Admin Law Case Bank w2

Securities and Exchange Commission vs.
Chenery
Corp., 332 US 194
Olaguer vs. RTC, 170 SCRA 478 (1989)
Mendoza vs. Dizon, 77 Phil 533 (1946)
Padua vs. Ranada, 390 SCRA 663 (2002)
Realty Exchange Venture Co. vs. Sendino, 233

SCRA 665 (1994)
Joson vs. Executive Secretary, 290 SCRA 279 (1998)
Antipolo Realty Co. vs. NHA, 153 SCRA 399 (1987)
Eugenio vs. CSC, 242 SCRA 196 (1995)

Blaquera vs. Alcala, 295 SCRA 411 (1998)
Philippine International Trading Co. vs. Angeles, 263

SCRA 421 (1996)
Lumiqued vs. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125 (1997)
Christian General Assembly vs. Ignacio, 597 SCRA

266 (2009)
BANDA V. ERMITA G.R. No. 166620 April 20,

2010
Mitchell Coke and Coke Company vs. Pennsylvania

Railroad Co., 230 US 247 (1913)
Jaworski vs PAGCOR and

144463, 14 January 2004
US vs. Dorr, 2 Phil 332 (1903)

Cebu United Enterprises vs. Gallofin, 106 Phil 491
(1959)
Crisostomo vs. CA, 258 SCRA 134 (1996)
Viola vs. Alunan III, 277 SCRA 409 (1997)
Larin vs. Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA 713 (1997)
Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 (1989)
Tondo Medical Center Employees Assoc. vs. CA, 527
SCRA 746 (2007)
MANTRUSTE
APPEALS
SYSTEMS
vs
SAGE
GR
COURT
OF
PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL (1965)

CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (CGA) VS
SPS IGNACIO (2009)
ENRIQUE GARCIA VS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY (1992)
TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION v THE COURT OF APPEALS
La Bugal-BLaan v. Ramos
Conference of Maritime Agencies v. POEA
Banda vs. Ermita, 618 SCRA 488 (2010)
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)

Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary, 677 SCRA 408 (2012)
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. CA,
171 SCRA 348 (1989)
Balanguan vs. CA, 562 SCRA 184 (2008)
Dacudao vs. Gonzales, 688 SCRA 109 (2003)
Olaguer vs RTC, G.R. No. 81385. February 21,

1989
Ppl vs Dacuycuy
Dacudao vs Gonzales, 688 SCRA 109 (2013)
Demetrio vs Alba
Padua vs Ranada
APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon |
Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers
Viola vs Alunan
ARNAULT vs EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS
US vs Ang Tang Ho, GR No. 17122
Realty Exchange Venture Co.

Sendino, 233 SCRA 665 (1994)
vs.
Lucina Sendino filed a complaint for Specific

Performance against REVI before the office
of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs
(OAALA) of HLURB. REVI Cancelled the
contract (entitled Reservation Agreement)
for the reservation of Sendino of a 120 sqm
house and lot in Paranaque. For the alleged
non-compliance with the requirement of
Sendino as provided in the Reservation
Agreement. OAALA decided in favour of
Sendino ordering to comply and continue
with the sale. On Appeal of the decision was
affirmed. This was further appealed to the
Office of the President but the case was
dismissed. MR was also denied.
Issue: W/N the Office of the Pres committed
a Serious Error in declaring that HLURB has
quasi-judicial functions even though theres
not express grant by EO 90.
Decision:
provides:
NO.
Section
of
PD
1344,
Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to

regulate real estate trade and business and
in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National
Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the
following nature:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other
claims
filed
by
subdivision
lot
or
condominium unit buyer against the project
owner,
developer,
dealer,
broker
or
salesman;
and
C. Cases involving specific performance of

contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lot or condominium
unit against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman.
There is no question that a statute may vest
exclusive
original
jurisdiction
in
an
administrative agency over certain disputes
and controversies falling within the agencys
special expertise. The constitutionality of
such grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the
National Housing Authority (now Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board) over cases
involving the sale of lots in commercial
subdivisions was upheld in Tropical Homes
Inc. v. National Housing Authority (152 SCRA
540 [1987]) and again sustained in a later
decision in Antipolo Realty Corporation v.
National Housing Authority (153 SCRA 399
[1987]) where We restated that the National
Housing Authority (now HLURB) shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real
estate trade and business in accordance
with the terms of PD No. 957 which defines
the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial
powers of said agency.
HLURB must interpret and apply contracts,
determine the rights of the parties under
these contracts, and award damages
whenever appropriate. 15 We fail to see how
the HSRC - which possessed jurisdiction over
the actions for specific performance for
buyers of subdivision lots against developers
- had suddenly lost its adjudicatory powers
by the mere fiat of a change in name
through E.O. 90. One thrust of the
multiplication of administrative agencies is
that the interpretation of such contracts and
agreements and the determination of private
rights under these agreements is no longer a
uniquely judicial function. 16 The absence
of any provision, express or implied, in E. O.
90, repealing those quasi-judicial powers
inherited by the HSRC from the National
Housing Authority, furthermore militates
against petitioners' position on the question
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioners.
Philippine International Trading Corp vs

Hon Angeles (GR 108461 Oct 21 1996)
Facts:
- PITC issued an Admin Order No. SOCPEC
89-08-01 requiring all importation from
China must be accompanied by a viable and
confirmed EXPORT PROGRAM" of Philippine
Products to China carried out by the importer
himself or through a tie-up.
- Desiring to make importations from China,
private
respondents
Remington
and
Firestone, both domestic corporations,
applied for authority to import from China
with PITC. They eventually granted authority
after satisfying the requirements and after
they executed respective undertakings to
balance their importations from China.
- Subsequently, for failing to comply with
their undertakings to submit export credits
equivalent to the value of their importations,
further import applications were withheld by
PITC from private respondents, such that the
latter were both barred from importing
goods from China
- Remington, with Firestone as Intervenor,
filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus
with prayer for issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against PITC assailing the said
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01
is an undue restriction of trade, and hence,

unconstitutional.
- The trial court ruled that PITC's authority to
process and approve applications for imports
and to issue rules and regulations has
already been repealed by EO No. 133, issued
on February 27, 1987 by President Aquino.
- PITC filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
to seek reversal of the Decision upholding
the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus of
Remington Industrial Sales (Remington) and
Firestone Ceramics (Firestone) , questioning
the trial court's decision particularly on the
propriety of the lower court's declarations on
the validity of Administrative Order No. 8908-01.
- Subsequently, when President Ramos went
to Beijing, a new a new trade agreement was
entered into between the Philippines and
China, encouraging liberalization of trade
between the two countries. Thereby the
President directing the Department of Trade
and Industry and the PITC to cease
implementing Administrative Order No.
SOCPEC 89-08-01.
- In view of the above fact, Remington then
expressed its desire to have the present
action to be declared moot and academic.
PITC disagreed that the case has become
moot and academic as a result of abrogation
of the said Administrative Order because
Remington still has outstanding obligation
with PITC consisting of charges for the 0.5%
Counter Export Development Service before
the said abrogation
Issue1: W/N PITC is legally empowered to
issue Administrative Orders.
Issue2: W/N Administrative
SOCPEC 89-08-01 valid?
Decision:1
Order
No.
YES. PITC is legally empowered 1 to issue

Administrative Orders, as a valid exercise of
a power ancillary to legislation. Hence
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01
is constitutional
Discussion:
The PITC is attached to the DTI 2 (as
established by EO 122) as an implementing
arm of the said department.
The PITC, as an implementing arm of
attached as an integral part of DTI as one of
its line agencies, has the authority to issue
the questioned Administrative Order.
Decision2:
No. Although PITC has quasi-legislative
power, this does not imply however, that the
subject Administrative Order is valid exercise
1
The grant of quasi-legislative powers in administrative

bodies is not unconstitutional. Thus, as a result of the growing
complexity of the modern society it has become necessary to
create more and more administrative bodies to help in the
regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the
particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the
problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can
be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This
is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably
called the fourth department of the government. 34
Evidently, in the exercise of such powers, the agency
concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and
determine the rights of private parties under such contracts.
One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is
that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of
private rights thereunder is no longer uniquely judicial
function, exercisable only by our regular courts. (Antipolo
Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority, G.R No. L50444, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 399).
As the primary coordinative, promote, facilitative and

regulatory arm of government for the country's trade,
industry and investment activities, which shall act as a
catalyst for intensified private sector activity in order to
accelerate and sustain economic growth. In furtherance of
this mandate, the DTI was empowered, among others, to
plan, implement, and coordinate activities of the government
related to trade industry and investments; to formulate and
administer policies and guidelines for the investment
priorities plan and the delivery of investment incentives; to
formulate country and product export strategies which will
guide the export promotion and development thrusts of the
government. Corollary, the Secretary of Trade and Industry is
given the power to promulgate rules and regulations
necessary to carry out the department's objectives, policies,
plans, programs and projects
of such. The original Administrative Order

issued on August 30, 1989, under which the
respondents filed their applications for
importation, was not published in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The questioned Administrative
Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid
within the context of Article 23 of Civil Code.
Discussion2:
Thus, even before the trade balancing
measures issued by the petitioner were
lifted by President Fidel V. Ramos, the same
were never legally effective, and private
respondents, therefore, cannot be made
subject to them, because Administrative
Order 89-08-0l embodying the same was
never published, as mandated by law, for its
effectivity.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION4
Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following

the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette (or
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines),
unless it is otherwise provided
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the lower court is

hereby AFFIRMED, to the effect that judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the private respondents, subject to the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1) Enjoining the petitioner:
a) From further charging the petitioners the Counter Export
Development Service fee of 0.5% of the total value of the
unliquidated or unfulfilled Undertakings of the private
respondents;
b) From further implementing the provisions of Administrative
Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its appurtenant rules; and,
2) Requiring petitioner to approve forthwith all the pending
applications of, and all those that may hereafter be filed by,
the petitioner and the Intervenor, free from and without
complying with the requirements prescribed in the abovestated issuances.
Cebu United Enterprises

Assistant Solicitor
vs
First
- A Suit for Mandatory Injunction was

instituted in the CFI of Cebu to compel Jose
Gallorfin (Collector of Customs, Cebu) to
release and deliver to plaintiff two shipments
from the US. As ancillary relief, the plaintiff
prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, which was
granted. Thereafter, the

released to the plaintiff.
goods
were
The importation of the aforesaid shipments

was made under and by virtue of an Import
Control Commission License No. 1225 issued
by the defunct Import Control Commission.
Under the terms of the license, the plaintiff
could import, on a no-dollar remittance
basis, overissue newspapers up to the
amount or value of $118,000.00.
The refusal of the defendant to deliver the
imported items is premised on his contention
that while the five bills of lading covering the
two shipments of the overissue newspapers
were all dated at Los Angeles, U.S.A.
December 17, 1953, or one day before the
expiration of the import license in question,
the vessels M/S VENTURA and M/S BATAAN,
carrying on board the said merchandise,
actually left the ports of embarkation,
Los Angeles, and San Francisco, on January
12 and January 16, 1954 respectively. Hence,
according
to
the
defendant,
the
importation was made without a valid
import
license, because under the
regulations issued by the Central Bank and
the Monetary Board, "all shipments that left
the port of origin after June 30, 1953, and
are covered by ICC licenses, may be
released by the Bureau of Customs without
the need of a Central Bank release
certificate; provided they left the port of
origin within the period of validity of
the licenses." No Central Bank certificate
for the release of the goods having been
shown or presented to the defendant, the
latter refused to make the delivery.
counted from the said date of June 18, 1953.

