Oposa vs.

Factoran

ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II,

FACTS:

id.)

Petitioners Minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents

grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2)

against original defendant Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., [Secretary of the

the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)] which he holds in

the legislative or executive branches of Government - granted further ruling that

trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations

the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts

petition to prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine

rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth - granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89
million hectares for commercial logging purposes thus, at the present rate of
deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour,
the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing

which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

2. W/N the TLA should be cancelled

it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter.

altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and selfperpetuation-the advancement of which may even be said to predate all

with each other;(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of

governments and constitutions.

written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of

life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

humankind.

a. effect "a more equitable distribution

of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural
resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful

As a matter of fact, these basic rights need NOT even be

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a

Constitutional policy of the State to:

Such a right belongs to a different category of rights

under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony

2. Yes. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be

found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies (NOT Bill of Rights),

policy of the State: (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions

present and future generations of Filipinos and;

HELD:Petition is granted

clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are

Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the

ISSUE:
1. whether or not the minors have locus standi - yes

entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae

Special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 to set aside dismissal order

decade, if not earlier.

Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on 2

Explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter because of

the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing
upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance
the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for
the present generation, but also for those to come.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with

it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

Laws Applicable:
FACTS:

even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,

specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the

Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The

present and future generations [June 1977: P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine

Philippines during a period covering 1943 and 1944 who is now charged before a

Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code)]

military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987

Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties

have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and

as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high

have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese

the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the

Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war"

state
all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by

due process clause of the Constitution.

participating in the prosecution of his case; and - not attorneys authorized by the
Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a diminution of our

regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public

personality as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a

welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the

violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice

due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly

law in the Philippines and not interested party in the case

withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case

the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of

- Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the
provision of our constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the

in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare

fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague

Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the

Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore

public to regulate it in the common interest.

With respect to renewal, the holder is NOT entitled to it as

to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case

obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State,

to enjoin and prohibit Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from

A timber license is an instrument by which the State

File a petition seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of

the President of the Philippines:

executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the

Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial

petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international

ISSUE: W/N Executive Order No. 68 is valid

a matter of right.
HELD: YES
o

President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to

consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of
war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68

KURODA VS. JALANDONI

Lessons Applicable: Generally accepted principles of international law

Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation
even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them

for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and

On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted

is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as

the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.

continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a
Held:

signatory.
It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the

Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the

a.

thus, illegal or being general warrants. There is no probable cause and

generally accepted principals of international law.

warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of

when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly

Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules,

committed the Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus

the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the

we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to the

privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims,

right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries

caprice or passion of peace officers.

the appointment of the 2 American attorneys is not violative of our

nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which has

b.

Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as

submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a

a fruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if

tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of those very

warranted by the circumstances.

crimes
c.

Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of
those taken from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they

STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO

are treated as personality different from that of the corporation.

Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners
personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to
search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences to search for personal properties books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on

Stonehill vs. Diokno

20 SCRA 383 (GR No. L-19550)
June 19, 1967

CJ Concepcion

the respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money
and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and

Facts:

were constrained to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the
admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.

Upon application of the prosecutors (respondent) several judges (respondent) issued

on different dates a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners (Stonehill et. al.)

and/or corporations of which they were officers to search the persons of the petitioner

The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However

and/or premises of their officers warehouses and/or residences and to seize and take

by a resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things

possession of the personal property which is the subject of the offense, stolen, or

seized from the offices of the corporations.

embezzled and proceeds of fruits of the offense, or used or intended to be used or

the means of committing the offense, which is described in the application as violation

Issues:

of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the
Revised Penal Code.

1.) Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to assail the legality of
search warrants issued against the corporation of which they were officers.

Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus and injunction and prayed that, pending final disposition of the case,

2.) Whether or not the search warrants issued partakes the nature of a general
search warrants.

a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the prosecutors, their agents and
representatives from using the effect seized or any copies thereof, in the deportation
case and that thereafter, a decision be rendered quashing the contested search

3.) Whether or not the seized articles were admissible as evidence regardless of the
illegality of its seizure.

warrants and declaring the same null and void. For being violative of the constitution
and the Rules of court by: (1) not describing with particularity the documents, books

Held:

and things to be seized; (2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized; (3) the
warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed against the

petitioner; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for
disposal in accordance with law.

