Is Advertising Puffery Believed?

Author(s): Herbert J. Rotfeld and Kim B. Rotzoll

Source: Journal of Advertising, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1980), pp. 16-20+45
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4188316
Accessed: 23-05-2016 13:05 UTC
REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4188316?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of
Advertising

This content downloaded from 121.52.146.139 on Mon, 23 May 2016 13:05:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

iS ADVERTISING
PUFFERY BELIEVED?

INTRODUCTION
A basic advertising copywriting text notes the impor-

tance of "getting the facts" and making certain they are

correct, because "Any attempt to write copy about a product or service without knowing in complete detail exactly
what it is and what it does will invite legal difficulties" (3).
However, within the next few paragraphs, an intriguing
qualification is offered:

[T]here is another recognized category known as

"puffery" or "puffing." Under this heading come

the harmless exaggerations that are expressions of

HERBERT J. ROTFELD KIM B. ROTZOLL

opinion rather than claims of some objective quality

or characteristic of the product. For example, even
the most gullible consumer is considered capable of

Herbert J. Rotfeld, an assistant professor of marketing at Bowling Green

State University of Ohio, received his Ph.D. in communications (1978)

from the Institute of Communications Research at the University of

grappling with the fact that such statements as "the

best of its kind," "the most beautiful," or "the finest"

might not be literally true.... Consumers who buy

Illinois-Urbana. His articles have appeared in Journal of Advertising,

"the funniest book you ever read" can expect to be

Journal of Consumer Affairs, and Journalism Quarterly, and the pro-

amused, but they really don't expect the advertiser to

ceedings of the American Academy of Advertising conferences. He has

also contributed articles to anthologies on advertising-communications
law and advertising deception.

be able to prove the superlative (3: 259-60).

Thus the author expresses the commonly accepted view

Kim B. Rotzoll is a professor of advertising at the University of Illinois,

Urbana-Champaign. He has a B.A. in advertising, M.A. in journalism,

that puffery claims are viewed as different from other advertised claims and considered patently nondeceptive.

and Ph.D. in sociology, all from the Pennsylvania State University. He is

Based on "logical" interpretations of such claims, but not

an author (with James Haefner and Charles Sandage) of Advertising in

research data, the law presumes consumers will not believe

Contempory Society: Perspectives Toward Understanding, and Advertising

such statements and what they imply. The legal logic pre-

Theory and Practice (with Charles Sandage and Vernon Fryburger), in

addition to journal and anthology articles.

The authors especially wish to thank Ivan L. Preston, University of Wis-

consin-Madison; David M. Gardner, University of Illinois-Urbana; and

Jean Bartunek, Boston College; for their helpful comments and suggestions.

sumes consumers expect exaggerations and inflated claims

in advertising and therefore "know" puffery statements

are not to be believed as literal facts. This study addresses

the basic research question of whether or not such claims

and what they may imply are believed by consumers, and
thus may be considered potentially deceptive.

ABSTRACT

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM:

There exists a legally unique class of literal advertising statements, puffery claims, that the law assumes to be incapable of causing any consumer
deception. Based on the historic treatment of such claims before the law

DECEPTION AND PUFFERY

While Congress did not define advertising deception

and "logical" interpretations of such claims by jurists, it is presumed that

when first empowering the Federal Trade Commission to

consumers recognize puffs as mere "seller's talk" that is not to be believed.

regulate unfair methods of competition, more specific rules

These legal assumptions directly raise research questions about two possible ways puffs might cause actual deception: do substantial numbers of
consumers believe puffs as literal facts? and, do consumers believe factual
claims that might be implied by the puffs? Findings of any consumer be-

and guides have emerged from FTC and court decisions

(for a more detailed discussion of these rules see 9). The legal issue is framed in terms of the presumed impression or

lief of puffs or what they imply (above a bare incidence) would be seen to

impact of advertised claims on consumers, and not on tech-

contradict legal assumptions of consumer responses to such claims.