This license states, among other conditions,
that "Commodities covered by this license must
be shipped from the country of origin before
the expiry date of the license, and are
subject to sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 650."
Although Republic Act No. 650, creating the
Import Control Commission, expired on July
31, 1953, it is to be conceded that its duly
executed acts can have valid effects even
beyond the life span of said governmental
agency
What is important to consider only is the
legal connotation of the word "shipped" as
the term was used in the license. Defendant
maintains that it is when the vessel leaves
the port of embarkation, while plaintiff holds
that it is the dates of the bills of lading,
which are usually issued after the cargo is
placed on board the vessel. That the date of
the shipment is the date when the goods for
dispatch are loaded on board the vessel, and
not necessarily when the ship puts to sea, is
clearly implied from our ruling in the case of
U.S. Tobacco Corporation v. Rufino Luna, Et
Al., (87 Phil., 4),
Issue: W/N The appeal has no merit.
The issuance of the bill of lading,

furthermore, presupposes or carries the
presumption that the goods were delivered
to the carrier for immediate shipment (13
C.J.S. sec. 123 (2), p. 235, and cases cited
therein). It does not appear here that the bill
of lading specified any designated day on
which the vessels were to lift anchor, nor
was it shown that plaintiff had any
knowledge that the vessels M/S VENTURA
and M/S BATAAN were not to depart soon
after he placed his cargo on board and the
corresponding bills of lading issued to him.
From this latter time, the goods, in
contemplation of law, are deemed already in
transit
The authority of the appellee to import was

contained in the Import Control Commission
License No. 17225, validated on June 18,
1953, and under Resolution 70 of the
Commission (adopted March 27, 1952), the
same had a six-month period of validity
Defendant's reliance upon Central Bank

regulations that the shipment licensed must
have "left the port of origin within the period
of validity of the license" is not maintainable
in the present case, because the regulations
came into effect only on July 1, 1953 already
The defendant appealed to the Court of

Appeals. The question raised, however,
being purely one of law, the appeal was
certified to us pursuant to a resolution of
said court dated July 19, 1957.
after issuance of the appellee's license and

cannot be read into the same
Appeal of the Defendant was dismissed
Crisostomo
(1996)
vs.
CA,
258
SCRA
G.R. No. 106296. July 5, 1996
134
to be a new institution, the law would have

said it was being "created." Petitioner claims
that the PUP is merely a continuation of the
existence of the PCC, and, hence, he could
be reinstated to his former position as
president.
Issue: W/N PD 1341 abolished the PCC?
Decision: NO. P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish,
but only changed, the former Philippine
College of Commerce into what is now the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in
the same way that earlier in 1952, R.A. No.
778 had converted what was then the
Philippine School of Commerce into the
Philippine College of Commerce. What took
place was a change in academic status of
the educational institution, not in its
corporate life.
Hence the change in its
name, the expansion of its curricular
offerings, and the changes in its structure
and organization.
- Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President

of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC),
having been appointed to that position by
the President of the Philippines on July 17,
1974.
- Two administrative cases were filed against
petitioner for illegal use of government
vehicles, misappropriation of construction
materials
belonging
to
the
college,
oppression
and
harassment,
grave
misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty. The
administrative cases, which were filed with
As petitioner correctly points out, when the
the
Office
of
the
President,
were
purpose is to abolish a department or an
subsequently referred to the Office of the
office or an organization and to replace it
Solicitor General for investigation.
with another one, the lawmaking authority
- Petitioner was then preventively suspended
says so.
from office
- On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued
The appellate court ruled, however, that the
by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
PUP and the PCC are not "one and the same
CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF
institution" but "two different entities" and
COMMERCE
INTO
A
POLYTECHNIC
that since petitioner Crisostomo's term was
UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES,
coterminous with the legal existence of the
ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE
AND
PCC, petitioner's term expired upon the
FUNCTIONS,
AND
EXPANDING
ITS
abolition of the PCC.
CURRICULAR OFFERINGS.
- But the reinstatement of petitioner to the
- After a couple of years, the Trial Court
position of president of the PUP could not be
acquitted Crisostomo and cases before the
ordered by the trial court because on June
ombudsman were also dismissed on the
10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437 had been
ground that they had become moot and
promulgated fixing the term of office of
academic and moved that he be reinstated
presidents of state universities and colleges
but is barred by the PD 1341.
at six (6) years, renewable for another term
- The People of the Philippines filed a
of six (6) years, and authorizing the
Certiorari before the CA on the decided case
President of the Philippines to terminate the
which acquitted Crisostomo before the CA.
terms of incumbents who were not
CA reversed the Decision of the lower court.
reappointed.
- PD 1341, Crisostomo argues that P.D. No.
- In accordance with 7 of the law, therefore,
1341, which converted the PCC into the PUP,
petitioner became entitled only to retirement
did not abolish the PCC. He contends that if
benefits or the payment of separation pay.
the law had intended the PCC to lose its
Petitioner must have recognized this fact
existence, it would have specified that the
that is why in 1992 he asked then President
PCC was being "abolished" rather than
Aquino to consider him for appointment to
"converted" and that if the PUP was intended
the same position after it had become

vacant in consequence of the retirement of
Dr. Prudente.
Larin vs Executive Sec

112745. October 16, 1997)
(G.R.
No.
Facts:
- This is Petition for validity of the
petitioner's removal from service as Asst.
Commissioner of the BIR, questioning the
creation of Memorandum Order no. 164 5
Administrative Order No. 101 which found
him guilty6 of grave misconduct in the
administrative charge and imposed upon
him the penalty of dismissal from office.
Likewise, petitioner seeks to assail the
legality of Executive Order No. 1327
- In his petition, petitioner challenged the
authority of the President to dismiss him
from office. He argued that in so far as
presidential appointees who are Career
Executive Service Officers are concerned,
the President exercises only the power of
control not the power to remove. He claimed
that there is yet no law enacted by Congress
which authorizes the reorganization by the
Executive
Department
of
executive
agencies, particularly the Bureau of Internal
revenue. He said that the reorganization
sought to be effected by the Executive
Department on the basis of E.O. No. 132 is
tainted with bad faith in apparent violation of
Section 2 of R.A. 66568
Issue:
5
issued by the Office of the President, which provides for the

creation of A Committee to Investigate the Administrative
Complaint Against Aquilino T. Larin, Assistant Commissioner,
Bureau of Internal Revenue as well as the investigation made
in pursuance thereto and
Petitioner is found guilty of the crimes of violation of Sec

268 (4) of NIRC and Sec 3 of RA 3019 in Criminal Cases Nos
14208-14209 (ppl vs Larin et. al)
Which mandates for the streamlining of the Bureau of

Internal Revenue. Under said order, some positions and
functions are either abolished, renamed, decentralized or
transferred to other offices, while other offices are also
created. The Excise Tax Service or the Specific Tax Service, of
which petitioner was the Assistant Commissioner, was one of
those offices that was abolished by said executive order.
Otherwise known as the Act Protecting the Security of

Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the
Implementation of Government Reorganization.
Does the President have the power to

reorganize the BIR or to issue the questioned
E.O. NO. 132?,
Decision:
YES. Petitioner is a presidential appointee
who belongs to career service of the Civil
Service. Being a presidential appointee, he
comes under the direct disciplining authority
of the President. This is in line with the well
settled principle that the power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint conferred to
the President by Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, it is ineluctably clear that
Memorandum Order No. 164, which created
a
committee
to
investigate
the
administrative charge against petitioner, was
issued pursuant to the power of removal of
the President.
- Under its Preamble, E.O. No. 132 lays down
the legal basis of its issuance, namely: a)
Section 48 and 62 of R.A. No. 7645, b)
Section 63 of E.O. No. 127, and c) Section
20, Book III of E.O. No. 292. Section 48 & 62
of R.A. 7645 clearly mentions the acts of
"scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of
offices only and does not cover the creation
of offices or transfer of functions.
- The foregoing provision evidently shows
that the President is authorized to effect
organizational
changes
including
the
creation of offices in the department or
agency concerned.
- While the President's power to reorganize
can not be denied, this does not mean
however that the reorganization itself is
properly made in accordance with law. Wellsettled is the rule that reorganization is
regarded as valid provided it is pursued in
good faith.9
9
Thus, in Dario vs. Mison, this court has had the occasion to
clarify that:"As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out
in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. In that event no dismissal or
separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases
to exist. And in that case the security of tenure would not be
a Chinese Wall. Be that as it may, if the abolition which is
nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political
reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or
otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes place and
whatever abolition is done is void ab initio. There is an invalid
DISPOSITIVE PORTION10
Pichay vs Office of the Dep. Sec

G.R. NO. 196425 - July 24, 2012
- This is a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order, seeking to
declare as unconstitutional Executive Order
No. 1311 and to permanently prohibit
respondents
from
administratively
proceeding against petitioner on the
strength of the assailed executive order.
- On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. 1212. On
November 15, 2010, President Benigno
Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No.
1313 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the Office of the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
(ODESLA), more particularly to its newlyestablished Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division (IAD).
abolition as where there is merely a change of nomenclature
of positions or where claims of economy are belied by the
existence of ample funds.
10
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted,

and petitioner is hereby reinstated to his position as Assistant
Commissioner without loss of seniority rights and shall be
entitled to full backwages from the time of his separation
from service until actual reinstatement unless, in the
meanwhile, he would have reached the compulsory
retirement age of sixty-five years in which case, he shall be
deemed to have retired at such age and entitled thereafter to
the corresponding retirement benefits.SO ORDERED.
- On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance

Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the
IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave
misconduct against petitioner Prospero A.
Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees
of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA), which arose from the purchase by
the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five
Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven
(445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings
Bank, Inc.
- Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a
case involving the same transaction and
charge of grave misconduct entitled,
"Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et
al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is
already pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman.
- In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13,
petitioner asseverates that the President is
not authorized under any existing law to
create the Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division, Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) and
that by creating a new, additional and
distinct office tasked with quasi-judicial
functions, the President has not only usurped
the powers of congress to create a public
office, appropriate funds and delegate quasijudicial functions to administrative agencies
but has also encroached upon the powers of
the Ombudsman. Petitioner avers that the
unconstitutionality of E.O. 13 is also evident
when weighed against the due process
requirement and equal protection clause
under the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
11
entitled, "Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft

Commission and Transferring Its Investigative, Adjudicatory
and Recommendatory Functions to the Office Of The Deputy
Executive Secretary For Legal Affairs, Office of the President"
12
creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)

and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and
corruption, among others, against presidential appointees
and to submit its report and recommendations to the
President.
W/N E.O. 13 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR

USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE
TO CREATE A PUBLIC OFFICE.
Decision
13 ABOLISHING THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT
COMMISSION AND TRANSFERRING ITS INVESTIGATIVE,
ADJUDICATORY AND RECOMMENDATORY FUNCTIONS TO THE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL
AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NO. The President has Continuing Authority

to Reorganize the Executive Department
under E.O. 29214. Section 31 of E.O. 292),
vests in the President the continuing
authority to reorganize the offices under him
in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency.
Discussion:
- The law grants the President this power in
recognition of the recurring need of every
President to reorganize his office "to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency."
- The Office of the President is the nerve
center of the Executive Branch. To remain
effective and efficient, the Office of the
President must be capable of being shaped
and reshaped by the President in the manner
he deems fit to carry out his directives and
policies. After all, the Office of the President
is the command post of the President.
- The abolition of the PAGC and the transfer
of its functions to a division specially created
within the ODESLA is properly within the
prerogative of the President under his
continuing "delegated legislative authority to
reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O.
292.
- Here, the Petitioner is a Presidential
Appointee15. Petitioner is a presidential
appointee occupying the high-level position
of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he
comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of
the President, who is well within his right to
order an investigation into matters that
require his informed decision.
- Presumption of Constitutionality16
===========
14
15
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987
Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining

authority of the President. This proceeds from the well settled
principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to
remove or to discipline is lodged in the same authority on
which the power to appoint is vested.32 Having the power to
remove and/or discipline presidential appointees, the
President has the corollary authority to investigate such
public officials and look into their conduct in office.
16
Every law has in its favor the presumption of

constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative one.39Petitioner has failed to
discharge the burden of proving the illegality of E.O. 13,
which IS indubitably a valid exercise of the President's
continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
- HSBC filed an estafa case against