Officers of certain corporations, from which the documents, papers, things were
seized by means of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of
the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple

In their answer, the prosecutors (respondent) alleged; (1) search warrants are valid
and issued in accordance with law; (2) defects of said warrants, were cured by
petitioners consent; and (3) in any event the effects are admissible regardless of the
irregularity.

reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares
of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the
offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure
can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that
the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be
availed of by third parties.

probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
Officers of certain corporations can not validly object to the use in evidence against

the

party

against

whom

it

is

sought

has

performed particularacts,

them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of

committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

or

the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects

General search warrants are outlawed because the sanctity of the domicile and the

belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them

privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or

in their individual capacity.

passion of peace officers.

II

To prevent the issuance of general warrants this Court deemed it fit to amend Section
3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the

The Constitution provides:

Revised Rules of Court that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects

Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for

against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants

more than one specific offense."

shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and

Seizure of books and records showing all business transaction of petitioners persons,

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal contravened the explicit

seized.

command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective the elimination of general warrants.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probablecause, to be determined by the judge
in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

III

Search warrants issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person

Most common law jurisdiction have already given up the Moncado ruling and

therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs

eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this isthe only practical means

Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,

of enforcing the constitutional injunctionagainst unreasonable searches and seizures.

no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with

In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

respect

to

the

offense

committed

were abstract.

As

consequence,

it

was impossiblefor the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such,
which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of

enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the

and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special

offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in

pronouncement as to costs.

case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot
profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.
The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if

MEJOFF VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011
90 Phil. 70 (1951) (Constitutional Law Right to Life and Liberty, Aliens)
FACTS: Herein petitioner, an alien illegally in this country was kept under prolonged

the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable

detention while arrangements for his departure are being made filed a petition

cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is

for habeas corpus. For two years, the Government has not found ways and means of

intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the

deporting the petitioner because no ship nor country would take the latter. It is

requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such

insinuated that the petitioner might join or aid the disloyal elements if allowed to be at
large.

competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable

ISSUE: Whether or not an alien, not enemy, against whom no charge has been made

cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible

other than that their permission to stay has expired, may be detained indefinitely for

explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of

as long as the Government is unable to deport him.

the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the

HELD: No, a foreign national, not enemy, against whom no criminal charges have

absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

been formally made or judicial order issued, may not indefinitely be kept in detention.
He also has the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to
human beings. Petitioner is ordered to be released upon the condition of being under

The Court held that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is

surveillance and exact bail in a reasonable amount with sufficient sureties. The

hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein

possibility that he might join or aid disloyal elements if turned out at large does not

petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the

justify prolonged detention.

Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 April 19, 2007)

searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus
seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the

Facts

writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so
seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned
motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and
that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the
documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices

Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest
were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was
upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the
extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by
the private respondent.

Ratio Decidendi
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting
the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high flight risk. Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent
judge subject to the following conditions:

Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a
right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused

hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these
proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of
this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the
cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a
harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of
filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition
proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this
case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if
they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of
accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if
the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent
judge. Hence, this instant petition.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of
America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42,
and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that
the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the
same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the
following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental
law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to
the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from
the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.

Issue
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

PEOPLE VS. GALIT

135 SCRA 465

Ruling
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

FACTS:
1. Francisco Galit was arrested for killing Natividad Fernando on the occasion of a

robbery.
2. He was detained and interrogated almost continuously for 5 days.
3. He consistently maintained his innocence.
4. There was no evidence to link him to the crime.
5. The interrogating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically.
6. They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl of human
waste.
7. The prisoner then admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit.
8. He then signed the confession they prepared.
9. The trial court convicted him of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced
him to the supreme penalty of Death.
10. Hence this appeal.

The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are
inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.

Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

Constitutional Law : Article VI, Sec. 1(Legislative Power; Non-Delegation)

G.R. No. L-14078; March 7, 1919; 39 Phil 660

ISSUE:
Is the confession is admissible in evidence.
HELD:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He
shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that
any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall
have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by
the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished.
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engage by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right
to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein
laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the
requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the
Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear questions
and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the
person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he
understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted
to communicate with his lawyer, a relative or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other
relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was
only about 2 weeks after he had executed the Salaysay that his relatives were
allowed to see him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to
counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed
re-enactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These
constitute grave violations of his rights.

FACTS:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes
of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally
deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his
companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro,
against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of
Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial
board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative
Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by
said action.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial

governor. With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor
of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such
a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him an approved by the provincial board.

Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful
delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and
a department head, therefore making it unconstitutional?
VILLAVICENCIO V. LUKBAN
HELD:
No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of
Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the
distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as
to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot
be done; to the later no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed by
the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make
decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has
committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing
tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely
conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and
the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is
necessary since the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge when such as course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order. As officials charged with the
administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better
fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the
people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.

Posted by kaye lee on 9:44 PM

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 [Habeas Corpus]
Facts:
Mayor Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of
years in the city of Manila, closed. The city authorities quietly perfected arrangements
with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers;
with

some

government

office

for

the

use

of

the

coastguard

cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the person be actually confined for writ of Habeas Corpus to issue.

RULING:
No, there is no need for actual confinement. Any restraint which precludes freedom of
action is sufficient. The forcible taking of women of ill-repute from Manila to be
brought to Davao, deprived them of their freedom of locomotion just as effectively as

Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation
of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a
department head.

if they were imprisoned.

The Checkpoints Case : Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
(173 SCRA 211)
DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

I.

THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command

(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine

III.

THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the
people against unreasonable search and seizures.

General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within
its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an
effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are

atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the

reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any

National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC

fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro

Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For Peoples Rights (ULAP) sought
the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or
flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.

unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and
the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate
guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people.
Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to
make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in

other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to
pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as
measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public
security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban

II.

THE ISSUE

centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA sparrow units, not to
mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness
and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures?

brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what one
can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right

of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's
right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the

Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the
truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance
and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.

former should prevail.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by

the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of

I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and eloquently.
I am agreed that the existence alone of checkpoints makes search done therein,
unreasonable and hence, repugnant to the Constitution.

abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to
the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community.
Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the
checkpoints it would sustain and fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The
bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security
ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of
the State even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the
searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without
proof of probable cause and much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse
is that they are aimed at 'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and
political development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every
individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because
he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers manning the
checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.
I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark
street as a routine measure of security and curiosity. But the case at bar is different.
Military officers are systematically stationed at strategic checkpoint to actively ferret
out suspected criminals by detaining and searching any individual who in their opinion
might impair "the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region." It is incredible that we can sustain such a measure. And we are not even
under martial law.

The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and
effects. (CONST., art. III, sec. 2.) It is also the bedrock the right of the people to be
left alone on which the regime of law and constitutionalism rest. It is not, as the
majority would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort and even
irritation." (Resolution, 4.) To say that it is, is so I submit to trivialize the plain
command of the Constitution.
Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They
first saw the light of day by virtue of General Order No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE
CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF
WANTED PERSONS AND CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67
(AMENDING AND AMPLIFYING PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66
DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial law issuance. (See O.G. 42244226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit, repressive measures,
the same measures against which we had fought so painstakingly in our quest for
liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a quest that terminated a dictatorship. How
soon we forget.
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren
advance, is a right personal to the aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely, have
come to Court because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit that in that
event, the burden is the State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search.
The petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated
the "details of the incident" (Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and gruesomeness.
In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes
checkpoint searches unreasonable, and by itself, subject to constitutional challenges.
(Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints", have become "search warrants" unto themselves a
roving one at that.
That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is fine.
And so is "a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to
be resolved according to the facts of each case." (Supra) But the question, exactly, is:

Is (are) the search(es) in this case reasonable? I submit that it (they) is (are) not, for
one simple reason: No search warrant has been issued by a judge.
I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely draw(ing)
aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle ... or simply look(ing) (supra) there, "or flash(ing)
a light therein." (Supra) What we have here is Orwell's Big Brother watching every
step we take and every move we make.
As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases the
majority refers to involve routine checks compelled by "probable cause". What we
have here, however, is not simply a policeman on the beat but armed men, CAFGU or
Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire with no
provocation and without batting an eyelash. They likewise shoot you simply because
they do not like your face. I have witnessed actual incidents.
Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation. He
can not be anymore correct here.

the State even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the
searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without
proof of probable cause and much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse
is that they are aimed at 'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and
political development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every
individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because
he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers manning the
checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.
I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark
street as a routine measure of security and curiosity. But the case at bar is different.
Military officers are systematically stationed at strategic checkpoint to actively ferret
out suspected criminals by detaining and searching any individual who in their opinion
might impair "the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region." It is incredible that we can sustain such a measure. And we are not even
under martial law.

"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on individual's
right against a warrantless search, which is reasonably conducted, "so my brethren
go on, the former shall prevail. (Supra) First, this is the same lie that the hated despot
foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to fall for it a second time around.
Second, the checkpoint searches herein are unreasonable: There was no warrant.

Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the
truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance
and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.

A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is once
again the "showcase of democracy" in Asia. But if in many cases, it has been "paper
democracy", let this Court anyway bring to pass its stand, and make liberty in the
land, a living reality.

I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and eloquently.
I am agreed that the existence alone of checkpoints makes search done therein,
unreasonable and hence, repugnant to the Constitution.

I vote then, to grant the petition.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the
checkpoints it would sustain and fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The
bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security
ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and
effects. (CONST., art. III, sec. 2.) It is also the bedrock the right of the people to be
left alone on which the regime of law and constitutionalism rest. It is not, as the
majority would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort and even
irritation." (Resolution, 4.) To say that it is, is so I submit to trivialize the plain
command of the Constitution.
Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They
first saw the light of day by virtue of General Order No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE
CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF
WANTED PERSONS AND CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67
(AMENDING AND AMPLIFYING PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66
DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial law issuance. (See O.G. 42244226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit, repressive measures,
the same measures against which we had fought so painstakingly in our quest for

liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a quest that terminated a dictatorship. How
soon we forget.

democracy", let this Court anyway bring to pass its stand, and make liberty in the
land, a living reality.

While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren

advance, is a right personal to the aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely, have
come to Court because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit that in that
event, the burden is the State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search.
The petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated
the "details of the incident" (Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and gruesomeness.

I vote then, to grant the petition.

MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
Posted by kaye lee on 1:16 PM
G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989

In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes
checkpoint searches unreasonable, and by itself, subject to constitutional challenges.
(Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints", have become "search warrants" unto themselves a
roving one at that.

FACTS:

That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is fine.
And so is "a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to
be resolved according to the facts of each case." (Supra) But the question, exactly, is:
Is (are) the search(es) in this case reasonable? I submit that it (they) is (are) not, for
one simple reason: No search warrant has been issued by a judge.

Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii,

I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely draw(ing)
aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle ... or simply look(ing) (supra) there, "or flash(ing)
a light therein." (Supra) What we have here is Orwell's Big Brother watching every
step we take and every move we make.

ISSUE:

As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases the
majority refers to involve routine checks compelled by "probable cause". What we
have here, however, is not simply a policeman on the beat but armed men, CAFGU or
Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire with no
provocation and without batting an eyelash. They likewise shoot you simply because
they do not like your face. I have witnessed actual incidents.

RULING:

USA, sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family
to order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the
President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not
define what is meant by executive power although the same article tackles on
exercises of certain powers by the President such as appointing power during recess

Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation. He
can not be anymore correct here.
"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on individual's
right against a warrantless search, which is reasonably conducted, "so my brethren
go on, the former shall prevail. (Supra) First, this is the same lie that the hated despot
foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to fall for it a second time around.
Second, the checkpoint searches herein are unreasonable: There was no warrant.
A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is once
again the "showcase of democracy" in Asia. But if in many cases, it has been "paper

of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices(Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making
power(Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section
22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power
inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

Alvero vs Dizon Case Digest

By maechmedina
AURELIO S. ALVERO vs ARSENIO P. DIZON, et al.,
G.R. No. L-342

HELD.
No. The petition for Certiorari with Injunction is absolutely no merit.

