1

CONTEMPT OF COURT
It is the willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience
to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in
its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual
sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrasecontempt of court is generic,
embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and need not
be specifically granted by statute. x x x x
Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to
obstruct him in the administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the
lawful process or order of the court. (Narcida v. Bowen, 22 Phil. 365.). The punishment for the first is generally summary and
immediate, and no process or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae. The inherent power of courts to
punish contempt of court committed in the presence of the courts without further proof of facts and without aid of a trial is not open to
question, considering that this power is essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of justice from falling into
disrepute; such summary conviction and punishment accord with due process of law. There is authority for the view, however, that an
act, to constitute direct contempt punishable by summary proceeding, need not be committed in the immediate presence of the court, if
it tends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the actions of the court in the courtroom itself. Also, contemptuousacts committed out of
the presence of the court, if admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be punished summarily as a direct contemptalthough it is
advisable to proceed by requiring the person charged to appear and show cause why he should not be punished when the judge is
without personal knowledge of the misbehavior and is informed of it only by a confession of the contemnor or by testimony under oath
of other persons. In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less summary than the first. The proceedings for the
punishment of the contumacious act committed outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all the
elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is
adjudged and sentence imposed. Plainly, therefore, the wordsummary with respect to the punishment for contempt refers not to the
timing of the action with reference to the offense but to the procedure that dispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that result
from the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting
briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial. (LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION ET AL. VS.
DISTRIBUTION BUTTON MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL., G.R. NO. 155849, AUGUST 31, 2011,
BERSAMIN, J.).
IN-COURT CONTEMPTS AND OUT-OF-COURT CONTEMPTS: A distinction between in-court contempts, which disrupt court
proceedings and for which a hearing and formal presentation of evidence are dispensed with, and out-of-court contempts, which
require normal adversary procedures, is drawn for the purpose of prescribing what procedures must attend the exercise of a courts
authority to deal with contempt. The distinction does not limit the ability of courts to initiate contempt prosecutions to the summary
punishment of in-court contempts that interfere with the judicial process. (Young v. United States, 481 US 787.). (LORENZO SHIPPING
CORPORATION ET AL. VS. DISTRIBUTION BUTTON MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 155849,
AUGUST 31, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).
EVIDENCE OF MENTAL RETARDATION:
People vs. Dalandas, G.R. No. 140209, December 27, 2002; People vs. Cartuano, G.R. No. 112457-58, March 29, 1996, does not
preclude the presentation by the State of proof other than clinical evidence to establish the mental retardation of the victim. For sure,
the courts are not entirely dependent on the results of clinical examinations in establishing mental retardation. In People vs.
Almacin, G.R. No. 113253, February 19, 1999,for instance, the Court took into consideration the fact that the victim was illiterate and
unschooled in concluding that she was mentally incapable of assenting to or dissenting from the sexual intercourse. Also, in People
vs. Dumanon, (G.R. No. 123096, December 18, 2000), the High Court concurred in the trial courts observation and conclusion that