nical or literal truth. An advertisement is considered decep-

? JOURNAL OF ADVERTISING, Vol. 9, No. 3,1980 16

This content downloaded from 121.52.146.139 on Mon, 23 May 2016 13:05:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

tive if it communicates facts-by statement, implication,

While Etzel and Knight assert firms are moving away

or omission-that differ from the reality of the situation

from the use of puffery claims in recognition of consumer

and affect buying behavior to consuimers' detriment. The

distrust of advertising's sales intent, their research found

Commission need not find actual deception, only its poten-

that inclusion of claim documentation did not influence

tial ("the tendency or capacity to deceive") (5; 9). So the

consumers' response to particular ads (7). Periodic profes-

important legal inquiry is in terms of what the ad commun-

sional surveys indicate often-repeated puffery slogans

icates. Communication of a false or misleading claim is le-

being noted as true by large percentages of consumers (1).

gally seen as having a potential to influence purchases, and

The Cunninghams found large numbers of consumers

advertisements possessing such deceptive potential may be

unable to correctly answer questions regarding commonly

used advertising terms such as "micro-encapsulated," ". .000o

proscribed.

With advertised statements that may be labeled as "puf-

solid state, " and "best." Even with items the researchers felt

fery," however, it is presumed that any communicated

were "exceptions" to this general misunderstanding, respon-

claim based on such literal content cannot possess a ten-

dent confusion and misinformation were high-e.g., more

dency or capacity to deceive since "no one would rely on

than 30 percent of the total sample noted as true the state-

its patently exaggerated claims" (4). In practice, decisions

ment that "a product which is advertised as the best available

concerning what is (or is not) puffery are made by Admin-

is superior to its competition" (6). While not intended to

istrative Law Judges, Federal Trade Commissioners, and/

directly address puffery issues, these results can stand as evi-

or Jurists who look at the literal content of the advertise-

dence of puffs possessing a potential for misleading many

ment and make certain assumptions about how consumers

consumers. Many of the terms studied, such as "best,," were

will interpret and/or use such content. These assumptions,

puffs, and portions of the results indicate respondents be-

based on legal history and past court decisions, view

lieved the puffery claims and thought they were literally true.

"puffs" as so exaggerated they are patently unbelievable.

Inquiring into deception issued from another perspec-

Logically, if the claim is unbelievable, it cannot be decep-

tive, Shimp studied what was communicated to college stu-

tive (8).

dents by what he referred to as "incomplete comparative

statements." The claims researched were puffery and he

In effect, once it is determined that a communicated

claim is based on puffery, a heavier burden of proof falls

found empirical evidence that such statements communi-

on the Commission. Deceptive capacity becomes insuffi-

cate multiple interpretations, some of which (or perhaps all)

cient; actual deception must now be shown (10, 700). While

the FTC has been increasing its use of research evidence in

might be seen as misleading (18). Such research supports

advertising cases (2), and is moving against increasing

numbers of potentially deceptive implied claims (14),

audience members do draw inferences beyond the manifest

findings of Preston (12) and Preston-Scharbach (15) that

content of an incomplete advertised statement, looking

toward what advertisers might have "liked to say." These

puffery claims remain legally special or unique. Puffs still

studies provide some additional evidence, albeit indirect,

tend to be seen as "harmless."

that consumers might be misled by puffery, but they do

It must be noted that many critics of puffery's legal status refer to logical or conceptual arguments and not data,

not really address questions of whether these implications

generally raising two basic questions. (For a more thor-

are believed.

ough discussion of these arguments and issues, see: 11;

13; 16). First, why is puffery used by advertisers? It is pre-

THE INVESTIGATION:

sumed to be nondeceptive because it is not believed, but if

FOCUS AND METHODOLOGY

puffery is not believed, it would have no effect and therefore would not be used. Second, can it be determined from

This study concerns the legal assumption that, even

looking at the literal content of an ad whether consumers

when communicated to large numbers of consumers,

readily recognize the exaggerations that are legally pre-

puffery claims and their implications are not believed. If

the previously discussed legal logic is not to be upheld,
then puffery claims and/or the facts they may imply will be
perceived and believed by a significant proportion of respondents. This was the investigation's working hypothesis:
It must be emphasized that researchers may not directly
conclude that a legally significant number of consumers

sumed to be so obvious? Basic communication theory tells

us different individuals can react to the same statements in

several different ways. Advertisers have been critical of

FTC advertising deception cases that were decided without
the use of consumer research, yet, with puffery, advertisers
insist that research is unnecessary.