May 4, 1946

LawPhils Full Text link:http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1946/may1946/gr_l342_1946.html

RATIONALE:
The right of the officer and men of the United States Army to arrest the petitioner as a
collaborationist suspect, and to seize his personal papers is unquestionable. Also,
proclamation of General Douglas McArthur, as Commander in Chief of the United
States of Army, declaring his purpose to remove certain citizens of the Philippines,

FACTS:

who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the enemy, in violation of the allegiance.

The petitioner has been accused of treason; that at the hearing on his petition for bail,
the prosecution presented, as part of its evidence, certain documents which had been
allegedly seized by soldiers of the United States Army, accompanied by Filipino
Guerrillas in the petitioners house. The Petitioner further contends that the seized

EXCEPTION:

documents should be returned as it obtained by means of force and intimidation or

Important exception to the necessity for a Search Warrant is the right of search and

through coercion, those are not his personal papers but part of the files of the New

seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a

Leaders Association, which was proven to be an organization created for the purpose

crime is being committed or after its commission. The right to search includes in both

of collaborating with the enemy. Lastly, the presentation of the seized documents in

instances that of searching the person of him who is arrested, in order to find and

the trial is tantamount to compelling him to testify against himself, in violation of his

seize things arrested with the crime as its fruits as the means by which it was

constitutional rights.

committed.

ISSUES:

The Petitioner consented to the presentation of the seized documents, as part of the

1.

Whether or not the seized documents are legal?

2.

Whether or not the documents seized should be admitted as evidence in the

trial court?

evidence for the prosecution, at the hearing in his petition for bail and at the trial of
the case on the merits, without having insisted that the question of the alleged
illegality of the search and seizure of said papers and documents should first have
been directly litigated and established by a motion.

COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION
Not violated by the use of evidence of articles obtained by an unconstitutional search
and seizure. Thus, the petitioner is estopped from questioning their admission.

Issue:
The papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful
means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and
disqualification from medical practice.

Ruling/Held:
PURPOSE: (Adam vs New York)
The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searched and seizures
is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful

The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husbands infidelity, who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced.

invasions of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative
and judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.
Zulueta vs Court of Appeals
Caption:
Cecilia Zulueta vs Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin
(253 SCRA 699)
GR no. 107383 February 20, 1996

Facts:
Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband Dr.
Alfredo Martin. Dr. Martin is a doctor of medicine while he is not in his house His wife
took the 157 documents consisting of diaries, cancelled check, greeting cards,
passport and photograph, private respondents between her Wife and his alleged
paramours, by means of forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta
filed the papers for the evidence of her case of legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. the trial
court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties described in paragraph 3 ofMartins Complaint or those further described in
the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her
behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00,
as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay
the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.

The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order
from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify
any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking
them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute
freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the
other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows
with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the
other.

Bache and Co vs Ruiz GR 32409 27 February 1971

11WednesdayMAR 2015
POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
LEAVE A COMMENT
Facts: Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to respondent
Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against

petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon and Arturo Logronio went to CFI with proper

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA.

documents. Judge Vivencio Ruiz asked his secretary to take the deposition and when
done stenographer read it to the judge. Logronio took the oath ans was warned by
judge that he may be charged with perjury if found lying. Search warrant was issued

Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on
apprehended with the help pf a civilian witness. Upon arrest following high powered
firearms were found in his possession:

and served. Petitioners lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal
complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents
nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes of documents. BIR

1.

.357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition

2.

M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo

3.

.380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo

4.

6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver

based on the documents seized. Petitioner contend that judged failed to personally
examine the complainant and witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not search warrant is null and void on the ground of no personal
examination of the jusge?
Decision: This cannot be consider a personal examination. If there was an
examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the
Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the Constitution and the rules require a
personal examination by the judge. It was precisely on account of the intention of the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the issuing judge to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses that the question of how much
time would be consumed by the judge in examining them came up before the
Convention, as can be seen from the record of the proceedings quoted above. The

Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run incident
modified to include grounds of Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On
Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under PD
1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals
confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of Angeles City was directed to
issue order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals.
Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made a
complete turnaround and filed Manifestation in Lieu of Comment praying for
acquittal (nabayaran siguro).

reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did not constitute sufficient
compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner
respondent Judge did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which
the judicial mind, on account of its training, was in the best position to conceive.
These were important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-important question of
whether or not there was probable cause.
CASE DIGEST ON PADILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS [269 SCRA 402 (1997)]
November 10, 2010

Issues:
1.
WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and consequently, the
firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence
under the exclusionary rule
No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no
dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not
make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests are
sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedurea peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his
presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. When caught in flagrante delicto with possession of

an unlicensed firearm and ammo, petitioners warrantless arrest was proper since he
was actually committing another offence in the presence of all those officers. There
was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run
and the actual apprehension. Because arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are
admissible.
Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid:
?
Seizure of evidence in plain view, elements of which are (a) prior valid
intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which police are legally present in
pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by police who had the
right to be there, (c) evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere
seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo: objects whose
possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found in plain view are subject to
seizure even without a warrant)
?

Search of moving vehicle

?
Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under section 12,
Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence where the test of
incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched must
be within arrestees custody or area of immediate control and search
contemporaneous with arrest.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the
policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. The
court begs to disagree. It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success
when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. Furthermore, in
accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending
an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea.

purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the
more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records
reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts
contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from
respondent courts incisive observation. Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt is
also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of
the Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel or
in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP, which would justify issuance of
mission order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms higher
than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian.
3.
PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive
and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court in applying P.D. 1866 in a
democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context and adds that respondent
court should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms
since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He
stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal
possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution.
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent
court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellants commission of
the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it
is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. And until its
repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated
the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.

2.
LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized, under a Mission
Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms

Equally lacking in merit is appellants allegation that the penalty for simple illegal
possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should
be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary
to appellants erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make
the same cruel and excessive.

No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be

established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the
accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding
license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject
firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioners possession via a valid
warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second
element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioners

Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden
of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden,
we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866
has been upheld twice by this Court. Just recently, the Court declared that the
pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of

the Constitution Appellants grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty

should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or
morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which
enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function
of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws
Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA sustaining
petitioners conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of
firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioners indeterminate
penalty is MODIFIED to 10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as
maximum.
People v. Simon Doctrine: Although PD 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein
were taken from the RPC, hence the rules in said code for graduating by degrees of
determining the proper period should be applied.

People vs. Libnao

Facts:

In the evening of October 19, 1996, Chief Inspector Benjamin Arceo of Tarlac
PNP held a briefing for which his office received a tip that two drug pushers, riding a
tricycle would be making a delivery that night. The team installed a checkpoint in
Barangay Salapungan to apprehend such suspects. At about 1:00 in the morning, the
police officer flagged down a tricycle. It had two female passengers who were
identified as the accused Agpanga Libnao and co-accused Rosita Nunga. In front of
them is a black bag and the two behaving uneasy, the officers invited them to
Kabayan center. Upon reaching Kabayan center, they opened the bag with the
presence of the accused. Inside were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and
covered with newspaper. The leaves were suspected to be marijuana. The accused
denied the accusation against them. Appellant capitalizes on the absence of warrant
of arrest. But their arguments was failed to impress the court. The accused was
convicted on violation of RA 4659.

Issue:

Whether or not the right of the accused against illegal and unwarranted arrest
and search were violated by the police officers who arrested both the them.

Ruling:

The general rule is that search may be conducted by law enforcers on the
strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, section
2 of the 1987 constitution. In the case at bar, the warrantless search is not bereft of a
probable cause. It is also clear that at the time of the apprehension, she was
committing a criminal offense. She was delivering a prohibited drugs. One of the
instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when a
person is when a person to be arrested is caught in flagrante delicto. The
constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures
as it operates only againt "unreasonable" searches and seizures. Searches and
seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless authorized by a validly searched warrant
or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by search and
seizure clause is that between persons and police must stand the protective authority
of a magistrate clothed with power to issue such warrants.
The decision was affirmed, the accused-appellant was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.