iii.

Jurisdiction over the subject

matter jurisdiction in rem

Applied Food Ingredients Co., Inc. v.

CIR
G.R. No. 184266
November 11, 2013
Sereno, CJ.
Doctrine:
The issue of jurisdiction over the subject
matter may, at any time, be raised by the
parties or considered by the Court motu
proprio.
Facts:
Petitioner alleged that from September
1998 to December 31, 2000, it paid an
aggregate sum of input taxes of
P9,528,565.85 for its importation of food
ingredients, as reported in its Quarterly
Vat Return. These sales were claimed by
petitioner to be zero-rated.
Subsequently,
these
imported
food
ingredients were exported between the
periods of April 1, 2000 to December 31,
2000, from which the petitioner was able
to generate export sales.
On March 26, 2002 and June 28, 2002,
petitioner filed two separate applications
for the issuance of tax credit certificates
(TCCs) in the amounts of P5,385,208.32
and P4,143,357.53, respectively.

The issue of jurisdiction over the subject

matter may, at any time, be raised by the
parties or considered by the Court motu
proprio. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the
CTA over petitioner's appeal may still be
considered and determined by this Court.
(1) Section 112 (A) provides for a two-year
prescriptive period after the close of the
taxable quarter when the sales were
made, within which a VAT- registered
person whose sales are zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated may apply for the
issuance of a tax credit certificate or
refund of creditable input tax.
Petitioner claims that from April 2000 to
December 2000 it had zero- rated sales to
which it attributed the accumulated input
taxes it had incurred from September
1998 to December 2000.
Applying Section 112 (A), petitioner had
until 30 June 2002, 30 September 2002
and 31 December 2002 or the close of
the taxable quarter when the zero-rated
sales were made within which to file its
administrative claim for refund. Petitioner
sufficiently complied with the two-year
prescriptive period when it filed its claim
on 26 March 2002 and 28 June 2002
covering its zero-rated sales for the period
April to September 2000 and October to
December 2000, respectively.

On July 24, 2002, in view of respondent's

inaction, petitioner elevated the case
before the CTA by way of a Petition for
Review.

Close of
taxable
quarter
when zerorated sale
was made

End of 2year
prescriptive
period to
file claim

Actual filing of
administrative
claim

CTA First Division and CTA En Banc:

denied TCC claim on grounds of failure to
comply with invoicing requirements.

AprilSeptember
2000

30 June
2002

26 March
2002

OctoberDecember
2000

31
December
2002

28 June 2002

Issue:
WON the CTA has jurisdiction over the
TCC claim of AFIC?
Held:
No.
Ratio:

(2) The Commissioner of Internal Revenue

(CIR) had one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of submission of complete
documents in support of the application

within
which
to
administrative claim.

decide

on

the

In relation thereto, absent any evidence to

the contrary and bearing in mind that the
burden to prove entitlement to a tax
refund is on the taxpayer, it is presumed
that in order to discharge its burden,
petitioner
had
attached
complete
supporting documents necessary to prove
its entitlement to a refund in its
application filed on 26 March 2002 and 28
June 2002. Therefore, the CIR's 120- day
period
to
decide
on
petitioner's
administrative claim commenced to run on
26 March 2002 and 28 June 2002,
respectively.
Counting 120 days from 26 March 2002,
the CIR had until 24 July 2002 within
which to decide on the claim of petitioner
for an input VAT refund attributable to
the its zero-rated sales for the period April
to September 2000.
On the other hand, the CIR had until 26
October 2002 within which to decide on
petitioner's claim for refund filed on 28
June 2002, or for the period covering
October to December 2000.
Records, however, show that the judicial
claim of petitioner was filed on 24 July
2002. Petitioner clearly failed to observe
the mandatory 120-day waiting period.
Consequently, the premature filing of its
claim for refund/credit of input VAT before
the CTA warranted a dismissal, inasmuch
as no jurisdiction was acquired by the
CTA.
Actual filing of
administrative
claim

120-day
period of
CIR to
decide
claim ends

26 March
2002

24 July
2002

28 June 2002

26 October
2002

Actual ate
of filing of
judicial
claim

24 July
2002

RA 1125, as amended by RA 9282, S7.