On the advertiser's side, however, there exists the valid

perceive and/or believe different types of claims. Statisti-

assertion that little research proof indicates puffery may

cal significance is not the same as legal significance. The

mislead consumers. To date, the small amount of research

former is the subject of studies such as this one; the latter

on this question is generally not focused specifically on the

can only be determined by the FTC or the courts, possibly

with guidance from research findings such as these (17).

potential deception of puffery.

17

This content downloaded from 121.52.146.139 on Mon, 23 May 2016 13:05:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

However, virtually any consumer belief of puffs or their

homes). While the sample size was limited by the fact that

implications above a bare incidence could be seen to con-

the researchers were "tied" to cumbersome videotape

tradict the legal logic.

equipment, the approach was deemed appropriate for this

Videotapes of current commercials for national adver-

study in its concerns for the reactions of a broad range of

tisers were shown to two groups of expert labelers: three

individuals from different backgrounds. The commercials

third-year law students with interests in communication

studied were all for products with broad target markets

law and three professors of advertising or marketing with

such as those commonly of concern to the FTC.

interests in areas of social issues and regulatory concerns of deceptive advertising. Since puffery is defined

RESULTS

in terms of literal content, the labelers were given a list of

all literal claims stated in each ad, and were instructed to

Communications of Puffs

identify which they felt would legally be labeled as puffery,

As shown in Table 1, the different literal puffery claims

based on the following definition (based on legal defini-

in the five commercials were communicated to an average

tions and common law as explained in 13):

Puffery claims: advertising claims that are puffs or

80.5 percent of the sample, and the claims implied by puffs

were communicated to an average 44.7 percent. While

puffing in that they are opinion or subjective claims,

there was some variation in consumer perceptions between

not known to be true and/or not substantiable. They

each commercial, the important finding is that both

do not literally state any factual claims, though such

puffery claims and their implications for each commercial

claims may be implied.

were communicated, on the average, to a substantial pro-

portion of respondents.

Some disagreement among the labelers was expected,

because all is not "black and white" with the puffery-fact
claim distinction. For this reason, twenty commercials

TABLE I

were initially selected and shown to two different groups

Average Percent of Total Sample to Whom Each

of expert labelers. Only those commercials with unanimous

agreement by the labelers, a total of five commercials for
noncompeting products, were used in the study. No guar-

Puff Related Claim was Communicated

Puffery Puffery-Implied

antee can be made that the FTC would have made the same

Claims Claims

categorizations, although the choices certainly seem to be

consistent with past FTC indications.

All Commercials 80.5 07o (13) 44.707o (17)

It was next necessary to determine just what implied

St. Joseph's Aspirin

claims might be communicated by these commercials. So

for Children 68.7 (3) 47.0 (5)

the five ads were shown to 20 individuals in small groups.

After seeing each commercial they were asked to list all literal claims they felt were made by the ad and then list what

Kaopectate 87.3 (3) 33.6 (5)

Pond'sColdCream 100.0 (1) 42.0 (2)
Head and Shoulders

they felt was said by implication. Post questionnaire interviews were conducted with all subjects to trace which elements of each commercial's literal content gave rise to the

Shampoo 81.2 (4) 78.0 (2)

Excedrin 76.5 (2) 39.0 (3)

different implied claims perceived. The aim was to ascer-

( ) = Number of claims.

tain, for each claim, whether it was implied by a puffery

claim (referred to as "puffery-implied" in this study) or

other ad content. The claim list from this step formed the

Admittedly, a few individual claims implied from puffery were perceived by so few respondents that such "per-

basis for a final structured questionnaire that asked resspondents what they felt was communicated by the ad and

ception" might logically be argued as being caused by the

test setting and/or use of the structured questionnaire.

which claims they believed about the brand advertised.

