apply. In a
contract of private carriage parties are free to stipulate that the
responsibility for the cargo rests solely in the charterer, such
stipulations are valid because they are freely entered into by the
parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good custom,
public order or public policy.
28. MERCHANTS INSURANCE COMPANY VS. ALEJANDRO
(145 SCRA 42)
Facts: Plaintiff Choa Tiek Seng filed a complaint against the
petitioner before the then Court of First Instance of Manila for
recovery of a sum of money under the marine insurance policy on
cargo. Mr. Choa alleged that the goods he insured with the
petitioner sustained loss and damage in the amount of P35,
987.26. The said goods were delivered to the arrastre operator E.
Razon, Inc., on December 17, 1976 and on the same date were
received by the consignee-plaintiff.
Petitioner disclaims liability and imputes against plaintiff
the commission of fraud. A similar complaint was filed by Joseph
Benzon Chua against the petitioner for recovery under the marine
insurance policy for cargo alleging that the goods insured with the
petitioner sustained loss and damage in the sum of P55,996.49.
The goods were delivered to the plaintiff-consignee on or about
January 25-28, 1977.
Petitioner filed third-party complaints against private
respondents for indemnity, subrogation, or reimbursement in the
event that it is held liable to the plaintiff.
The private respondents, carriers Frota Oceanica
Brasiliera and Australia-West Pacific Line alleged in their separate
answers that the petitioner is already barred from filing a claim
because under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the suit against
the carrier must be filed within one year after delivery of the
goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered
Petitioner contended that provision relied upon by the
respondents applies only to the shipper and not to the insurer of
the goods.
Respondent judge dismissed both third-party complaints.
The fact that the driver was able to use a bus with a faulty
speedometer shows that the employer was remiss in the
supervision of its employees and in the proper care of its vehicles.
Under Arts. 2180 and 2176 of Civil Code, owners and managers
are responsible for damages caused by their employees.
30. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
ARNEL MATARO Y ELIZAGA AND NICK PERUCHO Y SINGSON,
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
-No transportation-related issue
Held: The coverage of the Act includes the insurer of the goods.
Otherwise, what the Act intends to prohibit after the lapse of the
one-year prescriptive period can be done indirectly by the shipper
or owner of the goods by simply filing a claim against the insurer
even after the lapse of one year. This would be the result if we
follow the petitioner's argument that the insurer can, at any time,
proceed against the carrier and the ship since it is not bound by
the time-bar provision. In this situation, the one-year limitation will
be practically useless. This could not have been the intention of
the law which has also for its purpose the protection of the carrier
and the ship from fraudulent claims by having "matters affecting
transportation of goods by sea be decided in as short a time as
possible" and by avoiding incidents which would "unnecessarily
extend the period and permit delays in the settlement of questions
affecting the transportation."
Issue: Whether or not there was bad faith on the part of Air
France, petitioner, entitling Rafael Carrascoso, respondent for
moral and exemplary damages as against the petitioner?
1
2
9
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
In that case it was found that although the proximate cause of the
mishap was the negligence of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City,
the crew of the Don Juan was equally negligent as it found that the
latters master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was playing mahjong at
the time of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior Third Mate
Rogelio De Vera, admitted that he failed to call the attention of
Santisteban to the imminent danger facing them. This Court found
that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to
take steps to prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of
the ship and supervise the abandoning of the ship.
Third. The next issue is whether petitioner is liable to pay
damages notwithstanding the total loss of its ship. The issue is not
one of first impression. The rule is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence that a ship-owner may be held liable for injuries to
passengers notwithstanding the exclusively real and hypothetic
nature of maritime law if fault can be attributed to the ship-owner.
Fourth. Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case
applies, private respondents should be allowed to claim only
P43,857.14 each as moral damages because in the Mecenas case,
the amount of P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of
the Mecenas couple. Under petitioners formula, Ramon Miranda
should receive P43, 857.14, while the De la Victoria spouses
should receive P97, 714.28
36. R TRANSPORT VS EDUARDO PANTE, GR 162104,
SEPTEMBER 15, 2009
FACTS:
The case went on for 7 years. The delays were due to the
multiple postponements and unexplained absence of
petitioners counsel. Its rights to cross-examine and
present evidence were eventually forfeited as a
consequence.
11
11