Jurisdiction. The CTA shall exercise:

Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to

review by appeal, as herein
provided:
(2)

Inaction

Commissioner

of

by

the

Internal

Revenue in cases involving

disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or
other charges, penalties in relation
thereto, or other matters arising
under the National Internal
Revenue Code or other laws
administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, where the
National Internal Revenue Code
provides a specific period of action,
in which case the inaction
shall be deemed a denial; . . . .
"Inaction by the CIR" in cases involving
the refund of creditable input tax, arises
only after the lapse of 120 days. Thus,
prior thereto and without a decision of the
CIR, the CTA, as a court of special
jurisdiction, has no jurisdiction to
entertain claims for the refund or credit of
creditable input tax. "The charter of the
CTA also expressly provides that if the
Commissioner fails to decide within "a
specific period" required by law, such

"inaction shall be deemed a denial" of

the application for tax refund or credit. It
is the Commissioner's decision, or inaction
"deemed a denial," that the taxpayer can
take to the CTA for review. Without a
decision or an "inaction . . . deemed a
denial" of the Commissioner, the CTA has
no jurisdiction over a petition for review."
Considering further that the 30-day period
to appeal to the CTA is dependent on the
120-day period, both periods are hereby
rendered jurisdictional. Failure to observe
120 days prior to the filing of a judicial
claim is not a mere non- exhaustion of
administrative remedies, but is likewise
considered jurisdictional. The period of
120 days is a prerequisite for the
commencement of the 30-day period to
appeal to the CTA. In both instances,
whether the CIR renders a decision (which

must be made within 120 days) or there

was inaction, the period of 120 days is
material.

Medical Plaza Makati Condominium

Corp. v. Cullen

G.R. No. 181416

November 11, 2013
Peralta, J.
Doctrine:
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over
the subject matter is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. It is not
affected by the pleas or the theories set up
by the defendant in an answer or a motion
to dismiss.
The nature of the action is determined by
the body rather than the title of the
complaint.
Facts:
MPMCC
(Medical
Plaza
Makati
Condominium Corp.) demanded from
respondent Robert Cullen, a condominium
unit owner in MPMC, payment of alleged
unpaid association dues and assessments.
Respondent was prevented from exercising
his right to vote and be voted for during
the 2002 election of petitioner's Board of
Directors.
Cullen then demanded from petitioner an
explanation why he was considered a
delinquent payer despite the settlement of
the obligation. Petitioner failed to make
such explanation. Hence, the Complaint
for Damages filed by respondent against
petitioner and MLHI.
MPMCC: MTD for lack of jurisdiction as
case involves an intra-corporate dispute.
RTC: intra-corporate dispute. Dismissed.
CA: reversed. Ordinary civil action.
Issue:
WON the case involves an intra-corporate
dispute within the jurisdiction of Special
Commercial Courts (SCCs).

Held:
Yes, intra-corporate dispute. Case before
RTC Br. 58, not an SCC, ordered
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Remanded for re-raffling.
Ratio:
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over
the subject matter is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. It is not
affected by the pleas or the theories set up
by the defendant in an answer or a motion
to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would
become dependent almost entirely upon
the whims of the defendant.
In determining whether a dispute
constitutes an intra-corporate controversy,
the Court uses two tests, namely, the
relationship test and the nature of the
controversy test.
An intra-corporate controversy is one
which pertains to any of the following
relationships: (1) between the corporation,
partnership or association and the public;
(2) between the corporation, partnership
or association and the State insofar as its
franchise, permit or license to operate is
concerned; (3) between the corporation,
partnership or association and its
stockholders, partners, members or
officers; and (4) among the stockholders,
partners or associates themselves. Thus,
under the relationship test, the existence
of any of the above intra-corporate
relations makes the case intra-corporate.
Under the nature of the controversy test,
"the controversy must not only be rooted in
the existence of an intra-corporate
relationship, but must as well pertain to
the enforcement of the parties' correlative
rights
and
obligations
under
the
Corporation Code and the internal and
intra-corporate regulatory rules of the
corporation." In other words, jurisdiction
should be determined by considering both
the relationship of the parties as well as
the nature of the question involved.