Such a finding was intuitively expected. The claim list that

The final questionnaire included the possible claims

compiled from the above preliminary steps in the form of

formed the basis of the final closed-ended questionnaire

statements about each brand advertised, and asked sub-

attempted to include numerous possible claim-statements

that consumers might perceive in the ads. However, only
four items were perceived by fewer than 30 percent of the

jects: first, whether they felt the ad stated or implied such

statements; and second, whether or not they felt such statements were true. The former sought to ascertain what was

sample (three in the Kaopectate commercial at 13, 18 and

communicated; the latter, what was believed.

28 percent, and one for Pond's cold cream at 25 percent).

Most puffery-implied claims were perceived by a substan-

The sample for the final questionnaire consisted of 100

tially large proportion of respondents, such that relatively

members of organized community groups (such as citizen

18

This content downloaded from 121.52.146.139 on Mon, 23 May 2016 13:05:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

large averages were found in all commercials, with extrem-

spective of interest would be to question how likely these

ely strong communication being noted for both claims in

types of claims were to be believed once communicated. In

the Head and Shoulders commercial.

other words, once the respondent perceives the claim, how

likely is it that the person would also believe it. For data
analysis, this likelihood is based on taking the respondents

Belief of Puffs

who perceived each claim and measuring the percent of

As discussed, the legal logic with puffery is that even if

those respondents who noted that claim as true.

such claims are communicated to consumers, no one would

As can be seen by Table 3, the communicated puffery

seriously believe them. In other words, even if communi-

claims were very likely to be believed. Overall, once

cated, they cannot possess a tendency to deceive since they

communicated, the puffs had an almost .50 probability of

will not be believed and therefore cannot cause actual de-

also being believed; the puffery-implied claims possessed a

ception. For data analysis, this meant looking at levels of

.25 probability. There was some variation for individual

communication and belief of different claims. In other

commercials, but these likelihoods of belief remained relatively strong in all five.

words, the concern was with percentages of the sample that

perceived each type of claim and noted it as true. If the

claim was not communicated to a respondent, his or her
belief or disbelief of such statements about the brand was

TABLE 3

irrelevant.

Average Likelihood of Each Communicated

Overall, puffs were believed by a relatively large number

Claim Being Noted as True

of respondents, but belief of their implications was much

lower. As can be seen in Table 2, on the average, puffery

Puffery Puffery-Implied

claims for the five commercials were perceived and believed by 39.6 percent of the respondents while puffery im-

Claims Claims

plied claims averaged only 11.4 percent belief. Looking at

All Commercials 49.2 (13) 25.5 (17)

the separate commercials, average belief of the literal puffs

St. Joseph's Aspirin

was less than a third of the sample only in the St. Joseph's

for Children 42.2 (3) 22.5 (5)

and Excedrin commercials, and even in those commercials

Kaopectate 59.2 (3) 33.8 (5)

it was over 25 percent. However, only the Head and Shoul-

Pond's Cold Cream 57.0 (1) 23.8 (2)

ders commercial had puffery-implied claims that were

Head & Shoulders

believed by more than an average 20 percent. The 10 to 12

Shampoo 51.2 (4) 28.8 (2)

percent belief of such claims for three commercials was so

Excedrin 34.7 (2) 17.9 (3)

low as to raise questions of their nature; the Excedrin puff-

ery-implied claims averaged a mere 7 percent belief.

( ) = Number of Claims.

Since the legal logic addresses the patent unbelievable

nature of communications based on puffs, another per-

How to read: On the average, 49.2 percent of those who

perceived each puffery claim also noted them as true.