the victim was a mental retardate based on her physical appearance and on her difficulty to understand and answer the questions
during her testimony. (People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011, Bersamin, J.).
AN ACCUSED CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF AN OFFENSE THAT IS NOT CLEARLY CHARGED IN THE COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION. TO CONVICT HIM OF AN OFFENSE OTHER THAN THAT CHARGED IN THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION
WOULD BE VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION.
Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or necessarily included in the
information filed against him. (ANNA LERIMA PATULA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 164457, APRIL 11, 2012,
BERSAMIN, J.).
SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION:
SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims
and instituting two or more actions upon them. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided in order
to be made the subject of two or more different actions (CATALINA CHU ET AL. VS. SPS. FERNANDO CUNANAN & TRINIDAD
CUNANAN, G.R. NO. 156185, SEPTEMBER 12, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).
FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION VS. LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION:
Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of
action alleged in the pleading. x x x If the allegations of the complaint do not aver the concurrence of the elements of cause of
action, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Evidently, it is not
the lack or absence of a cause of action that is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint but the fact that the complaint states no
cause of action. Failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of an actionthrough a motion to dismiss,
but lack of cause of action may be raised at any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of the stipulations,
admissions, or evidence presented (DOLORES ADORA MACASLANG VS. RENATO & MELBA ZAMORA, G.R. NO. 156375, MAY 30,
2011, BERSAMIN, J.).
SPECIFIC DENIAL:
It is basic in remedial law that a defendant in a civil case must apprise the trial court and the adverse party of the facts alleged
by the complaint that he admits and of the facts alleged by the complaint that he wishes to place into contention. The defendant does
the former either by stating in his answer that they are true or by failing to properly deny them. There are two ways of denying alleged
facts: one is by general denial, and the other, by specific denial (Friedenthal, et al., Civil Procedure, 2nd Edition, 5.18 and 5.19). In
this jurisdiction, only a specific denial shall be sufficient to place into contention an alleged fact. Section 11, Rule 8, Rules of Court,
provides:
Section 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. Material averment in the complaint, other than those as
to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to
recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied under oath. (1a,R9).
Under Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, a specific denial of an allegation of the complaint may be made in any of three
ways, namely: (a) a defendant specifies each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever
practicable, sets forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial; (b) a defendant who desires to deny only
a part of an averment specifies so much of it as is true and material and denies only the remainder; and (c) a defendant who is without

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint states so, which has
the effect of a denial. x x x x x x In other words, while the admission is admissible in evidence, its probative value is to be determined
from the whole statement and others intimately related or connected therewith as an integrated unit. Although acts or facts admitted do
not require proof and cannot be contradicted, however, evidence aliunde can be presented to show that the admission was made
through palpable mistake. The rule is always in favor of liberality in construction of pleadings so that the real matter in dispute may be
submitted to the judgment of the court (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 166859, APRIL 12, 2011,
BERSAMIN, J.).
PROCEEDINGS FOR CONTEMPT ARE SUI GENERIS, IN NATURE CRIMINAL, BUT MAY BE RESORTED TO IN CIVIL AS WELL AS
CRIMINAL ACTIONS, AND INDEPENDENTLY OF ANY ACTION.
They are of two classes, the criminal or punitive, and the civil or remedial. A criminal contempt consists in conduct that is directed
against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority and
dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. A civil contempt consists in the failure to do something ordered to be
done by a court or judge in a civil case for the benefit of the opposing party therein. (Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271.) x x x
x Where the dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an order of a court for the benefit of a party in whose favor the order runs,
the contempt is civil; where the dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, and to protect the interests of
the general public, the contempt is criminal. Indeed, the criminal proceedings vindicate the dignity of the courts, but the civil
proceedings protect, preserve, and enforce the rights of private parties and compel obedience to orders, judgments and decrees made
to enforce such rights. (LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION ET AL. VS. DISTRIBUTION BUTTON MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL., G.R. NO. 155849, AUGUST 31, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).

PART OF RES GESTAE

Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae (Rule 140, Section 42 of
then Rules of Court). The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act
and which are admissible when illustrative of such act. In a general way, res gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and
declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous
with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.
The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators
to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity
for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or
event itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
A declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances (PEOPLE VS. GILBERTO VILLARICO ET AL., G.R. NO. 158362, APRIL 4, 2011, BERSAMIN, J).

JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: EXPROPRIATION: THE POWER TO DECIDE JUST COMPENSATION CASES FOR THE
TAKING OF LANDS UNDER R.A. NO. 6657 IS VESTED IN THE COURTS:
In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132767, January 18, 2000, 322 SCRA 139.), petitioner
landowner who was dissatisfied with the valuation made by LBP and DARAB, filed a petition for determination of just compensation in
the RTC (SAC). However, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for
filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB. On appeal, the CA upheld the order of dismissal. When the case was elevated to the
Supreme Court, it likewise affirmed the CA and declared that:
As we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals, this rule is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the power to decide just
compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the courts. It is error to think that, because of Rule
XIII, 11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has
thereby been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled principles of administrative
law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable
compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, but such determination is subject to
challenge in the courts.
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less original and exclusive because the question is first passed upon by
the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide
that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that
courts are the guarantors of the legality of the administrative action (LAND BANK OF THE PHILS. VS. SEVERINO LISTANA, G.R.
NO. 168105, JULY 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
AL. V s a p^ X mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'>DISTRIBUTION BUTTON MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
ET AL., G.R. NO. 155849, AUGUST 31, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).
RELEVANT DOCTRINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT ON THE SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
(i)
Indeed, a second MR as a rule, is generally a prohibited pleading.( Alcantara v. Ponce, 514 Phil. 222
(2005);Tirazona v. Philippine EDS Techno-Services, Inc., G.R. No. 169712, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 625, 628, citing Ortigas and
Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, 324 Phil. 483, 489 (1996).
The Court, however, does not discount instances when it may authorize the suspension of the rules of procedure so as to allow the
resolution of a second motion for reconsideration, in cases of extraordinarily persuasive reasons (Alcantara v. Ponce, 514 Phil. 222
(2005); Tirazona v. Philippine EDS Techno-Services, Inc., G.R. No. 169712, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 625, 628, citing Ortigas and
Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, 324 Phil. 483, 489 (1996). such as when the decision is a patent nullity.( Ramos vs.
NLRC, 358 Phil. 705 (1998).
Time and again, the Court has upheld the theory that the rules of procedure are designed to secure and not to override substantial
justice.( Cando v. Olazo, G.R. No. 160741, March 22, 2007, 518 SCRA 741.) These are mere tools to expedite the decision or
resolution of cases, hence, their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice must be avoided.( Peosa v. Dona, G.R. No. 154018, April 3, 2007, 520 SCRA 232.) (UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST
VS. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, G.R. NO. 179593, SEPTEMBER 14, 2011, MENDOZA, J.).

(ii) SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS PROHIBITED: Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that [n]o
motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules
of the Supreme Court (A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC.) decrees viz:

SEC. 3. Second motion for reconsideration. - The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration and any exception to this rule
can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is
reconsideration 'in the highest interest of justice' when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous but is likewise patently unjust and potentially
capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court's declaration.
Well-settled is the rule that issues or grounds not raised below cannot be resolved on review by the Supreme Court, for to allow the parties to
raise new issues is antithetical to the sporting idea of fair play, justice and due process. Issues not raised during the trial cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal and more especially on motion for reconsideration. Litigation must end at some point; once the case is finally adjudged, the parties
must learn to accept victory or defeat. Cuenco v. Talisay Tourist Sports Complex, Incorporated, G.R. No. 174154, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 396,
399-400.) (JOEB M. ALIVIADO VS. PROCTER & GAMBLE PHILS. INC. AND PROMM-GEM INC., G.R. NO. 160506, JUNE 6, 2011, DEL
CASTILLO, J.:) .:)
(iii) As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that: No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same
party shall be entertained. Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of the first motion for
reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court
therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for reconsideration is no longer
a prohibited pleading. (LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) ET AL, VS. COMELEC ET AL., G.R. NO. G.R. NO. 176951,
FEBRUARY 15, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.:)
(iv) We deny Judge Dilags Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration and note without
action the appended Second Motion for Reconsideration. Rule 52, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, on motions for reconsideration
filed before the Court of Appeals, reads:
Sec. 2.
Second Motion for Reconsideration. No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by
the same party shall be entertained.
Taken in conjunction with Rule 56, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, the aforequoted provision is also applicable to original
cases filed before the Supreme Court, which includes disciplinary proceedings against judges, such as the one at bar. A second motion
for reconsideration is, therefore, a prohibited pleading.
The rule against entertaining a second motion for reconsideration is rooted in the basic tenet of immutability of
judgments. At some point a decision becomes final and executory and, consequently, all litigations must come to an end.
Indeed, there have been instances when we gave merit to second motions for reconsideration, but only when there are
extraordinary persuasive reasons and only after an express leave shall have been obtained.( Tirazona v. Philippine EDS TechnoService, Inc., G.R. No. 169712, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 625, 628.)(NIDA VERGINESA SUAREZ VS. JUDGE RENATO DILAG &
CONCEPCION A. PASCUA, A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2014, AUGUST 16, 2011, PER CURIAM)
THE FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN A FINAL JUDGMENT OR ORDER, ON ONE HAND, AND AN INTERLOCUTORY
ORDER

THE FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN A FINAL JUDGMENT OR ORDER, ON ONE HAND, AND AN INTERLOCUTORY
ORDER, on the other hand, has been outlined in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (G.R. No. L-60036, 27 January 1987, 147
SCRA 334, 339-341) viz:
The concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final (or executory as of right [final and
executory]), is definite and settled. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done
by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an
action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the
controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except
to await the parties next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking
of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes final or, to use the established and
more distinctive term, final and executory. xxx
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of adjudicating the parties
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done
by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for
extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or
production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a final judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out,
an interlocutory ordermay not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final
judgment rendered in the case. (HEIRS OF SPS. TEOFILO M. RETERTA & ELISA RETERTA VS. SPS. LORENZO AMORES &
VIRGINIA LOPEZ, G.R. NO. 159941, AUGUST 17, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A summary judgment under Rule 35 of the Rules of Court is a procedural technique that is proper only when there is no
genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law (L-33983, January
27, 1983). It is a method intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on record (Sandiganbayan Records, Volume 9, pp. 344-380, 394-417).
Upon a motion for summary judgment the courts sole function is to determine whether there is an issue of fact to be tried, and
all doubts as to the existence of an issue of fact must be resolved againstthe moving party. In other words, a party who moves for
summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, and any doubt as to the
existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant. Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court should take
that view of the evidence most favorable to the party against whom it is directed, giving that party the benefit of all favorable
inferences (Sandiganbayan Records, Volume 9, pp. 344-380, 394-417)
The term genuine issue has been defined as an issue of fact that calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from
an issue that is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith, and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
The court can determine this on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits, and counter-affidavits submitted by the
parties to the court. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot
take the place of a trial [City of Manila v. Laguio, 455 SCRA 308 (2005)].
Well-settled is the rule that a party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of
any genuine issue of fact [Banco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil 921 (1918)]. Upon that partys shoulders rests the burden to
prove the cause of action, and to show that the defense is interposed solely for the purpose of delay. After the burden has been
discharged, the defendant has the burden to show facts sufficient to entitle him to defend (Habana v. National Labor Relations

Commission, G.R. No. 129418, September 10, 1999). Any doubt as to the propriety of a summary judgment shall be resolved against
the moving party.
We need not stress that the trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only in cases
where no genuine issue as to any material fact clearly exists between the parties. The rule on summary judgment does not invest the
trial courts with jurisdiction to try summarily the factual issues upon affidavits, but authorizes summary judgment only when it appears
clear that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No.
166859, April 12, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).
RES JUDICATA
The guiding principle of the doctrine of res judicata was formulated by Vice Chancellor Wigram in an English case circa 1843,
thus:
xxx that where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the
court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the
same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in
contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of
their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points which the court was actually required by the
parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which
the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. (Henderson v. Henderson, 3 Hare 100, pp. 114115).
The doctrine is also known as estoppel per rem judicatam and involves both cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel. The
purpose of the doctrine is two-fold - to prevent unnecessary proceedings involving expenses to the parties and wastage of the court's
time which could be used by others, and to avoid stale litigations as well as to enable the defendant to know the extent of the claims
being made arising out of the same single incident. (S. Sime, A Practical Approach To Civil Procedure, (1994 Ed.), Blackstone Press
Ltd., London, p. 391).
Under the doctrine of res judicata, therefore, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the
previous suit. (Dela Cruz v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 162788, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 576).
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must
be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on
the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, identity of the subject matter, and identity of
cause of action. (Custodio v. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 500).
The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue
more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. (Republic v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 101115, August 22, 2002, 387 SCRA 549 cited in CATALINA BALAIS-MABANAG, assisted by her husband,
ELEUTERIO MABANAG, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, and RAMONA
PATRICIA ALCARAZ, G.R. No. 153142 : March 29, 2010, BERSAMIN, J.).