Applying the two tests, we find and so hold

that the case involves intra-corporate
controversy. It obviously arose from the
intra-corporate relations between the
parties, and the questions involved pertain
to their rights and obligations under the
Corporation Code and matters relating to
the regulation of the corporation.
The nature of the action is determined by
the body rather than the title of the
complaint. Though denominated as an
action for damages, an examination of the
allegations made by respondent in his
complaint shows that the case principally
dwells on the propriety of the assessment
made by petitioner against respondent as
w ell as the validity of petitioner's act in
preventing respondent from participating
in the election of the corporation's Board
of Directors. Respondent contested the
alleged unpaid dues and assessments
demanded by petitioner.
RTC designated as SCC has jurisdiction
over the case as per SRC S5.2.

Province

of

Aklan

v.

Jody

King

Construction and Development Corp.

G.R. No. 197592 and 202623
November 27, 2013
Villarama, J.

Doctrine:
The court may raise the issue of primary
jurisdiction sua sponte and its invocation
cannot be waived by the failure of the
parties to argue it as the doctrine exists
for the proper distribution of power
between judicial and administrative bodies
and not for the convenience of the parties.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does
not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself
authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged
with an administrative body of special
competence. All the proceedings of the
court in violation of the doctrine and all
orders and decisions rendered thereby are
null and void.

A courts orders implementing its

judgment rendered without jurisdiction
must be set aside because a void judgment
can never be validly executed.
Facts:
The Province of Aklan (petitioner) and
Jody King Construction and Development
Corp. (respondent) entered into a contract
for the design and construction of the
Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal (Phase I)
in Malay, Aklan. In the course of
construction,
petitioner
issued
variation/change orders for additional
works. The scope of work under these
change orders were agreed upon by
petitioner and respondent.
Respondent made a demand for the items
which petitioner allegedly failed to settle.
Respondent sued petitioner in RTC
Marikina City to collect the aforesaid
amounts. The RTC issued a writ of
preliminary attachment.
The trial court issued a writ of execution
ordering the sheriff to demand from
petitioner the immediate payment and
tender the same to the respondent.
Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for
certiorari with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and preliminary
injunction assailing the Writ of Execution.
CA: petitioner is estopped from invoking
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as it
only raised the issue of COA's primary
jurisdiction after its notice of appeal was
denied and a writ of execution was issued
against it.
Issue:
WON the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
applies to this case.
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
Petitioner

is

not

estopped

raising the issue of jurisdiction

from

Petitioner
argues,
however,
that
respondent could no longer question the
RTC's jurisdiction over the matter after it
had filed its answer and participated in
the subsequent proceedings. To this, we
need only state that the court may raise
the issue of primary jurisdiction sua
sponte and its invocation cannot be waived
by the failure of the parties to argue it as
the doctrine exists for the proper
distribution of power between judicial and
administrative bodies and not for the
convenience of the parties.
There are established exceptions to the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of
the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where
the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction;
(c)
where
there
is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that
will
irretrievably
prejudice
the
complainant; (d) where the amount
involved is relatively small so as to make
the rule impractical and oppressive; (e)
where the question involved is purely legal
and will ultimately have to be decided by
the courts of justice; (f) where judicial
intervention is urgent; (g) when its
application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the
controverted acts violate due process; (i)
when the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative
remedies
has
been
rendered moot; (j) when there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k)
when strong public interest is involved;
and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings.
However,
none
of
the
foregoing
circumstances is applicable in the present
case.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does
not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself
authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged
with an administrative body of special
competence. All the proceedings of the
court in violation of the doctrine and all
orders and decisions rendered thereby are
null and void.

The RTC's orders implementing its

judgment rendered without jurisdiction
must be set aside because a void judgment
can never be validly executed.

Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. CA

G.R. No. 173946
June 19, 2013
Perez, J.
Doctrine:
(1) The aspect of jurisdiction which may be
barred from being assailed as a result of
estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
(2) Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of a party to a case is not
one of those defenses which are not
deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9,
such defense must be invoked when an
answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in
order to prevent a waiver of the defense.
Facts:
Petitioner Boston Equity Resources, Inc.
(BERI) filed a complaint for sum of money
against respondents Manuel and Lolita
Toledo. Lolita filed an Answer and later an
Amended Answer stating that her
husband and co-defendant Manuel is
already dead. Pretrial and trial followed.
In the period given to Lolita to file a
demurrer to evidence, she filed an MTD
for, inter alia, the Manila RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of
Manuel.
RTC: denied MTD.
CA: granted certiorari by Lolita. Issue on
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
the proceeding, even for the first time on
appeal. For raising the issue in her MTD,
Lolita not barred by laches to question
jurisdiction of RTC.
BERI: Lolita MTD filed more than 6 years
after her amended answer was filed. As
per Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, respondents

failure to raise the question of jurisdiction

at an earlier stage bars her from later
questioning it, especially since she actively
participated in the proceedings conducted
by the RTC.
Issue:
WON Lolita is barred from raising issue of
jurisdiction (over the person of the
deceased Manuel).
Held:
Yes. CA decision reversed and set aside.
RTC to proceed with trial of case against
Lolita Toledo.
Ratio:
The aspect of jurisdiction which may be
barred from being assailed as a result of
estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Thus, in Tijam, the case
relied upon by petitioner, the issue
involved was the authority of the then
Court of First Instance to hear a case for
the collection of a sum of money in the
amount of P1,908.00 which amount was,
at that time, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the municipal courts.
In subsequent cases citing the ruling of
the Court in Tijam, what was likewise at
issue was the jurisdiction of the trial court
over the subject matter of the case.
In all of these cases, the Supreme Court
barred the attack on the jurisdiction of the
respective courts concerned over the
subject matter of the case based on
estoppel by laches, declaring that parties
cannot be allowed to belatedly adopt an
inconsistent posture by attacking the
jurisdiction of a court to which they
submitted their cause voluntarily.
What respondent was questioning in her
motion to dismiss before the trial court
was that court's jurisdiction over the
person of defendant Manuel. Thus, the
principle of estoppel by laches finds no
application in this case. Instead, the
principles relating to jurisdiction over the
person of the parties are pertinent herein.

Rule 9, S1, and Rule 15, S8

Objection on jurisdictional grounds which
is not waived even if not alleged in a
motion to dismiss or the answer is lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. . . .
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter can always be raised anytime, even
for the first time on appeal, since
jurisdictional issues cannot be waived . . .
subject, however, to the principle of
estoppel by laches.
Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of a party to a case is not
one of those defenses which are not
deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9,
such defense must be invoked when an
answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in
order to prevent a waiver of the defense. If
the objection is not raised either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer, the
objection to the jurisdiction over the
person of the plaintiff or the defendant is
deemed waived by virtue of the first
sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
As the question of jurisdiction involved
here is that over the person of the
defendant Manuel, the same is deemed
waived if not raised in the answer or a
motion to dismiss. In any case, respondent
cannot claim the defense since "lack of
jurisdiction over the person, being subject
to waiver, is a personal defense which can
only be asserted by the party who can
thereby waive it by silence.

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
G.R. No. L-21450
April 15, 1968
Dizon, J.
Doctrine:
A party may be estopped or barred from
raising a question by estoppel by laches.
A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief against
his opponent and, after obtaining or

failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or

question that same jurisdiction.
Facts:
Spouses Tijam filed a collection case for
P1,908.00 against spouses Sibonghanoy
before the CFI of Cebu. They also prayed
for a writ of attachment but the same was
dissolved upon filing of a counter-bond by
defendants and Manila Surety and
Fidelity Co., Inc.
CFI Cebu rendered judgment in favor of
plaintiffs. Said judgment became final and
executory. The writ of execution issued
against the defendants was returned
unsatisfied, prompting plaintiffs to move
for the issuance of another writ now
directed to the Surety.
The writ against the Surety was finally
issued.
Surety: motion to quash writ of execution.
Summary hearing required by rules not
conducted. CFI denied MTQ.
CA: affirmed RTC ruling. Later granted
MOTEX filed by Surety.
Surety: instead filed MTD on ground of
lack of jurisdiction of RTC. MTC has
jurisdiction for recovery of sum of money
the subject matter or the amount of the
demand does not exceed P2,000.00 (as per
Judiciary Act of 1948). CA certified the
case to the SC.
Issue:
WON the collection suit should be
dismissed for CFIs lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
No.
Ratio:
The Surety is now barred by laches from
invoking this plea at this late hour for the
purpose of annulling everything done
heretofore in the case with its active
participation. The action was commenced
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on

July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years

before the Surety filed its motion to
dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the
question of lack of jurisdiction for the first
time.
Although the action, originally, was
exclusively against the Sibonghanoy
spouses, the Surety became a quasi-party
therein when it filed a counter-bond for
the dissolution of the writ of attachment
issued by the court of origin. Since then, it
acquired certain rights and assumed
specific obligations in connection with the
pending case, in accordance with Sections
12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of Court
Upon the filing of the first motion for
execution against the counter-bond the
Surety not only filed a written opposition
thereto praying for its denial but also
asked for an additional affirmative relief
that it be relieved of its liability under the
counter-bond upon the grounds relied
upon in support of its opposition lack of
jurisdiction of the court a quo not being
one of them.
At the hearing on the second motion for
execution against the counter- bond, the
Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask
for time within which to file an answer or
opposition thereto. This motion was
granted, but instead of such answer or
opposition, the Surety filed the motion to
dismiss mentioned heretofore.
A party may be estopped or barred from
raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of
estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by
record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale

demands" is based upon grounds of public
policy which requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of stale claims
and, unlike the statute of limitations, is
not a mere question of time but is
principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim
to be enforced or asserted.
A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief against
his opponent and, after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction.
From the time the Surety became a quasiparty, it could have raised the question of
the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu to
take cognizance of the present action by
reason of the sum of money involved which
was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to
do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as
in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case
for a final adjudication on the merits. It
was only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals that it
finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction.

Cadastre covered by a TCT. Her mother

had a conversation with one Maura Passio
regarding the sale of the said property.
Believing that Maura was a real estate
agent, her mother borrowed the owner's
copy of the TCT from her and gave it to
Maura. Maura then subdivided the
property into several lots from Lot No.
625-A to Lot No. 625-O, under the name of
Elenita and her husband.
Maura was able to sell through falsified
deeds lots to different buyers. One such
buyer was Lorna Ong, who later caused
the issuance of TCT in her name. A few
months later, Lorna sold the lot to
petitioner Editha Padlan for P4,000.00
After acquiring knowledge of the sale, the
Dinglasans
demanded
Padlan
to
surrender possession of the lot but the
latter refused. Respondents then filed
before the RTC Balanga, Bataan an action
to cancel the title held by petitioner.
RTC: Padlan buyer
Complaint dismissed.

in

good

faith.

CA: reversed RTC decision.

Padlan: MR, RTC has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case.
Issue:
WON the RTC acquired subject matter
jurisdiction over the case.

Padlan v. Spouses Dinglasan

G.R. No. 180321
March 20, 2013
Peralta, J.
Doctrine:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and determined by
the allegations in the complaint which
comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action.

Facts:
Respondent Elenita Dinglasan was the
registered owner of a lot of the Limay

Held:
No. Civil case dismissed without prejudice.
Ratio:
Respondents filed the complaint in 1999,
at the time BP 129, the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, was already
amended by RA No. 7691, An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, amending for the purpose BP Blg.
129. RA 7691, S1, amending BP Blg. 129,
provides that the RTC shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction on the
following actions:

Sec. 19.Jurisdiction in civil cases.

Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which
involve the title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds
Twenty
Thousand
Pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts; . . .
RA 7691, S3 expanded the exclusive
original jurisdiction of first level courts:
Sec. 33.Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil
Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(3)Exclusive original jurisdiction
in all civil actions which involve
title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the
property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where
such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages
of
whatever
kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses
and costs: Provided, That in cases
of land not declared for taxation

purposes, the value of such

property shall be determined by
the assessed value of the adjacent
lots.
However, in order to determine which
court has jurisdiction over the action, an
examination of the complaint is essential.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and determined by
the allegations in the complaint which
comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action.
An action "involving title to real property"
means that the plaintiff's cause of action is
based on a claim that he owns such
property or that he has the legal rights to
have
exclusive
control,
possession,
enjoyment, or disposition of the same.
Title is the "legal link between (1) a person
who owns property and (2) the property
itself." "Title" is different from a
"certificate of title" which is the document
of ownership under the Torrens system of
registration issued by the government
through the Register of Deeds. While title
is the claim, right or interest in real
property, a certificate of title is the
evidence of such claim.
A complaint must allege the assessed
value of the real property subject of the
complaint or the interest thereon to
determine which court has jurisdiction
over the action. In the case at bar, the only
basis of valuation of the subject property
is the value alleged in the complaint that
the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in
the amount of P4,000.00. No tax
declaration was even presented that would
show the valuation of the subject property.
In one of the hearings, respondents'
counsel informed the court that they will
present the tax declaration of the property
in the next hearing since they have not yet
obtained a copy from the Provincial
Assessor's Office. However, they did not
present such copy.
Since the ultimate objective of the
plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property,

it should be filed in the proper court

having jurisdiction over the assessed value
of the property subject thereof. Since the
amount alleged in the Complaint by
respondents for the disputed lot is only
P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has
jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all
proceedings in the RTC are null and void.

People v. Estrebella
G.R. No. 71464
August 4, 1988
Paras, J.
Doctrine:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of an
action is and may be conferred only by law,
and that jurisdiction over a given crime
not vested by law upon a particular court,
may not be conferred thereon by the
parties involved in the offense. RPC Art.
344 does not determine the jurisdiction of
our courts over the offenses therein
enumerated. It could not effect said
jurisdiction, because the same with
respect to the instant crime is governed by
the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the
Revised Penal Code.
[Note: Rape is now a crime against
persons. Who may now initiate an action
for rape?]
Facts:
Accused Romeo Estrebella was charged
with the crime of rape of Joy Alcala, a
mental retardate, aged 13 but with mental
age of only 6 or 7. The Complaint against
Estrebella was signed by Alcala herself.
He was found guilty as charged.
Estrebella: trial court
jurisdiction to try the
complaint was filed by a
retardate complainant,
(1985), S4 and 5:

did not acquire

case because the
minor and mental
contrary to R110

The offended party, even she were

a minor, has the right to institute
the prosecution for the above
offenses, independently of her
parents,
grandparents
or

guardian,
unless
she
is
incompetent or incapable of doing
so upon grounds other than her
minority.
and RPC Art. 344:
The
offenses
of
seduction,
abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness,
shall
not
be
prosecuted
except
upon
a
complaint filed by the offended
party of her parents, grandparents
or guardian, nor, in any case, if the
offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above named
persons, as the case may be . . .
Issue:
WON the trial court lacks jurisdiction to
try Estrebellas case.
Held:
No. Court has jurisdiction. Judgment of
conviction affirmed.
Ratio:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of an
action is and may be conferred only by law,
and that jurisdiction over a given crime
not vested by law upon a particular court,
may not be conferred thereon by the
parties involved in the offense. The
aforementioned provision of Art. 344 does
not determine the jurisdiction of our
courts
over
the
offenses
therein
enumerated. It could not effect said
jurisdiction, because the same with
respect to the instant crime is governed by
the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the RPC,
which deals primarily with the definition
of crimes and the factors pertinent to the
punishment of the culprits. The complaint
required in said Art. 344 is merely a
condition precedent to the exercise by the
proper authorities of the power to prosecute
the guilty parties. And such condition has
been imposed out of consideration for the
offended woman and her family who might
prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through with the scandal of
a public trial.

10

While the complaint may have been

technically defective in the sense that
complainant was incompetent, this defect
has been cured when complainant's
brother Fernando Alcala took the witness
stand for the prosecution.

Lloraa v. Leonidas
G.R. No. L-39810
March 28, 1988
Melencio-Herrera, J.
Doctrine:
To determine whether or not the principle
of res judicata applies, the following
requisites must concur:
(1) the presence of a final former
judgment;
(2) the former judgment must have been
rendered by a Court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the former judgment is a judgment on
the merits; and
(4) there is, between the first and the
second action identity of parties, subject
matter, and cause of action.
Facts:
Spouses Lloraa filed a special civil action
for certiorari to set aside the order of CFI
Capiz dismissing the case for enforcement
of warranty against eviction filed by them
against respondents Geners on the ground
of res judicata.
First case: Recovery of possession filed by
Precila Gener against other Geners and
Spouses Lloraa to recover 2ha Riceland
in Tapaz, Capiz. Precila alleges that the
property was adjudicated to her in the
extrajudicial settlement executed by her,
her mother, and sisters.
Lloraa spouses filed answer with crossclaims against the Geners, alleging the
they purchased the lot in a pacto de retro.
The cross-defendants did not repurchase
the lot in the stipulated period and that
said cross-defendants had a warranty

against eviction
claimants.

in

favor

of

cross-

Defendants Geners and Lloraa spouses

failed to appear at pre-trial and trial. CFI
decided in favor of plaintiff.
Fourth case: Lloraa spouses v. Geners for
enforcement warranty against eviction.
Case dismissed by CFI for bar by prior
judgment.
Issue:
WON latter case barred by res judicata.
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
To determine whether or not the principle
of res judicata applies, the following
requisites must concur:
(1) the presence of a final former
judgment;
There is a final former judgment
which is in Civil Case No. M-87.
The
defendants
and
crossclaimants, none other than the
Lloraa Spouses themselves, who
are the petitioners herein, filed in
said
case
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration and New Trial,
which was, however, denied. They
did not appeal the Decision, hence,
it acquired finality.
(2) the former judgment must have been
rendered by a Court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties;
The Court, which rendered the
judgment in Civil Case No. M-87,
had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and over the parties. A civil
action for recovery of possession,
annulment of partition, accounting
and damages was properly within
the jurisdiction of the then Court
of First Instance of Capiz (Section
2[a], Rule 4, Rules of Court).
Jurisdiction over the parties is not
disputed.

11

(3) the former judgment is a judgment on

the merits; and
The judgment in Civil Case No. M87, dated April 25, 1968, is a
judgment on the merits, that is, it
was rendered after consideration
of the evidence submitted by the
parties during the trial of the case.
(4) there is, between the first and the
second action identity of parties, subject
matter, and cause of action.
The Lloraa Spouses, who are the
plaintiffs in the second case, are
the same parties who filed a crossclaim against the Geners in the
earlier case. The Geners, who are
the cross-defendants in earlier
case are also the defendants in the
latter case. The subject matter in
both cases is the sale with pacto de
retro allegedly executed by the
Geners in favor of the Lloraa
Spouses. The cause of action in
both cases is also identical, which
is the liability of the Geners to the
Lloraa Spouses for damages for
alleged breach of their warranty,
as vendors, against the eviction of
the Lloraa spouses, as vendees.

Republic Planters Bank v. Molina

G.R. No. 54287
September 28, 1988
Gancayco, J.
Doctrine:
The order of dismissal in the first case
does not have the effect of an adjudication
on the merits of the case because the court
that rendered the same did not have the
requisite jurisdiction over the persons of
the defendants therein. This being so, it
cannot be the basis of res judicata and it
cannot be a bar to a lawful claim.
Facts:
First case: Republic Planters Bank (RPB)
v private respondents for collection of sum
of money based on a PN for P100,000.00.

Case was dismissed by CFI Manila Br. 36

for RPBs failure to prosecute the case
within a reasonable length of time.
Second case: also RPB v private
respondent for collection of sum of money
based on same PN for P100,000.00.
Private respondents filed MTD on ground
of res judicata. CFI Manila Br. 20
dismissed the case with prejudice. That
court in prior case did not acquire
jurisdiction over person of private
respondents of no moment.
Issue:
WON the second case was barred by res
judicata.
Held:
No.
Ratio:
Respondent trial judge acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction when he dismissed
the case because he thereby traversed the
constitutional precept that "no person
shall be deprived of property without due
process of law" and that jurisdiction is
vitally essential for any order or
adjudication to be binding.
The order of dismissal in the first case
does not have the effect of an adjudication
on the merits of the case because the court
that rendered the same did not have the
requisite jurisdiction over the persons of
the defendants therein. This being so, it
cannot be the basis of res judicata and it
cannot be a bar to a lawful claim. If at all,
such a dismissal may be considered as one
without prejudice.
There are no indications that petitioner
intentionally failed to prosecute the case.
The delay could not be attributed to its
fault. Petitioner pursued the case with
diligence, but jurisdiction could not be
acquired
over
defendants-private
respondents. The sheriff had not yet
submitted his return of the alias summons