TABLE 2

Average Percent of Total Sample That

DISCUSSION

Believed Each Puff Related Claim

Since many puffery claims were believed by a large proportion of respondents, the working hypothesis was up-

Puffery Puffery-Implied

held. A critic of the puffery exemption could point out that

Claims Claims

these puffs, if false, would probably cause actual deception. Such findings are similar to those of past surveys

All Commercials 39.6 (13) 11.4 (17)

St. Joseph's Aspirin
Kaopectate 51.7 (3) 11.0 (5)

cited herein that found large percentages of consumers noting puffery-type advertising slogans as completely true. In
this study, the following puffs were all believed by a large

Pond's Cold Cream 57.0 (1) 10.0 (2)

proportion of respondents:

for Children 29.0 (3) 10.6 (5)

Head & Shoulders

[St. Joseph's aspirin is] fast and gentle (43 percent).

[Kaopectate is] a lot of relief (62 percent).

Shampoo 40.8 (4) 22.5 (2)

Excedrin 26.5 (2) 7.0 (3)

[Kaopectate is] today's way to help stop diarrhea from

stopping you (57 percent).
[Pond's cold cream helps] keep skin soft and young

( ) = Number of claims.

19

This content downloaded from 121.52.146.139 on Mon, 23 May 2016 13:05:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

being believed and influencing purchases. Looking at the

likelihood of consumers believing puffery related claims in

looking (57 percent).

[Head and Shoulders shampoo] lathers nice (69 percent).

this study indicates that communications based on puffs

should also be seen to possess this potential.
It might also be noted that as it turned out, the sample
was very well educated overall. Only 15 of the respondents

[Head and Shoulders shampoo] is gentle on hair (51

percent).

Excedrin is the extra strength pain reliever (42 percent).

It would appear from their responses that the subjects

did not attend college at least for a short period of time, a

number equal to those who possessed post-graduate de-

could not tell that these puffs might not be literally true,
contrary to what some advertisers claim. To some, such

grees. Almost 70 percent had bachelor degrees or at least

some college education. This sample was much more educated than the average American, and intuitively, they
might be seen as more intelligent, more perceptive, and/or
more skeptical of advertising messages. These results
challenge legal assumptions as to puffery's inability to
cause actual deception, and they are challenged with a very

findings, coupled with the previously cited Shimp research

on the multiple interpretations consumers attribute to

similar statements, would probably be seen as strong evidence that puffery can deceive consumers. If false, the
above seven puffs might on the basis of this study's evidence be legally seen as having caused actual deception.
There remain ways in which advertisers' lawyers might

well-educated sample. A less well-educated sample probably would believe puffery claims even more.

defend against a finding of deception. Puffs are opinion

statements by definition, and, as such, cannot be seen as
literally false. To a defender of advertising puffery's pre-

CONCLUSIONS

sent legal status, if a consumer believes a literal puffery

statement, it might be said that the person shares that opinion with the advertiser. For an advertiser's puffery-type

While academically interesting consumer behavior issues

might go far beyond the questions addressed herein, this
study was concerned with solely legal concerns: the logic
for puffery's present legal status and assumptions behind

slogan to be seen as true by many consumers could be interpreted to mean that the consumers have accepted the
seller's feeling that it is a quality product. According to
such arguments, consumers are able to readily judge for
themselves whether or not Kaopectate is "a lot of relief."
Preston has argued that deception from puffery might

such logic (17). Findings of respondent beliefs of literal

puffs did not support these assumptions. Although the implications from the puffs, overall, were noted as true by
relatively small proportions of respondents, any consumer
belief of such claims contradicts the legal logic and its as-

come from its implying false facts that consumers believe

(13; 14). In this study, many respondents who perceived

the statement "Excedrin is the extra strength pain reliever"

sumptions. The only "problem" is that such low levels of

belief of the implied claims raises questions of whether such

noted the claim as being true. However, the claim's poten-

responses might have been a function of the test setting or

use of the structured questionnaire, but even these communications possessed high probabilities of being believed.