Balanguans which was dismissed by the
Prosecutor in its Resolution, finding no
probable cause. HSBC appealed to the
Secretary of DOJ by means of a Petition for
Review which was also dismissed. MR was
also denied.
- HSBC then went to CA by means of Petition
for Certiorari thereby annulling and setting
aside the resolutions of the DOJ. Balanguans
filed an MR before the CA but was denied.
ISSUE: W/N
Decision:
- The Prosecutor exceeded his authority and
gravely abused his discretion. It must be
remembered that a finding of probable
cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is
believed that the act or omission complained
of constitutes the offense charged.
Discussion:
Balanguan et. al vs CA (19th Division)

GR 174350 , 2008
- Petition for Certiorari assailing the Decision
and Resolution of CA w/c annulled and set
aside the Resolution of DOJ in HSBC vs
Balanguan which dismissed the criminal
complaint for Estafa filed against the
Balanguan.
- In this Petition, Balanguans urge the SC to
reverse and set aside the decision of CA and
accordingly, dismiss the complaint against
them in view of the absence of probable
cause
- The Court of Appeals found fault in the

DOJ's failure to identify and discuss the
issues raised by HSBC in its Petition for
Review. And, in support thereof, HSBC
maintains that it is incorrect to argue that "it
was not necessary for the Secretary of
Justice to have his resolution recite the facts
and the law on which it was based," because
courts and quasi-judicial bodies should
faithfully comply with Section 14, Article VIII
of the Constitution requiring that decisions
rendered by them should state clearly and
distinctly the facts of the case and the law
on which the decision is based
- It must be remembered that a preliminary
investigation
is
not
a
quasi-judicial
proceeding, and that the DOJ is not a quasijudicial agency17 exercising a quasi-judicial
function when it reviews the findings of a
public prosecutor regarding the presence of
probable cause
17
A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions

such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their
decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. A
quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such
that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their
decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court .
FACTS: .
- Though some cases describe the public
prosecutor's power to conduct a preliminary
investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this
is true only to the extent that, like quasijudicial bodies18, the prosecutor is an officer
of the executive department exercising
powers akin to those of a court, and the
similarity ends at this point.
- The alleged circumstances of the case at
bar make up the elements of abuse of
confidence, deceit or fraudulent means, and
damage under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal
Code on estafa and/or qualified estafa. They
give rise to the presumption or reasonable
belief that the offense of estafa has been
committed; and, thus, the filing of an
Information against petitioners Bernyl and
Katherene is warranted.
- Considering the allegations, issues and
arguments adduced, SC dismissed the
instant petition for being the wrong remedy
under the Revised Rules of Court, as well as
for petitioner Bernyl and Katherene's failure
to sufficiently show that the challenged
Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals were rendered in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the

Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She
applied for a Career Executive Service (CES)
Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was given a
CES eligibility and was recommended to the
President for a CESO rank by the Career
Executive Service Board.
Then
respondent
Civil
Service
Commission passed a Resolution which
abolished the CESB, relying on the provisions
of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly
conferring on the Commission the power and
authority
to
effect
changes
in
its
organization
as
the
need
arises.
Said resolution states:
Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive

Service Board, shall now be known as the
Office for Career Executive Service of the
Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the
existing personnel, budget, properties and
equipment of the Career Executive Service
Board shall now form part of the Office for
Career Executive Service.
Finding
herself
bereft
of
further
administrative relief as the Career Executive
Service Board which recommended her
CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner
filed the petition at bench to annul, among
others, said resolution.
EUGENIO vs. CSC et al G.R. No. 115863

March 31, 1995
18
A quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other

than a court and other than a legislature which affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rulemaking.
ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to

abolish the office of the CESB
HELD: the petition is granted and Resolution

of the respondent Commission is hereby
annulled and set aside
NO
1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was
created in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974 . It
cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the
CESB was created by law, it can only be
abolished by the legislature. This follows an
unbroken stream of rulings that the creation
and abolition of public offices is primarily a
legislative function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has

not enacted any law authorizing the
abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all
the General Appropriations Acts from 1975
to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds
for the operation of CESB.
Respondent Commission, however, invokes
Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
as the source of its power to abolish the
CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the
Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read
together with Section 16 of the said Code
which enumerates the offices under the
respondent Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion
is that respondent Commissions power to
reorganize is limited to offices under its
control as enumerated in Section 16..
2. . From its inception, the CESB was
intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent
Commission. As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee the CESB shall
be autonomous. It is expected to view the
problem of building up executive manpower
in the government with a broad and positive
outlook.
The essential autonomous character of the

CESB is not negated by its attachment to
respondent
Commission.
By
said
attachment, CESB was not made to fall
within
the
control
of
respondent
Commission. Under the Administrative Code
of 1987, the purpose of attaching one
functionally inter-related government agency
to another is to attain policy and program
coordination. This is clearly etched out in
Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the
aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the

lateral relationship between the department
or its equivalent and attached agency or
corporation for purposes of policy and
program coordination. The coordination may
be accomplished by having the department
represented in the governing board of the
attached agency or corporation, either as
chairman or as a member, with or without
voting rights, if this is permitted by the
charter; having the attached corporation or
agency comply with a system of periodic
reporting which shall reflect the progress of
programs and projects; and having the
department or its equivalent provide general
policies through its representative in the
board, which shall serve as the framework
for the internal policies of the attached
corporation or agency.
NOTES:
Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
as the source of its power to abolish the
CESB. Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Each
office of the Commission shall be headed by
a Director with at least one Assistant
Director, and may have such divisions as are
necessary independent constitutional body,
the Commissionmay effect changes in the

organization as the need arises.
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. The
Commission shall have the following offices:
(1) The Office of the Executive
(2) The
Merit
System
Protection
Board composed of a Chairman and two (2)
members
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs
(4) The Office of Planning and Management
(5) The Central Administrative Office.
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records
(7) The Office of Position Classification and
Compensation
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination
and Placement
(9) The Office
Standards
(10) The
Office
Development
of
Career
of
Systems
Human
and
Resource
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and

Audit.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs
(14) The Office of Retirement
(15) The Regional and Field Offices.
petitioners salaries or allowances of

the
amounts needed to cover the alleged
overpayments.
Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268
were issued in the valid exercise of
presidential control over the executive
departments
Blaquera vs Alcala
Facts: On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino
issued
AO
268
which
granted
each official and
employee
of
the
government
the
productivity
incentive benefits in a maximum amount
equivalent to 30% of the employees one
month basic salary but which amount not be
less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that
the productivity incentive benefits shall be
granted only for the year 1991. Accordingly,
all heads of agencies, including government
boards of government-owned or controlled
corporations and financial institutions, are
strictly
prohibited
from
granting
productivity incentive benefits for the year
1992 and future years pending the result of
a comprehensive study being undertaken by
the
Office
of
the
Pres.
Held: The Pres. is the head of the

government. Governmental power and
authority are exercised and implemented
through him. His power includes the control
of executive departments as provided under
Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.
Control means the power of an officer to
alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the
latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power
of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any
action or decision of his subordinate in the
executive departments, bureau or offices
under
him.
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the
amount
of incentive benefits,
enjoining
heads of government agencies from
granting incentive benefits without approval
from him and directing the refund of the
excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres.
was just exercising his power of control over
executive
departments.
The
petitioners,
who
are officials and
employees
of
several
government
departments
and
agencies,
were
paid incentive benefits for the year 1992.
The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the
Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos
grant of productivity incentive benefits and
issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of
to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and
productivity incentive benefits for the year
demoralization
among
government
1992 in the maximum amount of P1, 000.00
personnel
by
committing
limited
resources
of
and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7
government
for
the
equal
payment
of AO 268, enjoining the grant of
of
incentives
and
awards.
The
Pres.
was only
productivity incentive benefits without prior
exercising
his
power
of
control
by
approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29
modifying
the
acts
of
the
heads
of
the
directed all departments, offices and
government
agencies
who
agencies which authorized payment of
granted incentive benefits
to
their
productivity incentive bonus for the year
employees
without
1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately
appropriate clearance from the Office of the
cause the refund of the excess. In
Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven
compliance therewith, the heads of the
distribution
of
government
resources.
departments or agencies of the government
concerned caused the deduction from
The Presidents duty to execute the law is of

constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of
executive departments.
Lumiqued vs Exevea
FACTS:
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional
Director of the Department of Agrarian
Reform - Cordillera Autonomous Region
(DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos
dismissed him from that position pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12,
1993.
The following three complaints were filed by
DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private
respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the
Board of Discipline of the DAR:
-charged
with
malversation
through
falsification of official documents. From May
to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly
committed at least 93 counts of falsification
by padding gasoline receipts.
-private respondent accused Lumiqued with
violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules
and regulations, alleging that during the
months of April, May, July, August,
September and October 1989, he made
unliquidated cash advances in the total

amount of P116,000.00
-charged with oppression and harassment.
According to private respondent, her two
previous complaints prompted Lumiqued to
retaliate by relieving her from her post as
Regional Cashier without just cause
The DOJ made appropriate action by forming
a committee to investigate the complaints
against Lumiqued. *Committee hearings on
the complaints were conducted on July 3 and
10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by
counsel. On the second hearing date, he
moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to
enable him to employ the services of
counsel. The committee granted the motion,
but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel
appeared on the date he himself had
chosen, so the committee deemed the case
submitted for resolution. Acting on the report
and
recommendation,
former
Justice
Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted the
same in his Memorandum to President Fidel
V. Ramos dated October 22, 1992. On May
12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself
issued Administrative Order No. 52 (A.O. No.
52), 16 finding Lumiqued administratively
liable for dishonesty in the alteration of
fifteen gasoline receipts, and dismissing him
from the service, with forfeiture of his
retirement and other benefits.
Petition for appeal addressed to Pres Ramos
was filed by Lumiqued praying that A.O. No.
52 be reconsidered and that he be reinstated
to his former position "with all the benefits
accorded to him by law and existing rules
and regulations." The OP denied the motion.
Second motion was filed but on May 19,
1994, 20 however, before his motion could
be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September
28, 1994, 21 Secretary Quisumbing denied
the second motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit.
On May 19, 1994, 20 however, before his
motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died.
On September 28, 1994, 21 Secretary
Quisumbing denied the second motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
In view of Lumiqued's death on May 19,

1994, his heirs instituted this petition for
certiorari and mandamus, questioning such
order.
officers and employees, with the purpose of

maintaining the dignity of government
service.
ISSUES:
1. WON the administrative investigation
conducted by the DOJ is valid.
2. WON the right to counsel by Lumiques
was violated.
HELD:
1. Yes. While it is true that under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall
"administer the criminal justice system in
accordance with the accepted processes
thereof consisting in the investigation of the
crimes, prosecution of offenders and
administration of the correctional system,"
conducting criminal investigations is not its
sole function. By its power to "perform such
other functions as may be provided by law,"
prosecutors may be called upon to conduct
administrative investigations. Accordingly,
the investigating committee created by
Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound
to conduct the administrative investigation
in accordance with the rules therefor.
Moreover, the committee's findings pinning
culpability for the charges of dishonesty and
grave misconduct upon Lumiqued were not,
as shown above, fraught with procedural
mischief
2. No. under existing laws, a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be
assisted by counsel, irrespective of the
nature of the charges and of the
respondent's capacity to represent himself,
and no duty rests on such a body to furnish
the person being investigated with counsel.
In an administrative proceeding such as the
one that transpired below, a respondent
(such as Lumiqued) has the option of
engaging the services of counsel or not.
Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic
notes of the hearings attended by Lumiqued
clearly show that he was confident of his
capacity and so opted to represent himself .
Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative
in administrative investigations because
such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measures against erring public
among others, the creation of the NPO from

the merger of the Government Printing
Office and the relevant printing units of the
Philippine Information Agency (PIA). In 2004,
President Arroyo issued Executive Order No.
378 on 2004 amending Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia,
removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NPO over the printing services requirements
of
government
agencies
and
instrumentalities.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378,
government agencies and instrumentalities
are allowed to source their printing services
from the private sector through competitive
bidding, subject to the condition that the
services offered by the private supplier be of
superior quality and lower in cost compared
to what was offered by the NPO. Executive
Order
No.
378
also
limited
NPOs
appropriation in the General Appropriations
Act to its income.
As such, the petitioners perceived that
Executive Order No. 378 is a threat to their
security of tenure as employees of the NPO.
Hence, they filed this petition.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not President Arroyo has
the power to issue Executive Order
No. 378?
b) Whether
or
not
EO
378
is
constitutional?
HELD:
a) YES.
President
Arroyo
was
granted by law to issue Executive
Order No. 378.
BANDA V. ERMITA
G.R. No. 166620
April 20, 2010
FACTS:
Sometime in 1987, The National
Printing Office (NPO) was formed during the
term of former President Aquino by virtue of
Executive Order No. 285 which provided,
The law grants the President the

power to reorganize the Office of the
President in recognition of the recurring need
of every President to reorganize his or her
office to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. To remain effective and efficient,
it must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner the
Chief Executive deems fit to carry out
presidential directives and policies. The
Administrative Code provides that the Office
of the President consists of the Office of the
President Proper and the agencies under it.
The issuance of Executive Order No.

378 by President Arroyo is an exercise of a
delegated legislative power granted by the
aforementioned Section 31, Chapter 10, Title
III, Book III of the Administrative Code of
1987, which provides for the continuing
authority of the President to reorganize the
Office of the President, in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. This is a
matter
already
well-entrenched
in
jurisprudence. The reorganization of such an
office through executive or administrative
order is also recognized in the Administrative
Code of 1987.
In the present instance, involving
neither abolition nor transfer of offices, the
assailed action is a mere reorganization
under the general provisions of the law
consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in
the interest of simplicity, economy and
efficiency.
It is an act well within the
authority of the President motivated and
carried out, according to the findings of the
appellate court, in good faith, a factual
assessment that this Court could only but
accept.
b) YES . EO 378 is constitutional.
The basic evidentiary rule is that he who
asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue
has the burden of proving it. The petitioners
failed to allege, much less prove, sufficient
facts to show that the limitation of the NPOs
budget to its own income would indeed lead
to the abolition of the position, or removal
from office, of any employee. Neither did
they present any shred of proof of their
assertion that the changes in the functions
of the NPO were for political considerations
that had nothing to do with improving the
efficiency of, or encouraging operational
economy in, the said agency.
Furthermore, the Court finds that the petition
failed to show any constitutional infirmity or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyos
issuance of Executive Order No. 378.
Jaworski vs PAGCOR and SAGE

GR 144463, 14 January 2004
PAGCORs19 Board of Directors an instrument
called "Grant of Authority and Agreement for the
Operation of Sports Betting and Internet
Gaming", which granted SAGE20 the authority to
operate and maintain Sports Betting station in
PAGCORs casino locations, and Internet Gaming
facilities to service local and international bettors,
provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR,
appropriate safeguards and procedures are
established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the
games.
Senator R. Jaworski, as member of the Senate and
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games,
Amusement and Sports, filed a petition, praying that
the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE
be nullified for the following reasons:
1. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate
gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR
is not authorized to operate gambling on the internet
for the reason that PD 1869 could not have possibly
contemplated internet gambling since at the time of
its enactment, the internet was inexistent and
gambling activities were confined exclusively to realspace. 2. Further, he argues that the internet, being
an international network of computers, necessarily
transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of authority to
operate internet gambling contravenes the limitation
in PAGCORs franchise, under Section 14 of P.D. No.
1869 which provides that PAGCOR shall conduct
gambling activities or games of chance on land or
19
A GOCC existing under Presidential Decree No. 1869

issued on July 11, 1983 by then President Ferdinand Marcos
created to xxx To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for
amusement and recreation, including sports, gaming pools
(basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of
amusement and recreation including games of chance, which
may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines and which will: x x x (3) minimize, if not totally
eradicate, the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are
normally prevalent in the conduct and operation of gambling
clubs and casinos without direct government involvement.xxx
20 Abbrevation for Sports and Games and Entertainment

Corporation. A Corporation.
water within
Philippines.
the
territorial
jurisdiction
of
the
3. Internet gambling does not fall under any of

the categories of the authorized gambling activities
enumerated under Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 which
grants PAGCOR the "right, privilege and authority to
operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and
other recreation or amusement places, sports gaming
pools, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic
of the Philippines."1 He contends that internet
gambling could not have been included within the
commonly accepted definition of "gambling casinos",
"clubs" or "other recreation or amusement places" as
these terms refer to a physical structure in real-space
where people who intend to bet or gamble go and
play games of chance authorized by law
Issue: WHETHER RESPONDENT PAGCOR ACTED

WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION,
OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN
IT AUTHORIZED RESPONDENT SAGE TO
OPERATE INTERNET GAMBLING ON THE BASIS
OF ITS RIGHT "TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN
GAMBLING CASINOS, CLUBS AND OTHER
AMUSEMENT PLACES" UNDER SECTION 10 OF
P.D. 1869;
PAGCOR cannot delegate its power in view of the

legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non
potest21, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter
to show that it has been expressly authorized to do
so. Citing Lim v. Pacquing, the Court clarified that
"since ADC has no franchise from Congress to
operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it
has a license or permit from the City Mayor to
operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila." By the same
token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative
franchise and not "ride on" PAGCORs franchise
if it were to legally operate on-line Internet
gambling.
The "Grant of Authority and Agreement to Operate
Sports Betting and Internet Gaming" executed by
PAGCOR in favor of SAGE is declared NULL and
VOID.
Decision:
PAGCOR has acted beyond the limits of its authority
when it passed on or shared its franchise to SAGE
A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted
by the state to corporations. It is a privilege of public
concern which cannot be exercised at will and
pleasure, but should be reserved for public control
and administration, either by the government directly,
or by public agents, under such conditions and
regulations as the government may impose on them
in the interest of the public. It is Congress that
prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the
franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting
the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode
of conducting the business, the charter and the
quality of the service to be rendered and the duty of
the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise
are almost always defined in clear and unequivocal
language.
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter
into operators and/or management contracts, it is
not allowed under the same charter to relinquish
or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable
franchise to another entity such as SAGE.
21 In constitutional and administrative law, the principle

delegata potestas non potest delegari (Latin) states that
"no delegated powers can be further delegated".
Alternatively, it can be stated delegatus non potest
delegare, "one to whom power is delegated cannot himself
further delegate that power".
G.R. Nos. 86540-41November 6, 1989

MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ASSET
PRIVATIZATION
TRUST,
MAKATI
AGROTRADING, INC., and LA FILIPINA UY GONGCO.
CORP., respondents.
Facts:
- in 1986 (at the time when Freedom Constitution
was in force) Mantruste System, Inc. (MSI) entered
into an "interim lease agreement" with the
Development Bank of the Philippines (owner of the
Bayview Plaza Hotel) wherein the former would
operate the hotel for "a minimum of three months
or until such time that the said properties are sold
to MSI or other third parties by DBP.
- On December 8, 1986 the President issued
Proclamation No. 50 entitled "Launching a Program
for the Expeditious Disposition or Privatization of
Certain Government Corporations and/or the
(acquired) Assets thereof, and creating a
Committee on Privatization and the Asset
Privatization Trust."
- The Bayview Hotel properties were among the
government assets Identified for privatization and
were consequently transferred from DBP to APT for
disposition.
- To effect the disposition of the property, the DBP
notified MSI that it was terminating the "interim
lease agreement." in Sept 1987 (after more than a
year)
- MSI, in its reply to the said termination, said that it
is of the opinion that since its lease on the hotel
properties has been for more than one year now,
its lease status has taken the character of a long
term one. As such MSI as the lessee has acquired
certain rights and of firm contention that it has
acquired a priority right to the purchase of Bayview
Hotel properties over and above other interested
parties and does not need to participate in a
property bidding that was on going at that time.
- APT responded firmly that they disagree with

MSIs claims and recommended to join the bidding
instead should they intend to acquire the property.
- Eventually, Mantruste being firm to their stand,
did not join the bidding. As a result, the bid was
awarded to another company.
- MSI filed a Civil Complaint to prevent such
transfer of Bayview and from them being ejected.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of MSI.
- APT appealed to CA. CA nullified RTC's decision
on the ground that RTC's decision is violative of
Section 3122 of Proclamation No. 50-A and rejected
RTCs opinion in the case that the above provision
of Proclamation No. 50-A is unconstitutional
because it ceased to be operative in view of the
1987 Constitution
Issue:
- W/N Proclamation No. 50, that was promulgated
1986, has ceased to be operative in view of the
1987 Constitution
- W/N Sec 31 of Proclamation No. 50 impinges
upon the judicial power as defined in Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
Decision:
NO. Proclamation No. 50-A continued to be
operative after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, by virtue of Section 3 23, Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) providing that:
Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not
infringe any provision of the Constitution. It does
not impair the inherent power of courts "to settle
actual controversies which are legally demandable
and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
22
which provides:
No court or administrative agency shall issue any restraining
order or injunction against the Trust in connection with the
acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it . . .
Nor shall such order or injunction be issued against any
purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser
from taking possession of any assets purchased by him.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government" (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
The power to define, prescribe and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the
legislature, except that it may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
The President, in the exercise of her legislative
power under the Freedom Constitution, issued
Proclamation No. 50-A prohibiting the courts from
issuing restraining orders and writs of injunction
against the APT and the purchasers of any assets
sold by it, to prevent courts from interfering in the
discharge, by this instrumentality of the executive
branch of the Government, of its task of carrying
out "the expeditious disposition and privatization of
certain government corporations and/or the assets
thereof' (Proc. No. 50), absent any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction on its part. This proclamation, not being
inconsistent with the Constitution and not having
been repealed or revoked by Congress, has
remained operative (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987
Constitution).
- Under the system of separation of powers set up
in the Constitution, the power of the courts over the
other branches and instrumentalities of the
Government is limited only to the determination of
"whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion (by them) amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" in the exercise of their authority and in
the performance of their assigned tasks (Sec. 1,
Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
- There can be no justification for judicial
interference in the business of an administrative
agency, except when it violates a citizen's
constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of
discretion, or acts in excess of, or without
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition for
review is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against
the petitioner
23
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,

proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL (1965)

FACTS:
Pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code (RAC) of 1917, authorizing the President of
the Philippines to create new municipalities among
others,
then President (Macapagal) issued
Executive Orders creating 33 municipalities.
Thereafter, then a special civil action was instituted
by Emmanuel Pelaez as then the Vice President
and taxpayer against the Auditor General to
restrain him, as well as his representatives and
agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in the implementation of said
executive orders and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities.
ISSUE:
Whether the Executive Orders were valid and thus
constituted due delegation of power
HELD:
No.
R.A. 2370 (1960) has impliedly repealed Sec. 68 of
RAC when it expressed:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries
altered nor their names changed except under the
provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Thus, the power to fix such common boundary, in
order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction
between adjoining municipalities, may partake of
an administrative nature involving, as it does,
the adoption of means and ways to carry into
effect the law creating said municipalities the
authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature. The authority to
create
municipal
corporations
is
essentially legislative in nature; the creation of
municipalities, is not an administrative function, but
one which is essentially and eminently legislative in
character.
Although Congress may delegate to another

branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers,
that said law:
(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate and
(b) fix a standard the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of
his functions.
Without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would in effect, make or formulate such
policy, which is the essence of every law; and,
without the aforementioned standard, there would
be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or
beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could
thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only
to make the law, but, also and this is worse to
unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with
the end sought to be attained by the Act of
Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation
of powers and the system of checks and balances,
and, consequently, undermining the very
foundation of our Republican system.
Further, the 1935 Constitution (Art VII, Sec 11) has
granted the President control over all executive
departments and with regard to local governments,
only supervision. He was then denied the power to
control local governments by the very Constitution
itself. If the President was allowed to create a
municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its
officials, by creating a new municipality and
including therein the barrio in which the official
concerned resides, for his office would thereby
become vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the
power to create a new municipality (if he had it),
without actually creating it, he could compel local
officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect,
exercising over them the power of control denied to
him by the Constitution.
CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (CGA)

SPS IGNACIO (2009)
VS
FACTS:
Owners of subject property in Pulilan , Bulacan,
Spouses Ignacio, and CGA entered into a Contract
to Sell for the said subdivision lot with stipulations
on downpayment, installment terms and period.
CGA paid the downpayment and religiously paid its
monthly installments until it was discovered that
subject property had flaws and defects in its title;
that said lot was a property under litigation. CGA
filed an action before the RTC against Ignacio for
fraudulent concealment of property under litigation.
Ignacio moved to have the action dismissed
contending that the HLURB has jurisdiction over
their claims.
ISSUE:
Whether HLURB
complaint
has
jurisdiction
over
the
HELD:
Yes. HLURB had its beginning when pursuant to
PD No. 957 NHA was created intended to closely
supervise and regulate the real estate subdivision
and condominium businesses in order to curb the
growing number of swindling and fraudulent
manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous
subdivision and condominium sellers and
operators. By virtue of succeeding executive
orders, NHAs jurisdiction expanded until its
functions were transferred to the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) until
it was eventually renamed HLURB.
HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints
arising from contracts between the subdivision
developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at
compelling the subdivision developer to comply
with its contractual and statutory obligations to

make the subdivision a better place to live in.
In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial
powers which an administrative agency may
exercise is defined in the enabling act of such
agency. In other words, the extent to which an
administrative entity may exercise such powers
depends largely, if not wholly on the provisions of
the statute creating or empowering such agency. In
the exercise of such powers, the agency
concerned must commonly interpret and apply
contracts and determine the rights of private
parties under such contracts, One thrust of the
multiplication of administrative agencies is that the
interpretation
of
contracts
and
the
determination of private rights thereunder is no
longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable
only by our regular courts.
ENRIQUE GARCIA VS EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY (1992)
211 SCRA 219
FACTS: In November 1990, President Corazon

Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which
imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and
charges imposed by law on all articles imported
into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad
valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed
across the board on all imported articles, including
crude oil and other oil products imported into the
Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the
additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475
was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty
except that crude oil and other oil products
continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a
representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and
478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24
of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff

bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application,
and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with
amendments
He contends that since the Constitution vests the

authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the
President may not assume such power by issuing
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in
the nature of revenue-generating measures.
such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may

impose to fix within specific limits tariff rates . . .
and other duties or imposts . . . . In this case, it is
the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the
President to issue the said EOs.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are

constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the

Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,
revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of
course, within the province of the Legislative rather
than the Executive Department. It does not follow,
however, that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478,
assuming they may be characterized as revenue
measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the
President, that they must be enacted instead by
the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution
provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law,

authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas,
tonnage
and
wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the
national development program of
the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to

Congress to authorize the President subject to
TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION v THE COURT OF APPEALS
527 SCRA 746 G.R. No. 167324 - on delegation
of powers
J. Chico-Nazario
Facts:
In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector
Reform Agenda (HSRA). It provided for five general
areas of reform:
To provide
hospitals;
fiscal
autonomy
to
government
Secure funding for priority public health

programs;
Promote the development of local health
systems and ensure its effective performance;
Strengthen the capacities of health
regulatory agencies;
Expand the coverage of the National Health
Insurance Program (NHIP)
On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled
Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the
Department of Health, which provided for the
changes in the roles, functions, and organizational
processes of the DOH. Under the assailed
executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate
from being the sole provider of health services to
being a provider of specific health services and
technical assistance, as a result of the devolution
of basic services to local government units.
A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector
Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of
the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive
Order No. 102, Redirecting the Functions and
Operations of the Department of Health,
Petitioners alleged that the HSRA should be
declared void, since it runs counter to the
aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as
embodied in the Constitution. They claim that the
HSRA's policies of fiscal autonomy, income
generation, and revenue enhancement violate
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II,
Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of
Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of
the 1987 Constitution. Such policies allegedly
resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and
free medical services.
which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the

State to protect and promote the peoples right to
health and well-being. It reasoned that the
aforementioned provisions of the Constitution are
not self-executing; they are not judicially
enforceable constitutional rights and can only
provide guidelines for legislation. The Court of
Appeals held that Executive Order No. 102 is
detrimental to the health of the people cannot be
made a justiciable issue. The question of whether
the HSRA will bring about the development or
disintegration of the health sector is within the
realm of the political department.
Issue:
WON EO 102 is void on the ground that it was
issued in excess of the president's authority.
Held: No. EO 102 is valid.
Executive Order No. 102 is well within the
constitutional power of the President to issue. The
President did not usurp any legislative prerogative
in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an
exercise of the President's constitutional power of
control over the executive department, supported
by the provisions of the Administrative Code,
recognized by other statutes, and consistently
affirmed by this Court.
The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on
petitioners' bare allegations that it violates the
general principles expressed in the non selfexecuting provisions they cite herein. There are two
reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged
infringement of broad constitutional principles:
basic considerations of due process and the
limitations of judicial power.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot

be declared void for violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11,
Petitioners also claim that Executive Order No. 102
13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III;
is void on the ground that it was issued by the
Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1
President in excess of his authority. They maintain
and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution,
that the structural and functional reorganization of
the DOH is an exercise of legislative functions,

which the President usurped when he issued
Executive Order No. 102. This line of argument is
without basis.
In Domingo v. Zamora, this Court explained the
rationale behind the President's continuing
authority under the Administrative Code to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office
of the President. The law grants the President the
power to reorganize the Office of the President in
recognition of the recurring need of every President
to reorganize his or her office "to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency." To remain effective and
efficient, it must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief
Executive deems fit to carry out presidential
directives and policies.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant
Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 26 November 2004, declaring both
the HSRA and Executive Order No. 102 as valid.
No costs.
declaring the unconstitutionality of certain

provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of
the entire FTAA executed between the government
and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are
service contracts prohibited by the 1987
Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject
FTAA for being similar to service contracts,[9]
which, though permitted under the 1973
Constitution, were subsequently denounced for
being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty
over our natural resources, because they allowed
foreign control over the exploitation of our natural
resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.
La Bugal-BLaan v. Ramos
G.R. No. 127882. December 1, 2004. J.
Panganiban
Facts:
The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before
the Court challenges the constitutionality of (1)
Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of
1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3)
the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) dated 30 March 1995, executed by the
government with Western Mining Corporation
(Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).
The Decision quoted several legal scholars and

authors who had criticized service contracts for,
inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive
management and control of the enterprise,
including operation of the field in the event
petroleum was discovered; control of production,
expansion and development; nearly unfettered
control over the disposition and sale of the
products discovered/extracted; effective ownership
of the natural resource at the point of extraction;
and beneficial ownership of our economic
resources. According to the Decision, the 1987
Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII) effectively
banned such service contracts. Subsequently,
Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]),
Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences
Bureau [MGB-DENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive
Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines) Inc. filed
separate Motions for Reconsideration.
Petitioners argued that no amendatory laws have

been passed to make the Mining Act of 1995
conform to constitutional strictures (assuming that,
at present, it does not); that public respondents will
continue to implement and enforce the statute until
this Court rules otherwise; and that the said law
continues to be the source of legal authority in
On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc
accepting, processing and approving numerous
promulgated its Decision, granting the Petition and
applications for mining rights.
Issue:
WON the court can decide on the controversy on
the ground that it is a justiciable question.
Held: Yes, it is a justiciable question.
All the protagonists are in agreement that the Court

has jurisdiction to decide this controversy, even
assuming it to be moot.
Petitioners stress the following points. First, while
a case becomes moot and academic when there
is no more actual controversy between the parties
or no useful purpose can be served in passing
upon the merits,[18] what is at issue in the instant
case is not only the validity of the WMCP FTAA, but
also the constitutionality of RA 7942 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. Second, the
acts of private respondent cannot operate to cure
the law of its alleged unconstitutionality or to divest
this Court of its jurisdiction to decide. Third, the
Constitution imposes upon the Supreme Court the
duty to declare invalid any law that offends the
Constitution.
Petitioners also argue that no amendatory laws
have been passed to make the Mining Act of 1995
conform to constitutional strictures (assuming that,
at present, it does not); that public respondents will
continue to implement and enforce the statute until
this Court rules otherwise; and that the said law
continues to be the source of legal authority in
accepting, processing and approving numerous
applications for mining rights.
entered into under the provisions of the Mining Act

invites potential litigation for as long as the
constitutional issues are not resolved with finality.
Nevertheless, we must concede that there exists
the distinct possibility that one or more of the future
FTAAs will be the subject of yet another suit
grounded on constitutional issues.
But of equal if not greater significance is the cloud
of uncertainty hanging over the mining industry,
which is even now scaring away foreign
investments. Attesting to this climate of anxiety is
the fact that the Chamber of Mines of the
Philippines saw the urgent need to intervene in the
case and to present its position during the Oral
Argument; and that Secretary General Romulo Neri
of the National Economic Development Authority
(NEDA) requested this Court to allow him to speak,
during that Oral Argument, on the economic
consequences of the Decision of January 27, 2004.
[20]
We are convinced. We now agree that the Court
must recognize the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest
involved, as well as the necessity for a ruling to put
an end to the uncertainties plaguing the mining
industry and the affected communities as a result
of doubts cast upon the constitutionality and validity
of the Mining Act, the subject FTAA and future
FTAAs, and the need to avert a multiplicity of suits.
Paraphrasing Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections,[21] it is evident that strong reasons of
public policy demand that the constitutionality issue
be resolved now.[22]
In further support of the immediate resolution of the

Indeed, it appears that as of June 30, 2002, some
constitutionality issue, public respondents cite Acop
43 FTAA applications had been filed with the Mines
v. Guingona,[23] to the effect that the courts will
and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), with an
decide a question -- otherwise moot and academic
aggregate area of 2,064,908.65 hectares -- spread
-- if it is capable of repetition, yet evading
over Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao[19] -review.[24] Public respondents ask the Court to
applied for. It may be a bit far-fetched to assert, as
avoid a situation in which the constitutionality issue
petitioners do, that each and every FTAA that was
may again arise with respect to another FTAA, the
resolution of which may not be achieved until after

it has become too late for our mining industry to
grow out of its infancy. They also recall Salonga v.
Cruz Pao,[25] in which this Court declared that
(t)he Court also has the duty to formulate guiding
and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of
educating the bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees. x x
x.
The mootness of the case in relation to the WMCP
FTAA led the undersigned ponente to state in his
dissent to the Decision that there was no more
justiciable controversy and the plea to nullify the
Mining Law has become a virtual petition for
declaratory relief.[26] The entry of the Chamber of
Mines of the Philippines, Inc., however, has put into
focus the seriousness of the allegations of
unconstitutionality of RA 7942 and DAO 96-40
which converts the case to one for prohibition[27] in
the enforcement of the said law and regulations.
Indeed, this CMP entry brings to fore that the real
issue in this case is whether paragraph 4 of
Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is
contravened by RA 7942 and DAO 96-40, not
whether it was violated by specific acts
implementing RA 7942 and DAO 96-40. [W]hen
an act of the legislative department is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling
the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By
the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is
said to have ripened into a judicial controversy
even without any other overt act.[28] This ruling
can be traced from Taada v. Angara,[29] in which
the Court said:
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the

right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute.
x x x
x x x
xxx
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly
emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress
from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to
uphold the Constitution in matters that involve
grave abuse of discretion brought before it in
appropriate cases, committed by any officer,
agency, instrumentality or department of the
government.[30]
Additionally, the entry of CMP into this case has
also effectively forestalled any possible objections
arising from the standing or legal interest of the
original parties.
For all the foregoing reasons, we believe that the
Court should proceed to a resolution of the
constitutional issues in this case.
AFTER ALL IS SAID AND DONE, it is clear that
there is unanimous agreement in the Court upon
the key principle that the State must exercise full
control and supervision over the exploration,
development and utilization of mineral resources.
This Court cannot but be mindful that any decision
rendered in this case will ultimately impact not only
the cultural communities which lodged the instant
Petition, and not only the larger community of the
Filipino people now struggling to survive amidst a
fiscal/budgetary deficit, ever increasing prices of
fuel, food, and essential commodities and services,
the shrinking value of the local currency, and a
government hamstrung in its delivery of basic
services by a severe lack of resources, but also
countless future generations of Filipinos.
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine

Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
For this latter group of Filipinos yet to be born, their
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
eventual access to education, health care and
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
basic services, their overall level of well-being, the
very shape of their lives are even now being

determined and affected partly by the policies and
directions being adopted and implemented by
government today.
And in part by the this
Resolution rendered by this Court today.
Verily, the mineral wealth and natural resources of
this country are meant to benefit not merely a
select group of people living in the areas locally
affected by mining activities, but the entire Filipino
nation, present and future, to whom the mineral
wealth really belong. This Court has therefore
weighed carefully the rights and interests of all
concerned, and decided for the greater good of the
greatest number. JUSTICE FOR ALL, not just for
some; JUSTICE FOR THE PRESENT AND THE
FUTURE, not just for the here and now.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT
the respondents and the intervenors Motions for
Reconsideration; to REVERSE and SET ASIDE
this Courts January 27, 2004 Decision; to
DISMISS the Petition; and to issue this new
judgment
declaring
CONSTITUTIONAL
(1)
Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Law),
(2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations
contained in DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No.
9640 -- insofar as they relate to financial and
technical assistance agreements referred to in
paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the
Constitution; and (3) the Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30,
1995 executed by the government and Western
Mining Corporation Philippines Inc. (WMCP),
except Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the subject FTAA
which are hereby INVALIDATED for being contrary
to public policy and for being grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
Conference of Maritime Agencies v. POEA

G.R. No. 114714
FACTS:
Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning
Agencies, Inc., an incorporated association of
licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its copetitioners, all licensed manning agencies which
hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of
their respective foreign ship-owner-principals, urge
to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the
Governing Board" of the POEA and POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 05.
Petitioners contend that POEA does not
have the power and authority to fix and promulgate
rates affecting death and workmen's compensation
of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels;
only Congress can.
The reasons given above for the delegation

of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more necessary
to entrust to administrative agencies the authority
to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of
the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate
legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may
implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
by "filling in" the details which the Congress may
not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
This is effected by their promulgation of what are
known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of
Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.
Governing Board Resolution No. 1: the

POEA Governing Board resolves to amend and
increase the compensation and other benefits as
specified under Part II, Section. C, paragraph 1
and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA
Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the POEA can promulgate
rules by virtue of delegation of legislative power?
HELD:
YES! The principle, of non-delegation of
powers is applicable to all the three major powers
of the Government but is especially important in
the case of the legislative power because of the
many instances when delegation is permitted. The
occasions are rare when executive or judicial
powers have to be delegated by the authorities to
which they legally pertain. In the case of legislative
power, however, such occasions have become
more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had
led to the observation that the delegation of
legislative power has become the rule and its nondelegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of
the task of government and the growing inability of
the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention. These solutions
may, however, be expected from its delegates, who
are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
assigned to them.
treaties, the instant case, in my view, also "must

surely be controlled by political standards."
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)

FACTS:
President Carter terminated a treaty with Taiwan,
and a few Congressional members felt that this
deprived them of their Constitutional with respect to
a change in the supreme law of the land. Congress
has taken no official action. However, no
Congressional action was ever taken. The Senate
considered a resolution that would require the
President to get Senate approval before any
mutual defense treaty could be terminated, but
there was no final vote on the resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether the issue as the President can terminate a
treaty without Congressional approval is a nonjusticiable political question.
HELD:
Yes, because it involves the authority of the
President in the conduct of our country's foreign
relations and the extent to which the Senate or the
Congress is authorized to negate the action of the
President. The question of the efficacy of
ratifications by state legislatures, in the light of
previous rejection or attempted withdrawal, should
be regarded as a political question pertaining to the
political departments, with the ultimate authority in
the Congress in the exercise of its control over the
promulgation of the adoption of the Amendment.
The controversy is a non-justiciable political
dispute that should be left for resolution by the
Executive and Legislative Branches of the
Government and might be answered in different
ways for different amendments which must surely
be controlled by political standards, rather than
standards easily characterized as "judicially
manageable". In light of the absence of any
constitutional provision governing the termination
of a treaty, and the fact that different termination
procedures may be appropriate for different
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over
the case notwithstanding Olaguer's appointment as
fiscal agent of the PCGG.
Olaguer vs RTC, G.R. No. 81385. February 21,
1989
FACTS:
HELD:
When the Development Bank of the Philippines

(DBP) provided certain financing accommodations
to Philippine Journalists, Inc. (PJI), Publisher, the
voting rights over 67% of the total subscribed and
outstanding voting shares of stock of the company
held by the stockholders were assigned to the
bank. The bank appointed some stockholders as
proxies to exercise its right to vote. But when PJI
defaulted, the bank cancelled the said proxies and
designated as its proxies petitioner Eduardo
Olaguer, Jose Mari Velez and Manuel de Leon.
DBP scheduled a special stockholders meeting for
the purpose of electing new set of directors.
However, complaints were filed against them due
to some alleged illegal acts committed by them.
Among which is that Olaguer continued to exercise
and retain full management and control of PJI
despite of his termination of his appointment as
member of the board of directors of DBP by Pres.
Aquino. It was alleged that Olaguer, et. al have
been acting as corporate officers and/or members
of the board without their having been elected by
the majority vote of stockholders and without their
owning in their own right even a single qualifying
share. It was also alleged in the complaint, that
petitioner Reyes had been sending out notices to
private respondents about an alleged stockholders
meeting to be held on December 21, 1987 at the
PJI building, and that in the letter written by the
DBP chief legal counsel, it is stated that petitioner
Olaguer and his associates who claim to be
members of the board and corporate officers of PJI
do not represent DBP and that they are not
authorized to act in its behalf.
No. Olaguer, being a fiscal agent of the PCGG and

Chairman of the Board of Directors of the PJI, was
acting for and in behalf of the PCGG. Under
Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14, the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original
jurisdiction over all cases regarding "the funds,
moneys, assets and properties illegally acquired by
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives,
subordinate, business associates, dummies,
agents, or nominees," civil or criminal, including
incidents arising from such cases. The Decision of
the Sandiganbayan is subject to review on
certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. In the
exercise of its functions, the PCGG is a co-equal
body with the regional trial courts and co-equal
bodies have no power to control the other. The
regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals have
no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of its
powers under the applicable Executive Orders and
Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
and, therefore, may not interfere with and restrain
or set aside the orders and actions of the PCGG.
The Commission should not be embroiled in and
swamped by legal suits before inferior courts all
over the land. Otherwise, the Commission will be
forced to spend valuable time defending all its
actuations in such courts. This will defeat the very
purpose behind the creation of the Commission.
A complaint was filed in the RTC of Manila

however, Olaguer contested that he has just been
designated the fiscal and team leader of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) assigned to the PJI and that all his actions
are sanctioned and reported to PCGG.
G.R. No. L-45127
May 5, 1989
Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

represented by the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte
Respondent:
HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C.
DACUYCUY,
CELESTINO
S.
MATONDO,
SEGUNDINO A, CAVAL and CIRILO M.
ZANORIA
(TOPIC:
TESTS
FOR
VALID
DELEGATION)
Ponente: REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
The Private respondents were charged of violation
of Republic Act 4670. During the arraignment the
Private respondents pleaded guilty and moved to
quash the charge on the ground that the facts of
the charge do not constitute offense, Sec 32 of the
said law is null and void for being unconstitutional.
The disputed section of Republic Act
No. 4670 provides:
Sec. 32. Penal Provision. A
person who shall wilfully interfere
with, restrain or coerce any teacher
in the exercise of his rights
guaranteed by this Act or who shall
in any other manner commit any act
to defeat any of the provisions of
this Act shall, upon conviction, be
punished by a fine of not less than
one hundred pesos nor more than
one
thousand
pesos, or
by
imprisonment, in the discretion of
the court. (Emphasis supplied).
imprisonment would be violative of the

constitutional prohibition against undue delegation
of legislative power, and that the absence of a
provision on the specific term of imprisonment
constitutes that penalty into a cruel and unusual
form of punishment. Hence, said Section 32 is
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether the absence of designated limits in fixing
the length of service of a term of imprisonment (as
in Sec 32 of RA 4670) constitutes an exercise of
undue delegation of powers?
HELD:
Yes. The court held that It is not for the courts to
fix the term of imprisonment where no points of
reference have been provided by the legislature.
What valid delegation presupposes and
sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the
length of service of a term of imprisonment
which must be encompassed within specific or
designated limits provided by law, the absence
of which designated limits well constitute such
exercise as an undue delegation, if not-an
outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative
power.
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for
an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with
neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having
been set by the legislative authority. The courts are
thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the
term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of
any sufficient standard, such that the duration
thereof may range, in the words of respondent
judge, from one minute to the life span of the
accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It
vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially
legislative in nature and which, as applied to this
case, does violence to the rules on separation of
powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative
powers.
This
time,
the
preumption
of
constitutionality has to yield.
The private respondents contend that in the

penalties imposed by the said law, it is apparent
that it has no prescribed period or term for the
imposable penalty of imprisonment. While a
minimum and maximum amount for the penalty of
fine is specified, there is no equivalent provision for
On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of
the penalty of imprisonment, although both appear
the separability clause in Section 34 of Republic
to be qualified by the phrase "in the discretion of
Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided
the court. The determination of what Congress
intended to be the duration of the penalty of
in Section 32 thereof should be, as it is hereby,

declared unconstitutional.
It follows, therefore, that a ruling on the proper
interpretation of the actual term of imprisonment,
as may have been intended by Congress, would be
pointless and academic. It is, however, worth
mentioning that the suggested application of the
so-called rule or principle of parallelism, whereby a
fine of P1,000.00 would be equated with one year
of imprisonment, does not merit judicial
acceptance. A fine, whether imposed as a single or
as an alternative penalty, should not and cannot be
reduced or converted into a prisonv term; it is to be
considered as a separate and independent penalty
consonant with Article 26 of the Revised Penal
Code. 23 It is likewise declared a discrete principal
penalty in the graduated scales of penalties in
Article 71 of said Code. There is no rule for
transmutation of the amount of a fine into a term of
imprisonment. Neither does the Code contain any
provision that a fine when imposed in conjunction
with imprisonment is subordinate to the latter
penalty. In sum, a fine is as much a principal
penalty as imprisonment. Neither is subordinate to
the other
their right to due process, right to equal

protection of the law and right to speedy
disposition of the cases.
Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of DOJ commited
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
Department Order 182 and Memorandum?
Held:
No. The Secretary of DOJ did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the DO 182.
Dacudao vs Gonzales, 688 SCRA 109 (2013)

Facts:
The petitioners filed a case of syndicated

estafa against Celso Delos Angeles and his
associates in the Legacy Group of
companies, after the petitioners were
defrauded in a business venture.
Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary Gonzales

issued Department Order 182 which directs
all prosecutors in the country to forward all
cases already filed against Celso Delos
Angeles, Jr and his associates to the
secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate
action.
However, in separate order which in

Memorandun dated March 2009, it was said
that cases already filed against Celso Delos
Santos et. al of the Legacy Group of
companies in Cagayan De Oro City need
to be sent anymore to the secretariat of
DOJ Manila.
Because of such orders, the complaint of

petitioners was forwarded to the secretariat
of the Special Panel of the DOJ of Manila.
Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed a

petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus assailing to the respondent
Secretary of Justice grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the D.O. and
Memorandum which accordingly violated
The Secretary of Justice did not exercise any

judicial or quasi-judicial functions because his
questioned issuance were ostensibly intended to
ensure his subordinates' efficiency and economy in
conducting the preliminary investigation involving
the legacy group. The function involved is purely
executive and adminstrative.
Furthermore, Preliminary Investigation is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding. The DOJ as a primary
prosecution arm of the government, does not
exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews
the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of
probable cause in any case.
Appropriations Act, to any program, project

or activity of any department, bureau, or
office
included
in
the
General
Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment.
On the other hand, the constitutional provision

under consideration reads as follows:
Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
however, the President, the Prime Minister,
the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of
constitutional commis ions may by law be
authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987

DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P.,petitioners, vs.
HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the
MINISTER OF THE BUDGET, respondents.
ISSUE: WON Presidential Decree 1777 amounts to

undue delegation of legislative powers to the
executive
FACTS:
HELD:
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with

prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the
constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section
44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise
known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977."
One of the grounds relied upon by the

Petitioners, is that stated in Paragraph D which
states that Section 44 of the same decree
amounts to undue delegation of legislative
powers to the executive
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44

of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section
16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is
readily perceivable from a mere cursory
reading thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44
provides:
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly

over extends the privilege granted under said
Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately
transfer
funds
from
one
department, bureau, office or agency of the
Executive Department to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment, without regard as to
whether or not the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item from which the same
are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for
the purpose of augmenting the item to which said
transfer is to be made. It does not only completely
disregard the standards set in the fundamental law,
thereby amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the
tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities
render the provision in question null and void.
The President shall have the authority to

Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the
transfer any fund, appropriated for the
Constitutional Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight Edition,
different departments, bureaus, offices and
Little, Brown and Company, Boston, explained:
agencies of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General
... The legislative and judicial are coordinate

departments of the government, of equal
dignity; each is alike supreme in the
exercise of its proper functions, and cannot
directly or indirectly, while acting within the
limits of its authority, be subjected to the
control or supervision of the other, without
an unwarrantable assumption by that other
of power which, by the Constitution, is not
conferred upon it. The Constitution
apportions the powers of government, but it
does not make any one of the three
departments subordinate to another, when
exercising the trust committed to it. The
courts may declare legislative enactments
unconstitutional and void in some cases,
but not because the judicial power is
superior in degree or dignity to the
legislative. Being required to declare what
the law is in the cases which come before
them, they must enforce the Constitution,
as the paramount law, whenever a
legislative enactment comes in conflict with
it. But the courts sit, not to review or revise
the legislative action, but to enforce the
legislative will, and it is only where they find
that the legislature has failed to keep within
its constitutional limits, that they are at
liberty to disregard its action; and in doing
so, they only do what every private citizen
may do in respect to the mandates of the
courts when the judges assumed to act and
to render judgments or decrees without
jurisdiction. "In exercising this high
authority, the judges claim no judicial
supremacy; they are only the administrators
of the public will. If an act of the legislature
is held void, it is not because the judges
have any control over the legislative power,
but because the act is forbidden by the
Constitution, and because the will of the
people, which is therein declared, is
paramount to that of their representatives
expressed in any law." [Lindsay v.
Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38, 61; People
v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v. Com., 210 Pa.
St. 544; 60 Atl. 169, 1 L.R.A. [N.S.] 409,
105 Am. St. Rep. 825] (pp. 332-334).
judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the

former. But where the legislature or the executive
acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers,
it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what
the other branches of the government had
assumed to do as void. This is the essence of
judicial power conferred by the Constitution "in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973
Constitution and which was adopted as part of the
Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution] and which power this Court
has exercised in many instances. *
The instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is
declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
Indeed, where the legislature or the executive

branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the
G.R. No. 141949
October 14, 2002
CEFERINO
PADUA, petitioner, vs.
HON.
SANTIAGO RANADA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF
MAKATI, RTC, BRANCH 137 et al
FACTS:
interim adjustment of the toll rates at the Metro

Manila Skyway Project Stage 1.CITRA
moored its petition on the provisions of the
"Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement"
(STOA), authorizing it, as the investor, to apply
for and if warranted, to be granted an interim
adjustment of toll rates in the event of a
"significant currency devaluation."
Claiming that the peso exchange rate to a U.S.
dollar had devaluated, CITRA alleged that there
was a compelling need for the increase of the
toll rates to meet the loan obligations of the
Project and the substantial increase in debtservice burden.
Due to heavy opposition, CITRAs petition
remained unresolved. This prompted CITRA to
file an "Urgent Motion for Provisional Approval,"
this time, invoking Section 3, Rule 10 of the
"Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing
Hearing Before the Toll Regulatory Board"
(TRB Rules of Procedure) which provides:
"SECTION 3. Provisional Relief. Upon the filing

of an application or petition for the approval of the
initial toll rate or toll rate adjustment, or at any
stage, thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of
the pleader or in its own initiative, the relief prayed
for without prejudice to a final decision after
completion of the hearing should the Board find
that the pleading, together with the affidavits and
supporting documents attached thereto and such
additional evidence as may have been requested
and
presented,
substantially
support
the
provisional order; Provided: That the Board may,
motu proprio, continue to issue orders or grant
relief in the exercise of its powers of general
supervision under existing laws. Provided: Finally,
that pending finality of the decision, the Board may
require the Petitioner to deposit in whole or in part
in escrow the provisionally approved adjustment or
initial toll rates." (Emphasis supplied)
CITRA moved to withdraw its "Urgent Motion

The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) issued
for Provisional Approval" without prejudice to its
Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing provisional
right to seek or be granted provisional relief
toll rate adjustments at the Metro Manila
under the above-quoted provisions of the TRB
Skyway
Rules of Procedure, obviously, referring to the
The above Resolution approving provisional toll
power of the Board to act on its own initiative.
rate adjustments was published in the
Hence, petitioners Ceferino Padua and
newspapers of general circulation.
Eduardo Zialcita, as toll payer assail before this
Tracing back the events that led to the
Court the validity and legality of TRB
issuance of the said Resolution, it appears that
Resolution No. 2001-89.
Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation
As a toll payer, Padua claims that: (1)
(CITRA) filed with the TRB an application for an
Resolution No. 2001-89 was issued without the
required publication and in violation of due

process; (2) alone, TRB Executive Director
Jaime S. Dumlao, Jr., could not authorize the
provisional toll rate adjustments because the
TRB is a collegial body; and (3) CITRA has no
standing to apply for a toll fee increase since it
is an "investor" and not a "franchisee-operator."
Private respondent CITRA, in its comment
counters that: (1) the TRB has primary
administrative jurisdiction over all matters
relating to toll rates; (2) prohibition is an
inappropriate remedy because its function is to
restrain acts about to be done and not acts
already accomplished; (3) Resolution No. 200189 was issued in accordance with law; (4)
Section 3, Rule 10 of the TRB Rules is
constitutional; and (5) private respondent and
the Republic of the Philippines would suffer
more irreparable damages than petitioner.
ISSUE: WON TRB has jurisdiction to issue

Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing provisional toll
rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway
HELD:
We take cognizance of the wealth of jurisprudence
on the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative
remedies. In this era of clogged court dockets, the
need for specialized administrative boards or
commissions with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine
promptly disputes on technical matters or intricate
questions of facts, subject to judicial review in case
of grave abuse of discretion, is indispensable.
Between the power lodged in an administrative
body and a court, the unmistakable trend is to refer
it to the former."[24] In Industrial Enterprises, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals,we ruled:
"x x x, if the case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies
because technical matters or intricate questions of
facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained
in an administrative proceeding before a remedy
will be supplied by the courts even though the
matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court."
Petitioner Paduas "Urgent Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order to Stop Arbitrary Toll Fee
Increases" is DENIED and petitioner Zialcitas
"Petition for Prohibition" is DISMISSED.
the election of first, second and third vice

presidents and for auditors for the National
Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters.
Petitioners contention is that the
positions in question are in excess of those
provided in the Local Government Code
(R.A. No. 7160),Petitioner argues that, in
providing for the positions of first, second and
third vice presidents and auditor for each
chapter, 1-2 of the Implementing Rules
expand the number of positions authorized in
493 of the Local Government Code in
violation of the principle that implementing
rules and regulations cannot add or detract
from the provisions of the law they are
designed to implement.
ISSUE: Is the power to create additional positions
necessary for the management of the
National Liga and Local Liga Chapter vested
upon the respective Board of Directors.
HELD: Contrary to petitioners contention, the
creation of the additional positions is
authorized by the LGC which provides as
follows:
G.R. No. 115844. August 15,1997

CESAR G. VIOLA, Chairman, Bgy. 167, Zone 15,
District II, Manila, petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL
M. ALUNAN III, Secretary, DILG, ALEX L. DAVID,
President/Secretary General, National Liga ng
mga Barangay, LEONARDO L. ANGAT,
President, City of Manila, Liga ng mga
Barangay,respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Cesar Viola, a Bgy. Chairman,

challenged the validity of Art. III, 1-2 of the
Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines
for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga
Barangay Officers so far as they provide for
493. Organization. The liga at

the municipal, city, provincial,
metropolitan
political
subdivision, and national
levels
directly
elect
a
president, a vice-president,
and five (5) members of the
board
of
directors. The
board
shall appoint
its
secretary
and
treasurer
and create
such
other
positions as it may deem
necessary
for
the
management
of
the
chapter.
We hold that 493 of the Local
Government Code, in directing the board of
directors of the liga to create such other
positions as may be deemed necessary for
the management of the chapter[s],
embodies a fairly intelligible standard. There
is no undue
Congress.
delegation
of
power
by
While the board of directors of a local

chapter can create additional positions to
provide for the needs of the chapter, the
board of directors of the National Liga must
be deemed to have the power to create
additional positions not only for its
management but also for that of all the
chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and
metropolitan
political
subdivision
levels. Otherwise the National Liga would be
no different from the local chapters.
Section 493 actually gives the board the
power to [1] appoint its secretary and
treasurer and [2] create such other positions
as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter. The additional
positions to be created need not therefore
be appointive positions.
Petitioner was an attorney in-fact in the

negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista
and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the
Philippines.
The Senate of the Philippines adopted Resolution

No. 8, whereby created a Special Committee to
determine whether the said purchase was honest,
valid and proper, and whether the price involved in
the deal was fair and just, the parties responsible
therefor, any other facts the Committee in
pursuance of said Resolution.
Petitioner was asked to whom a part of the

purchase price was delivered. Petitioner refused to
answer this question.
Petitioner was imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison

until such time when he shall reveal to the Senate
the name of the person who received the part of
the purchase price.
Petitioner contended that the Senate of

Philippines has no power to punish him
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of
person to whom he gave the money to, that
Legislature lacks authority to punish him
contempt.
the
for
the
the
for
ISSUE:
WON the courts have the right to review the
findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the
prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their
proceedings.
RULING:
JEAN L. ARNAULT vs EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS

FACTS:
There was an inherent fundamental error in the

course of action that the lower court followed. It
assumed that courts have the right to review the
findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the
prerogative if legislation, or interfere with their
proceedings or their discretion in what is known as
the legislative process.
Since the legislature is given a large discretion in

reference to the means it may employ to promote
the general welfare, and alone may judge what
means are necessary and appropriate to
accomplish an end which the Constitution makes
legitimate, the courts cannot undertake to decide
whether the means adopted by the legislature are
the only means or even the best means possible to
attain the end sought, for such course would best
the exercise of police power of the state in the
judicial department.
US vs Ang Tang Ho, GR No. 17122, February 27,

1922
The judicial department of the government has no

right or power or authority to do, much in the same
manner that the legislative department may not
invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of
truth and in the application and interpretation of the
law, in what is known as the judicial process,
because that would be in direct conflict with the
fundamental principle of separation of powers
established in the Constitution. The only instances
when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke
are when there has been a violation of a
constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an
arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a

proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be
sold.
Facts:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine
Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act
penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and
speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under
extraordinary
circumstances,
regulating
the
distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of
State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the

defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale
of rice at an excessive price when he sold to Pedro
Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty
centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that
fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the GovernorGeneral of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August,
1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No.
2868.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and
sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court,
claiming that the lower court erred in finding
Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force
and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense
charged, and in imposing the sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take
effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30,
1919; that the Governor-General issued his
proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the
law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919;
and that the proclamation itself was first published on
the 20th of August, 1919.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine Legislature passed Act
No. 2868 delegation to the Governor General a valid
delegation of power?
Held:
No. The said Act constituted an invalid delegation of

power since the said Act authorized the GovernorGeneral to promulgate laws and not merely rules and
regulations to effect the law. The said Act was not
complete when it left the legislature as it failed to
specify what conditions the Governor-General shall
issue the proclamation as the said Act states for any
cause. It also failed to define extraordinary rise that
such proclamation by the Governor-General aims to
prevent. Lastly, the said Act authorized the
promulgation of temporary rules and emergency
measures by the Governor-General.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No.
2868, and before any rules and regulations were
promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in
rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per
"ganta," and that he would not commit a crime,
because there would be no law fixing the price of rice,
and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime.
That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it
was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it
must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime,
it was because the Governor-General issued the
proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature
making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without
the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a
crime.
ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION vs. THE

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (NHA), Hon. G.V.
Tobias, in his capacity as General Manager of the
National Housing Authority, The Hon. Jacobo C. Clave,
in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant and
Virgilio A. Yuson (G. R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987)
FACTS:
Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial
ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa
Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the
petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation under a Contract
to Sell. On 28 August 1974, Hernando transferred his
rights over the said lot to private respondent Virgilio
Yuson, embodied in a Deed of Assignment and
Substitution of Obligor. However, for failure of Antipolo
Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance
with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to
Sell (subdivision beautification), Mr. Yuson paid only the
arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including,
the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly
installment payments falling due thereafter.
On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty
sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that
the required improvements in the subdivision had
already been completed, and requesting resumption of
payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For
his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he would conform with
the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of
the representation in the notice. In a second letter dated
27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its
request citing the decision rendered by the National
Housing Authority (NHA) on 25 October 1976 in Case
No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs.
Conrado S. Reyes, respondent") declaring Antipolo
Realty to have "substantially complied with its
commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the Contract to
Sell. A formal demand was made for full and immediate
payment of the amount of P16,994.73, representing
installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued
during the period while the improvements were being
completed i.e., between September 1972 and October
1976.
Yuson refused to pay the September 1972 - October
1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post
October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded
by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the
forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by
Mr. Yuson. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo
Realty before NHA. Antipolo Realty filed a motion to

dismiss, which NHA denied. After hearing, the NHA
rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the
reinstatement of the Contract to Sell. A motion for
reconsideration of Antipolo Realty was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in hearing the complaint of Yuson and in
ordering the reinstatement of the
Contract to Sell between the parties NHA assumed the
performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions which
it was not authorized to perform.
DARIO VS MISON
FACTS:
President
Aquino
promulgated
Proclamation No. 3 Declaring a
National Policy to implement the
reforms mandated by the people,
protecting their basic rights, adopting
a
provisional
constitution
and
providing for an orderly transition to a
government under a new Constitution.
Then the President issued a number of

executive
orders
and
directives
reorganizing
various
other
government offices, which led to EO
No.
127
provided
for
the
reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs and prescribed a new
staffing pattern.
The
petitioner
was
Commissioner at the
Customs.
The petitioner was one of the

personnel that were terminated from
office.
HELD:
No. It is by now commonplace learning that many
administrative
agencies
exercise
and
perform
adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited
extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasijudicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the National
Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in our
jurisdiction,basically because the need for special
competence and experience has been recognized as
essential in the resolution of questions of complex or
specialized character and because of a companion
recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have
remained crowded and clogged.
The Court held that under the law creating NHA it is
empowered to regulate the real estate trade
and business involving ...specific performance of
buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against
the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman..
The Court held that under the "sense-making and
expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory
statute administered."
a
Deputy
Bureau of
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners dismissal was

legal.
HELD:
With respect to EO No. 127,

Commissioner submits that under
Section 59 thereof, those incumbents
whose positions are not included
therein or who are not reappointed
shall be deemed separated from the
service. He submits that because the
removed personnel have not been
reappointed they are considered
terminated. To
begin
with
the
Commissioners appointing power is
subject to the provisions of EO No. 39.
Under EO No. 39 the Commissioner of
Customs may appoint all Bureau
personnels except those appointed by
the President.
Accordingly with respect to Deputy
Commissioner Dario, Commissioner
Mison
could
not
have
validly
terminated
them,
they
being
Presidential appointees.
G.R. No. 131255 May 20, 1998

JOSON vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PONENTE: PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents submitted a lettercomplaint against HON. EDUARDO NONATO
JOSON, in his capacity as the Governor of
the Province of Nueva Ecija to the Office of
the President. The President, acting on the
complaint, instructed in writing the then
Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments (SILG) Robert Barbers to
"[t]ake
appropriate
preemptive
and
investigative actions," but to "[b]reak not
the peace. The Secretary of DILG then
proceeded, requiring the petitioner to
submit his answers. After asking for
extensions for filing his answer, the
petitioner instead submitted a Motion to
Dismiss, alleging that the DILG had no
jurisdiction over the case and no authority
to require him, to answer the complaint.
Pending the resolution of the motion to
Dismiss, the Executive Secretary, by
authority of the President, adopted the
findings and recommendation of the DILG
Secretary, finding Nueva Ecija Governor
Eduardo Nonato Joson guilty of grave
misconduct and abuse of authority and is
meted the penalty of suspension from office
for a period of six (6) months without pay.
The Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the implementation of the
order of the Executive Secretary. Despite
the restraining order, the said suspension
was implemented, and Oscar Tinio was
installed as Acting Governor of the province.
Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition
alleging that the Court of Appeals Gravely
Erred In applying the Alter-Ego Principle
because, contrary to law, it was the
Secretary of the DILG who was exercising
the powers of the President which are
clearly vested by law only upon him or the
executive secretary
Issue:
Whether the Secretary of DILG has
jurisdiction and authority over the case
Held:
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary
actions against elective local officials is
lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining
Authority and the Investigating Authority.
This is explicit from A.O. No. 23. Pursuant to
these provisions,
the power to investigate may be delegated
to the DILG or a Special Investigating
Committee, as may be constituted by the
Disciplining Authority. This is not undue
delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's
claim.
The
President
remains
the
Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is
the power to investigate, not the power to
discipline
Moreover, the power of the DILG to
investigate administrative complaints is
based on the alter-ego principle or the
doctrine of qualified political agency. Thus:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, all
executive and administrative organizations
are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of
the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he
act personally, the multifarious executive
and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of

business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated
by
the
Chief
Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive. 55
This doctrine is corollary to the control
power of the President. 56 The power of
control is provided in the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of
all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed
Control is said to be the very heart of the
power of the presidency. 58 As head of the
Executive Department, the
President,
however, may delegate some of his powers
to the Cabinet members except when he is
required by the Constitution to act in person
or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he acts personally. 59 The members of
Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the
President in certain matters because the
President cannot be expected to exercise
his control (and supervisory) powers
personally all the time. Each head of a
department is, and must be, the President's
alter ego in the matters of that department
where the President is required by law to
exercise authority.
Note:
The resolution issued by the
Executive Secretary, however was declared
null and void on the grounds of noncompliance to the procedure by which an
administrative case involving Elective
Official must be investigated as specified in
the Local Government Code and A.O. No.
23. Section 62

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Securities and Exchange Commission vs.

Olaguer vs. RTC, 170 SCRA 478 (1989)

Mendoza vs. Dizon, 77 Phil 533 (1946)

Padua vs. Ranada, 390 SCRA 663 (2002)

Realty Exchange Venture Co. vs. Sendino, 233

Joson vs. Executive Secretary, 290 SCRA 279 (1998)

Antipolo Realty Co. vs. NHA, 153 SCRA 399 (1987)

Eugenio vs. CSC, 242 SCRA 196 (1995)

Philippine International Trading Co. vs. Angeles, 263

Lumiqued vs. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125 (1997)

Christian General Assembly vs. Ignacio, 597 SCRA

BANDA V. ERMITA G.R. No. 166620 April 20,

Mitchell Coke and Coke Company vs. Pennsylvania

Jaworski vs PAGCOR and

US vs. Dorr, 2 Phil 332 (1903)

PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL (1965)

Banda vs. Ermita, 618 SCRA 488 (2010)

Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)

Olaguer vs RTC, G.R. No. 81385. February 21,

Realty Exchange Venture Co.

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