12

when the action was

dismissed by the trial court.

precipitately

ALU-TUCP v. Borromeo
G.R. No. 75736
September 29, 1988
Sarmiento, J.
Doctrine:
The courts of law have no jurisdiction to
act on labor cases or various incidents
arising therefrom. That is basic and
elementary. Jurisdiction to try and
adjudicate such cases pertains exclusively
to the proper labor officials of the
Department of Labor.
Facts:
Associated Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP)
filed a notice of strike and complaint for
various offenses before the MOLE against
respondent Belyca Corp. ranging from
ULP to non payment of minimum wages.
Respondent filed an action for injunction
with the RTC, alleging that works prevent
the giving of feeds to the hogs and fowls
who would die if not attended to (about
7,500 hogs and 8,000 fowls). The RTC
issued a TRO commanding striking
workers to allow Belyca to feed its hogs
and fowls.
Belyca then sought extension of the TRO
for 20 days was granted by the RTC.
Issue:
WON RTC has jurisdiction over the
injunction case.
Held:
No. RTC orders declared void.
Ratio:
The courts of law have no jurisdiction to
act on labor cases or various incidents
arising therefrom. That is basic and
elementary. Jurisdiction to try and
adjudicate such cases pertains exclusively
to the proper labor officials of the
Department of Labor, thus:

ART. 217.Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters

and the Commission.
(a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide within thirty (30) working days
after submission of the case by the parties
for decision, the following cases involving
all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural:
1.Unfair labor practice cases;
2.Those that workers may le
involving wages, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of
employment;
3.All money claims of workers,
including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of
wages, overtime compensation,
separation pay and other bene ts
provided by law or appropriate
agreement, except claims for
employees' compensation, social
security, medicare and maternity
benefits.
4.Cases
involving
services; and

household

5.Cases arising from any violation

of Article 265 of this Code,
including questions involving the
legality of strikes and lockouts.
(b)The Commission shall have exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Labor Arbiters.
Art. 128. xxx
(b)The Minister of Labor or his duly
authorized representatives shall have the
power to order and administer, after due
notice and hearing, compliance with the
labor standards provisions of this Code
based on the findings of labor regulation
officers or industrial safety engineers
made in the course of inspection, and to
issue writs of execution to the appropriate
authority for the enforcement of their
order, except in cases where the employer

13

contests the findings of the labor

regulations officer and raise issues which
cannot be resolved without considering
evidentiary matters that are not verifiable
in the normal course of inspection.

What is even clearer is the fact that in

labor cases, injunction itself stands as an
exceptional remedy. It does not lie save in
those cases as the Labor Code provides:

That the case in question involves a labor

dispute is patent from the records. In
rendering his ruling, the respondent judge
himself was aware that the dispute was
the result of an impasse between employer
and employees, an impasse cognizable
alone by the National Labor Relations.

ART. 255.Injunction prohibited. No

temporary or permanent injunction or
restraining order in any case involving or
growing out of labor disputes shall be
issued by any court or other entity, except
as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and
264 of this Code.

The respondent judge cannot enjoin acts

carried out as a consequence of the strike
without unavoidably ruling on the legality
of the strike itself. To say indeed that the
workers had obstructed free passage to the
strike-bound firm, is, by necessity, to say
that
the
strike
was
illegal,
notwithstanding the judge's own words of
caution.

The fact that the poultry and piggery

maintained by the private respondent
required close care and attention does not
warrant
the
respondent
judge's
assumption of jurisdiction. It did not
confer on him the competence he did not
have. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not
by the demands of emergency.

14