tially deceptive implications "nothing stronger is available," "[Excedrin is] the only extra strength pain reliever,"
and "other pain relievers are lacking in ingredients and in

Thus, this study offers research evidence casting some

doubt on the current legal logic that advertising claims designated as puffery cannot be considered deceptive because
they are not believed. Puffs were communicated to large
numbers of respondents, and if false, would easily be seen
as possessing a potential to deceive if they did not have special legal exemption from such consideration. Contrary to

strength" were not readily believed (6, 6, and 9 percent belief, respectively). Lacking strong consumer belief of these
implications from the puffs, there could remain a valid
question of whether actual deception occurred.
One possibility is that different consumers might perceive and/or believe different false facts implied by a puffery claim. Thus, if puffery is communicated to 5007o of the
audience, then those people would be divided up among
the various false facts implied by the puff. Large propor-

the logic behind this exemption, puffs were noted as true by

large numbers of respondents, suggesting that respondents
might have thought such claims were literally true. Puffery
advertising statements of this study could therefore be influential in consumer decision making and purchase behavior, indicating that the law should not treat puffery as
any different from other types of advertising claims.

tions of consumers might be actually deceived by such a

puffery claim, but research such as this would find low leels of consumer belief "split" among the possible pufferyimplied claims studied. Such an inquiry would be the next
logical step after a study such as this.

However, the importance of this "question" fades when

REFERENCES

it is realized that all communicated claims of this study

possessed a likelihood of being believed. The legal concept

of "capacity or potential to deceive," the FTC's burden of
proof in deceptive advertising cases, in effect assumes that
any communicated non-puffery claim has a potential for

I. "Adbeat," Advertising Age, Vol. 48 (October 24, 1977), p. 94.

2. Brandt, Michael T. and Ivan L. Preston. "The Federal Trade Commisions' Use of Evidence to Determine Deception," Journal of Marketing,
Vol. 41 (January. 1977). op. 54-62.
continue to page 45

20

This content downloaded from 121.52.146.139 on Mon, 23 May 2016 13:05:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

The Compatibility of Advertising Regulation

and The First Amendment continued from page 15.

10. Reich, Robert B. "Consumer Protection and the First Amendment: A

Dilemma for the FTC?" Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 61 (1977), pp. 705741.

11. Rotzoll, Kim B., James E. Haefner, and Charles H. Sandage. Adver-

was developed as an unfairness rather than a deception vi-

tising in Contemporary Society. Columbus: Grid, Inc., 1976.

olation, it might appear that the First Amendment jeopar-

12. Sears Roebuck, complaint, FTC Dkt. No. 9104 (Nov. 4, 1977).

dizes the entire concept.

13. Turner, James S. The Chemical Feast. New York: Grossman, 1970.
14. Turner, James S. "Five Perspectives: Preparing the Consumer Citizen,"

However, in National Dynamics (7) the FTC established

Social Education, (Oct., 1974).

that the reasonable basis principle was a deception viola-

15. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer

tion, which makes the rule more likely to survive First

Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).

Amendment attacks. In the current case involving dish-

16. Warner-Lambert v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir., 1977); cert. denied,

washer claims, Sears Roebuck (12) is presenting a First

435 U.S. 950 (1978).

Amendment defense against the charge of unfairness but

the FTC is responding that the ads were also deceptive and
thus the First Amendment does not matter. That case is
pending.

Is Advertising Puffery Believed? Continued from

SUMMARY

page 20.

The following summarizes the argument seen here which

suggests that First Amendment incompatibility with adver-

3. Burton, Philip Ward. Advertising Copywriting, 4th edition, Columbus,

tising regulation is essentially minor. First, advertising law

Ohio: Grid, Inc., 1978.

4. Callman, Rudolph. The Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks and

says that sellers' messages are free except where the burden

Monopolies, 3rd edition, 6 volumes (Mundelein, Illinois: Callagham and

is met to show that they should be prohibited. That is paral-

Company, 1967), Vol. 1.

lel to First Amendment operation. Next, the prohibition

of deception is quite in keeping with the First Amendment.

