Assignment Title:

With advancing technology is there a need to reinstate a Maritime

Patrol Aircraft capability?

Student Name:

Georgina Dempsey

Student ID:

Unit Title:

Dissertation

Unit Code:

Unit Tutor:

Date of Submission:

19 May 2016

Word Count:

10,280

With advancing technology is there a need to reinstate a Maritime Patrol Aircraft capability?

Georgina Dempsey

ii

Acknowledgements
I am indebted to the exceptional support of the entire library staff at the Defence School of
Aeronautical Engineering, Cosford. I offer my deepest thanks to them for their kind and
enthusiastic assistance with my constant stream of research enquires over the last three
years. The wealth of knowledge and unreserved support offered to me has greatly aided my
studies. I am also thankful for the unswerving support and tutelage of my supervisor during
this journey, providing me with calm reassurance and much needed inspiration for when the
going got tough. I have also received a huge amount of support from ex-Nimrod aircrew who
have helped sort out issues with my work and pointed me in the right direction. Finally, I wish
to express my gratitude to the management staff at RAF Cosford for offering critique of my
work and allowing frequent trips to the library, without which I could not have completed this
project.

iii

Abstract
The main objective of this research was to investigate whether the UK needed to reinstate a
Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), or could an asset [or collection thereof] carry out the role
instead. Following the decision to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 project, the UK has been without
a dedicated MPA for more than 6 years with nothing planned to replace it until at least 2019.
Desk-based research was utilised in order to make the best use of the wealth of secondary
data, specifically documents written in the last 15 years. The research looked into the reasons
behind the cancellation of the Nimrod to discover what went wrong and why; then compared
it to other procurement processes to see if the system was inherently flawed. With the
upcoming purchase of Poseidon P8 aircraft, this research looked to examine if the UK was in
danger of repeating past procurement mistakes; which may indeed be the case. The UK would
benefit from replicating a previous procurement strategy utilised for the C17 aircraft, however
it appears that the Government have decided on the purchase without proper consideration to
other options or indeed any other platform. Different forms of technology were investigated to
find out if any could fulfil the role of a MPA or at least alleviate its responsibilities, however few
offered the unique abilities needed for Maritime Security. The research has shown that the UK
have relied on neighbouring countries to borrow MPA in order to maintain Maritime Security
since 2009. Thus, this research concluded that technology is not yet advanced enough to
carry out the UKs military tasks without a dedicated MPA.

iv

Contents Page
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... iii
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv
List of tables and figures ................................................................................................... vi
Glossary of Terms ............................................................................................................ vii
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
Literature Review ................................................................................................................ 4
Maritime Trade and its vulnerability ....................................................................................... 4
Underwater Network ............................................................................................................. 6
UKs Responsibilities............................................................................................................. 6
UK Maritime Patrol Capability ............................................................................................... 8
The Maritime Patrol Aircraft Free Period ............................................................................. 10
The Nuclear Problem .......................................................................................................... 10
Maritime Patrol Alternatives ................................................................................................ 11
Research Methodology..................................................................................................... 13
Sources of Information ........................................................................................................ 14
Results and Discussion .................................................................................................... 15
What factors caused the eventual scrapping of the Nimrod MRA4 project? ........................ 15
Is the procurement process of military assets in the UK inherently flawed? ......................... 18
Can other assets satisfactorily carry out the role of a Maritime Patrol Aircraft? ................... 20
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 25
References ........................................................................................................................ 28
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 40
Appendix 1 ........................................................................................................................ 44

List of tables and figures

Figure 1. UK offshore marine area (Joint Nature Conservation Committee, 2015) ................ 5
Figure 2. Defence Tasks, summation from Ministry of Defence (2015) ................................. 7
Figure 3. UK Overseas Territories. (Overseas Territories Environment Programme, 2010)... 9
Figure 4. Military Expenditure as a percentage of GDP (The World Bank, 2015) ................ 11

Table 1. Filling the capability gap adapted from Defence Committee (2011) ......................... 8
Table 2. BAE Systems Major Projects in 2001 (National Audit Office, 2001) ....................... 15
Table 3. Radar Coverage by other assets from Roberts (2014, Appendix A) ...................... 21
Table 4. Potential options for using other assets for maritime security ................................ 22

vi

Glossary of Terms

ALARP

As Low as Reasonably Practicable

ADS

Advanced Deployable System

ASW

Anti-Submarine Warfare

EEZ

Exclusive Economic Zone

ESM

Electronic Support Measures

FOI

Freedom of Information

ISD

In Service Date

JSF

Joint Strike Fighter

MAD

Magnetic Anomaly Detection

MOD

Ministry of Defence

MPA

Maritime Patrol Aircraft

NSC

Nimrod Safety Case

OSD

Out of Service Date

RAF

Royal Air Force

RCC

Rescue Coordination Centre

SAR

Search and Rescue

SDSR

Strategic Defence and Security Review

SLOC

Sea Lines of Communication

SOLAS

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea

SOSUS

Sound Surveillance System

STOVL

Short Take Off and Vertical Landing

UAV

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UNCLOS

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

vii

Introduction

The loss of Nimrod XV230 in 2006 over Afghanistan initiated an investigation which highlighted
a number of fatal errors and cultural norms which ultimately contributed to the accident
(Haddon-Cave, 2009). Less than a year later the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010
was published and it declared that the government would not bring into service the Nimrod
MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft (Cabinet Office, 2010, 27). The Nimrod conversion was an
ongoing project to update the existing airframes into a virtually new aircraft (BAE Systems,
2000; Gibson, 2015) and the In Service Date (ISD) was expected to be April 2003 (National
Audit Office, 2001). The project encountered design issues, cost over-runs and significant
delays causing the ISD to be reforecast to September 2012, making a total of 114 months
delay (Hartley, 2015, National Audit Office, 2011). However, according to other sources
(airforce-tecnology.com, 2010; Simons, 2013), the first Nimrod MRA4 was actually delivered
and accepted in March 2010; 6 months before the announcement by the government to scrap
the project entirely (Webb, 2015). The delay prior to the project cancellation was not due to
production issues or cost over-runs, but because of a decision taken by the government to
reprioritise resources to more urgent operational requirements (National Audit Office, 2010,
15), therefore funding was [temporarily] removed. In the same publication the Government
admitted that when they mandate an enforced slowing down of a project to save money in
the short term that it often results in an overall increase in costs and a delay in delivering new
defence capabilities (National Audit Office, 2010, 7).
The total spent on the Nimrod MRA4, programme including assessment, demonstration and
manufacture is reported to have been 3.4bn which was 789m over the agreed budget
(National Audit Office, 2011). This combined with the reduction in numbers of aircraft procured
from 21 to 9 would have made the price per unit at an uncomfortable 377m.
The flawed procurement process and management of the Nimrod MRA4 project is not unique.
The Typhoon aircraft was also over budget during the same time period (2000-2010) and
ended up costing the government 3.5bn more than expected (National Audit Office, 2010).
This was partly due to a decision to reduce the numbers of Typhoon bought, but a contractual
clause meant that the government was obliged to pay regardless; this unexpected new
financial commitment made it necessary to make savings elsewhere (National Audit Office,
2010). This information was less publicised than the Nimrod issues. It could be assumed that
following the XV230 incident, the Haddon-Cave report and due to the long delays, cancelling
the MRA4 project was an easy decision to make and more likely to get public backing.

Once the decision was made to cancel the project, the dismantling process was started and
by the end of March 2011 all aircraft were reduced to scrap (Hastings, 2013; Wolverhampton
Aviation Group, 2016). The option to completely dismantle the aircraft as opposed to storing
them for future use was discussed in the Major Projects Report 2011 (National Audit Office,
2011); it was considered that storing the aircraft and eventually returning them to operational
standards would be too costly.
The main justification given for cancelling the Nimrod MRA4 project was down to cost,
however there are other factors to consider. The 789m overspend, although undeniably
large, has to be put into context. As well as the Typhoon being 3.5bn over budget; the Type
45 destroyer was also 1bn over budget (National Audit Office, 2010). In civilian context the
Scottish National Parliament building was supposed to cost 10m-40m but ended up costing
414bn and the extension to the Jubilee line was 1.5bn over budget (Thompson, 2001). So
in context, 789m overspend for 9 aircraft does not seem so bad, suggesting there must be
have been other reasons for the cancellation. The Major Project Report in 2011 speculated
that a possible 1.9bn would be saved up to 2020 by not introducing the Nimrod (National
Audit Office, 2011). Not included in that figure is the cost relating to the decision to keep a
contingent of trained personnel on MPA by deploying them with allies overseas (National Audit
Office, 2012). It was also estimated to cost 500,000 to dismantle the aircraft following the
cancellation, although 1m was recouped from selling equipment (Dunne, 2014).
Keeping a trained strength of MPA operators made it seem quite likely that a MPA would, at
some point, be reinstated. This initiative was entitled Operation Seedcorn and the total cost of
the project to date is just under 14.5m (Appendix 1). That amount includes the military pay
of the circa 30 personnel involved in the initiative which arguably would have been paid
regardless. It was no surprise when the latest Strategic and Defence Review stated We will
buy nine new Maritime Patrol Aircraft, based in Scotland, to protect our nuclear deterrent, hunt
down hostile submarines and enhance our maritime search and rescue (Cabinet Office, 2015,
6); specifying Boeing Poseidon P8 as the aircraft of choice later in the review. Although
claiming that there was no immediate threat to the UK, they admitted there was increased
activity of foreign maritime vessels around the UKs waters and that MPA would significantly
increase security (Cabinet Office, 2015). However, it is unlikely that any MPA will be
operational until 2019/2020 (House of Lords, 2015) which will total 10 plus years that the UK
has been without a dedicated MPA.
This report aims to answer whether the UK government is making the right decision to
reinstate a Maritime Patrol Aircraft capability? In order to help answer the question, the
following research questions will be investigated:

1. What factors caused the eventual scrapping of the Nimrod MRA4 project?
2. Is the procurement process of military assets in the UK inherently flawed?
3. Can other assets satisfactorily carry out the intended role of a Maritime Patrol Aircraft?

Literature Review
Maritime Trade and its vulnerability
The economics of today show that we produce less and buy more, powering the need for the
shipping industry; without which, the world would not work (George, 2014). Shipping is an
international industry with great strategic importance; fortunes can be made from conflict, such
as the closure of the Suez Canal, therefore the importance of maritime trade and routes should
not be underestimated (Stopford, 2013). The UK sea ports industry is the largest in Europe
and handles around 500 million tonnes of freight each year; by volume, that is over 95% of all
UKs imports and exports transported via the sea (Cicin-Sain et al, 2015). Taking advantage
of rich territorial waters, the UK is also one of the top producers of sea fishing, with the industry
contributing 570m to its own GDP (Griffin, 2011).
In 2015, worldwide imports and exports traded 54,082m worth of goods (HM Revenue and
Customs, 2015). As an island nation, most of the UKs connections, such as energy, raw
materials and goods, are provided by the sea and are critical for maintaining its way of life
(HM Government, 2014). Ringsmose and Rynning (2012) recognised maritime security as
extremely significant due to the necessity of keeping open the Sea Lines of Communication
(SLOC) which are crucial to international trade. As countries become increasingly reliant on
these communication and transport routes, they require greater efforts to ensure their
resilience against attack or disruption (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2012). This may mean extra
responsibilities for NATO in the future to ensure worldwide maritime security (Ringsmose and
Rynning, 2012).
China relies on 5 major Sea Lines of Communication for 90% of its trade; these are among
the most vulnerable routes in the world due to the narrow stretches in between countries, such
as the Malacca Strait (Wu and Zou, 2014; Collins et al, 2012). This Strait extends 600 miles,
the narrowest section having only 1 mile of navigable width, and it accommodates 60,000
ships annually (Maritime Security Review, 2015). In 2005, four countries (Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand), set upon an Eyes in the Sky programme to carry out Malacca Strait
Patrols using MPA. An important undertaking as they would be severely affected if this
shipping lane was undermined (Liow and Leifer, 2014). Extra naval patrols were also enforced
by Indonesia in their territorial waters, which combined, resulted in a decline of attacks in the
Strait of Malacca from 38 in 2004 to just 2 in 2008 (Singh, 2009). Australia also has a founded
interest is maintaining peace and stability to allow their freedom of navigation through and
over the South China Sea as large amounts of their trade pass through these waters (Defence
Committee, 2015). The UK government stressed their willingness to deploy in support of
4

peacekeeping in this area, however, it was realised that the lack of maritime capabilities would
be a barrier to significant contribution (Defence Committee, 2015).
Since 2008 there has been a coalition operation dealing with pirates off the coast of Somalia
entitled Operation Atalanta. It is expected to be in operation until at least December 2016 and
possibly longer (Sherriff, 2015). Over 10 countries have made a permanent commitment to
this threat and have contributed their assets in support of this ongoing problem by providing a
continuous presence of Maritime Patrol Aircraft (Defence Committee, 2010). It is interesting
to note that Luxembourg, although a landlocked country, operate MPA aircraft and have been
supporting operation Atalanta since its inception (Germond, 2015).
The ability to protect surrounding waters is a fundamental requirement of all coastal and island
states (Bateman, 2015). Territorial waters expand 12 miles from the coast base line or 12
miles from the border of an inland water (United Nations, 2004). Next to that is the Contiguous
Zone; the 12 mile wide band surrounding the territorial waters of which there are no standard
laws of protection, unless the actions are likely to infringe on the territorial waters (United
Nations, 2004). Further to that is the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of which the coastal
state has all economic rights, such as fishing and mining, which can extend up to 200 miles
from the coast base line (United Nations, 2004).

Figure 1. UK offshore marine area (Joint Nature Conservation Committee, 2015)

In order to exploit their natural resources in territorial seas and EEZs, countries may build
artificial islands such as oil production platforms (United Nations, 1990). Incidentally, it was a
Nimrod MPA that was scrambled one evening after a devastating incident aboard the North
Sea oil platform Piper Alpha. The Nimrod co-ordinated the rescue effort and made it possible
for survivors to be located and rescued (Lees, 2012; McGinty, 2009; Moir and Seabridge,
2006; Woolfson et al, 1997); an invaluable contribution which almost certainly saved lives.

Underwater Network
The Worlds waters are an interconnected network of underwater cables and pipelines;
providing communication and resources. There is approximately 550,000 miles of submarine
cable alone (Jasper and Moreland, 2015) which provide around 97% of the data traffic around
the World (Burnett et al, 2013). A concentrated effort to intentionally damage these submarine
assets would severely affect the global economy and most certainly create huge repair costs
(Burnett et al, 2013). Should a pipeline containing oil be targeted, the resultant pollution could
be devastating to the local wildlife. The feasibility of a directed attack on this global underwater
network is conceivable due to the publicised position of the cables and pipelines to enable
well-meaning sea-farers to avoid unintentional damage by fishing or the dropping of their
anchor (Burnett et al, 2013). Australia and New Zealand have devised legislation to protect
cable areas (in their territorial waters and EEZ) which prohibits the use of certain types of
fishing gear or fishing activities and prevents any action which is likely to cause damage to the
cables; offering significant penalties for intentional or negligent damage (Burnett et al, 2013).
However, so far there has not been an international convention on the protection of submarine
cables, leaving the underwater network vulnerable to intentional or terrorist attack (Burnett et
al, 2013).

UKs Responsibilities
In 2015 the government outlined their eight Defence Tasks as follows:

DT1 Defence, security and resilience of the homeland and overseas territories
DT2 Nuclear deterrence
DT3 Understanding
DT4 Influencing through Defence engagement
DT5 Military interventions
DT6 UK prosperity and civil society
DT7 Direct Defence
DT8 Strategic base and enabling functions
Figure 2. Defence Tasks, summation from Ministry of Defence (2015)

This list is not exhaustive and does not include every task carried out by the MOD. Some tasks
arise from other obligations the UK has committed to. Out of those obligations, the most
applicable ones to this issue are:
1. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS). States that each
contracting Government should ensure that there are arrangements to monitor their
coasts and for the rescue of persons at sea in their area of responsibility. This includes
adequate means of finding and rescuing persons in distress while taking into
consideration the density of seagoing traffic in their area (International Maritime
Organisation, 1999).
2. International Convention on maritime search and rescue, 1979 (SAR). States that
Search and Rescue efforts shall be co-ordinated through Rescue Co-ordination
Centres (RCC) and help from other rescue centres should be granted if required.
Neighbouring states should allow for pooling of resources and sharing of information.
Searches should only be terminated when all reasonable hope of survivors has gone.
(International Maritime Organisation, 2006).
3. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS). States that all
ships should be granted Innocent right of Passage through territorial waters. Such
passage may be assumed as not being innocent if their aim is to exercise weapons or
carry out surveillance. In such instances the coastal state may intervene to suspend
the activity (Centre for Oceans Law and Policy, 1993).
Should a vessel known to be carrying Nuclear weaponry be detected, then it would be easy
for them to declare Innocent right of passage should they get challenged, so that no action
could be taken against them. This loophole led to the issue of a Security Council Resolution
which states proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means
7

of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security (United Nations, 2004, 1).
In this case the vessel would be in direct confliction of article 27 of UNCLOS which explains
that criminal proceedings can be brought against a foreign ship if, while passing through
territorial waters, their actions are likely to disturb the peace of the country or the good order
of the territorial sea (United Nations, 2004, 34).

UK Maritime Patrol Capability

When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1989 the threat from Russia also diminished, therefore
the need to track submarines became less necessary (Gibson, 2015). However, there was still
a need to operate nuclear deterrent, so the MPA became the protection for those assets
(Gibson, 2015). When the decision was made to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 project it was
considered an acceptable risk and not a gamble (National Audit Office, 2011). The
Government would depend on other assets to support the tasks that were expected to be
carried out by the Nimrod (Cabinet Office, 2010). The government proposed to use Merlin
Helicopters, Type 23 frigates and C130 aircraft to contribute to the tasks previously planned
for them [the Nimrod] (National Audit Office, 2010, 27):

Table 1. Filling the capability gap. Adapted from Defence Committee (2011)

Task

Nimrod MRA4

Detection (ASW)
Counter-terrorism

Search & Rescue

Overseas
Maritime Patrol

Trident

23

C130

Yes 6000 nm range Yes - 200 nm range

Submarine

Protection

Type

Merlin Mk1

with 15 hour mission with 90 minute mission Yes

time

time

Yes

No

Yes - 2400nm range for

3 hours search

No

Limited
range

300

with

nm

No

hour No

Yes

Limited range

Submarines

Limited
range

600

nm

range with 2 hours

search

No

of

Perhaps
Limited

search

Yes

No

No

No

Without UK MPA the above tasks cannot be fulfilled as well or at all. There is no provision for
overseas Maritime Patrol; an important role for looking after the UKs sovereign states. In 2014
the Government produced a document entitled The UK National Strategy for Maritime
Security (HM Government, 2014) and it states that The Royal Navy and Border Force will
work together to patrol our waters in addition to intercepting vessels; and that they will monitor
developments in security technology to ensure that we stay ahead of the threat (HM
Government, 2014, 11). They also commit to protecting their maritime domain by maintaining
persistent presence and being ready to take fast and appropriate action when the need arises
(HM Government, 2014). However, the ability to respond appropriately and with speed is
significantly reduced without a dedicated manned MPA (European Union Committee, 2010).
Protecting the UKs territorial waters is not limited to the sea surrounding the UK. The map
below shows the extent of the UKs territories around the world.

Figure 3. UK Overseas Territories. (Overseas Territories Environment Programme, 2010)

The UK sees its responsibility for the defence, security and safety of the overseas territories
as a core task of the Government. The importance of the overseas territories should not be
overlooked as they provide Britain with a global strategic reach, in order to maintain their
international objectives (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2012).

The Maritime Patrol Aircraft Free Period

In the 6 years without Nimrods, the UK has not lost any overseas territories or been subject to
a nuclear attack. Some might assume that this is enough proof that the capability is not
required. The threat is no greater without MPA and it could be assumed that an attack is no
more likely with or without MPA. However, the loss of MPA could be seen as a weakness
worth exploiting (Coughlin, 2011). Since the capability was lost, the UK have been borrowing
assets from their NATO allies; in 2015 MPA were borrowed 21 times (Morduant, 2016). This
indicates that the predicted use of C130, type 23 frigates or Merlin helicopters for certain tasks
has proven unsuccessful.
In May 2014, four British yachtsmen died after their boat, the Cheeky Rafiki got into difficulties
while returning to the UK after an Antigua regatta (BBC, 2014). The UK sent a Hercules C130
aircraft to help search for the crew, although with no technology to assist with searching for a
missing vessel, they had to use their naked eye to search the area (Roberts, 2014). The
Nimrod was fitted with specialist equipment for spotting small items in the water, i.e. a
submarines periscope (Blackman, 2011) and would have been ideal for this job.

The Nuclear Problem

The use of Nuclear weapons is a complex issue. According to the NATO strategic concept it
is committed to a goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, however
it states that as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear
Alliance (NATO, 2010, preface). It also goes on to say that governments should sustain
necessary levels of defence spending in order for the armed forces to be sufficiently resourced
(NATO, 2010). The NATO defence spending commitment for all allies is 2% of GDP (NATO,
2006).
Russia is well known for having nuclear capability and in recent years they have steadily
increased their spending in the defence sector. In the figure below it shows Russias spending
as a percentage of GDP compared with France, the UK and the average for the rest of the
world:

10

Figure 4. Military Expenditure as a percentage of GDP (The World Bank, 2015)

The UK also noted that Russian provocative actions, intended to undermine NATO, have
included military aircraft entering airspace of member countries prompting interception by
those countries Air Forces (Defence Committee, 2015, 12). These actions have been seen
as a test of that countrys response time.
The UK has been criticised in recent years by other NATO allies for not contributing as much
as it could to the growing number of European crises (Keohane, 2016). When the defence
spending review came out in 2010, the UK was heavily committed in Afghanistan and much
of the spending, in support of that, took precedence (Friedman, 2016). However, since then,
the frequency of Russian assets probing British strategic submarines has increased,
highlighting the UKs vulnerability and justifying the need to revive a MPA facility (Friedman,
2016).

Maritime Patrol Alternatives

According to Defence IQ (2015) at least 72 countries operate a dedicated maritime aircraft.
Out of those 72 countries, 54 utilise MPA alongside Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) leaving
18 which have only UAVs. In Europe, 11 of the 26 countries operate just UAVs, including the
UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland; most with no plans to procure
manned MPA at all (Defence IQ, 2015). The UK currently employ the ScanEagle UAVs which
are designed to be launched from naval ships, staying airborne for over 24 hours and
possessing an internal GPS which can follow pre-determined way points (Royal Navy 2013).
The programmable nature of UAVs makes them an ideal platform for pipeline and cable
11

monitoring as they also offer real time data capture; however the savings in cost due to the
absence of a pilot can be negligible due to the extra cost in data transfer (Gomez and Green,
2016). Currently the legislation on the use of UAVs is quite restrictive in civilian airspace due
to the lack of regulations for their safe operation, such as the need for collision avoidance
software (Gomez and Green, 2015; Chesebro, 2011).
Another element of maritime security which is in operation in Long Range Identification and
Tracking [of ships] (LRIT) which uses satellites to monitor the position of vessels in the ocean
(Munnell, 2014; Nardon and Venet, 2011). Satellites can also detect a range of maritime
issues such as trafficking activities and areas of pollution (Nardon and Venet, 2011). By
tracking the ships and using past and present images of areas of pollution, offending vessels
can be identified and brought to justice (Nardon and Venet, 2011). Although satellites are
useful for identifying problems, the long revisit times and the low resolution images make them
unreliable on their own and they need support from other maritime assets (Nardon and Venet,
2011). It is also possible for vessels to opt-out of broadcasting their position or do not have
this technology fitted; meaning they can travel through waters almost undetected (Munnell,
2014).
Another lesser known asset historically used in the detection of sea-going vessels are fixed
underwater sonar hydrophones (listening devices), also known as Sound Surveillance
Systems (SOSUS). Initially a highly secret initiative, having only become declassified in 1991,
it offered deep water and long range detection capability (Pike, 2011). It achieved many
successes and became invaluable in the early detection of threats; however, with the end of
the cold war, SOSUS faced an uncertain future (Pike, 2011). Because its inception was in the
early 1950s much of the original technology is no longer useful due to newer vessels having
a much quieter footprint than previously (Pike, 2011). Out of the original 36 monitoring stations
only three remain and the need to continually listen for hostile nuclear powered submarines is
not considered beneficial (Whitman, 2005). The most recent use for these hydrophones has
been for tracking the migration habits of whales and the detection of illegal fishing operations
(Whitman, 2005). The main issue with the system is that submarines were becoming much
quieter and much harder to detect. There has been some innovations since, namely an
Advanced Deployable System (ADS) which allowed rapid deployment of an array of
hydrophones, however this never got past the prototype phase (Clark, 2015). The set up costs
and maintenance of these underwater systems, due to their vulnerability, are large and the
task of interpreting the results is a highly complex skill that takes analysts 7-10 years to learn
(Maskell, 2001). Due to high set up and running costs, and their limited usefulness, this type
of technology is unlikely to be reinstated for the tracking of submarines in the near future.

12

Research Methodology
There are many styles of research which can all have different applications. Conducting
research develops an analytical way of thinking and having the knowledge of research
methodology provides techniques that are essential for answering research questions (Kumar,
2014). Research enables the practitioner to systematically examine, explain and find answers
to problems with a view to implementing changes for a more efficient workplace (Kumar,
2014). The validity of findings during a research project will depend entirely on the research
methods and procedures that are adopted (Kumar, 2014). Good research will produce
dependable data which can be reliably used for decision making in the future (Cooper and
Schindler, 2005). Blaxter et al (2010) advise that research is carried out around the subject to
ensure contextualisation within the broader field of study, otherwise reports tend to be too
narrowly defined. Cooper and Schindler (2005) agree, warning if the investigation is too
confined then often the best information is missed.
There are two main types of research, qualitative and quantitative, which cover a wide range
of approaches and methods (Flick, 2015). Neither type are exclusive to a particular subject or
discipline (Reardon, 2006). Quantitative research is where data collection is carried out in a
standardised way with scientific measurement and usually works with numbers and statistics
(Flick, 2015; Collis and Hussey, 2009; Robson, 2007). Interviews and questionnaires will
employ closed questions to ensure the answers can be collated for the purpose of working out
trends (Flick, 2015; Kuada, 2012). Due to the type of data collection and collation, this type of
research can be aimed at a wide selection of participants and/or be gathered from a large
number of sources (Flick, 2015).
Qualitative research has a much more open data collection style; small numbers of case
studies are chosen to investigate and participants are selected purposively based on their
position and relevance (Flick, 2015). Interviews and questionnaires are conducted using open
questions to understand different points of view, rather than initiating a response based on a
few select answers (Flick, 2015). Kuada (2012) suggests that this method should be used for
gaining newer insights into a topic as opposed to confirming existing theories. Collating the
data and generalising the results can be very time consuming for this type of research and the
answers can be open to interpretation by the researcher (Flick, 2015). Cooper and Schindler
(2005) agree that this type of data collection is susceptible to human error and can be too
subjective.
Many consider that a mixed method approach is a more sensible way to approach a research
project (McCartan and Robson, 2015; Creswell, 2014; Bergman, 2011). By combining
qualitative and quantitative approaches there will be a more complete understanding of a
13

problem than either could conclude alone (Creswell, 2013). The mixed method approach is
not an easy option as there is no specific technique (McCartan and Robson, 2015) and the
process can be more time consuming as it relies on multiple forms of data (Creswell, 2014).
Watkins and Gioia (2015) warn that studies using the mixed method approach may be
conceptually and methodologically weak due to the difficulty in integrating the qualitative and
quantitative data.
After reviewing the types of research methodology the author has concluded that this report
will be making use of quantitative data. This is because the research will be exploring facts
and figures relating to cost, effort and time. The topics that the author will be researching
already have a wide range of existing publications written so this is where the majority of
information will be sought from. Reports that depend on reviewing and analysing existing
information is known as desk-based research; it is not a straightforward option due to the often
extensive amounts of data (McCartan and Robson, 2015). Desk-based research makes use
of secondary data which can be a rich source of hypotheses and can provide excellent
background information (Cooper and Schindler, 2005). Studying an organisations internal
documentation can identify the thinking behind policies and decisions and also identify trends
(Reardon, 2006).

Sources of Information
In order to identify the most relevant data, the author reviewed literature from the last 15 years.
The three main sources of information are categorised as follows:
1. Government publications official information relating to the research question
2. Academic articles peer reviewed articles published in reputable journals
3. Unofficial publications this will be the least reliable source of information but will
provide insights into issues not published elsewhere.

14

Results and Discussion

Before attempting to answer the main research question the author undertook research to
answer the three sub questions. Each one will be looked at in turn.

What factors caused the eventual scrapping of the Nimrod MRA4 project?
The author conducted exploratory research into the failures of the Nimrod MRA4 project to
discover what led to the scrapping of the Nimrod MRA4. This involved looking at reports from
the Government and BAE systems to find out what factors were the most relevant to the
aircrafts downfall and distinguish whether outside influences, such as the media, had any
effect.
The Nimrod upgrade programme (originally called Nimrod 2000) was a fixed price contract to
procure 21 aircraft. BAE won the bidding competition with their Nimrod 2000 design which
used the existing airframes. It was, however, essentially a new aircraft as 95% of the structure
was replaced leaving only the fuselage still intact (National Audit Office, 2003). The first major
glitch was experienced late in 2002 when they started work on the second aircraft and
attempted to fit the specially made wings to the fuselage (Flight Global, 2002). The wings had
been laser cut to exacting standards with minimal tolerances, but were measured to fit the first
production aircraft. BAE had not anticipated this issue and there was no contingency set up
for differing sizes of the 1960s fuselages. This was a huge oversight and a major setback for
BAE as the new wings had to undergo considerable modifications to fix them and at their
expense. It also caused the first major delay in the project. Another point to note is that during
the same time period BAE had other major projects on the go. The Major Projects Report in
2001 (National Audit Office, 2001) details the other projects underway and the year they were
approved.
Table 2. BAE Systems Major Projects in 2001 (National Audit Office, 2001)

Year Approved

Project

No. Requested/Purchased

1996

Nimrod MRA4

21

1997

Astute Class Submarines

1998

Typhoon aircraft

148

1999

Type 45 Destroyer

15

That is undeniably a major workload, with some of the UKs biggest projects undertaken; this
could indicate that perhaps they had taken on too much and this had left them struggling to
meet their targets (The Committee Office, 2004). Once these delays became public
knowledge, the media exposed the problems encountered by BAE and this resulted in an
immediate drop in share prices (Fletcher, 2002). It was speculated that these problems
contributed to the subsequent manpower cuts in March 2003 (BBC, 2003) which could not
have come at a worse time when they were already over-stretched. (Fletcher, 2002).
It may appear that it was the Government at fault with this procurement, but it was BAE that
provided the bid and settled on the fixed price. The renegotiations in cost were approved by
the Government due to the understanding that delays and rising inflation caused higher priced
goods (National Audit Office, 2003). BAE Systems were given significant financial penalties
for their delays (The Committee Office, 2003) which meant that the profits that were originally
estimated for the project were no longer as lucrative; adding to that was the reduction in asset
numbers requested by the military which would further reduce the profit margin. Although BAE
were under contract and could not back out without more financial penalties, their commitment
to the project seemed to be waning: the consequent cost pressure and financial losses
provided little incentive on BAE Systems to deliver (National Audit Office, 2003, 30). The
government realised that if they did not bail them out financially, then there could be no aircraft
whatsoever (National Audit Office, 2003). The government at that time decided they could not
risk the possibility of being without the capability entirely, so the contract was renegotiated and
more money was made available (National Audit Office, 2003).
With the MRA4 ISD being pushed back further, the Nimrod MR2 out of service date (OSD)
was extended: The consequence of the Nimrod MRA4 ISD slip is that the Nimrod MR2 will
remain in service until mid-2008 (National Audit Office, 2001, 120). It was not evident at the
time that the government even considered the UK being without this capability. Military
regulations that were in force in 2001 meant that all flying aircraft had to have a safety case
assessed against them to ensure their airworthiness (Haddon-Cave, 2009). The Nimrod
Safety Case (NSC) took four years to produce and cost over 400,000; it should have outlined
all the potential risks of failure and initiated safe working practices to avoid problems As low
as reasonably practicable (ALARP) (Haddon-Cave, 2009). BAE systems were tasked with
hazard analysis and mitigation in order to correctly identify the risks; the final reports skimmed
over the fact that 40% of the hazards remained open and 30% remained unclassified (HaddonCave, 2009). It also became apparent that some of the Hazard analysis was carried out using
the data from the MRA4 aircraft, however, as the MRA4 was 90% new, this method was
explicably flawed (Haddon-Cave, 2009).
16

On 2nd September 2006 a catastrophic fire caused a Nimrod MR2 to crash in Afghanistan
killing all 14 service personnel on board (Gibson, 2015). The subsequent board of inquiry was
published in December 2007 and referred back to the NSCs overly optimistic hazard
categorisation and named it as a contributory factor in the loss of the XV230 (Air Command,
2007). They also concluded that some of the fuel seals could have been in place for 38 years,
therefore age was a possible Contributory Factor (Air Command, 2007, 2-19). The board
stated that blown off fuel, caused by the pressurised fuel system post Air to Air Refuelling
(AAR), on a hot section of cross-feed piping in the dry bay behind the No.7 fuel tank provides
the most likely source of ignition for the fire that led to the loss of XV230 (Air Command, 2007,
2-38).
On 13 December 2007 Charles Haddon-Cave was appointed to conduct a review into the loss
of Nimrod XV230. This report was condemning to the inherent safety of the Nimrod MR2 and
it could be believed that by association it was also damning for the Nimrod MRA4. It was
discovered that the cause of the loss of XV230 was never rectified or mitigated and it put a
very dark cloud over the future of the Nimrod MRA4 (Haddon-Cave, 2009). Experiments were
carried out on the MRA4 to try and recreate the possible occurrence of fuel in the dry bay
which was considered to be the source of ignition aboard XV230 (Haddon-Cave, 2009). In the
Haddon-Cave report it was stated that The viability of blown-off fuel entering small gaps has
been amply demonstrated by the dye experiments for the MRA4 (Haddon-Cave, 2009, 119).
The only way to prevent the blowing off fuel was to inhibit the use of the in-flight refuelling
probe or to receive much less fuel so as to prevent overspill; either of which would have
created a major reduction in the range and capability of the aircraft (Haddon-Cave, 2009). In
the same report there was also the results of a test, carried out on the MRA4, to show
likelihood of fluid causing ice formation on the wings; this showed the fluid fanning out and
tracking back over and under the wing and entering parts of the fuselage (Haddon-Cave,
2009, 115); another damning blow for the project. This report was published in October 2009
and the cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 project came just 1 year later in October 2010. It
could be believed that both of these pieces of evidence could have affected the decision made
by the Government to cancel the project.

All the evidence points to the fact that the Nimrod MRA4 project was flawed from the
beginning. The intention of a refurbished airframe based on the esteemed Nimrod MR2 was
assumed to be value for money and smart, yet the finished article had only 5% of the original
structure (National Audit Office, 2003); ultimately a far bigger task than was ever envisaged.
The lack of forethought and preparation led to ill-fitting parts, causing costs to spiral from the
17

outset. The huge workload being undertaken by BAE Systems at the time would have probably
meant there was a lack of focus on the project and ever changing demands further soaked up
an ever increasing budget. The NSC failed to highlight the potential issues and flight safety
risks; it seemed as if the safety cushion of a proven airframe, resulted in hazards that were
downplayed and considered unlikely to cause a failure. The review into the loss of Nimrod
XV230 exposed the failings of the NSC and found that the MRA4 was potentially as flawed as
its predecessor (Haddon-Cave, 2009).

Is the procurement process of military assets in the UK inherently flawed?

The military has conducted thousands of procurement activities, ranging from radios and
weapons to aircraft and boats; and to compare them all would be counterproductive to this
report. However, by comparing what went well to what went wrong there should be at least
some awareness as to how the procurement process could be improved in the future.
A UK defence document written in 2012 stated that the default method of procuring assets is
through open competition (HM Government, 2012). This document recognises that buying
assets off the shelf does not necessarily mean value for money and that technology will
become obsolete more quickly when buying a mature, proven aircraft platform. Single source
procurement is a method used only if the MOD is unable to source their requirements through
open competition, or to meet an urgent operational requirement (MOD, 2013; Fenwick, 2014)
There are some other things that need to be considered when buying a proven off the shelf
asset besides the aircraft itself. Will the spares package and the Maintenance Manuals be
provided in the price or will that be extra? And for every modification ever done to the aircraft
will it need to be done by approved contractors and will they be British? The aircraft also may
not be [as standard] compliant with all UK systems so there may be significant expenses to
convert them. With British aircraft, teams already employed in the military are able to design
software updates for the systems and integrate them with negligible costs. This would not be
the case with a foreign bought aircraft and these extra costs should be taken into account. If
all our assets are bought off the shelf from other countries, then it could feasibly lead to
manpower cuts across the military and defence sector.
There were some things identified in the Better Defence Acquisition white paper as reasons
for underperformance in procurement, such as a poor initial specification, poor cost estimation
and poor project control (MOD, 2013). The paper also recognises that value for money is at
risk when there is only a single source for supply as they there are no competitors and they
cannot be undercut (MOD, 2013). The MOD have a natural ambition to maximise their
capabilities along with a reluctance to compromise which has led to a situation where all too
18

often the list of planned requirements has significantly exceeded the funding available to pay
for them (MOD, 2013, 19).
In 2001 the UK leased 4 C-17s from America which they subsequently bought outright from
Boeing, plus an extra one. Later the UK would purchase a total of 8 aircraft (to date) with an
estimated cost of 200m - 250 per asset (Defence Industry Daily, 2013). This could put the
total spend for the aircraft alone at somewhere in the region of 1.5bn - 2bn. The exact cost
of the program is currently classified but that figure is likely to be much higher with operational
costs, training etc. All of the modifications required on the aircraft have to be renegotiated
through Boeing, which usually result in a fixed price agreement. Although this takes the onus
away from the UK to carry out the work, it is fuelling another countrys economy rather than its
own, which may cause GDP to fall, ultimately leading to a drop in the defence budget.
This try before you buy option has proved very successful for the UK and there is scope to
repeat this process with the expected upcoming purchase of the Poseidon P8 aircraft.
However, it is not easy to compare how much better this type of scheme is without knowing
the full cost of the C17 procurement project or of the other implications of buying a foreign
aircraft.
To say BAE Systems had a monopoly over defence procurement would be suggesting that
the MOD had no choice about where to buy its assets, which in some cases is not true.
However there are a number of troubling issues that could signify that it is the case. One case
in point is the [currently being built] aircraft carrier. It was originally competed for by two
companies, Thales and BAE Systems, the latter of which won, and they were awarded the
contract with an expected ISD of August 2012 (National Audit Office, 2003). It was conceived
with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft in mind but was required to have an adaptable design
for maximum flexibility to ensure future proofing (National Audit Office, 2003). In the 2010
SDSR the government stated that it would fit catapult and arrestor capability on the carriers
and accept a new ISD of 2020 to provide a platform for a more capable aircraft type (Cabinet
Office, 2010). The expected cost to add this capability was quoted at 2bn (work to be done
by BAE Systems) even though it was specified as an option in the original design and expected
to cost less than 886m (Ministry of Defence, 2013; House of Commons, 2011). This prompted
the government to reconsider and finally elect not to have the catapult and arrestor capability
(Ministry of Defence, 2013). Due to the fact the Harrier aircraft had been forced into retirement
some years earlier (BBC, 2010), this decision affected the type of aircraft that would be
procured, which now had to be Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) capable. The
JSF STOVL aircraft variant is more complicated, more expensive, is less capable, has a
reduced range (compared with the conventional take-off version) and is being partially built by
19

BAE Systems (Rogoway, 2014). Had the catapult and arrestor capability been installed, then
a cheaper, ready to go aircraft (such as F18) could have been operated from the carrier. A
sceptic might believe that BAE Systems inflated the cost of installing this capability to ensure
that the UK had to continue with the procurement of their JSF STOVL aircraft. The cost of the
project so far has cost 6bn (at least 2.5bn over budget) and the first carrier is not likely to
be in service until 2018 at the earliest with the second a few years after (National Audit Office,
2015).
The activity of procuring aircraft is a huge undertaking and can often take decades to come to
fruition. Any mistakes made early on are likely to snowball throughout the project. A solid
proposal is also imperative to ensure that the finished article is not a collection of successive
governments wish lists. The UK have understandably intended to keep things as British as
possible but are potentially missing the mark with cost over quality. Much trust has to be placed
with the defence contractors to provide a platform that is value for money and on time.
Unfortunately, while those two factors may come top of the Governments wish list, they are
not always the same requirements as the contractor. It would not be a stretch to believe their
main purpose is to make money, however there needs to be a good product at the end,
otherwise the contractor would never survive. As the defence sector has such niche
requirements it is also very likely that a company may have a monopoly over a product and
steps must be taken to ensure costs are not inflated. Leasing a proven asset is an obvious
way to fill a capability gap while testing the platform for future purchase. This may not,
however, be an option for some procurement activities. A balance must be struck to ensure
that the British manufacturing industry does not suffer irreversibly.

Can other assets satisfactorily carry out the role of a Maritime Patrol Aircraft?
This can only be answered by confirming exactly what a MPA needs to capable of doing. It
has already been implied in this report that the government may have been asking too much
of the Nimrod MRA4 and kept moving the goal posts. The government stated in the Strategic
and Defence Security review that the upcoming purchase of the P8 Poseidon aircraft was to
protect our nuclear deterrent, hunt down hostile submarines and enhance our maritime
search and rescue (Cabinet Office, 2015, 6). By sticking to those three requirements this
research can look to find alternative methods.
There are many functions that Nimrod MRA4 was expected to be capable of. It was in fact
likely to be the most capable MPA in the world. The procurement of an overly capable aircraft
could be down to the UKs desire to lead the field or potentially the eagerness to buy British.

20

It does not necessarily mean that the role of maritime patrol would have been carried out better
or that it cannot be carried out by other means.
Defending the United Kingdom and its overseas territories is currently carried out by the Type
23 frigates which carry either Lynx or Merlin helicopters; Merlin being the only Anti-Submarine
Warfare (ASW) capable helicopter (Naval Technology, 2016b). Together they can detect
submarines in their immediate vicinity, however, the helicopters rely on getting near to the
search location first via the frigate, losing valuable time and giving the enemy vessel ample
time to retreat. There are various ways of tracking enemy submarines such as Magnetic
Anomaly Detection (MAD), Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and Infra-red, but the most
common and reliable way is with the use of sonobuoys (David, 2007). These can be fired from
ships or dropped from helicopters/fixed wing aircraft into the water. Sonobuoys employ
passive or active sensors based on their design and their application and can triangulate the
position of a submarine. (David, 2007). The accurate positioning of sonobuoys is fundamental
in the ability to track submarines (Janes Navy International, 2007) but also the speed at which
they are delivered into the ocean is also important, otherwise the target could change course
and leave the area undetected. Due to their small size, UAVs were not able to carry
sonobuoys, however, recent advances in technology indicate that this capability may be
available in the future (Ultra Electronics, 2016; USI, 2015). However, a human would be
needed to interpret any data communicated from the sonobuoy and that relies on good
network connection. Fixed wing aircraft are more likely to succeed in detecting a vessel as
they can drop sonobuoys over a bigger range in a shorter period of time compared with other
assets.
For the ASW role, the Nimrod MR2 had a reach of 3800 nautical miles and an endurance of
10-12 hours (Armed Forces, 2012; BBC, 2009; Heyman, 2006) compared with the MRA4s
reach of 6000 nautical miles and 14 hours on task (Think Defence, 2011); both of which could
be air to air refuelled to increase their capability. An MPA can fly at 35,000ft making the
viewable radar range far greater than that of a ship. To directly compare the ability of an MPA

Table 3. Radar Coverage by other assets from Roberts (2014, Appendix A)

21

over other assets the following table shows the different search rates when looking for a target
at 15ft above sea level over a period of one hour:

To carry out the same search area as a MPA with a ship it would take nearly 207 hours
(370,894/791) or for just 1 hour of search time you would need 207 ships. For a helicopter it
would take 4.5 hours to cover the same area as a MPA (or 5 helicopters). The main
disadvantage of a helicopter is their limited range and thus their need for a nearby platform to
land on (Roberts, 2009). And as there are only 4 Frigates which currently carry a single Merlin
Mk1 helicopter (Naval Technology, 2016b) this would be unachievable and would create a
diversion of resources needed for other obligations around the world.
UK submarines, besides their own defensive capabilities, are unprotected. According to the
Royal Navy there are four Vanguard-class submarines which form the UKs strategic nuclear
deterrent force, armed with trident, one of which is always on patrol (Royal Navy, 2016). With
a top speed of 25 knots (about 28mph) their response time is slow so they have to rely on the
intelligence received as to where to patrol. They are equipped with active sonar (used to
actively detect other vessels), however, using it would immediately give away their position
(Byce and Tewari, 2006; Fein, 2002) and their goal is not to be detected. For that reason,
submarines depend on their passive sonar which constantly listens for signals from other
vessels (Stefoff, 2006; Fein, 2002). Where two stealth submarines are in the same vicinity
using only passive sonar it is possible that they dont know each others location. This can
lead to collisions; as such in 2009 when HMS Vanguard and the French Le Triomphant (both
carrying nuclear missiles) struck each other while on patrol in the Atlantic Ocean (Williams
and Norton-Taylor, 2009). Therefore having other means of detecting enemy vessels by allied
assets is desirable. It is also impractical for submarines to carry sonobuoys as they would
have to be manually dropped while surfaced, leaving the submarine vulnerable to detection.
The maximum flight time of a Merlin is 210 minutes (Naval Technology, 2016a) therefore it
would not be able to shadow and protect a friendly submarine for very long.
If a suspect foreign submarine is detected in off shore, there are a number of possibilities
which could be initiated:

Table 4. Potential options for using other assets for maritime security

Action

Advantages/Disadvantages

22

Time

Cost

Send a Type 23

By the time the asset arrived at

Slow reaction

Minimal cost to the

frigate to the area

the location, the threat may have

time

government other

and search using a

disappeared

than operational

combination of

costs

helicopters and
sonobuoys
Send a submarine

As well as the Vanguard

Slow reaction

Minimal cost to the

to locate and deal

Submarines there are attack

time and limited

government other

with the threat

submarines which could be

detection

than operational

dispatched to the area to search

capability unless

costs

for the foreign vessel

supported by an
airborne asset

Send other aircraft

Unless the aircraft was fitted with

Could arrive

Minimal cost to the

to the area

specialist detection

quickly but

government other

equipment/sonobuoys, it would be

unlikely to useful

than operational

almost impossible to detect the

costs

submarine
Use fixed sonar

Results are difficult to read and

technology

not very accurate. They would

difficulty in

offer no protection of overseas

installation and

territories without global

expected high

implementation

maintenance costs.

Use satellite

Data received is old and is of little

imagery to track

use unless the submarine

positions of

resurfaces in order to establish

submarines

direction and speed

Borrow assets from

Unpredictable

High due to the

Slow

Minimal cost

A good solution in order to find a

If aircraft was

Low but would

neighbouring

foreign vessel. However, there

already

include: Operational

countries with

may be compatibility issues and

borrowed then

costs plus

submarine

the UK cannot always guarantee

the reaction time

negotiated cost for

detection capability

the availability of neighbouring

would be fast

borrowing the asset

Fast

High cost to the

assets.
Purchase an

Would provide the capability

aircraft for the task

wherever and whenever it was

government

needed

The UK is currently relying on less capable assets [than MPA] to carry out all maritime roles.
Together Frigates and Merlin helicopters can provide an ASW role, however, with only four of
23

this combination currently utilised (Naval Technology, 2016b) it leaves the UKs Vanguardclass submarines, its vast coastline and overseas territories lacking in protection. To avoid
detection, submarines will rely on their passive sonar (Steffodd, 2006; Fein, 2002) which
means they are unlikely to detect a foreign submarine unless they use their active sonar or if
it comes close enough to be picked up passively (Williams and Norton-Taylor, 2009). This
suggests that a secondary form of detection and tracking is needed. Reaction times are the
biggest problem when it comes to maritime assets as helicopters have a limited range without
the aid of a frigate to land on (Roberts, 2009); thus their reaction time is extremely slow. Poor
response time was noted in December 2013 when a Russian submarine was detected 30
miles off the coast of the UK and it took the Navy 24 hours to arrive after making the 600 mile
journey to the area; this was speculated to be a test of reaction times (The News, 2014; Nicol,
2014). Currently long range search and rescue is non-existent, there is barely any contribution
to overseas maritime issues and the UKs reaction to any threat is embarrassingly slow.

24

Conclusion
This report set out to answer the question: With advancing technology is there a need to
reinstate a Maritime Patrol Aircraft capability? Until this capability was scrapped in 2009
(Cabinet Office, 2010) MPA had been providing the UK with a significant contribution to
maritime security, as well as to the rest of the world. The Nimrod MRA4 was envisaged to be
an unsurpassed aircraft in terms of reach and endurance (Think Defence, 2011) and as BAE
Systems were a British company it would also contribute to the UKs economy. Because it was
re-using the old Nimrod MR2 airframe, it might have been assumed that it would be a
straightforward upgrade and would be value for money. This was not the case. Poor initial
specification, incorrect assumptions about the aircraft tolerances and changing requirements,
all led to huge time overruns and a budget that could not stretch to fit (MOD, 2013). Although
it could be implied that BAE Systems may not have had the exact same agenda as the
Government, they cannot be held fully accountable for the outcome. Successive governments
inherited the problems and the poor decisions of the ones before, sometimes adding new
requirements and further increasing the chance of failure (MOD, 2013). Numbers were
decreased to try and save as much money as possible but in the end the high specification of
the MRA4 exceeded the budget set aside for it (MOD, 2013). Due to the huge delays, the
Nimrod MR2 carried on flying past its intended OSD; which could be an indication that the
Government were willing to risk keeping an old aircraft flying, rather than be without the
capability altogether. It was also a result of the NSC which found no reasons to cease flying
the MR2, as all the potential risks were never highlighted therefore no mitigation strategies
were ever instigated (Haddon-Cave, 2009).
There was much controversy surrounding the decision made in the Strategic and Defence
Security Review 2010 to not bring into service the Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft
(Cabinet Office, 2010, 27). It was claimed that it was due to the delays and cost overruns with
little suggestion of more disturbing issues. By delving deeper into the reasons behind this
decision, the research has shown that it was not just about the time and cost factors, but also
because of the discovery that the Nimrod MRA4 was not a fundamentally safe aircraft to
operate and that it had inherited the same design flaw that had contributed to the loss of XV230
(Haddon-Cave, 2009). The Nimrod aircraft had experienced a successful military career and
provided enduring service, but following the tragic loss of XV230 and the subsequent HaddonCave report, that name had been irreversibly tainted. The Government were struggling to
balance the books and the Nimrod cancellation was an easy target. Unfortunately this decision
was made far too late to save any real money and very little was recouped. The whole project
was doomed from the beginning and should never have been attempted in the first place.

25

With no immediate plans [at the time] to replace the aircraft the Government stated that the
capability gap would be mitigated with the use of other assets to contribute to the tasks
previously planned for them (National Audit Office, 2010, 27). Cancelling the Nimrod project
was such a huge decision that it would have been unacceptable to not have a mitigation
strategy in place, but the research has shown that nothing could fill the capability gap left.
Perhaps the significant word in that statement was contribute; although it might be
speculative to suggest that this statement was nothing more than a way of satisfying the public
by maintaining that the UK could cope effectively without MPA. Whatever the expectation was,
the fact remains that the UK has subsequently borrowed MPA from neighbouring countries
numerous times (Morduant, 2016) showing that the UK did not manage without MPA entirely.
Since the deletion of the Nimrod MRA4 project there has been a contingent of RAF personnel
training alongside US allies on their MPA, specifically Poseidon P8s, adding to the suggestion
that MPA would be reinstated at some point. It was therefore no major surprise that the
Government decided to buy a fleet of MPA and that the P8 was the aircraft of choice (Cabinet
Office, 2015) in what could be considered a U-turn decision. It will also be an easier transition
for the new aircrew which can benefit from the Seedcorn personnel having experience with
the aircraft. The troubling issue is that this decision was made without any [obvious]
consideration to other aircraft options, even though it was stated to be the default method of
procurement (HM Government, 2012). Following the successful C17 procurement project of
leasing first, buying later, it would have been shrewd to repeat this on the P8, so it is a concern
that the purchase has not been carefully considered. The unit price will also be subject to
inflation so could end up costing much more than predicted and the proven airframe will
become obsolete more quickly (HM Government, 2012). Had the UK leased the aircraft
temporarily it would have then allowed time for an open competition to have taken place,
ensuring the right decision could be made for all interested parties.
The advances in technology has seen an increase in the use of UAVs for maritime
surveillance, with some countries opting to operate them exclusively (Defence IQ, 2015). The
major drawback is that they currently do not offer the ability to drop sonobuoys making them
of little use for submarine hunting, however, if that technology becomes available, they could
offer a viable replacement for the ASW element of MPA (Ultra Electronics, 2016; USI, 2015);
although they would still require a human element to understand the data should a vessel be
detected. Some other issues would also need to be addressed first, such as the restrictive
legislation and the lack of avoidance software, but the outlook is promising.
The research has also looked into satellites which currently only have the ability to monitor
ships which have voluntary tracking (Munnell, 2014; Nardon and Venet, 2011). They also

26

observe larges areas of ocean to identify pollution and its probable causes but there is no
evidence to suggest they could perform a viable alternative to MPA. There is also the option
of having strategically placed arrays of listening hydrophones (SONUS) which would offer an
early warning system to the UK and abroad, although the costs involved with set-up,
monitoring and maintenance makes this option much less viable.
This research has proved beyond any reasonable doubt that the only viable option to fill the
capability gap left by Nimrods is with another MPA. Currently the UK is not fulfilling its
obligations to its overseas territories and there is no Long Range SAR facility. Having to
borrow MPA from neighbouring countries is embarrassing for the UK especially with a defence
budget among the highest in the world. Not forgetting the reliance the UK has on keeping open
the SLOC, fundamental to the UK and all island nations. The UK cannot currently offer a
significant contribution to any overseas crises or maritime operations (Defence Committee,
2015). Current technology is not yet at a point where maritime security could be maintained
autonomously, therefore the Government is making the right decision to reinstate the
capability. However there should be serious considerations in looking into the possibility of
leasing P8s before committing to the purchase of a fleet. This research has not concluded that
the procurement process is inherently flawed, however there is major scope for improvement.
To ensure the procurement process is carried out successfully in future, there needs to be a
more practical approach when specifying the aircraft requirements and perhaps the
introduction of penalty clauses for unscheduled changes would help prevent the process going
off-track. There should also be a tiered expenditure system which could offer payments only
when milestones were achieved and could also provide the contractor with financial awards
for completing the project early.

27

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