5. Charlton, Francis J. and William A. Fawcett. "The FTC and False

Advertising," University of Kansas Law Review, Vol. 17 (June, 1969),
p.618.

Finally, the prohibition of unfairness may not be permis-

6. Cunningham, Isabella C. M. and William H. Cunningham. "Standards

sible under the First Amendment, but the FTC may be able
in the future to avoid this incompatibility. The Commission
has made some of its prohibitions inadvertently while pur-

for Advertising Regulation," Journal of Marketing, Vol. 41 (October),

p. 92-97.

7. Etzel, Michael J. and E. Leon Knight, Jr. "The Effect of Documented

suing other acceptable prohibitions, and may in other in-

Versus Undocumented Advertising Claims," Journal of Consumer

stances be able to drop the unfairness approach in favor of

Affairs, Vol. 10(Winter, 1976), pp. 233-38.

8. Feldman, Lawrence P. Consumer Protection: Problems and Prospects.

the substitute ground of deception.

St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1976, p. 136.

A reasonable conclusion from this is that there is very lit-

9. Francois, William E. Mass Media Law and Regulation. 2nd edition,

tle incompatibility of advertising regulation and the First

Columbus, Ohio: Grid, Inc., 1978, pp. 389-430.

Amendment, and that little resulting change in advertising

10. Gilmor, Donald M. and Jerome A. Barron. Mass Communication

regulation will occur.

Law: Cases and Comment. 2nd edition, St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1974.

11. Oliver, Richard L. "An Interpretation of the Attitudinal and Behavioral Effects of Puffery," Journal of Consumer Affairs, Vol. 13 (Sum-

REFERENCES

mer, 1979), pp. 8-27.

1. Beneficial Finance Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3rd Cir., 1976); cert.

12. Preston, Ivan L. "Logic and Illogic in the Advertising Process,"

Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 44 (Summer, 1967), pp. 231-239.

denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).

13. Preston, Ivan L. The Great American Blow-Up: Puffery in Advertising

and Selling. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975.

2. Federal Trade Commission Act, Sec. V, 38 Stat. 719 (1914).

3. Federal Trade Commission Act, Sec. V, amended, 52 Stat. 114, 115

14. Preston, Ivan L. "The FTC's Handling of Puffery and Other Selling
Claims Made 'By Implication,' " Journal of Business Research, Vol. 5

(1938).

4. Federal Trade Commission, staff report, "Television Advertising to

(June, 1977), pp. 155-81.

Children," 43 Fed. Reg. 17967 (1978).

15. Preston, Ivan L. and Steven E. Sharbach. "Advertising: More Than

5. Gillmor, Donald M., and Jerome A. Barron. Mass Communication

Meets the Eye?" Journal of Advertising Research, Vol. 11 (June, 1971),

Law, 2d ed. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1974.

pp. 19-24.

6. Kottman, E. John. "Is National Advertising Still a 'Stepchild of the

First Amendment'?" Journal of Advertising, Vol. 8:4 (Fall, 1979),

Arguments," Boston College School of Management working paper (1979).

16. Rotfeld, Herbert J. "Advertising Puffery as Deception: Evidence and

pp. 6-12.

17. Rotfeld, Herbert J. "Conceptualizing Research on Deceptive Adver-

7. National Dynamics, 82 FTC 488 (1973); affirmed, National Dynamics

tising Issues: The Example of Puffery," Boston College School of Manage-

v. FTC, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir., 1973).

ment working paper #79-11 (1979).

8. Pfizer, 81 FTC 23 (1972).

ment working paper #79-11 (1979).

9. Preston, Ivan L. The Great American Blow-Up: Puffery in Advertising

and Selling. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1975.

of Advertising Research, Vol. 18 (December, 1978), pp. 21-28.

18. Shimp, Terence A. "Do Incomplete Comparisons Mislead?" Journal

45

This content downloaded from 121.52.146.139 on Mon, 23 May 2016 13:05:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms