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CASES IN PALE

(1)
FIDELA VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 3569


Present:

- versus -

ATTY. MANUEL G. SAN JOSE,


Respondent.

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,


CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
February 23, 2007

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RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an administrative complaint[1] for disbarment filed by Fidela Vda. De Enriquez against respondent
Atty. Manuel G. San Jose for gross negligence.
Complainant alleged that on August 28, 1989, she hired the services of respondent Atty. San Jose for the
purpose of filing an unlawful detainer case against one Rugerio Alipante, who defaulted in the payment of
monthly rentals on complainants property in Taban, Libmanan, Camarines Sur.According to the
complainant, respondent failed to file the appropriate civil case, despite payment to him of P2,000
attorneys fees, so she decided to withdraw the case from respondent. She demanded the return of the
pertinent documents but despite repeated demands, respondent refused and failed to return the
documents. As a result, the action for unlawful detainer prescribed. Complainant alleged further, that her
daughter who worked for respondent was not paid her salary. Complainant prayed that Atty. San Jose be
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.
In his Comment,[2] respondent denied being negligent. He alleged that he received a letter from the
complainant informing him that the lessee had already agreed to vacate the premises, and thus, the filing
of an unlawful detainer case had become unnecessary. Respondent also explained that he did not file the
case even before receiving complainants letter because there was a vacancy in the sala of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Libmanan-Cabusao, Camarines Sur. He claimed that he informed
complainant that the case could not be filed until a new judge was appointed, but he promised to file the
case before the action prescribed. Respondent claimed further that the attorneys fee was P3,000 and that
he had paid complainants daughter P700 per month.
The Court referred[3] the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation by the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). The investigating officer found that
respondent was indeed remiss in the performance of his professional duties as counsel. According to
Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo, the only complete work respondent rendered to his client was sending a
demand letter for the lessee to vacate the subject premises within ten days from receipt of the demand
letter. The Commissioner also found respondents explanation for his failure to file the case unsatisfactory
and concluded that respondent was guilty of negligence in the performance of his duty as a lawyer for

abandonment of his clients cause. The Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for three months.[4]
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation of the Commissioner finding
respondent liable for negligence but only imposed the penalty of one-month suspension from the practice
of law.[5]
On December 17, 1997, respondent filed a petition seeking the dismissal of the case against him and
prayed that he be exonerated. He denied being negligent. He claimed that the IBP Board of Governors
misinterpreted the complainants letter, which stated that the complainant and her lessee came to an
agreement for the latter to vacate the leased premises. He claimed that he relied on that letter thereby
negating the necessity of further filing a case for unlawful detainer.
In our Resolution, dated December 6, 1999, we resolved to remand the case to the IBP which, in turn,
assigned the case to the IBP-CBD for further investigation.
The Investigating Commissioner in her report, dated August 5, 2004, recommended that the petition be
dismissed for lack of merit. Said recommendation was adopted by the IBP, which passed a resolution to
that effect, and approved by the IBP Board of Governors on October 7, 2004.
After a thorough review of the records in this matter, we are in agreement with the IBP that respondent
Atty. San Jose be held liable for negligence; thus, his petition for exoneration should be denied for utter
lack of merit.
The Code of Professional Responsibility in Rule 18.03 enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. [6] A lawyer engaged to
represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence. It
is the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence and he should exert his best efforts
to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his client. It is not enough that a practitioner is
qualified to handle a legal matter; he is also required to prepare adequately and give the appropriate
attention to his legal work.[7]
In Santos v. Lazaro,[8] we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate
in legal ethics. Indeed, when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence
in protecting the latters rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good
father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him
answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society. Until the lawyers
withdrawal is properly done, the lawyer is expected to do his or her best for the interest of the client.[9]
In this case, respondent fell short of the diligence required of a lawyer entrusted with a case. It is
undisputed that respondent was hired by the complainant on August 28, 1989, and that respondent sent
the notice to vacate to the lessee before the appropriate unlawful detainer case could be filed. However,
after nine months, respondent had done nothing further in connection with the case.
Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an
action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. [10] However, respondent in this case failed to file
the appropriate civil case after sending a demand letter. The failure to file a pleading is by itself
inexcusable negligence on the part of respondent. [11] Moreover, this Court finds reprehensible respondents
failure to heed the request of his client for the return of the case documents. That respondent gave no
reasonable explanation for that failure makes his neglect patent.

Respondent aggravates his misconduct by blaming the courts. Respondents excuse that the MCTC having
jurisdiction over the case was vacant; that filing of a case would be useless; and that the best thing to do
was to wait for the vacancy to be filled, finds no support in the practice of law.The vacancy in court did
not suspend the courts official existence, much less render it functus oficio.
Respondent also relies in vain on complainants letter dated August 16, 1990, wherein complainant
informed respondent of her decision to withdraw the case. According to the complainant, she resorted to
the letter so she could retrieve the records she previously handed over to the respondent, but he continued
to refuse to return them. It may be noted that the letter was sent to respondent a few days before the lapse
of the one-year prescriptive period. If respondent had earlier filed a case, there would have been no need
for complainant to resort to that letter to get the records in line with her plan to have the Public Attorneys
Office assist in filing the appropriate case. Needless to stress, because of the respondents failure to file the
appropriate case, and his refusal to return the documents, time ran out and the action for unlawful detainer
case was barred by prescription. Damage and prejudice to the clients cause was undeniable.
Finally, we find the recommended penalty of one-month suspension from the practice of law too light. In
previous cases, we have imposed six months suspension for violations of this nature, taking into
consideration the gravity of the offense and the necessity of preserving the integrity of the legal
profession. In Reyes v. Vitan,[12] for failure to take the appropriate actions in connection with his clients
case, the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months and was required to
render accounting of all the sums he received from his client. Considering precedents, in the light of
circumstances in this case, we find no reason to deviate now from the penalty meted previously for
similar infractions.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Manuel G. San Jose is hereby declared guilty of violation of Canon 18
specifically Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon notice of this Resolution.He is ordered to return to
complainant, within five (5) days from notice, the sum of P2,000 with 12% interest per annum from the
date of the promulgation of this Resolution until the full amount shall have been returned.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered into respondents personal records as an attorney and as a member
of the Philippine Bar, and furnished the Court Administrator for distribution to all courts of the land, the
IBP, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.

(2) A.M. No. MTJ-06-1636


March 12, 2007
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-1662-MTJ]

JULIO B. VERZOSA, Complainant,


vs.
JUDGE MANUEL E. CONTRERAS, Municipal Trial Court, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, Respondent.

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Verified Complaint1 dated December 30, 2004 of Julio B. Verzosa (complainant) charging
Judge Manuel E. Contreras (respondent), Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Ocampo, Camarines Sur with
Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave Misconduct (Harassment and Oppression), and Violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, relative to Criminal Case No. 2071, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Rodrigo E.
Candelaria."
Complainant alleges: he is a forest ranger of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Protected Area Office. On April 14, 2004, while conducting surveillance on treasure hunting
activities in Mt. Isarog Natural Park, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, he and his co-forest rangers discovered an
open pit left in damaged condition, allegedly in violation of Republic Act No. 7586. They likewise found
and confiscated in favor of the Government two metal chains used to overturn huge stones in the treasure
hunting site. He found out later that the alleged treasure hunters were led by a certain Jose Credo
(Credo) a.k.a. "Labaw" and Basilio Sumalde (Sumalde) a.k.a. "Moren". The Executive Director of the
DENR Region V Office thereafter ordered the complainant to continue monitoring the said treasure
hunting site. Because of his involvement in the treasure hunting activities and on the basis of the
testimony of Credo, he was implicated as an accessory in Criminal Case No. 2071 against Rodrigo
Candelaria (Candelaria), et al. for robbery. The said case arose from the alleged information relayed by
respondent to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Officers of Ocampo, Camarines Sur in the morning of
April 18, 2004, which led to the arrest of the principal accused. Respondent did not inhibit himself from
conducting the preliminary investigation despite his proven bias against all of the accused, in apparent
violation of the guiding principles of Judicial Ethics and Responsibilities. Complainant was not among
the persons on board the truck when the same was apprehended by members of the PNP on April 18,
2004. On the basis of the affidavit executed by Credo, respondent hastily issued an order for
complainant's arrest. After the information reducing the charge from robbery to simple theft was filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur, Judge Nilo Malanyaon, in an
Order dated September 13, 2004 dismissed the case due to lack of probable cause. Respondent is the
mastermind behind the treasure hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur and the robbery case for
which complainant was implicated as an accessory was a way of harassing anybody who opposes the
activities.
In his Comment,2 respondent contends: on the latter part of March 2004, he went on mountain hiking at
Mt. Isarog with the Tinablanan River as his destination. While at Mt. Isarog, he received an information
that Candelaria, known confidant of the personnel of the DENR and by the CARE Philippines, was
looting by dismantling the tower antennae of the Philippine Long Distance and Telephone Company
(PLDT) used as a relay station but already inoperational. The PLDT Tower is already a government
property and declared by the provincial government as a tourist attraction and destination being
strategically located at the towering heights of Mt. Isarog. The activity of looting the steel trusses and bars
of the PLDT Tower had been going on since January 2004. He directed the police of Ocampo, Camarines
Sur to investigate the looting of the steel trusses and bars of the PLDT Tower. The second time that he
went on mountain hiking at Tinablanan River on April 18, 2004, he was again informed that the steel

trusses and bars of the PLDT Tower were already being loaded in a truck bound for the junkshop in Naga
City. With the use of a binocular, he was able to personally confirm the report. He immediately called the
PNP Regional Intelligence Group and in a checkpoint set up by the police, the truck was apprehended
with Candelaria and several men aboard. On April 19, 2004, the OIC-Chief of Police of Ocampo,
Camarines Sur filed a criminal complaint for robbery before the MTC of Ocampo, Camarines Sur
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2071 for preliminary investigation. Upon conclusion of the preliminary
investigation and finding probable cause against the accused for robbery, respondent forwarded the
records to the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur for appropriate action. However, the provincial
prosecutor modified the charge of robbery to theft, and the corresponding information was filed with the
RTC, Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. P-3647, presided by Judge
Malanyaon. The latter, finding no probable cause, dismissed the case against complainant and likewise
ordered the arresting officer to adduce additional evidence against the remaining accused for
determination of judicial probable cause. Having failed to do so, Judge Malanyaon dismissed Criminal
Case No. P-3647. Persons motivated with ill-will against him were just making a failed and porous
connection to the alleged treasure hunting activity. If respondent was subsequently seen at Zone 2, Del
Rosario, Ocampo, Camarines Sur after the apprehension of those involved in the looting at the PLDT
Tower, it was because he was then conducting the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 2071
having inquisitorial authority to extend his investigation on the area. The complainant's surmise that he is
the mastermind of the alleged treasure hunting of the group of Sumalde was based on the alleged
information relayed to complainant by Myrna Dacer, Daisy Moran, Salvacion Candelaria, Analiza
Candelaria, and Mary Ann Candelaria. Complainant imputed bias against him when he did not inhibit
from conducting the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 2071 despite prior knowledge of the
looting at the PLDT Tower. Prior knowledge of the commission of a crime is not a mandatory ground for
a first level court judge to recuse himself from conducting preliminary investigation. It was just incidental
that he caused the apprehension of the truck loaded with stolen trusses and bars of the PLDT Tower.
Preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial function of an MTC judge. The matter of issuance of a
warrant of arrest is discretionary and judicial in nature which is authorized under the rules. If ever
complainant perceived that irregularities attended the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, he has
all available judicial remedies, such as filing a motion to quash warrant of
arrest, habeas corpus proceedings, or certiorari, but none was availed of by complainant despite being
represented and assisted by a retained counsel. Under the Rules, the result/recommendation of the
investigating judge during the preliminary investigation is subject to review or appropriate action by the
provincial prosecutor. The finding of probable cause against the accused in Criminal Case No. 2071 was
sustained by the provincial prosecutor of Camarines Sur upon review, although the recommended charge
of robbery was modified to theft. The dismissal by Judge Malanyaon of the information for theft finding
that no probable cause exists should not militate or be taken against him. He discharged his duties as
investigating judge regularly with faithful adherence to the law and the rules, and he acted in good faith
and without malice in his conduct of the preliminary investigation. The Sangguniang Bayan of Ocampo,
Camarines Sur, rendered a committee report stating that an ocular inspection had been conducted on the
alleged site of treasure hunting and they were able to confirm that it was indeed a fishpond loaded with so
many growing fish and not a site of treasure hunting.
In the Agenda Report,3 the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its evaluation and
recommendation, to wit:
EVALUATION:
xxxx

The complainant, in branding the respondent Judge as the mastermind of the alleged treasure hunting
activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur, relied heavily on the narrations of and affidavits executed by Myrna
Dacer, Daisy Moran, Salvacion Candelaria, Analiza and Mary Ann Candelaria. Clearly, these
narrations/affidavits are not based on the complainant's own personal knowledge but rather on the
personal knowledge of the said persons. The same are, thus, considered hearsay because their probative
force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other tha[n] the
complainant. (Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, April 3, 2001). For being hearsay, the same are
insufficient and inconclusive to determine the participation of the respondent Judge in the alleged treasure
hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur. In this light, the complainant failed to submit substantial
evidence to support his imputation that the respondent Judge is the mastermind behind the treasure
hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the issuance of warrant of arrest, such issue is judicial and may be best resolved through
judicial adjudication. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Judge, if there are irregularities in the
issuance of warrant against the complainant, the latter has all available judicial remedies, such as filing a
motion to quash, an action for habeas corpus, or a special civil action for certiorari. However, the
complainant chose not to avail of any judicial remedy.
To merit disciplinary sanction, the error or mistake committed by a judge should be patent, gross,
malicious, deliberate, or done in bad faith and absent a clear showing that the judge has acted errantly; the
issue becomes judicial in character and would not properly warrant the imposition of administrative
punishment (Godinez vs. Alano, 303 SCRA 259).
At any rate, the respondent Judge followed the letter of the law, specifically Rule 112, Section 6,
paragraph b,when, prior to the issuance of warrant of arrest against the complainant, he personally
conducted preliminary examination in the form of searching questions and answers on witness Jose Credo
and upon finding probable cause and the necessity to place the complainant under custody in order [not]
to frustrate the ends of justice.
Anent the respondent Judge's failure to inhibit himself in conducting the preliminary investigation in
Criminal Case No. 2071, he violated Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (now Canon 3, Section 5
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct) for taking part in a proceeding where he has personal knowledge of
the disputed evidentiary facts. Respondent Judge admitted having prior knowledge of the looting and
dismantling of the PLDT Tower in Ocampo, Camarines Sur. As a matter of fact, he was able to visually
confirm the said activities which he later relayed to the local PNP and led to the arrest of the principal
accused in the said case. [The] Judge still conducted the preliminary investigation.
It should be noted, however, that while no motion for inhibition of respondent judge was filed by the
complainant during the preliminary investigation stage of the case, this does not mean that respondent can
freely act on the same despite the lingering doubt created in the minds of the parties that he would not be
impartial in his judgment.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or
valid reasons other than those mentioned above. While the first paragraph of Article 137 provides for the
specific grounds for disqualification and gives the judicial officer no discretion to sit in a case, the second
paragraph leaves the matter of inhibition to the sound discretion of the judge (People vs. Serrano, 203
SCRA 17).

It does not explicitly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition but provides a broad policy-oriented
ground for disqualification of judges for just and valid reasons other than those enumerated in the first
paragraph (Geotina vs. Gonzales, 41 SCRA 66).
The judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case for just
and valid reasons (Parayno vs. Meneses, 231 SCRA 807) other than those mentioned in Rule 137, Section
1. The ultimate test in determining the validity of the court's inhibition is whether or not the petitioner is
deprived of fair and impartial trial (Associacion de Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay
Milling Co., Inc., 88 SCRA 294) and the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court are our
recommendations that:
1. The instant matter be re-docketed as a regular administrative case;
2. Judge Manuel E. Contreras, Municipal Trial Court of Ocampo, Camarines Sur be admonished
for violation of Canon 3, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct with a warning that
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
On September 5, 2006 and September 26, 2006, complainant and respondent manifested their willingness
to submit the case for decision/ resolution based on the pleadings filed, respectively.
We agree with the findings of the OCA except that respondent should be reprimanded instead of being
merely admonished.
Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.4
The issue of whether a judge should voluntarily inhibit himself is addressed to his sound discretion
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, which provides that a judge may, in the
exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for a just or valid reason other
than those mentioned in the first paragraph.5
However, respondent failed to consider the proscription under Rule
3.12(a) of Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
Rule 3.12. - A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably
be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.
In Oktubre v. Velasco,6 citing Perez v. Suller,7 we held that the rule on disqualification of judges under
Rule 3.12 and Section 1, Rule 137 [S]tems from the principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent. A Judge should not handle a case in which he might be

perceived to be susceptible to bias and partiality. The rule is intended to preserve the peoples faith and
confidence in the courts of justice.8
True, a judge should possess proficiency in law so that he can competently construe and enforce the law.
However, it is more important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him
have confidence in his impartiality. Indeed, even conduct that gives rise to the mere appearance of
partiality is proscribed.9
Records reveal that respondent had prior knowledge of the looting and dismantling at the PLDT Tower in
Ocampo, Camarines Sur and he was instrumental in the apprehension of the robbers. Respondent should
have been aware of the impropriety of conducting the preliminary investigation considering that Rule
3.12(a), Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge from taking part in proceedings where
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Respondent ignored said rule, warranting
disciplinary sanction from this Court.
Respondent's averment that prior knowledge of the commission of a crime is not a mandatory ground for
the first level court judge to recuse himself from conducting preliminary investigation, holds no water. As
a judge, respondent must keep himself abreast with the law. He should have known that it is well
entrenched in the Code of Judicial Conduct, prevailing at that time, that personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding disqualifies him from taking part in such proceeding as the
same would necessarily spawn a perception that he is bias and impartial. It is of no moment that the
finding of probable cause was sustained by the provincial prosecutor. What is of paramount importance is
the perceived bias and impartiality by the complainant against respondent in his conduct of the
preliminary investigation due to respondent's prior knowledge of the looting at the PLDT Tower,
respondent being instrumental in the apprehension of the robbers.
Although respondent should have inhibited himself from conducting the preliminary investigation, it did
not render as void the act of respondent in issuing a warrant of arrest. He acted within the bounds of the
then existing Section 6(b), Rule 112 10 of the Rules of Court which provides, inter alia, that without
waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after an
examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
The OCA rightly observed that respondent followed the letter of the existing Rule, when, prior to the
issuance of warrant of arrest against complainant, respondent personally conducted preliminary
examination in the form of searching questions and answers on witness Credo. The purpose of issuing the
warrant of arrest was to place the respondents under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends
of justice.11 Whether it is necessary to place the accused in custody is left to the judges sound judgment. 12
Moreover, the OCA correctly sustained respondents claim that if ever complainant perceived that
irregularities attended the issuance of warrant of arrest against him, he has all available judicial
remedies,13 such as filing a motion to quash warrant of arrest, habeas corpus proceedings, or certiorari,
but none was availed of by complainant.
In Lumbos v. Baliguat,14 we held that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are
not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. 15 To hold, otherwise,
would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in
the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 16 An inquiry into the administrative

liability of a judge may be resorted to only after the available remedies have been exhausted and decided
with finality.17 For until there is a final declaration by the appellate court that the challenged order or
judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether respondent is
administratively liable.18 The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. 19 Thus,
not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless
he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. 20Good faith and absence
of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge x x x can
find refuge.21
Anent the allegation that respondent is the mastermind behind the treasure hunting activities in Ocampo,
Camarines Sur, we find the allegation to be devoid of merit.
In Espaol v. Mupas,22 we held that in administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of
proving by substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints. Thus, when the complainant relies
mainly on second-hand information to prove the charges against the respondent, the complaint is reduced
into a bare indictment or mere speculation. 23 The Court cannot give credence to charges based on mere
suspicion or speculation. In this case, complainant failed to discharge that burden. As aptly observed by
the OCA, complainant has no personal knowledge of the treasure hunting by respondent as he relied only
on the information relayed to him by the relatives of the accused Candelaria in the robbery case.
Furthermore, we find that the affidavits of Myrna Dacer, Daisy Moran, Salvacion Candelaria, Analiza
Candelaria, and Mary Ann Candelaria relate to the incident surrounding the arrest of Dante Dacer, one of
the accused in the robbery case. The police blotter which is not even a certified true copy is an alleged
threat made by respondent against Mary Ann Candelaria. Nowhere in the said documents do we find that
respondent was being tagged as the mastermind of the treasure hunting. Taken all together, these
documents have no prima facie evidentiary value as to warrant further investigation on the matter.
In Mataga v. Rosete,24 we held that any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be
examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are by their nature highly penal, such
that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. Mere imputation of
judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the same will never be countenanced. 25 If
a judge should be disciplined for misconduct, the evidence against him should be competent. 26
In fine, we find that respondent is merely guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct in not recusing
himself from conducting preliminary investigation.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Manuel E. Contreras, MTC, Ocampo, Camarines Sur guilty of
violation of Rule 3.12(a), Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and is REPRIMANDED with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

(3) PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or A.C. No. 6323


OLIVARES REALTY
CORPORATION,
Complainants, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
ATTY. ARSENIO C.
VILLALON, JR.,
Respondent. Promulgated:
April 13, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint[1] for disbarment and suspension[2] against respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. by
Pablo R. Olivares and/or Olivares Realty Corporation for violation of Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the rule on forum shopping.
In his complaint, Olivares alleged that respondents client, Sarah Divina Morales Al-Rasheed, repeatedly
sued him for violations of the lease contract which they executed over a commercial apartment in
Olivares Building in Paraaque.[3]
In 1993, Al-Rasheed filed an action for damages and prohibition with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.[4] The case was dismissed for improper venue. [5]
Six years later, on July 1, 1999, Al-Rasheed filed an action for breach of contract with damages in
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274. [6] The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0233, was
dismissed for failure to prosecute. [7] Al-Rasheed, through counsel Atty. Villalon, sought a review of the
order dismissing Civil Case No. 99-0233 but the Court of Appeals did not give due course to her appeal.
[8]
The subsequent petition for review on certiorari filed in the Supreme Court was likewise denied. [9]
On January 29, 2004, Al-Rasheed re-filed the 1999 suit in the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque,
Branch 274[10]where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 0J-04-009. [11] It was dismissed on the grounds
of res judicata and prescription.[12]
Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he was only performing his legal obligation as a
lawyer to protect and prosecute the interests of his client. [13] He denied that he was forum shopping as his
client, in her certificate of non-forum shopping, [14] disclosed the two previous cases involving the same
cause of action which had been filed and dismissed. [15] Respondent further claims he could not refuse his
clients request to file a new case because Al-Rasheed was the oppressed party in the transaction. [16]

This Court referred the complaint, together with respondents comment, to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [17]
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP found that respondent assisted Al-Rasheed
in repeatedly suing Olivares for the same cause of action and subject matter. [18] It opined that respondent
should have noted that the 1999 case was dismissed for lack of interest to prosecute. [19] Under Rule 17,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court, such dismissal had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. [20] The
CBD recommended the suspension of respondent for six months with a warning that any similar
infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely.[21]
The IBP adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the proscription on forum shopping. It, however,
modified the recommended penalty to reprimand.[22]
We adopt the findings of the IBP except its recommendation as to the penalty.
All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty formality.
When they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice. They accept the
sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. [23] As the first Canon of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states, [a] lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes. [24] Moreover, according to the lawyers oath they took, lawyers should
not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent
to the same.[25]
With all this in mind, respondent should have refrained from filing the second complaint against
Olivares. He ought to have known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice since it had the effect of
an adjudication on the merits. There was no excuse not to know this elementary principle of procedural
law.
The facts of this case reveal that Atty. Villalon purposely filed the second complaint. Respondent
appealed the 1999 case to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court. Both actions were
dismissed for lack of merit, not on mere technicality. The certificate of non-forum shopping attached to
the 2004 complaint disclosed that Al-Rasheed previously sued Olivares for violating their lease contract.
As if such disclosure was a sufficient justification, Atty. Villalon unapologetically reproduced his
1999[26] arguments and assertions in the 2004[27] complaint. Respondent obviously knew the law and tried
to go around it. This Court therefore concludes that respondent willfully violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12
which provides that:
A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Furthermore, he violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.
A lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice. [28] Lawyers
have the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Filing multiple actions
constitutes an abuse of the Courts processes. It constitutes improper conduct that tends to impede,
obstruct and degrade justice. Those who file multiple or repetitive actions subject themselves to

disciplinary action for incompetence or willful violation of their duties as attorneys to act with all good
fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions that appear to be just and consistent with truth and
honor.[29]
Everything considered, this Court finds that a reprimand is insufficient and rules instead that
CBDs recommendation for a six-month suspension from the practice of law to be more commensurate to
the violation committed. However, in view of respondents death on September 27, 2006, [30] the penalty
can no longer be imposed on him. This development has, in effect, rendered this disciplinary case moot
and academic.
SO ORDERED.

(4) FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA, A.C. No. 7298

Complainant, [Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565]


- versus ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO,
Promulgated:
June 25, 2007
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
R E S O LUTI O N
TINGA, J.:
In this administrative complaint, a lawyer is charged with violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand letter the contents of which threatened
complainant with the filing of criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents.
Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal counsel for Grace C. Hufana in an illegal
dismissal case before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Sometime in August 2005,
complainant Fernando Martin O. Pena, as President of MOF Company, Inc. (Subic), received a notice
from the Conciliation and Mediation Center of the NLRC for a mediation/conciliation conference. In the
conference, respondent, in behalf of his client, submitted a claim for separation pay arising from her
alleged illegal dismissal. Complainant rejected the claim as being baseless. Complainant thereafter sent
notices to Hufana for the latter to explain her absences and to return to work. In reply to this return to
work notice, respondent wrote a letter to complainant reiterating his clients claim for separation pay. The
letter also contained the following threat to the company:
BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and claim
bigger amounts including moral damages to the tune of millions under established
precedence of cases and laws. In addition to other multiple charges like:
1.

Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the


government.
2.
Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion
3.
Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents
4.
Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.
These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above amounts as
settlements in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). [1]

Believing that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted ethical standards, complainant
filed an administrative complaint[2] with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). Respondent filed an Answer with Impleader (Motion to Dismiss and Counterclaims)
[3]
claiming that Atty. Emmanuel A. Jocson, complainants legal counsel, also played an important part in
imputing the malicious, defamatory, and fabricated charges against him. Respondent also pointed out that
the complaint had no certification against forum shopping and was motivated only to confuse the issues
then pending before the Labor Arbiter. By way of counterclaim, respondent asked for damages and for the
disbarment of Atty. Jocson. Respondent also asked the IBP to endorse the prosecution of Atty. Jocson for
Usurpation of Public Functions[4]and for violation of the Notarial Law.[5]
A mandatory conference was held on 6 December 2005 but respondent failed to appear.[6] Both
parties were thereafter required to submit their position papers.
The Report and Recommendation[7] of Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan found
that complainant, failed to file his position paper and to comply with Administrative Circular No. 04-94
requiring a certificate against forum shopping and, accordingly, recommended the dismissal of the
complaint against respondent. On 26 May 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.[8] On 10 July 2006, the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline transmitted to the Supreme Court the notice of said Resolution and the records of the
case.[9] Thereafter, on 18 August 2006, respondent filed with the IBP a Motion for Reconsideration (for
Modification of Decision)[10] reiterating his claim of damages against complainant in the amount of four
hundred million pesos (P400,000,000.00), or its equivalent in dollars, for filing the false, malicious,
defamers [sic], fraudulent, illegal fabricators [sic], malevolent[,] oppressive, evasive filing [of] a
groundless and false suit.[11]
Complainant thereafter filed this Petition for Review (of the Resolution of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline)[12] alleging that he personally submitted and filed with the IBP his position paper, after
serving a copy thereof on respondent by registered mail. He further alleges that he was deprived of his
right to due process when the IBP dismissed his complaint without considering his position paper and
without ruling on the merits thereof.
Complainant accordingly prays for the reversal and setting aside of the 26 May 2006
Resolution[13] of the IBP Board of Governors and the remand of the case to the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline for proper adjudication and disposition on the merits.
Based on the records, there is truth to complainants assertion that he filed his position paper on 21
December 2005, after serving a copy of the same to respondent. The IBP stamp on the front page of said
document shows that it was received by the IBP on 21 December 2005. The registry receipt attached to
the same document also shows that it was sent by registered mail to respondent on the same date. [14]
Complainant, however, omitted to offer any explanation in his petition before this Court for his
failure to attach a certification against forum shopping in his complaint against respondent.
The requirement of a certification against forum shopping was originally required by Circular No.
28-91, dated 8 February 1994, issued by this Court for every petition filed with the Court or the Court of
Appeals. Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 1 April 1994, expanded the certification
requirement to include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below this Court and the Court of
Appeals.Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and (2) of Administrative Circular No. 0494 to become Section 5, Rule 7 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [15] Said rule states that a violation thereof would constitute contempt of
court and be cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions without prejudice to the taking of
appropriate action against the counsel of the party concerned. [16]
The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors took against complainant his
failure to attach the certification against forum shopping to his complaint and consequently dismissed his
complaint. This Court, however, disagrees and, accordingly, grants the petition. However, a remand of the
case to the IBP would unduly prolong its adjudication.
The Courts determination is anchored on the sui generis nature of disbarment proceedings, the
reasons for the certification against forum shopping requirement, complainants subsequent compliance
with the requirement, and the merit of complainants complaint against respondent.
The Court, in the case of In re Almacen,[17] dwelt on the sui generis character of disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, thus:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather
an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended
to
inflict
punishment,
it
is
in
no
sense
a
criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may
be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the
real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such.Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of
an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.[18] [Emphasis supplied]
In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against forum shopping to be
attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such proceedings, must refer to another
administrative case for disciplinary proceedings against the same respondent, because such other
proceedings or action is one that necessarily involves the same issues as the one posed in the disbarment
complaint to which the certification is supposedly to be attached.
Further, the rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping is to apprise
the Court of the pendency of another action or claim involving the same issues in another court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency, and thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation. Filing multiple
petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes, [19] which tends to degrade the administration
of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily
burdened dockets of the courts. [20] Furthermore, the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote
candor and transparency among lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to
promote the orderly administration of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and save
the precious time of the courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or
agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same issue. [21]

It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of attaching a certification against
forum shopping to a disbarment complaint. It would seem that the scenario sought to be avoided, i.e., the
filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely happens in disbarment
complaints considering that said proceedings are either taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. [22] Thus, if the
complainant in a disbarment case fails to attach a certification against forum shopping, the pendency of
another disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be ascertained with ease. We have
previously held that the rule requiring a certification of forum shopping to accompany every initiatory
pleading, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedurewhich is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.[23]
At any rate, complainants subsequent compliance with the requirement cured the supposed defect
in the original complaint. The records show that complainant submitted the required certification against
forum shopping on 6 December 2006 when he filed his Comment/Opposition to respondents Motion to
Dismiss the present petition.
Finally, the intrinsic merit of complainants case against respondent justifies the grant of the
present petition. Respondent does not deny authorship of the threatening letter to complainant, even
spiritedly contesting the charge that the letter is unethical.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall represent his client
with zeal within the bounds of the law, reminding legal practitioners that a lawyers duty is not to his client
but to the administration of justice; to that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. [24] In particular, Rule 19.01
commands that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to
obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or
threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client
designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the
lawyers client.[25]
In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his
letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement,
he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax
evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of
laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail.
Blackmail is the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or
opposition in the public prints,obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making
an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice. In common
parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the exaction of
money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence.
Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to
conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim. [26]
In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr.,[27] we held that [a]n accusation for blackmail and extortion is a
very serious one which, if properly substantiated, would entail not only respondents disbarment from the
practice of law, but also a possible criminal prosecution. [28] While the respondent in Boyboy was
exonerated for lack of evidence, the same may not be said of respondent in the present case for he admits
to writing the offensive letter.

In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the same as merely an
act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the other party, and, with boldness, asserting that a
lawyer is under obligation to tell the truth, to report to the government commission of offenses punishable
by the State.[29] He further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition and
that our laws allow and encourage the settlement of disputes.
Respondents assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that respondents threat to
file the cases against complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the latter to give in to
his clients demands. It was not respondents intention to point out complainants violations of the law as he
so gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to keep silent about the said
violations if payment of the claim is made on the date indicated.
Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is
usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the
principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his clients
claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring payment
within a specified period. However, the letter in this case contains more than just a simple demand to pay.
It even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant which have nothing to do with his
clients claim for separation pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure leverage to compel
complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged communication rule under
which a private communication executed in the performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The
privileged nature of the letter was removed when respondent used it to blackmail complainant and extort
from the latter compliance with the demands of his client.
However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we hold that disbarment is
too severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent, considering that he wrote the same out of his
overzealousness to protect his clients interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty is reprimand.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The 26 May 2006 Resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is
hereby found liable for violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and is accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

(5)
MA. LUISA HADJULA,
Complainant,

- versus -

A.C. No. 6711


Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
*
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:

ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA,


Respondent.

July 3, 2007

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 of the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint for disbarment filed by herein complainant Ma. Luisa Hadjula
against respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda.
The case started when, in an AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT[1] bearing date September 7, 2002 and filed with
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant charged Atty. Roceles F. Madianda with violation of
Article 209[2] of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In said affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both
worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officer while she
was the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed that, sometime in
1998, she approached respondent for some legal advice. Complainant further alleged that, in the course of
their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and
produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be informed
later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious,
so complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had already heard
her secrets.
Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with respondent soured after her filing, in the later
part of 2000, of criminal and disciplinary actions against the latter. What, per complainants account,
precipitated the filing was when respondent, then a member of the BFP promotion board, demanded a
cellular phone in exchange for the complainants promotion.
According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid actions, filed a
COUNTER COMPLAINT[3] with the Ombudsman charging her (complainant) with violation of Section
3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019,[4] falsification of public documents and immorality, the last two charges
being based on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on the basis of the same

disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted against her before the
Professional Regulation Commission.
Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latters act of disclosing
personal secrets and confidential information she revealed in the course of seeking respondents legal
advice.
In an order dated October 2, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required respondent to file her
answer to the complaint.
In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT,[5] respondent denied giving legal advice to the
complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between
them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed confidential data and sensitive documents
adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge in the BFP. The relevant portions of the answer
read:
5. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in
paragraph 4 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT for reason that she never WAS MY
CLIENT nor we ever had any LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP that ever existed
ever since and that never obtained any legal advice from me regarding her PERSONAL
PROBLEMS or PERSONAL SECRETS. She likewise never delivered to me legal
documents much more told me some confidential information or secrets. That is because
I never entertain LEGAL QUERIES or CONSULTATION regarding PERSONAL
MATTERS since I know as a LAWYER of the Bureau of Fire Protection that I am not
allowed to privately practice law and it might also result to CONFLICT OF
INTEREST.As a matter of fact, whenever there will be PERSONAL MATTERS referred
to me, I just referred them to private law practitioners and never entertain the same, NOR
listen to their stories or examine or accept any document.
9. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in
paragraph 8 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT, the truth of the matter is that her ILLICIT
RELATIONSHIP and her illegal and unlawful activities are known in the Bureau of Fire
Protection since she also filed CHILD SUPPORT case against her lover where she has a
child .
Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS she purportedly have shown to me
sometime in 1998, are all part of public records .
Furthermore, F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA, is filing the instant case just
to get even with me or to force me to settle and withdraw the CASES I FILED AGAINST
HER since she knows that she will certainly be DISMISSED FROM SERVICE,
REMOVED FROM THE PRC ROLL and CRIMINALLY CONVICTED of her ILLICIT,
IMMORAL, ILLEGAL and UNLAWFUL ACTS.

On October 7, 2004, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline came out
with a Report and Recommendation, stating that the information related by complainant to the respondent
is protected under the attorney-client privilege communication. Prescinding from this postulate, the
Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have violated legal ethics when she [revealed]

information given to her during a legal consultation, and accordingly recommended that respondent be
reprimanded therefor, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent
Atty. Roceles Madianda be reprimanded for revealing the secrets of the complainant.
On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 reading as
follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and , finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering the actuation of revealing information given to respondent during a
legal consultation, Atty. Roceles Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED.
We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises holding it together.
As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a friend, to
bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice and assistance. The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal
advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon
the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the
relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential
information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day, not
inclined to handle the clients case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no
formal professional engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it make any difference that no contract
whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the relationship. As we said inBurbe v. Magulta,
[6]
A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advise regarding the formers business. To
constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the
attorney professionally on any previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his
service had been sought.
It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a
lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional
employments is established.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal
relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of the formers
fees.

Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-client privilege
communication, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by
himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived. [7]
With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached his duty of preserving the confidence of a
client. As found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the documents shown and the information
revealed in confidence to the respondent in the course of the legal consultation in question, were used as
bases in the criminal and administrative complaints lodged against the complainant.
The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach of
confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.
The seriousness of the respondents offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for
compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to
condone the error of respondents ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends
becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever
convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information respondent
gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the score. At the end
of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps
realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on
confidentiality.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED and
admonished to be circumspect in her handling of information acquired as a result of a lawyer-client
relationship. She is also STERNLY WARNED against a repetition of the same or similar act complained
of.
SO ORDERED.

(6)
JOSELANO GUEVARRA,
Complainant,

versus

ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL


EALA,
Respondent.

A.C. No. 7136


PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 1, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment[1] before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel
M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the
lawyers oath.
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann)
Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March
2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read I
love you, I miss you, or Meet you at Megamall.
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the
morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her
whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her
work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On
the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday celebration at which he saw her
and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he

left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all
her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words I Love
You on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day
of his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, youll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a
prayer for you that you may find meaning in what youre about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience
eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because
theres a bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly
possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to
YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the
time we spent together, up to the final moments of your single life.But more importantly,
I will love you until the life in me is gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a
lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU
WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS
ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS IM LIVING
MY TWEETIE YOULL BE![2]
Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street,
New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also
learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002together with respondent
during a concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the abovequoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS
RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the
third week of September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the Wine All You Can

promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B


at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila
Standard issue
of 24
September
2001,
on
page
21. Respondent
and
Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned: Irene with Sportscaster
Noli Eala. A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C. [4](Italics and emphasis in
the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting their adulterous relationship
supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4.
Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the
matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the
immediate members of their respective families , and that Respondent, as far as the
general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary
Anne Tantoco.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondents adulterous conduct with the complainants wife and his
apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral
depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his
aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a piece of paper.Morally reprehensible
was his writing the love letter to complainants bride on the very day of her wedding,
vowing to continue his love for her until we are together again, as now they are.
[6]
(Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the
Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral
depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being
that Respondents relationship with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and
that as far as his relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with
[his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary
Anne is aware of Respondents special friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution
of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his
reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between
Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of
the marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the
laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the
foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).[9]
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
19. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a
lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the
complainants wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family,
broke up the complainants marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the
legal profession.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the
Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with
respect to his purely personal and low profile special relationship with Irene is
neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court.[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To respondents ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,[12] alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl
and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girls father. Complainant attached to
the REPLY, as Annex A, a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth [13] bearing Irenes signature and naming
respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14,
2002 at St. Lukes Hospital.
Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS [14] dated January
10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth
attached to the complainants Reply.[15] Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of
a civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for
adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainants Complaint-Affidavit
and REPLY to ANSWER were adopted as his testimony on direct examination. [16] Respondents counsel
did not cross-examine complainant.[17]
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION[18]dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent
sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:


Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution
dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE,
the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE
the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit. [20] (Italics and emphasis in
the original)
Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c),
Rule 139[22] of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its
above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment [23] on the present petition of complainant, that there is no
evidence against him.[24] The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. C) and
the news item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. D), even taken together do not
sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with
complainants wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support the
accusation of complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent
through counsel made the following statements to wit: Respondent specifically
denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in
paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship
was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective
families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of
the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the
respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene
is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct . . .

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there


is indeed a special relationship between him and complainants wife, Irene,
[which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise
Irene Moje (Annex H-1) sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child
Samantha. In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that
complainants wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the father
of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with
Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored
that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha
Louise Irene Moje.[25] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship
with Irene, adultery being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that committed by any
married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has
carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void.
[26]
(Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it
was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families.
In other words, respondents denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was
directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which
carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in
the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the
words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held
that thequalifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.
[27]
(Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of having personal knowledge of Irenes daughter
Samantha Louise Irene Mojes Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a
lawyer, 38 years old as the childs father. And the phrase NOT MARRIED is entered on the desired
information on DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE. A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene
in the certificate[28] with her signature on the Marriage Certificate [29] shows that they were affixed by one
and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never
denied being the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Lukes Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit[30] which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the
Certificate of Live Birth that the childs father is Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who was 38 years old and
a lawyer.[31]
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently
proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the
other[32] which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or
suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that is required.[33] (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was
not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or
other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as
an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall
be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),
under scandalous circumstances.[34]
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the
phrase grossly immoral conduct, not under scandalous circumstances. Sexual intercourse under
scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the
conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances,
with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman
elsewhere.

Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage
should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on the surrounding circumstances. [35] The
case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It
is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of
this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36]
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extramarital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is
not so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree in order to merit disciplinary sanction.We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual
relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative
sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital
vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under
penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as
it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. [37] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:[38]
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent
did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this
administrative case substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as
well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on
an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of
an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This
detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the
treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.
[39]
(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before admission to practice law which
goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the
Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of
the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional
provision, obligates the husband and the wife to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.[40]
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the
IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation[41]on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainants
petition for nullity of his (complainants) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed
against respondent and Irene based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case, which was pending
review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of
complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainants Motion to
Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the
petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of
Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that notwithstanding the
perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is
finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no
appeal has been taken.[42] (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took placebefore the marriage was declared null and void. [43] As a
lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [44] In carrying
on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant
was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution
held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly
omitted to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for
Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003reversing the
dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutors Office of complainants complaint for adultery. In reversing the
City Prosecutors Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair
estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of
adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to
complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when

complainant confronted her about Ealas frequent phone calls and text messages to
her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married
to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another
woman. Moreover, Mojes eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after
complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit
relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent
by Mojes subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City,
which was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows
with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially
since Ealas vehicle and that of Mojes were always seen there. Moje herself admits that
she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held
office. The happenstance that it was in that said address thatEala and Moje had decided to
hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one,
the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all
throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both respondents love nest, to
put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later
when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Lukes Medical Center. What
finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of
birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all
too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the
respondents. Complainants supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most
certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any
categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.
[45]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus
leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainants motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if
respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed
in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to
these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal
law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different
capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case[47] (Italics in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28,
2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct,
violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the
Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.

(7) JUAN DE LA CRUZ A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043


(CONCERNED CITIZEN OF
LEGAZPI CITY),
Complainant, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
JUDGE RUBEN B. CARRETAS,
Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Legazpi City,
Branch 9,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 5, 2007
x---------------------------------------------------x
R E S O LUTI O N
CORONA, J.:
This administrative case stems from an anonymous complaint by Juan de la Cruz, a concerned
citizen of Legazpi City, against respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas, presiding judge of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 9. The letter-complaint [1] read:
The Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court
and The Honorable Court Administrator
Supreme Court, Manila
Sir and Madam,
Kami po ay sumulat sa inyo dahil po sa reklamo sa masamang ugali at asal ni Judge
Ruben Car[r]etas ng RTC, Branch 9, Legazpi City.
Siya po ay isang mayabang na Judge at mahilig mang insulto sa pamamagitan ng side
comments sa mga testigo, abogado at fiscal, parang siya na lang ang may alam sa batas.
Bilang Judge siya na po ang nagdirect, at cross-examine sa mga testigo.
Dahil sa kanyang ginagawa napapahiya ang mga testigo, abogado at fiscal sa harap
ng publiko. Nawawala din po ang respeto ng publiko sa justice system.
Kami po ay umaasa at nanalangin sa madaliang aksyon ng inyong opisina para
malutas ang problemang ito.
Salamat at mabuhay po kayong lahat.
Ang gumagalang,

(Sgd. Juan de la Cruz)


Concern[ed] citizen of Legazpi [City]
In his comment,[2] respondent judge surmised that the complaint was initiated by a lawyer whose
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was not granted. He denied the accusation and claimed that
he had not insulted anyone. He then narrated that, in his first few months in office, he experienced the
following exasperating and somewhat amusing incidents: a lawyer insisting on further examining a
witness he had already subjected to re-cross examination; a prosecutor proceeding with the presentation
of evidence when the accused had not yet been arraigned; a lawyer appearing for an absent counsel de
parte and manifesting that he was appearing in corroboration with the latter; lawyers appearing without
observing the proper dress code; a lawyer offering the testimony of his witness to collaborate the
testimony of another witness; a lawyer manifesting that he was ready for trial but turning out to be
unprepared with his documentary evidence, prompting the court to call a recess; a case for unjust vexation
committed against a minor being raffled to his sala when the records showed that the victim was waylaid,
boxed and dragged to a forested area where the accused touched her private part and mashed her breasts;
a case being filed for kidnapping and serious illegal detention only despite the fact that the girl was raped
while in captivity. Respondent judge stated that he never encountered these mistakes in all his years of
law practice in Manila. Thus, he was shocked because he thought that these things happened only in
anecdotes.
Respondent judge observed that due to their familiarity with each other, lawyers appearing in his sala
hardly objected even to obviously objectionable questions. In such instances, he called the attention of
counsels because, to his mind, they were making a moro-moro[3] out of the proceedings.
Respondent judge also stated that, while he may have used harsh word sometimes, they were
made out of exasperation and with the intention merely to right the wrong committed in his presence, not
to insult anyone. Nonetheless, he apologized to those who may have been offended by his remarks.
In connection with the complaint, Judge Romeo S. Daas, executive judge of the RTC of Legazpi
City, conducted a discreet investigation. [4]He interviewed lawyers who appeared in the sala of respondent
judge. He requested them to submit their respective written comments on the decorum of respondent
judge when holding trial. Among these comments were the following:
1. Atty. Mariano B. Baranda, Jr.
Respondent judge should avoid making embarrassing, insulting and abrasive
remarks. He should also limit himself to asking clarificatory questions. [5]
2. Atty. Expedito P. Nebres
If not in open court respondent judge is kind, courteous and respectful.
However, in open court he is arrogant and boastful. He has a bad habit in making
embarrassing or insulting remarks when presiding over cases. Most of the time, he was
the one conducting direct and cross-examination of witnesses. He used to scold, harass
and embarrass witnesses, litigants, lawyers, prosecutors and PAO [6] lawyers for just a
slight mistake in procedure.[7]
3. Atty. Alexis C. Albao
In the course of presentation of evidence for his client, he was insulted and
subjected to sarcastic remarks by respondent judge, not once but for several occasions.
This traumatized him and made him avoid reading the transcript of stenographic notes

of the said hearing until now. In one occasion, respondent judge proceeded to cut short
the proceedings. When he manifested that he would cross-examine the defendant,
respondent judge stood from his seat and in a sarcastic manner looked backward
manifesting that he was not interested or not listening to the cross-examination. Thus, he
was discouraged from proceeding with his cross-examination. Most of the time,
respondent judge would unduly intervene in the presentation of evidence and asked
more questions than counsel. Respondent judge showed apathy to those who were
subjected to his insults. He insisted that others submit to his way of doing things. He
showed inflexibility to minor mistakes.[8]
4. Atty. Ricardo V. de Jesus
While he was in the process of conducting direct examination, respondent judge
instructed him to ask questions which respondent judge thought to be material. When he
was through with his direct examination, respondent judge asked him in open court how
long he had been in private practice. He replied that he had been practicing for only a
period of one and a half (1) years. Respondent judge then told him to prepare supposed
direct questions and expected answers. He felt embarrassed. [9]
On October 6, 2005, the members of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Albay held a meeting to
discuss the matter of assigning a public prosecutor to the sala of respondent judge. During the meeting,
the prosecutors raised their concern about the behavior of respondent judge. Provincial prosecutor
Benigno L. Tolosa furnished Judge Daas with a copy of the minutes of the meeting. [10] The relevant
portions of the minutes[11] were:
II.

DISCUSSION
The Provincial Prosecutor informed the group about the purpose of the
meeting. He said that the prosecutor assigned in RTC Branch 9, Prosecutor
Maria Miranda-Gojar will soon be transferring to the Office of the Regional
State Prosecutor. He asked suggestions from the group on how to go about
the matter of assigning a prosecutor in Branch 9 considering that all
prosecutors have their own court assignment and considering further that
the Presiding Judge of said Branch has a behavioral and attitudinal
problem.
Considering that the matter to be discussed involves the problem with the
Presiding Judge, the Provincial Prosecutor requested those prosecutors
[present] to share their experiences in the court with the Presiding Judge.
Prosecutor [Eduardo B.] Quinzon remarked that the judge has a sudden
burst of temper and wild moods, insulting and humiliating lawyers in front
of their clients even in the presence of other people.
Prosecutor Gojar added that the Presiding Judge has a volatile temper and
is fond of insulting and humiliating witnesses and also lawyers. She also
said that during arraignment or trial of cases, he would even call her
attention and would insult the prosecutor who made the Information and
Resolution of the case and even the Chief who approved the same.

Prosecutor [Maria Teresa A.] Mahiwo added that she observed one
hearing [where] the Presiding Judge [scolded] the two private lawyers who
[were] much older than him. She said that being assigned in Branch 9 will
not be good for the health of any prosecutor.
III.

RECOMMENDATION/AGREEMENT
Prosecutor [Elmer M.] Lanuzo opined that because the judge is
temperamental, he should be given a fiscal who is not temperamental.
It was resolved by the group that no prosecutor will be assigned at RTC
Branch 9 considering that all prosecutors have their own court assignment.
It was also agreed that the Presiding Judge can request from the
Department of Justice a prosecutor who would attend to the cases in his
sala.[12]

Judge Daas also received a letter[13] from city prosecutor Palmarin E. Rubio of Legazpi City. City
prosecutor Rubio stated that the prosecutor assigned to the sala of respondent judge did not want to
comment on the conduct of respondent judge. He suggested that members of an audit team from this
Court be made to observe the proceedings in Branch 9 to see and feel the tension[-]charged atmosphere in
the sala once the trial started.[14]
To his report, Judge Daas attached copies of the comments of the lawyers he interviewed, the
letter of provincial prosecutor Tolosa enclosing the minutes of the meeting of the public prosecutors in
Albay and the letter of city prosecutor Rubio. [15] He concluded that the charges against respondent judge
were true. However, he refrained from recommending any definite action against him and left the matter
to the sound discretion of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). [16]
In its report,[17] the OCA adopted the findings of Judge Daas and made the following
recommendation:
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the
Honorable Court is our recommendation that respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Legazpi City be ADVISED to observe proper judicial
decorum and to conscientiously abide by the mandates of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics in the exercise of his official functions. [18]
We disagree. Respondent judge deserves more than mere advice.
Respondent judge should be reminded of Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 and Section 1, Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary: [19]
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only in the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.

SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but
that it is perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in
the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be
done.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
A judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. He should be learned in the law, dignified in
demeanor, refined in speech and virtuous in character. Besides having the requisite learning in the law, he
must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. [20] In this
connection, he should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court. [21] A judge
who is inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers, litigants or witnesses who appear in his sala
commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to reaffirm the peoples faith in the judiciary. He also violates
Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides:
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses,
lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall
require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their
influence, direction or control.[22] (emphasis supplied)
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, [23] litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of
patience, prudence and restraint.[24]Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. [25] He
must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man
is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness. [26]
Equanimity and judiciousness should be the constant marks of a dispenser of justice. [27] A judge
should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. He
descends to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant when he utters harsh words, snide
remarks or sarcastic comments. As a result, he degrades the judicial office and erodes public confidence
in the judiciary.
Against this backdrop, respondent judge indeed appears arrogant and boastful not only in the eyes
of the anonymous complainant but also to the lawyers who practice in his sala. He revealed a hint of
arrogance in his comment when he professed exasperation over minor procedural mistakes [28] or even
negligible lapses (such as the confusion in the use of collaborate and corroborate). He also displayed a
condescending attitude toward lawyers in the provinces when he implied that they were inferior to
lawyers from Manila. As a judge, he should ensure that his conduct is always above reproach and

perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. He must never show conceit or even an appearance thereof,
or any kind of impropriety.
The dispensation of justice is a joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer.[29] A sense of
shared responsibility which is a crucial factor in the administration of justice is expected of them. [30] They
should co-exist in a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect, not animosity and derision. Respondent
judge antagonized the lawyers (private practitioners, public attorneys and public prosecutors alike)
appearing in his sala by his perceived arrogance and insulting remarks. Consequently, he impaired the
administration of justice.
Respondent judge unduly intervened in the presentation of evidence. He asked more questions
than counsel and conducted direct and cross-examination of witnesses. In so doing, he contravened Rule
3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: [31]
RULE 3.06 While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or
clear up some obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the
trial, it should be borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper
presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.

14. Interference in conduct of trial


While a judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition
and prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, nevertheless, he
should bear in mind that his undue interference, impatience, or participation in the
examination of witnesses, or a severe attitude on his part toward witnesses, especially
those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of trial, may tend to
prevent the proper presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in respect
thereto.
Conversation between the judge and counsel in court is often necessary, but the
judge should be studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of
the dispute between litigants and lead to its unjust disposition. In addressing counsel,
litigants or witnesses, he should avoid a controversial tone.
He should avoid interruptions of counsel in their arguments except to clarify his
mind as to their positions, and he should not be tempted to an unnecessary display of
learning or a premature judgment.
A judge may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent
unnecessary waste of time and clarify obscure and incomplete details in the course of the testimony of the
witness or thereafter.[32] Questions designed to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence are
not improper.[33] But the judge should limit himself to asking clarificatory questions and the power should
be sparingly and judiciously used. The rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible,
neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial. [34] A judge must always maintain cold
neutrality and impartiality for he is a magistrate, not an advocate. [35]

In fine, the over-all conduct of respondent judge has been unbecoming of a magistrate. It is
classified as a light charge [36] for which a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000 may be
imposed.[37]
Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,[38] this administrative case against respondent judge shall also
be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the bar.
Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics
constitutes a breach of Canons 1[39] and 11[40] of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, a judge
who falls short of the ethics of the judicial office tends to diminish the peoples respect for the law and
legal processes. He also fails to observe and maintain the esteem due to the courts and to judicial officers.
Respondent judge also transgressed Canon 8[41] and Rule 8.01[42] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he humiliated, insulted or embarrassed lawyers appearing in his sala. Instead of
establishing a cordial and collaborative atmosphere with lawyers, respondent judge alienated them and
effectively disregarded their significant role in the administration of justice.
Accordingly, respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas is hereby found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a
judge. In particular, he violated Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2, Section 1, Canon 4 and Section 6, Canon 6 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He is FINED in the amount of P7,500.
Respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas is also hereby found GUILTY of violating Canons 1, 8 and 11 and
Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is FINED in the amount of P7,500.
Judge Carretas is further STERNLY WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent judge.
SO ORDERED.

(8) MANUEL L. LEE, A.C. No. 5281

Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
February 12, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
R E S O LUTI O N
CORONA, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty.
Regino B. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for
notarizing a spurious last will and testament.
In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never
executed the contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano
Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to its execution.
In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee,
save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965.
Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificate [2] of the testator noted in the
acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962. [3] Furthermore, the signature of the testator was
not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donation [4] (containing his purported genuine
signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the deed of
donation were in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed from (sic) one another in all angle[s]. [5]
[1]

Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported
witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied
from their respective voters affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives
division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the
Arts (NCCA). In this connection, the certification of the chief of the archives division dated September
19, 1999 stated:
Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT executed by
BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30, 1965 and is available in thisOffice[s] files.[6]
Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the complaint against him contained
false allegations: (1) that complainant was a son of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the will in
question was fake and spurious. He alleged that complainant was not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr.
and the last will and testament was validly executed and actually notarized by respondent per

affidavit[7] of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by the joint
affidavit[8] of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N. Lee, Jr. xxx. [9]
Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him because the criminal
case filed by complainant against him in the Office of the Ombudsman did not prosper.
Respondent did not dispute complainants contention that no copy of the will was on file in the
archives division of the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the contested will could be found there
because none was filed.
Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause of action against him as he
(complainant) did not first file an action for the declaration of nullity of the will and demand his share in
the inheritance.
In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [10]
In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of pertinent provisions
of the old Notarial Law as found in the Revised Administrative Code. The violation constituted an
infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon 1 [11] and Rule 1.01[12] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).[13] Thus, the investigating commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended the suspension of respondent for a period of three months.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 dated May 26, 2006,
resolved:
[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondents failure to comply with the laws in the discharge of his
function as a notary public, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby suspended from the
practice of law for one year and Respondents notarial commission is Revoked and
Disqualifiedfrom reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years. [14]
We affirm with modification.
A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control
to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. [15] A will may either be
notarial or holographic.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The
object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. [16]
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.[17]

The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this circumstance
alone, the will must be considered void. [18] This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against
the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their
validity.
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. [19] The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was
segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and separate
provision.[20]
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent
officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the
signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed. [21] The
acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes long after
his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular
requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous
absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the
acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testators old residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe
the formalities of a will and those of notarization. As we held in Santiago v. Rafanan:[22]
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public.
They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before him
had presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and
to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree of importance
and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. [23] A notary public, especially a lawyer,[24] is
bound to strictly observe these elementary requirements.
The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence certificate upon
notarization of a document or instrument:
Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula] residence tax. Every
contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public shall have
certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper [cedula] residence
certificate or are exempt from the [cedula] residence tax, and there shall be entered by the
notary public as a part of such certificate the number, place of issue, and date of each
[cedula] residence certificate as aforesaid. [25]
The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section 6 of the Residence Tax Act [26] which
stated:
When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any document
before a notary public xxx it shall be the duty of such person xxx with whom such

transaction is had or business done, to require the exhibition of the residence certificate
showing payment of the residence taxes by such person xxx.
In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the true and correct identity of
the person to whom it is issued, as well as the payment of residence taxes for the current year. By having
allowed decedent to exhibit an expired residence certificate, respondent failed to comply with the
requirements of both the old Notarial Law and the Residence Tax Act. As much could be said of his
failure to demand the exhibition of the residence certificates of Noynay and Grajo.
On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy of the
notarized will to the archives division, Article 806 provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witness. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will,
or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (emphasis supplied)
Respondents failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the notarized will was
therefore not a cause for disciplinary action.
Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries
pertaining to the will in his notarial register. The old Notarial Law required the entry of the following
matters in the notarial register, in chronological order:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him;


person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument;
witnesses, if any, to the signature;
date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument;
fees collected by him for his services as notary;
give each entry a consecutive number; and
if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the substance of the instrument.
[27]

In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned rule, respondent contended
that he had crossed out a prior entry and entered instead the will of the decedent. As proof, he presented a
photocopy of his notarial register. To reinforce his claim, he presented a photocopy of a
certification[28] stating that the archives division had no copy of the affidavit of Bartolome Ramirez.
A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it is shown that the original
is unavailable. The proponent must first prove the existence and cause of the unavailability of the original,
[29]
otherwise, the evidence presented will not be admitted. Thus, the photocopy of respondents notarial
register was not admissible as evidence of the entry of the execution of the will because it failed to
comply with the requirements for the admissibility of secondary evidence.
In the same vein, respondents attempt to controvert the certification dated September 21,
1999[30] must fail. Not only did he present a mere photocopy of the certification dated March 15, 2000;
[31]
its contents did not squarely prove the fact of entry of the contested will in his notarial register.

Notaries public must observe with utmost care [32] and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will
be undermined.[33]
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. This
carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will, considering
that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to
confirm its contents.[34] Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The validity of the
will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty.[35]
In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided:
Grounds for revocation of commission. The following derelictions of duty on the part of
a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient
ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register
touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula certificates. [36]
These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of his oath as a lawyer
and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court [37] and Canon 1[38] and
Rule 1.01[39] of the CPR.
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.[40] For a lawyer is the servant of the
law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the
dispensation of justice.[41]
While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation imposed on every
citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As a
servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover make himself an example for others to emulate. [42] Being a
lawyer, he is supposed to be a model in the community in so far as respect for the law is concerned. [43]
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. [44] A breach of these conditions
justifies disciplinary action against the erring lawyer. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon
a finding or acknowledgment that he has engaged in professional misconduct. [45]These sanctions meted
out to errant lawyers include disbarment, suspension and reprimand.
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. [46] We have held in a number of cases
that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution [47] and should not be decreed if any
punishment less severe such as reprimand, suspension, or fine will accomplish the end desired. [48] The rule
then is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. [49]

Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary duties of his
office. Contrary to his claims that he exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due
regard to the provision of existing law and had complied with the elementary formalities in the
performance of his duties xxx, we find that he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question.
Such recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law. It is, as
well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission [50] and his perpetual disqualification to be
commissioned as a notary public.[51]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of professional
misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyers Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of
the old Notarial Law.
Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year and his
notarial commission REVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a
notary public and as an officer of the court, he is PERPETUALLYDISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as made part of the personal records of
respondent.
SO ORDERED.

(9)
VIVIAN VILLANUEVA,
Complainant,
Present:

A.C. No. 7657

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
ATTY. CORNELIUS M. GONZALES, Promulgated:
Respondent. February 12, 2008
x---------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a complaint Vivian Villanueva (complainant) filed against Atty. Cornelius M. Gonzales
(respondent) for failure to render legal services and failure to return the money, Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT), and other documents he received from complainant.
The Facts
Sometime in 2000, complainant engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of transferring the
title over a piece of property located inTalisay, Cebu. Complainant, as mortgagee, wanted to transfer the
title to her name because the mortgagor failed to redeem the property within the redemption period and
the sheriff had already issued a sheriffs definite deed of sale in complainants favor. Complainant gave
respondent P8,000 as acceptance fee, the propertys TCT, and other pertinent documents. [1]
After receiving the money, TCT, and other documents, respondent began to avoid complainant. Whenever
complainant went to respondents office at BPI Building, Escario St., Cebu City, respondents secretary
would tell her that respondent could not be disturbed because he was either sleeping or doing something
important.[2]

In a letter dated 2 July 2003,[3] complainant told respondent that she had lost her trust and confidence in
him and asked him to return the P8,000, TCT, and other documents. Respondent refused to return the
money, TCT, and other documents. After some time and after complainants daughter confronted him,
respondent finally returned the money. However, until now, respondent has not returned the TCT and
other documents.[4] Thus, complainant filed a complaint [5] dated 10 September 2003 against respondent
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
In an Order[6] dated 7 October 2003, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered
respondent to submit his answer to the complaint. Respondent did not submit an answer.[7] In an
Order[8] dated 21 April 2004, IBP Commissioner for Bar Discipline Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered
respondent to submit his answer to the complaint, and set the mandatory conference on 2 June
2004. Respondent did not submit an answer or attend the mandatory conference. The Commission on Bar
Discipline considered the case submitted for resolution. [9]
The IBPs Report and Recommendations
In a Report[10] dated 27 October 2006, IBP Commissioner for Bar Discipline Caesar
R. Dulay (Commissioner Dulay) found respondent guilty of misconduct and negligent behavior: (1) he
failed to perform any legal service to his client, (2) he did not inform his client about the status of the
case, (3) he returned the P8,000 acceptance fee without any explanation, and (4) he was
indifferent. Commissioner Dulay found that respondent violated Canons 16 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year.
In a Resolution[11] dated 31 May 2007, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted and approved the
Report dated 27 October 2006 withmodification. The IBP Board suspended respondent from the practice
of law for six months and ordered him to return to complainant the P2,000, TCT, and the other
documents.
As provided in Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, [12] the IBP Board forwarded the instant
case to the Court for final action.
The Courts Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and recommendations of the IBP with modification. Respondent violated
Canons 16, 17, and 18, and Rules 16.01, 16.03, 18.03, and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Respondent Refused to Account for
and Return His Clients Money
Canon 16 states that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys of his client that may come into his
possession. Rule 16.01 of the Code states that a lawyer shall account for all money received from the
client. Rule 16.03 of the Code states that a lawyer shall deliver the funds of his client when due or upon
demand.
In Meneses v. Macalino,[13] the Court held that if [a] lawyer does not use the money for the intended
purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client. In the instant case, respondent
demanded P10,000 and received P8,000 as acceptance fee. Since he did not render any legal service, he
should have promptly accounted for and returned the money to complainant. [14] He did not.
After receiving the money, respondent began to avoid complainant. He asked his secretary to lie to
complainant and shoo her off. When complainant demanded for the return of the money after three

years of not hearing from respondent, respondent opted to ignore the demand.Respondent only returned
the money after complainants daughter confronted him. If complainants daughter had not persisted,
respondent would not have returned the money. Respondent did not offer any explanation as to why he
waited for three years to lapse before returning the money. InMacarilay v. Seria,[15] the Court held that
[t]he unjustified withholding of funds belonging to the client warrants the imposition of disciplinary
action against the lawyer.
Respondents failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and upon demand
violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity [16] and moral soundness,[17] and
warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. [18] It gave rise to the presumption that he converted the
money to his own use and constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession.[19]
Respondent Refuses to Return
His Clients TCT and Other Documents
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall hold in trust all properties
of his client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.03 of the Code states that a lawyer shall deliver
the property of his client when due or upon demand.
The TCT and other documents are the properties of complainant. Since respondent did not render any
legal service to complainant, he should have returned complainants properties to her. However, he refuses
without any explanation to return them. Respondent has kept the TCT and other documents in his
possession since 2000. He refuses to return them despite receiving a written demand and being confronted
by complainants daughter. In Vda. De Enriquez v. San Jose,[20] the Court held that failure to return the
documents to the client is reprehensible: this Court finds reprehensible respondents failure to heed the
request of his client for the return of the case documents. That respondent gave no reasonable explanation
for that failure makes his neglect patent.
Respondent Failed to Serve His Client
with Fidelity, Competence, and Diligence
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client. Canon 18 of the Code states that [a] lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence. Rule 18.03 of the Code states that [a] lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Clearly, respondent did not serve complainant with fidelity, competence, or diligence. He totally
neglected complainants cause. An attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant was
established when respondent accepted the acceptance fee. Since then, he should have exercised due
diligence in furthering his clients cause and given it his full attention. [21] Respondent did not
render any service.
Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, he is bound by the Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In Emiliano Court Townhouses v. Atty. Dioneda,[22] the Court held that the act of receiving
money as acceptance fee for legal services and subsequently failing to render such service is a clear
violation of Canons 17 and 18.

Respondent Did Not Keep His Client Informed


of the Status of Her Case and Refused to Respond
to Her Requests for Information
Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that [a] lawyer shall keep the client informed
of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
Respondent avoided complainant for three years and kept her in the dark. He did not give
her any information about the status of her case or respond to her request for information. After giving the
money, complainant never heard from respondent again. Complainant went to respondents office several
times to request for information. Every time, respondent avoided complainant and gave her the runaround. In her affidavit, complainant stated that:
I often visited him in his office to make a [follow up] of the progress of the transfer
x x x only [to be] told by his secretary that he [was] sleeping and not to be disturbed or
[was] doing something important;
x x x For three agonizing years, I x x x never received a feedback from Atty.
Gonzales so much so that I was forced [to write him] a letter which up to present
remain[s] unanswered[.][23] (Emphasis ours)

Respondent unjustifiably denied complainant of her right to be fully informed of the status of her case,
and disregarded his duties as a lawyer.[24]
Respondent Did Not File an Answer or
Attend the Mandatory Hearing Before the IBP
Respondents repeated failure to file an answer to the complaint and to appear at the 2 June
2004 mandatory conference aggravate his misconduct.These demonstrate his high degree of
irresponsibility[25] and lack of respect for the IBP and its proceedings. [26] His attitude stains the nobility of
the legal profession.[27]
On the Appropriate Penalty
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on
the surrounding facts.[28] The Court finds the recommended penalty inadequate. In Rollon,[29] the Court
suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for two years for failing to render any legal service after
receiving money and for failing to return the money and documents he received. In that case, the Court
held that:
The circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount
of P8,000 as x x x partial service fee, respondent failed to render any legal service in
relation to the case of complainant. His continuous inaction despite repeated follow-ups
from her reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling indifference toward his clients cause,
in brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Not only that. Despite her repeated
demands, he also unjustifiably failed to return to her the files of the case that had been
entrusted to him. To top it all, he kept the money she had likewise entrusted to him. [30]

In Small,[31] the Court suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for two years for failing to render any
legal service after receiving money, failing to inform his client of the status of the case, and failing to
promptly account for and return the money he received.
The Court notes that respondent does not have to return any amount to complainant. Complainant gave
respondent only P8,000, not P10,000, and respondent has returned the total amount he received. As stated
in complainants affidavit:
For the legal service[s] sought, Atty. Gonzales asked an acceptance fee of P10,000 to
which I gave him P8,000 together with the pertinent [mortgage] documents needed by
him for the transfer including the Transfer Certificate of Title;
xxxx
[D]ue to the persistence of my daughter, Lurina Villanueva, Atty. Gonzales returned the
acceptance fee of P8,000 on August 5, 2003 but never returned the documents
mentioned in my letter.[32] (Emphasis ours)

Lawyers are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility because an attorney-client relationship is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost
fidelity and good faith. Those who violate the Code must be disciplined. [33]Respondent failed to live up to
these standards.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Cornelius M. Gonzales GUILTY of violating Canons
16, 17, and 18, and Rules 16.01, 16.03, 18.03, and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two years effective
upon finality of this Decision, ORDERS him to RETURN the TCT and all other documents to
complainant within 15 days from notice of this Decision, and WARNS him that a repetition of the same
or similar offense, including the failure to return the TCT and all other documents as required herein, shall
be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents
personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

(10) WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738


Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,
Respondent. Promulgated:
February 19, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
R E S O LUTI O N
CORONA, J.:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot [1] and the building erected thereon located at 959
San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the
possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu [2] and Antonio Pastor[3] of one of the units in the building. The latter
ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5 th District of Manila[4] where the parties
reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation
meetings.[5] When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification
for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the
defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, [6] claiming
that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as
counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the
litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints
referred to the barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio
against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without
bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their
dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal
assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed
and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of
the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. [7]

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the
conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor.
Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by
Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with
counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while
in said service.
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2)
of RA 6713:[8]
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of
public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension from the practice
of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely.[9] This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors. [10]
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.
RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES
ONLY TO FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in

connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,
[11]
we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service.
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of.
Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2)


OF RA 6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF
PROFESSION
OF
ELECTIVE
LOCAL
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency,
from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions. This is the
general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 [12] governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors
are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than
the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided,
Thatsanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is
the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings
involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when
the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours
of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned
do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local
officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local
officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the
private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.[13]
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the
following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces;
the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsodfor cities; the
municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities

and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of
the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited
from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions
as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service. They should
therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal
mayors, members of thesangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are
required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week. [14]Since the law itself grants them the authority
to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is
no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office
for any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial
board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their
profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the
members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[15] Since they are excluded
from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands
to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed
to hold regular sessions only twice a month.[16]
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as
required by civil service regulations.
A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO
IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW MUST
SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD
OF HIS DEPARTMENT
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the
disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of
the head of the department concerned. [17] Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those
officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be
at the disposal of the Government;Provided, further, That if an employee is granted
permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should
be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the
officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent

conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in
the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise
or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of
the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth
and Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires
legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To
underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal
profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and
disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar.[18] Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. [19]
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of
the lawyers oath[20] and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional
misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six
months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of
respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the
courts of the land for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

(11) HEIRS OF LYDIO JERRY ADM. CASE NO. 6876


FALAME, namely: MELBA
FALAME, LEO FALAME and Present:
JERRY FALAME,
Complainants, CARPIO, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,*
- versus - TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
March 7, 2008
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
R E S O LUTI O N
TINGA, J.:
On Petition for Review[1] is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by the Heirs of Lydio Jerry Falame (complainants)
against Atty. Edgar J. Baguio (respondent), docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1191.
In their Complaint[2] against respondent, complainants alleged that on 15 July 1991, their father, the late
Lydio Jerry Falame (Lydio), engaged the services of respondent to represent him in an action for forcible
entry docketed as Civil Case No. A-2694 (the first civil case) and entitled Heirs of Emilio T. Sy,
represented by Anastacia Velayo Vda. De Sy and Belen V. Sy vs. Lydio Jerry Falame, Raleigh Falame and
Four (4) John Does, in which Lydio was one of the defendants.[3]
Complainants recounted that respondent, as counsel for the defendants, filed the answer to the complaint
in the first civil case. Subsequently, when the parties to the first civil case were required to file their
respective position papers, respondent used and submitted in evidence the following: (1) a special power
of attorney dated 1 July 1988 executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing the
latter to be his attorney-in-fact; and (2) the affidavit of Raleigh Falame dated 23 July 1988, executed
before respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the property subject of the first civil case. [4]
Complainants claimed that even after the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City had ruled in favor of the
defendants in the first civil case, Lydio retained the services of respondent as his legal adviser and counsel
for his businesses until Lydios death on 8 September 1996.[5]
However, on 23 October 2000, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, respondent filed
a case against complainants allegedly involving the property subject of the first civil case,
entitled Spouses Rally F. Falame and Noemi F. Falame v. Melba A. Falame, Leo A. Falame, Jerry A.
Falame, Jr., Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporations, their representatives, agents and
persons acting in their behalf anddocketed as Civil Case No. 5568 (the second civil case) before the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6. The complaint sought the declaration of nullity of the
deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20241 issued as a

consequence of the registration of the deed of sale, and the real estate mortgage on the said property.
Alternatively, it prayed for specific performance and reconveyance or legal redemption and damages with
preliminary injunction and restraining order.[6]
Firstly, complainants maintained that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the second civil case
wherein they were impleaded as defendants, respondent violated his oath of office and duty as an
attorney. Plainly, they contended that the spouses Falames interests are adverse to those of his former
client, Lydio.[7]
Secondly, complainants claimed that respondent knowingly made false statements of fact in the complaint
in the second civil case to mislead the trial court. In so doing, respondent violated paragraph (d), Section
20[8] of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,[9] complainants asserted further.
Lastly,
complainants
alleged
that
the
second
civil
case
is
a
baseless and fabricated suit which respondent filed as counsel for
complainants
uncle
against the heirs of respondents deceased
client.
Specifically,
they averred that respondent filed the case for
the sole purpose
of
retaining,maintaining and/or withholding the
possession of the subject property from complainants
who are its true owners. Complainants concluded that respondent violated paragraph (g), Section 20 [10] of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[11]
In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, [12] respondent controverted complainants allegations. He
emphasizes that it was only Raleigh Falame who personally engaged his legal services for him and on
Lydios behalf and that, in fact, it was Raleigh who paid him the attorneys fees. He also stated that he
signed the jurat in Raleighs affidavit, which was submitted as evidence in the first civil case, believing to
the best of his knowledge that there is good ground to support it. Insisting that he did not betray the
confidence reposed in him by Lydio as the latters counsel in the first civil case, respondent maintained
that he did not reveal or use any fact he acquired knowledge of during the existence of the attorney-client
relation in the first civil case as he had never even conferred with nor talked to Lydio in the first place.
Respondent likewise contended that he did not knowingly make any misleading or untruthful statement of
fact in the complaint in the second civil case and neither did he employ any means inconsistent with truth
and honor in the hearing of the case.[13]
Respondent vigorously averred that Lydio had not retained him as counsel in any case or transaction.
Stressing the long interval of twelve years separating the termination of the first civil case and his
acceptance of the second civil case, respondent pointed out that the first civil case was not
between Lydio and Raleigh but rather between the heirs of Emilio T. Sy on one hand and Lydio and
Raleigh on the other where physical possession of property was at stake. Respondent further averred that
in contrast the second civil case is one involving the spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame as plaintiffs, and
Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr., all surnamed Falame, and Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporation,
as defendantsa case which arose from the wrongful acts committed by Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr. after
Lydios death.[14]
Respondent maintained that since the second civil case was still pending before the trial court, the IBP
had no jurisdiction over the instant administrative case. He added that complainants filed this
administrative case when Raleigh could no longer testify in his own favor as he had died a year earlier.[15]
In their Position Paper[16] dated 7 September 2004, in addition to their previous charges against
respondent, complainants claimed that respondent violated Rule 15.03 [17] of the Code of Professional

Responsibility when he represented the cause of the spouses Falame against that of his former
client, Lydio.[18]
On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-167 adopting and
approving Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuans report and recommendation for the
dismissal of this administrative case, thus: [19]
x x x The charge lacks specification as to what part of the lawyers oath was violated by
the respondent and what confidence was disclosed. The complainants may have in mind
the prohibition against disclosure of secret information learned in confidence, but there is
no specification in the complaint what secret or information learned in confidence under
Civil Case No. A-2694 was disclosed or will be disclosed by respondent in Civil Case
No. 5568. In administrative complaints for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the
complainant must specify in the affidavit-complaint the alleged secrets or confidential
information disclosed or will be disclosed in the professional employment (Uy v.
Gonzalez, 426 SCRA 422; 431). In the absence of such specification, the complaint must
fail.
In the complaint, there is no specific charge against respondent for violation of Canon 15,
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility about the prohibition against
representation of conflicting interest. So, the allegation in paragraph 1, page 8 and 9 of
complainants position paper stating: With all due respect, it is submitted that respondent
violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot be
countenanced. The reason being that it is an elementary principle of due process to which
the respondent is entitled that only those charged in the complaint can be proved by the
complainants. A charge not specified in the complaint cannot be proved (Uy v. Gonzales,
id.)
x x x But still this charge will not proper for lack of sufficient bases.
xxx
Civil Case No. 5568, which was commenced on 03 October 2000, or three years since the
complainants became owners of Lydio Falames properties, is a suit against the
complainants, not as representatives of Lydio Falame, but as owners of their respective
aliquot interests in the property in question (Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA 104; 107-108).
The complainants are sued not on the basis of the acts, rights, obligations and interest of
Lydio Falame on the material possession of the improvements found on Lot 345 litigated
in Civil Case No. A-2694 nor even on such land itself, but rather on the facts alleged in
the second amended and supplemental complaint which give rise to their cause of action
against them.
While the complainants could not specify under what circumstances the respondent
committed [the] alleged breach of confidence, breach of secrecy or revelation of secret or
confidential information[,] the respondent has shown that he did not commit any
violation of such duties or obligations of an attorney.
It is clear that only Raleigh Falame engaged the legal services of the respondent for his
and Lydio Falames defense in Civil Case No. A-2694.
xxx

The other allegations of the complainants that the respondent violated paragraph (d),
Section 20 of Rule 139, Rules of Court, and his lawyers oath when he allegedly betrayed
the trust and confidence of his former client by denying knowledge of the fact that the
land was owned by Lydio Falame and when he did not disclose to the Court that at one
time his present clients categorically declared and unconditionally recognized the full
ownership of the late Lydio Falame and complainant Melba Falame over subject matter
of both cases equally lacks evidentiary basis.
xx
It is beyond the competence of the complainants to conclude and is outside the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Commission to rule as to whether or nor (sic) the complaint
in Civil Case No.5568 is baseless or fabricated. It is only the Honorable Court which has
the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the same and cannot be the subject of an
administrative complaint against the respondent.
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this
complaint be dismissed on grounds of prescription, the same having been filed four (4)
years after the alleged misconduct took place and for lack of merit.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[20]
Dissatisfied, complainants filed the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
reiterating their allegations in the complaint and their position paper.[21] They likewise assert that the IBP
erred in holding that the instant administrative complaint had been filed out of time since it was filed on
16 January 2004, or three (3) years, four (4) months and sixteen (16) days after the second civil case was
filed on 23 October 2000.[22] In addition, in their Consolidated Comment (should be Consolidated Reply),
[23]
complainants invoke the Courts ruling in Frias v. Bautista-Lozada[24] to support their contention that
administrative complaints against members of the bar do not prescribe. [25]
In his Comment,[26] respondent principally maintains that the charges imputed to him have never been
proven by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence which is the quantum of proof required in
administrative cases against lawyers, and that complainants have the burden to prove their accusations as
he enjoys the presumption of innocence.[27] Respondent likewise asserts that in accusing him of violation
of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility only in their position paper and in the instant
petition, complainants infringed his right to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him.[28]
There is merit in the petition.
At the outset, the Court holds that the instant administrative action is not barred by prescription. As early
as 1947, the Court held in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo,[29] to wit:
The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings, nor
does the circumstance that the facts set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a crime,
prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding is barred by limitation, affect the
disbarment proceeding x x x (5 AM. JUR. 434)[30]

This doctrine was reaffirmed in the relatively recent case of Frias v. Bautista-Lozada[31] where the Court
held that Rule VII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP, which provides for a prescriptive
period for the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers, should be struck down as void and of
no legal effect for being ultra vires.[32]
Prescinding from the unavailability of the defense of prescription, the Court concurs with the
Investigating Commissioners opinion that some of the charges raised by complainants in their complaint
are unsubstantiated.
There is, however, sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. While this charge was not raised in the initiatory pleading, it was put
forward in complainants position paper filed with the IBP and in the petition filed with the Court. In fact,
respondent proffered his defenses to the charge in his position paper before the IBP and likewise in his
comment before the Court. In his very first pleading before the IBP, the answer with motion to dismiss, he
denied having Lydio as his client. Such absence of attorney-client relationship is the essential element of
his defense to the charge of conflict of interest, as articulated in his subsequent submissions.

The Court, therefore, rules and so holds that respondent has been adequately apprised of and
heard on the issue. In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full
adversarial proceedings. Actual adversarial proceedings only become necessary for clarification when
there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. Due process is
fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in
support of their arguments.[33]
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose
interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. [34] The test is whether, on behalf of one client, it
is the lawyers duty to contest for that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose or when the
possibility of such situation will develop. [35] The rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used.[36] In addition, the rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or the lawyer
has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests. [37]
The rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that representation
will be directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be
allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse
to the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the
fiduciary obligation of loyalty.[38] In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the
facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that
relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. [39]
The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest
adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The clients confidence once reposed should not be

divested by mere expiration of professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a
lawyer should not do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he
previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired in the
previous relation.[40]
In relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. His
highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to himself. [41] The
protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it
affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of
relation between them. It even survives the death of the client. [42]
In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as defendants in the
first civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and respondent was established
despite the fact that it was only Raleigh who paid him. The case of Hilado v. David[43] tells us that it is
immaterial whether such employment was paid, promised or charged for.[44]

As defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated the stance that Lydio solely
owned the property subject of the case. In the second civil case involving the same property, respondent,
as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the inconsistent position that Raleighowned the same
property in common with Lydio, with complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts which
debase respondents rights as a co-owner.
The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydios death or through the completion
of the specific task for which respondent was employed is not reason for respondent to advocate a
position opposed to that of Lydio.[45] Precedents tell us that even after the termination of his employment,
an attorney may not act as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though, while acting
for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his clients disadvantage in the
subsequent adverse employment.[46] And while complainants have never been respondents clients, they
derive their rights to the property from Lydios ownership of it which respondent maintained in the first
civil case.
For representing Raleighs cause which is adverse to that of his former clientRaleighs supposed coownership of the subject property respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Having
previously undertaken joint representation of Lydio and Raleigh, respondent should have diligently
studied and anticipated the potential conflict of interest. Accordingly, disciplinary action is warranted.
[47]
Heretofore, respondent is enjoined to look at any representation situation from the point of view that
there are possible conflicts; and further, to think in terms of impaired loyalty that is to evaluate if his
representation in any way will impair loyalty to a client. [48] Considering, however, that this is respondents
first offense, the Court resolves to reprimand respondent, with admonition to observe a higher degree of
fidelity in the practice of his profession.[49]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar J. Baguio is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests
and meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND. He is further admonished to observe a higher degree of
fidelity in the practice of his profession and to bear in mind that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

(12)
ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE,
Complainant,
- versus JUDGE
MEDEL ARNALDO
B.
BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 36,CALAMBA CITY,
Respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119


[Formerly A.M. O.C.A. IPI
No. 07-2709-RTJ]
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 30, 2008

x-------------------------------------------------- x

R E S O LUTI O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By letter-complaint dated May 19, 2006 [1] which was received by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) on May 26, 2006, Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane (complainant) charged Judge Medel Arnaldo B.
Belen (respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court, Calamba City, of demean[ing],
humiliat[ing] and berat[ing] him during the hearing on February 27, 2006 of Civil Case No. 3514-2003C, Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samuel Malabanan, et al in which he was counsel for the plaintiff.
To prove his claim, complainant cited the remarks made by respondent in the course of the proceedings
conducted on February 27, 2006 as transcribed by stenographer Elenita C. de Guzman, viz:
COURT:
. . . Sir, are you from the College of Law of the University of the Philippines?
ATTY. MANE:
No[,] [Y]our Honor[,] from Manuel L. Quezon University[,] [Y]our Honor.
COURT:
No, youre not from UP.
ATTY. MANE:
I am very proud of it.
COURT:
Then youre not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a
saying and I know this, not all law students are created equal, not all law schools are

created equal, not all lawyers are created equal despite what the Supreme Being that
we all are created equal in His form and substance. [2](Emphasis supplied)
Complainant further claimed that the entire proceedings were duly recorded in a tape recorder by
stenographer de Guzman, and despite his motion (filed on April 24, 2006) for respondent to direct her to
furnish him with a copy of the tape recording, the motion remained unacted as of the date he filed the
present administrative complaint on May 26, 2006. He, however, attached a copy of the transcript of
stenographic notes taken onFebruary 27, 2006.

In his Comments[3] dated June 14, 2006 on the complaint filed in compliance with the Ist Indorsement
dated May 31, 2006[4] of the OCA, respondent alleged that complainant filed on December 15, 2005 an
Urgent Motion to Inhibit,[5] paragraph 3[6] of which was malicious and a direct assault to the integrity and
dignity of the Court and of the Presiding Judge as it succinctly implied that [he] issued the order dated 27
September 2005 for [a] consideration other than the merits of the case. He thus could not simply sit idly
and allow a direct assault on his honor and integrity.
On the unacted motion to direct the stenographer to furnish complainant with a copy of the unedited tape
recording of the proceedings, respondent quoted paragraphs 4 and 3 [7] of the motion which, to him,
implied that the trial court was illegally, unethically and unlawfully engaged in editing the transcript of
records to favor a party litigant against the interest of [complainants] client.
Respondent thus claimed that it was on account of the two motions that he ordered complainant, by
separate orders dated June 5, 2006, to explain within 15 days[8] why he should not be cited for contempt.
Complainant later withdrew his complaint, by letter of September 4, 2006,[9] stating that it was a
mere result of his impulsiveness.

In its Report dated November 7, 2007,[10] the OCA came up with the following evaluation:
. . . The withdrawal or desistance of a complainant from pursuing an administrative
complaint does not divest the Court of its disciplinary authority over court officials and
personnel. Thus, the complainants withdrawal of the instant complaint will not bar the
continuity of the instant administrative proceeding against respondent judge.
The issue presented before us is simple: Whether or not the statements and actions made
by the respondent judge during the subject February 27, 2006 hearing constitute conduct
unbecoming of a judge and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
After a cursory evaluation of the complaint, the respondents comment and the documents
at hand, we find that there is no issue as to what actually transpired during the February
27th hearing as evidenced by the stenographic notes. The happening of the incident
complained of by herein complainant was never denied by the respondent judge. If at all,
respondent judge merely raised his justifications for his complained actuations.
xxxx

. . . [A] judges official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties
should be free from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. A judge
must at all times be temperate in his language. Respondent judges insulting
statements which tend to question complainants capability and credibility stemming
from the fact that the latter did not graduated [sic] from UP Law school is
clearly unwarranted and inexcusable. When a judge indulges in intemperate language,
the lawyer can return the attack on his person and character, through an administrative
case against the judge, as in the instant case.
Although respondent judges use in intemperate language may be attributable to human
frailty, the noble position in the bench demands from him courteous speech in and out of
the court. Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in
conduct and language.
xxxx
Judge Belen should bear in mind that all judges should always observe courtesy and
civility. In addressing counsel, litigants, or witnesses, the judge should avoid a
controversial tone or a tone that creates animosity. Judges should always be aware that
disrespect to lawyers generates disrespect to them. There must be mutual concession of
respect. Respect is not a one-way ticket where the judge should be respected but free
to insult lawyers and others who appear in his court. Patience is an essential part of
dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. If a judge desires
not to be insulted, he should start using temperate language himself; he who sows the
wind will reap a storm.
It is also noticeable that during the subject hearing, not only did respondent judge make
insulting and demeaning remarks but he also engaged in unnecessary lecturing and
debating. . .
xxxx
Respondent should have just ruled on the propriety of the motion to inhibit filed by
complainant, but, instead, he opted for a conceited display of arrogance, a conduct that
falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. If respondent judge felt that
there is a need to admonish complainant Atty. Mane, he should have called him in his
chambers where he can advise him privately rather than battering him with insulting
remarks and embarrassing questions such as asking him from what school he came
from publicly in the courtroom and in the presence of his clients. Humiliating a lawyer is
highly reprehensible. Itbetrays the judges lack of patience and temperance. A highly
temperamental judge could hardly make decisions with equanimity.
Thus, it is our view that respondent judge should shun from lecturing the counsels or
debating with them during court hearings to prevent suspicions as to his fairness and
integrity. While judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can
competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and
behave in such manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their
impartiality.[11] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The OCA thus recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violation of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. [12]
By Resolution of January 21, 2008,[13] this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already filed. Respondent complied
on February 26, 2008,[14] manifesting in the affirmative.

The pertinent provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct reads:


Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the
inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge
should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for
the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
An author explains the import of this rule:
Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be courteous to
counsel, especially to those who are young and inexperienced and also to all those others
appearing or concerned in the administration of justice in the court. He should be
considerate of witnesses and others in attendance upon his court. He should be
courteous and civil, for it is unbecoming of a judge to utter intemperate language
during the hearing of a case. In his conversation with counsel in court, a judge should
be studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of the dispute
between litigants and lead to its unjust disposition. He should not interrupt counsel in
their arguments except to clarify his mind as to their positions. Nor should he be
tempted to an unnecessary display of learning or premature judgment.
A judge without being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust may endeavor to hold
counsel to a proper appreciation of their duties to the courts, to their clients and to the
adverse party and his lawyer, so as to enforce due diligence in the dispatch of business
before the court. He may utilize his opportunities to criticize and correct
unprofessional conduct of attorneys, brought to his attention, but he may not do so in
an insulting manner.[15] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The following portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, quoted verbatim, taken during the
February 27, 2006 hearing show that respondent made sarcastic and humiliating, even threatening and
boastful remarks to complainant who is admittedly still young, unnecessary lecturing and debating, as
well as unnecessary display of learning:

COURT:
xxx
Sir do you know the principle or study the stare decisis?
ATTY. MANE:
Ah, with due respect your

COURT:
Tell me, what is your school?
ATTY. MANE:
I am proud graduate of Manuel L. Quezon University.
COURT:
Were you taught at the MLQU College of Law of the principle of Stare Decisis and the interpretation of the Supreme Court of
the rules of procedure where it states that if there is already a decision by the Supreme Court, when that
decision shall be complied with by the Trial Court otherwise non-compliance thereof shall subject the
Courts to judicial sanction, and I quote the decision. Thats why I quoted the decision of the Supreme Court
Sir, because I know the problem between the bank and the third party claimants and I state, The fair market
value is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a
buyer, who is not compelled to buy. Sir, thats very clear, that is what fair market value and that is not
assessment value. In fact even you say assessment value, the Court further state, the assessed value is the fair
market value multiplied. Not mere the basic assesses value. Sir that is the decision of the Supreme Court, am I
just reading the decision or was I inventing it?
ATTY. MANE:
May I be allowed to proceed.
COURT:
Sir, you tell me. Was I inventing the Supreme Court decision which I quoted and which you should have researched too or I
was merely imagining the Supreme Court decision sir? Please answer it.
ATTY. MANE:
No your Honor.

COURT:
Please answer it.
xxxx
COURT:
Thats why. Sir second, and again I quote from your own pleadings, hale me to the Supreme Court otherwise I will hale you
to the bar. Prove to me that I am grossly ignorant or corrupt.
ATTY. MANE:
Your Honor when this representation, your Honor . . .
COURT:
No, sir.
ATTY. MANE:
Yes your Honor . . .
COURT:
No sir unless you apologize to the Court I will hale you to the IBP Because hindi naman ako ganon. I am not that vindictive
but if this remains. You cannot take cover from the instruction of your client because even if the instruction of a
client is secret. Upon consideration, the language of the pleader must still conform with the decorum and
respect to the Court. Sir, thats the rule of practice. In my twenty (20) years of practice Ive never been haled by a
judge to any question of integrity. Because even if I believed that the Court committed error in judgment or
decision or grave abuse of discretion, I never imputed any malicious or unethical behavior to the judge because
I know and I believe that anyone can commit errors. Because no one is like God. Sir, I hope sir you understand
that this Court, this Judge is not God but this Judge is human when challenge on his integrity and honor is
lodged.No matter how simple it is because that is the only thing I have now.

Atty. Bantin, can you please show him my statement of assets and liabilities?
ATTY. MANE:
I think that is not necessary your Honor.
COURT:
No counsel because the imputations are there, thats why I want you to see. Show him my assets and liabilities for the
proud graduate of MLQU. Sir, look at it. Sir, I have stock holdings in the U.S. before I joined the bench. And
it was very clear to everyone, I would do everything not be tempted to accept bribe but I said I have spent my
fifteen (15) years and thats how much I have worked in fifteen (15) years excluding my wifes assets which is
more than what I have may be triple of what I have. May be even four fold of what I have. And look at my
assets. May be even your bank can consider on cash to cash basis my personal assets. That is the reason I am
telling you Atty. Mane. Please, look at it. If you want I can show you even the Income Tax Return of my wife
and you will be surprised that my salary is not even her one-half month salary. Sir, she is the Chief Executive
Officer of a Multi-National Publishing Company. Thats why I have the guts to take this job because doon po sa
salary niya umaasa na lamang po ako sa aking asawa. Atty. Mane, please you are still young. Other judges you
would already be haled to the IBP. Take that as a lesson. Now that you are saying that I was wrong in the threeday notice rule, again the Supreme Court decision validates me, PNB vs. Court of Appeals, you want me to cite
the quotation again that any pleadings that do not conform with the three-day notice rule is considered as
useless scrap of paper and therefore not subject to any judicial cognizance. You know sir, you would say but I
was the one subject because the judge was belligerent. No sir, you can go on my record and you will see that
even prior to my rulings on your case I have already thrown out so many motion for non-compliance of a threeday notice rule. If I will give you an exception because of this, then I would be looked upon with suspicion. So
sir again, please look again on the record and you will see how many motions I threw out for non-compliance
with the three-day notice rule. It is not only your case sir, because sir you are a practitioner and a proud
graduate of the MLQU which is also the Alma Mater of my uncle. And I supposed you were taught in
thought that the three-day notice rule is almost sacrosanct in order to give the other party time to appear
and plead. In all books, Moran, Regalado and all other commentators state that non-compliance with the
three-day notice rule makes the pleading and motion a useless scrap of paper. If that is a useless scrap of
paper, sir, what would be my ground to grant exception to your motion? Tell me.
xxxx
COURT:
Procedural due process. See. So please sir dont confuse the Court. Despite of being away for twenty years from the college
of law, still I can remember my rules, In your motion you said . . . imputing things to the Court. Sir please read
your rules. Familiarize yourself, understand the jurisprudence before you be the Prince Valiant or a Sir
Gallahad in Quest of the Holy Grail. Sir, ako po ay mahirap na tao, karangalan ko lang po ang aking kayang
ibigay sa aking mga anak at iyan po ay hindi ko palalampasin maski kanino pa. Sir, have you ever heard of
anything about me in this Court for one year. Ask around, ask around. You know, if you act like a duck, walk
like a duck, quack like a duck, you are a duck. But have you ever heard anything against the court. Sir in a
judicial system, in a Court, one year is time enough for the practitioner to know whether a judge is what,
dishonest; 2), whether the judge is incompetent; and 3) whether the judge is just playing loco. And I have sat
hear for one year sir and please ask around before you charge into the windmill. I am a proud product of a
public school system from elementary to college. And my only, and my only, the only way I can repay the
taxpayers is a service beyond reproach without fear or favor to anyone. Not even the executive, not even the one
sitting in Malacanang, not even the Supreme Court if you are right. Sir, sana po naman inyo ring igalang ang
Hukuman kasi po kami, meron nga po, tinatanggap ko, kung inyo pong mamarapatin, meron pong mga
corrupt, maaari pong nakahanap na kayo ng corrupt na Judge pero hindi po lahat kami ay corrupt .Maaari ko rin
pong tanggapin sa inyong abang lingcod na merong mga Hukom na tanga pero hindi po naman lahat kami ay
tanga. Ako po ay 8:30 or before ay nandito po ako sa husgado ko. Aalis po ako dito sa hapon, babasahin ko
lahat ang kaso ko para ko po malaman kung any po ang kaso, para po pagharap ko sa inyo at sa publiko hindi po
ako magmumukhang tanga. Sir, please have the decency, not the respect, not to me but to the Court.Because if
you are a lawyer who cannot respect the Court then you have no business appearing before the Court because
you dont believe in the Court system. Thats why one of my classmates never appeared before Court because he
doesnt believe in that system. He would rather stay in their airconditioned room because they say going to Court
is useless. Then, to them I salute, I give compliment because in their own ways they know the futility and they
respect the Court, in that futility rather than be a hypocrite. Atty. Mane hindi mo ako kilala, Ive never
disrespect the courts and I can look into your eyes. Kaya po dito ko gusto kasi di po ako dito nagpractice para
po walang makalapit sa akin. Pero kung ako po naman ay inyong babastusin ng ganyang handa po akong
lumaban kahit saan, miski saan po. And you can quote me, you can go there together to the Supreme
Court.Because the only sir, the only treasure I have is my name and my integrity. I could have easily let it go
because it is the first time, but the second time is too much too soon. Sir, masyado pong kwan yon, sinampal na
po ninyo ako nung primero, dinuran pa po ninyo ako ng pangalawa. Thats adding insult to the injury po. Hindi
ko po sana gagawin ito pero ayan po ang dami diyang abugado. I challenge anyone to file a case against me for
graft and corruption, for incompetence.

xxxx
COURT:
I will ask the lawyer to read the statement and if they believe that you are not imputing any wrong doing to me I will
apologize to you.
Atty. Hildawa please come over. The Senior, I respect the old practitioner, whose integrity is unchallenged.
Sir you said honest. Sir ganoon po ako. You still want to defend your position, so be it.
Atty. Hildawa I beg your indulgence, I am sorry but I know that you are an old practitioner hammered out by years of
practice and whose integrity by reputation precedes you. Please read what your younger companero has written
to this Honorable Court in pleading and see for yourself the implications he hurled to the Court in his honest
opinion. Remember he said honest. That implication is your honest opinion of an implication sir.
Sir 1, 2 and 3. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. If that is your honest opinion. Remember the word you said honest opinion.
Alam mo Atty. Mane I know when one has to be vigilant and vigorous in the pursue of pride. But if you are vigilant and
vigor, you should never crossed the line.
Sir, what is your interpretation to the first three paragraphs?
ATTY. HILDAWA:
There will be some . . .
COURT:
What sir?
ATTY. HILDAWA:
. . . indiscretion.
COURT:
Indiscretion. See, that is the most diplomatic word that an old practitioner could say to the Court because of respect.
Sir, salamat po.
xxxx
COURT:
Kita po ninyo, iyan po ang matatandang abogado. Indiscretion na lang. Now you say that is your honest opinion and the
old practitioner hammered through years of practice could only say indiscretion committed by this judge. Much
more I who sits in this bench?
Now is that your honest opinion?[16] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court thus finds the evaluation by the OCA well-taken.


An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the
Bar Examinations which this Court administers, taking of the Lawyers oath, and signing of the Roll of
Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia, an
officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the fitness
or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in an
argumentum ad hominem.
A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If respondent
felt that his integrity and dignity were being assaulted, he acted properly when he directed complainant to

explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when he, as the abovequoted portions of the transcript of stenographic notes show, engaged on a supercilious legal and personal
discourse.
This Court has reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those they
deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the
court.[17]
Respondent having exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge, classified as a light charge under Section
10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is penalized under Section 11(c) of the same Rule by
any of the following: (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceedingP10,000; (2) censure; (3)
reprimand; and (4) admonition with warning, the Court imposes upon him the penalty of reprimand.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 36, Calamba City, is foundGUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge and
is REPRIMANDED therefor. He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

(13) CARMELITA FUDOT, G.R. No. 171008


Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
CATTLEYA LAND, INC., VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:
September 13, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
For resolution is a petition that seeks to nullify the Decision [1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals
dated 28 April 2005 and 11 January 2006, respectively, in C.A.G.R. CV No. 73025 which declared
respondent as having a better right over a parcel of land located in Doljo, Panglao, Bohol.
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
Sometime in July 1992, Cattleya Land, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as respondent) asked someone to
check, on its behalf, the titles of nine (9) lots, the subject land included, which it intended to buy from the
spouses Troadio and Asuncion Tecson. Finding no defect on the titles, respondent purchased the nine lots
through a Deed of Conditional Sale on 6 November 1992. Subsequently, on 30 August 1993, respondent
and the Tecsons executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties. The Deed of Conditional
Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale were registered with the Register of Deeds on 06 November
1992 and 04 October 1993, respectively.[3] The Register of Deeds, Atty. Narciso dela Serna, refused to
actually annotate the deed of sale on the titles because of the existing notice of attachment in connection
with Civil Case No. 3399 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. [4] The attachment was
eventually cancelled by virtue of a compromise agreement between the Tecsons and their attaching
creditor which was brokered by respondent. Titles to six (6) of the nine (9) lots were issued, but the
Register of Deeds refused to issue titles to the remaining three (3) lots , because the titles covering the
same were still unaccounted for.
On 23 January 1995, petitioner presented for registration before the Register of Deeds the owners copy of
the title of the subject property, together with the deed of sale purportedly executed by the Tecsons in
favor of petitioner on 19 December 1986. On the following day, respondent sent a letter of
protest/opposition to petitioners application. Much to its surprise, respondent learned that the Register of
Deeds had already registered the deed of sale in favor of petitioner and issued a new title in her name. [5]
On 5 May 1995, respondent filed its Complaint [6] for Quieting Of Title &/Or Recovery Of Ownership,
Cancellation Of Title With Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City.[7] On 26 June
1995, Asuncion filed a complaint-in-intervention, claiming that she never signed any deed of sale
covering any part of their conjugal property in favor of petitioner. She averred that her signature in

petitioners deed of sale was forged thus, said deed should be declared null and void. [8] She also claimed
that she has discovered only recently that there was an amorous relationship between her husband and
petitioner.[9]
Petitioner, for her part, alleged in her answer [10] that the spouses Tecson had sold to her the subject
property for P20,000.00 and delivered to her the owners copy of the title on 26 December 1986. She
claims that she subsequently presented the said title to the Register of Deeds but the latter refused to
register the same because the property was still under attachment.
On 31 October 2001, the trial court rendered its decision: [11] (i) quieting the title or ownership of the
subject land in favor of respondent; (ii) declaring the deed of sale between petitioner and spouses Tecson
invalid; (iii) ordering the registration of the subject land in favor of respondent; (iv) dismissing
respondents claim for damages against the Register of Deeds for insufficiency of evidence; (v) dismissing
Asuncions claim for damages against petitioner for lack of factual basis; and (vi) dismissing petitioners
counterclaim for lack of the required preponderance of evidence. [12]
According to the trial court, respondent had recorded in good faith the deed of sale in its favor ahead of
petitioner. Moreover, based on Asuncions convincing and unrebutted testimony, the trial court concluded
that the purported signature of Asuncion in the deed of sale in favor of petitioner was forged,
thereby rendering the sale void.[13]
Petitioner sought recourse to the Court of Appeals, arguing in the main that the rule on double sale was
applicable to the case. The appellate court, however, dismissed her appeal, holding that there was no
double sale because the alleged sale to petitioner was null and void in view of the forgery of Asuncions
purported signature in the deed. The appellate court noted that petitioner failed to rebut Asuncions
testimony despite opportunities to do so. [14] Moreover, even if there was double sale, according to the
appellate court, respondents claim would still prevail since it was able to register the second sale in its
favor in good faith, had made inquiries before it purchased the lots, and was informed that the titles were
free from encumbrance except the attachment on the property due to Civil Case No. 3399. [15]
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied her motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.[16]
Petitioner thus presents before this Court the following issues for resolution:
I.
BETWEEN 2 BUYERS OF REGISTERED LAND, WHO HAS THE BETTER
RIGHT-IS IT THE FIRST BUYER WHO WAS GIVEN THE OWNERS
DUPLICATE TCT TOGETHER WITH A DEED OF SALE IN 1986, OR THE
SECOND BUYER IN 1992 WITH ONLY A DEED OFSALE.
II.
IS A BUYER OF REGISTERED LAND WHO DID NOT DEMAND OR REQUIRE
THE DELIVERY OF THE OWNERS DUPLICATE TCT A BUYER IN GOOD
FAITH.
III.
II. IN SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION OF REGISTERED LANDS, AS
BY SALE, WHICH LAW SHALL GOVERN, ARTICLE 1455 OF CIVIL CODE OR
P.D. 1529 OR TORRENS SYSTEM.[17]

Petitioner avers that she was the first buyer in good faith and even had in her possession the
owners copy of the title so much so that she was able to register the deed of sale in her favor and caused
the issuance of a new title in her name. She argues that the presentation and surrender of the deed of sale
and the owners copy carried with it the conclusive authority of Asuncion Tecson which cannot be
overturned by the latters oral deposition.[18]
Petitioner claims that respondent did not demand nor require delivery of the owners duplicate title
from the spouses Tecson, neither did it investigate the circumstances surrounding the absence of the title.
These indicate respondents knowledge of a defect in the title of the spouses and,thus, petitioner concludes
that respondent was not a buyer in good faith.[19]
Finally, petitioner insists that the applicable law in this case is P.D. No. 1529, a special law
dealing precisely with the registration of registered lands or any subsequent sale thereof, and not Article
1544 of the Civil Code which deals with immovable property not covered by the Torrens System. [20]
Respondent points out, on one hand, that petitioners first two issues which present an inquiry on
who has a better right or which one is a buyer in good faith, are questions of fact not proper in a petition
for review. The third issue, on the other hand, is ostensibly a question of law which had been
unsuccessfully raised below.[21]
Respondent maintains that there is no room to speak of petitioner as a buyer in good faith since
she was never a buyer in the first place, as her claim is based on a null and void deed of sale, so the
court a quo found. Respondent also asserts that its status as a buyer in good faith was established and
confirmed in the proceedings before the two courts below.[22]
Lastly, respondent argues that P.D. No. 1529 finds no application in the instant case. The
production of the owners duplicate certificate x x x being conclusive authority from the registered owner
is only true as between the registration applicant and the register of deeds concerned, but never to third
parties. Such conclusive authority, respondent adds, is only for the Register of Deeds to enter a new
certificate or to make a memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument. It cannot cure
the fatal defect that the instrument from which such registration was effected is null and void ab initio,
respondent concludes.[23]
The petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioners arguments, which rest on the assumption that there was a double sale, must fail.
In the first place, there is no double sale to speak of. Art. 1544 of the Civil Code,[24] which provides the
rule on double sale, applies only to a situation where the same property is validly sold to different
vendees. In this case, there is only one sale to advert to, that between the spouses Tecson and respondent.
In Remalante v. Tibe,[25] this Court ruled that the Civil Law provision on double sale is not applicable
where there is only one valid sale, the previous sale having been found to be fraudulent. Likewise,
in Espiritu and Apostol v. Valerio,[26] where the same parcel of land was purportedly sold to two different
parties, the Court held that despite the fact that one deed of sale was registered ahead of the other, Art.
1544 of the Civil Code will not apply where said deed is found to be a forgery, the result of this being that
the right of the other vendee should prevail.
The trial court declared that the sale between the spouses Tecson and petitioner is invalid, as it bears the
forged signature of Asuncion. Said finding is based on the unrebutted testimony of Asuncion and the trial

courts visual analysis and comparison of the signatures in her Complaint-in-Intervention and the
purported deed of sale. This finding was upheld by the Court of Appeals, as it ruled that the purported sale
in petitioners favor is null and void, taking into account Asuncions unrefuted deposition. In particular, the
Court of Appeals noted petitioners failure to attend the taking of the oral deposition and to give written
interrogatories. In short, she did not take the necessary steps to rebut Asuncions definitive assertion.
The congruence of the wills of the spouses is essential for the valid disposition of conjugal property.
[27]
Thus, under Article 166 of the Civil Code [28] which was still in effect on 19 December 1986 when the
deed of sale was purportedly executed, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent.
In this case, following Article 173[29] of the Civil Code, on 26 June 1995, or eight and a half years (8 )
after the purported sale to petitioner,Asuncion filed her Complaint-in-Intervention seeking the
nullification thereof, and while her marriage with Troadio was still subsisting. Both the Court of Appeals
and the trial court found Asuncions signature in the deed of sale to have been forged, and consequently,
the deed of sale void for lack of marital consent. We find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals. Findings of fact of lower courts are deemed conclusive and binding upon
the Supreme Court subject to certain exceptions, [30] none of which are present in this case. Besides, it has
long been recognized in our jurisprudence that a forged deed is a nullity and conveys no title. [31]
Petitioner argues she has a better right over the property in question, as the holder of and the first one to
present, the owners copy of the title for the issuance of a new TCT. The Court is not persuaded.
The act of registration does not validate petitioners otherwise void contract. Registration is a mere
ministerial act by which a deed, contract, or instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the
Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of title covering the land
subject of the deed, contract, or instrument. While it operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or
instrument to others, it does not add to its validity nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid one as
between the parties,[32] nor amounts to a declaration by the state that the instrument is a valid and
subsisting interest in the land. [33] The registration of petitioners void deed is not an impediment to a
declaration by the courts of its invalidity.
Even assuming that there was double sale in this case, petitioner would still not prevail. The pertinent
portion of Art. 1544 provides:
Art. 1544. x x x.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
x x x x.
In interpreting this provision, the Court declared that the governing principle is primus tempore, potior
jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat
the first buyers rights, except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the
first as provided by the aforequoted provision of the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does
not bar him from availing of his rights under the law, among them to register first his purchase as against
the second buyer. However, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even
if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith.

[34]

It is thus essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph, that the second realty buyer
must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale. [35]
We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that respondent was a buyer in good faith, having
purchased the nine (9) lots, including the subject lot, without any notice of a previous sale, but only a
notice of attachment relative to a pending civil case. In fact, in its desire to finally have the title to the
properties transferred in its name, it persuaded the parties in the said case to settle the same so that the
notice of attachment could be cancelled.
Relevant to the discussion are the following provisions of P.D. No. 1529:
Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. An owner of registered
land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance
with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, lease or other voluntary
instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary
instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect
as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties
and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make Registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land
insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the
registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city
where the land lies. (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration.Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien
attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if
registered, filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city
where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time
of such registering, filing or entering.
It has been held that between two transactions concerning the same parcel of land, the registered
transaction prevails over the earlier unregistered right. The act of registration operates to convey and
affect the registered land so that a bona fide purchaser of such land acquires good title as against a prior
transferee, if such prior transfer was unrecorded. [36] As found by the courts a quo, respondent was able to
register its purchase ahead of petitioner. It will be recalled that respondent was able to register its Deed of
Conditional Sale with the Register of Deeds as early as 6 November 1992, and its Deed of Absolute Sale
on 14 October 1993. On the other hand, petitioner was able to present for registration her deed of sale and
owners copy of the title only on 23 January 1995, or almost nine years after the purported sale. Why it
took petitioner nine (9) years to present the deed and the owners copy, she had no credible explanation;
but it is clear that when she finally did, she already had constructive notice of the deed of sale in
respondents favor. Without a doubt, respondent had acquired a better title to the property.
Finally, anent petitioners claim that P.D. No. 1529 applies to registered lands or any subsequent sale
thereof, while Art. 1544 of the Civil Code applies only to immovable property not covered by the Torrens
System, suffice it to say that this quandary has already been answered by an eminent former member of
this Court, Justice Jose Vitug, who explained that the registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been
held to refer to registration under P.D. No. 1529, thus:
The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to
registration under Act 496 Land Registration Act (now PD 1529)which considers the

act of registration as the operative act that binds the land (see Mediante v. Rosabal, 1 O.G.
[12] 900, Garcia v. Rosabal, 73 Phil 694). On lands covered by the Torrens System, the
purchaser acquires such rights and interest as they appear in the certificate of title,
unaffected by any prior lien or encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser is not
required to explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates. The only
exception is where the purchaser has actual knowledge of a flaw or defect in the title of
the seller or of such liens or encumbrances which, as to him, is equivalent to registration
(see Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales v. IAC, G.R. 75336, 18 October 1988; Hernandez vs.
Sales, 69 Phil 744; Tajonera s. Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27 March 1981) (Emphasis
supplied)[37]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals are affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

(14) DANILO DAVID S. MARIANO, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1688


Complainant, (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-1763-MTJ)
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- v e r s u s - AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION and
PERALTA, JJ.
JUDGE JOSE P. NACIONAL,
Respondent. Promulgated:
February 10, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
R E S O LUTI O N
CORONA, J.:
This concerns an administrative complaint stemming from an action for ejectment [1] docketed as Civil
Case No. 12334.[2] In the course of the ejectment proceedings, respondent Judge Jose P. Nacional issued a
pre-trial order dated September 3, 2004 requiring the parties to file their respective position papers and
affidavits of witnesses on September 30, 2004. The parties complied with the September 3, 2004 order.
Subsequently, respondent issued an order dated December 28, 2004 [3] requiring the parties to
submit their respective memorand[a] in the form of a court decision. The parties likewise complied with
this order. The case was eventually decided by respondent on February 14, 2005.
Complainant avers that the issuance of the December 28, 2004 order violated the prohibition on
memoranda by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (RRSP). Complainant likewise posits that
respondent violated the Rules when he decided the case only on February 14, 2005 or 136 days from the
date required by law.[4]
In view of respondents acts, complainant filed this administrative complaint for gross
inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, dereliction of duty and violation of judicial conduct.
In his comment, respondent admitted that he had exceeded the maximum period allowed under
the RRSP. He offered the following excuses: (1) the quality of his decision
had priority over compliance with the reglementary period; (2) his caseload was heavy and (3) the

documents of the case were voluminous. He also justified his December 28, 2004 order by stating that the
case was not an ordinary one.[5]
Respondent added that this administrative complaint was filed only because the judgment was
against complainant.
In its evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that respondent violated basic
procedure and the code of judicial conduct. [6]It also found that respondent had been previously
admonished for gross ignorance of the law, dereliction of duty, partiality, oppression and incompetence
in Prado v. Judge Nacional.[7]
The OCA recommended that respondent be held liable for violation of judicial conduct and gross
ignorance of the law or procedure. It proposed that respondent be fined P20,000 with a stern warning that
a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
The findings of the OCA are well-taken but we do not agree with the recommended penalty.
Without doubt, Civil Case No. 12334 was a case of unlawful detainer covered by the RRSP. [8] Section 5 of
the RRSP explicitly provides that only complaints, compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims pleaded in
the answer, as well as the answers to these pleadings, are allowed. The RRSP also expressly prohibits the
filing of a memorandum. [9] The same prohibition is contained in Section 13, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
(ROC).
The urgency of restoring social order is the paramount consideration in settling unlawful detainer
and forcible entry cases. To aid the judiciary in proceeding with these cases, the RRSP was promulgated
with the following rationale:[10]
[T]he adoption of the Rule on Summary Procedure is part of the commitment of the
judiciary to enforce the constitutional right of litigants to a speedy disposition of their
cases. It was promulgated [to] achiev[e] an expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases. Any member of the judiciary who causes the delay sought to be prevented by the
Rule is sanctionable.
The necessity of promptly resolving unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases is made more
imperative by the express legal provisions on periods of rendition of judgments. Specifically, Section 11,
Rule 70 of the ROC provides that the court shall render judgment within 30 days after receipt of the
affidavits and position papers, or expiration of the period for filing the same. The RRSP provides for the
same period.
Corollarily, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct [11] admonishes all judges to
dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases [12] within the period specified in Section 15 (1)
and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution. [13] This is supplemented by Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary[14] requiring judges to perform all judicial duties
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
We cannot accept the justifications advanced by respondent. Doing so will undermine the wisdom
behind procedural rules and diminish respect for the law. We reiterate that a judge (by himself) cannot
choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. [15] If a judge needs more
time to decide a case, he should formally request this Court for an extension of the deadline.

The rules of procedure are clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for interpretation. We have
held in numerous cases that the failure to apply elementary rules of procedure constitutes gross ignorance
of the law and procedure.[16] Neither good faith nor lack of malice will exonerate respondent because, as
previously noted, the rules violated were basic procedural rules. All that was needed for respondent to do
was to apply them.[17] Unfortunately, he chose not to.
It is settled that one who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court the
ability to be proficient in the law and the duty to maintain professional competence at all times.
[18]
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. [19]
We note that aside from Prado v. Judge Nacional[20] for which respondent was admonished in
2001, he was also indicted for conduct unbecoming of a judge in Abesa v. Judge Nacional.[21]
Respondent argues that his 24 years in the judiciary should be considered in his favor. We
disagree. Length of service, as a factor in determining the imposable penalty in administrative cases, is a
double-edged sword. While it can sometimes help mitigate the penalty, it can also justify a more serious
sanction.[22] Whatever it is, a judges long years of service on the bench are no excuse for ignorance of
procedural rules.[23]
As to the penalty that should be properly meted out to respondent, A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC governs.
Gross ignorance of the law and procedure is classified as a serious charge. [25] And for his violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, the evidence shows that he only committed simple misconduct, a less
serious charge.[26]
[24]

Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,[27] this administrative case against respondent is also
considered a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the bar. [28] Violation of the basic tenets
of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the
Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 1[29] and 12[30] as well as Rules 1.03[31] and
12.04[32] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Respondent also transgressed Rule 10.03 [33] of
the CPR when he violated the provisions of the RRSP and the ROC.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Jose P. Nacional is hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance
of the law and procedure for which he isFINED P40,000. He is also found GUILTY of violation of Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary for which he is FINED P20,000. Respondent is furthermore
found GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 12 as well as Rules 1.03, 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for which he is FINED P10,000.
He is hereby ordered to remit payment of the fines within ten (10) days from receipt of this
resolution.
Respondent is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall
warrant an even more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of
Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.

(15) DEE C. CHUAN & SONS, INC., A.M. No. RTJ-05-1917


represented by Efren A. [Formerly OCA I.P.I No. 04-2006-RTJ]
Madlangsakay,
Complainant, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
JUDGE WILLIAM SIMON
P. PERALTA, Presiding Judge
Regional Trial Court, Manila,
Branch 50,
Respondent. Promulgated:
April 16, 2009
x---------------------------------------------------x
R E S O LUTI O N
CORONA, J.:
In a verified complaint dated May 5, 2004 filed in the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
complainant Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. [1](DCCSI) which was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 02-105031
entitled Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Tek Hua Enterprising Corporation, Manuel C. Tiong and So Ping
Bun, charged respondent Judge William Simon P. Peralta, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 50, with undue delay in the disposition of pending motions in connection with
that case.
Complainant alleges that on September 13, 2002, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch
6[2] rendered a decision[3] in the unlawful detainer case ordering defendants Tek Hua Enterprising
Corporation (represented by its president Manuel C. Tiong) and So Ping Bun to vacate the leased
premises and to jointly pay the cost of suit, attorneys fees and rentals for the reasonable use and
occupation of the premises beginning June 1991.[4]
An appeal was filed in RTC Manila and the case was raffled to Branch 50 wherein respondent was
presiding judge.[5] On March 18, 2003, DCCSI filed a motion to dismiss appeal and for issuance of writ of
execution for failure of the appellants to post the required bond and to pay the rentals due in accordance
with the decision of the MeTC. Acting on the motion, respondent issued an order dated March 21, 2003
requiring the appellants to file their comment thereto. Consequently, three motions to resolve were filed
by DCCSI dated August 11, 2003, October 20, 2003 and December 3, 2003 respectively. However,
despite the lapse of more than one year, respondent failed and refused to resolve the pending motions,
prompting complainant to file this complaint. [6]
In his comment dated June 4, 2004, respondent merely informed the OCA that the subject case ha(d) been
resolved by (his) Court and the same (was) already for mailing and attached a copy of his order dated
May 5, 2004. In his order, he dismissed the appeal for failure of the appellants to file their memorandum
and directed the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of DCCSI.

The OCA, in its report dated December 15, 2004, found that respondent indeed failed to resolve several
motions for more than a year and showed indifference in his comment. It recommended that respondent
be held liable for inefficiency in the performance of his official duties and fined in the amount of P11,000.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA but modify the penalty.
The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower courts shall be decided or
resolved within 90 days from the time the case is submitted for decision. [7] Respondent ignored this
mandate. He was also in violation of the Canon of Judicial Ethics [8] and Code of Judicial Conduct[9] which
require judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. [10]
For more than a year, the respondent failed to resolve several motions the motion to dismiss
appeal and for issuance of writ of execution as well as the three motions to resolve. Had the OCA not
required him to comment on this complaint, these motions might well have remained pending up to now.
Failure to comply within the mandated period constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional
right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. [11] Considering that the subject case was an
unlawful detainer case, its prompt resolution was a matter of public policy as it was subject to summary
procedure.[12] It is disappointing that it was the respondent himself who caused the delay.[13]
The Court has always considered a judges failure to resolve motions and incidents within the
prescribed period of three months as gross inefficiency.[14] It undermines the peoples faith and confidence
in the judiciary,[15] lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute. [16] Undue delay cannot be countenanced
at a time when the clogging of the court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary. [17] The raison d' etre of
courts lies not only in properly dispensing justice but also in being able to do so seasonably. [18]
It is opportune to remind respondent of the evils of judicial delay:
Delay derails the administration of justice. It postpones the rectification of wrong
and the vindication of the unjustly prosecuted. It crowds the dockets of the courts,
increasing the costs for all litigants, pressuring judges to take short cuts, interfering with
the prompt and deliberate disposition of those causes in which all parties are diligent and
prepared for trial, and overhanging the entire process with the pall of disorganization and
insolubility. More than this, possibilities for error in fact-finding multiply rapidly as time
elapses between the original fact and its judicial determination. If the facts are not fully
and accurately determined, then the wisest judge cannot distinguish between merit and
demerit. If courts do not get the facts right, there is little chance for their judgment to be
right.[19]
Furthermore, it is distressing that in his one-page comment containing two very brief paragraphs,
respondent did not even bother to counter the accusation of DCCSI. Neither did he offer any reason or
justification on why it took him more than a year to resolve the motions.
The Court will not tolerate the indifference of respondent judges to administrative complaints and to
resolutions requiring comment on such complaints. An order or resolution of this Court is not to be
construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.
[20]
To do so shows disrespect to the Court, an act only too deserving of reproof. [21]
Respondent judge ought to be reminded that a resolution of this Court requiring
comment on an administrative complaint against officials and employees of the Judiciary
is not to be construed as a mere request from this Court. On the contrary, respondents in
administrative cases are to take such resolutions seriously by commenting on all
accusations or allegations against them as it is their duty to preserve the integrity of
the judiciary. The Supreme Court can hardly discharge its constitutional mandate of
overseeing judges and court personnel and taking proper administrative sanction against

them if the judge or personnel concerned does not even recognize its administrative
authority.[22]
(Emphasis supplied)
A magistrates delay in rendering a decision or order and failure to comply with this Courts rules,
directives and circulars both constitute less serious offenses under Rule 140, Section 9 of the Rules of
Court.[23] Section 11(B) of Rule 140 provides the following sanctions for less serious offenses:
Sec. 11. Sanctions.
xxx xxx xxx
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall
be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1)
month nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
xxx xxx xx
In the light of the circumstances of this case, we find that a fine of P15,000 would be just and fair.
Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,[24] this administrative case against respondent as a judge based
on grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the Bar, shall be
considered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.[25]
Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct
constitutes a breach of Canons 1 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR):
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL
PROCESSES.

CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE


TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON
SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Certainly, a judge who falls short of the ethics of the judicial office tends to diminish the peoples respect
for the law and legal processes. He also fails to observe and maintain the esteem due to the courts and to
judicial officers.[26] Respondent must always bear in mind that it is a magistrates duty to uphold the
integrity of the judiciary at all times.
Respondents delay also runs counter to Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of the CPR which provides:

CANON 12 A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS


DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse Court processes.
For such violation of Canons 1, 11, 12 and Rule 12.04 of the CPR, he should be further fined in the
amount of P5,000.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge William Simon P. Peralta, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Manila, Branch 50 is hereby found GUILTY of two less serious offenses: (1) undue delay in
rendering a decision or order and (2) violation of Supreme Court directives. He isFINED P15,000
payable within 10 days from his receipt of this resolution.
Respondent is further hereby FINED P5,000 for his violation of Canons 1, 11, 12 and Rule 12.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility payable within the same period stated above.
He is STERNLY WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator and the Office of
the Bar Confidant to be attached to respondents records.
SO ORDERED.

(16)
CARLITO P. CARANDANG, A.C. No. 7813
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

ATTY. GILBERT S. OBMINA, Promulgated:


Respondent. April 21, 2009
x-------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

This is a complaint filed by Carlito P. Carandang (Carandang) against Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina (Atty.
Obmina). Atty. Obmina was counsel for Carandang in Civil Case No. B-5109 entitled Sps. Emilia A.
Carandang and Carlito Carandang v. Ernesto Alzona. Carandang brought suit for Atty. Obminas failure to
inform Carandang of the adverse decision in Civil Case No. B-5109 and for failure to appeal the decision.

The Facts
The facts of CBD Case No. 06-1869 in the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) read as follows:
Complainants Sworn Statement is hereto reproduced as follows:
SWORN STATEMENT
Ako si CARLITO P. CARANDANG, nasa wastong gulang, may asawat
mga anak, at nakatira sa 5450 Alberto Apt., St. Francis Homes, Halang
Bian, Laguna.
Na ako ay may kasong isinampa kay ERNESTO T. ALSONA tungkol sa
aming bahay at lupa, at isinampa sa BIAN RTC BRANCH 25, CIVIL
CASE NO. B-5109.
Na ang naturang kaso ay natapos at nadisisyunan noong Enero 28, 2000
at ako ay natalo sa naturang kaso.
Na ang aking naging abogado ay si ATTY. GILBERT S. OBMINA,
tubong Quezon at bilang kababayan ako ay nagtiwala sa kanyang
kakayahan upang maipagtanggol sa naturang kaso, ngunit taliwas sa
aking pananalig sa kanya ang nasabing kaso ay napabayaan hanggang sa
magkaroon ng desisyon ang korte na kunin ang aking lupat bahay, sa
madalit sabi kami ay natalo ng hindi ko man lang nalalaman at huli na
ang lahat ng malaman ko dahil hindi na kami pwedeng umapila.
Na nalaman ko lang na may desisyon na pala ang korte pagkatapos ng
anim na buwan. Ang aking anak na si ROSEMARIE ay nagpunta sa
BIAN, sa RTC ay binati at tinatanong kung saan kayo nakatira at ang
sagot [ng] aking anak BAKIT? At ang sagot naman [ng] taga RTC,
HINDI MO BA ALAM NA ANG INYONG KASO AY TAPOS
NA. Nang marinig yon ay umuwi na siya at sinabi agad sa akin. Tapos na
daw yung kaso [ng] ating bahay at ako ay pumunta sa opisina ni ATTY.
OBMINA at aking tinanong BAKIT DI MO SINABI SA AKIN NA
TAPOS NA ANG KASO? At ang sagot niya sa akin AY WALA KANG
IBABAYAD SA ABOGADO DAHIL WALA KANG PERA PANGAPILA dahil sa sagot sa akin ay para akong nawalan [ng] pag-asa sa
kaso.
Lumapit ako sa Malacaang at binigay yung sulat pero doon ay aking
nakausap yung isang abogado at akoy kanyang pinakinggan at aking
inabot ang papeles at aking pinakita at ang sabi ay hindi na pwede dahil
anim na buwan na [nang] lumipas ang kaso. Kaya aking sinabi sa ATTY.
ng Malacaang na hindi sinabi sa akin agad ni ATTY. OBMINA na may
order na pala ang kaso.
Kaya ang ginawang paraan ay binigyan ako ng sulat para ibigay sa IBP,
at nang mabasa ang sulat ay sinabi sa akin na doon sa SAN PABLO ang

hearing, at tinanong ako kung nasaan ang ATTORNEYS


WITHDRAWAL NYO? Ang sagot ko ay WALA HO, kaya inutusan ako
na kunin ang ATTORNEYS WITHDRAWAL at agad akong nagpunta sa
opisina ni ATTY. OBMINA at tinanong ko sa sekretarya niya kung
nasaan si ATTY. OBMINA ang sagot sa akin ay nasa AMERICA NA!
Kayat aking tinanong kung sinong pwede magbigay sa akin ng attorneys
withdrawal at ang sabi ay yung anak nya na si CARMELITSA
OBMINA. Bumalik ako noong araw ng Biyernes at aking nakuha, pero
hindi na ako nakabalik sa IBP dahil noong araw na iyon ay hindi ko na
kayang maglakad, kaya hindi na natuloy ang hearing sa SAN PABLO.
CARLITO P. CARANDANG
Affiant
CTC No. 21185732
Issued on March 7, 2006
At Bian, Laguna
On November 16, 2006, the Commission on Bar Discipline, through Rogelio A. Vinluan,
the then Director for Bar Discipline (now the incumbent Executive Vice President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines), issued an Order directing respondent Atty. Gilbert S.
Obmina to submit his Answer, duly verified, in six (6) copies, and furnish the
complainant with a copy thereof, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order.
On December 12, 2006, this Commission was in receipt of a Manifestation dated
December 11, 2006 filed by a certain Atty. Ma. Carmencita C. Obmina-Muaa. Allegedly,
she is the daughter of respondent Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina. She further alleged that [her]
father is already a permanent resident of the United States of America since March 2001
and had already retired from the practice of law.
That on February 20, 2007, undersigned Commissioner [Jose I. De La Rama, Jr.]
scheduled the Mandatory Conference/Hearing of the case on March 20, 2007 at 9:30 a.m.
On March 19, 2007, Atty. Ma. Carmencita C. Obmina-Muaa filed a Manifestation and
Motion reiterating her earlier Manifestation that the respondent, Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina
is already a permanent resident of the United States for the last six (6) years and likewise,
she reiterated her request that summons be served on her father thru extraterritorial
service. Atty. Muaa likewise requested the cancellation of the mandatory conference and
resetting of the same on April 10, 2007.
On the scheduled Mandatory Conference on March 20, 2007, complainant Carlito P.
Carandang appeared. The undersigned Commissioner directed Atty. Carmelita Muaa to
appear before this Commission on May 18, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and to bring with her the
alleged withdrawal of appearance filed by her father and to bring proof that her father is
now really a permanent resident of the United States of America.
That on May 18, 2007, Atty. Muaa again filed a Manifestation and Motion informing this
Honorable Commission that she cannot possibly appear for the reason that she is the legal
counsel of a candidate in Muntinlupa City and that the canvassing of the election results
is not yet finished. She likewise submitted copies of her fathers Passport and US
Permanent Residence Card. That with respect [to] the Withdrawal of Appearance, Atty.
Muaa alleged that copies of the same were all given to complainant Carlito P. Carandang.
That an Order dated May 18, 2007 was issued by the undersigned Commissioner granting
the aforesaid Manifestation and Motion. Atty. Muaa was likewise directed to appear
before this Office on June 22, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.

On June 22, 2007, in the supposed Mandatory Conference, Atty. Carmencita Obmina
Muaa appeared. Likewise presented was Mr. Carlito Carandang who is the complainant
against Atty. Gilbert Obmina. In the interest of justice, Atty. Muaa was given a period of
ten (10) days within which to file a verified answer.The Mandatory Conference was set
on August 3, 2007 at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon.
On June 29, 2007, Atty. Muaa filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file Answer.
On July 3, 2007, this Commission is in receipt of the verified Answer filed by respondent
Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina.
On August 3, 2007, during the Mandatory Conference, complainant Carlito Carandang
appeared. Atty. Muaa appeared in behalf of [her] father. After making some admissions,
stipulations and some clarificatory matters, the parties were directed to submit their
verified position papers within ten (10) days.Thereafter, the case will be submitted on
report and recommendation.
On August 10, 2007, complainant, by himself, filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of
Time to File Position Paper. Likewise, respondent, through Atty. Muaa, filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Position Paper on August 13, 2007.
On September 3, 2007, the Commission on Bar Discipline received copy of the
Respondents Memorandum.
On September 12, 2007, this Commission received copy of complainants Position Paper.
[1]
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a Report[2] dated 2 October 2007, IBP Commissioner for Bar Discipline Jose I. De La Rama, Jr.
(Commissioner De La Rama) found that Atty. Obmina was still counsel of record for complainant at the
time the decision was rendered and up to the time of the issuance of the writ of execution. Atty. Obmina
received the Decision dated 28 January 2000 on 1 March 2000. Atty. Carmencita Obmina-Muaa
manifested in Court that her father has been living in the United States of America since 2001. There is
nothing on record that will show that Atty. Obmina notified complainant in any manner about the
decision.
Although Commissioner De La Rama observed that complainant is partly to blame for his loss for
failure to maintain contact with Atty. Obmina and to inform himself of the progress of his case,
Commissioner De La Rama nonetheless underscored the duty of Atty. Obmina to notify his client as to
what happened to his case. Thus:
One cannot escape the fact that the complainant himself failed to communicate with his
counsel for quite sometime. There is nothing in the complainants Sworn Statement that
would show that he regularly visited the office of the respondent, Atty. Gilbert S.
Obmina. Complainant is partly to blame for his loss and it should not be attributed solely
to the respondent.
The Supreme Court held that clients should maintain contact with their counsel from time
to time and inform themselves of the progress of their case, thereby exercising that

standard of care which an ordinary prudent man bestows upon his business (Leonardo vs.
S.T. Best, Inc., 422 SCRA 347)
However, the respondent who has in his possession the complete files and address of the
complainant, should have exerted efforts to even notify Mr. Carandang as to what
happened to his case. Whether the decision is adverse [to] or in favor of his client,
respondent is duty bound to notify the clients pursuant to Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence. Further under Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.Lastly, under Rule 18.04, a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of
his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to clients request for information.
That as a result of the respondents failure to notify the complainant, the latter lost the
case leading to his eviction.
In the case of Mijares vs. Romana 425 SCRA 577, the Supreme Court held that as an
officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever
information he may have acquired which it is important that the client should have
knowledge of. In another case, the Supreme Court held thatrespondents failure to perfect
an appeal within the prescribed period constitutes negligence and malpractice
proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility (Cheng vs. Agravante, 426 SCRA
42).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, with head bowed in sadness, it is respectfully
recommended that Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year.
Although the said respondent is reportedly in the United States of America and
accordingly retired from the practice of law, this Commission will not close its eyes on
the negligence that he has committed while in the active practice.
SO ORDERED.[3] (Emphasis in the original)
In a Resolution[4] dated 19 October 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner De La Rama. The Office of the Bar Confidant received
the notice of the Resolution and the records of the case on 14 March 2008.

The Ruling of the Court


We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendations. Atty. Obmina violated Canon 18, and
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Obmina Failed to Serve Complainant
with Competence and Diligence
Canon 18 states that [a] lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rules 18.03 and
18.04 provide that [a] lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable and [a] lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of
his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.

In his Memorandum, Atty. Obmina admitted that he was counsel for Carandang in Civil Case No. B5109. Atty. Obmina blamed Carandang for the adverse decision in Civil Case No. B-5109 because
Carandang did not tell him that there was a Compromise Agreement executed prior to Atty. Obminas
filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. B-5109. Carandang, on the other hand, stated that Atty. Obmina
made him believe that they would win the case. In fact, Carandang engaged the services of Atty. Obmina
on a contingent basis. Carandang shall pay Atty. Obmina 40% of the sale proceeds of the property subject
matter of the case. Atty. Obmina promised to notify Carandang as soon as the decision of the court was
given.
Contrary to Atty. Obminas promise, there is no evidence on record that Atty. Obmina took the initiative to
notify Carandang of the trial courts adverse decision. Atty. Obmina again put Carandang at fault for
failure to advance the appeal fee. Atty. Obminas version of Carandangs confrontation with him was
limited to this narrative:
Sometime in the year 2000, complainant went to respondents law office. He was fuming
mad and was blaming respondent for having lost his case. He asked for the records of the
case because according to him, he will refer the case to a certain Atty. Edgardo
Salandanan. Respondent gave complainant the case file.Complainant did not return to
pursue the appeal or at least had given an appeal fee to be paid to Court in order to
perfect the appeal.[5]
Atty. Obminas futile efforts of shifting the blame on Carandang only serve to emphasize his failure to
notify Carandang that the trial court already promulgated a decision in Civil Case No. B-5109 that was
adverse to Carandangs interests. Atty. Obmina cannot overlook the fact that Carandang learned about the
promulgation of the decision not through Atty. Obmina himself, but through a chance visit to the trial
court. Instead of letting Carandang know of the adverse decision himself, Atty. Obmina should have
immediately contacted Carandang, explained the decision to him, and advised them on further steps that
could be taken. It is obvious that Carandang lost his right to file an appeal because of Atty. Obminas
inaction.Notwithstanding Atty. Obminas subsequent withdrawal as Carandangs lawyer, Atty. Obmina was
still counsel of record at the time the trial court promulgated the decision in Civil Case No. B-5109.
In Tolentino v. Mangapit, we stated that:
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform her client of whatever
information she may have acquired which it is important that the client should have
knowledge of. She should notify her client of any adverse decision to enable her client to
decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof.Keeping the client informed of the
developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and [loss] of trust and
confidence in the attorney.[6]
The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the lawyer to
inform timely and adequately the client of important developments affecting the clients case. The lawyer
should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the clients interests.[7]
The Court finds well-taken the recommendation of the IBP to suspend Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina from the
practice of law for one year. In the cases of Credito v. Sabio[8] and Pineda v. Macapagal,[9] we imposed
the same penalty upon attorneys who failed to update their clients on the status of their cases. Considering
Atty. Obminas advanced age, such penalty serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the public and
legal profession.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and
adopting the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Accordingly, Atty. Gilbert S.

Obmina is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 18 and of Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Court SUSPENDS Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina from the practice of law for
one year, and WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents
personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

(17)
ATTY. FLORENCIO ALAYBINALAY,
Complainant,
- versus -

JUDGE ELIAS O. LELINA, JR.,


Respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2132


[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2549RTJ]
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** and
PERALTA,*** JJ.
Promulgated:
July 31, 2009

x-------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By Complaint of July 5, 2006, [1] Atty. Florencio Alay Binalay (complainant), head agent of the National
Bureau of Investigation in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, administratively charged Judge Elias O. Lelina,
Jr. (respondent), presiding judge of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabarroguis, Quirino,
for violation of Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Rule 5.07, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.

The Court, by Order of August 5, 1998, preventively suspended respondent on account of an


earlier administrative complaint filed by Divina Perez and Margie Monforte, docketed as A.M. No. RTJ98-1415,[2] charging respondent with harassment in connection with the criminal complaint for Rape filed
against him, which he allegedly committed against Margie Monforte, and the complaint for Abduction
with Rape and Slight Illegal Detention filed by Divina Perez.
In view of the above-said criminal complaints against him, respondent was placed under
detention from the time of his voluntary surrender on November 18, 1998 until his release on July 28,
2005 following his acquittal by the RTC, Branch 27, Manila which reversed its earlier decision of
conviction after the conduct of a new trial.
On January 11, 2006, respondent filed a Motion for Early Resolution [3] of A.M. No. RTJ-98-1415 praying
for a resolution in his favor, given his acquittal in the criminal cases against him. He subsequently filed a
Manifestation, Appeal and Omnibus Motion of June 1, 2006[4] appealing to the Courts sense of
understanding, charity and justice to grant him the permission to practice law during the remainder of his
preventive suspension or, if such cannot be granted, to consider him resigned from the judiciary. It turned
out that before he filed the above-said Manifestation, Appeal and Omnibus Motion, respondent engaged
in the private practice of law. Thus he represented Melanio Agustin and Patricio Bautista in Criminal
Case No. 5192, for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, pending before the RTC,
Branch 27, of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, as shown by a Notice of Hearing dated May 10,
2006[5] addressed to him as counsel for the accused, as well as pleadings [6] signed by him on April 10,
2006 and May 11, 2006. And he also represented a certain Agnes Mariano Gabatin in Civil Case No. 6322006 before the RTC, Branch 32 of Cabarroguis, Quirino, as shown by a motion dated May 21,
2006[7] signed by him. The pleadings filed in both cases were signed by him as a partner of the Bartolome
Lelina Calimag Densing & Associates Law Offices. [8]
Respondent was thus required to comment on the present Complaint of July 5, 2006 within 10
days from receipt of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCAs) 1st Indorsement of July 10, 2006.
[9]
(The directive for respondent to comment on the present complaint was later reiterated by the OCA by
1st Tracer of September 5, 2006).[10]
In the meantime, the OCA, by Memorandum of August 17, 2006, directed respondent to desist from
engaging in the practice of law pending the Courts resolution of his above-stated Manifestation, Appeal
and Omnibus Motion. Responding, respondent, by letter of October 9, 2006 to the OCA, prayed that the
desist order be set aside and a new one issued considering him resigned and thus not covered by the Code
of Judicial Conduct. This letter was, by November 13, 2006 Memorandum of the Court Administrator to
then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, treated as urgent motion for the early resolution of the
administrative complaint [A.M. No. RTJ-98-1415] against him. [11]
In his October 14, 2006 Comment[12] on the present complaint, respondent posits that the prohibition to
engage in the private practice of law applies only to judges who are in the active service and should not
cover those under suspension. He stresses that during his preventive suspension and following his release
from detention, he was forced to engage in the private practice of law, the only profession known to him,
due to his impoverished life and the continuous sufferings of his wife and children; and that the present
administrative case was ill-motivated as complainant bears a grudge against him for his failure to
convince his (respondents) client, Agnes Mariano Gabatin (Agnes) to desist from her complaint against
herein complainant pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
In his Reply to respondents Comment, [13] complainant denies respondents attribution to him of ill-motive,
explaining that the complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman was filed by Agnes, as advised by
respondent, to stymie him from performing his functions as a law enforcer.

By Resolution of March 28, 2007, the Court directed the consolidation of the present complaint with
A.M. No. RTJ-98-1415,[14] which directive was later revoked by Resolution of December 12, 2007,
[15]
A.M. No. RTJ-98-1415 having already been dismissed by Resolution of August 13,
2007[16] (exonerating respondent of the two administrative charges against him).

By Memorandum of May 20, 2008,[17] the OCA, in the present complaint, finds respondent guilty of
unauthorized practice of law since by being merely suspended and not dismissed from [the] service, he
remains to be bound by the prohibition to practice conformably with the provision of the code. The OCA
thus recommends a penalty of three-month suspension from the service without pay.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should
not distinguish.[18] Since Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court [19] and Section 11, Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary [20] does not make any distinction in prohibiting
judges from engaging in the private practice of law while holding judicial office, no distinction should be
made in its application. In the present case, respondent having been merely suspended and not dismissed
from the service, he was still bound under the prohibition.
Apropos is this Courts ruling in Tabao v. Judge Asis:[21]
x x x Specifically, Section 35 of Rule 138 was promulgated pursuant to the
constitutional power of the Court to regulate the practice of law. It is based on sound
reasons of public policy, for there is no question that the rights, duties, privileges and
functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are so inherently incompatible with the high
official functions, duties, powers, discretions and privileges of a judge of the Regional
Trial Court. This rule is obligatory upon the judicial officers concerned to give their full
time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors
for their own private interests and assure the public of impartiality in the performance of
their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and the desire
to promote public interest.[22] (Underscoring supplied)
Admitting having engaged in the private practice of law while he was under preventive suspension,
respondent explains that he was forced to do so out of his sense of responsibility to ameliorate the pitiful
condition of his family. The justification does not lie. As a member of the judiciary, albeit a suspended
one, he still had the duty to comply with the Rules and the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
That respondent tried to secure an authorization to engage in private practice pending the
resolution of A.M. No. RTJ-98-1415[23] shows his awareness of the proscription against engaging in the
private practice of law.
Additionally, a judge should not permit a law firm, of which he was formerly an active member, to
continue to carry his name in the firm name as that might create the impression that the firm possesses an
improper influence with the judge which consequently is likely to impel those in need of legal services in
connection with matters before him to engage the services of the firm. A judge cannot do indirectly what
the Constitution prohibits directly, in accordance with the legal maxim, quando aliquid prohibitur ex
directo, prohibitur et per obliquum or what is prohibited directly is prohibited indirectly.[24]

By allowing his name to be included in the firm name Bartolome Lelina Calimag Densing & Associates
Law Offices[25] while holding a judicial office, he held himself to the public as a practicing lawyer, in
violation of the Rules and the norms of judicial ethics.
Under Sections 9 and 11(B), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10
SC,[26] unauthorized practice of law is classified as a less serious charge punishable by suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months, or a fine of
more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.
Records of the Court show that respondent, in two separate administrative complaints, A.M. No.
OCA IPI 99-860-RTJ and A.M. No. OCA IPI 99-588-RTJ, [27] was charged with gross misconduct, bias,
violation of RA No. 3019 and other illegal activities. By Decision of July 14, 2005, the Court found
him guilty of gross misconduct and suspended him from office for six (6) months, without salary and
other benefits.
With the dismissal on August 13, 2007 of A.M. No. RTJ-98-1415, as reflected above, the
suspension of respondent on account of said case was deemed lifted.
Given that respondent is not a first-time offender, he having been previously faulted for gross
misconduct with warning of stiffer penalties on future infractions, [28] the Court finds the penalty
recommended by the OCA in order.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Elias O. Lelina, Jr. of Branch 32, Regional Trial Court of
Cabarroguis,
Quirino
GUILTY
of
unauthorized
practice of law, and is SUSPENDED from office for Three (3) Months without salary and other benefits
and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

(18)
CONCERNED
BULACAN,
Petitioners,

LAWYERS

OF

- versus -

PRESIDING
JUDGE
VICTORIA
VILLALON-PORNILLOS,
RTC,
BRANCH
10, MALOLOS CITY,
BULACAN,
Respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183


[formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2346-RTJ]
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
Promulgated:

July 7, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Some Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan, denominating themselves as such, filed a five-page Anonymous
Administrative Complaint of August 31, 2005 against Presiding Judge Victoria Villalon-Pornillos
(respondent) of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City.
THE CHARGES AGAINST RESPONDENT:
Complainants charged respondent with having violated Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 6713, the Canons of
Judicial Conduct, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Rules of Court, Rule 140, Sections 1, 8
(pars. 1-4, 6-9) and 9 (pars. 2, 4), as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC [1] (2001), and furnished details
synthesized as follows:
Respondent has a notorious history of committing graft and corruption by fixing cases and selling
decisions or orders, such as receiving P5 million from Lorna Silverio, extorting P6 million from Romeo
Estrella, and obtaining P200,000 from Leonardo de Leon and asking him to pay her electric bills while
simultaneously extorting from de Leons detractors, all relative to the election protests involving the
mayoralty race at San Rafael, Baliuag and Angat, respectively.
Respondent is maintaining amorous relationships with her driver and bodyguards, borrowing money from
her staff and other court officers to cover up her corruption, vindictively detailing almost all of her staff to
other offices, and bragging about her associations with former classmates now working in the judiciary.
Respondent has ostentatiously displayed ill-gotten wealth. She rented a taxi for P2,000 a day for almost
six months. She maintains and enrolls her four children in first-class schools. And she acquired a
new Ford Lynx car.
Respondent reports to court only twice a week. She became mentally ill when her husband passed away
in 1993 and experienced mental trauma when her alleged lover was killed.

REFERRAL OF THE COMPLAINT TO, AND ACTION TAKEN BY, THE OFFICE OF THE
COURT ADMINISTRATOR:
By internal Resolution of September 20, 2005,[2] the Court directed the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) to conduct a discreet investigation of the charges and to submit a report thereon within 30 days
from notice.
A sub rosa investigation was conducted in October 2005 by an investigating team which interviewed
court officers and personnel as well as practicing lawyers in Malolos, after apprising and assuring them of
the confidentiality of the inquiry. Without disclosing the subject of the investigation, the investigating
team represented itself to be on a covert fact-finding mission on alleged irregularities by some RTC
judges of Malolos.
The OCA, which submitted its report by Memorandum of November 24, 2005, concluded that the
allegations of corruption and extortion were based on hearsay; and absent any evidence from reliable
witnesses, it found the same to be difficult to prove; and as long as no one is willing to come forward and
testify based on personal knowledge, the charges of corruption must fail.

On the allegations of respondents illicit amorous relationships with her driver and bodyguards, the OCA
found the same to be based on rumors, noting that not one of the witnesses confirmed that respondent and
her alleged lovers were seen under scandalous circumstances.
The OCA confirmed, however, that Judge Pornillos obtained loans from court personnel and lawyers. One
lawyer the team interviewed who maintains a law office in Malolos disclosed, under condition of
anonymity, that respondent obtained a P5,000 loan from her which has remained unpaid, albeit she has
condoned it as she considers respondent as one of her friends. One court employee also interviewed by
the team similarlyrevealed that respondent obtained loans ranging from P500 to P1,000 from her in 19911992 which had, however, been settled.
Respecting respondents alleged reporting to court twice a week, the team noted that a perusal of the
guards logbook indicating the Malolos judges time of arrival and departure shows that out of the 29
working days for the period from September 1, 2005 to October 11, 2005, respondent reported to court
only for 20 days. Respondent notably arrived late in court and departed therefrom almost always earlier
than 4:30 p.m.
Upon the recommendation of the OCA, the Court, by Resolution of January 17, 2006, directed the Office
of the Deputy Court Administrator to immediately conduct a judicial audit to ascertain conclusively
whether respondent could be held to answer administratively for (a) habitual tardiness, (b) failure to
report to the court during all working days of the week, and (c) apparent poor records management; and to
forthwith submit a judicial report thereon.[3]
The Office of the Deputy Court Administrator thus conducted a judicial audit from July 31,
2007 to August 3, 2007 and examined 354 cases assigned to Branch 10 of the Malolos RTC.
DIRECTIVE FOR RESPONDENT TO COMMENT:
As recommended in the Audit Report of October 15, 2007, the Court, by Resolution of November 20,
2007, required respondent to comment on the following:
(a) Why the records of Criminal Case No. 600-M-1997 was not presented to the audit
team for judicial audit and to submit to the Office of the Court Administrator the
status of the said cases;
(b) Why it took her several months to act on the Motion for Reconsideration in the
following decided cases: Civil Cases 388-M-2006, CV-520-M-2006, CV-714-M2002 and CV-195-2006;
(c) Why she designated Ms. Venus M. Awin, Officer-in-Charge/Branch Clerk of Court to
receive evidence ex-parte despite the clear mandate of Sec. 9, Rule 30 of the Rules
of Court, requiring that only Clerk[s] of Court who are members of the bar can be
delegated to receive evidence ex-parte;
(d) Why the criminal cases CR-836-M-98, CR-2315-M-2004, CR-3569-M-2003 and P558-2004 has not been acted upon for a considerable period of time since its last
orders;

(e) Why Election Case No. 01-M-2004 entitled Apolonio Marcelo vs. Leonardo De Leon
is still pending despite the order of the Comelec for her to cease and desist from
acting on the case since April 3, 2006;
(f) Why the following cases has not been set for further hearing/trial for a considerable
length of time since its last orders:
Civil Cases Criminal Cases
18-M-2005 CR-4180-M-2003
654-M-2004 CR-2189-M-2003
515-M-2005 CR-2190-M-2003
CR-559-M-2004
CR-1385-M-2004
CR-833-M-2003
CR-1433-M-1999[;]
to submit a report on the status of the following cases which were submitted for decision and resolution:
Submitted for decision are: Civil Cases Nos. 119-M-2007, CV-583-M-2006, CV-310-M2007 and CV-071-2004[;]
Submitted for resolution are: Civil Cases Nos. 236-M-2007, 76-M-2005, 288-M-2006,
497-M-2003, SP-Proc. 20-M-2000, CV-228-M-2005, CV-797-M-2005, CV-775-M-2001
and Criminal Cases Nos. CR-1677-M-2006, CR-2199-M-2007, CR-3866-M-2003, CR452-M-2006, CR-453-M-2006, CR-2609-M-2006, CR-2610-M-2006, CR-2611-M-2006.
CR-2612-M-2006, CR-1197-M-1998 and CR-1359-M-2005[;]
and to submit her comment on the charges of (i) habitual tardiness; (ii) failure to report during all working
days of the week; and (iii) apparent poor records management. [4]
RESPONDENTS COMMENT:
On January 15, 2008, respondent filed her 34-page Comment, devoting the first five pages thereof to
imputing to former Judge Florentino Floro the malicious filing of the anonymous complaint. She prayed
for the immediate dismissal of all the false charges engineered by petitioner herein for lack of merit, with
costs against him [sic].[5]
Respondent explains that the record of Criminal Case No. 600-M-1997 was not presented to the audit
team for audit because Public Prosecutor Gaudioso Gillera borrowed it on June 1, 2005 along with two
other related cases; and that by Order of November 29, 2007, Criminal Case No. 600-M-1997 and the
related cases were provisionally dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Respondent belies the delay in resolving the respective motions for reconsideration in four civil
cases. Thus, she explains: In Civil Case No. 388-M-2006, the two motions for reconsideration of the
September 8, 2006 Decision (which were filed on March 16, 2007 and May 28, 2007) were expunged by
Orders of March 16, 2007 and June 28, 2007; the Motion for Reconsideration of March 5, 2007 in Civil
Case No. 520-M-2006 was denied by Order of April 17, 2007 after it was submitted for resolution on
April 16, 2007, and since no appeal was taken therefrom, the Decision of November 17, 2006 became
final and executory; while Civil Case No. 714-M-2002 was dismissed by Decision of November 15,
2005, the Motion for Reconsideration was only resolved on January 10, 2007 because the motion was

submitted for resolution only on January 10, 2007; and in Civil Case No. 195-M-2006, a motion for
reconsideration of the June 10, 2006 Decision was filed on August 24, 2006 but was resolved only on
May 10, 2007 because the motion was submitted for resolution only on May 9, 2007.
Respondent denies designating Venus M. Awin, Officer-in-Charge/Branch Clerk of Court (OIC-BCC), to
receive evidence ex parte and claims that she herself heard all cases on the merits in open court,
including ex parte proceedings.
Respondent asserts that she has always timely resolved motions submitted for resolution upon receipt of
the last pleading and explains as follows: the last Order in Criminal Case No. 836-M-1998 found in the
records by the audit team was one dated February 1, 2006 giving the prosecution five days to file the
necessary motion to finally terminate the case but respondent states that she actually issued an Order of
June 28, 2007 setting the pre-trial conference/hearing on August 15, 2007, which was followed by notices
of pre-trial conference/hearing for September 26, 2007, October 24, 2007 and February 6, 2008; in
Criminal Case No. 2315-M-2004 where the last notice referred to a trial in absentia set on June 1, 2005,
she scheduled the case for reception of prosecution evidence on October 10, 17, 31, 2007 and of defense
evidence on January 30, 2008; in Criminal Case No. 3569-M-2003, she provisionally dismissed the case
by Order of November 9, 2005, and as no further setting appeared in the record, the case was archived by
Order of April 10, 2007.
On why EPC No. 01-M-2004 was still pending despite the order of the Comelec for her to cease and
desist from acting on the case since April 3,2006, respondent explains that she ordered the suspension of
the proceedings on March 17, 2005 and subsequently dismissed the case by Order of August 28, 2007 for
being moot after the protestant filed his candidacy for the Sangguniang Barangay elections.
Respecting the cases listed under paragraph (f) of the Courts November 20, 2007 Resolution, respondent
states that there was no necessity to set them for further hearings because: Civil Case No. 18-M-2005 was
already dismissed for failure to prosecute by Order of April 10, 2007; judgment on the pleadings was
rendered on April 19, 2007 in Civil Case No. 654-M-2004; in Civil Case No. 515-M-2005, the process
server was required, by Order of May 17, 2007, to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him for his non-submission of an Explanation as required by previous Orders; several
hearings were set in Criminal Case No. 4180-M-2003 by Orders of April 19, 2007, May 30, 2007, June
20, 2007 and December 5, 2007; in Criminal Cases Nos. 2189-M-2003 and 2190-M-2003, hearings were
set on October 3, 2007 and November 21, 2007 by Orders of July 12, 2007 and October 3, 2007,
respectively, and subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum was issued to confirm the alleged death of the
accused at the Manila City Jail; Criminal Case No. 559-M-2004 was provisionally dismissed by Order of
November 30, 2005; Criminal Case No. 833-M-2003 was provisionally dismissed by Order of July 6,
2005, which dismissal was clarified by Order of January 17, 2006; and Criminal Case No. 1433-M1999 was provisionally dismissed by Order of December 7, 2007.
As for the status of the cases submitted for decision, respondent relates that Civil Case No. 119-M2007 was not raffled to Branch 10 but to Branch 20; a Decision of November 10, 2006 was already
rendered in Civil Case No. 583-M-2006; a Decision of July 19, 2007 was issued in Civil Case No. 310M-2007; and a Decision of May 10, 2005 was released in Civil Case No. 071-M-2004.
Respecting the incidents submitted for resolution in the following enumerated cases, respondent narrates
that: the motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 236-M-2007 was granted by Order of July 29, 2007; in Civil
Case No. 76-M-2005, the motion for new trial was granted by Order of July 26, 2007; in Civil Case
No. 288-M-2006, the Orders of March 19 and 21, 2007 denying the defendants motions for
reconsideration and to quash subpoena were sustained by this Court in G.R. No. 176295 by Resolution of
June 18, 2007; in Civil Case No. 497-M-2003, pre-trial conference was set by Order of June 14, 2007; in

SP-Proc. 20-M-2000, an Order of November 27, 2007 was issued partly granting a motion to exclude
certain properties from the estate and denying the motion to distribute collected rentals from the existing
improvements in those partly excluded properties except the withdrawal of the sum to pay inheritance and
realty taxes; in Civil Case No. 228-M-2005, judgment on the pleadings was rendered on August 28, 2007;
Civil Case No. 797-M-2005 was dismissed without prejudice by Order of August 1, 2007; Civil Case
No. 775-M-2001 was dismissed for failure to prosecute by Order of April 9, 2007; Criminal Case
No. 1677-M-2006 was dismissed by Order of August 29, 2007; in Criminal Case No. 2199-M-2007, the
Amended Information which downgrades the offense to homicide was admitted by Orders of October 3,
2007; in Criminal Case No. 3866-M-2003, the prosecutions exhibits were admitted by Order of July 23,
2007 which also set the reception of defense evidence on September 19, 2007; Criminal Cases Nos. 452M-2006, 453-M-2006, 2609-M-2006, 2610-M-2006, 2611-M-2006, 2612-M-2006 were consolidated and
set for pre-trial conference on January 30, 2008 per Notice of November 21, 2007; in Criminal Case
No. 1197-M-1998, the defense counsel was directed anew to submit the required pleading and to manifest
in writing the intention to present rebuttal evidence; and in Criminal Case No. 1359-M-2005, the
accuseds Motion for Reconsideration was denied by Order of May 30, 2007.
Respondent avers that she arrives early for work, her asthmatic attacks or high fever notwithstanding. She
submitted a certification[6] from the Courts Leave Division which enumerates the days for which she had
filed leaves of absence. She states that she has always filed leaves of absence for the days that she was
absent from work. She adds that while on leave, she would still work on cases and would never use such
time for pleasure, travel or vacation. She maintains that she operates the court efficiently despite it
being understaffed, as there are only four remaining in her staff, adding that she merely placed some of
her erring staff on floating status to reform them after their commission of misdeeds.
As no Reply is expected to be forthcoming from complainants, the Court deems waived their right to file
one.[7]
THE COURTS FINDINGS:
The Court finds no evidence to sustain the charges of corruption and immorality, and accordingly finds
the OCA recommendation to dismiss well-taken.
The burden of substantiating the charges in an administrative proceeding against court officials and
employees falls on the complainant, who must be able to prove the allegations in the complaint with
substantial evidence. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that respondent regularly
performed her duties will prevail. Moreover, in the absence of cogent proof, bare allegations of
misconduct cannot prevail over the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. In
fact, an administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating
eye, for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that the respondent stands to face
the sanction of dismissal and/or disbarment. The Court does not thus give credence to charges based on
mere suspicion and speculation.[8]
The Court, however, finds well-taken the audit teams observation that Branch 10 lacks proper monitoring
of cases.
While respondent provided the Court the latest issued orders in all but one (Criminal Case No. 1385-M2004) of the listed cases, she failed to justify her failure to act on the incidents thereon despite the lapse of
a considerable period. Respondent offered no explanation for the delay in the resolution of the incidents
in the cases. She simply furnished their status, some of which involve decisions or orders issued after the
conduct of the judicial audit and mostly beyond the prescribed 90-day period, [9] without her having
requested extension for the purpose. Notably, respondent failed to explain her inaction for allowing a

hiatus of at least one year in Civil Case No. 714-M-2002 and eight months in Civil Case No. 195-M2006, she appearing to have merely waited for the submission of a comment on/opposition to a motion for
reconsideration, and a reply, if any.
Moreover, respecting the orders or decisions purportedly dated before July 31, 2007, the start of the
judicial audit, respondent gave no reason why those issuances were not presented or made available to the
audit team during the four-day judicial audit ending on August 3, 2007.
It bears emphasis that the responsibility of making a physical inventory of cases primarily rests on the
presiding judge, even as he/she is provided with a court staff, and a branch clerk of court who shall take
steps to meet the requirements of the directives on docket inventory. [10] Why respondent failed to make a
complete report to the audit team, the court cannot fathom, despite the clear mandate of Administrative
Circular No. 10-94[11] for the performance of a semestral physical inventory of the courts docket which,
for the first semester of 2007, should have been conducted by June 30, a full month prior to the start on
July 31, 2007 of the judicial audit. What was instead presented to the audit team was a docket inventory
of cases for the period from July 2006 to December 2006.
Judges are mandated to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. [12] Prompt disposition of the courts business is attained
through proper and efficient court management, and a judge is remiss in his duty as court manager if he
fails to adopt a system of record management.[13]
Respondent defied the duties to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods, to diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence
in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and
court personnel, and to organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and
fidelity.[14]
A judge being expected to keep his own record of cases so that he may act on them promptly without
undue delay, it is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court so
that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition. Proper and efficient court
management is as much his responsibility. As the judge is the one directly responsible for the proper
discharge of official functions, he/she is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of
the cases and official documents in his/her custody are intact.Hence, the necessity of adopting a system of
record management and of organization of dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business.[15]
Oblivious to the telling condition res ipsa loquitor, respondent asserts that she efficiently manages her
court. If respondents declarations are, by any measure, reflective of her level of satisfaction with court
management, it is unfortunate to find her standard of professional competence in court administration
below par. It is disquieting that she, even while acknowledging that she does not have a full complement
of court personnel,[16] has not been bothered by the prevailing human resource predicament in her
court. She finds comfort in maintaining a limited number of staff for years without actively seeking
additional staff, and in detailing her clerk-in-charge of civil cases and legal researcher to other offices for
alleged misconduct without initiating the appropriate disciplinary measures.
If respondent became aware of any unprofessional conduct on the part of any of her court personnel, she
should have, as a rule of judicial canon, [17] taken or initiated appropriate disciplinary measures against
them. By simply detailing them and omitting to initiate an administrative proceeding, she has not only
tolerated the misdeed but also paid no heed to finding suitable and qualified replacements who could

assist her.Respondent had only to request the Executive Judge of the RTC of Malolos City or the Office of
the Court Administrator for the detail of needed personnel in order not to deprive the public of vital
services. In previous cases, the Court rejected the lame excuse that a trial court had no legal
researcher[18] or branch clerk of court.[19] Adhering to what she personally perceives to be the best way of
managing her court, respondent has only herself to blame for any gaffe plaguing her court.
It bears reiteration that proper court management for the effective discharge of official functions is the
direct responsibility of judges who, therefore, cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency of the court
personnel. The inability of a judge to control and discipline the staff demonstrates weakness in
administrative supervision, an undesirable trait frowned upon by this Court. [20] A judge should be the
master of his own domain and take responsibility for the mistakes of his subjects. [21]
Indeed, a judges duties and responsibilities are not strictly confined to judicial functions. A judge is also
an administrator who must organize the court with a view to prompt and convenient dispatch of its
business.[22]
Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies as less serious offense the undue delay in rendering
a decision or order, which is punishable, under Section 11 (b) thereof, by suspension from office without
salary and other benefits ranging from one to three months, or a fine of more thanP10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000.
To further ensure the speedy disposition of cases, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 [23] provides the
following guidelines for faithful observance:
I. The session hours of all Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall be
from 8:30 A.M. to noon and from 2:00 P.M. to 4:30 P.M. from Monday to Friday. The
hours in the morning shall be devoted to the conduct of trial, while the hours in the
afternoon shall be utilized for (1) the conduct of pre-trial conferences; (2) writing of
decisions, resolutions, or orders; or (3) the continuation of trial on the merits, whenever
rendered necessary, as may be required by the Rules of Court, statutes, or circular in
specified cases.
However, in multi-sala courts in places where there are few practicing lawyers, the
schedule may be modified upon request of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines such that
one-half of the branches may hold their trial in the morning and the other half in the
afternoon. Except those requiring immediate action, all motions should be scheduled for
hearing on Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a non-working day, in the afternoon of the
next business day. The unauthorized practice of some judges of entertaining motions or
setting them for hearing on any other day or time must be immediately stopped.
II. Judges must be punctual at all times.
III. The Clerk of Court, under the direct supervision of the Judge, must comply with Rule
20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the calendar of cases.
IV. There should be strict adherence to the policy on avoiding postponements and needles
delay.
Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Rule 30, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure on adjournments and
postponements and on the requisites of a motion to postpone trial for absence of evidence
or for illness or a party or counsel should be faithfully observed.

Lawyers as officers of the court, are enjoined to cooperate with judges to ensure swift
disposition of cases.
And Administrative Circular No. 1-99[24] enunciates that in inspiring public respect for the justice system,
court officials and employees must strictly observe official time. As punctuality is a virtue, absenteeism
and tardiness are impermissible.
As shown by the logbook maintained by the security personnel, respondent was absent for nine out of the
29 working days for the period from September 1, 2005 to October 11, 2005, [25] and for eight out of the 24
working days for the period from July 1, 2007 to August 2, 2007. [26] In both periods, respondent usually
arrived at around 9:30 a.m. and mostly stayed for less than four hours in office. Such documented
evidence is, however, insufficient to hold respondent liable for habitual tardiness and habitual
absenteeism. An employee shall be considered habitually tardy if one incurs tardiness, regardless of the
number of minutes, ten times a month for at least two months in a semester or at least two consecutive
months during the year,[27] while one is considered habitually absent if one incurs unauthorized absences
in excess of the allowable 2.5 monthly leave credit under the Leave Law for at least three months in a
semester or at least three consecutive months during the year.[28]
Nonetheless, under Administrative Circular No. 2-99, [29] absenteeism and tardiness, even if such do not
qualify as "habitual" or "frequent," shall be dealt with severely.[30] In Office of the Court Administrator v.
Go,[31] the Court enjoined all judges to render at least eight hours of service just like any ordinary
government employee.
Judges are duty bound to comply with the required working hours to insure the maximum
efficiency of the trial courts for a speedy administration of justice. Daily trials at a
minimum of five hours per working day of the week will enable the judge to calendar as
many cases as possible and to dispose with regular dispatch the increasing number of
litigations pending with the court. All other matters needing the attention of the judge are
to be attended to outside of this five-hour schedule of trial.
Judges are reminded that circulars prescribing hours of work are not just empty
pronouncements. They are there for the purpose of promoting efficiency and speed in the
administration of justice, and require prompt and faithful compliance by all concerned. [32]
Moreover, OCA Circular 63-2001[33] reiterated the strict observance of working hours and session hours by
the trial courts and the rules on punctuality and attendance, and enjoined strict compliance with
Administrative Circulars Nos. 1-99, 2-99 and 3-99.
Respecting respondents designation of OIC-BCC Venus Awin who is a non-lawyer to receive
evidence ex-parte, the Court finds the same contrary to the express mandate of Section 9, Rule 30 of the
Rules of Court which requires that only clerks of court who are members of the bar can be delegated to
receive evidence ex-parte. Respondents Orders for the OIC-BCC to conduct ex-parte hearings and to
submit reports thereon, as confirmed by the audit team from the written orders in the records, clearly
contradict and outweigh respondents denial and avowed posture that she personally heard all cases. A
violation of the basic rule on reception of evidence ex-parte or any of its related circulars[34] merits the
imposition of an administrative sanction.[35]

Under Section 9 in relation to Section 11(b) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, violation of
Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars is a less serious offense punishable by suspension from
office without salary and other benefits ranging from one to three months, or a fine of more than P10,000
but not exceeding P20,000.
With respect to the OCAs finding that respondent obtained loans from court personnel and lawyers in
amounts ranging from P500 to P5,000, the Court takes exception to the OCAs conclusion that such act
attaches no administrative liability. That the loans had already been paid or waived by the creditors do not
detract from the fact that certain prohibitions were violated. That the loans were obtained way back in
1991-1992 is of no moment, considering that administrative offenses do not prescribe. [36]
There is a standing legal proscription on [b]orrowing money by superior officers from subordinates, a
violation of which is punishable, under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
by reprimand, suspension ranging from one to 30 days, and dismissal from service, for the first, second
and third offense respectively.[37] At the very least, respondent should be admonished for such dealings
with her subordinates in an improper manner that is precisely being averted by the prohibition, any tinge
or appearance of impropriety of which is sternly avoided by judges.
More severely prohibited is the serious charge of [b]orrowing money or property from lawyers and
litigants in a case pending before the court. [38]In this case, the loan extended to respondent remains unpaid,
yet was unilaterally condoned by the lawyer-creditor. Notably, the investigation team did not inquire
whether the Malolos-based lawyer-creditor has handled a case pending before Branch 10 of the RTC of
Malolos City, over which respondent presides. A perusal of the court calendar submitted by respondent to
this Court reveals, however, that the lawyer-creditor has at least two cases pending before respondents
sala.[39]
The impropriety of borrowing money from unsuitable sources is underscored by the broad tenets of
Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct [40]which took effect on October 20, 1999 or prior to the date of
the loan transactions entered into by respondent. In the recent case of Burias v. Valencia,[41] the Court
ruled:
With respect to the charge of borrowing money in exchange for a favorable judgment,
Rule 5.02, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall refrain
from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the courts
impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase
involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should
so manage investments and other financial interests as to minimize the number of cases
giving grounds for disqualification.
Under Rule 5.04 of Canon 5, a judge may obtain a loan if no law prohibits such
loan. However, the law prohibits a judge from engaging in financial transactions with a
party-litigant. Respondent admitted borrowing money from complainant during the
pendency of the case. This act alone is patently inappropriate. The impression that
respondent would rule in favor of complainant because the former is indebted to the
latter is what the Court seeks to avoid. A judges conduct should always be beyond
reproach. (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
Under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, it is a serious charge to borrow money or property
from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court. Under the same provision, an act that
violates the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes gross misconduct, [42] which is also a serious charge. In
either instance, a serious charge is punishable by: 1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of

the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations, provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 2) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or 3) a fine of more
than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.[43]
Civil service rules[44] and jurisprudence[45] provide that when the respondent is guilty of two or more
charges, the penalty to be imposed shall be that corresponding to the most serious charge, and the rest
shall be considered aggravating circumstances.
It bears noting that this is the third time that respondent has been haled to face an administrative
complaint. Although, in Portic v. Villalon-Pornillos,[46] the complaint against respondent for abuse of
authority and neglect of duty was dismissed, respondent was meted a fine of P5,000 inDela Cruz v.
Villalon-Pornillos[47] for failure to comply with Administrative Circular No. 20-95 with a stern warning
against repetition of similar acts.
Considering that respondent is not a first-time offender and taking into account respondents less serious
violations as aggravating circumstances, the Court imposes the penalty of dismissal from service.
All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds the exhortation that the
administration of justice is a mission. Judges, from the lowest to the highest levels, are the gems in the
vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights looked upon as the embodiments of all what is right, just and
proper, the ultimate weapons against injustice and oppression. [48]
Those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity have no place in the
judiciary. The various violations of respondent reflect a totality of transgressions of one who no longer
deserves a seat in the bench. This Court will not withhold penalty when called for to uphold the peoples
faith in the judiciary.
WHEREFORE, Judge Victoria Villalon-Pornillos, Presiding Judge of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos City, is found guilty of violating paragraph 7, Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
(borrowing money from a lawyer in a case pending before her court) which is also a gross misconduct
constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, aggravated by, inter alia, undue delay in rendering
decisions or orders, and violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars. She
is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits,
with prejudice to re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality. Immediately upon service
on her of this decision, she is deemed to have vacated her office and her authority to act as judge is
considered automatically terminated.
SO ORDERED.

(19) OLGA M. SAMSON, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138


Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,*
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- v e r s u s - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
JUDGE VIRGILIO G. CABALLERO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 5, 2009
x----------------------------------------------------x
R E S O LUTI O N
Per Curiam:

This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and falsification of a public document against
respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija.
In her complaint,[1] complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that respondent Judge Virgilio G.
Caballero should not have been appointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutional qualifications of
proven competence, integrity, probity and independence [2], and for violating the Rules of the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any applicant for judgeship with a pending
administrative case.[3]
According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews, deliberately concealed the
fact that he had pending administrative charges against him.
She disclosed that, on behalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva Ecija), Inc., she had
filed criminal and administrative charges for grave abuse of authority, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code against respondent in the
Office of the Ombudsman on July 23, 2003.
At that time a public prosecutor, respondent allegedly committed certain improprieties [4] and
exceeded his powers by overruling the Secretary of Justice in a reinvestigation he conducted.
On March 24, 2004, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges. [5] It also denied the complainants
motion for reconsideration.[6]
Thereafter, the complainant filed a petition for review [7] on October 28, 2004 in the Court of
Appeals (CA). In a decision[8] datedNovember 25, 2005, the appellate court held that it could not take
cognizance of the criminal charges against respondent on the ground that all appeals from the decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman pertaining to criminal cases should be taken to the Supreme Court by way
of a petition for certiorari. [9] As to the administrative aspect, the CA reversed and set aside the decision
and joint order of the Ombudsman dismissing the charges against respondent. The CA then directed
Ombudsman to file and prosecute the administrative charges against respondent.
While the complainants petition was pending in the CA, respondent was interviewed several
times in the JBC from February 2005 to August 2005 for the position of RTC judge. On August 25, 2005,
he was appointed to the RTC, Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. The complainant charged that
respondent never informed the JBC of his pending cases. This, she said, made it possible for him to be
nominated and, subsequently, appointed.
In his comment,[10] respondent admitted that complainant had lodged criminal and administrative
cases against him in the Ombudsman. He, however, insisted that these were already dismissed by virtue of
the immediately effective and executory March 24, 2004 decision of the Ombudsman. Thus, there were
actually no more pending cases against him during his interviews in the JBC from February to August
2005. Accordingly, there was no impediment to his nomination to and assumption of the position of
judge. However, he insisted that he informed the JBC of the said cases.
The complainant filed a reply,[11] stating that the March 24, 2004 decision of the Ombudsman was
not yet final and executory as it was timely appealed by way of a petition for review filed on October 28,
2004 in the CA. In fact, the petition was even granted.
To further support her charge of dishonesty against respondent, complainant pointed to the
Personal Data Sheet (PDS) filed by respondent on March 21, 2006 in the Office of Administrative
Services-Office of the Court Administrator (OAS-OCA) RTC Personnel Division. [12]According to her,
respondent categorically denied ever having been charged formally with any infraction.

On the basis of the pleadings and documents presented by both parties, the OCA found
respondent administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of an official document for his false
statement in his PDS. It recommended respondents dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government
service.
We agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent is guilty of dishonesty and falsification of
an official document.
We have no way of knowing whether respondent withheld information from the JBC, as both he and
complainant never backed their respective allegations with concrete evidence. [13] Thus, no probative value
can be given either to the charges or to the defenses.
However, respondent is not to be exonerated on the basis of the foregoing alone. Regardless of
whether he disclosed his pending cases during his interviews, the fact remains that he committed
dishonesty when he checked the box indicating No to the question Have you ever been formally charged?
in his March 21, 2006 PDS filed in the OAS-OCA RTC Personnel.[14]
Respondents act of making an obviously false statement in his PDS was reprehensible, to say the
least. It was not mere inadvertence on his part when he answered No to that very simple question posed in
the PDS. He knew exactly what the question called for and what it meant, and that he was committing an
act of dishonesty but proceeded to do it anyway. To make matters worse, he even sought to wriggle his
way out of his predicament by insisting that the charges against him were already dismissed, thus, his
negative answer in the PDS. However, whether or not the charges were already dismissed was immaterial,
given the phraseology of the question Have you ever been formally charged?, meaning, charged at
anytime in the past or present.
In Ratti v. Mendoza-De Castro,[15] we held that the making of untruthful statements in the PDS
amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave
offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits
except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government
service.
Respondent, a judge, knows (or should have known) fully well that the making of a false
statement in his PDS could subject him to dismissal. This Court will not allow him to evade the
consequences of his dishonesty. Being a former public prosecutor and a judge now, it is his duty to ensure
that all the laws and rules of the land are followed to the letter. His being a judge makes it all the more
unacceptable. There was an obvious lack of integrity, the most fundamental qualification of a member of
the judiciary.
Time and again, we have emphasized that a judge should conduct himself in a manner which
merits the respect and confidence of the people at all times, for he is the visible representation of the law.
[16]
Regrettably, we are convinced of respondents capacity to lie and evade the truth. His dishonesty misled
the JBC and tarnished the image of the judiciary. He does not even seem remorseful for what he did as he
sees nothing wrong with it.
He deserves the harsh penalty of dismissal from the service.
This administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding
against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. [17] This resolution, entitled
Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the

Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar,
provides:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are
lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action
ofmembers of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches
of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of
lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be
considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official
concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to
comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended,
disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar.Judgment in both
respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against members
of the bar who were likewise members of the court were treated separately. [18] However, pursuant to the
new rule, an administrative case against a judge of a regular court based on grounds which are also
grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the Bar shall be automatically considered as
disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.[19]
This must be so as violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the new
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of
Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR):[20]
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful act.
CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT
DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON
SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

Since membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral
fitness of a judge also reflects his moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of
judicial conduct also violates his oath as a lawyer. [21] In this particular case, respondents dishonest act was
against the lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
Respondents misconduct likewise constituted a contravention of Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, which strictly enjoins a lawyer from committing acts of deceit, otherwise, he may be
suspended or disbarred. Thus:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
This Court did not hesitate to apply the provisions of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC in a plethora of cases.
Of particular importance to this case is our decision in Caada v. Suerte[23] where we applied the rule to
its fullest extent: automatic disbarment.
[22]

In Caada v. Suerte, complainant charged respondent Judge Suerte with grave abuse of authority,
grave misconduct, grave coercion, dishonesty, harassment, oppression and violation of Article 215 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and the Canons of Judicial Ethics. The complaint alleged, among others, that
respondent tried to sell a dilapidated cargo pick-up truck and Daewoo car to complainant. The latter
refused. Their friendship later on turned sour when they failed to reach an agreement on the commission
respondent was supposed to receive as agent-broker for the contemplated sale of complainants beach lot.
The complainant voiced out his fear that respondent would use his judicial power to persecute him for
what respondent may have perceived as complainants infractions against him.
In his comment, respondent denied offering to sell the vehicles to complainant since, according to
him, he never owned a dilapidated cargo pick-up truck nor could he recall if he had a Daewoo car in
1998.
However, a perusal of respondents Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the years 1998-2001
revealed that among his personal properties were a Daewoo car acquired in 1996 and an L-200 double cab
acquired in 1998. Accordingly, we found respondent guilty of dishonesty for having falsely denied that he
ever owned the aforementioned vehicles. For his infraction, respondent judge was fined in the amount
of P40,000. He would have been dismissed from the service were it not for the fact that he had already
been dismissed therefrom because of an earlier case. [24]
Significantly, pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, we deemed respondent Judge Suertes
administrative case as disciplinary proceedings for disbarment as well, and proceeded to strip him of his
membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and
show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as
member of the Bar." The rule does not make it mandatory, before respondent may be held liable as a
member of the bar, that respondent be required to comment on and show cause why he should not be

disciplinary sanctioned as a lawyer separately from the order for him to comment on why he should not
be held administratively liable as a member of the bench. [25] In other words, an order to comment on the
complaint is an order to give an explanation on why he should not be held administratively liable not only
as a member of the bench but also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and reasonable meaning
of automatic conversion of administrative cases against justices and judges [26] to disciplinary
proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid
the duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint filed against
a member of the bench[27] also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of
the rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar isimpliedly instituted with the filing of
an administrative case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals
or a judge of a first- or second-level court. [28]
It cannot be denied that respondents dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary, it
also put his moral character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law.[29] If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain
its basic ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should
also accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater
import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. [30]
A parting word.
The first step towards the successful implementation of the Courts relentless drive to purge the
judiciary of morally unfit members, officials and personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid set of
rules of conduct on judges. The Court is extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible
representation of the law, they should set a good example to the bench, bar and students of the law. The
standard of integrity imposed on them is and should be higher than that of the average person for it is
their integrity that gives them the right to judge.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, GUILTY of dishonesty and falsification of an official document. He is
ordered DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave
credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Respondent is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this resolution be entered into respondents records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

(20)
ANTERO J. POBRE,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 7399


Present:

- versus Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO,


Respondent.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,*
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:
August 25, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the
Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the
Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am
suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing
up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the
face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no

longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I
would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker
towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct
contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be
taken against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does
not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered
by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the
discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to
her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial
legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar
Council [JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated
position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme
Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced
advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief
Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section
11 of the Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. Explaining the import of the
underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun,said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental
privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the
English Parliament, its purpose is to enable and encourage a representative of the public
to discharge his public trust with firmness and success for it is indispensably necessary
that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from
resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense.[1]
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and
arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without
parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective
debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative
duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if
they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the
pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives. [2]
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance
of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look
diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the
country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the
manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an
unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress
does not destroy the privilege.[3] The disciplinary authority of the assembly[4] and the voters, not the
courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.
[5]

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or
in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last
word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of
the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator
has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that
her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was
quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts
in the Supreme Court, and calling the Court a Supreme Court of idiots.
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.[6] We draw her attention to the ensuing passage
in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this
Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take
the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to
erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01
and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves.
She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and
international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to
stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in
public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice. [7] Senator Santiago should have known, as any
perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the peoples faith in the integrity of the
courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial
legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of
what she said. We quote the passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am
suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing
up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the

face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no
longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by
idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x
x x. (Emphasis ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of
personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore,
her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity
must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court
and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary
immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress
for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that
represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting
rhetoric and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as
an unjust act the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But
while the JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief
Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officio chairperson,[8] have no official duty to nominate candidates for
appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiagos
wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and
defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with
the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its
own forum, from the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to
maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.[9]

In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,[10] we reiterated our
pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer[11] that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to
uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that [i]t is the
duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of
the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance. That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers
to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. And more. The attorneys oath
solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all good fidelity x x x to the courts.
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v.
Cloribel[12] that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of
the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the
judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it
is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem
and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice. [13]
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code.
Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice.
Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.[14]
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as
their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, [15] a good character being an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the
Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference
is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers professional
duties, but also covers any misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the actual practice of their
professionwould show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license
and the law invest in them.[16]
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples faith in courts and trust in the rule of
law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or
personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts,
and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in the case of
former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of
Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang[17] who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most
insolent manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago
for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its
members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even
without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive and disrespectful
language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill
in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her
anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect
them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the peoples representatives, to
perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other
forums outside the congressional hall.[18] It is intended to protect members of Congress against
government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress
and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that
enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, offensive or improper language against another
Senator or against any public institution.[19] But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the
Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics
Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance. [20] The lady
senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and
avoided imposing their own rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary
proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot
overstress that the senators use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the
land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts. [21]
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the
statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied
making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her
implied admission is good enough for the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam DefensorSantiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

(21)
MARGIE CORPUS MACIAS,
Complainant,

A.M. No. RTJ-01-1650


(Formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1195RTJ)
Present:

- versus -

MARIANO JOAQUIN S. MACIAS, Presiding Judge,


Branch 28, Regional Trial Court, Liloy, Zamboanga
del Norte,
Respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 29, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

This involves an administrative complaint [1] filed by complainant Margie C. Macias charging her
husband, Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Judge Macias), with immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. The complaint was filed on March 7, 2001, when respondent was still sitting as the
presiding judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
Complainant alleged that sometime in 1998, respondent engaged in an illicit liaison and immoral
relationship with a certain Judilyn Seranillos (Seranillos), single and in her early 20s. The relationship
continued until the time of the filing of the complaint. Complainant enumerated some of the abuses
committed by respondent, to wit:
(a)
[Respondent] has been using court personnel, namely, Emmanuel
Botiong Tenefrancia, process server, as constant escort of his paramour in going to their
appointed trysts or in escorting back said woman to the place where she is staying, and as
errand boy seeing to their needs when respondent and his mistress are together;
(b)
Respondent has been using another court employee in the person of
Camilo Bandivas, court sheriff, as contact person to his young lover and in summoning
and bringing complainants witnesses to respondent to be harassed and threatened;
(c)
Said Judilyn Seranillos, respondents lover, has been brought many
times by respondent to his court in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, thereby scandalizing
court personnel and lawyers, who sometimes must wait for the session to start because
respondent and his mistress are not yet through with each other; That the scandalous
relations of respondent with his mistress is an open secret among lawyers, court
personnel and litigants [in] Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte;
(d)
Respondent has not been calendaring (sic) cases nor holding court
sessions nor court hearings on Mondays and Fridays so that he can have an extended date
with his paramour, to the great prejudice of public service;
(e)
Respondent and his paramour had often met at the house of Zoosima
(sic) Ojano Carangan, aunt of respondents paramour, [in] Taway, Ipil, Zamboanga del
Sur, and the people of Taway know that respondent judge, who usually arrives in his car,
has been shamelessly and immorally carrying on an illicit affair with said Judilyn
Seranillos. Some inquisitive people usually go out of their houses upon seeing
respondents car parked at the house of the aunt of respondents young mistress, and these
barrio folks often watch respondent come and go; [and]
(f)
Respondent has one or two other women lovers whom he
shamelessly cavorts even in the presence of court personnel. [2]
Complainant attached the affidavits of Shem Tabotabo, [3] Zacarias Cordova,[4] Zosima Carangan,
Danny Layogue and Consolacion S. Layogue, [6] her son Marictibert Corpus Macias, [7] Ruben Perater,
[8]
Roel Mutia,[9] and Aniceto Zozobrado.[10] However, five of them Tabotabo, [11] Cordova,[12] Carangan,
[13]
Danny Layogue,[14] and Marictibert Macias[15] later recanted their affidavits.
[5]

On August 20, 2001, this Court issued a Resolution [16] referring the complaint to Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. for investigation, report and recommendation. On October 29,
2001, Justice Rosario issued an Order [17] setting the initial hearing on November 27, 28 and 29, 2001 and
requiring the parties to submit a list of their respective witnesses and documentary evidence. The hearing

was, however, reset to January 28, 29, 30, and 31, 2002 upon motion of complainant. On January 28,
2002, the parties informed the Investigating Justice that they were exerting all efforts for a possible
reconciliation. Upon motion by both parties, the hearing was again reset to March 11, 12, 13, and 14,
2002.
On March 11, 2002, the parties again informed the Investigating Justice of their desire to confer
in a last effort to settle. The request was again granted with an order that both parties should be ready the
following day if no settlement was reached. The following day, March 12, 2002, the scheduled hearing
proceeded after the parties failed to reach any amicable settlement.
From a list of seven (7) witnesses, complainant manifested that only four (4) witnesses shall be
presented. The first witness, Roel Mutia, testified that he was hired by complainants son, Marquinjo
Macias, to tail Judge Macias after suspecting that his father was having an illicit affair. In summary, Mutia
testified that he saw Judge Macias and Seranillos enter a house in Dipolog City on the afternoon of
October 17, 1999, and that both dined and spent the night there together inside one bedroom. [18] He said
that he accompanied Marquinjo and complainant the next day to the said house and that he saw
complainant pull Seranillos outside the house creating a commotion within the neighborhood. [19] On
cross-examination, Mutia admitted that he was not sure if Seranillos did spend the night inside the said
house, or whether she left that night and just returned the following morning. Counsel for respondent also
pointed to Mutia that the spot where he positioned himself, while observing Judge Macias, was blocked
by leaves and tall trees.[20]
The next witness for complainant was Aniceto Zozobrado. He testified that he was hired by
Seranillos to drive a motorcycle which, according to her, was a gift from Judge Macias. He said that he
saw Judge Macias visit Seranillos on three (3) occasions; that he ran errands for both Judge Macias and
Seranillos; and that he was slapped once by Judge Macias for allegedly peeping at Seranillos. [21] On crossexamination, Zozobrado admitted that he was not really sure if the motorcycle he saw was actually owned
by Seranillos, and that his statement was based merely on presumption. [22] He also admitted that he had
been residing with complainants counsel since the date he executed his affidavit against Judge Macias. [23]
The third witness, Engracio Dialo, Jr., was not allowed to testify after respondents counsel
objected because the intended testimony would cover an event that took place after the filing of the
complaint, and Dialos affidavit narrated matters that were not covered by the allegations in the complaint.
[24]
Complainant manifested her intention to file a motion to amend the complaint. [25] The Investigating
Justice ordered the direct examination of the fourth witness, complainant Margie Macias, without
prejudice to her presenting Dialo after the motion to amend the complaint shall have been resolved.
Complainant, however, refused, saying that she would testify only after Dialo had testified. [26] The
Investigating Justice warned complainant that her refusal to testify shall be taken as a waiver of her right
to present further witnesses and evidence. [27] Despite the warning, complainant refused to proceed with
her direct testimony. The Investigating Justice ordered complainant to rest her case, but she again refused.
The witness for respondent was Judge Macias himself. He denied the allegations of Mutia and
Zozobrado. He said that complainant also filed a complaint for concubinage against him, but the same
was dismissed by the Regional State Prosecutor for lack of sufficient evidence. He believed that
complainants accusations were brought about by her psychiatric condition characterized as severe
paranoia.[28]
On April 25, 2002, the Investigating Justice submitted his Report and Recommendation [29] to this
Court. He recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Judge Macias. The Investigating Justice
reasoned that complainant failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that respondent committed acts of
immorality, or that his conduct was prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Investigating

Justice, however, recommended that Judge Macias be reprimanded for failing to exercise great care and
circumspection in his actions.[30]
The case now comes before this Court for final resolution.
There are two basic questions that must be resolved. First, considering the finding of the
Investigating Justice, we ask: is it really necessary that administrative complaints against members of the
judiciary be disposed of only after adducing evidence that will prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt? And
second, do the acts complained of warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction on respondent judge?
I.
In several cases,[31] this Court has ruled that if what is imputed to a respondent judge connotes a
misconduct that, if proven, would result in dismissal from the bench, then the quantum of proof necessary
to support the administrative charges or to establish grounds for the removal of a judicial officer should
be more than substantial.
The first case involving an administrative complaint filed against a judge in this jurisdiction was
decided in 1922 in In re Impeachment of Horrilleno.[32] There, Justice Malcolm explained:
The procedure for the impeachment of judges of first instance has heretofore not
been well defined. The Supreme Court has not yet adopted rules of procedure, as it
is authorized to do by law. In practice, it is usual for the court to require that charges
made against a judge of first instance shall be presented in due form and sworn to;
thereafter, to give the respondent judge an opportunity to answer; thereafter, if the
explanation of the respondent be deemed satisfactory, to file (sic) the charges without
further annoyance for the judge; while if the charges establish a prima facie case, they are
referred to the Attorney-General who acts for the court in conducting an inquiry into the
conduct of the respondent judge. On the conclusion of the Attorney-Generals
investigation, a hearing is had before the court en banc and it sits in judgment to
determine if sufficient cause exists involving the serious misconduct or inefficiency of
the respondent judge as warrants the court in recommending his removal to the
Governor-General.
Impeachment proceedings before courts have been said, in other jurisdictions, to be in
their nature highly penal in character and to be governed by the rules of law applicable to
criminal cases. The charges must, therefore, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [33]
With Horilleno, it became necessary for every complainant to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt despite the fact that the case will only involve an administrative, and not a criminal, complaint. The
reason is explained, albeit scarcely, in Alcuizar v. Carpio:[34]
While substantial evidence would ordinarily suffice to support a finding of guilt, the rule
is a bit different where the proceedings involve judges charged with grave offense .
Administrative proceedings against judges are, by nature, highly penal in character and
are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. [35]
In more recent rulings, however, the Court applied substantial evidence as the normative quantum
of proof necessary in resolving administrative complaints against judges. In order to diffuse confusion, a
clarification has to be made. First, the pronouncements in Horilleno andAlcuizar may be said to have

been superseded by the Courts recent rulings in Gutierrez v. Belen,[36] Reyes v. Paderanga,[37] and Naval v.
Panday.[38]
Second, members of the judiciary are not a class of their own, sui generis, in the field of public
service as to require a higher degree of proof for the administrative cases filed against them other than,
perhaps, the fact that because of the nature of the responsibility judges have, they are required to live up
to a higher standard of integrity, probity and morality.
When we dismiss a public officer or employee from his position or office for the commission of a
grave offense in connection with his office, we merely require that the complainant prove substantial
evidence. When we disbar a disgraceful lawyer, we require that complainant merely prove a clear
preponderance of evidence to establish liability.[39] There appears no compelling reason to require a higher
degree of proof when we deal with cases filed against judges.
Judges play a vital role in the dispensation of justice. In this jurisdiction, the integrity demanded
of a judge does not commence only when he dons the habiliments of a magistrate or ends when he sheds
off his judicial robe. The nature of the position requires nothing less than a 24-hour daily obeisance to this
mandate of integrity. Any judge who cannot live up to this exacting requirement has no business sitting
on the bench. Considering the proliferation of complaints of abuses and immorality committed by judges,
it is only proper that the Court be ever vigilant in requiring impeccable conduct from the members of its
bench.
II.
However, in this case, we are not convinced that complainant was able to prove, by substantial
evidence, that respondent committed the acts complained of. Basic is the rule that in administrative
proceedings, complainant bears the onus of establishing the averments of her complaint. [40]If complainant
fails to discharge this burden, respondent cannot be held liable for the charge. [41]
Under Sections 8 and 11 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a judge found guilty of immorality
can be dismissed from the service, if still in the active service, or may forfeit all or part of his retirement
benefits, if already retired, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office
including government-owned or controlled corporations. [42] We have already ruled that if a judge is to be
disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct
knowledge.[43] This quantum of evidence, complainant failed to satisfy.
The testimonies of Mutia and Zozobrado are specious and insufficient to convincingly prove that
respondent committed disreputable conduct. This considered, complainant should not have refused to
testify during the hearing. More than anyone else, it was complainant who had a direct interest in making
sure that the evidence adduced met the necessary burden of proof, considering that the allegations in her
complaint involved charges that cannot be lightly dealt with. She should have been more zealous in
prosecuting her complaint.
Nevertheless, we agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice that although the charges of
immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service were not satisfactorily proven by
complainant, respondent cannot be completely exonerated. [44] Mutias testimony that he saw Judge Macias
having dinner with Seranillos and entering a bedroom with her may not satisfactorily prove the charge of
immorality, but this act certainly suggested an appearance of impropriety, Judge Macias being a married
man. Such behavior undeniably constituted unbecoming conduct, a light offense punishable by a fine not
less than P1,000.00 but not more than P10,000.00.[45] In light of the circumstances affecting not only the

reputation of Judge Macias himself but the image and reputation of the whole judiciary as well, we find it
reasonable to impose upon him the maximum fine of P10,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative complaint for immorality and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service against respondent Judge Mariano Joaquin S. Macias of RTC,
Branch 28, of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. However,
respondent is held administratively liable for UNBECOMING CONDUCT and FINED in the amount
of P10,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.

(22)
CESAR TALENTO and MODESTA
HERRERA TALENTO,
Petitioners,

A.C. No. 7433


[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1554]
Present:

- versus

ATTY. AGUSTIN F. PANEDA,


Respondent.

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,


CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
December 23, 2009

x------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is the administrative complaint filed by mother and son Modesta Herrera Talento and
Cesar Talento charging Atty. Agustin F. Paneda of violation of his oath as a lawyer and neglect of duty.

This case was initiated by petitioners with the filing of a Complaint [1] before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) on August 29, 2005. In the said Complaint, petitioners alleged the following:
a. Sometime in October 17, 2000, a civil complaint was filed by Leticia
Herrera. The same complaint was raffled to Regional Trial Court Branch 31, Agoo, La
Union presided by Hon. Clifton U. Ganay;
b. This case was entitled: LETICIA HERERRA, Plaintiff vs. MODESTA H.
TALENTO and CESAR TALENTO as Defendants for Quieting of Title, docketed as
Civil Case No. A-2043;
c. [Petitioners] secured the services of Atty. Agustin Paneda to help and defend
[them] in the aforementioned case. [Petitioners] paid the attorneys fees he required from
[them] in order that [they] could avail of his services as counsel;
d. Atty. Paneda filed [petitioners] answer to the complaint on November 14,
2000 and the case was set for pre-trial. The Honorable Court in an order required both
parties counsels to submit their respective pre-trial briefs and appear during the scheduled
pre-trial hearing on December 18, 2000;
e. Despite the order and notice to [their] counsel, he did not file or submit a pretrial brief for [petitioners] behalf. Much more to [their] surprise and predicament,
although [petitioners] attended the pre-trial hearing, he did not appear;
f. As a result of his non-appearance, the counsel for the other party spoke of
things beyond our knowledge which the Honorable Court granted being expressly stated
and provided in the Rules of Court. [Petitioners] were declared in default because of the
failure of [their] counsel to file and submit [petitioners] pre-trial brief. The Honorable
Court allowed the case to be heard ex parte much to our damage and prejudice;
g. The Honorable Court issued a decision against [petitioners] simply for failure
of [their] counsel Atty. Paneda to submit [petitioners] pre-trial brief and for his failure to
attend the pre-trial of the case. It was simply because of technicality and not based on the
merits of the allegations of both parties that [petitioners] lost the case;
h. Atty. Paneda filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 27, 2000, but
the same was dismissed by the Honorable Court;
i. Atty. Paneda told [petitioners] that he will appeal the case to the Court of
Appeals and [they] agreed because [they were] confident of [petitioners] claim over the
parcel of land subject of this case. He filed a notice of appeal on February 8, 2001.
[Petitioners] paid the required fees and he even required [petitioners] to shell out more
money for the preparation of the Appeal brief;
j. [Petitioners] waited for so long for the decision of the Honorable Court of
Appeals and [petitioners] found out later that [petitioners] appeal was dismissed due to
lack of an appeal brief only when [petitioners] went to Atty. Paneda. [2]
In the Order[3] dated August 30, 2005 issued by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(Commission), respondent was required to submit his Answer to the Complaint within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the notice. Respondent filed his Answer [4] on October 24, 2005.

In his Answer, respondent states that he honestly believed that he had not violated his oath as a
lawyer nor did he commit negligence in handling the case of the petitioners. He likewise avers that there
were other considerations and incidents which had intervened in the case that produced adverse
reactions. He cites as reason for the non-filing of the Pre-trial Brief the fact that, before the date set for
pre-trial hearing, respondent was informed by petitioners that they had already entered into an Amicable
Settlement with the plaintiff. Respondent advised petitioners to submit the said agreement to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in lieu of the Pre-trial Brief. Respondent did not appear during the pre-trial conference
scheduled in the morning of December 19, 2000 because he chose instead to attend the pre-trial
conference of the replevin case involving his personal vehicle in Dagupan City which was also set on that
same morning.[5] With regard to his failure to file the required Appellants Brief before the Court of
Appeals (CA), he points to his secretarys oversight in promptly informing him of the latters receipt of the
Notice of Submission of Appellants Brief. [6] Respondent insists that he was not negligent in his practice
but there were circumstances beyond his control and were unavoidable. He contends that petitioners
should not altogether blame him but they should also accept that the debacle was due to their inaction. [7]
Petitioners refute the foregoing assertions of the respondent. [8] They vehemently deny respondents
claim that they allegedly informed him of the Amicable Settlement prior to the date of pre-trial hearing. In
fact, they intended to show the document to him for the very first time at the pre-trial conference in which
he did not appear. They likewise belie respondents claim that he gave instructions to petitioners on what
to do during the pre-trial conference in his absence. They further deny respondents claim that he had
informed them beforehand of his inability to attend due to a conflict of schedule. Granting that there was
indeed a conflict of schedule, petitioners maintain that respondent is required by Rule 18, Sec. 6 of the
Rules of Court[9] to file the Pre-trial Brief at least three (3) days before the date of pre-trial
conference. Finally, petitioners insist that, contrary to respondents assertion in his Answer, respondent did
not exert his best efforts for his clients because, after negligently abandoning them at the RTC, respondent
likewise failed to fulfill his duty of safeguarding their interests in the CA when respondent failed to
perform a basic legal requirement of filing an Appeal Brief in order for the said court to take cognizance
of their Appeal.
The parties were then required by the Commission to appear at a mandatory conference held
on November 30, 2005. Petitioner Cesar Talento appeared together with his counsel, Atty. Matthew L.
Dati. Co-petitioner Modesta Herrera Talento executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Cesar
Talento and Atty. Dati. Respondent appeared on his behalf.
After the termination of the hearing, the parties were directed to file their respective verified
position papers within ten (10) days from receipt of the Order [10] and were informed that with or without
said position papers, the case shall be deemed submitted for report and recommendation. Only petitioners
submitted a Position Paper[11] which was received by the Commission on January 4, 2009.
On April 28, 2006, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted her Report and
Recommendation finding respondent guilty of gross violation of his duties as a lawyer and of inexcusable
negligence with the recommendation that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year. The salient portion of the Report reads:
Respondents failure to file complainants Pre-trial Brief, his failure to appear
during the Pre-trial Conference because he has to attend to another case, his failure to file
complainants Appeal Brief and his failure to inform complainants of the dismissal of the
case at the Court of Appeals are in gross violation of his duties as a lawyer and show
inexcusable negligence on his part.

His contention that he told complainants to present the Amicable Settlement


agreed upon by the parties for the courts appreciation does not excuse him of his
obligation to his clients, much more his allegation that he advised complainants of the
futility of the case. It should be noted that the Amicable Settlement was forged by the
parties after the case was already filed in court, therefore the same has no legal effect.
The lawyer owes a duty to his client to be competent to perform the legal
services which the lawyer undertakes on his behalf. The lawyer should serve his client in
a conscientious, diligent and efficient manner and he should provide a quality of service
at least equal to that which lawyers generally would expect of a competent lawyer in a
like situation (citation omitted).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby recommend that respondent
ATTY. AGUSTIN F. PANEDA be SUSPENDED for a period of ONE YEAR from
receipt hereof from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
[12]

On November 18, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-495 adopting the
aforequoted Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondents inexcusable negligence, Atty. Agustin F. Paneda is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.[13]
The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent committed gross negligence or
misconduct in handling petitioners case both on trial in the RTC and on appeal in the CA which led to its
dismissal without affording petitioners the opportunity to present their evidence.
After a careful consideration of the records of the instant case, this Court agrees with the IBP in its
findings and conclusion that respondents documented acts fall extremely short of the standard of
professional duty that all lawyers are required to faithfully adhere to.
The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND
HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
xxxxx
Rule 18.02 A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.
There is no doubt that respondent was woefully remiss in his duty to display utmost diligence and
competence in protecting the interests of his clients. The records of this case clearly detailed dire

instances of professional neglect which undoubtedly showed respondents failure to live up to his duties
and responsibilities as a member of the legal profession. Petitioners lost Civil Case No. A-2043 in the
RTC mainly because they were barred from presenting their evidence in court. This was a result of their
being declared in default in the said case as a consequence of respondents failure to appear at the pre-trial
conference. Respondent defended his non-appearance by stating that he had informed petitioners
beforehand of a conflict of schedule and that he had instructed them on what to do in his absence, but
petitioners vehemently denied this claim.
Even if we are to give credence to respondents justification, this does not excuse him from the
fact that he was unable to file a Pre-trial Brief at least three (3) days prior to the scheduled pre-trial
conference, as required by the Rules. Respondent alleges that he already prepared the Pre-trial Brief but
did not push through with filing it because he was allegedly furnished by petitioner Modesta Herrera
Talento with an Amicable Settlement that was forged between the parties before the Barangay Lupon of
San Pedro, Agoo, La Union. He claims that he instructed his clients to present said document during the
pre-trial conference as he had another hearing to attend. [14] However, respondents excuse is untenable as
any lawyer worth his salt would readily know that once a case has been filed in court, any amicable
settlement between the parties must be approved by the court in order for it to be legally binding in
accordance with Section 416[15] of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to the last paragraph of
Section 408[16] of the same Code. Thus, he cannot assume that the case will be deemed closed by virtue of
the supposed amicable settlement so as to excuse him from filing the Pre-trial Brief and from appearing at
the pre-trial set by the court.
With regard to his subsequent error of failing to file the required Appeal Brief which led to the dismissal
of his clients appeal before the CA, respondent did not give any plausible explanation other than merely
placing the blame on the incompetence of his secretary in not promptly informing him about her receipt
of the Notice of Submission of Appellants Brief. [17] This mistake by respondent is exacerbated by the fact
that he did not care to inform his clients of the dismissal of their appeal in 2002 and it was only in 2005
that his clients learned about this unfortunate turn of events.
It is beyond dispute that respondent is duty-bound by his oath as a lawyer to diligently prosecute the case
of his clients to the best of his ability within the bounds of law. Regrettably, the facts of this case illustrate
respondents dismal performance of that responsibility, which in its totality could amount to a
reprehensible abandonment of his clients cause.
A lawyer, when he undertakes his clients cause, makes a covenant that he will exert all efforts for its
prosecution until its final conclusion. He should undertake the task with dedication and care, and he
should do no less, otherwise, he is not true to his lawyers oath. [18]
As held in the case of Vda. De Enriquez v. San Jose:[19]
The Code of Professional Responsibility in Rule 18.03 enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable. A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of
protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence. It is the duty of a lawyer to serve his
client with competence and diligence and he should exert his best efforts to protect,
within the bounds of the law, the interest of his client. It is not enough that a practitioner
is qualified to handle a legal matter; he is also required to prepare adequately and give the
appropriate attention to his legal work.
In Balatbat v. Arias,[20] the Court also held that:

It must be stressed that public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts in the
prosecution or defense of a clients cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interests of his client, he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to
the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. Lawyers are
indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when
strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict compliance with
ones oath of office and the canons of professional ethics is an imperative.
Accordingly, for seriously prejudicing his clients interests due to inexcusable neglect of his professional duties as a
lawyer, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the suspension of respondent for one (1) year from the
practice of law. The IBP Board of Governors acceded to this recommendation.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Agustin F. Paneda GUILTY of violating Canons 17 and 18 as well as Rules
18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent from the
practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal
record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

(23)
ATTY. ELMER C. SOLIDON,
Complainant,

versus -

A.C. No. 8158


Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
Promulgated:

ATTY. RAMIL E. MACALALAD,


Respondent.

February 24, 2010

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
In a verified complaint [1] before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP Commission on Bar Discipline), Atty. Elmer C. Solidon (Atty. Solidon) sought the
disbarment of Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad (Atty. Macalalad) for violations of Rule 16.01,[2] Rule 18.03,
[3]
and Rule 18.04[4] of the Code of Professional Responsibility involving negligence in handling a case.
The Facts

Atty. Macalalad is the Chief of the Legal Division of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Regional Office 8, TaclobanCity. Although he is in public service, the DENR
Secretary has given him the authority to engage in the practice of law.
While on official visit to Eastern Samar in October 2005, Atty. Macalalad was introduced to Atty.
Solidon by a mutual acquaintance, Flordeliz Cabo-Borata (Ms. Cabo-Borata). Atty. Solidon asked Atty.
Macalalad to handle the judicial titling of a parcel of land located in Borongan, Eastern Samar and owned
by Atty. Solidons relatives. For a consideration of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00), Atty. Macalalad
accepted the task to be completed within a period of eight (8) months. Atty. Macalalad received Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as initial payment; the remaining balance of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) was to be paid when Atty. Solidon received the certificate of title to the property.
Atty. Macalalad has not filed any petition for registration over the property sought to be titled up
to the present time.
In the Complaint, Position Papers[5] and documentary evidence submitted, Atty. Solidon claimed
that he tried to contact Atty. Macalalad to follow-up on the status of the case six (6) months after he paid
the initial legal fees. He did this through phone calls and text messages to their known acquaintances and
relatives, and, finally, through a letter sent by courier to Atty. Macalalad. However, he did not receive any
communication from Atty. Macalalad.
In the Answer,[6] Position Paper,[7] and affidavits of witnesses, Atty. Macalalad posited that the
delay in the filing of the petition for the titling of the property was caused by his clients failure to
communicate with him. He also explained that he had no intention of reneging on his obligation, as he
had already prepared the draft of the petition. He failed to file the petition simply because he still lacked
the needed documentary evidence that his clients should have furnished him. Lastly, Atty. Macalalad
denied that Atty. Solidon tried to communicate with him.
The Findings of the IBP
In his Report and Recommendation dated June 25, 2008, Investigating Commissioner Randall C.
Tabayoyong made the following finding of negligence against Atty. Macalalad:
complainant submitted in his position paper the affidavit of Flordeliz Cabo-Borata,
the mutual acquaintance of both complainant and respondent. In the said affidavit,
Mrs. Cabo-Borata described how she repeatedly followed-up the matter with
respondent and how respondent turned a deaf ear towards the same. There is nothing
on record which would prompt this Office to view the allegations therein with
caution. In fact, considering that the allegations corroborate the undisputed facts of
the instant case...
As respondent has failed to duly present any reasonable excuse for the non-filing of
the application despite the lapse of about a year from the time his services were
engaged, it is plain that his negligence in filing the application remains
uncontroverted. And such negligence is contrary to the mandate prescribed in Rule
18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoins a lawyer
not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. In fact, Rule 18.03 even provides that
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Acting on this recommendation, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-336 dated July 17, 2008, holding that:

RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously


ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents violation of
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months and Ordered to
Return the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) with 12% interest per annum
to complainant
The case is now before this Court for our final action pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court, considering that the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline imposed the penalty of suspension on
Atty. Macalalad.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the IBPs factual findings and legal conclusions.
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of
evidence which the complainant has the burden to discharge. [8] We fully considered the evidence
presented and we are fully satisfied that the complainants evidence, as outlined above, fully satisfies the
required quantum of proof in proving Atty. Macalalads negligence.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on
negligence and states:
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
This Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform the
obligations due to the client is consideredper se a violation.
Thus, in Villafuerte v. Cortez,[9] we held that a lawyer is negligent if he failed to do anything to
protect his clients interest after receiving his acceptance fee. In In Re: Atty. Briones,[10] we ruled that
the failure of the counsel to submit the required brief within the reglementary period (to the prejudice of
his client who languished in jail for more than a year) is an offense that warrants disciplinary
action. In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, we penalized a lawyer for failing to inform the client of the status of
the case, among other matters.[11]
Subsequently, in Reyes v. Vitan,[12] we reiterated that the act of receiving money as acceptance fee
for legal services in handling the complainants case and, subsequently, in failing to render the services, is
a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.We made the same conclusion
in Canoy v. Ortiz[13] where we emphatically stated that the lawyers failure to file the position paper
was per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The circumstance that the client was also at fault does not exonerate a lawyer from liability for
his negligence in handling a case. In Canoy, we accordingly declared that the lawyer cannot shift the
blame to his client for failing to follow up on his case because it was the lawyers duty to inform his client
of the status of the case. [14] Our rulings in Macarilay v. Seria,[15] in Heirs of Ballesteros v. Apiag,
[16]
and in Villaflores v. Limos[17] were of the same tenor. In Villaflores, we opined that even if the client
has been equally at fault for the lack of communication, the main responsibility remains with the lawyer
to inquire and know the best means to acquire the required information. We held that as between the
client and his lawyer, the latter has more control in handling the case.

All these rulings drive home the fiduciary nature of a lawyers duty to his client once an
engagement for legal services is accepted. A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility
of protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence.[18] The lawyer bears the duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence, and to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest
of his or her client.[19]Accordingly, competence, not only in the knowledge of law, but also in the
management of the cases by giving these cases appropriate attention and due preparation, is expected from a
lawyer.[20]
The records in this case tell us that Atty. Macalalad failed to act as he committed when he failed
to file the required petition. He cannot now shift the blame to his clients since it was his duty as a lawyer
to communicate with them. At any rate, we reject Atty. Macalalads defense that it was his clients who
failed to contact him. Although no previous communication transpired between Atty. Macalalad and his
clients, the records nevertheless show that Atty. Solidon, who contracted Atty. Macalalads services in
behalf of his relatives, tried his best to reach him prior to the filing of the present disbarment case. Atty.
Solidon even enlisted the aid of Ms. Cabo-Borata to follow-up on the status of the registration application
with Atty. Macalalad.
As narrated by Ms. Cabo-Borata in her affidavit, [21] she succeeded several times in getting in
touch with Atty. Macalalad and on those occasions asked him about the progress of the case. To use Ms.
Cabo-Boratas own words, she received no clear-cut answers from him; he just informed her that
everything was on process. We give credence to these narrations considering Atty. Macalalads failure to
contradict them or deny their veracity, in marked contrast with his vigorous denial of Atty. Solidons
allegations.
We consider, too, that other motivating factors specifically, the monetary consideration and the
fixed period of performance should have made it more imperative for Atty. Macalalad to promptly take
action and initiate communication with his clients. He had been given initial payment and should have at
least undertaken initial delivery of his part of the engagement.
We further find that Atty. Macalalads conduct refutes his claim of willingness to perform his
obligations. If Atty. Macalalad truly wanted to file the petition, he could have acquired the necessary
information from Atty. Solidon to enable him to file the petition even pending the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline investigation. As matters now stand, he did not take any action to initiate
communication. These omissions unequivocally point to Atty. Macalalads lack of due care that now
warrants disciplinary action.
In addition to the above finding of negligence, we also find Atty. Macalalad guilty of violating
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to account for all the
money received from the client. In this case, Atty. Macalalad did not immediately account for and
promptly return the money he received from Atty. Solidon even after he failed to render any legal service
within the contracted time of the engagement.[22]
The Penalty
Based on these considerations, we modify the IBP Commission on Bar Disciplines recommended
penalty by increasing the period of Atty. Macalalads suspension from the practice of law from three (3)
months, to six (6) months.[23] In this regard, we follow the Courts lead in Parias v. Paguinto[24] where we
imposed on the respondent lawyer suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law for violations of
Rule 16.01 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
we
hereby AFFIRM
WITH
MODIFICATION Resolution No. XVIII-2008-336 dated July 17, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. We impose on Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad the penalty of SIX (6)
MONTHS SUSPENSION from the practice of law for violations of Rule 16.03 and Rule 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, effective upon finality of this Decision. Atty. Macalalad
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Macalalad is also ORDERED to RETURN to Atty. Elmer C. Solidon the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of
promulgation of this Decision until the full amount is returned.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in Atty.
Macalalads record as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.

(24) ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., A.C. No. 5768


Complainant,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR.,
Respondent. Promulgated:
March 26, 2010
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled invectives upon another
lawyer and filed a baseless suit against him.
The Facts and the Case
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit [1] with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment,
suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent
Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the following offenses:

1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiffs counsel in Civil Case 7040,
filed a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive, and
improper language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document
in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case 7040
for alleged falsification of public document when the document allegedly falsified was a
notarized document executed on February 23, 1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was
not yet a lawyer nor was assigned in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a
signatory to the document.
3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened
Atty. Barandon saying, Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng p
amilya. Wala napalang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito
ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa CamarinesSur, hindi kayo taga-rito.
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document without
bothering to check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of Court and, with gross
ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized document is presumed to be
genuine and authentic until proven otherwise.
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against
repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an
office secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of
lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed
against him. In October 2000, Atty. Ferrerasked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time
record of his son who worked with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems,
Department of Justice. When Atty. Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed
him with inflammatory language.
Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:
1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for examination,
Atty. Barandon filed charges of libel and grave threats against him. These charges came
about because Atty. Ferrers clients filed a case for falsification of public document
against Atty. Barandon.
2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed that
her thumbmark in the waiver document had been falsified.
3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks against
Atty. Barandon, the MTC Daet was already in session. It was improbable that the court
did not take steps to stop, admonish, or cite Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt for his
behavior.
4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations that
Atty. Ferrer was drunk on December 19, 2000 and that he degraded the law
profession. The latter had received various citations that speak well of his character.

5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against
Atty. Ferrer were still pending. Their mere filing did not make the latter guilty of the
charges. Atty. Barandon was forum shopping when he filed this disbarment case since it
referred to the same libel and grave threats subject of the criminal cases.
In his reply affidavit,[2] Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment. He alleged that on
December 29, 2000 at about 1:30 p.m., while Atty. Ferrer was on board his sons taxi, it figured in a
collision with a tricycle, resulting in serious injuries to the tricycles passengers. [3] But neither
Atty. Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers helped the victims and, during the police investigation, he
denied knowing the taxi driver and blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk. Atty. Ferrer also prevented
an eyewitness from reporting the accident to the authorities. [4]
Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already been dismissed. He belittled the
citations Atty. Ferrer allegedly received.On the contrary, in its Resolution 00-1, [5] the IBPCamarines Norte Chapter opposed his application to serve as judge of the MTC of
Mercedes,Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not have the qualifications, integrity, intelligence,
industry and character of a trial judge and that he was facing a criminal charge for acts of lasciviousness
and a disbarment case filed by an employee of the same IBP chapter.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to this
Court a Report, recommending the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating
Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrers violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case
7040, the falsification of the plaintiffs affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the document had in
fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also found
that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of other counsels, court
personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.
On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-225, [6] adopting and approving
the Investigating Commissioners recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year.
Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its Resolution [7] of
October 19, 2002 on the ground that it had already endorsed the matter to the Supreme Court. On
February 5, 2003, however, the Court referred back the case to the IBP for resolution of
Atty. Ferrers motion for reconsideration.[8] On May 22, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation[9] of the Investigating Commissioner that denied
Atty. Ferrers motion for reconsideration.[10]
On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of Governors IBP Notice of Resolution
No. XVIII-2008.[11] On August 12, 2009 the Court resolved to treat Atty. Ferrers comment as a petition for
review under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Barandon filed his comment,[12] reiterating his
arguments before the IBP. Further, he presented certified copies of orders issued by courts
in Camarines Norte that warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing in court drunk.[13]
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating Commissioner erred in
finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against him; and

2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.


The Courts Ruling
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.[14]
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with
courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code provides:
Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Atty. Ferrers actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to
Atty. Barandon the falsification of the SalaysayAffidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this
imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that the affidavit had been falsified and that
Atty. Barandon authored the same.
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and without
using offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer. To quote portions of what he said in his
reply with motion to dismiss:
1. That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable misrepresentation and
FALSIFICATION of documents, committed to mislead this Honorable Court, but
with concomitant grave responsibility of counsel for Defendants, for distortion and
serious misrepresentation to the court, for presenting a grossly FALSIFIED
document, in violation of his oath of office as a government employee and as
member of the Bar, for the reason, that, Plaintiff, IMELDA PALATOLON, has
never executed the SALAYSAY AFFIDAVIT, wherein her fingerprint has been
falsified, in view whereof, hereby DENY the same including the affirmative defenses,
there being no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the same,
from pars. (1) to par. (15) which are all lies and mere fabrications, sufficient ground
for DISBARMENT of the one responsible for said falsification and distortions. [15]
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite
the adversarial nature of our legal system. [16]
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins
lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code
provides:
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrers drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly before
the start of a court hearing. Atty. Ferrerdid not present convincing evidence to support his denial of this

particular charge. He merely presented a certification from the police that its blotter for the day did not
report the threat he supposedly made. Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police blotter on a
subsequent date that recorded his complaint against Atty. Ferrer.
Atty. Ferrer said, Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palan
g magaling na abogado sa CamarinesNorte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na
kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito. Evidently, he uttered these with intent to annoy, humiliate,
incriminate, and discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court personnel, and litigants waiting
for the start of hearing in court. These language is unbecoming a member of the legal profession. The
Court cannot countenance it.
Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. [17] Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this
sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public
respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he chose to express
his indignation.
Contrary to Atty. Ferrers allegation, the Court finds that he has been accorded due process.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of ones defense. [18] So long as the parties are given the opportunity to
explain their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. [19] Here, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner gave Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file countless pleadings and refute
all the allegations of Atty. Barandon.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain
the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.
[20]
Atty. Ferrers display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance
of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent
transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in
CBD Case 01-809 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for
one year effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrers personal record as an attorney with the
Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy of the same be served to the IBP and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.

(25)
MICHAEL B. BELEN,
Complainant,

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2139


Present:

- versus -

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,NACHU


RA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ.

JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN,


Promulgated:
Regional Trial Court,
Calamba City, Branch 36,
Respondent.
August 9, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative complaint for grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a judge
filed by Michael B. Belen against Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Calamba City, Branch 36.

The Facts
Complainant Michael B. Belen filed a Verified Complaint dated 7 March 2001 with the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court, charging Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen with grave
abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a judge. According to complainant,[1]sometime in March
2004, respondent judge filed a case for Estafa against complainants father, Nezer D. Belen, but the same
was dismissed for lack of probable cause by Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Sunega-Lagman in a
Resolution dated 28 July 2004. Respondent judge filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration and
Disqualif[ication]) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City, alleging, inter alia, that
Sunega-Lagman was always absent during the hearings in the preliminary investigation in the estafa case.
Respondent judge likewise filed a complaint for disciplinary action against Sunega-Lagman before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline, docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1700. To
refute the allegations of respondent judge against Sunega-Lagman, complainant executed an Affidavit
dated 19 May 2006, which was submitted by Sunega-Lagman as evidence in the CBD case. Complainants
Affidavit stated that the allegations of respondent judge against Sunega-Lagman were false; that SunegaLagman was present during the preliminary investigation hearings dated 14, 21 and 29 April 2004, and
that she was absent only once, on 6 May 2004, when she was already on maternity leave; and that it was
respondent judge who was absent during the hearings. [2]
Thereafter, respondent judge allegedly started harassing and threatening complainant with the filing of
several cases against the latter. On 11 January 2007, at 10:00 in the morning, complainant received a
mobile phone text message from the caretaker of his piggery, informing him that respondent judge arrived
and was taking pictures of the piggery. Complainant rushed to the area and saw respondent judge,
accompanied by the Municipal Agriculturist and Sanitary Inspector and the Barangay Chairman,
inspecting complainants piggery.
Respondent judge also wrote several letters addressed to certain local government authorities and
employees, requesting information oncomplainants piggery and poultry business; advising them of the
alleged violations by the complainant of the National Building Code and certain environmental laws; and
reminding the local government authorities of their duty to forestall the issuance of municipal clearance
and license to complainants business establishment. We enumerate these letters below.[3]
1.
Letter dated 15 January 2007, addressed to the Municipal Engineer of
Alaminos, Laguna, requesting confirmation of the issuance by said office of construction,
building and occupancy permits to Michael B. Belens Piggery and Poultry in Brgy. IV
and House in Sta. Rosa, and stating that non-compliance with, or violation of the National
Building Code is a criminal offense;[4]
2.
A follow-up letter dated 23 January 2007, addressed to the Municipal
Engineer of Alaminos, Laguna, referring to respondent judges previous letter dated 15
January 2007; citing provisions of the National Building Code on Building Use Affecting
Health and Safety (Sec. 1.01.05), Building Permits (Sec. 1.02.03), and Inspection and
Certificates of Occupancy (Sec. 1.02.05); and stating: These statutory provisions are
mandatory and any violation thereof is subject to appropriate legal sanctions. Thus, in
accordance with the National Building Code and Code of Conduct of Public Officers that
mandates action and reply to any complaint within 15 days from receipt, may I know
your official action and reply on the matter; [5]
3.
Letter dated 15 January 2007, addressed to Mayor Samuel Bueser of
Alaminos, Laguna, expressing his appreciation of the immediate action taken by the
mayor in relation to the inspection of the piggery and poultry business establishment of

complainant; enumerating the environmental laws violated by the complainant, i.e., Sec.
8 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 984, Section 3 of PD 953, Section 48 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 9003, Section 49 of PD 1152, and Section 27 of Resolution No. 33, Series of
1996; stating that With the violations of the owner and his farm workers, appropriate
criminal actions shall be instituted against them; and reminding the mayor that municipal
officers are mandated by environmental laws not to issue municipal clearance and
permits, and to close business enterprises within its jurisdiction, specifically complainants
piggery and poultry, violating environmental laws;[6]
4.
A follow-up letter dated 23 January 2007, addressed to Mayor Samuel
Bueser of Alaminos, Laguna, inquiring on the official action taken by the mayor in
relation to respondent judges earlier letters and complainants alleged violation of
environmental laws, and emphasizing the responsibility of the mayor to withhold
clearances and permits from business establishments violating environmental laws; [7]
5.
Letter dated 13 February 2007, addressed to Ms. Gladys D. Apostol, the
Municipal Agriculturist of Alaminos, Laguna, requesting a copy of the Inspection report
dated 11 January 2007;[8] and
6.
Letter dated 13 February 2007, addressed to the Municipal Engineer of
Alaminos, Laguna, requesting for prompt action on respondent judges previous letters
dated 15 and 23 January 2007, with a warning that the failure of the said office to reply to
respondent judges inquiries will compel the latter to file administrative and criminal
complaints before the Office of the Ombudsman pursuant to Section 5 of RA 6713,
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.[9]
All of the letters enumerated above bore a letterhead indicating respondent judges official government
position, viz:
From the Chamber of:
Medel Arnaldo B. Belen
Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 36
4th Judicial region, Calamba City
Respondent judge also filed a criminal case against complainant for violations of Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 984 and Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 953, docketed as I.S. No. 07-246/07-247, before
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna. [10]
In his Comment,[11] respondent judge alleged that he never neglected his duties as a judge; that as a
landowner and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines, he had the right to file criminal complaints
against violators of environmental laws to protect the environment; and that he had the right, under the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6173, to secure public information from government offices,
especially about the complainant who was violating numerous laws. Respondent judge also claimed that
he did not use the courts official stationery or letterhead in his correspondence with government
authorities and employees of Alaminos, Laguna. He emphasized that the courts official letterhead should
appear as:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES


REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
4TH JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 36
CALAMBA CITY

Respondent judge claimed that he used his personal stationery or letterhead, and signed the same in his
private, not judicial, capacity.

The OCAs Report and Recommendation


On 11 March 2008, the OCA submitted its Report [12] finding respondent judge guilty of violating Section
4, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. The OCA stated that while
respondent judge did not actually use the courts official letterhead but his own personal stationery, his
letters indicated that he is the presiding judge of an RTC in Calamba City, and even stated that his letters
were from the chambers of the presiding judge. It is apparent from the acts of respondent judge that he
intended to use the prestige of his judicial position to promote his personal interest.
The OCA recommended that (a) the administrative case against respondent judge be re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter; and (b) that respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen be fined in the
amount of P11,000 for violation of Section 4, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.[13]
In a Resolution dated 13 August 2008, the Supreme Court resolved, among others, to re-docket the
administrative complaint against respondent judge as a regular administrative matter. [14] Subsequently, the
OCA, in compliance with the Courts Resolution,[15] designated Court of Appeals Associate Justice Ramon
R. Garcia as the investigating justice of the administrative case.
The Findings and Recommendation
of the Investigating Justice
Investigating Justice Ramon R. Garcia found respondent judge to have violated Section 4 of Canon 1 and
Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary when he used a

letterhead indicating his position as the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36.
According to Justice Garcia, while the computer-printed letterhead of respondent judge is not the official
letterhead of the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, the use of the same reflects respondent judges
designation and position in the judiciary, and indicates that the letters came from the chambers of the
presiding judge of Branch 36. Undoubtedly, respondent judge was trying to use the prestige of his judicial
office for his own personal interest.
Justice Garcia agreed with the OCA in recommending the imposition of the administrative penalty of fine
in the amount of P11,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.
The Courts Ruling
The findings and recommendations of both the Investigating Justice and the OCA are well-taken.
Respondent judge wrote letters to government authorities and employees to secure public information
regarding complainants piggery and poultry business; to inform addressees of the laws allegedly being
violated by complainant; and to remind the addressees of their duties as government officials or
employees and warn them of the possible legal effects of neglect of public duties. In writing these letters,
respondent judges use of his personal stationery with letterhead indicating that he is the Presiding Judge
of RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, and stating that the letter was from [his] chambers, clearly manifests
that respondent judge was trying to use the prestige of his office to influence said government officials
and employees, and to achieve with prompt and ease the purpose for which those letters were written. In
other words, respondent judge used said letterhead to promote his personal interest. This is violative
of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary. We quote these sections below:
CANON
INDEPENDENCE

xxx
SECTION. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
CANON
PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
xxx
In Oktubre v. Velasco,[16] this Court held that respondent judges act of sending several letters bearing his
salas letterhead, in connection with an apparent dispute in the administration of the estates of his relatives,

clearly showed the judges intent to use the prestige of his judicial office, and hence, violative of Rule 2.03
of the Code of Judicial Conduct.[17] The Court considered respondent Judge Velascos excuse for using his
salas letterhead, i.e., that he wanted to protect the interest of his maternal co-heirs in the subject
properties, as flimsy, and emphasized that respondent judge had no business using his salas letterhead for
private matters, as the same should be used only for official correspondence. [18]
Similarly, in Rosauro v. Kallos,[19] it was held that respondent judges use of his salas official stationery in
his private correspondence with complainant and his counsel constitutes violation of Rule 2.03 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court concluded that: By using his salas stationery other than for official
purposes, respondent Judge evidently used the prestige of his office to benefit Guerrero (and himself) in
violation of Rule 2.03 of the Code.[20]
In Ladignon v. Garong,[21] respondent judges act of using the official letterhead of his court and signing
the same using the word judge in his letter-complaint to the First United Methodist Church in Michigan,
USA, was held to be violative of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics and Rule 2.03 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The Court held, thus:
We agree with the Report that what is involved here is the rule that Judges shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. (Canon 4,
Section 1, New Code of Judicial Conduct) Indeed, members of the Judiciary should be
beyond reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and should be free from any appearance
of impropriety in the discharge of their official duties as well as in their personal behavior
and everyday life. No position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and
uprightness on the individual than a seat in the Judiciary. x x x
xxx
x x x As the Report stated, [repondent judges] use of the letterhead and his
designation as a Judge in a situation of potential dispute gave the appearance that there is
an implied or assured consent of the court to his cause. This circumstance, to our mind,
was what marked the respondent Judges use of his letterhead and title as improper. In
other words, the respondent Judges transgression was not per se in the use of the
letterhead, but in not being very careful and discerning in considering the circumstances
surrounding
the
use
of
his
letterhead
and
his
title.
xxx
x x x the use of a letterhead should not be considered independently of the
surrounding circumstances of the use - the underlying reason that marks the use with the
element of impropriety or appearance of impropriety. In the present case, the respondent
Judge crossed the line of propriety when he used his letterhead to report a complaint
involving an alleged violation of church rules and, possibly, of Philippine laws. Coming
from a judge with the letter addressed to a foreign reader, such report could indeed have
conveyed the impression of official recognition or notice of the reported violation.
The same problem that the use of letterhead poses, occurs in the use of the title of Judge
or Justice in the correspondence of a member of the Judiciary. While the use of the title is
an official designation as well as an honor that an incumbent has earned, a line still has to
be drawn based on the circumstances of the use of the appellation. While the title can be
used for social and other identification purposes, it cannot be used with the intent to use

the prestige of his judicial office to gainfully advance his personal, family or other
pecuniary interests. Nor can the prestige of a judicial office be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, or to convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the judge. (Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct) To do any of these is to cross into the prohibited field of impropriety. [22]
In view of the foregoing, we find respondent judge guilty of violation of Section 4 of Canon 1 and
Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
Section 11(B), in relation to Section 9(4) of Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, [23] provides
that violation of Supreme Court rules constitutes a less-serious charge punishable by any of the following
sanctions:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor
more than three (3) months; or
2.
A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

We agree with the recommendation of the investigating justice and the OCA that respondent
judge, for his transgression, be meted a penalty of fine amounting to P11,000, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, we find Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba City, Branch 36, GUILTY ofviolation of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, and FINE himP11,000, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

(26)

MANUEL C. YUHICO,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 8391


[Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1631]
Present:

- versus -

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO-MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,*
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO JJ.
Promulgated:

ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ,


Respondent.

November 23, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint [1] dated January 10, 2006 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty.
Fred L. Gutierrez (Gutierrez) filed by Manuel C. Yuhico (Yuhico) for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Complainant Yuhico alleged that he met Gutierrez at the Office of the City Prosecutor
in Pasig City on May 4, 2005. Yuhico was there to testify at the preliminary investigation of a Complaint
for Estafa against one Jose S. Chicharro, who was then being represented by Gutierrez. He claimed that
they eventually became acquainted as they frequently saw each other during the hearings of the case.

On June 24, 2005, Yuhico averred that Gutierrez phoned him and asked for a cash loan
of P30,000.00. Gutierrez then claimed that he needed money to pay for the medical expenses of his
mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico immediately handed the money. In turn, Gutierrez promised to pay
the loan very soon, since he was expecting to collect his attorney's fees from a Japanese client.

On June 28, 2005, Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a loan, this time in the amount of P60,000.00,
allegedly to pay the medical expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized. Again, Yuhico readily issued
to Atty. Gutierrez an Equitable PCI Bank check amounting to P60,000.00.[2]Again, Gutierrez promised to
pay his two loans totalling to P90,000.00 within a short time.

On July 12, 2005, Yuhico asked Gutierrez to pay his loans. Atty. Gutierrez failed to pay. In a text
message on July 12, 2005 at 2:47 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez stated:

I really don't know how to say this as I don't want to think that I may be taking
advantage of our friendship. You see i've long expected as substantial attorney's fees since
last week from my client Ogami from japan. It's more or less more than 5m and its release
is delayed due to tax and the law on money laundering. From my estimate it wud be
collected by me on or b4 august 5. N the meantime I am quite in a financial difficulty as
everyone is.

Later, Yuhico alleged that Gutierrez attempted to borrow money from him again. He said
Gutierrez claimed that his daughter neededP70,000.00 to pay the fees required to take the licensure
examination in the U.S. Medical Board. Gutierrez assured him that he will pay all his debts on or
before August 10, 2005. In his text message on July 12, 2005 at 3:05 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez said:

As you are aware of these past few days were really great trials 4 me. My mother
died, my wife got sick and now my bro in law died. These events led me to struggling
finances. To get me going I tried to sel my car but my buyer backed out. Now my
immediate problem is the amt of 70thousand which my daughter needs for her payment
sa US medical board. I dnt want her to miss this opportunity. Can u help me again? I will
pay all my debts on or b4 Aug.10 pls. Thanks.

However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez any amount of money. Instead, he demanded
from Gutierrez the payment of his debts. Gutierrez then sent another text message to Yuhico on July 12,
2005 and requested him to give him another week to pay his debts. Gutierrez failed to make the payment.

Yuhico repeatedly requested the payment of loans from Gutierrez from August to December
2005. Gutierrez, on the other hand, for numerous times promised to pay, but always failed to do so. At
one point, Gutierrez even asked Yuhico's account number and promised to deposit his payment there, but
he never deposited the payment.

On December 5, 2005, Yuhico's counsel sent a demand letter [3] to Gutierrez to pay his debts, but
to no avail.

Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against Gutierrez before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to submit his Answer on the complaint
against him.[4]

In his Answer,[5] Gutierrez claimed that Yuhico was the one who offered to lend him money in
gratitude for the assistance he extended to the latter when he was under threat by his clients. He, however,
admitted that he accepted the loan due to compelling circumstances. Gutierrez added that he has no
intention of evading his obligation to pay his debts, but he is currently in financial distress, thus, he
cannot pay his debts yet. He claimed he will pay his debts when his financial condition improves.

On March 24, 2006, both parties were directed to appear at the mandatory conference before the
IBP-CBD. Gutierrez failed to attend on two occasions.

On June 9, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed both parties to submit their respective position papers.

Likewise, during the clarificatory hearing before the IBP-CBD, only the complainant's counsel
attended. There was no appearance on the part of Gutierrez.

In his Position Paper, Yuhico manifested that the Supreme Court, in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez,
had already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct, in view of his failure to
pay his debts and his issuance of worthless checks.
[6]

Subsequently, in a Resolution dated December 11, 2008, the, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of nonpayment of just debts and ordered him to return the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos ( P90,000.00) to
Yuhico, with interest until full payment.

In view of the previous disbarment of Gutierrez, the IBP-CBD recommended to the Court that, instead of
rendering the instant case moot, Gutierrez should be disbarred anew effective upon the expiration of the
sanction pursuant to the March 26, 2004 Supreme Court Decision. The IBP-CBD explained that while we
do not have jurisprudence on the issue of double or multiple disbarment, the American jurisprudence,
however, recognizes double or multiple disbarments as well as the minimum requirement of five (5) years
for readmission to the Bar.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649, resolved to
adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve it with modification as to the payment
of the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00), this time, without interest.

We sustain the findings of the IBP, but with modification as to its recommendations.
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may
be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of
justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but
also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to
society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.
They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[7]
In the instant case, there is no question as to Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he contracted and
his failure to pay the same leaves no room for interpretation. Neither can he justify his act of non-payment
of debt by his dire financial condition. Gutierrez should not have contracted loans which are beyond his
financial capacity to pay.
Likewise, we cannot overlook Gutierrez's propensity of employing deceit and misrepresentations for the
purpose of obtaining debts without the intention of paying them. Records show Gutierrez's pattern of
habitually making promises of paying his debts, yet repeatedly failing to deliver. The series of text
messages he sent to Yuhico promising to pay his loans, while simultaneously giving excuses without
actually making good of his promises, is clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts demonstrate lack of

moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as
officers of the court.
We also note that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez,[8] the Court had already disbarred Gutierrez from the
practice of law for gross misconduct due to non-payment of just debts and issuance of bouncing checks.
In view of the foregoing, while we agree with the findings of the IBP, we cannot, however, adopt its
recommendation to disbar Gutierrez for the second time, considering that Gutierrez had already been
previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP pointed out, we do not have double or multiple disbarment in our
laws or jurisprudence. Neither do we have a law mandating a minimum 5-year requirement for
readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's infraction calls for the penalty of disbarment, we
cannot disbar him anew.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649 dated December 11, 2008, of the IBP, which found
FRED
L.
GUTIERREZ
guilty
of GROSS
MISCONDUCT, is AFFIRMED. He
is ORDERED to PAY the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) to the complainant
immediately from receipt of this decision with interest.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished and properly recorded in the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to the personal record ofGutierrez; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the
Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
(27) A.C. No. 8253
March 15, 2011
(Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1067)
ERLINDA R. TAROG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT, Respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

We resolve a complaint for disbarment for alleged grave misconduct brought against Atty. Romulo L.
Ricafort for his failure to account for and to return the sums of money received from his clients for
purposes of the civil action to recover their property from a foreclosing banking institution he was
handling for them. The original complainant was Arnulfo A. Tarog, but his wife, Erlinda R. Tarog,
substituted him upon his intervening death.

Antecedents

In 1992, the Tarogs sought the advice of Atty. Jaime L. Miralles regarding their bank-foreclosed property
located in the Bicol Region. Atty. Miralles advised them to engage a Bicol-based attorney for that
purpose. Thus, they went to see Atty. Ricafort accompanied by Vidal Miralles, their friend who was a
brother of Atty. Miralles.1 They ultimately engaged Atty. Ricafort as their attorney on account of his being
well-known in the community, and being also the Dean of the College of Law of Aquinas University
where their son was then studying.

Having willingly accepted the engagement, Atty. Ricafort required the Tarogs to pay P7,000.00 as filing
fee, which they gave to him.2 He explained the importance of depositing P65,000.00 in court to counter
the P60,000.00 deposited by Antonio Tee, the buyer of the foreclosed property. After they informed him
that they had onlyP60,000.00, he required them to add some more amount (dagdagan niyo ng konti).3 To
raise the P65,000.00 for the Tarogs, therefore, Vidal solicited a loan from one Sia with the guarantee of
his brother Atty. Miralles. Sia issued a check in that amount in the name of Arnulfo. 4

On November 7, 1992, the Tarogs and Vidal went to the office of Atty. Ricafort to deliver the P65,000.00.
When Arnulfo said that he had first to encash the check at the bank, Atty. Ricafort persuaded him to
entrust the check to him instead so that he (Atty. Ricafort) would be the one to encash it and then deposit
the amount in court. On that representation, Arnulfo handed the check to Atty. Ricafort. 5
After some time, the Tarogs visited Atty. Ricafort to verify the status of the consignation. Atty. Ricafort
informed them that he had not deposited the amount in court, but in his own account. He promised to
return the money, plus interest. Despite several inquiries about when the amount would be returned,
however, the Tarogs received mere assurances from Atty. Ricafort that the money was in good hands.
The Tarogs further claimed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, in Sorsogon (RTC), where their
complaint for annulment of sale was being heard, had required the parties to file their memoranda.
Accordingly, they deliveredP15,000.00 to Atty. Ricafort for that purpose, but he did not file the
memorandum.6

When it became apparent to the Tarogs that Atty. Ricafort would not make good his promise of returning
theP65,000.00, plus interest, Arnulfo demanded by his letter dated December 3, 2002 that Atty. Ricafort
return theP65,000.00, plus interest, and the P15,000.00 paid for the filing of the memorandum. 7 Yet, they
did not receive any reply from Atty. Ricafort.

In his defense, Atty. Ricafort denied that the P65,000.00 was intended to be deposited in court, insisting
that the amount was payment for his legal services under a "package deal," that is, the amount included
his acceptance fee, attorneys fee, and appearance fees from the filing of the complaint for annulment of

sale until judgment, but excluding appeal. He claimed that the fees were agreed upon after considering the
value of the property, his skill and experience as a lawyer, the labor, time, and trouble involved, and his
professional character and social standing; that at the time he delivered the check, Arnulfo read,
understood, and agreed to the contents of the complaint, which did not mention anything about any
consignation;8 and that Arnulfo, being a retired school principal, was a learned person who would not
have easily fallen for any scheme like the one they depicted against him.

Findings of the IBP Commissioner

Following his investigation, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline rendered his Report and Recommendation dated October 7,
2004,9 in which he concluded that:

It is respectfully recommended that respondent, Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort be DISBARRED and be


ordered to return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 which he got from his client.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

Commissioner Reyes regarded the testimonies of Erlinda and Vidal more credible than the testimony of
Atty. Ricafort, observing:

Based on the said testimony, statements and actuations of complainant Erlinda Tarog and his collaborating
witness, we find their statements to be credible.

Atty. Ricafort in his testimony attempted to show that the amount of P65,000.00 was paid to him by the
complainant as acceptance fee on a package deal basis and under said deal, he will answer the filing fee,
attorneys fees and other expenses incurred up to the time the judgment is rendered. He presented a
transcript of stenographic notes wherein it was stated that complainant himself did not consign the money
in court. The respondent admitted in his testimony that he did not have any retainer agreement nor any
memorandum signed or any receipt which would prove that the amount of P65,000.00 was received as an
acceptance fee for the handling of the case.

Atty. Romulo Ricafort stated that there was no retainer agreement and that he issued only receipt because
the late Arnulfo Tarog will not pay unless a receipt is issued.

The Undersigned Commissioner asked the respondent "Basically you describe that thing that will happen
in the litigation related to the payment of fees. But when you received that P65,000.00 did you not put
anything there that you will describe the nature of legal work which you will undertake considering that
you have considered thisP65,000.00 as your attorneys fees? And Atty. Ricafort stated: Yes I did. I do not
know why they were not showing the receipt. That is a big amount, Your Honor. They demanded for me
the receipt of P30,000.00 how much more with that P65,000.00. They demanded for the receipt of
that P65,000.00 but I cannot explain the reason why

During the clarificatory questioning, the Undersigned Commissioner also asked Atty. Ricafort why he did
not answer the demand letter sent by Arnulfo Tarog and the proof of service of the said letter was
presented by the complainant. Conveniently, Atty. Ricafort stated that he did not receive the letter and it
was received by their helper who did not forward the letter to him. He also adopted the position that the
complainant was demanding the P65,000.00 wherefore this case was filed. When confronted by the
testimony of Mr. Vidal Miralles, the respondent Atty. Ricafort just denied the allegation that he received
the P65,000.00 for deposit to the court. He also denied that Mr. Miralles has visited his residence for
follow-up the reimbursement.

The Undersigned Commissioner asked the respondent if he has personal animosity with Arnuldo Tarog,
Erlinda Tarog and Vidal Miralles and if there are any reason why this case was filed against him. In his
answer the respondent stated that we have been very good friends for the past ten (10) years and he said
that in fact he was surprised when the complaint was filed against him and they even attached the
decision of the Supreme Court for his suspension and maybe they are using this case to be able to collect
from him.

The main defense of the respondent is that the complainant in this case testified that the total amount to
redeem his property is P240,000.00 and when asked whether he consigned the money to the court to
redeem the property he answered in the negative.

The alleged payment of P65,000.00 was made prior to the said testimony sometime in 1992. Hence, it
was stated on complainants affidavit that on November 7, 1992, prior to filing said complaint I had given
him the sum of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos to be deposited to the Regional Trial Court representing
redemption money of the Real Estate Mortgage. The amount of P65,000.00 is very much close to the
amount of the principal obligation of the complainant and it is not surprising for a non-lawyer to hold on
to the belief that with the filing of the case for annulment of foreclosure his case would be strengthened
by making a deposit in court hence, the motivation to produce the deposit was logical and natural insofar
as the complainant is concerned. The testimony of the complainant in court that the bank
needed P240,000.00 for the redemption of the property will have no bearing on the actuation of the

complainant who has been required to deposit P65,000.00 by his lawyer. The Undersigned Commission
has no alternative but to believe in the credibility and truthfulness of complainants narration that of Mrs.
Erlinda Tarog and Vidal Miralles.10

Commissioner Reyes concluded that Atty. Ricafort violated Canon 15, and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03
of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by taking advantage of the vulnerability of his
clients and by being dishonest in his dealings with them by refusing to return the amount of P65,000.00 to
them.

On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVI-2004-473, 11 resolving to
return the matter to Commissioner Reyes for a clarification of whether or not there was evidence to
support the claim that the P65,000.00 had been in payment of attorneys fees and other expenses.

On October 11, 2005, Commissioner Reyes issued a second Report and Recommendation, 12 in which he
declared that Atty. Ricafort did not present any retainer agreement or receipt to prove that the amount
of P65,000.00 had been part of his attorneys fees; that Atty. Ricafort had willfully ignored the demand of
Arnulfo by not replying to the demand letter; that, instead, Atty. Ricafort had insisted that the househelp
who had received the demand letter had not given it to him; and that in his (Commissioner Reyes)
presence, Atty. Ricafort had also promised to the complainant that he would settle his liability, but Atty.
Ricafort did not make good his promise despite several resettings to allow him to settle his obligation.

Action of IBP Board of Governors

Through Resolution No. XVII-2006-569,13 therefore, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Reyes and recommended the disbarment of Atty.
Ricafort and the order for him to return the amounts of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 to Erlinda, viz:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A" and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent has taken advantage of his client [sic]
vulnerability and has been dishonest with his dealings to his client, Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort is hereby
DISBARRED and Ordered to Return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 to complainant.

Atty. Ricafort moved for reconsideration, 14 maintaining that a retainer agreement was immaterial because
he had affirmed having received the P65,000.00 and having issued a receipt for the amount; that he had
not kept the receipt because "the practice of lawyers in most instances is that receipt is issued without
duplicate as it behooves upon the client to demand for a receipt;" 15 that considering that the Tarogs had
produced a photocopy of the receipt he had issued for the P30,000.00 in connection with their appeal, it
followed that a similar receipt for attorneys fees had been made at the time when the case had been about
to be filed in the RTC; that the testimonies of Erlinda and Vidal were inconsistent with Arnulfos affidavit;
and that he did not receive Arnulfos demand letter, which was received by one Gemma Agnote (the name
printed on the registry receipt), whom he did not at all know.

Acting on Atty. Ricaforts motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors downgraded the
penalty from disbarment to indefinite suspension,16 thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the


Recommendation of the Board of Governors First Division of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with modification
of Resolution No. XVII-2006-509 of the Board of Governors dated 18 November 2006, that in lieu of the
Disbarment of Atty. Romulo Ricafort, he is INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED from the practice of law and
Ordered to return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 to complainant.
Atty. Ricafort filed a second motion for reconsideration, 17 assailing the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors for violating Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court requiring the decision of the IBP
Board of Governors to be in writing and to clearly and distinctly state the facts and reasons on which the
decision was based.

Hence, the administrative case is now before the Court for resolution.

Ruling

We affirm the findings of the Commissioner Reyes, because they were supported by substantial evidence.
However, we impose the penalty of disbarment instead of the recommended penalty of indefinite
suspension, considering that Atty. Ricafort committed a very serious offense that was aggravated by his
having been previously administratively sanctioned for a similar offense on the occasion of which he was
warned against committing a similar offense.

A.
Version of the complainants was more credible than version of Atty. Ricafort
Atty. Ricafort admitted receiving the P65,000.00 from the Tarogs. Even so, we have two versions about
the transaction. On the one hand, the Tarogs insisted that the amount was to be consigned in court for
purposes of their civil case; on the other hand, Atty. Ricafort claimed that the amount was for his fees
under a "package deal" arrangement.

Commissioner Reyes considered the Tarogs version more credible.

We hold that Commissioner Reyes appreciation of the facts was correct and in accord with human
experience.

Firstly, it is easier to believe that Atty. Ricafort persuaded the Tarogs on the need for that amount to be
deposited in court for purposes of their civil case. Being non-lawyers, they had no idea about the
requirement for them to consign any amount in court, due to the substantive and procedural implications
of such requirement being ordinarily known only to lawyers. Their ready and full reliance on Atty.
Ricaforts representations about the requirement to consign that amount in court was entirely
understandable in view of their awareness of Atty. Ricaforts standing in the legal community of the
place. Besides, as Commissioner Reyes observed, it was not far-fetched for the Tarogs to believe that an
amount close in value to their original obligation was necessary to be deposited in court to boost their
chances of recovering their property.

Secondly, Atty. Ricaforts denial of receipt of Arnulfos demand letter was incredible. He already initially
admitted receiving the letter through a househelp. 18 His denial came only subsequently and for the first
time through his motion for reconsideration dated December 30, 2006, 19 in which he completely turned
about to declare that the Gemma Agnote who had received the letter was unknown to him. 20 Expectedly,
Commissioner Reyes disregarded his denial, because not only was the denial an apparently belated
afterthought, it was even contradicted by his earlier admission of receipt. In any event, the fact that
Gemma Agnote was even the househelp whom Atty. Ricafort had adverted to becomes very plausible
under the established circumstances.

Thirdly, Atty. Ricafort explained that he had no copies of the receipts for the P65,000.00 and P15,000.00
issued to the Tarogs because "the practice of lawyers in most instances is that receipt is issued without
duplicate as it behooves upon the client to demand for a receipt." 21 But such explanation does not
persuade us. Ethical and practical considerations made it both natural and imperative for him to issue
receipts, even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for his own records. He was all too
aware that he was accountable for the moneys entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means of
ensuring accountability was by issuing and keeping receipts. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly enjoins such accountability, viz:

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Definitely, Atty. Ricafort had a highly fiduciary and confidential relation with the Tarogs. As such, he was
burdened with the legal duty to promptly account for all the funds received from or held by him for
them.22

And, fourthly, to buttress his denial that the P65,000.00 was not intended for deposit in court, Atty.
Ricafort insisted that Arnulfo did not object to the omission from the complaint in the civil action of any
mention of consignation. However, the complaint that he himself had written and filed for the Tarogs
contradicted his insistence, specifically in its paragraph 16, which averred the plaintiffs (i.e., Tarogs)
readiness and willingness to deposit the amount of P69,345.00 (inclusive of the redemption price and
interest) in court, thus:

16. And to show willingness and sincerity of the plaintiffs, they are ready and willing to deposit the
amount ofP69,345.00 as redemption price plus reasonable accrued interests, if there are any; 23
Nor could the Tarogs have conjured or invented the need for consignation. The consignation was a notion
that could have emanated only from him as their lawyer. In fact, Erlinda recalled while testifying before
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline that they had brought to their meeting with Atty. Ricafort
only P60,000.00 for the consignation, but that Atty. Ricafort had to instruct them to raise the amount. The
excerpt of her pertinent testimony follows:

Comm. Reyes: Madam Witness, in this affidavit you stated that your late husband and Mr. Vidal Miralles
went to the office of Atty. Ricafort to advise the latter that we already had the sum of P65,000.00 in the
form of check, how did you come to know this fact?
Witness: Paano po ba sabi nya na magdeposit ng P65,000.00 tapos may P60,000.00 kami sabi niya
dagdagan niyo ng konti.
Comm. Reyes: Kinausap ba niya kayo?
Witness: Nandoon po ako.
Comm. Reyes: Where you present when the check was given?
Witness: Yes.
Comm. Reyes: So, alam niyo, nakita niyo na binigay yong P65,000.00 na tseke?
Witness: Opo.

Comm. Reyes: Alam niyo ba kung ano ang nangyari doon sa tseke na idiniposit?
Witness: Noong una sinabi niya sa amin na ididiposit niya sa court.
Comm. Reyes: Nalaman niyo ba na hindi naman pala idiniposit sa court?
Witness: Opo.
Comm. Reyes: Kailan niyo nalaman?
Witness: Nagsabi siya tapos sinabi pa niya na yong interest sa bank ay ibinigay niya sa amin ang sabi
naming salamat.24

B.
Atty. Ricaforts acts and actuations constituted serious breach of his fiduciary duties as an attorney
The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing
with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship. 25 In particular, Rule 16.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Ricafort was required to hold in trust any money and property of his clients that came
into his possession,26 and he needed to be always mindful of the trust and confidence his clients reposed
in him.27 Thus, having obtained the funds from the Tarogs in the course of his professional employment,
he had the obligation to deliver such funds to his clients (a) when they became due, or (b) upon
demand.281avvphi1

Furthermore, Rule 16.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, imposes on an attorney the positive
obligation to keep all funds of his client separate and apart from his own and from those of others kept by
him, to wit:

Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.

Atty. Ricaforts act of obtaining P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 from the Tarogs under the respective pretexts
that the amount would be deposited in court and that he would prepare and file the memorandum for the
Tarogs erected a responsibility to account for and to use the amounts in accordance with the particular
purposes intended. For him to deposit the amount of P65,000.00 in his personal account without the

consent of the Tarogs and not return it upon demand, and for him to fail to file the memorandum and yet
not return the amount of P15,000.00 upon demand constituted a serious breach of his fiduciary duties as
their attorney. He reneged on his duty to render an accounting to his clients showing that he had spent the
amounts for the particular purposes intended. 29 He was thereby presumed to have misappropriated the
moneys for his own use to the prejudice of his clients and in violation of the clients trust reposed in
him.30 He could not escape liability, for upon failing to use the moneys for the purposes intended, he
should have immediately returned the moneys to his clients. 31

Atty. Ricaforts plain abuse of the confidence reposed in him by his clients rendered him liable for
violation of Canon 16,32 particularly Rule 16.01, supra, and Canon 17, 33 all of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. His acts and actuations constituted a gross violation of general morality and of
professional ethics that impaired public confidence in the legal profession and deserved punishment. 34
Without hesitation, therefore, we consider Atty. Ricaforts acts and conduct as gross misconduct, a serious
charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 8. Serious charges. Serious charges include:


xxx
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
xxx

That this offense was not the first charged and decided against Atty. Ricafort aggravated his liability.
In Nuez v. Ricafort,35 decided in 2002, the Court found him to have violated Rules 1.01 36 of Canon 1 and
Rule 12.0337 and Rule 12.0438 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in relation to his
failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of realty to the complainant (who had authorized him to sell
the realty in her behalf). His failure to turn over the proceeds compelled the complainant to commence in
the RTC a civil action to recover the proceeds against him and his wife. The Court meted on him the
penalty of indefinite suspension, and warned him against the commission of similar acts, stating:

We concur with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted and approved by the Board of
Governors of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings
with complainant. Indeed, the record shows respondents grave misconduct and notorious dishonesty.
There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent gravely
abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed dishonesty when he did not turn
over the proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the
complainant to go to court for the recovery of the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend
money, time and energy therefor. Then, despite his deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in

his having been declared in default, he appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad
faith attended such a step because he did not pay the docket fee despite notice. Needless to state,
respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what
rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and unlawfully done to
complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant
of what he had done and in continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what
had been validly and lawfully adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the account against
which the checks were drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his
obligation as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay
the obligation.

All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

Respondents claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has already
encashed all checks is preposterous. The account was closed on or before 26 February 1996. He knew that
there were still other checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15 March 1996 which could not be encashed
before their maturity dates.

By violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished
public confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busios v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v.
Villalon, 337 SCRA 622 [2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably failed
to live up to the standards of the legal profession (Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v.
Villalon, supra).

Respondents act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment
rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the
checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued
defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold. 39
Bearing in mind his administrative record, and considering that the penalty for violation of Canon 16
ranges from suspension for six months, 40 to suspension for one year,41 to suspension for two
years,42 depending on the amount involved and the severity of the lawyers misconduct, we rule that
disbarment is the commensurate punishment for Atty. Ricafort, who has shown no reformation in his
handling of trust funds for his clients.

WHEREFORE, we find and declare Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort guilty of a violation of Canon 16, Rule
16.01 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, accordingly, disbar him. The Bar
Confidant is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

Atty. Ricafort is ordered to return to Erlinda R. Tarog the sums of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00, plus
interest of six percent per annum reckoned from the demand made on December 3, 2002, within twenty
days from notice.

This decision is effective immediately.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for its reference. SO ORDERED.
(28)
ANTONINO MONTICALBO,
Complainant,

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197


[Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 08-3026-RTJ]
Present:

- versus -

JUDGE CRESCENTE F. MARAYA, JR.,


Regional Trial Court,
Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte,
Respondent.

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,


NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
April 13, 2011

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a verified Complaint dated September 24, 2008 filed by
complainant Antonino Monticalbo charging respondent Judge Crescente F. Maraya, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte, with gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence and grave
abuse of authority thru false representation. [1]

Complainant Monticalbo is one of the defendants in a civil case for collection of a sum of money filed by
Fatima Credit Cooperative against him and his wife before the 6 th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Calubian-San Isidro, Leyte (MCTC).[2]
The case was dismissed by the said court in its February 1, 2008 Order on the ground that the
representative of Fatima Credit Cooperative had no authority to prosecute the case. [3] The MCTC,
however, did not rule on the counterclaim of complainant Monticalbo for attorneys fees and litigation
expenses. For said reason, he filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the court.
[4]

Aggrieved, complainant elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte (RTC),
where his appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. CN-89. [5] He then filed a motion for extension of time to
file a memorandum on appeal, which was granted by respondent judge in his Order dated June 25, 2008.[6]
In his August 26, 2008 Order, respondent judge dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time. He
stated that:
Under the rules on Summary Procedure which was applied to govern the
proceedings of this case, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Being a
prohibited pleading, it will not suspend the period of appeal. (Jaravata vs. CA G.R. No.
85467, April 25, 1990, 3rd Division). Since the appealed Order was received by counsel
for the defendants-appellants on February 13, 2008, the notice of appeal, not a motion for
reconsideration, should have been filed within a period of 15 days which lapsed
on February 29, 2008. As the Notice of Appeal was filed on March 31, 2008, the appeal
was, therefore, filed out of time and the appealed Order has become final and
executory. The lapse of the appeal period deprives the courts of jurisdiction to alter the
final judgment (Delgado vs. Republic, 164 SCRA 347).[7]
Complainant Monticalbo imputes the following errors on the part of respondent judge: (1) respondent
erred in ruling that Civil Case No. CN-89 is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, considering
that the total claim of the plaintiff in the said case exceeded P10,000.00; (2) respondent, motivated by bad
faith and corruption, cited the non-existent case of Jaravata v. Court of Appeals in his questioned Order;
and (3) respondent accepted bribes in the form of food from plaintiff cooperative in Civil Case No. CN89, through Margarito Costelo, Jr., then Sheriff of the trial court presided over by respondent judge, and
Chairman of the Board and President of the said cooperative. [8] Complainant further avers that he
personally witnessed the respondent judge enjoying a drinking spree with Costelo and his other male staff
members in a nipa hut annexed to the building of the trial court during office hours in the afternoons
of July 9, 2008, August 6, 2008 and September 10, 2008.[9]
In his Comment and Manifestations dated December 29, 2008, respondent judge refutes all the
accusations hurled by complainant against him. He explains that he decided to dismiss complainants
appeal because it was filed out of time under the Rules on Summary Procedure. This decision was made
in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the MCTC and of his sound discretion. [10] Secondly, he
argues that complainants accusation of bad faith and corruption is baseless and that the complaint was
filed upon the urging of Atty. Alexander Lacaba, his counsel, in an attempt to get even with him
(respondent judge) for having lost the appeal in the case. [11] Lastly, respondent denies having participated
in any drinking spree with his staff members or Costelo, who has been prohibited by his doctor from
drinking alcoholic beverages. He claims that he only eats his meals in the nipa hut because he has to
refrain from eating in public eateries for security reasons. [12]

The administrative complaint was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and referred to the
Executive Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City Station, for raffle among the justices thereat for
investigation, report and recommendation.[13]
On April 13, 2010, Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon issued his Report and Recommendation, the
pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
In sum, it is recommended that respondent Judge be ABSOLVED from the
charge of grave misconduct and corruption. However, the citation of a non-existent case
by the respondent Judge in his assailed order of dismissal is tantamount to a
misrepresentation and therefore reflect poorly on his esteemed position as a public officer
in a court of justice, it is therefore recommended that he be ADMONISHED AND
STRICTLY WARNED that a repetition thereof will be more severely dealt with. [14]
The Court agrees with the findings of the Investigating Justice.

Grave Misconduct and Bribery


In order to merit disciplinary action, it must be established that respondents actions were
motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred or were attended by fraud, dishonesty or corruption. [15] In the
absence of such proof, the decision or order in question is presumed to have been issued in good faith by
respondent judge.[16] This was emphasized in the case of Balsamo v. Judge Suan,[17] where the Court
explained:
The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and
partial. Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his
duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate
intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law
can find refuge.[18]
In cases where a judge is charged with bribery or grave misconduct, bias or partiality cannot be presumed.
Neither can bad faith or malice be inferred just because the judgment or order rendered by respondent is
adverse to complainant.[19] What constitutes bad faith has been expounded on in the case of Sampiano v.
Judge Indar:[20]
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of a
sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive
of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest
deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage. [21]

Before a judge can be held liable for deliberately rendering an unjust judgment or order, one must
be able to show that such judgment or order is unjust and that it was issued with malicious intent to cause
injustice to the aggrieved party.[22] Well-established is the rule in administrative proceedings that the
burden of proof rests on the complainant, who must be able to support and prove by substantial evidence
his accusations against respondent.[23] Substantial evidence, the quantum of proof required in
administrative cases, is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.[24] Failure of the complainant to substantiate his claims will lead to the
dismissal of the administrative complaint for lack of merit because, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the presumption that a judge has regularly performed his duties will prevail. [25]
In this case, complainant has nothing but mere assertions and conjectures to buttress his allegations of
grave misconduct and bribery on the part of respondent who, if complainant is to be believed, accepted
bribes of food and engaged in drinking sprees with court employees during office hours.Contrary to
complainants statement, the Investigating Justice found that respondent was attending to his cases during
the dates when he allegedly had those drinking sessions.
Time and again, this Court has held that charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot
be given credence.[26] Complainant miserably failed to substantiate his allegations of grave misconduct
and bribery. He merely alleged hollow suppositions to shore up his Complaint.Consequently, this Court
has no other option except to dismiss the administrative complaint for lack of merit.
Although the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that would violate
the norm of public accountability or diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary, it will not hesitate to
protect an innocent court employee against any groundless accusation or administrative charge which has
no basis in fact or law.[27] As succinctly put by Justice Quisumbing in the case of Francisco v. Leyva,[28]
This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon
employees of the Judiciary. At the same time, however, neither will we hesitate to shield
the same employees from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote
the orderly administration of justice.[29]
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Respondent judge can be held liable for gross ignorance of the law if it can be shown that he committed
an error so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith. [30] In addition to this, the acts
complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but should also be motivated
by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.[31]
Complainant Monticalbo insists that respondent judge erred in ruling that his counterclaim for attorneys
fees and litigation expenses was covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure which provides that a
motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and will not toll the running of the period to
appeal. To support his argument, complainant points out that his claim exceeds the P10,000.00 limit set in
the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Complainant is mistaken.
A cursory reading of Section 1 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure clearly shows that
complainants claim is covered by the said rule which reads:

Section 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases
xxx
(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount
of the plaintiffs claim does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) in
Metropolitan Manila, exclusive of interest and costs.
Evidently, the complainant has been consulting old books. The rule now, as amended by A.M.
No. 02-11-09-SC, effective November 25, 2002, has placed the ceiling at P100,000.00. As such, the
complainant has no basis in charging that respondents knowledge of law fell so short and that he was
remiss in his obligation to be familiar with the law which even law students these days know such x x x.
[32]

For this reason, counsel for complainant is reminded to choose his words carefully and refrain from
hurling insults at respondent judge especially if, as in this instance, he is obviously mistaken in his
reading of the law. His use of insulting language and unfair criticism is a violation of his duty as a lawyer
to accord due respect to the courts. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a
lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist
on similar conduct by others.

Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent judge erred in issuing the
questioned order, he cannot be held liable for his official acts, no matter how erroneous, for as long as he
acted in good faith.[33] A judge is not required to be faultless because to demand otherwise would make the
judicial office untenable for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the administration of
justice can be infallible.[34] As a matter of policy, a judge cannot be subject to disciplinary action for his
erroneous actions, unless it can be shown that they were accompanied by bad faith, malice, corrupt
motives, or improper considerations.[35]
The complainant should have elevated his grievance to the higher courts. The filing of an
administrative case against the judge is not an alternative to the other judicial remedies provided by law,
neither is it complementary or supplementary to such actions. [36] With regard to this matter, the case
of Flores v. Abesamis[37] is instructive:
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or
irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The
ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in
nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or
application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial),
and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be
deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power
or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and
criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute
for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion
of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or
proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the
judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the
available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken
with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability
may be said to have opened, or closed.[38]
Citation of non-existent case
The Court now deals with the charge that respondent judge cited a non-existent case Jaravata v.
Court of Appeals with case number CA G.R. No. 85467 supposedly promulgated on April 25, 1990 in his
questioned Order.
A search of available legal resources reveals that no such decision has been promulgated by the
Supreme Court.
Besides, Supreme Court docket numbers do not bear the initials, CA G.R. And, it cannot be
considered a CA case because the respondent is the Court of Appeals. This undoubtedly runs counter to
the standard of competence and integrity expected of those occupying respondents judicial position. A
judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. [39] The Code of Judicial
Conduct also demands that he be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. [40]
While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment without proof that it was made with a
deliberate intent to cause an injustice, still he is required to observe propriety, discreetness and due care in
the performance of his official duties. [41] As such, he should always strive to live up to the strict standards
of competence, integrity and diligence in public service necessary for one in his position. [42] The case
of Lacanilao v. Judge Rosete appropriately states that: A judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and
propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty. Integrity,
in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity.[43]
It is important to note that respondent did not offer any explanation for the incorrect citation of the said
case in his Comment to the complaint against him. He should be admonished for his failure to address this
issue, especially as it pertains to the proper execution of his office.
Nonetheless, considering that this is the first time that respondent has been reported to have
committed such carelessness, the Court will accord him leniency.
WHEREFORE, the
complaint
for
Grave
Misconduct
and
Corruption
is
hereby DISMISSED. For citing a non-existent case, however, respondent judge is ADMONISHED to
observe due care in the performance of his functions and duties and WARNED that a repetition thereof
would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

(29)

RE: COMPLAINT OF CONCERNED MEMBERS


OF CHINESE GROCERS ASSOCIATION
AGAINST JUSTICE SOCORRO B. INTING OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS

A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-177-CA-J


Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:

April 12, 2011


x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

R E S O LUTI O N
BRION, J.:
We pass upon the unsigned letter complaint for administrative action and disbarment sent by the
Concerned Members of Chinese Grocers Association (CGA) to the Office of Chief Justice Corona against
Court of Appeals Justice Socorro B. Inting on November 25, 2010 for gross neglect of judicial duties in
deciding Case No. P-08-132 GLRO CA.D Record No. 84, entitled In Re: Petition for Issuance of a New
Owners Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42417 of the Registry of Deeds of
Manila while she was still Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Manila. Specifically,
the complainants allege that Justice Inting acted with gross negligence when she turned a blind eye to the
suspicious circumstances surrounding the petitioner in the case, Romualdo dela Cruz, and granted the
petition.
Factual Antecedents
The CGA is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 315 square meters located in Manila, registered
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42417.
Sometime in 2008, Romualdo dela Cruz (dela Cruz) filed a petition for the issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. 42417, claiming that the old owners duplicate copy had been misplaced. This
petition was assigned to the sala of then Judge Inting, presiding Judge of Branch IV, RTC Manila.

In the petition, dela Cruz claimed that: (a) the Office of the Register of Deeds had already been
notified of the loss through an Affidavit of Loss; (b) TCT No. 42417 issued in the name of the CGA is
still valid and subsisting; (c) copies of the Notice of Hearing have been duly posted, as evidenced by the
Sheriffs Certificate of Posting; and (d) dela Cruzs interest in filing this petition is based on his right as
a vendee of the property, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 19, 2008, allegedly
executed between CGA, represented by Ang E. Bio, and dela Cruz. [1]
On June 16, 2009, Justice Inting issued an order granting dela Cruzs petition. The dispositive portion of
this Order stated:
WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds of Manila is hereby ordered upon payment of the
prescribed fees of his office to issue a new owners duplicate of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 42417 in lieu of the lost one which is hereby cancelled and declared of no
further force and effect and to annotate on said title a memorandum of the issuance of a
new owners copy thereof in lieu of the lost one upon Order of the Court and to deliver
said new owners copy of the title to the petitioner or his counsel or duly authorized
representative provided that such new owners copy of the title to be issued shall be
made subject to the same terms and conditions as the original thereof and that no
document or transaction registered or pending registration in his office shall be adversely
affected thereby.
SO ORDERED.
Since no motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal was filed challenging Justice Intings June
16, 2009 Order within the reglementary period provided by law, the order became final and executory,
and the new owners duplicate title was given to dela Cruz.
The Letter Complaint
In their letter complaint dated November 15, 2010, the Concerned Members of CGA claimed that
Justice Inting acted with gross neglect when she granted dela Cruzs petition for the issuance of a new
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 42417. To recall, dela Cruz filed the petition as the alleged vendee of
the property. However, the complainants point out that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 15,
2008, the basis for dela Cruzs interest and right to file the petition, should have aroused Justice Intings
suspicion as it was allegedly signed on behalf of CGA by Ang E. Bio, who died on August 28, 2001.
The complainants also found it suspicious that Justice Inting did not question dela Cruz on the particulars
of the sale i.e, what the basis was of Bios authority to represent CGA in the sale, whether dela Cruz had
paid the applicable taxes in relation to the alleged sale, and why the land was sold for only P5,500,000.00
when it was worth at least P50 million before granting the petition. The complainants further faulted
Justice Inting for not asking dela Cruz why he, and not CGA, filed the petition.
Justice Intings Comment
On December 7, 2010, the Court en Banc issued a resolution requiring Justice Inting to comment
on the letter complaint within ten (10) days from notice of the resolution.
Responding to our Order, Justice Inting filed a letter with the Court on January 28, 2011 asking
for an additional thirty (30) days to file her comment. The Court en Banc resolved to grant this request in
its February 1, 2011 resolution.

In her comment filed on February 23, 2011, Justice Inting averred that there was nothing
suspicious in dela Cruz filing the petition as a vendee since Section 109 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree) allows another person in interest to file a petition for the issuance of a new
owners duplicate title. She further explained that on May 8, 2009, the Acting Chief of the Clerks of Court
Division issued a Notice of Hearing addressed to dela Cruz, the Register of Deeds of Manila and the
CGA, setting the case for hearing on June 3, 2009. The courts process server also posted this Notice of
Hearing on May 13, 2009 at three conspicuous public places in Manila. However, no representative of
CGA appeared to participate in the proceedings or oppose the petition at the initial hearing on June
3, 2009. Accordingly, Justice Inting allowed dela Cruz to present his evidence ex-parte before Atty.
Cheryl Morales, the Chief of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Authority. Based on
the evidence presented, consisting of the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale between CGA and dela Cruz,
and the Affidavit of Loss registered with the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the original
title in the possession of the Register of Deeds of Manila, and given CGAs lack of opposition, Justice
Inting granted the petition.
Justice Inting further emphasized that she did not transfer title over the land to dela Cruz;
rather, she merely issued an order granting the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No.
42417, with the same terms and conditions as the original. She also denied the complainants claim that
she knew dela Cruz prior to this case, stressing the fact that she only met dela Cruz when he appeared
before her court with his attorney to comply with the petitions jurisdictional requirements.
Justice Inting also questioned the complainants failure to take the necessary remedial actions against the
order, such as filing a petition for relief of judgment within the reglementary period, as well as their
failure to file any criminal action against dela Cruz, the instigator of the alleged fraudulent sale.
OUR RULING
The only issue we have to resolve is whether Justice Inting, in granting dela Cruzs petition, is guilty of
misconduct. To answer this question, we examine the procedure in petitions for the issuance of new
duplicate certificates of title.
The applicable law is Section 109 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree), which states:
Section 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. - In case of loss or theft
of an owners duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner
or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the
land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate
to him or for the registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss
or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and
registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may,
after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall
contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate,
but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and
shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
The above-quoted provision clearly allows a person who is not the owner of the property to file
the petition for a new duplicate certificate, provided the person has interest in the property.

The next logical question is was dela Cruz a person in interest to the subject property? We find
that he was, given the fact that he had what appeared to be a validly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over
the subject property in his favor. As a public document, the subject Deed of Absolute Sale has in its favor
the presumption of regularity. To contradict it, one must present evidence that is clear and convincing;
otherwise, the document should be upheld.[2]
In the present case, however, no one from CGA appeared during the proceedings to oppose dela
Cruzs petition or to bring to Justice Intings attention the fact that Ang Bio was already dead at the time
the deed of sale was allegedly executed. Given the lack of any evidence to assume otherwise, Justice
Inting correctly relied on the notarized Deed of Sales presumption of regularity.
As for the complainants allegation that Justice Inting had the duty to inquire into the details of the
alleged sale, we reiterate that in a petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of a certificate
of title, the RTC, acting only as a land registration court with limited jurisdiction,has no jurisdiction to
pass upon the question of actual ownership of the land covered by the lost owner's duplicate copy of
the certificate of title. [3] Questions involving the issue of ownership have to be threshed out in a separate
suit where the trial court will conduct a full-blown hearing with the parties presenting their respective
evidence to prove ownership over the subject realty.[4] After all, the objective of a petition for the issuance
of a new owners duplicate copy is merely to determine two things (1) that the owners duplicate copy of
the certificate of title was actually lost; and (2) that the person who filed the petition has sufficient interest
in the property covered by the title to acquire a copy of the same. It was thus not for Justice Inting to
question dela Cruz on the specifics of the purported sale (i.e., why the land was sold to dela Cruz at such
a low price, whether dela Cruz paid the applicable taxes for the transfer of the property, etc.) during these
proceedings.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in the
complaint with substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. [5] We set the applicable standard in deciding cases involving
accusations of misconduct leveled at judges in Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Villalon-Pornillos,
where we said:
The burden of substantiating the charges in an administrative proceeding against
court officials and employees falls on the complainant, who must be able to prove the
allegations in the complaint with substantial evidence. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the presumption that respondent regularly performed her duties will
prevail. Moreover, in the absence of cogent proof, bare allegations of misconduct cannot
prevail over the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. In
fact, an administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a
discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such
that the respondent stands to face the sanction of dismissal and/or disbarment. The Court
does not thus give credence to charges based on mere suspicion and speculation. [6]
Apart from the questionable nature of the Deed of Absolute Sale in dela Cruzs favor, brought to
light only now upon the presentation of the Certificate of Death, the complainants have not presented any
other evidence to support the charge of misconduct leveled against Justice Inting.
Significantly, however, the complainants attached a mere photocopy of Ang Bios Certificate of
Death to their letter complaint. While the Certificate of Death is indeed a public document, to prove its
contents, there is a need to present a certified copy of this document, issued by the public officer in

custody of the original document. [7] Since the Certificate of Death is not a certified copy, it is inadmissible
as proof, and is considered a mere scrap of paper without any evidentiary value.
Given the lack of any evidence to prove that Justice Inting acted with any bad faith or ill-motive
in acting on the petition, or even committed any error in issuing the assailed order, we dismiss the
complaint against her. As we stated in Tan Tiac Chiong v. Cosico:[8]
When an administrative charge against a Judge or court personnel has no basis
whatsoever in fact or in law, this Court will not hesitate to protect them against any
groundless accusation that trifles with judicial processes. In short, this Court will not
shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon all employees of the judiciary,
but neither will it hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt
rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the administrative
complaint against Justice Socorro B. Inting, Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cebu, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

(30)
MA. CHEDNA ROMERO,

A.M. No. P-11-2913

Complainant,

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2810-P)

Present:

- versus -

PACIFICO B. VILLAROSA, JR., Sheriff IV,


Regional
Trial
Court,
Branch
17,
Palompon, Leyte,
Respondent.

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,*
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:
April 12, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a Sworn Complaint[1] filed on July 4, 2007, by complainant Ma. Chedna
Romero (Romero), charging respondent Pacifico B. Villarosa, Jr. (Sheriff Villarosa), Sheriff IV of
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte, with grave abuse of authority, conduct
unbecoming of a government employee, dishonesty and estafa, for failing to remit amounts owing to her
by virtue of a compromise agreement.
In accordance with the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated April 21,
2008, the complaint was referred on September 15, 2008 to Judge Apolinario M. Buaya (Investigating
Judge), Executive Judge of the RTC of Ormoc City, for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Investigating Judge submitted his Report [2] on January 18, 2010, which was referred on September 6,
2010 to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
The facts, as culled from the records and the Report of the Investigating Judge, are as follows:
Romero was the plaintiff in a claim for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 462, entitled Maria Chedna
Romero vs. Sps. Valentin and Enriqueta A. Laurente, filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Palompon. The case was amicably settled by way of a Compromise Agreement [3]dated December 8, 2005,
duly approved by the MTC, where Spouses Valentin Laurente and Enriqueta Laurente (Spouses
Laurente) bound themselves to pay Romero a total amount of P30,000.00, P24,000.00 of which would be
paid on or before March 2006, and the remaining balance of P6,000.00 on or before October 2006.

On December 6, 2005, Romero had already received the amount of P10,000.00 from Enriqueta Laurente
in partial compliance with the obligation. [4] Failing to receive the balance of P20,000.00 in accordance
with the Compromise Agreement, Romero filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ Execution dated April
18, 2006, for which a corresponding writ was issued on August 8, 2006. In response thereto, Enriqueta
Laurente attested[5]that she had delivered the amount of P20,000.00 to Sheriff Villarosa, as supported by a
certification[6] executed by the latter himself, dated May 9, 2007, that they had fully paid such amount.
Romero added that Sheriff Villarosa demanded a total amount of P1,500.00 from her on two occasions as
sheriffs fee.
In his Comment[7] dated August 7, 2007, Sheriff Villarosa denied any wrongdoing. He admitted having
received P200.00 from Romero for gasoline expenses for his trip to the residence of the spouses Laurente.
He further admitted having received the total amount of P13,000.00 from Enriqueta Laurente, evidenced
by acknowledgment receipts,[8] as follows:
P 3,000.00 September 20, 2006
P 1,700.00 November 15, 2006
P 4,000.00 December 6, 2006
P 1,000.00 January 9, 2007
P 3,300.00 February 28, 2007
P13,000.00
Of the above-stated P13,000.00, Sheriff Villarosa claimed that he had directly turned
over P10,000.00 to Romero, evidenced by acknowledgment receipts, [9] as follows:
P 7,000.00 November 2006
P 3,000.00 January 10, 2007
P10,000.00

Regarding the remaining P3,000.00, he claimed that it was given by Enriqueta Laurente directly
to the Officer-in-charge (OIC) Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 17, Palompon.
On May 2, 2007, Romero received the amount of P4,000.00 directly from Enriqueta Laurente.
[10]
As stated in the earlier mentioned Certification of Sheriff Villarosa, the full amount of P20,000.00 had
already been fully paid by the spouses Laurente as of May 9, 2007.
Also in May 2007, Sheriff Villarosa alleged that for unknown reasons, Romero refused to receive
the final amount of P6,000.00 from him, prompting him to deposit the amount by way of consignation
with the OIC Clerk of Court of the MTC of Palompon. He claimed that a receipt [11]was issued for the final
amount only on November 27, 2008 because the acting OIC refused to issue a receipt in such capacity.
On April 17, 2009, Romero received the final amount of P6,000.00 from the MTC Clerk of Court of
Palompon.[12]
In sum, Romero received the full amount of the obligation in accordance with the Compromise
Agreement, as follows:
P10,000.00 December 6, 2005, received directly from Enriqueta Laurente
P 7,000.00 November 2006, received from Sheriff Villarosa

P 3,000.00 January 10, 2007, received from Sheriff Villarosa


P 4,000.00 May 2, 2007, received directly from Enriqueta Laurente
P 6,000.00 April 17, 2009, received from the Clerk of Court
__________ of MTC Palompon
P30,000.00

Finding the above transactions of Sheriff Villarosa to be highly anomalous and irregular, the
Investigating Judge found him guilty of grave abuse of authority, conduct unbecoming of a government
employee and dishonesty. He recommended his suspension for a period of six months and the payment of
a fine equivalent to three months salary, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense would
merit dismissal.
The OCA agreed with the factual findings of the Investigating Judge, and likewise found Sheriff
Villarosa guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty, but recommended his outright dismissal from the
service.
The factual findings of the Investigating Judge and recommendation of the OCA are well-taken and
adopted by the Court.
Sheriffs are officers of the court who serve and execute writs addressed to them by the court, and
who prepare and submit returns on their proceedings. As officers, they must discharge their duties with
great care and diligence, perform faithfully and accurately what is incumbent upon them, and at all times
show a high degree of professionalism in the performance of their duties. Despite being exposed to the
hazards that come with the implementation of a judgment, sheriffs must perform their duties by the book.
[13]
In contravention of his duties, numerous irregularities in the transactions of Sheriff Villarosa were
observed by the Investigating Judge and this Court.
First, Sheriff Villarosa admitted having received a total of P13,000.00 from Enriqueta Laurente
but turned over only P10,000.00 to Romero. He claimed that the remaining P3,000.00 was given directly
to the OIC Clerk of Court of the MTC of Palompon but this assertion was plainly belied by the
Affidavit[14] of Enriqueta Laurente and the Certification[15] of the Clerk of Court.
Second, Sheriff Villarosa remitted amounts to Romero different from the amounts he received from
Enriqueta Laurente which could only be indicative of his failure to immediately account therefor. In
November 2006, P7,000.00 was remitted by Sheriff Villarosa to Romero, when Enriqueta Laurente had so
far only paid him the aggregate amount of P4,700.00. By January 10, 2007, he had turned over to Romero
the total amount of P10,000.00, when he had so far only received P9,700.00 from Enriqueta Laurente.
Third, Sheriff Villarosa only delivered the final balance of P6,000.00 to the MTC Clerk of Court of
Palompon on November 27, 2008, or more than a year after Romero allegedly refused to receive such
amount from him. He further failed to show when he received such amount from Enriqueta Laurente, or
the P3,000.00 from the Clerk of Court whom, he claimed, directly received it. Furthermore, not only was
he in delay in delivering the final balance, but he was also in delay in the delivery of all the amounts
remitted to him by Enriqueta Laurente.
Fourth, Sheriff Villarosa delivered the amounts he received from Enriqueta Laurente directly to Romero,
the judgment obligee, instead of the Clerk of Court.

Section 9 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides in part:


Sec. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced.
(a) Immediate payment on demand. - The officer shall enforce an execution of a
judgment for money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of
the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The judgment obligor
shall pay in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee or his authorized
representative if present at the time of payment. The lawful fees shall be handed under
proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn over the said amount within the
same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ.
If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive payment,
the judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff. The
latter shall turn over all the amounts coming into his possession within the same day to
the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ, or if the same is not practicable,
deposit said amount to a fiduciary account in the nearest government depository bank of
the Regional Trial Court of the locality.
The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the deposit to the
account of the court that issued the writ whose clerk of court shall then deliver said
payment to the judgment obligee in satisfaction of the judgment. The excess, if any, shall
be delivered to the judgment obligor while the lawful fees shall be retained by the clerk
of court for disposition as provided by law. In no case shall the executing sheriff demand
that any payment by check be made payable to him.
xxx
From the above, it is clear that in the execution of judgments for money, where the judgment
obligee is not present to receive payment, the judgment obligor shall deliver payment to the executing
sheriff who, in turn, shall turn over such payment within the same day to the clerk of court who issued
the writ, or if the same is not practicable, the amount should be deposited to a fiduciary account in the
nearest government depositary bank of the RTC of the locality. In either case, it is the clerk of court, and
not the sheriff, who should deliver the amount to the judgment obligee.
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees [16] enunciates the
state policy to promote a high standard of ethics in public service, and enjoins public officials and
employees to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity and competence. Section 4 of the
Code lays down the norms of conduct which every public official and employee shall observe in the
discharge and execution of their official duties, specifically providing that they shall at all times respect
the rights of others, and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, and public interest. Thus, any conduct contrary to these standards would qualify
as conduct unbecoming of a government employee.
With regard to grave abuse of authority, such has been defined as a misdemeanor committed by a
public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm,
imprisonment or other injury; it is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. [17] On the other
hand, dishonesty has been defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness;
lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.[18]

Guided by the foregoing, it is clear that Sheriff Villarosa is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
government employee, grave abuse of authority, and dishonesty, characterized by serious nonfeasance.
Sheriff Villarosa manifestly failed to observe Section 9 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Given the
numerous amounts that were remitted to him by Enriqueta Laurente on various occasions, at no instance
did he turn over such amounts within the same day that they were received by him. As regards the
delivery of the final balance of P6,000.00, it was not shown when such amount was received by him.
Even counting from the time in May 2007 when he claimed that Romero refused to receive such amount,
more than a year had elapsed from such attempted delivery before he turned over the said amount to the
clerk of court. His defense that the acting OIC refused to issue a receipt in May 2007, is simply too
tenuous to be believed. Even granting such defense to be true, other dubious irregularities prevail in the
case at bench.

Section 9 of Rule 39 states that when the judgment obligee is not present at the time the judgment
obligor makes the payment, the sheriff is authorized to receive it. However, the money received must be
remitted to the clerk of court within the same day or, if not practicable, deposited in a fiduciary account
with the nearest government depository bank. Evidently, sheriffs are not permitted to retain the money in
their possession beyond the day when the payment was made or to deliver the money collected directly to
the judgment obligee.[19]
It is recognized that the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the execution of judgment.
Thus, officers charged with this task must, in the absence of a restraining order, act with considerable
dispatch so as not to unduly delay the administration of justice; otherwise, the decisions, orders, or other
processes of the courts of justice would be futile. [20] After all, a decision left unexecuted or indefinitely
delayed due to their inefficiency renders it useless. [21] Sheriff Villarosas repeated and evident delays
hindered the speedy administration of justice for Romero and the spouses Laurente.
Sheriff Villarosas delivery of amounts in excess of what was remitted to him by Enriqueta
Laurente, also evinces a failure of his duty as sheriff to properly account for all amounts received and
turned over by him. As the amounts were received by him by virtue of his office, it was his duty, as
sheriff, to faithfully account for said money.[22] By failing to deliver the exact amounts remitted to him by
the judgment obligor, it is apparent that he failed to faithfully account for the money which he
received. Sheriffs have the duty to perform faithfully and accurately what is incumbent upon them, and
any method of execution falling short of the requirement of the law should not be countenanced. [23]
Sheriff Villarosas conduct is highly irregular and suspicious. He repeatedly failed to comply with his
duties under the Rules. Despite the several dates set for hearing, he did not appear and opted instead to
submit his Position Paper[24] where he failed to address any of the aforementioned irregularities.
In sum, Sheriff Villarosas failure to comply with Section 9 of Rule 39 by delaying the deposit of
the final amount he received and not delivering the other amounts to the Clerk of Court; and to faithfully
account for the amounts he received thru his failure to deliver the exact amounts and his inconsistent
assertions regarding the P3,000.00, are clear manifestation of conduct unbecoming a government
employee, tantamount to grave abuse of authority and dishonesty. He failed to perform his duty as sheriff
in accordance with the Rules, thereby acting contrary to law, good morals, and public policy, in disregard
of the rights of the litigants. By acting under color of his office and in excess of his authority, he
wrongfully inflicted injury onto the parties involved. His conduct goes against the nature of the
performance by a government employee of his functions, and casts a shadow over his motives. His

conduct and resulting nonfeasance reek of a lack of integrity and honesty, and reveal a disposition to
deceive.
Sheriff Villarosas guilt was thus proven by substantial evidence, which is that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, such being the
quantum of proof required in administrative cases. [25]
A sheriff is a front-line representative of the justice system in this country. Once he loses the
peoples trust, he diminishes the peoples faith in the judiciary. [26] High standards of conduct are expected
of sheriffs who play an important role in the administration of justice. They are tasked with the primary
duty to execute final judgments and orders of the courts. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it
becomes his ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to implement it in
accordance with its mandate. It must be stressed that a judgment, if not executed, would be an empty
victory on the part of the prevailing party.[27]
All court employees, regardless of rank, being public servants in an office dispensing justice,
must always act with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be in accordance with the law and court
regulations. No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its holder than an
office in the judiciary. Court employees should be models of uprightness, fairness and honesty to maintain
the peoples respect and faith in the judiciary. The conduct of court personnel therefore, must not only be,
but must also be perceived to be, free from any whiff of impropriety, both with respect to their duties in
the judiciary and to their behavior outside the court. Any act or omission of any court employee
diminishing or tending to diminish public trust and confidence in the courts will not be tolerated. [28] The
Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty on those who fall short of their accountabilities. [29]
Under Rule IV, Section 52(A)(14) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, [30] grave abuse of authority or oppression is a grave offense punishable with suspension of six (6)
months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal from service for the second
infraction.[31] While dishonesty, also a grave offense under Section 52(A)(1) of the same Rule, is
punishable by dismissal for the first offense. Sheriff Villarosa being guilty of dishonesty, the penalty of
dismissal is just and proper.
WHEREFORE, Pacifico B. Villarosa, Jr., Sheriff IV of Regional Trial Court, Branch 17,
Palompon, Leyte, is hereby found GUILTY of Conduct Unbecoming a Public Official, Grave Abuse of
Authority, and Dishonesty, and is hereby ordered DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all
benefits, except leave credits already accrued. He is further barred from re-employment in any branch or
office of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.

(31) B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013


IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A.
MEDADO, Petitioner.
R E S O LUTI O N
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado
(Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in
19791and passed the same years bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7. 2cralaw
virtualaw library
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorneys Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC)
together with the successful bar examinees. 3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign
the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a vacation. 6cralaw
virtualaw library
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the
Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had
signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record. 7cralaw virtualaw library
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing
corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he
operated under the mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of
Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer; 8 and the matter of signing in the
Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten. 9cralaw virtualaw
library
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was
required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. 10 Not having
signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. 11cralaw virtualaw library
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013. 13The
OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioners gross negligence, gross misconduct
and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference,
petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys. 15cralaw

virtualaw library
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medados prayer in the instant petition, subject to the
payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most
serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant
Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Courts
attention to petitioners omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit
after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to
file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa yo, you dont know whats gonna happen. At the same time, its a combination of
apprehension and anxiety of whats gonna happen. And, finally its the right thing to do. I have to come
here sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of
law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as
members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the
strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the
character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company,
and the Energy Development Corporation.19cralaw virtualaw library
All these demonstrate Medados worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege, 20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege
from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of
inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years,
without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as
neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment. 22cralaw
virtualaw library
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his
acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification,
because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences. 25 Ignorantia facti excusat;
ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake
of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already

the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an
attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that
point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of
his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him
so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary
steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by ones assuming to be an attorney or officer
of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court, 27which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal
contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings. 30 In this case,
while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging
in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as
no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
CANON 9 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice
of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because
at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyers duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of
law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they
are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him
from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by
allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him
in the amount of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to
engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner
Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this
Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of
law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY
WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys
will be dealt with severely by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

(32) B.M. No. 1678

December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,


BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

R E S O LUTI O N
CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice
of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved and he
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. 1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the
Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner
Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine
citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys
and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years
of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of
law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyers oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare. 3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful
observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the
conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice
law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence
which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege. 4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the
bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in
good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory
requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for
admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character and a resident of the Philippines. 5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence
of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
educational, moral and other qualifications; 7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyers oath9 and
signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license
to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good standing is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues
in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax; 12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being
continually subject to judicial disciplinary control. 14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino
citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the
bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in
the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. 16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who

become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic
right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires
his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license
or permit to engage in such practice." 18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the
authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update
him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to
compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar
Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.

(33) B.M. No. 2112

July 24, 2012

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE


PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March
21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United States of
America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General
in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the
practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support of his petition, albeit mere
photocopies thereof, to wit:

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;


3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;
4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;
5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar petition filed
by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of law after availing the
benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December
1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually became a Canadian
citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A.
No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada.
He returned to the Philippines and intended to resume his practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a
continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioners
membership in the bar;ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225,
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens
of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later
re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. 2 R.A. No. 9225
provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. 3

It can not be overstressed that: The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 1wphi1 It is
so delicately affected with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this
Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful
observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the
conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice
law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence
which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege. 4

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC required
the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following documents in relation
to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;


2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:


1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of
Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good moral
character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE
Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all
the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the
petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the
petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the
condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the
payment of appropriate fees.
Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the reacquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar.
SO ORDERED.

(34) A.C. No. 7766, August 05, 2014


JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant, v. PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Courts resolution is an administrative Complaint 1 for disbarment dated February 1, 2008 filed by
complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant) against respondent Pedro S. Diamante (respondent), charging
him of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyers oath for fabricating and
using a spurious court order, and for failing to keep his client informed of the status of the case.
The Facts

On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son of the late Luis Tan, secured
the services of respondent in order to pursue a case for partition of property against the heirs of the late
spouses Luis and Natividad Valencia-Tan.2 After accepting the engagement, respondent filed the
corresponding complaint3 before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as
Civil Case No. 03-11947. The complaint was eventually dismissed by the RTC in an Order 4 dated July 25,
2007 for lack of cause of action and insufficiency of evidence. 5 While respondent was notified of such
dismissal as early as August 14, 2007, 6 complainant learned of the same only on August 24, 2007 when he
visited the formers office.7 On such occasion, respondent allegedly asked for the amount of P10,000.00
for the payment of appeal fees and other costs, but since complainant could not produce the said amount
at that time, respondent, instead, asked and was given the amount of P500.00 purportedly as payment of
the reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal before the RTC. 8 On September 12, 2007, Tan
handed the amount of P10,000.00 to respondent, who on even date, filed a notice of appeal 9 before the
RTC.10cralawred
In an Order11 dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainants appeal for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period provided for by law. Respondent, however, did not disclose such fact and,
instead, showed complainant an Order12 dated November 9, 2007 purportedly issued by the RTC
(November 9, 2007 Order) directing the submission of the results of a DNA testing to prove his filiation
to the late Luis Tan, within 15 days from receipt of the notice. Considering the technical requirements for
such kind of testing, complainant proceeded to the RTC and requested for an extension of the deadline for
its submission. It was then that he discovered that the November 9, 2007 Order was spurious, as certified
by the RTCs Clerk of Court.13 Complainant also found out that, contrary to the representations of
respondent, his appeal had long been dismissed. 14 Aggrieved, he filed the instant administrative complaint
for disbarment against respondent.
In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it was complainants
failure to timely produce the amount of P1,400.00 to pay for the appeal fees that resulted in the late filing
of his appeal. According to him, he informed complainant of the lapse of the reglementary period to
appeal, but the latter insisted in pursuing the same. He also claimed to have assisted complainant not for
money or malice but being a desperate litigant, he was blamed for the courts unfavorable
decision.16cralawred
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly recommended that
the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year be meted out against him. 18cralawred
The Investigating Commissioner found complainants imputations against respondent to be well-founded,
observing that instead of meeting complainants allegations squarely, particularly, the issue of the nondisclosure of the dismissal of the partition case, respondent sidestepped and delved on arguments that
hardly had an effect on the issues at hand.19cralawred
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in respondents accusation that the
spurious November 9, 2007 Order originated from complainant, ratiocinating that it was respondent who
was motivated to fabricate the same to cover up his lapses that brought about the dismissal of
complainants appeal and make it appear that there is still an available relief left for Tan. 20cralawred
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and approved the
aforesaid report and recommendation.21cralawred

The Issue Before the Court


The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for
violating the CPR.
The Courts Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBPs findings, subject to the
modification
of
the
recommended
penalty
to
be
imposed
upon
respondent.
Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyers duty to keep his client constantly updated on
the developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining the latters confidence, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to clients request for information.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever important
information he may have acquired affecting his clients case. He should notify his client of any adverse
decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof. Keeping the client
informed of the developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and
confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is
defending the clients interests. 22 In this connection, the lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his
actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. Concomitantly, the lawyer is
expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him
has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a wholehearted fealty to the clients cause.23cralawred
In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already knew of the dismissal of
complainants partition case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he never bothered to inform complainant
of such dismissal as the latter only knew of the same on August 24, 2007 when he visited the formers
office. To add insult to injury, respondent was inexcusably negligent in filing complainants appeal only
on September 12, 2007, or way beyond the reglementary period therefor, thus resulting in its outright
dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal
profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment. 24cralawred
Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainants appeal by fabricating the
November 9, 2007 Order which purportedly required a DNA testing to make it appear that complainants
appeal had been given due course, when in truth, the same had long been denied. In so doing, respondent
engaged in an unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct that caused undue prejudice and unnecessary
expenses on the part of complainant. Accordingly, respondent clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
CPR, which provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but
also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing, 25 failing in which whether in his personal or private
capacity, he becomes unworthy to continue his practice of law. 26 A lawyers inexcusable neglect to serve
his clients interests with utmost diligence and competence as well as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
and deceitful conduct in order to conceal such neglect should never be countenanced, and thus,
administratively sanctioned.
In view of the foregoing, respondents conduct of employing a crooked and deceitful scheme to keep
complainant in the dark and conceal his cases true status through the use of a falsified court order
evidently constitutes Gross Misconduct.27 His acts should not just be deemed as unacceptable practices
that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice
law.28 In
this
regard,
the
Courts
pronouncement
in Sebastian
v.
Calis29 is
instructive,viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal
moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyers relationship with others should be
characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyers
oath. The lawyers oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld
and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good
moral character. This requisite is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the practice of law, its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. We have sternly warned
that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his
moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law.30 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to inform their clients of the status of
their respective cases, the Court suspended them for a period of six (6) months. In Mejares v.
Romana,31 the Court suspended the lawyer for the same period for his failure to timely and adequately
inform his clients of the dismissal of their petition. In the same vein, in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr.,32 the same
penalty was imposed on the lawyer who consistently failed to update his client of the status of his cases,
notwithstanding several follow-ups.
However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct by falsifying
documents, the Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct and disbarred them. In Brennisen v.
Contawi,33 the Court disbarred the lawyer who falsified a special power of attorney in order to mortgage
and sell his clients property. Also, in Embido v. Pe,34 the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the
lawyer who falsified an inexistent court decision for a fee.
As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to misrepresent to his client,i.e.,
complainant, that he still had an available remedy in his case, when in reality, his case had long been
dismissed for failure to timely file an appeal, thus, causing undue prejudice to the latter. To the Court,
respondents acts are so reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral
unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of the bar. His actions erode rather than
enhance the public perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations,
as well as the damage and prejudice caused to his client, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of
disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Misconduct and
violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Pedro S. Diamantes record in this Court. Further,
let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.

(35) A.C. No. 6732

October 22, 2013

ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF


INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISA YAS, REGIONAL OFFICE NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN
PEDRO,
ILOILO
CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE,
ANTIQUE, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty of the gravest
misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.

The Case

Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N
Pe, Jr. respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having allegedly falsified an in existent decision of Branch
64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique (RTC) instituted by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office, represented by Regional Director Atty. Oscar L.
Embido.

Antecedent

On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written communication
from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The letter requested a copy of
the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela in Special Proceedings Case
No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner
was one Shirley Quioyo.1

On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request for a copy
of the decision in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.2

Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special Proceedings Case No.
084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was then discovered
that the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner.
Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela had decided Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In
the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena
Catin Austria.

Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist, 3 Mr. Hunt sent a letter dated October
12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In
the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna that had been presented by Shirley
Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK.4

After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the October 12, 2004
letter was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of the situation. 5
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on the situation in
writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of the falsification. 6

In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4,


2005,7 wherein he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the falsified
decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against the respondent were substantially
corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an affidavit dated March 20, 2005. 8
The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side, 9 but he invoked his constitutional right to remain
silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the latter appeared and
gave his sworn statement.

After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas the
records of the investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be prosecuted for falsification of
public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal Code, and for violation of Section 3(a)
of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). 10 The NBI likewise recommended to
the Office of the Court Administrator that disbarment proceedings be commenced against the
respondent.11 Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a Member of the Court) officially
endorsed the recommendation to the Office of the Bar Confidant. 12

Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-affidavit, 13 whereby he denied
any participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his opinion on Shirleys
petition for the annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice on the pertinent laws involved and
the different grounds for the annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy Quioyo had gone back to him
to present a copy of what appeared to be a court decision; 14 that Dy Quioyo had then admitted to him that
he had caused the falsification of the decision; that he had advised Dy Quioyo that the falsified decision
would not hold up in an investigation; that Dy Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had
previously resorted to people on Recto Avenue in Manila to solve his documentation problems as an
OFW; and that he had also learned from Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a
resident of Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn statement before Police Investigator
Herminio Dayrit with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late husband, Manuel Jalipa,
had been responsible for making the falsified document at the instance of Dy Quioyo. 15

Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution16 treating the respondents counter-affidavit as his comment,
and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006, 17 Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct and violations of the Attorneys Oath
and Code of Professional Responsibility , and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for

one year. She concluded that the respondent had forged the purported decision of Judge Penuela by
making it appear that Special Proceedings No. 084 concerned a petition for declaration of presumptive
death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner, when in truth and in fact the proceedings
related to the petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria
as the petitioner;18 and that the respondent had received P60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified
decision. She rationalized her conclusions thusly:

Respondents denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it was one Manuel Jalipa
(deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof thereof, he presented the sworn statement of the
widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to believe. In the first place, if the decision was
obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision on file in
Judge Penuelas branch except for the names and dates? Respondent failed to explain this. Secondly,
respondent did not attend the NBI investigation and merely invoked his right to remain silent. If his side
of the story were true, he should have made this known in the investigation. His story therefore appears to
have been a mere afterthought. Finally, there is no plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary
Rose Quioyo would falsely implicate him in this incident. 19

In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 200, 20 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved, with modification, the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner by
suspending the respondent from the practice of law for six years.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-709 21 denying
the respondents motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-2007-063. The IBP Board
of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court in accordance with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 22 of the
Rules of Court.

On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondents comment/opposition as his appeal
by petition for review; (2) to consider the complainants reply as his comment on the petition for review;
(3) to require the respondent to file a reply to the complainants comment within 10 days from notice; and
(4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original records of the case within 15 days from notice.

Ruling

We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the respondent was guilty of grave
misconduct for falsifying a court decision in consideration of a sum of money.

The respondents main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He insisted that he had had
no hand in the falsification, and claimed that the falsification had been the handiwork of Dy Quioyo. He
implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady characters in Recto Avenue in Manila to resolve the
problems he had encountered as an OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo had a history of employing
unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.

However, the respondents denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation of the
falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyos categorical declaration on the respondents personal
responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature was positive evidence, was not overcome by the
respondents blanket denial, which by nature was negative evidence. 23

Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics and did not command
credence.1wphi1 It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent filed his counter-affidavit only after the
Court, through the en banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had required him to comment. 24 The belatedness
of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing more than an after thought.

The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that declared that her
deceased husband had been instrumental in the falsification of the forged decision. But such reliance was
outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife was rendered unreliable due to its patently
hearsay character. In addition, the unworthiness of the sworn statement as proof of authorship of the
falsification by the husband is immediately exposed and betrayed by the falsified decision being an
almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in the real Special
Proceedings Case No. 084.

In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having
authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and integrity
of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall
not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." Lawyers are further
required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest
and immoral or deceitful conduct.

Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a
lawyers disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. 25 Specifically, the deliberate falsification of
the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part.
Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the
falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby
became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.

It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do nothing that may
in any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their professional fidelity and integrity. 26 The
Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among them who wittingly and
willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of their Attorneys Oath for them to:

x x x support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; x x x
delay no man for money or malice, and x x x conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of their
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients x x x.

No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a privilege
that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to
him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyers Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in his
professional and private capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only
for acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings, but also for gross
misconduct not directly connected with his professional duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and
his unworthiness of the principles that the privilege to practice law confers upon him. 27 Verily, no lawyer
is immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and
punish lawyer misconduct committed either in a professional or private capacity. 28 The test is whether the
conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and
whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. 29 WHEREFORE,
the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and DISBARS him effective upon receipt of this decision.

The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.

This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated against
ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the country and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

(36) A.C. No. 7360

July 24,2012

ATTY.
POLICARIO
I.
vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, Respondent.

CATALAN,

JR., Complainant,

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa
(Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against Atty. Silvosa; (1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as
counsel for the accused in the same case for which he previously appeared as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa
bribed his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros.Toribio) for P30,000; and (3) the
Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for direct bribery. Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa (Comm. Funa) held Atty.
Silvosa liable only for the first cause of action and recommended the penalty of reprimand. The Board of
Governors of the IBP twice modified Comm. Funas recommendation: first, to a suspension of six
months, then to a suspension of two years.

Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public prosecutor in
Criminal Case No. 10256-00, "People of the Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et al."
(Esperon case), for the complex crime of double frustrated murder, in which case Atty. Catalan was one of
the private complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosas manner of prosecuting the case, and
requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.

In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private counsel in a case
where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.1Atty. Catalan also alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the accused are
relatives and have the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the accuseds favor.

Atty. Silvosa caused numerous delays in the trial of the Esperon case by arguing against the position of
the private prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo Ching granted Atty. Catalans request to
relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling the Esperon case. The RTC rendered judgment convicting the accused
on 16 November 2005. On 23 November 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the
accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgment of the Esperon case.

In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a case for frustrated
murder where Atty. Catalans brother was a respondent, Pros. Toribio reviewed the findings of the
investigating judge and downgraded the offense from frustrated murder to less serious physical injuries.
During the hearing before Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that, while still a public prosecutor at the
time, Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of frustrated
murder.

Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayans decision in Criminal
Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18 May 2006. Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse) filed
a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Despite the
execution of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant in a homicide case in favor of Lanticses fatherin-law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in detention for more than two years. Atty.
Silvosa demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for the release of Cadinas. The
NBI set up an entrapment operation for Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7s television
program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the actual entrapment operation. The footage was offered and
admitted as evidence, and viewed by the Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty. Silvosas defense of instigation,
the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal Case No. 27776 reads:

WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the
crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of:
(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one month and
eleven days of prision correccional, as minimum, up to three years, six months and twenty days
of prision correccional, as maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.

SO ORDERED.2

In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as prosecutor from the
Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its decision in the Esperon case on 16
November 2005 and cancelled the accuseds bail. Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was only for
the purpose of the reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any relationship between himself and
the accused.

On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribios allegations as "self-serving" and
"purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue persecution."

On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the Sandiganbayan and is under
probation, he asserts that "conviction under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code,
do [sic] not involve moral turpitude since the act involved do [sic] not amount to a crime." He further
claims that "it is not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his capacity as a public officer, the
charge against respondent for which he was convicted falling under the category of crimes against public
officers x x x."

In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found that:

As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal Case No. 10246-00. [Atty.
Silvosas] attempt to minimize his role in said case would be unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed to
have acquainted himself with the facts of said case and has made himself familiar with the parties of the
case. Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the case. The fact that, subsequently, [Atty. Silvosa]
entered his appearance in said case only to file a Motion toPost Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still
constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act is sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.

As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that occurred more than
seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations are merely based on the word of one
person against the word of another. With [Atty. Silvosas] vehement denial, the accusation of witness
[Pros.] Toribio stands alone unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that the alleged incident occurred
more than seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this disbarment case was filed on November
2006. Such a long period of time would undoubtedly cast doubt on the veracity of the allegation. Even the
existence of the bribe money could not be ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.

As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant has no personal
knowledge about the charge of extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa] was convicted by the Sandiganbayan.
[Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor was he ever involved in said case. The findings of the

Sandiganbayan are not binding upon this Commission. The findings in a criminal proceeding are not
binding in a disbarment proceeding. No evidence has been presented relating to the alleged extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First Charge in
violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be given the penalty of
REPRIMAND.

Respectfully submitted.3

In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and suspended Atty. Silvosa from the
practice of law for six months. In another Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
increased the penalty of Atty. Silvosas suspension from the practice of law to two years. The Office of
the Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records of the case on 1 March 2012.
We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its recommendations in the
second and third causes of action.

Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service." Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule 2.01 which provides that "A lawyer shall not
reject, except for valid reasons the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed" and on Canon 14 which
provides that "A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy."

We agree with Comm. Funas finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his
appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule
15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts."

Atty. Silvosas attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two occasions can only be
described as desperate. He claims his participation as public prosecutor was only to appear in the
arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He likewise claims his subsequent participation as
collaborating counsel was limited only to the reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will do well
to take heed of our ruling in Hilado v. David:4

An attorney is employed that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor
when he is listening to his clients preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon,

just as truly as when he is drawing his clients pleadings, or advocating his clients pleadings, or
advocating his clients cause in open court.

xxxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the
yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the
dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded
suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has
been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether
the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves
attorneys, like Caesars wife, not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets
to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although the attorneys
intentions were honest and he acted in good faith. 5
Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribios accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its veracity by emphasizing
the delay in presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by stating that there is difficulty in
ascertaining the veracity of the facts with certainty, in effect agreed with Atty. Silvosa. Contrary to
Comm. Funas ruling, however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio
and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and
had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no
reason for Pros. Toribio to make false testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand,
merely denied the accusation and dismissed it as persecution. When the integrity of a member of the bar
is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality
and integrity which at all times is expected of him. 6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.

Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint against a member
of the bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No
matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time
of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining
arm of the Court.7

We disagree with Comm. Funas ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a
disbarment proceeding.

First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can be no doubt of the
right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public officers which a
citizen feels are incompatible with the duties of the office and from which conduct the public might or
does suffer undesirable consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:

Section 1. How Instituted. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be
taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the
verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of
and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged
and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter
Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring
attorneys including those in government service.

xxxx
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776, and that
Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a witness in the present case. There is no doubt
that the Sandiganbayans judgment in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of public record and is already
final. Atty. Catalan supported his allegation by submitting documentary evidence of the Sandiganbayans
decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa himself admitted, against his interest, that he is under
probation.

Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude is
defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow
men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. 9 Section 27, Rule 138
provides:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction. 10
Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v. COMELEC, 11
we ruled:

By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through
another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a
view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his
official duty to do; and
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a
promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in
exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties
which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of
his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly
contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct
bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. (Italicization in the original)

Atty. Silvosas representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio merit
at least the penalty of suspension.1wphi1 Atty. Silvosas final conviction of the crime of direct bribery
clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows
as a consequence of Atty. Silvosas conviction of the crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty more
severe than suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting standards of
morality and decency required of a member of the Bar. His excuse that his conviction was not in his
capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity
in his character. The practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise
this privilege.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his name ORDERED
STRICKENfrom the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar

Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the Court Administration for circulation to all
courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

(37)
MARITES E. FREEMAN,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 6246


[Formerly CBD No. 00-730]
Present:

- versus -

CORONA, C.J.,*
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,**
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*
DEL CASTILLO,**
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:
ATTY. ZENAIDA P. REYES,
Respondent.
November 15, 2011
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint, filed by complainant Marites E. Freeman, seeking the
disbarment of respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes, for gross dishonesty in obtaining money from her,
without rendering proper legal services, and appropriating the proceeds of the insurance policies of her
deceased husband. Complainant also seeks recovery of all the amounts she had given to respondent and
the insurance proceeds, which was remitted to the latter, with prayer for payment of moral and exemplary
damages.

In her sworn Complaint-Affidavit [1] dated April 7, 2000, filed on May 10, 2000, complainant alleged that
her husband Robert Keith Freeman, a British national, died in London on October 18, 1998. She and her
son, Frank Lawrence applied for visas, to enable them to attend the wake and funeral, but their visa
applications were denied. Complainant engaged the services of respondent who, in turn, assured her that
she would help her secure the visas and obtain the death benefits and other insurance claims due
her. Respondent told complainant that she had to personally go to London to facilitate the processing of
the claims, and demanded that the latter bear all expenses for the trip. On December 4, 1998, she gave
respondent the amount of P50,000.00. As acknowledgment for the receipt of P47,500.00 for service
charge, tax, and one round trip ticket to London, respondent gave her a Cash/Check Voucher, [2] issued by
Broadway Travel, Inc., but on the right margin thereof, the notations in the amount of P50,000.00 and the
date 12-5-98 were written and duly initialled. On December 9, 1998, she acceded into giving respondent
the amount of P20,000.00 for legal costs in securing the visas, as shown by the Temporary
Receipt[3] bearing said date, issued by Z.P. Reyes Law Office (respondent's law firm). On December 18,
1998, she went to see respondent to follow-up the visa applications, but the latter asked for the additional
amount of P10,000.00 for travel expenses, per Temporary Receipt [4] bearing said date, issued by
respondents law firm. After several phone calls inquiring about the status of the visa applications,
respondent told her, Mahirap gapangin ang pagkuha ng visa, kasi blacklisted at banned ka sa
Embassy. (It is difficult to railroad the process of securing visa, because you are blacklisted and banned
by the Embassy). Sometime in February 1999, respondent told her that to lift the travel ban on her, she
should shell out P18,000.00 as panlagay or grease money to bribe some staff of the British
Embassy. After a week, respondent informed her that the ban was lifted, but the visas would be issued on
a later date, as she had convinced the British Embassy to issue resident visas instead of tourist
visas. Respondent told her that to expedite the release of the resident visas, she should again
give P20,000.00 and a bottle of wine, worth P5,000.00, as grease money to bribe the British Embassy
personnel. After several weeks, respondent told her that the period for visa applications had lapsed, and
that another amount of P18,000.00 was needed to reinstate the same. Later, respondent asked
for P30,000.00 as legal costs, per Temporary Receipt, [5] dated April 19, 1999, to be used for booking the
former's flight to London, and P39,000.00 for legal costs, per Temporary Receipt [6] dated May 13, 1999, to
cover the expenses for the plane tickets. Both temporary receipts were issued by respondents law firm.
Complainant said that despite repeated follow-ups with respondent, nothing came out. Instead, she
received a picture of her husband's burial, sent by one Stanley Grist, a friend of the deceased. She later
learned that respondent left for London alone, without informing her about it. Respondent explained that
she needed to go to London to follow-up the insurance claims, and warned her not to communicate with
Grist who allegedly pocketed the proceeds of her husband's insurance policy. She told respondent that she
received a letter[7] dated March 9, 1999 from one Martin Leigh, an Officer of H.M. Coroner's Court,
London, informing her about the arrangements for the funeral and that her late husband was covered by
three insurance policies, to wit: Nationwide Building Society (Account Number 0231/471 833 630),
Lincoln Assurance Company (British National Life Policy No. PP/85/00137851), and Scottish Equitable
PLC (Policy No. 2779512).[8] Respondent offered to help and assured her that representations with the
insurance companies had earlier been made, so that the latter would be receiving the insurance proceeds
soon.
According to the complainant, respondent required her to affix her signature in a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA),[9] dated November 6, 1998 [first SPA], which would authorize the respondent to followup the insurance claims. However, she found out that the SPA [first SPA] she signed was not notarized,
but another SPA,[10] dated April 6, 1999, was notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], and that her
signature therein was forged. Later, she came across a similar copy of the SPA, [11] dated April 6, 1999,
also notarized on April 30, 1999 [third SPA], but this time, additionally bearing the signatures of two

witnesses. She said that without her knowledge and consent, respondent used the third SPA, notarized on
April 30, 1999, in her correspondence with the insurance companies in London.
Complainant discovered that in an undated letter,[12] addressed to one Lynn O. Wilson of Scottish
Equitable PLC (Policy No. 2779512), respondent made representations that her husband left no will and
that she had no verified information as to the total value of her husband's estate and the existence of any
property in London that would be subjected to Grant of Representation. Said letter requested that
complainant be advised on the value for probate in the amount of 5231.35 and the procedure for its
entitlement. Respondent added therein that As to the matter of the installments due, as guaranteed by Mr.
Freeman's policy, Mrs. Freeman requests that the remittance be sent directly to Account No. 0148-273777 Far East Bank, Diliman Branch, with business address at Malakas St. Barangay Central District,
Quezon City, Philippines under the account name:Reyes/Mendiola, which serves as her temporary
account until further notice.
Subsequently, in a letter[13] dated July 29, 1999, addressed to one Andrea Ransom of Lincoln Financial
Group (PP/8500137851), respondent, declaring that she is the Counsel/Authorized Representative [of the
complainant], per SPA dated April 20, 1999 [should be April 30, 1999], replied that she had appended the
documents required (i.e., marriage certificate and birth certificate), in her previous letter, [14] dated April
20, 1999, to the said insurance company; that pursuant to an SPA[15] executed in her favor, all
communications pertaining to complainant should be forwarded to her law firm; that she sought
clarification on whether complainant is entitled to death benefits under the policy and, if so, the amount
due and the requirements to be complied with; and that in the absence of a Grant of Probate ( i.e., the
deceased having left no will), she enclosed an alternative document [referring to the Extrajudicial
Settlement[16] dated June 1, 1999, notarized by respondent] in support of the claim of the surviving spouse
(Mrs. Freeman) and their sole child (Frank Lawrence Freeman). In the same letter, respondent reiterated
that complainant requests that any amount of monies due or benefits accruing, be directly deposited to
Account No. 0148-27377-7 at Far East Bank, Diliman Branch, Malakas St., Quezon City, Philippines
under Reyes/Mendiola, which serves as her temporary account until further notice.
Complainant declared that in November 1999, she made a demand upon the respondent to return her
passport and the total amount of P200,000.00 which she gave for the processing of the visa
applications. Not heeding her demand, respondent asked her to attend a meeting with the Consul of the
British Embassy, purportedly to discuss about the visa applications, but she purposely did not show up as
she got disgusted with the turn of events. On the supposed rescheduled appointment with the British
Consul, respondent, instead, brought her to Airtech Travel and Tours, and introduced her to one Dr. Sonny
Marquez, the travel agency's owner, who assured her that he would help her secure the visas within a
week.Marquez made her sign an application for visa and demanded the amount of P3,000.00. After a
week, she talked to one Marinez Patao, the office secretary of respondent's law firm, who advised her to
ask respondent to return the total amount of P200,000.00.
In her Counter-Affidavit/Answer[17] dated June 20, 2000, respondent countered that in 1998, complainant,
accompanied by former Philippine Sports Commission (PSC) Commissioner Josefina Bauzon and another
woman whose identity was not ascertained, sought legal advice regarding the inheritance of her deceased
husband, a British national.[18] She told complainant to submit proof of her marriage to the deceased, birth
certificate of their son, and other documents to support her claim for the insurance proceeds. She averred
that before she accepted the case, she explained to complainant that she would be charging the following
amounts: acceptance fee of P50,000.00, P20,000.00 for initial expenses, and additional amount
of P50,000.00 on a contingent basis. She said complainant agreed to these rates and, in fact, readily paid
her the said amounts.With an SPA,[19] dated April 6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA],
having been executed in her favor, she made preliminary communications with the insurance companies
in London regarding complainant's claims. Having received communications from said insurance

companies, she stated that complainant offered, which she accepted, to shoulder her plane ticket and the
hotel accommodation, so that she can personally attend to the matter. She left for London in May 1999
and, upon her return, she updated the complainant about the status of her claims.
As to the visa arrangements, respondent said that when she met with complainant, she asked her why she
had not left for London, and the latter replied that her contacts with the embassy had duped her. She
explained to complainant that she could refer her to a travel consultant who would handle the visa
arrangements for a fee, to which the latter agreed. She stated that when complainant acceded to such
arrangement, she accompanied her, in December 1999, to a travel consultant of Airtech Travel and Tours,
who found out that complainant's previous visa applications had been denied four times, on the ground of
falsity of information. Thereafter, complainant was able to secure a visa through the help of the travel
consultant, who charged her a professional fee of P50,000.00. She added that she had no participation in
the foregoing transactions, other than referring complainant to the said travel consultant.
With regard to the alleged falsified documents, respondent denied knowledge about the existence of the
same, and declared that the SPA, [20] dated April 6, 1999, which was notarized on April 30, 1999 [second
SPA], was her basis for communications with the insurance companies in London.She stated that in her
absence, complainant, through wily representations, was able to obtain the case folder from Leah Buama,
her office secretary, and never returned the same, despite repeated demands. She said that she was
unaware of the loss of the case folder as she then had no immediate need of it. She also said that her
secretary failed to immediately report about the missing case folder prior to taking a leave of absence, so
as to attend to the financial obligations brought about by her mother's lingering ailment and consequent
death.[21] Despite repeated requests, complainant failed to return the case folder and, thus, the law firm
was prevented from pursuing the complainant's insurance claims. She maintained that through
complainant's own criminal acts and machinations, her law office was prevented from effectively
pursuing her claims.Between January to February 2000, she sent complainant a billing statement which
indicated the expenses incurred[22] by the law firm, as of July 1999; however, instead of settling the
amount, the latter filed a malicious suit against her to evade payment of her obligations.

On January 19, 2001, complainant filed a Motion Submitting the Instant Case for Immediate Resolution
with Comments on Respondent's Answer, alleging, among others, that upon seeing the letter [23] dated
March 9, 1999 of the Coroner's Court, respondent began to show interest and volunteered to arrange for
the insurance claims; that no acceptance fee was agreed upon between the parties, as the amounts earlier
mentioned represented the legal fees and expenses to be incurred attendant to the London trip; that the
parties verbally agreed to a 20% contingent fee out of the total amount to be recovered; that she obtained
the visas with the assistance of a travel consultant recommended by respondent; that upon return from
abroad, respondent never informed her about the arrangements with the insurance companies in London
that remittances would be made directly to the respondent's personal account at Far East Bank; that the
reason why respondent went to London was primarily to attend the International Law Conference, not
solely for her insurance claims, which explained why the receipt for the P50,000.00, which she gave, bore
the letterhead of Broadway Travel, Inc. (in the amount of P47,500.00) and that she merely made a
handwritten marginal note regarding the receipt of the amount of P50,000.00; that with the use of an SPA
[referring to the second SPA] in favor of the respondent, bearing her forged signature, the amount
of 10,546.7 [should be 10,960.63],[24] or approximately equivalent to P700,000.00, was remitted to the
personal bank account of respondent, but the same was never turned over to her, nor was she ever
informed about it; and that she clarified that she never executed any SPA that would authorize respondent
to receive any money or check due her, but that the only SPA [first SPA] she executed was for the purpose
of representing her in court proceedings.

Meanwhile, respondent filed a criminal complaint [25] for malicious mischief, under Article 327 of the
Revised Penal Code, against complainant and one Pacita Mamaril (a former client of respondent), for
allegedly barging into the law office of the former and, with the use of a pair of scissors, cut-off the cords
of two office computer keyboards and the line connections for the refrigerator, air conditioning unit, and
electric fan, resulting in damage to office equipment in an estimated amount of P200,000.00. In the
Resolution,[26] dated July 31, 2000, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City recommended that the
complaint be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The case was subsequently dismissed due to lack of
evidence and for failure of respondent to appear during the preliminary investigation of the case. [27]
Thereafter, complainant filed a criminal case for estafa, under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised
Penal Code, against respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-108181, before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 83. On Motion for Reinvestigation by respondent, the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City, in the Resolution[28] dated October 21, 2002, recommended that the information, dated
February 8, 2002, for estafa be withdrawn, and that the case be dismissed, for insufficiency of
evidence. On November 6, 2002, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information.
[29]
Consequently, in the Order[30] dated November 27, 2002, the trial court granted the withdrawal of the
information, and dismissed the case.
In the Report and Recommendation[31] dated August 28, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V.
San Juan of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent
to have betrayed the trust of complainant as her client, for being dishonest in her dealings and
appropriating for herself the insurance proceeds intended for complainant. The Investigating
Commissioner pointed out that despite receipt of the approximate amount of P200,000.00, respondent
failed to secure the visas for complainant and her son, and that through deceitful means, she was able to
appropriate for herself the proceeds of the insurance policies of complainant's husband. Accordingly, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the
maximum period allowed under the law, and that she be ordered to turn over to complainant the amounts
she received from the London insurance companies.
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVI-2003-166, [32] adopted and
approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with modification that respondent be
disbarred.
The Court agrees with the observation of the Investigating Commissioner that complainant had
sufficiently substantiated the charge of gross dishonesty against respondent, for having appropriated the
insurance proceeds of the complainant's deceased husband, and the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors that respondent should be disbarred.
The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to
safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of
officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of
office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.[33]
A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, it does
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of
its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is
still fit to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice, by purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.[34]

Being a sui generis proceeding, the main disposition of this Court is the determination of the respondent's
administrative liability. This does not include the grant of affirmative reliefs, such as moral and
exemplary damages as prayed for by the complainant, which may very well be the subject of a separate
civil suit for damages arising from the respondent's wrongful acts, to be filed in the regular courts.
In the absence of a formal contract, complainant engaged the legal services of respondent to assist her in
securing visa applications and claiming the insurance proceeds of her deceased husband. There are
conflicting allegations as to the scope of authority of respondent to represent the complainant. A perusal
of the [first] SPA,[35] dated November 6, 1998, which was not notarized, showed that complainant merely
authorized respondent to represent her and her son, in order to protect their rights and interests, in the
extrajudicial and/or judicial proceeding and the possibility of any amicable settlement, relating to the
estate of her deceased husband, both in the Philippines and United Kingdom. The [second] SPA,[36] dated
April 6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999, allegedly bearing the forged signature of complainant, in
addition to the foregoing representations, authorized respondent to appear and represent the complainant,
in connection with her insurance claims, and to receive monies and/or encash treasury warrants, checks
arising from said claims, deposit the same, and dispose of such funds as may be necessary for the
successful pursuit of the claims. The [third] SPA,[37] also dated April 6, 1999 and notarized on April 30,
1999, allegedly bearing the forged signature of complainant, but additionally bearing the signatures of
two witnesses, was a faithful reproduction of the second SPA, with exactly the same stipulations. The
three SPAs, attached to the pleadings of the parties and made integral parts of the records of the case,
were not certified true copies and no proof was adduced to verify their genuineness and
authenticity. Complainant repudiates the representation of respondent in her behalf with regard to the
insurance claims; however, the admission of respondent herself, as lawyer, that she received payment
from complainant, her client, constitutes sufficient evidence to establish a lawyer-client relationship. [38]
Be that as it may, assuming that respondent acted within the scope of her authority to represent the
complainant in pursuing the insurance claims, she should never deviate from the benchmarks set by
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Specifically, Rule 16.01 states that
a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client, and Rule
16.03 thereof requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of a client when due or upon
demand.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use
the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client. [39] In the
present case, the cash/check voucher and the temporary receipts issued by respondent, with the letterhead
of her law firm, Z.P. Reyes Law Office, indubitably showed that she received the total amount
of P167,000.00[40] from the complainant, in connection with the handling of the latter's case. Respondent
admitted having received money from the complainant, but claimed that the total amount
ofP120,000.00[41] she received was in accordance with their agreement. Nowhere was it shown that
respondent rendered an accounting or, at least, apprised the complainant of the actual expenses
incurred. This leaves a quandary as to the discrepancy in the actual amount that respondent should
receive, supposedly pursuant to an agreement of engaging respondent to be her counsel, as there was
absence of a formal contract of legal services.
Further, on December 4, 1998, complainant gave P50,000.00 to the respondent for the purpose of
assisting her in claiming the insurance proceeds; however, per Application for United Kingdom Entry
Clearance,[42] dated December 8, 1998, it showed that respondent's primary purpose in traveling to
London was to attend the International Law Conference in Russell Square, London. It is appalling that
respondent had the gall to take advantage of the benevolence of the complainant, then grieving for the
loss of her husband, and mislead her into believing that she needed to go to London to assist in recovering

the proceeds of the insurance policies. Worse, respondent even inculcated in the mind of the complainant
that she had to adhere to the nefarious culture of giving grease money or lagay, in the total amount
of P43,000.00,[43] to the British Embassy personnel, as if it was an ordinary occurrence in the normal
course of conducting official business transactions, as a means to expedite the visa applications. This runs
afoul the dictum in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
More importantly, apart from her bare denials that no remittance was made to her personal bank account,
as shown by the monthly transaction report (covering January to December for the years 2000-2001),
[44]
respondent never attempted to reconcile the discrepancy, or give a satisfactory explanation, as to why
she failed to render an accounting, on the proceeds of the insurance policies that should rightfully belong
to the complainantvis--vis the correspondence by the insurance companies based in London, pertaining to
the remittance of the following amounts to the respondent's personal bank account, to wit: Per
letter[45] dated November 23, 2000, from one Rupesh Majithia, Administrator, Customer Services
Department of Lincoln Financial Group, addressed to complainant, stating, among others, that An amount
of 10,489.57 was paid out under the Power of Attorney on 27th September 2000), and per letter,[46] dated
April 28, 2000, from one Jeff Hawkes, Customer Services Claims (CLD), of the Eagle Star Life
Assurance Company Limited, addressed to one Andrea Ransom of the Lincoln Financial Group, The
Quays, stating, among others, that I can confirm that a death claim was made on the policy on 13 October
1999 when an amount of 471.06 was sent by International Moneymover to the client's legal
representative, ZP Reyes Law Office of Quezon City, Philippines. Clearly, there is no doubt that the
amounts of 10,489.57 and471.06 were remitted to respondent through other means of international
transactions, such as the International Moneymover, which explains why no direct remittance from the
insurance companies in London could be traced to the personal bank account of respondent, per monthly
transaction report, covering January to December for the years 2000-2001.

A criminal case is different from an administrative case, and each must be disposed of according to the
facts and the law applicable to each case. [47] Section 5, in relation to Sections 1 [48] and 2,[49] Rule 133,
Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required,
not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil
cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. Applying the rule to the present case, the dismissal of a criminal case
does not preclude the continuance of a separate and independent action for administrative liability, as the
weight of evidence necessary to establish the culpability is merely substantial evidence. Respondent's
defense that the criminal complaint for estafa against her was already dismissed is of no consequence. An
administrative case can proceed independently, even if there was a full-blown trial wherein, based on both
prosecution and defense evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a judgment of acquittal, on the
ground either that the prosecution failed to prove the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that
no crime was committed. More so, in the present administrative case, wherein the ground for the
dismissal of the criminal case was because the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to withdraw the
information and, a fortiori, dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence.
In Velez v. De Vera,[50] the Court ruled that the relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in
nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity, and disinterestedness on the part of the
attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client. The Canon of Professional Ethics
provides that the lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain, he
abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Money of the client or collected
for the client, or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer, should be reported and
accounted for promptly and should not, under any circumstances, be commingled with his own or be used

by him. Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the
prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment. Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of
professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are
guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. [51] Indeed,
lawyering is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration.[52]
In some cases, the Court stripped lawyers of the privilege to practice their profession for breach of trust
and confidence pertaining to their clients' moneys and properties. In Manzano v. Soriano,[53] therein
respondent, found guilty of grave misconduct (misappropriating the funds belonging to his client) and
malpractice, represented therein complainant in a collection suit, but failed to turn over the amount
of P50,000.00 as stipulated in their agreement and, to conceal the misdeed, executed a simulated deed of
sale, with himself as the vendor and, at the same time, the notary public.In Lemoine v. Balon, Jr.,
[54]
therein respondent, found guilty of malpractice, deceit, and gross misconduct, received the check
corresponding to his client's insurance claim, falsified the check and made it payable to himself, encashed
the same, and appropriated the proceeds.
Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple
rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a
greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with public interest, for which it is
subject to State regulation. [55] Respondent's repeated reprehensible acts of employing chicanery and
unbecoming conduct to conceal her web of lies, to the extent of milking complainant's finances dry, and
deceitfully arrogating upon herself the insurance proceeds that should rightfully belong to complainant, in
the guise of rendering legitimate legal services, clearly transgressed the norms of honesty and integrity
required in the practice of law. This being so, respondent should be purged from the privilege of
exercising the noble legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes is found guilty of gross misconduct
and DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let her name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This
Decision is immediately executory.
Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it duly recorded in the personal file of the
respondent.
Respondent is ORDERED to turn over to complainant Marites E. Freeman the proceeds of the insurance
policies remitted to her by Lincoln Financial Group, in the amount of 10,489.57, and Eagle Star Life
Assurance Company Limited, 471.06, or in the total amount of 10,960.63, which is approximately
equivalent to P700,000.00, pursuant to the prevailing exchange rate at the time of the subject transaction.
SO ORDERED.

(38)
LUZVIMINDA R. LUSTESTICA,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 6258


Present:

versus -

ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE,


Respondent. -- -

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:

August 24, 2010


x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For consideration is the disbarment complaint filed by Luzviminda R. Lustestica (complainant) against
Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe (respondent) for notarizing a falsified or forged Deed of Donation of real
property despite the non-appearance of the donors, Benvenuto H. Lustestica (complainants father) and his
first wife, Cornelia P. Rivero, both of whom were already dead at the time of execution of the said
document.

In his Answer,[1] the respondent admitted the fact of death of Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P.
Rivero, considering their death certificates attached to the complaint. The respondent claimed, however,
that he had no knowledge that the real Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero were already dead
at the time he notarized the Deed of Donation. [2] He also claimed that he exerted efforts to ascertain the
identities of the persons who appeared before him and represented themselves as the donors under the
Deed of Donation.[3]
After the submission of the respondents Answer to the complaint, the Court referred the matter to
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline) for investigation, evaluation and recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
made the following findings:
The core issue is whether or not Respondent committed a falsehood in violation of his
oath as a lawyer and his duties as Notary Public when he notarized the Deed of Donation
purportedly executed by Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero as the donors
and Cecilio R. Lustestica and Juliana Lustestica as the donees on 5 August 1994.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2013, otherwise known as the Notarial Law, explicitly
provides:
x x x The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment
shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him and that he is the same person who
executed it acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. x x x.
As correctly observed by Complainant, Respondents Acknowledgment is the best
evidence that NO RESIDENCE CERTIFICATES were presented by the alleged donors
and the donees. Had the parties presented their residence certificates to Respondent, it
was his duty and responsibility under the Notarial Law to enter, as part of his
certification, the number, place of issue and date of each residence certificate presented
by the parties to the Deed of Donation. Respondent, however, failed to make the required
entries. Respondents claim that the persons who allegedly appeared before him and
represented themselves to be the parties to the Deed of Donation showed their residence
certificates and that he instructed his secretary to indicate the details of the residence
certificates of the parties is self-serving and not supported by the evidence on record.
xxxx
The fact that Respondent notarized a forged/falsified document is also undisputed not
only by [the] strength of Complainants documentary evidence but more importantly, by
Respondents own judicial admission. x x x. In view of Respondents judicial admission
that the alleged donors, BENVENUTO H. LUSTESTICA and his first wife, CORNELIA
P. RIVERO, died on 7 September 1987 and 24 September 1984, respectively, it is beyond
reasonable doubt that said donors could not have personally appeared before him on 5
August 1994 to [acknowledge] to him that they freely and voluntary executed the Deed
of Donation. Moreover, x x x quasi-judicial notice of the Decision of the Municipal Trial
Court finding accused CECILIO LUSTESTICA and JULIANA LUSTESTICA GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principals of the crime of falsification of public
document.[4]
In his Report dated August 15, 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found the respondent
grossly negligent in the performance of his duties as notary public and recommended that the respondents

notarial commission be suspended for a period of one (1) year. The IBP Commissioner also recommended
that a penalty ranging from reprimand to suspension be imposed against the respondent, with a warning
that a similar conduct in the future will warrant an imposition of a more severe penalty. [5]
By Resolution No. XVII-2005-116 dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline adopted and approved the Report of the IBP Commissioner. The pertinent
portion of this Resolution reads:
[C]onsidering Respondents gross negligence in the performance of his duties as Notary
Public, Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year and Respondents notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified from
reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) yearswith a notification that this
suspension of one year must be served in succession to the initial recommendation of
the IBP Board of Suspension of one year in CBD Case No. 04-1371.[6]
From these undisputed facts, supervening events occurred that must be taken into consideration of the
present case.
First, CBD Case No. 04-1371, entitled Victorina Bautista, complainant, v. Atty. Sergio E.
Bernabe, respondent, which was the case referred to in Resolution No. XVII-2005-116, was docketed as
A.C. No. 6963[7] before the Court. In a decision dated February 9, 2006, the Court revoked the
respondents notarial commission and disqualified him from reappointment as Notary Public for a period
of two (2) years, for his failure to properly perform his duties as notary public when he notarized a
document in the absence of one of the affiants. In addition, the Court suspended him from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that a repetition of the same or of similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely.
Second, on January 6, 2006, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of Resolution No.
XVII-2005-116 before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The respondent moved to reconsider the
IBP Resolution, claiming that the penalty imposed for the infraction committed was too harsh. The
motion was denied in Resolution No. XVII-2006-81, dated January 28, 2006, [8] for lack of jurisdiction of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, since the administrative matter had then been endorsed to the
Court.
Third, on January 4, 2006, a motion for reconsideration (the same as the one filed with the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline) was filed by the respondent before the Court. In a Minute Resolution
dated March 22, 2006, the Court noted the findings and recommendations in Resolution No. XVII-2005116 and required the complainant to file her Comment to the respondents motion for reconsideration. On
April 28, 2006, the complainant filed her Comment praying for the denial of the motion.
On July 5, 2006, the Court issued a Minute Resolution noting the denial of the respondents motion for
reconsideration, by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, and the complainants Comment to the
respondents motion before the Court.
Subsequently, on January 26, 2009, the Court declared the case closed and terminated after considering
that no motion for reconsideration or petition for review, assailing both IBP resolutions, had been filed by
the respondent.[9]
On October 8, 2009, the respondent, through a letter addressed to the Office of the Bar Confidant,
requested that he be given clearance to resume the practice of law and to allow him to be commissioned
as a notary public. In his letter, the respondent alleged that he has already served the penalties imposed
against him in A.C. No. 6963 and the present case. He claimed that after the receipt of the IBP

Resolutions in both cases, he did not practice his profession and had not been appointed or commissioned
as a notary public.
The Office of the Bar Confidant
Acting on the respondents letter, the Office of the Bar Confidant submitted a Report and
Recommendation, which states:
1.

The EFFECTIVITY of the respondents suspension and disqualification should


have been COMMENCED on the date of receipt of the Decision of the Court and
not from the date of receipt of the Resolution of the IBP recommending the
respondents suspension from the practice of law and disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public, it being recommendatory in nature;

2.

The prayer of the respondent to resume his practice of law in Adm. Case No. 6963
be denied;

3.

The respondent be REQUIRED to submit certification from competent courts and


IBP that he has fully served the entire period of suspension and disqualification in
Adm. Case No. 6963;

4.

The Court may now FINALLY RESOLVE the findings and recommendation of
the IBP in its Resolution No. XVII-2005-16, dated October 2005, in Adm. Case No.
6258, for final disposition of the case and for proper determination whether the order
of suspension and disqualification in Adm. Case No. 6963 should be lifted after the
respondent has satisfactorily shown that he has fully served the suspension and
disqualification.[10]

The Courts Ruling


The findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline are well-taken.
We cannot overemphasize the important role a notary public performs. In Gonzales v. Ramos,[11] we
stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one invested with substantive
public interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document,
making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. [12] A notarized document is, by
law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. [13] It is for this reason that a notary public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the publics
confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined. [14]
The records undeniably show the gross negligence exhibited by the respondent in discharging his
duties as a notary public. He failed to ascertain the identities of the affiants before him and failed to
comply with the most basic function that a notary public must do, i.e., to require the parties presentation
of their residence certificates or any other document to prove their identities. Given the respondents
admission in his pleading that the donors were already dead when he notarized the Deed of Donation, we

have no doubt that he failed in his duty to ascertain the identities of the persons who appeared before him
as donors in the Deed of Donation.
Under the circumstances, we find that the respondent should be made liable not only as a notary
public but also as a lawyer. He not only violated the Notarial Law (Public Act No. 2103), but also Canon
1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 (Old Notarial Law)[15] states:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents
in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made
under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate
shall so state.
In turn, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that [a] lawyer shall uphold
the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. At the same
time, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In this regard, a reading of the respondents Acknowledgment in the Deed of Donation shows how
these provisions were violated by the respondent:
BEFORE ME, Notary Public for and in Bulacan this AUG 05 1994 day of August, 1994,
personally appeared:
BENVENUTO H. LUSTESTICA: C.T.C. # _______:________:________
CORNELIA RIVERO : C.T.C. # ________:________:________
CECILIO LUSTESTICA : C.T.C. # ________:________:________
JULIANA LUSTESTICA : C.T.C. # ________:________:________
known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing
instrument and acknowledged to me that the same are their free act and voluntary deed. [16]
The respondent engaged in dishonest conduct because he falsely represented in his
Acknowledgment that the persons who appeared before him were known to him to be the same persons
who executed the Deed of Donation, despite the fact that he did not know them and did not ascertain their
identities as he attested.[17]
Moreover, the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct when he did not observe the requirements
under Section 1 of the Old Notarial Law that requires notaries public to certify that the party to the
instrument has acknowledged and presented, before the notaries public, the proper residence certificate
(or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter the residence certificates number, place, and
date of issue as part of the certification. [18] The unfilled spaces in the Acknowledgment where the
residence certificate numbers should have been clearly established that the respondent did not perform
this legal duty.
With these considerations, we find that the imposition of administrative sanctions for the above
infractions committed is in order.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the penalty of suspension, for a period of
one (1) year, from the practice of law and disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public for a
period of two (2) years. Considering that this is already Atty. Bernabes second infraction, we find the
IBPs recommendation to be very light; it is not commensurate with his demonstrated predisposition to
undertake the duties of a notary public and a lawyer lightly.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting,[19] we disbarred a lawyer for failing to subscribe to the sacred duties
imposed upon a notary public. In imposing the penalty of disbarment, the Court considered the lawyers
prior misconduct where he was suspended for a period of six (6) months and warned that a repetition of
the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.[20]
In Flores v. Chua,[21] we disbarred the lawyer after finding that he deliberately made false
representations that the vendor appeared before him when he notarized a forged deed of sale. We took into
account that he was previously found administratively liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (for bribing a judge) and sternly warned that a repetition of similar act or acts
or violation committed by him in the future would be dealt with more severely.[22]
In Traya v. Villamor,[23] we found the respondent notary public guilty of gross misconduct in his
notarial practice for failing to observe the proper procedure in determining that the person appearing
before him is the same person who executed the document presented for notarization. Taking into account
that it was his second offense, he was perpetually disqualified from being commissioned as a notary
public.[24]
In Social Security Commission v. Coral,[25] we suspended indefinitely the notarial commission of
the respondent lawyer who was found to have prepared, notarized and filed two complaints that were
allegedly executed and verified by people who have long been dead. We also directed him to show cause
why he should not be disbarred.[26]
Considering these established rulings, read in light of the circumstances in the present case, we
find that Atty. Bernabe should be disbarred from the practice of law and perpetually disqualified from
being commissioned as a notary public. We emphasize that this is respondents second offense and while
he does not appear to have any participation in the falsification of the Deed of Donation, his contribution
was his gross negligence for failing to ascertain the identity of the persons who appeared before him as
the donors. This is highlighted by his admission [27] in his Answer that he did not personally know the
parties and was not acquainted with them. The blank spaces in the Acknowledgment indicate that he did
not even require these parties to produce documents that would prove that they are the same persons they
claim to be. As we emphasized inMaligsa:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as
honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a
member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in
any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the legal profession.[28]

In light of the above findings and penalties, the respondents request to be given clearance to
resume the practice of law and to apply for a notarial commission, after serving the administrative
sanctions in A.C. No. 6963, is now moot and academic. We, accordingly, deny the request for clearance to
practice law and to apply for notarial commission.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) NOTE the letter dated October 8, 2009 of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe to the Office of
the Bar Confidant.
(2) ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline with
MODIFICATION on the administrative penalty imposed.

(3) DECLARE respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe liable for gross negligence, in the
performance of his duties as notary public, and for his deceitful and dishonest attestation, in
the course of administering the oath taken before him. Respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe is
hereby DISBARRED from
the
practice
of
law
and his
name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from
the
Roll
of
Attorneys.
He
is
alsoPERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.
(4) DENY the request for clearance to practice law and to apply for notarial commission of
respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Sergio E. Bernabes record, as a member of the
bar, and copies furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts.
In view of the notarization of a falsified deed whose purported parties were already dead at the time of
notarization, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Prosecutor General, Department of
Justice for whatever action, within its jurisdiction, it may deem appropriate to bring against Atty. Sergio
E. Bernabe.
SO ORDERED.

(39)
PACITA CAALIM-VERZONILLA,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 6655


Present:

- versus -

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*
DEL CASTILLO,*
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA,Respondent.


Promulgated:

October 11, 2011


x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is the verified affidavit-complaint [1] of Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla seeking the disbarment
of respondent Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua for allegedly falsifying a public document and evading the
payment of correct taxes through the use of falsified documents.
Complainant alleges that on September 15, 2001, respondent prepared and notarized two Deeds of ExtraJudicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Lope Caalim with Sale. The first deed [2] was for a
consideration of P250,000 and appears to have been executed and signed by Lopes surviving spouse,
Caridad Tabarrejos, and her children (complainant, Virginia Caalim-Inong and Marivinia Caalim) in favor
of spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga. The second deed[3]was for a consideration of P1,000,000 and
appears to have been executed by and for the benefit of the same parties as the first deed. The two deeds
have identical registration numbers, page numbers and book numbers in the notarial portion.
Complainant avers that both deeds are spurious because all the heirs signatures were falsified. She
contends that her sister Marivinia does not know how to sign her name and was confined at the Cagayan
Valley Medical Center, Tuguegarao City, at the time the deeds were allegedly signed by her, as shown by
a certification[4]from said hospital. The certification, dated February 6, 2004 and signed by Dr. Alice
Anghad, Medical Officer IV, attested that Marivinia has been confined at the Psychiatry Ward of the
Cagayan Valley Medical Center since May 3, 1999 after being diagnosed of Substance Induced Psychosis
and Schizophrenia, Undifferentiated Type.
Complainant further alleges that the two deeds were not presented to any of them and they came to know of
their existence only recently. She further claims that the Community Tax Certificates [5] (CTCs) in her name
and in the names of her mother and her sister Marivinia were procured only by the vendee Shirley and not
by them. Complainant submits the affidavit[6] executed by Edwin Gawayon, Barangay Treasurer of C-8,
Claveria, Cagayan, on August 3, 2002, attesting that the CTCs were procured at the instance of Shirley and
were paid without the complainant and her co-heirs personally appearing before him. Gawayon stated that
the signatures and thumbmarks appearing on the CTCs are not genuine and authentic because it can be seen
with the naked eyes that the signatures are similar in all three CTCs.
Lastly, complainant alleges that the two deeds were used by respondent and Shirley to annul a previously
simulated deed of sale[7] dated June 20, 1979 purportedly executed by Lope in favor of the spouses Madki
and Shirley Mipanga. Said deed was likewise a complete nullity because at that time Shirley Mipanga
was only sixteen years old and still single.
In his comment,[8] respondent admits having prepared and notarized the two disputed Deeds of ExtraJudicial Settlement of the Estate with Sale (subject deeds), but denies any irregularity in their
execution. He claims that the preparation and notarization of the subject deeds were made under the
following circumstances:

In the morning of September 15, 2001, complainant, Caridad, Virginia and Shirley Mipanga went
to his house and requested him to prepare a deed of sale of a residential lot located in Claveria, Cagayan.
He was informed by the parties that the agreed purchase price is P1,000,000 and was presented the
certificate of title to the property. Upon finding that the registered owner is Lope Caalim, married to
Caridad Tabarrejos and knowing that Lope already died sometime in the 1980s, he asked for, and was
given, the names and personal circumstances of Lopes surviving children. He asked where Marivinia was,
but Caridad told him that Marivinia remained home as she was not feeling well. As Caridad assured him
that they will fetch Marivinia after the deed of conveyance is prepared, he proceeded to ask the parties to
present their CTCs. Caridad and Pacita, however, told him that they have not secured their CTCs while
Virginia forgot to bring hers. So he instructed them to get CTCs from Claveria.
An hour later, Caridad and Shirley came back with the CTCs of Caridad, Virginia, complainant and
Marivinia. After he finished typing the deed and the details of the CTCs, Caridad said that she will bring the
deed with her to Claveria for her daughters to sign. He then told them that it was necessary for him to meet
them all in one place for them to acknowledge the deed before him as notary public. It was agreed upon that
they will all meet at the house of the Mipangas between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon on that same day.
Respondent arrived at the Mipanga residence shortly before 12:00 noon. There he saw Shirley, Caridad,
complainant, Pacita and Marivinia with two other persons whom he later learned were the instrumental
witnesses to the execution of the document. Upon being informed that the parties have already affixed
their signatures on the deed, he examined the document then inquired from the heirs if the signatures
appearing therein were theirs and if they were truly selling the property for P1,000,000. The heirs
answered in the affirmative, thereby ratifying and acknowledging the instrument and its contents as their
own free and voluntary act and deed. Thus, he notarized the document and then gave the original and two
carbon copies to Shirley while leaving two in his possession.
Respondent adds that Shirley thereafter asked him what steps were needed to effect registration of the
deed and transfer of the title in her and her husbands name. He replied that all the unpaid land taxes
should be paid including the capital gains tax, documentary stamp taxes and estate tax to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) which will then issue the necessary clearance for registration. When asked how
much taxes are payable, he replied that it depends on the assessment of the BIR examiner which will be
based on the zonal value or selling price stated in the deed of sale. He added that the estate taxes due, with
interests and surcharges, would also have to be paid. Since the consideration for the sale is P1,000,000,
the taxes payable was quite enormous. Shirley asked him who between the vendor and the vendee should
pay the taxes, and he replied that under the law, it is the obligation of the vendors to pay said taxes but it
still depends upon the agreement of the parties. He asked if there was already an agreement on the matter,
but the parties replied in the negative.
Shirley then told the vendors that they should shoulder the payment of taxes. Caridad and her covendors, however, refused and said that a big portion of the P1,000,000 paid to them was already used by
them to pay and settle their other obligations. Shirley then offered to pay one-half of whatever amount the
BIR will assess, but Caridad insisted that another document be prepared stating a reduced selling price of
only P250,000 so that they need not contribute to the payment of taxes since Shirley was anyway already
willing to pay one-half of the taxes based on the selling price stated in the first deed. This resulted in a
heated discussion between the parties, which was, however, later resolved by an agreement to execute a
second deed. The prospect of preparing an additional deed, however, irritated respondent as it meant
additional work for him. Thus, respondent went home.
Later, the parties visited respondent at his house and pleaded with him to prepare the second deed
with the reduced selling price. Moved by his humane and compassionate disposition, respondent gave in
to the parties plea.

In the presence of all the heirs, the vendees and the instrumental witnesses, respondent prepared
and notarized the second deed providing for the lower consideration of only P250,000. He used the same
document number, page number and book number in the notarial portion as the first deed because
according to him, the second deed was intended by the parties to supplant the first.
Respondent denies complainants assertions that the two deeds are simulated and falsified, averring that as
stated above, all the parties acknowledged the same before him. Likewise, he and his clients, the spouses
Madki and Shirley Mipanga, presented the subject deeds as exhibits in Civil Case No. 2761-S also
pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
As to the allegation that Marivinia did not appear before him as she was allegedly under
confinement at the Cagayan Valley Medical Center on September 15, 2001, respondent cites a medical
certificate[9]stating that Marivinia was confined in said hospital from May 3, 1999 to August 10, 1999. He
also points out that Marivinia is one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2836-S pending before the RTC,
Branch 12, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, for the annulment of the subject deeds, and nothing in the complaint
states that she is mentally or physically incapacitated. Otherwise, her co-plaintiffs would have asked the
appointment of a guardian for her.
By Resolution[10] dated August 10, 2005, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In a Report and Recommendation[11] dated May 3, 2007, Commissioner Jose Roderick F. Fernando found
respondent administratively liable on account of his indispensable participation in an act designed to
defraud the government. He recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
three months and that his notarial commission, if still existing, be revoked and that respondent be
prohibited from being commissioned as a notary public for two years.
According to Commissioner Fernando, respondent did not offer any tenable defense to justify his
actions. As a notary, it was his responsibility to ensure that the solemnities of the act of notarization were
followed. As a lawyer, it was likewise incumbent upon him that the document he drafted and
subsequently notarized was neither unlawful nor fraudulent. Commissioner Fernando ruled that
respondent failed on both counts since he drafted a document that reflected an untruthful consideration
that served to reduce unlawfully the tax due to the government. Then he completed the act by likewise
notarizing and thus converting the document into a public document.
On June 26, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Fernandos report
and recommendation but imposed a higher penalty on respondent. Its Resolution No. XVII-2007-285
reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Respondents violation of Notarial Law and for his participation to a
transaction that effectively defrauded the government, Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and SUSPENSION of
his Notarial Commission for two (2) years with Warning that a similar violation in the
future will be dealt with severely.[12]
The above resolution is well taken.

By respondents own account of the circumstances surrounding the execution and notarization of
the subject deeds of sale, there is a clear basis for disciplining him as a member of the bar and as notary
public.
Respondent did not deny preparing and notarizing the subject deeds. He avers that the true
consideration for the transaction is P1,000,000 as allegedly agreed upon by the parties when they
appeared before him for the preparation of the first document as well as the notarization thereof. He then
claimed to have been moved by his humane and compassionate disposition when he acceded to the parties
plea that he prepare and notarize the second deed with a lower consideration of P250,000 in order to
reduce the corresponding tax liability. However, as noted by Commissioner Fernando, the two deeds were
used by respondent and his client as evidence in a judicial proceeding (Civil Case No. 2671-S), which
only meant that both documents still subsist and hence contrary to respondents contention that the second
deed reflecting a lower consideration was intended tosupersede the first deed.
As to the charge of falsification, the Court finds that the documents annexed to the present
complaint are insufficient for us to conclude that the subject deeds were indeed falsified and absolutely
simulated. We have previously ruled that a deed of sale that allegedly states a price lower than the true
consideration is nonetheless binding between the parties and their successors in interest. [13] Complainant,
however, firmly maintains that she and her co-heirs had no participation whatsoever in the execution of
the subject deeds. In any event, the issues of forgery, simulation and fraud raised by the complainant in
this proceeding apparently are still to be resolved in the pending suit filed by the complainant and her coheirs for annulment of the said documents (Civil Case No. 2836-S).
With his admission that he drafted and notarized another instrument that did not state the true
consideration of the sale so as to reduce the capital gains and other taxes due on the transaction,
respondent cannot escape liability for making an untruthful statement in a public document for an
unlawful purpose. As the second deed indicated an amount much lower than the actual price paid for the
property sold, respondent abetted in depriving the Government of the right to collect the correct taxes
due. His act clearly violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Xxxx
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
Not only did respondent assist the contracting parties in an activity aimed at defiance of the law,
he likewise displayed lack of respect for and made a mockery of the solemnity of the oath in
an Acknowledgment. By notarizing such illegal and fraudulent document, he is entitling it full faith and
credit upon its face, which it obviously does not deserve considering its nature and purpose.
In Gonzales v. Ramos,[14] we elucidated on how important and sacrosanct the notarial act is:
By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent converted the
Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public document. Such act is no
empty gesture. The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents.
When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of a document under his
hand and seal, he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes
of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the
solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to
authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and

delivery. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgement executed before a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
Hence, a notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with
public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.[15]
Moreover, while respondents duty as a notary public is principally to ascertain the identity of the affiant
and the voluntariness of the declaration, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him to guard against any illegal
or immoral arrangement or at least refrain from being a party to its consummation. [16]Rule IV, Section 4 of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice in fact proscribes notaries public from performing any notarial act for
transactions similar to the herein document of sale, to wit:
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described
in these Rules for any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee
specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or
transaction is unlawful or immoral;
xxxx
In this case, respondent proceeded to notarize the second deed despite knowledge of its illegal
purpose. His purported desire to accommodate the request of his client will not absolve respondent who,
as a member of the legal profession, should have stood his ground and not yielded to the importunings of
his clients. Respondent should have been more prudent and remained steadfast in his solemn oath not to
commit falsehood nor consent to the doing of any.[17] As a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might
lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession. [18]
Respondent also failed to comply with Section 2, Rule VI of the 2004Rules on Notarial Practice when he
gavethe second document the same document number, page number and book number as the first:
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. x x x
xxxx
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn
to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and
shall also state on the instrument or document the page/s of his register on which the
same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.
Xxxx
Respondent admitted having given the second deed the same document number, page number and
book number as in the first deed, reasoning that the second deed was intended to supplant and cancel the
first deed. He therefore knowingly violated the above rule, in furtherance of his clients intention of
concealing the actual purchase price so as to avoid paying the taxes rightly due to the Government.
Even assuming that the second deed was really intended to reflect the true agreement of the
parties and hence superseding the first deed they had executed, respondent remains liable under the aforecited Section 2(e) which requires that each instrument or document, executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before the notary public shall be given a number corresponding to the one in his register. Said rule is not
concerned with the validity or efficacy of the document or instrument recorded but merely to ensure the
accuracy and integrity of the entries in the notarial register.

A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in
his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.[19] Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds _herefore. A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, of for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Xxxx

In Gonzales, the notary public who notarized the document despite the non-appearance of one of
the signatories was meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from
re-appointment for two years. The notary in Gonzales was likewise suspended from the practice of law
for one year. Said penalty was in accord with the cases of Bon v. Ziga,[20]Serzo v. Flores,[21]Zaballero v.
Montalvan[22]and Tabas v. Mangibin.[23] The Court found that by notarizing the questioned deed, the
respondent in Gonzales engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. [24]
In the instant case, we hold that respondent should similarly be meted the penalty of suspension and
revocation of his notarial commission for having violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. In line
withcurrent jurisprudence, and as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, the revocation of his
notarial commission and disqualification from re-appointment as notary public for two years is in order.
With respect, however, to his suspension from the practice of law, we hold that the one-year
suspension imposed in Gonzales and the other cases is not applicable considering that respondent not only
failed to faithfully comply with the rules on notarial practice, he also violated his oath when he prepared and
notarized the second deed for the purpose of avoiding the payment of correct amount of taxes, thus abetting
an activity aimed at defiance of the law. Under these circumstances, we find the two-year suspension
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors as proper and commensurate to the infraction committed by
respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years. In addition, his present notarial commission, if any,
is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a period of
two (2) years. He is further WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Office of the Court
Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
recorded in the personal records of the respondent. SO ORDERED.
(40)
ATTY. FLORITA S. LINCO,Complainant,

A.C. No. 7241


[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1506]
Present:

- versus -

VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,


PERALTA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:
ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL,
Respondent.

October 17, 2011

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The instant case stemmed from an Administrative Complaint 1 dated June 6, 2005 filed by
Atty. Florita S. Linco (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty.
Jimmy D. Lacebal for disciplinary action for his failure to perform his duty as a notary public, which
resulted in the violation of their rights over their property.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco), the registered
owner of a parcel of land with improvements, consisting of 126 square meters, located at No.
8, Macopa St., Phase I-A, B, C & D, Valley View Executive Village, Cainta, Rizal and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 259001.
Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary public for Mandaluyong City,
notarized a deed of donation2 allegedly executed by her husband in favor of Alexander David T. Linco, a
minor. The notarial acknowledgment thereof also stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P. Toledo (Toledo),
mother of the donee, allegedly personally appeared before respondent on July 30, 2003, despite the fact
that complainants husband died on July 29, 2003.3
Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of Deeds of Antipolo City
cancelled TCT No. 259001 on March 28, 2005 4 and issued a new TCT No. 29251 5 in the name of
Alexander David T. Linco.
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She claimed that respondent's reprehensible act in
connivance with Toledo was not only violative of her and her children's rights but also in violation of the
law. Respondent's lack of honesty and candor is unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.
In his Answer,6 respondent admitted having notarized and acknowledged a deed of donation executed by
the donor, Atty. Linco, in favor of his son, Alexander David T. Linco, as represented by Lina P. Toledo.
Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by Atty. Linco, through an emissary in the
person of Claire Juele-Algodon (Algodon), to see him at his residence located at Guenventille II D-31-B,
Libertad Street, Mandaluyong City. Respondent was then informed that Atty. Linco was sick and wanted
to discuss something with him.
Respondent pointed out that Atty. Linco appeared to be physically weak and sickly, but was articulate and
in full control of his faculties. Atty. Lincoshowed him a deed of donation and the TCT of the property
subject of the donation. Respondent claimed that Atty. Linco asked him a favor of notarizing the deed of
donation in his presence along with the witnesses.
However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that he would be notarizing a document, he did
not bring his notarial book and seal with him. Thus, he instead told Algodon and Toledo to bring to his
office the signed deed of donation anytime at their convenience so that he could formally notarize and
acknowledge the same.

On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon went to his law office and informed him
that Atty. Linco had passed away on July 29, 2003. Respondent was then asked to notarize the deed of
donation. Respondent admitted to have consented as he found it to be his commitment to a fellow lawyer.
Thus, he notarized the subject deed of donation, which was actually signed in his presence on July 8,
2003.
During the mandatory conference/hearing on September 7, 2005, it was established that indeed the deed
of donation was presented to respondent on July 8, 2003. 7 Respondent, likewise, admitted that while he
was not the one who prepared the deed of donation, he, however, performed the notarization of the deed
of donation only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died.8
On November 23, 2005, in its Report and Recommendation, 9 the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD observed that respondent wanted it to appear that because the donor appeared before him
and signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, it was just ministerial duty on his part to notarize the
deed of donation on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died. The IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent
should know that the parties who signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, binds only the signatories
to the deed and it was not yet a public instrument. Moreover, since the deed of donation was notarized
only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died, the acknowledgement portion of the said deed of
donation where respondent acknowledged that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before me is
false. This act of respondent is also violative of the Attorney's Oath to obey the laws and do no falsehood.
The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year, and that his notarial commissionbe revoked and he be disqualified from re-appointment as
notary public for a period of two (2) years.
On April 27, 2006, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-215,10 the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt
and approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied. 11
On July 29, 2009, considering respondent's petition for review dated May 19, 2009 of IBP Resolution No.
XVII-2006-215 dated April 27, 2006 and IBP Resolution No. XVIII-2008-678 dated December 11, 2008,
denying complainant's motion for reconsideration and affirming the assailed resolution, the Court
resolved to require complainant to file her comment. 12
In her Compliance,13 complainant maintained that respondent has not stated anything new in his motion
for reconsideration that would warrant the reversal of the recommendation of the IBP. She maintained that
respondent violated the Notarial Law and is unfit to continue being commissioned as notary public; thus,
should be sanctioned for his infractions.
On August 16, 2011, in view of the denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration, the Office
of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court, recommended that the instant complaint is now ripe for judicial
adjudication.
RULING
The findings and recommendations of the IBP are well taken.

There is no question as to respondent's guilt. The records sufficiently established that Atty. Linco was
already dead when respondent notarized the deed of donation on July 30, 2003. Respondent likewise
admitted that he knew that Atty. Linco died a day before he notarized the deed of donation. We take note
that respondent notarized the document after the lapse of more than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when he
was allegedly asked to notarize the deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of time from the time he last
saw Atty. Linco should have put him on guard and deterred him from proceeding with the notarization of
the deed of donation.
However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in order to accommodate the alleged
need of a colleague. The fact that respondent previously appeared before him in person does not justify
his act of notarizing the deed of donation, considering the affiant's absence on the very day the document
was notarized. In the notarial acknowledgment of the deed of donation, respondent attested that
Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously, Atty. Linco could
not have appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because the latter died on July 29, 2003. Clearly,
respondent made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
his oath as a lawyer.
We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.14Respondent should not notarize a document unless the persons
who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to
attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. 15
Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public of the importance attached to the act of
notarization. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document; thus, making that document admissible
in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith
and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon
the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. 16
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance
of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would
be undermined.17 Hence, again, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to
the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer. A graver responsibility is
placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the
doing of any. He is mandated to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties, being dictated by
public policy and impressed with public interest. 18 Respondent's failure to perform his duty as a notary
public resulted not only in damaging complainant's rights over the property subject of the donation but
also in undermining the integrity of a notary public. He should, therefore, be held liable for his acts, not
only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
In Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,19 respondent having failed to discharge his duties as a notary public, the
revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a
period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one year were imposed. We deem it
proper to impose the same penalty.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility,
the notarial commission of respondent ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, is REVOKED. He

is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. He is


also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He is
further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He
is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this Decision in order to determine when his suspension
shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the
personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

(41) RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and A.C. No. 9081


MAXIMO A. GLINDO,
Complainants, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,


BRION,
- versus - SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ.
ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA, Promulgated:
Respondent. October 12, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa (Espinosa)
and Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against Atty. Julieta A. Omaa(Omaa).

The Antecedent Facts

Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaa with violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and
gross misconduct in office.

Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal)
sought Omaas legal advice on whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage
solemnized
on
23
July
1983. Omaa then
prepared
a
document
entitled Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay(contract) which reads:

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS
BAYAN NG GUMACA
LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON

KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY

KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga Filipino, may sapat na gulang,
dating
legal na mag-asawa, kasalukuyang naninirahan at
maypahatirang sulat sa Brgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca,
Quezon,
at
COMELEC, Intramuros,
Manila ayon sa pagkakasunod-sunod, matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sabatas ay nagpapatuna
y ng nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:

1.

Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng aming mga buhay ng wa


lang pakialaman,
kung kayat bawat isa sa amin ay maaari ng humanapng makakasama sa buhay;

2.

Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel


John
Espinosa,
14 na taong gulang; Aiza Espinosa,
11 taong gulang at Aldrin Espinosa,
10 taong gulang aynamili na kung kanino sasama sa aming dalawa. Si Ariel John
at Aiza Espinosa
ay sasama sa kanilang ama,
Rodolfo
Espinosa,
at ang bunso, AldrinEspinosa at sasama naman sa ina na si Elena;

3.

Na dahil sina Ariel


John
at Aiza ay nagsisipagaral sa kasalukuyan sila ay pansamantalang mananatili sa kanilang ina, habang ti
natapos ang kanilangpag-aaral.
Sa pasukan sila ay maaari ng isama ng ama, sa lugar kung saan siya ay naninirah
an;

4.

Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa aming dalawa tuwing ma
y pagkakataon;

5.

Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama kay Aldrin at ang kak
ulangan sa mga pangangailangan nito ay pupunan ng ina;

6.

Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V.,


gas
stove, mga kagamitan sa kusina ay aking (Rodolfo) ipinagkakaloob kay Elena
at hindi naako interesado dito;

7.

Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin dalawa sa mga panahong


darating ay aming mga sari-sariling pag-aari na at hindi napinagsamahan o
conjugal.

BILANG
PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre,
1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon.

(Sgd) (Sgd)
ELENA MARANTAL RODOLFO ESPINOSA
Nagkasundo Nagkasundo

PINATUNAYAN
AT
PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre,
1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon

ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA


Notary Public
PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97
Gumaca, Quezon

Doc. No. 482;


Page No. 97;
Book No. XI;
Series of 1997.

Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract
dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually
took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the property they acquired during their
union.

Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who informed
him that the contract executed by Omaa was not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a
lawyer to file a complaint against Omaa before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD).

Omaa alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know Espinosa. She denied that she
prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the
contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omaa alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she
was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her
office
staff
forged
her
signature
and
notarized
the
contract. Omaa presented Marantals Sinumpaang Salaysay (affidavit) to support her allegations and to
show that the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Omaa further presented a letter of apology from her
staff, Arlene Dela Pea, acknowledging that she notarized the document without Omaas knowledge,
consent, and authority.

Espinosa later submitted a Karagdagang Salaysay stating that Omaa arrived at his residence together with
a girl whom he later recognized as the person who notarized the contract. He further stated that Omaa was
not in her office when the contract was notarized.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation1 dated 6 February 2007, the IBP-CBD stated that Espinosas desistance
did not put an end to the proceedings. The IBP-CBD found that Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaa had failed to exercise due diligence in the
performance of her function as a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the law. The IBPCBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense of Omaa who first claimed that it was her part-time
staff who notarized the contract but then later claimed that it was her former maid who notarized it. The
IBP-CBD found:

Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed its authorship, thereby
revealing much more her propensity to lie and make deceit, which she is deserving [of]
disciplinary sanction or disbarment.

The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaa be suspended for one year from the practice of law and for two
years as a notary public.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Omaa filed a motion for reconsideration.

In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied Omaas motion for
reconsideration.
The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether Omaa violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in the
notarization of Marantal and Espinosas KasunduanNg Paghihiwalay.

The Ruling of this Court

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership
without judicial approval is void.2 The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the
disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses
andextrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership,3 which is exactly what Omaa did in this case.

In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where the lawyer was sanctioned for
notarizing similar documents as the contract in this case, such as: notarizing a document between the
spouses which permitted the husband to take a concubine and allowed the wife to live with another man,
without opposition from each other; 5 ratifying a document entitled Legal Separation where the couple
agreed to be separated from each other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations,
authorizing each other to remarry, and renouncing any action that they might have against each
other;6 preparing a document authorizing a married couple who had been separated for nine years to
marry again, renouncing the right of action which each may have against the other; 7 and preparing a
document declaring the conjugal partnership dissolved. 8

We cannot accept Omaas allegation that it was her part-time office staff who notarized the contract. We
agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaa herself notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her parttime staff who notarized the contract, it only showed Omaas negligence in doing hernotarial duties. We
reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could
not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries 9 or any member of his
staff.

We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaa violated
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Omaa knew fully well that
theKasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay has no legal effect and is against public policy. Therefore, Omaa may be
suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.10

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaa from the practice of law for ONE YEAR.
We REVOKE Atty. Omaas notarial commission, if still existing, and SUSPEND her as a notary public
for
TWO
YEARS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to
all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

(42)

MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 6593

versus -

ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO


ROMANA P. VALENCIA,
Respondents.

and

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
*
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
**
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
______________

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit [1] and a supplemental affidavit [2] for
disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia
(Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them
with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:
1.

That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June
23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr.
Daniel Cortes x x x

2.

That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely,
Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and
Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;

3.

xxxx

4.

5.

That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my
daughters, Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later part of 1987, an
unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. I
ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my
daughters told me that sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at
the Robinsons Department Store at Ermita, Manila together with a woman and a
child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona
Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x

xxxx

6.

That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the
Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is their
daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana
Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong sometime on 1978.

7.

That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona
Paguida Valencia at their residence x x x

8.

That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed
financial support to the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of
financial constraints.

xxxx

That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in


the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I
suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and
sleepless nights; x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit,[3] Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas charges and imputations. By way of
defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David
(Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia
parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his bad boy image
before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial
problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his

difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial difficulties with his second
family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea,
emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from college
except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course. [4] Atty. Garrido alleged that
Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of
the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December
26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer.
In her Counter-Affidavit,[5] Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She
explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was
void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia.
Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido,
as they (Maelotisea and Atty.Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with
Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido
build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to this
suit because of her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty.
Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings [6] in view of the criminal
complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity [7] (of
marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss [8] the complaints after the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea an absolute nullity. Since
Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no personality
to file her complaints against them. The respondents also alleged that they had not committed any
immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and the acts complained of
were committed before his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this
motion.[9]
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the
respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of
her six (6) children.[10] The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion. [11]
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating
Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation for the respondents disbarment.
[12]
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors)
approved and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated
July 30, 2004. This resolution in part states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which
lacks the degree of morality required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is
hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P.
Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint.

Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied his
motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He submits that
under the circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He
also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his
profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and
irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal
(Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She
recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that
disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts and
tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. RisosVidal also notes that no other administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.

THE COURTS RULING


After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors
against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.
General Considerations

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial
questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the
complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for membership in
the Bar.[13] We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. [14] First,
admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public
interest because it involves service to the public. [15] The admission qualifications are also qualifications
for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation
of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State
may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct
party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; [16]effectively, his or her
participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.

As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the
filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for
admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal
profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before

Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,[17] the
possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant
admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not
preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or
moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer. [18] Admission to the practice only creates the
rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be
refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission to the Bar. [19]

Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority
of the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit
applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority is Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly
immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of
law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment
proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotiseas affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of
discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness
than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only
after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Courts examination and
consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that
Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but
solely becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in
continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. [20] Immoral conduct
is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
communitys sense of decency.[21] We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising
from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct. [22]

In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an
unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[23] the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and
subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the respondents pattern of misconduct
undermined the institutions of marriage and family institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing
of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our
communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than
disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24] the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage
with his first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondents act of contracting the second marriage was
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral character required by the Rules
of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar.
Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[25] where the respondent secretly
contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent
exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he
made a mockery of marriage a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also declared his
act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido
established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only
corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and
during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this
Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not
mutually exclusive.

Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already


married to Constancia.[26] This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a
prohibited relationship.

Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the
subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the
commission of a crime.

Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two
marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his
actions on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage.

Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of
Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty.Valencia who bore him a daughter.

Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then
a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not valid.

Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in
an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.

Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had
sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double
life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.

Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the
position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or
an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his
past actions by having his second marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed against
him.

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically,
violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.

He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to
the Bar.[27] As a lawyer, he violated his lawyers oath, [28] Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
[29]
and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[30] all of which commonly require him to obey
the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second
marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when
he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.

He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which commands that he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that [a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides that, [a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a good
example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted
it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession and created

the public impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended and abused to
satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted
relationships.
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms
expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[31] Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. [32] Lawyers are at all times
subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation. [33] Needless to state, those whose conduct
both public and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings,
accordingly penalized.[34]
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be
administratively liable under the circumstances for gross immorality:
x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978
when they got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral
character is required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is
no distinction whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional
capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was
void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility x x x Although the second
marriage of the respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that
respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of them as
members of the Bar.[35]
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. [36] To have
good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that
he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in
which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known. [37] The requirement of good moral
character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of
lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves. [38] Each
purpose is as important as the other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer,
Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea),
and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garridos admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to
give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years
during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that
he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she
lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values,
whose confidential advice was sought by another with respect to the latters family problems, would not
aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice, thereby
effectively alienating the other persons feelings and affection from his wife and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact
remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would
have required her to ward off Atty. Garridos advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married
man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very
start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia,

away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of
Atty. Valencias presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children for a
third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law.
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty. Garridos second marriage to
Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict
legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos marriage to
Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the
country. Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos second
marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino
tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty. Valencias claim that she agreed to
marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid
marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong [39] leads us to the opposite conclusion; they
wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into
the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that
Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her
husband. Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with her
under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did
not mind at all sharing her husband with another woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty.
Valencias perverse sense of moral values.
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias actions grossly
immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all
appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions were also unprincipled
and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and
engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As
already mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of
shocking the communitys sense of decency; while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she
helped the second family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to
sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage.
We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply
failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.
[40]
In Barrientos v. Daarol,[41] we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good
moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards
before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal profession.
Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law
through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely
show the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this
privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to
disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects
the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court. [42]

We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them.
The records show the parties pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of
mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties
imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.

While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his act of supporting his
children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated
violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what
under other circumstances are commendable traits of character.

In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a
basic and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the
dignity of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of the administration of justice into
question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full
participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of
the Lawyers Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty.
Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P.
Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

(43) A.C. No. 5581

January 14, 2014

ROSE
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.

BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment 1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose Bunagan-Bansig
(Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct.

In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan
(Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of
marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila. 2 Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan,
legal wife of respondent.

However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage
on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox
copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila. 3

Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal
existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been
annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.

Bansig alleged that respondents act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders
him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.

In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a comment on
the instant complaint.

Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the Court's
Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a Resolution 5 dated
March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment on the complaint against him. 6

On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion 7 praying that respondent's failure to
file his comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the same, and that the case be submitted
for disposition.

On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an administrative case was
filed against him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion,
he received no other pleading or any processes of this Court. Respondent, however, countered that
Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife from pursuing the criminal
complaints for falsification of public documents they filed against Bansig and her husband. He also
explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show Cause Order only when he visited his
brother who is occupying their former residence at 59-B Aguho St., Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent
further averred that he also received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus Motion when the same was sent to his
law office address.

Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's husband,
Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to send a copy of the complaint to him. Respondent
suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to prevent him from defending himself. He
added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation amounting to P2,000,000.00 to his wife which triggered a
sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he and his wife received death threats from unknown persons;
thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new residences, i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City. He then
prayed that he be furnished a copy of the complaint and be given time to file his answer to the complaint.

In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent with a
copy of the administrative complaint and to submit proof of such service; and (b) require respondent to
file a comment on the complaint against him.

In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the administrative
complaint was furnished to respondent at his given address which is No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy
Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 2167. 9

On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of the
complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.10

On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation, 11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy of the
complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably had not complied with the Court's Order, otherwise, he
would have received the same already. He requested anew that Bansig be directed to furnish him a copy
of the complaint.

Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of the
complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the complaint to respondent. 12

On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly undertaken by
respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig asserted that the Court
should sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to frustrate the actions of the Court. She
attached a copy of the complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a copy of the
complaint was mailed at respondent's residential address in Angeles City as shown by Registry Receipt
No. 3582.

On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003
despite service of copy of the complaint by registered mail. 14

On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order dated May
16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt No.

55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig to submit the correct and present address
of respondent.15

On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his
correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as his
residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said address were returned with a note
"moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his appearance as counsel with mailing
address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City." 16

On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005
to respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City. 17
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005,
for failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint as required in the Resolution dated July 7,
2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of P1,000.00 payable to the court, or a
penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to
COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the comment required thereon. 18

In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the Court's
Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with the filing by
respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for noncompliance with the Resolution dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of compliance with the
Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to REFER the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation.20

However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa,
Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located because
neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be located. During
surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a
vacant lot with debris of a demolished building. Considering that the given address cannot be found or
located and there were no leads to determine respondent's whereabouts, the warrant of arrest cannot be
enforced.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution, reported
that as per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd.,
Taytay, Rizal.

Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices. Thus, in an
Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD, declared
respondent to be in default and the case was submitted for report and recommendation. The Order of
Default was received by respondent as evidenced by a registry return receipt. However, respondent failed
to take any action on the matter.

On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that respondent
Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.

RULING

A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. 22 The issue to be determined is whether
respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an
administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of
the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges
against him despite numerous notices.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the
allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.23

In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second marriage
despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of
the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C.
Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with
Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage,
however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4,
2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera
contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church,
Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.

Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered into a
second marriage while the latters first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second marriage
apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the
first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.

The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are
admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved
by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.

Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in evidence,
also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting.
By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would already have been sufficient to
establish the existence of two marriages entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be
accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For purposes of this disbarment
proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing
evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the
Bar.24

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar.
He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct
and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. 25
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondents defiant stance against
the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file his comment
on the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has
issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to have preselected only
those he will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The Court has issued several resolutions
directing respondent to comment on the complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any
answer thereto. He claimed to have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on
the complaint against him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have
escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached
him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending before this
Court which he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.

The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this case;
accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of the
complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous affidavits of service, have relentlessly
tried to reach respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of the Court's Resolutions and complaint
to different locations - both office and residential addresses of respondent. However, despite earnest
efforts of the Court to reach respondent, the latter, however conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure
to receive the complaint. When said excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a
manner of speaking, respondents acts were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to
delay the disposition of the case and to evade the consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is
apparent is respondents deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or
disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere
request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Respondents obstinate
refusal to comply with the Courts orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also
underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof." 26

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or

for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.

Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful
disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from
the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.1wphi1
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal file of respondent. All the
Courts of the Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.

SO ORDERED.

(44)
EUGENIA MENDOZA,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 5338


Present:

- versus -

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, Jr.,
NACHURA,
DE CASTRO,
BRION, and
PERALTA, JJ.

ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE,


Promulgated:
Respondent.
February 23, 2009
x----------------------------------------------------------- x
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his
profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority for there is perhaps no
profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than
that of law.[1]
Before the Court is the Petition filed by Eugenia Mendoza (complainant) dated September 19, 2000, seeking
the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre (respondent) for his acts of fraudulently filling up blank postdated checks
without her authority and using the same for filing unfounded criminal suits against her.
Complainant, a mail sorter at the Central Post Office Manila, averred that: On October 13, 1998, she
borrowed from Rodela Loans, Inc., through respondent, the amount of P20,000.00 payable in six months at 20%
interest, secured by 12 blank checks, with numbers 47253, 47256 to 47266, drawn against the Postal Bank. Although
she was unable to faithfully pay her obligations on their due dates, she made remittances, however, to respondent's
Metrobank account from November 11, 1998 to March 15, 1999 in the total sum of P12,910.00.[2] Claiming that the
amounts remitted were not enough to cover the penalties, interests and other charges, respondent warned complainant
that he would deposit Postal Check No. 47253 filled up by him on March 30, 1999 in the amount
ofP16,000.00. Afraid that respondent might sue her in court, complainant made good said check and respondent was
able to encash the same on March 30, 1999.Thereafter, complainant made subsequent payments to the Metrobank
account of respondent from April 13, 1999 to October 15, 1999,[3] thereby paying respondent the total sum
of P35,690.00.[4]
Complainant further claimed that, later, respondent filled up two of the postal checks she issued in blank,
Check Nos. 47261 and 47262 with the amount ofP50,000.00 each and with the dates January 15, 2000 and January 20,
2000 respectively, which respondent claims was in exchange for the P100,000.00 cash that complainant received on
November 15, 1999. Complainant insisted however that she never borrowed P100,000.00 from respondent and that it
was unlikely that respondent would lend her, a mail sorter with a basic monthly salary of less than P6,000.00, such
amount. Complainant also claimed that respondent victimized other employees of the Postal Office by filling up,
without authorization, blank checks issued to him as condition for loans.[5]
In his Comment dated January 18, 2000, respondent averred that his dealings with complainant were done in
his private capacity and not as a lawyer, and that when he filed a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.
Blg.) 22 against complainant, he was only vindicating his rights as a private citizen. He alleged further that: it was
complainant who deliberately deceived him by not honoring her commitment to their November 15, 1999 transaction
involvingP100,000.00 and covered by two checks which bounced for the reason account closed; the October 13, 1999
transaction was a separate and distinct transaction; complainant filed the disbarment case against him to get even with
him for filing the estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 case against the former; complainant's claim that respondent filled up the
blank checks issued by complainant is a complete lie; the truth was that the checks referred to were already filled up
when complainant affixed her signature thereto; it was unbelievable that complainant would issue blank checks, and
that she was a mere low-salaried employee, since she was able to maintain several checking accounts; and if he really
intended to defraud complainant, he would have written a higher amount on the checks instead of onlyP50,000.00.[6]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines [7] (IBP), and the parties were required to file
their position papers.[8]
In her Position Paper, complainant, apart from reiterating her earlier claims, alleged that respondent, after the
hearing on the disbarment case before the IBP on September 5, 2001, again filled up three of her blank checks, Check
Nos. 47263, 47264 and 47265, totaling P100,000.00, to serve as basis for another criminal complaint, since the earlier
estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 case filed by respondent against her before the Office of the Prosecutor of Pasig City was
dismissed on August 14, 2000.[9]

Respondent insisted in his Position Paper, however, that complainant borrowed P100,000.00 in exchange for
two postdated checks, and that since he had known complainant for quite some time, he accepted said checks on
complainant's assurance that they were good as cash.[10]
Investigating Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes submitted his Report dated September 6, 2002, finding
respondent guilty of dishonesty and recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one year.
[11]
The Report was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution dated October 19, 2002.
[12]
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied, however, by the IBP Board of Governors
on January 25, 2003 on the ground that it no longer had jurisdiction on the matter, as the same was already endorsed to
the Supreme Court.[13]
On June 9, 2003 this Court's Second Division issued a Resolution remanding the case to the IBP for the
conduct of formal investigation, as the Report of Commissioner Reyes was based merely on the pleadings submitted.
[14]

After hearings were conducted,[15] Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report
dated December 5, 2006 finding respondent guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and recommended respondent's suspension for three years.[16]
Commissioner Funa held that while it was difficult at first to determine who between complainant and
respondent was telling the truth, in the end, respondent himself, with his own contradicting allegations, showed that
complainant's version should be given more credence.[17]
Commissioner Funa noted that although complainant's total obligation to respondent was only P24,000.00,
since the loan obtained by complainant onOctober 13, 1998 was P20,000.00 at 20% interest payable in six months,
by April 13, 1999, however, complainant had actually paid respondent the total amount of P30,240.00. Thus, even
though the payment was irregularly given, respondent actually earned more than the agreed upon 20%
interest. Moreover, the amounts of P50,000.00 as well as the name of the payee in the subject checks were all
typewritten[18]
Commissioner Funa also gave credence to complainant's claim that it was respondent's modus operandi to
demand a certain amount as settlement for the dropping of estafa complaints against his borrowers. As Commissioner
Funa explains:
[A] complaint for estafa/violation of BP 22 was filed against [complainant] before the
Prosecutor's Office in Pasig City on June 21, 2000. On August 14, 2000, the Prosecutor's Office
dismissed the complaint. On October 2, 2000, Complainant filed this disbarment case. About one
year later, or on September 5, 2001, Complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter
demanding payment once again for another P100,000.00 corresponding to another three checks,
Check Nos. 0047263, 0047264 and 0047265.
Furthermore, Respondent filed another criminal complaint for estafa/violation of BP 22
dated October 17, 2001, this time before the QC Prosecutor's Office. The prosecutor's office
recommended the filing of the criminal case for one of the checks.
xxxx
Respondent's version, on the other hand, is that Check Nos. 0047261 and 0047262 were
given to him for loans (rediscounting) contacted on November 15, 1999 and not for a loan
contracted on October 13, 1998. x x x He claims that the October 13, 1998 transaction is an earlier
and different transaction. x x x On the very next day, or on November 16, 1999, Complainant again

allegedly contracted another loan for another P100,000.00 for which Complainant allegedly issued
the following Postal Bank checks [Check No. 0047263 dated May 16, 2001 for P20,000.00; Check
No. 0047264 dated May 30, 2001 for P30,000.00 and Check No. 0047265 dated June 15, 2001
forP50,000.00].
xxxx
Oddly though, Respondent never narrated that Complainant obtained a second loan
on November 16, 1999 in his Answer [dated January 18, 2000] and in his Position Paper
[dated October 8, 2001]. He did not even discuss it in his Motion for Reconsideration
dated December 20, 2002, although he attached the Resolution of the QC Prosecutor's
Office. Clearly, the November 16, 1999 transaction was a mere concoction that did not actually
occur. It was a mere afterthought. Respondent once again filled-up three of the other checks in his
possession (checks dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001) so that he can again
file another estafa/BP 22 case against Complainant (October 17, 2001) AFTER the earlier complaint
he had filed before the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office had been dismissed (August 14, 2000) and
AFTER herein Complainant had filed this disbarment case (October 2, 2000).
More telling, and this is where Respondent gets caught, are the circumstances attending this
second loan of November 16, 1999. In addition to not mentioning it at all in his Answer, his Position
Paper, and his Motion for Reconsideration, which makes it very strange, is that fact that he alleges
that the loan was contracted on November 16, 1999 for which Complainant supposedly issued
checks dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001. Note that May 16, 2001 is eighteen
(18 months), or 1 year and 6 months, from November 16, 1999. This is strangely a long period for
loans of this nature. This loan was supposedly not made in writing, only verbally. With no collaterals
and no guarantors. Clearly, this is a non-existent transaction. It was merely concocted by
Respondent.
More importantly, and this is where Respondent commits his fatal blunder thus
exposing his illegal machinations, Complainant allegedly received P100,000.00 in cash
on November 16, 1999 for which Complainant gave Respondent, in return, checks also amounting
to P100,000.00. The checks were supposedly dated May 16, 2001,May 30, 2001 and June 15,
2001 x x x.
Now then, would not Respondent suffer a financial loss if he gave away P100,000.00
on November 16, 1999 and then also receive P100,000.00 on May 16, 2001 or 1 year and 6
months later? A person engaged in lending business would want to earn interest. The same also with
a person re-discounting checks. In this instance, in his haste to concoct a story, Respondent forgot to
factor in the interest. At 20% interest, assuming that it is per annum, for 1 years, Respondent
should have collected from Complainant at least P130,000.00. And yet the checks he filled up
totaled only P100,000.00. The same is true in re-discounting a check. If Complainant gave
Respondent P100,000.00 in checks, Respondent should be giving Complainant an amount less
than P100,000.00. This exposes his story as a fabrication.
The same observations can be made of the first loan of P100,000.00 secured by Check
Nos. 0047261 and 0047262.
More strangely, during the course of the entire investigation, Respondent never touched on
what transpired on the dates of November 15 and 16, 1999. Consider that Complainant's position is
that no such transaction took place on November 15 and 16. And yet, Respondent never made any
effort to establish that Complainant borrowedP100,000.00 on November 15 and then
another P100,000.00 again on November 16. Respondent merely focused on establishing that

Complainant's checks bounced --- a fact already admitted several times by the Complainant --- and
the reasons for which were already explained by Complainant. This only shows the lack of candor
of Respondent.[19]
xxxx
We take note further that Complainant is a mere mail sorter earning less than P6,000.00
per month. Who would lend P200,000.00 to an employee earning such a salary, nowadays, and not
even secure such a loan with a written document or a collateral? It defies realities of finance,
economy and business. It even defies common sense.[20]
Commissioner Funa also took note that the instant case had practically the same set of facts as in Olbes v.
Deciembre[21] and Acosta v. Deciembre.[22] InOlbes, complainants therein, who were also postal employees, averred
that respondent without authority filled up a total of four checks to represent a total ofP200,000.00. In Acosta, the
complainant therein, another postal employee, averred that respondent filled up two blank checks for a total
of P100,000.00. Acosta,however, was dismissed by Commissioner Lydia Navarro on the ground that it did not involve
any lawyer-client relationship, which ground, Commissioner Funa believes, is erroneous.[23]
On May 31, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution adopting and approving Commissoner
Funa's Report, but modifying the penalty, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-219
Adm. Case No. 5338
Eugenia Mendoza vs.
Atty. Victor V. Deciembre
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent's gross misconduct and for practically found guilty of committing the same set of facts
alleged in AC 5365, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the
practice of law to be served successively after the lifting of Respondent's Indefinite Suspension.[24]
Although no motion for reconsideration was filed before the IBP Board of Governors, nor a petition for
review before this Court as reported by IBP and Office of the Bar Confidant, the Court considers the IBP Resolution
merely recommendatory and therefore would not attain finality, pursuant to par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court. The IBP elevated to this Court the entire records of the case for appropriate action.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP, but finds that disbarment and not just indefinite suspension is in
order.
The practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. [25] A high
sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of members of the bar. [26] They must conduct
themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times.[27]
The fact that there is no attorney-client relationship in this case and the transactions entered into by respondent
were done in his private capacity cannot shield respondent, as a lawyer, from liability.
A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts which tend to bring
reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. [28] Indeed, there is no distinction as

to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer may not
divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.[29]
In this case, evidence abounds that respondent has failed to live up to the standards required of members of
the legal profession. Specifically, respondent has transgressed provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
As correctly observed by IBP Investigating Commissioner Funa, respondent failed to mention in his
Comment dated January 18, 2000, in his Position Paper dated October 8, 2001 and in his Motion for Reconsideration
dated December 20, 2002, the P100,000.00 loan which complainant supposedly contracted on November 16, 1999. It
is also questionable why the checks dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001 which were supposedly
issued to secure a loan contracted about 18 months earlier, i.e. November 16, 1999, were made without any
interest. The same is true with the checks dated January 15 and 20, 2000 in the total sum of P100,000.00, which were
supposed to secure a loan contracted on November 15, 1999, for the same amount. Considering these circumstances
and the sequence of dates when respondent filed his criminal cases against complainant, and complainant her
disbarment case against respondent, what truly appears more believable is complainant's claim that respondent was
merely utilizing the blank checks, filling them up, and using them as bases for criminal cases in order to harass
complainant.
The Court also notes that the checks being refuted by complainant, dated January 15 and 20, 2000, May 16,
2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001[30]had its dates, amounts and payee's name all typewritten, while the blanks on
the check for P16,000.00 dated March 30, 1999 which complainant used to pay part of her original loan, were all filled
up in her handwriting.[31]
It is also observed that the present case was not the only instance when respondent committed his wrongful
acts. In Olbes,[32] complainants therein contracted a loan from respondent in the amount of P10,000.00 on July 1,
1999, for which they issued five blank checks as collateral. Notwithstanding their full payment of the loan, respondent
filled up four of the blank checks with the amount of P50,000.00 each with different dates of maturity and used the
same in filing estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 cases against complainants. The Court, in imposing the penalty of indefinite
suspension on respondent, found his propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation as reprehensible and his
misuse of the filled up checks, loathsome.[33]
In Acosta,[34] complainant therein also averred that on August 1, 1998, she borrowed P20,000.00 from
respondent with an interest of 20% payable in six months and guaranteed by twelve blank checks. Although she had
already paid the total amount of P33,300.00, respondent still demanded payments from her, and for her failure to
comply therewith, respondent filed a case against her before the City Prosecutor of Marikina City, using two of her
blank checks which respondent filled up with the total amount of P100,000.00. Unfortunately, the complaint was

dismissed by IBP Investigating Commissioner Navarro on October 2, 2001 on the ground that the said transaction did
not involve any lawyer-client relationship.[35] As correctly observed by Commissioner Funa, such conclusion is
erroneous, for a lawyer may be disciplined even for acts not involving any attorney-client relationship.
As manifested by these cases, respondent's offenses are manifold. First, he demands excessive payments from
his borrowers; then he fills up his borrowers' blank checks with fictitious amounts, falsifying commercial documents
for his material gain; and then he uses said checks as bases for filing unfounded criminal suits against his borrowers in
order to harass them. Such acts manifest respondent's perversity of character, meriting his severance from the legal
profession.
While the power to disbar is exercised with great caution and is withheld whenever a lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired, [36] the seriousness of
respondent's offense compels the Court to wield its supreme power of disbarment. Indeed, the Court will not hestitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it. [37] This is because in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to
the office of an attorney.[38]
As respondent's misconduct brings intolerable dishonor to the legal profession, the severance of his privilege to practice law for life is in order.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is hereby found GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT and VIOLATION of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon
7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective
immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant which shall forthwith record it in the personal files of respondent; all the courts of the
Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic
of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

(45)
TANU REDDI,
Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. DIOSDADO C. SEBRIO, JR.,


Respondent.

A.C. No. 7027


Present:
PUNO,* C.J.,
QUISUMBING,** Acting C.J.,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,*
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,*
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,*
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, &
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
January 30, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Tanu Reddi (complainant), an American citizen of Indian descent and a practicing endodontist in
New York, seeks the disbarment of Atty. Diosdado C. Sebrio, Jr. (respondent) for allegedly deceiving her
into giving him a total of US$ 3,000,000 for the purpose of, among other things, purchasing several real
estate properties for resale.
From the records of the case, the following facts are gathered:
Taking after her parents who had been involved in various charitable activities in India,
complainant nurtured philanthropic desires of her own consisting primarily in opening a hospital with
modern facilities in an underdeveloped part of Asia. [1]
Together with Immaculada Luistro (Immaculada), a Filipino citizen, [2] who was her assistant of
over 10 years, complainant visited the Philippines for the first time in 2000. Noting the level of poverty in
the country and the lack of medical services for the poor,[3] she decided to put up a hospital.[4]
Immaculada suggested to complainant to consider engaging in the real estate business in the
Philippines in order to speed up the generation of funds. [5] Heeding the suggestion, complainant returned
to the Philippines in 2003 to explore opportunities in the real estate business. [6]
Complainant was introduced to respondent who would help her acquire real properties for
development and/or resale. Since she could not acquire ownership of lands in the Philippines, respondent
advised her to use corporate vehicles to effect the purchases. Three corporations were thus formed
Tagaytay Twins, Inc., Manila Chic Twins, Inc., and Tanu, Inc.[7]
By complainants account, respondent cajoled her into buying several parcels of land located at
Tagaytay City, Las Pias City, Makati City, Quezon City, and Pasay City. She related the details
surrounding the intended acquisition of property as follows:
Re the Tagaytay City Property
Respondent represented to complainant that his client Teresita Monzon (Teresita) owned an
untitled 27-hectare property located at Tagaytay City. Through the Tagaytay Twins, Inc., complainant and
Teresita executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated March 21, 2003 (Tagaytay MOA) [8] prepared by
respondent under which she agreed to finance the titling of the property in the total amount
of P20,000,000, and that once titled, the property would be offered for sale, the proceeds of which would
be divided equally between her and Teresita. Complainant thereupon made staggered payments of
US$1,000, P2,000,000, and US$36,360 to Teresita.[9]
Complainant was later to discover that 996 square meters of the 27-hectare property had been
purchased by Aldio Properties, Inc. in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, which sale Teresita challenged in
an action for annulment before the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City. In said action, respondent was
Teresitas counsel of record.[10]
Re the Las Pias City Property
Respondent offered to complainant the option to purchase a house and lot located at Las Pias
City, which were encumbered by a mortgage, and which respondent represented as owned and being sold
by one Francisca Parales (Francisca)[11] to finance an urgently needed heart surgery of her daughter.[12]

On respondents advice, complainant obtained a franchise to operate a Jollibee food outlet, with
the agreement that out of the profits that its operation would generate, she would get 50% while
respondent and Immaculada would share the remaining 50%. [13] Complainant thus sent respondent sums
of money for the acquisition of both the Las Pias property and a franchise to operate a Jollibee outlet. [14]
Re the Makati City Property
Respondent introduced complainant to a certain Mario C. Mangco (Mangco), alleged legal officer
of the intestate estate of one Faustino Ramos (Ramos), which estate was alleged to be the owner of a real
property located at the consular area adjacent to Forbes Park in Makati City.[15] Complainant having been
interested in acquiring the property, respondent prepared a Memorandum of Agreement (Makati MOA)
which she, together with Mangco, forged on March 20, 2004. [16]
Under the Makati MOA, complainant agreed to, as she did, release P10,000,000 representing the
cost of development and titling of the property, and payment of back taxes; and an additional P2,000,000
for the execution of the Makati MOA.
Complainant was later to learn that the property was neither owned by the intestate estate of
Ramos nor for sale.
Re the Quezon City Property
Respondent broached to complainant the idea of buying the land on which SM North Mall in Quezon City
stands, he representing that it belongs to his client, purportedly a retired US Navy employee who resides
in Mindanao.[17] Complainant assented and transmitted large sums of money to respondent for the purpose
of, among other things, filing a petition for injunction against SM North Mall, paying back taxes, and
titling of the land.[18]
Re the Pasay City Property
Complainant sent respondent hefty amounts of money for the purchase of a vacant lot located along
Roxas Boulevard in Pasay City, alleged to belong to Florenda Estrada (Florenda) and Alma Mallari
(Alma), but which was mortgaged to one Atty. Go to secure a loan of P5,000,000.[19]She also defrayed
expenses, on the strength of respondents representations, to secure title to the lot, settle the mortgage
obligation, relocate squatters on the lot, and bribe a judge to close the transaction. [20]
Complainant subsequently discovered that there was no such vacant lot along Roxas Boulevard
in Pasay City; instead, she found out that the vacant lot referred to was titled in the names of Philippine
Bank of Communications (PBC) and Banco De Oro Universal Bank (BDO). [21]
In light of the foregoing developments, complainants counsel, by letter dated December 19,
2005,[22] demanded from respondent the return of the amount of US$3,000,000, claimed to be part of the
total sum of money she had sent to him for all the transactions that did not come about.No amount has
been returned to complainant.
Hence, spawned the filing on January 27, 2006[23] of the present complaint for disbarment against
respondent.
By his Comment, respondent admits receiving a total of US$544,828 from complainant [24] which
amount he claims was used not only for the purchase of the Las Pias property and discharge of the

mortgage thereon, but also for the setting up of the earlier mentioned corporations, as well as for the
downpayment on the Makati property and related expenses.[25]
Respondent likewise admits having represented to complainant that the Las Pias City property
belonged to one Francisca,[26] certificate of title to which and the corresponding deed of sale signed by
Francisca, by his claim, are in his possession; but the title has not been transferred to Tanu, Inc., as
agreed, in view of complainants failure to provide the money needed therefor, he adding that he is also
exercising his retaining lien over the Las Pias documents. [27]
Specifically with respect to the Makati property, respondent claims having paid P500,000 to
Mangco representing initial payment [28]thereof.
Regarding the Tagaytay City property, respondent admits that the Tagaytay MOA exists, and
avers that it is complainant who wants to get out of a perfected sale in order to recover her partial
payment amounting to approximately P4,000,000.[29]
With respect to the Quezon City property, respondent states that he is willing to surrender all the
documents pertaining thereto, but would do so only if complainant is first ordered to pay him his
professional fees.[30]
As for the Pasay City property, respondent denies complainants claims thereon as mere
preposterous allegations.
Following the filing by complainant of her Reply, the Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation/decision by Resolution of
January 22, 2007.[31]
At the mandatory conference scheduled by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline on September 13,
2007 before Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing (the Commissioner), [32] respondent failed to appear
despite notice. He instead sent a representative who sought a resetting as, allegedly, respondent was in
Ilocos attending to an important family matter.[33] The Commissioner, finding respondents absence
inexcusable, given that he had ample time to file a motion for resetting but he did not, considered
respondent to have waived his right to participate in the proceedings. [34] Complainant thereupon presented
evidence ex-parte and submitted her position paper.[35]
In her Report and Recommendation[36] submitted to the IBP Board of Governors on December 14, 2007,
the Commissioner found respondent to have committed fraudulent acts which constitute violations of the
lawyers oath and numerous provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), viz:
1. Respondent violated CANON 1 which states: A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and for legal processes.
Respondent committed estafa punishable under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal
Code. With unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, he misappropriated millions of pesos
which was [sic] given to him on his misrepresentation that such were needed for the
acquisition of the aforementioned properties.
Respondent also committed an unlawful act (i.e., falsification as part of his fraudulent
scheme) when he tampered with the Articles of Incorporation of Tanu, Inc.. A perusal of
the Articles of Incorporation given by respondent to complainant shows that the
incorporators are Tanu Reddi, Michael Lee, Prasuna Reddy, Ahalya Devi, and Robert

Juntilla. When complainant obtained a copy of the same in September 2005, she
discovered that other names were inserted.The names of respondent, Clarito D. Cardozo,
Brian Pellazar, and Michael Angelo Lopez were intercalated. (Exhibit W)
2.

He likewise violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR which provides: A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

He engaged in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct when he offered properties


for sale to complainant on the misrepresentation that complainant was dealing with the
true owners thereof. This is very clear from the documents he asked complainant to sign;
namely, the Memorandum of Agreement (Exhibit D) for the Tagaytay property, Deed of
Conditional Sale (Exhibit U) for the Pasay City property, and Memorandum of
Agreement (Exhibit M) for the Makati City property. The certificates of title, tax
declaration and other documents obtained by complainant from the various government
agencies reveal that all these properties aforementioned were either fictitious, not
susceptible to sale, simulated, or inexistent.
3.

Respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the CPR which state:
CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that
may come into his possession.

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
He failed to account for the sums of money he received from complainant and failed
to return the same upon demand. (Copy of demand letter dated 19 December 2005,
Exhibit T)
4. Respondent violated Rule 15.06 of the CPR which provides:
A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal
or legislative body.
He convinced complainant to pay bribe money to our judges since, he claims, that it
is a common practice in the Philippines.[37] (Underscoring supplied)
The Commissioner thus recommended that respondent be disbarred; that his name be ordered
stricken from the roll of attorneys; and that he be ordered to return the total amount of US$3,000,000 to
complainant.
By Resolution of January 17, 2008,[38] the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Commissioner, with the modification that respondent was ordered to return
only the admitted amount he received from complainant (US$544,828), without prejudice to
complainants recovery of the other amounts claimed in the appropriate forum.
The Court sustains the IBP Board of Governors, except its findings/conclusion that respondent
committed estafa and falsification. This is not the proper forum to determine whether he committed these
offenses.

The Court finds, however, that respondents dishonest and deceitful conduct with respect to the intended
transactions, real property acquisitions which turned out to be bogus, is sufficiently established.
It bears emphasis that respondent admits having received from complainant at least US$544,828. He
claims, however, that the amount was used for the purchase of the Las Pias property and the discharge of
the mortgage thereon, the setting up of the corporations earlier mentioned, and the downpayment on the
Makati property and related representation expenses therefor. The Court finds that the claim does not lie.
All that respondent presented to account for the money is a handwritten acknowledgment of a supposed
partial payment of P500,000 for the Makati property, purportedly executed by one Mangco. [39] By any
standard, this document is a mere piece of paper, Mangco not having been presented, if he exists at all, to
confirm that he indeed issued the receipt. Since respondent failed to credibly account, upon demand, for
the money held by him in trust an element of misappropriation [40] complainants claim that respondent
employed deceit on her is established.
Respondents culpability is further highlighted by his utter lack of regard for the seriousness of the
charges against him. His defenses raised in his Comment consist mainly in bare denials. When the
integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he
must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. [41] He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. [42] This, respondent
miserably failed to do.
Respondents justification for his non-presentation of any documents to substantiate the so-called
property acquisitions that he is exercising his retaining lien over them as, allegedly, his professional fees
have not been paid is incredible.
If those documents actually exist, and considering that his license to practice law is on the line,
respondent could have readily attached even photocopies thereof to his Comment in order to lend a
semblance of credibility to his claim. His retaining lien claim remains just that. Worse, it only amounts to
an admission that he acted as counsel for complainant; yet, he completely failed to show that in his
dealings on her behalf, he put her interests before his.
As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, the Court finds the same to be in order.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to
do so. x x x.
To reiterate, by his own admission, respondent received a total of US$544,828 from complainant, which
he could not properly account for. The orchestrated manner in which he carried out his fraudulent
scheme, in connivance with other persons, and by taking advantage of complainants naivete in the
workings of the real estate business in the Philippines, depict a man whose character falls way, way short
of the exacting standards required of him as a member of the bar and an officer of the court. Thus,
respondent is no longer fit to remain as such.

The Court is mindful that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction and, as such, the
power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, and only for the most imperative reasons
and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of
the court and a member of the bar.[43] If the practice of law, however, is to remain an honorable profession
and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but
should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. [44] The requirement of good moral character
is, in fact, of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning.[45]
The Court also sustains the order of the IBP for respondent to return only the amount of
US$544,828. While complainant submitted documents showing her bank remittances involving different
sums of money, some of these remittances were not made in the name of respondent. [46] And as
complainant herself declares, the amount of US$3,000,000 is a mere estimate of her total claim.[47] Thus,
only the return of the admitted amount of US$544,828 is in order. As reflected above, complainant is not
precluded from litigating her claim for any balance due her in the proper forum.
WHEREFORE, respondent Diosdado C. Sebrio, Jr. is DISBARRED, and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is ORDERED TO RETURN to
complainant the amount of US$544,828. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member
of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.
(46) KELD STEMMERIK, A.C. No. 8010
represented by ATTYS.
HERMINIO A. LIWANAG and
WINSTON P.L. ESGUERRA,
Complainant, Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
- v e r s u s - CARPIO MORALES,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
ATTY. LEONUEL N. MAS,
Respondent. Promulgated:
June 16, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------x
R E S O LUTI O N
Per Curiam:

Complainant Keld Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. In one of his trips to the Philippines,
he was introduced to respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas. That was his misfortune.
In one visit to the Philippines, complainant marveled at the beauty of the country and expressed
his interest in acquiring real property in the Philippines. He consulted respondent who advised him that he
could legally acquire and own real property in the Philippines. Respondent even suggested an 86,998
sq.m. property in Quarry, Agusuin, Cawag, Subic, Zambales with the assurance that the property was
alienable.
Trusting respondent, complainant agreed to purchase the property through respondent as his
representative or attorney-in-fact. Complainant also engaged the services of respondent for the
preparation of the necessary documents. For this purpose, respondent demanded and received aP400,000
fee.
Confident that respondent would faithfully carry out his task, complainant returned to Denmark,
entrusting the processing of the necessary paperwork to respondent.
Thereafter, respondent prepared a contract to sell the property between complainant, represented by
respondent, and a certain Bonifacio de Mesa, the purported owner of the property. [1] Subsequently,
respondent prepared and notarized a deed of sale in which de Mesa sold and conveyed the property to a
certain Ailyn Gonzales for P3.8 million.[2] Respondent also drafted and notarized an agreement between
complainant and Gonzales stating that it was complainant who provided the funds for the purchase of the
property.[3] Complainant then gave respondent the full amount of the purchase price (P3.8 million) for
which respondent issued an acknowledgment receipt. [4]
After the various contracts and agreements were executed, complainant tried to get in touch with
respondent to inquire about when the property could be registered in his name. However, respondent
suddenly became scarce and refused to answer complainants calls and e-mail messages.
When complainant visited the Philippines again in January 2005, he engaged the services of the Jimenez
Gonzales Liwanag Bello Valdez Caluya & Fernandez Law Office to ascertain the status of the property he
supposedly bought. He was devastated to learn that aliens could not own land under Philippine laws.
Moreover, verification at the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources in Olongapo City revealed that the property was
inalienable as it was situated within the former US Military Reservation. [5] The CENRO also stated that
the property was not subject to disposition or acquisition under Republic Act No. 141. [6]
Thereafter, complainant, through his attorneys-in-fact, [7] exerted diligent efforts to locate respondent for
purposes of holding him accountable for his fraudulent acts. Inquiry with the Olongapo Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) disclosed that respondent was in arrears in his annual dues and
that he had already abandoned his law office in Olongapo City.[8] Search of court records of cases handled
by respondent only yielded his abandoned office address in Olongapo City.
Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent in the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the IBP.[9] He deplored respondents acts of serious misconduct. In particular, he
sought the expulsion of respondent from the legal profession for gravely misrepresenting that a foreigner
could legally acquire land in the Philippines and for maliciously absconding with complainants P3.8
million.[10]

Respondent failed to file his answer and position paper despite service of notice at his last known address.
Neither did he appear in the scheduled mandatory conference. In this connection, the CBD found that
respondent abandoned his law practice in Olongapo City after his transaction with complainant and that
he did not see it fit to contest the charges against him. [11]
The CBD ruled that respondent used his position as a lawyer to mislead complainant on the matter of land
ownership by a foreigner.[12] He even went through the motion of preparing falsified and fictitious
contracts, deeds and agreements. And for all these shameless acts, he collectedP400,000 from
complainant. Worse, he pocketed the P3.8 million and absconded with it.[13]
The CBD found respondent to be nothing more than an embezzler who misused his professional
status as an attorney as a tool for deceiving complainant and absconding with complainants money.
[14]
Respondent was dishonest and deceitful. He abused the trust and confidence reposed by complainant
in him. The CBD recommended the disbarment of respondent. [15]
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of the CBD with the
modification that respondent was further required to return the amount of P4.2 million to respondent.[16]
We agree with the IBP.

SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE OF
THE DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS
We shall first address a threshold issue: was respondent properly given notice of the disbarment
proceedings against him? Yes.
The respondent did not file any answer or position paper, nor did he appear during the scheduled
mandatory conference. Respondent in fact abandoned his last known address, his law office in Olongapo
City, after he committed the embezzlement.
Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his disappearing act. He can neither defeat this
Courts jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative liability by the mere ruse of
concealing his whereabouts. Thus, service of the complaint and other orders and processes on respondents
office was sufficient notice to him.
Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of notice on him impossible, the notice requirement
cannot apply to him and he is thus considered to have waived it. The law does not require that the
impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile.[17] The law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic,
common sense, reason and practicality.[18]
In this connection, lawyers must update their records with the IBP by informing the IBP National Office
or their respective chapters[19] of any change in office or residential address and other contact details. [20] In
case such change is not duly updated, service of notice on the office or residential address appearing in
the records of the IBP National Office shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for purposes of
administrative proceedings against him.

RESPONDENTS ADMINISTRATIVE INFRACTIONS


AND HIS LIABILITY THEREFOR
Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promote respect for the law and
uphold the integrity of the bar. As men and women entrusted with the law, they must ensure that the law
functions to protect liberty and not as an instrument of oppression or deception.
Respondent has been weighed by the exacting standards of the legal profession and has been
found wanting.
Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is also guilty of culpable violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal profession.
All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do no falsehood. [21] That oath
is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is a sacred trust that should be upheld and kept
inviolable at all times.[22]
Lawyers are servants of the law[23] and the law is their master. They should not simply obey the
laws, they should also inspire respect for and obedience thereto by serving as exemplars worthy of
emulation. Indeed, that is the first precept of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.
This Court has interpreted this provision, as early as the 1947 case Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,
to mean that under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands, including
residential lands. The provision is a declaration of imperative constitutional policy. [25]
[24]

Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy,


showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious
documents that he knew were void and illegal.
By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant and that de Mesa
thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made the purchase for and in behalf of complainant, he
falsified public documents and knowingly violated the Anti-Dummy Law.[26]
Respondents misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a foreigner could
legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property
was alienable, respondent deliberately foisted a falsehood on his client. He did not give due regard to the
trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant. Instead, he deceived complainant and misled him
into parting with P400,000 for services that were both illegal and unprofessional. Moreover, by pocketing
and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for the purchase of the property, respondent
committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in nature.

Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the process, he committed unethical act after
unethical act, wantonly violating laws and professional standards.
For all this, respondent violated not only the lawyers oath and Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He also transgressed the following provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND
HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN
HIM. (emphasis supplied)
A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and uses his legal knowledge to
further his selfish ends to the great prejudice of others, poses a clear and present danger to the rule of law
and to the legal system. He does not only tarnish the image of the bar and degrade the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, he also betrays everything that the legal profession stands for.
It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a bad name and make laymen support Dick the
Butchers call, Kill all lawyers![27] A disgrace to their professional brethren, they must be purged from the
bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court
is directed to immediately strike out the name of respondent from the Roll of Attorneys.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Keld Stemmerik the total amount
of P4.2 million with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of this resolution until full
payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment of the amount
within ten days from payment.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is ORDERED to locate Atty. Mas and file the
appropriate criminal charges against him. The NBI is further DIRECTED to regularly report the progress
of its action in this case to this Court through the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant who shall forthwith record it in the
personal file of respondent, the Court Administrator who shall inform all courts of the Philippines, the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines which shall disseminate copies to all its chapters and members and all
administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

(47) A.C. No. 9604

March 20, 2013

RODRIGO
E.
TAPAY
and
ANTHONY
J.
RUSTIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia
(Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty.
Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of Ethics and
Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.

The Facts

Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the Office
of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of
authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias
Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The
Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.

When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo
of the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he
represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the
Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for
Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact.
On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on the
Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for
comparison. Using Atty. Bancolos affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a
counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the
Complaint since the falsification of the counsels signature posed a prejudicial question to the
Complaints validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification of
Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as
complainants.

Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified the
signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1
August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law

Office accepted Divinagracias case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was
signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolos instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the
Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of public document and dishonesty filed against him by
Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against
Tapay and Rustia.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for
falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive
portion states:

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to
the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against
Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4

The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of substantial
evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.

On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolos law partner. The complainants alleged
that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the
forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the
Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants attached a Report 6 dated 1 July 2005 by
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed
by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the
questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were
not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents
engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents
used to harass and persecute innocent people.

On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional
Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law
Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.

In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that the
criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the

Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo.
Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to
prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty.
Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the
law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them
since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by
testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed
as secretary of their law office.

Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were directed
by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The
conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were present but respondents
failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents
failed to appear despite receiving notice of the conference. Complainants manifested that they were
submitting their disbarment complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were
also deemed to have waived their right to participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties
were directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received
complainants position paper dated 18 October 2006 and respondents position paper dated 23 October
2006.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule
9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating

Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and
Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:

x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in the
complaint filed against complainants Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were
signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures appearing in the various
documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent
clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to

represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot
serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm
composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence
and undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the
notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as
lawyers.

On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates
Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a
senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command responsibility". x x x.

xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995 and
practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder
Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find
out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his responsibility to provide efficacious control of court
pleadings and other documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have
known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder
failed to perform this task and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.7

On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved
with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution
states:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolos
violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors RESOLVED as
it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit. 8

Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for
Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated
Comment/Reply to Complainants Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by Complainants
dated 29 January 2008.

In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both
complainants and Atty. Bancolos motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to
reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated
19 September 2007.

The Courts Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and recommendation of the
IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule
9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9.
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio, 9 where we held:
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer
is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of
moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar
from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the
canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be

used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate.
And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.

In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, 10 we held that the preparation and signing of a pleading
constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal
profession. Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further,
under the Rules of Court, counsels signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2)
to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not
interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing ones signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the
responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document.1wphi1
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was
a victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and confidence in
his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation,
save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP
his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to
the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did
not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo
simply signed the verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications
and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to
affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary
action.

The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of,
or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to
sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not
administratively liable.

In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is warranted.
We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year

effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this Court as
attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

(48)
RURAL BANK OF CALAPE,
INC. (RBCI) BOHOL,
Complainant,
- versus -

ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT FLORIDO,


Respondent.

A.C. No. 5736


Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEREZ,* JJ.
Promulgated:

June 18, 2010


x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by the members of the Board of Directors [1] of the Rural Bank of
Calape, Inc. (RBCI) Bohol against respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido (respondent) for acts
constituting grave coercion and threats when he, as counsel for the minority stockholders of RBCI, led his
clients in physically taking over the management and operation of the bank through force, violence and
intimidation.
The Facts
On 18 April 2002, RBCI filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent. [2] RBCI alleged that
respondent violated his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).
According to RBCI, on 1 April 2002, respondent and his clients, Dr. Domeciano Nazareno, Dr. Remedios
Relampagos, Dr. Manuel Relampagos, and Felix Rengel (Nazareno-Relampagos group), through force
and intimidation, with the use of armed men, forcibly took over the management and the premises of
RBCI. They also forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay (Garay), the bank manager, destroyed the banks vault,
and installed their own staff to run the bank.
In his comment, respondent denied RBCIs allegations. Respondent explained that he acted in accordance
with the authority granted upon him by the Nazareno-Relampagos group, the lawfully and validly elected
Board of Directors of RBCI. Respondent said he was merely effecting a lawful and valid change of
management. Respondent alleged that a termination notice was sent to Garay but he refused to
comply. On 1 April 2002, to ensure a smooth transition of managerial operations, respondent and the
Nazareno-Relampagos group went to the bank to ask Garay to step down.However, Garay reacted
violently and grappled with the security guards long firearm. Respondent then directed the security guards
to prevent entry into the bank premises of individuals who had no transaction with the bank. Respondent,
through the orders of the Nazareno-Relampagos group, also changed the locks of the banks vault.
Respondent added that the criminal complaint for malicious mischief filed against him by RBCI was
already dismissed; while the complaint for grave coercion was ordered suspended because of the
existence of a prejudicial question. Respondent said that the disbarment complaint was filed against him
in retaliation for the administrative cases he filed against RBCIs counsel and the trial court judges of
Bohol.
Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to prove their
allegations. Respondent added that the affidavits attached to the complaint were never identified,
affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that none of the documentary exhibits were originals or
certified true copies.
The Ruling of the IBP
On 28 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.)
submitted his report and declared that respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of
him as vanguard of law and justice.[3] Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. recommended the imposition on

respondent of a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months to one year with a warning
that the repetition of similar conduct in the future will warrant a more severe penalty.
According to Commissioner Villadolid, Jr., respondent knew or ought to have known that his clients could
not just forcibly take over the management and premises of RBCI without a valid court
order. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. noted that the right to manage and gain majority control over RBCI
was one of the issues pending before the trial court in Civil Case No. 6628. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.
said that respondent had no legal basis to implement the take over of RBCI and that it was a naked power
grab without any semblance of legality whatsoever.
Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. added that the administrative complaint against respondent before the IBP is
independent of the dismissal and suspension of the criminal cases against respondent. Commissioner
Villadolid, Jr. also noted that RBCI complied with the IBP Rules of Procedure when they filed a verified
complaint and submitted duly notarized affidavits. Moreover, both RBCI and respondent agreed to
dispense with the mandatory conference hearing and, instead, simultaneously submit their position
papers.
On 20 March 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-120 which declared
that respondent dismally failed to live up to the exacting standards of the law profession and suspended
respondent from the practice of law for one year with a warning that repetition of similar conduct will
warrant a more severe penalty.[4]
On 5 July 2006, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 11 December 2008 Resolution, the
IBP denied respondents motion.[5]
The Ruling of the Court
We affirm the IBP Board of Governors resolution.
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. [6] Likewise, it is the lawyers duty to promote
respect for the law and legal processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or
lessening confidence in the legal system.[7]
Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the
law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with
the law and principles of fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client.[8] It is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking
justice and refrain from doing an intentional wrong to their adversaries. [9]
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.s conclusion:
Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their
professional oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily, when they
appear before a tribunal, they act not merely as representatives of a party but, first and
foremost, as officers of the court. Thus, their duty to protect their clients interests is
secondary to their obligation to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. While they are obliged to present every available legal remedy or defense, their
fidelity to their clients must always be made within the parameters of law and ethics,
never at the expense of truth, the law, and the fair administration of justice. [10]

A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his clients success is
wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and
ethics.[11] Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit
of his devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable and unethical. [12]
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido GUILTY of violating Canon 19 and
Rules 1.02 and 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent
from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents
personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and in all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

(49)
ATTY.
CARMEN
LEONOR
M. A.C. No. 5859
ALCANTARA, VICENTE P. MERCADO, (Formerly CBD Case No. 421)
SEVERINO P. MERCADO AND SPOUSES
JESUS AND ROSARIO MERCADO,
Present:
Complainants,
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,*
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and

SERENO, JJ.

ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA,


Respondent.

Promulgated:

November 23, 2010


x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For our review is the Resolution [1]of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera liable for professional malpractice and
gross misconduct and recommending his disbarment.
The facts, as appreciated by the investigating commissioner,[2]are undisputed.
The respondent is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of Rosario P. Mercado in a
civil case filed in 1984 with the RegionalTrial Court of Davao City and an administrative case filed
before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Davao City Extension Office. [3]
Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in favor of
Rosario P. Mercado. Herein respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank deposits of the
defendant, but did not turn over the proceeds to Rosario. Rosario demanded that the respondent turn over
the proceeds of the garnishment, but the latter refused claiming that he had paid part of the money to the
judge while the balance was his, as attorneys fees. Such refusal prompted Rosario to file an administrative
case for disbarment against the respondent. [4]
On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors promulgated a Resolution holding the
respondent guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of clients funds and recommending to the
Court his one-year suspension from the practice of law.[5]
Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series of lawsuits
against the Mercado family except George Mercado. The respondent also instituted cases against the
family corporation, the corporations accountant and the judge who ruled against the reopening of the case
where respondent tried to collect the balance of his alleged fee from Rosario. Later on, the respondent
also filed cases against the chairman and members of the IBP Board of Governors who voted to
recommend his suspension from the practice of law for one year.Complainants allege that the respondent
committed barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of family problems, and use of intemperate language
when he filed several frivolous and unwarranted lawsuits against the complainants and their family
members, their lawyers, and the family corporation. [6] They maintain that the primary purpose of the cases
is to harass and to exact revenge for the one-year suspension from the practice of law meted out by the

IBP against the respondent. Thus, they pray that the respondent be disbarred for malpractice and gross
misconduct under Section 27,[7]Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
In his defense the respondent basically offers a denial of the charges against him.
He denies he has committed barratry by instigating or stirring up George Mercado to file lawsuits
against the complainants. He insists that the lawsuits that he and George filed against the complainants were
not harassment suits but were in fact filed in good faith and were based on strong facts.[8]
Also, the respondent denies that he has engaged in forum shopping. He argues that he was merely
exhausting the remedies allowed by law and that he was merely constrained to seek relief elsewhere by
reason of the denial of the trial court to reopen the civil case so he could justify his attorneys fees.
Further, he denies that he had exploited the problems of his clients family. He argues that the case
that he and George Mercado filed against the complainants arose from their perception of unlawful
transgressions committed by the latter for which they must be held accountable for the public interest.
Finally, the respondent denies using any intemperate, vulgar, or unprofessional language. On the
contrary, he asserts that it was the complainants who resorted to intemperate and vulgar language in accusing
him of extorting from Rosario shocking and unconscionable attorneys fees.[9]
After careful consideration of the records of this case and the parties submissions, we find
ourselves in agreement with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State
upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege.[10] Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer
has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for
misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been
afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law
may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a
license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose
of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has
proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of an attorney,
and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish
the attorney.[11]In Maligsa v. Cabanting,[12]we explained that the bar should maintain a high standard of
legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member
of the legal profession should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence
and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. An attorney
may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor,
which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the respondent committed professional malpractice and gross misconduct
particularly in his acts against his former clients after the issuance of the IBP Resolution suspending him
from the practice of law for one year. In summary, the respondent filed against his former client, her
family members, the family corporation of his former client, the Chairman and members of the Board of
Governors of the IBP who issued the said Resolution, the Regional Trial Court Judge in the case where
his former client received a favorable judgment, and the present counsel of his former client, a total of
twelve (12) different cases in various fora which included the Securities and Exchange Commission; the

Provincial Prosecutors Office of Tagum, Davao; the Davao City Prosecutors Office; the IBP-Commission
on Bar Discipline; the Department of Agrarian Reform; and the Supreme Court. [13]
In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed cases which had previously
been dismissed. The respondent filed six criminal cases against members of the Mercado family
separately docketed as I.S. Nos. 97-135; 97-136; 97-137; 97-138; 97-139; and 97-140. With the exception
of I.S. No. 97-139, all the aforementioned cases are re-filing of previously dismissed cases. [14]
Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in different fora, as
long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and without any ill-motive or purpose
other than to achieve justice and fairness. In the present case, however, we find that the barrage of cases
filed by the respondent against his former client and others close to her was meant to overwhelm said
client and to show her that the respondent does not fold easily after he was meted a penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law.
The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing them after being dismissed,
the timing of the filing of cases, the fact that the respondent was in conspiracy with a renegade member of
the complainants family, the defendants named in the cases and the foul language used in the pleadings
and motions[15]all indicate that the respondent was acting beyond the desire for justice and fairness. His
act of filing a barrage of cases appears to be an act of revenge and hate driven by anger and frustration
against his former client who filed the disciplinary complaint against him for infidelity in the custody of a
clients funds.
In the case of Prieto v. Corpuz,[16]the Court pronounced that it is professionally irresponsible for a
lawyer to file frivolous lawsuits. Thus, we stated in Prieto,
Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint. Although
no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, however, this right
must be exercised in good faith.[17]
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous petitions
that only add to the workload of the judiciary.
A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he
is an instrument to advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and
inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A
lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid any
unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, charged
as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.[18]Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility promulgated on 21 June
1988 is very explicit that lawyers must exert every effort and consider it their duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated his duties as
an officer of the court in aiding in the proper administration of justice, but he did so against a former
client to whom he owes loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility[19]provides:

CANON 21 - A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after
the attorney-client relation is terminated.
Rule 21.02 A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired
in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a
third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and information
acquired by the respondent during the time when he was still Rosarios counsel. Information as to the
structure and operations of the family corporation, private documents, and other pertinent facts and
figures used as basis or in support of the cases filed by the respondent in pursuit of his malicious motives
were all acquired through the attorney-client relationship with herein complainants. Such act is in direct
violation of the Canons and will not be tolerated by the Court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice
of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippinesfor distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

(50)
TERESITA D. SANTECO,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 5834


(formerly CBD-01-861)

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
- versus -

CARPIO MORALES,*
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE,


Respondent.

Promulgated:

February 22, 2011


x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The case originated from an administrative complaint [1] filed by Teresita D. Santeco against
respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance for mishandling Civil Case No. 97-275, an action to declare a deed of
absolute sale null and void and for reconveyance and damages, which complainant had filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.

In an En Banc Decision[2] dated December 11, 2003, the Court found respondent guilty of gross
misconduct for, among others, abandoning her clients cause in bad faith and persistent refusal to comply
with lawful orders directed at her without any explanation for doing so. She was ordered suspended from
the practice of law for a period of five years, and was likewise directed to return to complainant, within
ten (10) days from notice, the amount of P3,900.00 which complainant paid her for the filing of a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which she never filed.
Respondent moved to reconsider[3] the decision but her motion was denied in a
Resolution[4] dated February 24, 2004.
Subsequently, while respondents five-year suspension from the practice of law was still in effect,
Judge Consuelo Amog-Bocar, Presiding Judge of the RTC of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, sent a letterreport[5] dated November 12, 2007 to then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock informing the latter
that respondent had appeared and actively participated in three cases wherein she misrepresented herself
as Atty. Liezl Tanglao. When her opposing counsels confronted her and showed to the court a certification
regarding her suspension, respondent admitted and conceded that she is Atty. Luna B. Avance, but
qualified that she was only suspended for three years and that her suspension has already been lifted.
Judge Amog-Bocar further stated that respondent nonetheless withdrew her appearance from all the cases.
Attached to the letter-report were copies of several pertinent orders from her court confirming the report.
Acting on Judge Amog-Bocars letter-report, the Court, in a Resolution [6] dated April 9, 2008,
required respondent to comment within ten (10) days from notice. Respondent, however, failed to file the
required comment. On June 10, 2009, the Court reiterated the directive to comment; otherwise the case
would be deemed submitted for resolution based on available records on file with the Court. Still,
respondent failed to comply despite notice. Accordingly, this Court issued a Resolution[7] on September
29, 2009 finding respondent guilty of indirect contempt. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby found guilty of indirect contempt and is
hereby FINED in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more
severely.
Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this
Resolution, and be it duly recorded in the personal file of respondent Atty. Luna B.
Avance.[8]
A copy of the September 29, 2009 Resolution was sent to respondents address of record at 26B Korea Ave., Ph. 4, Greenheights Subd., Nangka,Marikina City by registered mail. The same was
delivered by Postman Hermoso Mesa, Jr. and duly received by one Lota Cadete on October 29, 2009, per
certification[9] dated February 3, 2011 by Postmaster Rufino C. Robles of the Marikina Central Post
Office.
Despite due notice, however, respondent failed to pay the fine imposed in the September 29, 2009
Resolution based on a certification issued by Araceli C. Bayuga, Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Cash
Collection and Disbursement Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office. The said certification
reads:
This is to certify that as per records of the Cashier Division, there is no record of
payment made by one ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE in the amount of Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00) as payment for COURT FINE imposed in the resolution dated 29
Sept. 2009 Re: Adm. Case No. 5834.[10]

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent unfit to continue as a member of the bar.
As an officer of the court, it is a lawyers duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The
highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and
processes.[11]
Here, respondents conduct evidently fell short of what is expected of her as an officer of the court
as she obviously possesses a habit of defying this Courts orders. She willfully disobeyed this Court when
she continued her law practice despite the five-year suspension order against her and even misrepresented
herself to be another person in order to evade said penalty. Thereafter, when she was twice ordered to
comment on her continued law practice while still suspended, nothing was heard from her despite receipt
of two Resolutions from this Court. Neither did she pay the P30,000.00 fine imposed in the September 29,
2009 Resolution.
We have held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct,
insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyers suspension or even disbarment. [12] Sebastian v.
Bajar[13] teaches
Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a
high degree of irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is not to be construed as a mere
request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively.
Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders not only betrays a
recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful
orders which is only too deserving of reproof.[14]
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from office as an attorney for gross misconduct and/or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In repeatedly disobeying this Courts orders, respondent proved herself unworthy of membership
in the Philippine Bar. Worse, she remains indifferent to the need to reform herself. Clearly, she is unfit to
discharge the duties of an officer of the court and deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE is hereby DISBARRED for gross misconduct
and willful disobedience of lawful orders of a superior court. Her name is ORDERED
STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal record with the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts
of the land.

SO ORDERED.

(51)
MARIA ANGALAN,
NENA ANGALAN,
DIONICIO ANGALAN,
MAGDALENA ANGALAN,
FRANCISCA ANGALAN,
INIS ANGALAN,
ROSALINO ANGALAN,
AND JOSEFINA ANGALAN,
ALL OF WHOM ARE HEIRS

A.C. No. 7181


Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA,LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,BRION, and
PERALTA, JJ.

OF ANGALAN SAMAL married


to SANAAN SAMAL,
Complainants,

- versus -

Promulgated:
February 6, 2009

ATTY. LEONIDO C. DELANTE,


Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Maria, Nena, Dionicio, Magdalena, Francisca, Inis, Rosalino, and Josefina
Angalan (complainants) against Atty. Leonido C. Delante (respondent) for gross violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Complainants are the heirs of Angalan Samal (Angalan) and Sanaan Samal (Sanaan). Complainants allege
that they are illiterate and belong to the Samal Tribe. Angalan, Sanaan, and complainants owned a 9.102hectare parcel of land in Barrio San Jose, Kaputian, Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte. The
property was covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-11499. [1]
On 15 April 1971, Angalan and complainants borrowed P15,000 from Navarro R. Eustaquio and Arabella
P. Eustaquio (Spouses Eustaquio). To secure the loan, Angalan and complainants mortgaged 8.102
hectares of the 9.102-hectare property and surrendered OCT No. P-11499 to the Spouses Eustaquio. The
Spouses Eustaquio prepared a document [2] and asked Angalan and complainants to sign it. Angalan and
complainants affixed their thumb marks on the document.
When complainants tried to pay the loan and recover OCT No. P-11499 from the Spouses Eustaquio, the
Spouses Eustaquio refused. Complainants learned that the document which the Spouses Eustaquio
prepared, and which complainants signed, was a deed of absolute sale and not a real estate
mortgage. They also learned that Navarro R. Eustaquio (Navarro) had transferred the title over the 8.102property to his name OCT No. P-11499 was canceled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T9926[3] in the name of Navarro was issued.
Complainants engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of recovering their property. In a
receipt[4] dated 18 November 1970, respondent acknowledged receipt of P1,200 from Francisca Angalan
and her husband, Macario Capul (Capul), representing the full payment of his professional fees: Received
from Mr. MACARIO CAPUL and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full payment of professional services in regard to recovery
of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499 in the name of Angalan (Samal).
Respondent filed a complaint[5] dated 13 April 1976 with the then Court of First Instance (CFI), now
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region XVI, Tagum, Davao stating that:
2.
x x x Angalan Samal and his children x x x are the original
patentees of a certain parcel of land, situated in Ombay, Samal, Davao, covered under
Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499, of the Registry of Deeds of Davao, having
acquired the same under HP-No. 65310, pursuant to the provisions of the Homestead
Laws of the Public Land Law (C.A. 141);

3.
x x x [O]n April 15, 1971, the herein original patentees x x x
sold and conveyed said parcel of land covered by the aforesaid title to the herein
defendants for the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) x x x;
4.
x x x [U]nder the provisions of the Public Land Law,
particularly Section 119 thereof and even on the face of the title of said property now
under the name of the defendants x x x the herein plaintiffs have the right to
repurchase said property within a period of five (5) years from the date of the
conveyance;
xxxx
7.
[A]s a matter of right under the law, the herein plaintiffs are
entitled to the produce of the property at least beginning April 8, 1976;
xxxx
9.
[B]y reason of unwarranted refusal on the part of the
defendants to reconvey the property to plaintiffs, the latter have been constrained to
engage, and in fact have engaged, the services of counsel x x x [6]

Complainants and the Spouses Eustaquio entered into an amicable settlement. In the amicable
settlement[7] dated 3 September 1977, the parties stated that:
1.
x x x [T]he plaintiffs have offered to the defendant[s] the sum
of P30,000.00 as repurchase price which the defendant[s accept];
2.
x x x [U]pon the signing hereof, the plaintiffs shall pay the
defendant[s] the sum of P15,000.00 and for this purpose hereby authorize the
defendants to collect the same from the Clerk of Court which amount had been
deposited with this Honorable Court; Likewise, upon signing hereof the Deed of
Reconveyance shall be immediately executed and delivered by the defendants to
plaintiff[s];
3.
x x x [W]hile the balance of P15,000.00 has not been paid, the
defendant[s] shall continue to possess, and if necessary to gather the produce of the
property, however, upon receipt of the defendant[s] of the balance of P15,000.00,
said defendants together with [their] agent and/or worker, Alfredo Rabadon shall
clear the area and turnover the same within fifteen (15) days from receipt [of] said
balance.[8]
In a Decision[9] dated 30 September 1977, the CFI approved the amicable settlement.
Complainants did not have the P30,000 repurchase price for the property. Respondent advanced
the P30,000 and, in return, complainants allowed respondent to possess the property and gather its
produce until he is paid. In a letter[10] dated 10 January 1979 and addressed to the barrio captain of
Umbay, Samal, Davao del Norte, respondent stated that:

This will inform you that the Heirs of Angalan Samal have already redeemed
their property through me from Mr. Navarro Eustaquio since September, 1978. In my
capacity as counsel of the Heirs of Angalan Samal and owner of the money in redeeming
the property, I have authorized Mr. Macario Capol to take over the possession of the
property together with the harvesting of the matured coconuts.
When complainants tried to repay the P30,000 repurchase price and recover the property from
respondent, respondent refused. Complainants learned that respondent transferred the title of the property
to his name TCT No. T-9926 was canceled and TCT No. T-57932 [11] in the name of respondent was
issued.
Complainants filed a complaint [12] dated 30 April 2004 with the RTC, Judicial Region XI, Branch 34,
Davao City praying that (1) the deed of absolute sale prepared by the Spouses Eustaquio and signed by
the complainants be declared void, (2) TCT No. T-57932 be declared void, and (3) respondent be made to
pay damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 57-2004. In his answer[13] dated 29 December
2004, respondent stated that:
[In] 1971, ANGALAN (SAMAL) [now deceased) [sic] together with his son-in-law,
MACARIO CAPUL, the latter being the town mate of herein defendant Delante in
Danao, Cebu and who is married to the daughter of the late ANGALAN (SAMAL), came
to herein defendants office and sought for an advice to borrow money;
x x x [T]he late ANGALAN (SAMAL) together with his children in company with
MACARIO CAPUL, were directed by herein defendant to inform him why it was
necessary for them to borrow money and for whatever [sic] purpose; after their story,
herein defendant disagreed as to their justification in borrowing money which was for no
other purpose except to have money on their own;
xxxx
It is preposterous for plaintiff[s] to claim that they had [sic] engaged the professional
services of herein defendant to file an annulment case since plaintiffs never came back
apparently ashamed when they were driven out, but worse they had [sic] never paid the
herein defendant a single centavo for purposes of filing an annulment case against codefendant NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO;
x x x [T]he transfer of said property consisting of 8.102 hectares under the name of
herein defendants was not tainted with any deceit but effected legally by virtue of a
valid deed of sale executed by defendants [sic] spouses EUSTAQUIO in favor of herein
defendants.
xxxx
[T]he absolute deed of sale, [sic] dated 15 April 1971, executed by herein plaintiffs in
favor of defendants EUSTAQUIO, speaks for itself. It is a sale of real property and
NOT a mortgage.
xxxx
Contrary to the malicious and untruthful claim of the plaintiffs, the legal services of
defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE was never solicited by them.Plaintiffs only asked

defendant from where they could borrow money, and after knowing that they just simply
would [sic] like to borrow money without any concrete investments in mind to repay
[sic] back [sic] any loan, defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE drove them out of his
office and told them to look for another person to help them;
Defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE later learned from MACARIO CAPUL, who is a
friend and a town mate, and who is the husband of FRANCISCA ANGALAN CAPUL,
that the plaintiffs had negotiated a sale with a certain NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO x x x;
In September 1977, a former Filipino client of herein defendant DELANTE, who, and his
family [sic] are now permanent residents of New York, was looking for a real property to
build his retirement home, [sic] and he approached herein defendant, in which he was
referred to defendant EUSTAQUIO [sic]; Upon visiting the property of defendant
EUSTAQUIO, he was so impressed of the location of the property and decided to buy the
same, hence left the money to herein defendant DELANTE and to buy [sic] said property
under defendants name, with the understanding to turn over said property to him, as soon
as he and his family shall have returned to the country;
x x x [S]ince herein defendant is not interested over the said property as his own, he
waited for his client from New York to come home and to get his property but after 11
years, his client decided not to come back anymore to the Philippines, and directed herein
defendant to register the Deed of Sale over the property to [sic] his name and directed
herein defendant to refund his client.[14]
Complainants filed a complaint[15] dated 28 December 2005 with the Court charging respondent with
gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In a Resolution[16] dated 3 July 2006, the Court
required respondent to comment on the complaint and, in a Resolution [17] dated 4 December 2006, the
Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In a Notice dated 14 March 2007, Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag (Commissioner Hababag) directed
complainants and respondent to appear before the IBP for a mandatory conference. The parties failed to
appear at the mandatory conference. In an Order dated 16 May 2007, Commissioner Hababag directed the
parties to submit their position papers.
In a motion dated 4 April 2007 and filed with the RTC, respondent and complainants prayed that Civil
Case No. 57-2004 be dismissed.Complainants filed with the Court a motion to withdraw the complaint for
disbarment dated 4 April 2007 and an affidavit of desistance dated April 2007.
In his position paper dated 2 July 2007, respondent stated that (1) Angalan and Capul went to his office in
1971 to seek advice about borrowing money; (2) his client from New York bought the property from the
Spouses Eustaquio; and (3) complainants executed a motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment
and an affidavit of desistance.
In a Report dated 15 October 2007, Commissioner Hababag found that respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
The issue to resolve is whether or not respondent committed grave violation of [the] Code
of Professional Responsibility when he bought the property of his client[s] without their
knowledge, consent and against their will?

Weighing evidence presented by both parties, respondent should be punished for his
unprofessional and distasteful acts.
xxxx
His vain attempt to salvage his malicious acts was too flimsy to gain belief and
acceptance. It is unbelievable that a buyer would entrust his money intended for
payment of a property but allowed that said property be registered under the name
of another, specifically his lawyer, simply runs counter to ordinary human
nature. (Emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Hababag recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six
months.
In a Resolution dated 22 November 2007, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) adopted and approved the
Report with modification. The Board increased respondents suspension from six months to one year.
Pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, [18] the Board forwarded the case to the Court
for final action.
The Court sustains the findings of the IBP.
Complainants and respondent presented two different sets of facts. According to complainants, they
engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of recovering their property from the Spouses
Eustaquio. In violation of the trust and confidence they reposed in him, respondent transferred the title
over the property to his name. According to respondent, complainants did not engage his services. His
client from New York was the one who bought the property from the Spouses Eustaquio.
After a careful review of the records, the Court gives credence to complainants version of the facts.
Respondents credibility is highly questionable. In his answer dated 29 December 2004 and filed with the
CFI and in his position paper dated 2 July 2007 and filed with the IBP, respondent alleged that Angalan
and Capul went to his office in 1971 to seek advice about borrowing money.According to respondent,
complainants did not engage his services. In his answer, respondent stated that:
It is preposterous for [complainants] to claim that they had [sic] engaged the
professional services of herein defendant to file an annulment casesince
[complainants] never came back apparently ashamed when they were driven out x x x;
xxxx
Contrary to the malicious and untruthful claim of [complainants], the legal services
of defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE was never solicited by them. Plaintiffs
only asked defendant from where they could borrow money, and after knowing that
they just simply would like to borrow money without any concrete investments in mind
to repay back [sic] any loan, defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE drove them out of
his office and told them to look for another person to help them;

Defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE later learned from MACARIO CAPUL x x


x that the plaintiffs had negotiated a sale with a certain NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO.
[19]
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court is not impressed. Angalan and complainants went to respondents office not to seek advice
about borrowing money but to engage his services for the purpose of recovering their property. This is
obvious. First, after Angalan and complainants went to respondents office, respondent filed a complaint
with the CFI praying that the Spouses Eustaquio reconvey the property to Angalan and
complainants. Second, in the complaint, respondent stated that, by reason of unwarranted refusal on the
part of the defendants to reconvey the property to plaintiffs, the latter have been constrained to engage,
and in fact have engaged, the services of counsel. Third, respondent issued a receipt to complainants
stating that heRECEIVED from Mr. MACARIO CAPUL and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the
sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full payment of
professional services in regard to the recovery of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499 in the
name of Angalan (Samal). Fourth, in respondents letter dated 10 January 1979 and addressed to the
barrio captain of Umbay, Samal, Davao del Norte, he stated that he was the lawyer of complainants:
This will inform you that the Heirs of Angalan Samal have already redeemed their
property through me from Mr. Navarro Eustaquio since September, 1978.In my capacity
as counsel of the Heirs of Angalan Samal and owner of the money in redeeming the
property, I have authorized Mr. Macario Capol to take over the possession of the property
together with the harvesting of the matured coconuts. [20]
These clearly show that complainants engaged the services of respondent.
In his answer, respondent alleged that complainants did not pay him his professional fees (which,
according to him, they did not engage). He stated that, [complainants] had never paid the herein defendant
a single centavo for purposes of filing an annulment case against x x x NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO.
The Court is not impressed. Complainants fully paid respondent his professional fees. This is obvious. In
a receipt dated 18 November 1970, respondent stated that he RECEIVED from Mr. MACARIO
CAPUL and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full payment of professional services in regard to the recovery of
Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499 in the name of Angalan (Samal). This clearly shows that
complainants paid respondent his professional fees.
In his answer and position paper, respondent alleged that his client from New York bought the property
from the Spouses Eustaquio:
[I]n September 1977, a former Filipino client of herein respondent, who, and his family
[sic] are now permanent residents of New York, was looking for a real property to build
his retirement home, and he approached herein respondent, in which [sic] he was referred
to Navarro Eustaquio; and upon visiting the property of Navarro Eustaquio, he was
impressed of [sic] the location of the property and decided to buy the same, hence left the
money to herein respondent and to buy [sic] said property under respondents name, with
the understanding to turn over said property to him, as soon as he and his family shall
have returned to the country;

x x x [S]ince herein respondent was not interested over the said property as his own, he
waited for his client from New York to come home and to get his property but after 11
years, his client decided not to come back anymore to the Philippines, and directed herein
respondent to register the Deed of Sale over the property under his name and directed
herein respondent to refund his client.[21]
The Court is not impressed. Complainants repurchased the property from the Spouses Eustaquio. This is
obvious. First, complainants and the Spouses Eustaquio entered into an amicable settlement stating that
complainants would repurchase the property from the Spouses Eustaquio:
1. x x x [T]he plaintiffs have offered to the defendant[s] the sum of P30,000.00 as
repurchase price which the defendant[s accept];
2. x x x [U]pon the signing hereof, the plaintiffs shall pay the defendant[s] the sum
of P15,000.00 and for this purpose hereby authorize the defendants to collect the
same from the Clerk of Court which amount had been deposited with this Honorable
Court; Likewise, upon signing hereof the Deed of Reconveyance shall be
immediately executed and delivered by the defendants to plaintiff[s];
3. x x x [W]hile the balance of P15,000.00 has not been paid, the defendant[s] shall
continue to possess, and if necessary to gather the produce of the property, however,
upon receipt of the defendant[s] of the balance of P15,000.00, said defendants
together with [their] agent and/or worker, Alfredo Rabadon shall clear the area and
turnover the same within fifteen (15) days from receipt [of] said balance.
[22]
(Emphasis supplied)
Second, in his letter to the barrio captain, respondent stated that complainants repurchased the property
from the Spouses Eustaquio:
This will inform you that the Heirs of Angalan Samal have already redeemed their
property through me from Mr. Navarro Eustaquio since September, 1978. In my
capacity as counsel of the Heirs of Angalan Samal and owner of the money in redeeming
the property, I have authorized Mr. Macario Capol to take over the possession of the
property together with the harvesting of the matured coconuts. [23] (Emphasis supplied)
These clearly show that complainants repurchased the property from the Spouses Eustaquio.
Respondents story about the client from New York is unbelievable. Respondent did not give any detail or
proof to substantiate his story the name of the alleged client, an affidavit of the alleged client, the old
passport of the alleged client showing immigration stamps, or any form of correspondence between him
and the alleged client. The Court agrees with the observation of Commissioner Hababag that respondents
vain attempt to salvage his malicious acts [is] too flimsy to gain belief and acceptance.
In his position paper, respondent alleged that complainants executed a motion to withdraw the complaint
for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance. This is immaterial. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court states that, No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of charges, or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same.

Respondent violated Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 16 states
that lawyers shall hold in trust all properties of their clients that may come into their
possession. Respondent should have held in trust TCT No. T-9926 and returned the property to
complainants upon demand.[24] Instead of holding in trust the property of complainants, respondent (1)
transferred the title of the property to his name, (2) refused to return the property to complainants, and (3)
referred to complainants charges as malicious and untruthful.
Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
them. Respondent should have been mindful of the trust and confidence complainants reposed in
him. Complainants allege that they are illiterate and that the Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of
them.Complainants engaged the services of respondent in the hope that he would help them recover their
property. Instead of protecting the interests of complainants, respondent took advantage of complainants
and transferred the title of the property to his name.
Considering the depravity of respondents offense, the Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Violation of Canons 16 and 17 constitutes
gross misconduct.[25] Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Court for gross misconduct. In Hernandez v. Go,[26] the Court disbarred a lawyer for transferring the titles over the properties of
his client to his name without the knowledge of his client. In Hernandez, the Court held that:
Considering the depravity of respondents offense, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP too light. It
bears reiterating that a lawyer who takes advantage of his clients financial plight to acquire the latters properties for his
own benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Thus,
for violation of Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which constitutes gross misconduct,
and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal
profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. [27]
A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate clients and who is incapable of telling the truth is unfit to be a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS that his name be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the
country.Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

(52) DOLORES C. BELLEZA, A.C. No. 7815


Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- v e r s u s - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,*
PERALTA and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA,


Respondent. Promulgated:
July 23, 2009
x----------------------------------------------------x
R E S O LUTI O N
Per Curiam:
This treats of the complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Dolores C. Belleza against respondent
Atty. Alan S. Macasa for unprofessional and unethical conduct in connection with the handling of a
criminal case involving complainants son.
On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of their mutual friend, Joe Chua.
Complainant wanted to avail of respondents legal services in connection with the case of her son, Francis
John Belleza, who was arrested by policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for alleged violation of
Republic Act (RA) 9165.[1] Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000.
The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to respondent thru their mutual friend
Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an additional P10,000. She paid the P5,000 balance on
November 18, 2004. Both payments were also made thru Chua. On all three occasions, respondent did not
issue any receipt.
On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of posting a bond
to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainants) son. Again, respondent did not issue any receipt.
When complainant went to the court the next day, she found out that respondent did not remit the amount
to the court.
Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several occasions but respondent
ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of complainants son and complainant was
forced to avail of the services of the Public Attorneys Office for her sons defense.
Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint [2] for disbarment against respondent in the
Negros Occidental chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Attached to the verified
complaint was the affidavit[3] of Chua which read:
I, JOE CHUA, of legal age, Filipino and resident of Purok Sawmill, Brgy. Bata, Bacolod
City, after having been sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and state:
1. That I am the one who introduce[d] Mrs. Dolores C. Belleza [to] Atty. Alan
Macasa when she looked for a lawyer to help her son in the case that the latter is facing
sometime [i]n [the] first week of November 2004;
2. That by reason of my mutual closeness to both of them, I am the one who
facilitated the payment of Mrs. DOLORES C. BELLEZA to Atty. Alan Macasa;
3. That as far as I know, I received the following amount from Mrs. Dolores
Belleza as payment for Atty. Alan Macasa:
Date Amount
November 11, 2004 P15,000.00

A week after 10,000.00


November 18, 2004 5,000.00
4. That the above-mentioned amounts which I supposed as Attorneys Fees were
immediately forwarded by me to Atty. [Macasa];
5. That I am executing this affidavit in order to attest to the truth of all the
foregoing statements.
x x x x x x x x x[4]
In a letter dated May 23, 2005, [5] the IBP Negros Occidental chapter transmitted the complaint to
the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).[6]
In an order dated July 13, 2005,[7] the CBD required respondent to submit his answer within 15 days from
receipt thereof. Respondent, in an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer dated August 10,
2005,[8] simply brushed aside the complaint for being baseless, groundless and malicious without,
however, offering any explanation. He also prayed that he be given until September 4, 2005 to submit his
answer.
Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions [9] for second and third extensions of time praying to be
given until November 4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never did.
When both parties failed to attend the mandatory conference on April 19, 2006, they were ordered to
submit their respective position papers.[10]
In its report and recommendation dated October 2, 2007, [11] the CBD ruled that respondent failed to rebut
the charges against him. He never answered the complaint despite several chances to do so.
The CBD found respondent guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct.
It also found him guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those others kept by him.
The CBD ruled that respondent lacked good moral character and that he was unfit and unworthy
of the privileges conferred by law on him as a member of the bar. The CBD recommended a suspension
of six months with a stern warning that repetition of similar acts would merit a more severe sanction. It
also recommended that respondent be ordered to return to complainant the P18,000 intended for the
provisional liberty of the complainants son and the P30,000 attorneys fees.

The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the CBD
with the modification that respondent be ordered to return to complainant only the amount of P30,000
which he received as attorneys fees.[12]
We affirm the CBDs finding of guilt as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors but we modify the IBPs
recommendation as to the liability of respondent.
RESPONDENT DISRESPECTED
LEGAL PROCESSES
Respondent was given more than enough opportunity to answer the charges against him. Yet, he
showed indifference to the orders of the CBD for him to answer and refute the accusations of professional
misconduct against him. In doing so, he failed to observe Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.
Respondent also ignored the CBDs directive for him to file his position paper. His propensity to
flout the orders of the CBD showed his lack of concern and disrespect for the proceedings of the CBD.
He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to the legal profession to obey the laws and the
legal orders of the duly constituted legal authorities. He displayed insolence not only to the CBD but also
to this Court which is the source of the CBDs authority.
Respondents unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of the CBD was not only irresponsible but
also constituted utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. [13] His conduct was unbecoming
of a lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in
complying with court directives as an officer of the court. [14] Respondent should have known that the
orders of the CBD (as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers) were not
mere requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly and completely.[15]
RESPONDENT GROSSLY NEGLECTED
THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT
Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants son. Such undertaking
imposed upon him the following duties:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND
HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
xxxxxxxxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.

xxxxxxxxx
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN
THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself (particularly his time,
knowledge, skills and effort) to such cause. He must be ever mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him, constantly striving to be worthy thereof. Accordingly, he owes full devotion to the interest of his
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning, skill and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from his client, save by the
rules of law legally applied.[16]
A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to serve his client with
competence and diligence.[17] He must conscientiously perform his duty arising from such relationship. He
must bear in mind that by accepting a retainer, he impliedly makes the following representations: that he
possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill and ability other lawyers similarly situated possess; that
he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted to him; that he will
exercise reasonable care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the application of his knowledge to his
clients cause; and that he will take all steps necessary to adequately safeguard his clients interest. [18]
A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of counsel
and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights of a litigant,
particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of the ethics of the legal profession, a lawyers lethargy
in carrying out his duties to his client is both unprofessional and unethical. [19]
If his clients case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively represent his client by
promptly filing the necessary pleading or motion and assiduously attending the scheduled hearings. This
is specially significant for a lawyer who represents an accused in a criminal case.
The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution. [20] However, this right can
only be meaningful if the accused is accorded ample legal assistance by his lawyer:
... The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which
basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process
requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be
dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to
counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel
who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right
assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial
of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being
well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and
existing jurisprudence.[21]

[T]he right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right. Without


counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through
counsel that the accused secures his other rights. In other words, the right to counsel is
the right to effective assistance of counsel.[22]

The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn
duty of fidelity to his client. [23] Tersely put, it means an effective, efficient and truly decisive legal
assistance, not a simply perfunctory representation. [24]
In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving his attorneys fees,
respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and efficient legal assistance. For all intents
and purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client. Indeed, on account of respondents continued
inaction, complainant was compelled to seek the services of the Public Attorneys Office. Respondents
lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainants son was reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice
complainants son, it also deprived him of his constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use
the amount entrusted to him for posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent
unduly impeded the latters constitutional right to bail.

RESPONDENT FAILED TO RETURN


HIS CLIENTS MONEY
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty
to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client. [25]
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for
filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client
how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately
return it to the client.[26] His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended
purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[27]
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his clients funds or properties as they fall due or upon
demand.[28] His failure to return the clients money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the
client.[29] It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. [30] Indeed, it may border on the criminal as it
may constitute a prima facie case of swindling or estafa.
Respondent never denied receiving P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of posting a bond
to secure the provisional liberty of her son. He never used the money for its intended purpose yet also
never returned it to the client. Worse, he unjustifiably refused to turn over the amount to complainant
despite the latters repeated demands.
Moreover, respondent rendered no service that would have entitled him to the P30,000 attorneys
fees. As a rule, the right of a lawyer to a reasonable compensation for his services is subject to two
requisites: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship and (2) the rendition by the lawyer of
services to the client.[31] Thus, a lawyer who does not render legal services is not entitled to attorneys fees.
Otherwise, not only would he be unjustly enriched at the expense of the client, he would also be rewarded
for his negligence and irresponsibility.

RESPONDENT FAILED TO UPHOLD THE


INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION
For his failure to comply with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent
failed to obey Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who fails to abide by the Canons and Rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility disrespects the said Code and everything that it stands for. In so doing, he disregards the
ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
Lawyers should always live up to the ethical standards of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Public confidence in law and in lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. [32] Thus, every lawyer should act and comport
himself in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. [33]
Respondent was undeserving of the trust reposed in him. Instead of using the money for the bond
of the complainants son, he pocketed it. He failed to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings
with his client.[34] He failed to live up to his fiduciary duties. By keeping the money for himself despite his
undertaking that he would facilitate the release of complainants son, respondent showed lack of moral
principles. His transgression showed him to be a swindler, a deceitful person and a shame to the legal
profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa is hereby found GUILTY not only of dishonesty but also of professional misconduct for prejudicing Francis John
Bellezas right to counsel and to bail under Sections 13 and 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, and for violating Canons 1, 7, 17, 18 and 19 and Rules 12.03, 16.01,
16.02, 16.03 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore DISBARRED from the practice of law effective immediately. Respondent is
hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Dolores C. Belleza the amounts of P30,000 and P18,000 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of
this decision until full payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment of the amount within ten days from payment. Failure to
do so will subject him to criminal prosecution. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into the records of respondent
Atty. Alan S. Macasa and the Office of the Court Administrator to be furnished to the courts of the land for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

(53) Ederlinda K. Manzano vs. Atty. Santiago C. Soriano, AC No. 8051, April 7, 2009
(54) Same Case No. 27
(55) ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, INC., A.C. No. 8380
Complainant,
Present:
Puno, C.J.,
Carpio,
Corona,*
Carpio Morales,
- versus - Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr.,*
Nachura,
Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion,
Peralta,*
Bersamin,

Del Castillo,
Abad, and
Villarama, Jr., JJ.
ATTY. LEOVIGILDO H. MIJARES III,
Respondent. Promulgated:
November 20, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This disbarment case is about the need for a lawyer to account for funds entrusted to him by his client.
The Facts and the Case
The facts are taken from the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Sometime in January 2004, complainant Arellano University, Inc. (the University) engaged the services of
respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar, for securing a certificate of title covering a
dried up portion of the Estero de San Miguel that the University had been occupying. The property was
the subject of a Deed of Exchange dated October 1, 1958 between the City of Manila and the University.
In its complaint for disbarment against Mijares, the University alleged that it gave him all the documents
he needed to accomplish his work. Later, Mijares asked the University for and was given P500,000.00 on
top of his attorneys fees, supposedly to cover the expenses for facilitation and processing. He in turn
promised to give the money back in case he was unable to get the work done.
On July 5, 2004 Mijares informed the University that he already completed Phase I of the titling
of the property, meaning that he succeeded in getting the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA)
to approve it and that the documents had already been sent to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). The University requested Mijares for copies of the MMDA approval but he
unjustifiably failed to comply despite his clients repeated demands. Then he made himself scarce,
prompting the University to withdraw all the cases it had entrusted to him and demand the return of
the P500,000.00 it gave him.
On November 23, 2005 the University wrote Mijares by registered letter, formally terminating his
services in the titling matter and demanding the return of the P500,000.00. But the letter could not be
served because he changed office address without telling the University. Eventually, the University found
his new address and served him its letter on January 2, 2006. Mijares personally received it yet he did not
return the money asked of him.
In his answer to the complaint, Mijares alleged that he and the University agreed on a number of courses
of action relating to the project assigned to him: first, get the Universitys application for a survey plan
which the DENR-NCR approved for a facilitation cost of P500,000.00; second, get a favorable MMDA

endorsement for a facilitation cost of another P500,000.00; and, third, the titling of the property by the
Land Registration Authority for a facilitation cost of still another P500,000.00.
Mijares also alleged that the DENR-NCR Assistant Regional Director told him that he needed to get a
favorable endorsement from MMDA and that the person to talk to about it was Undersecretary Cesar
Lacuna. Mijares later met the latter through a common friend. At their meeting, Mijares and Lacuna
allegedly agreed on what the latter would get for recommending approval of the application. Later,
Mijares said, he gave theP500,000.00 to Lacuna through their common friend on Lacunas instruction.
Mijares next alleged that, after he received the money, Lacuna told him that the University filed an
identical application earlier on March 15, 2002.Mijares claimed that the University deliberately withheld
this fact from him. Lacuna said that, because of the denial of that prior application, he would have
difficulty recommending approval of the present application. It appeared that Lacuna endorsed the
previous application to the Mayor of Manila on July 23, 2003 but the latter did not act on it.
Mijares finally alleged that he and Lacuna wanted to bypass the Mayor of Manila in the paper work but
they were unable to arrive at a concrete plan. Mijares claimed that the University gave him
only P45,000.00 as his fees and that it was with the Universitys conformity that he gave the P500,000.00
to Lacuna.
The IBP designated Atty. Dennis B. Funa as Commissioner to conduct a formal investigation of the
complaint. Despite numerous settings, however, Mijares failed to appear before the Commissioner and
adduce evidence in his defense.
On October 17, 2008 Commissioner Funa submitted his Report and Recommendation [1] in the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Phillippines Board of Governors. The Report said that the University did not
authorize Mijares to give P500,000.00 to the then MMDA Deputy Chairman Cesar Lacuna; that Mijares
had been unable to account for and return that money despite repeated demands; and that he admitted
under oath having bribed a government official.
Commissioner Funa recommended a) that Mijares be held guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 1.02,
Canon 15, Rule 15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and meted out the penalty of disbarment; b) that he be ordered to return
the P500,000.00 and all the pertinent documents to the University; and c) that Mijares sworn statement
that formed part of his Answer be endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman for investigation and, if
warranted, for prosecution with respect to his shady dealing with Deputy Chairman Lacuna.
On December 11, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XVIII-2008-631, adopting and
approving the Investigating Commissioners recommendation but modifying the penalty from disbarment
to indefinite suspension from the practice of law and ordering Mijares to return the P500,000.00 and all
pertinent documents to the University within six months from receipt of the Courts decision. [2]
The Question Presented
The only question presented in this case is whether or not respondent Mijares is guilty of
misappropriating the P500,000.00 that his client, the University, entrusted to him for use in facilitating
and processing the titling of a property that it claimed.
The Courts Ruling
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer
for the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct;

(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority to do so.[3]
Every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client such that he must
promptly account for whatever money or property his client may have entrusted to him. As a mere trustee
of said money or property, he must hold them separate from that of his own and make sure that they are
used for their intended purpose. If not used, he must return the money or property immediately to his
client upon demand, otherwise the lawyer shall be presumed to have misappropriated the same in
violation of the trust reposed on him. [4] A lawyers conversion of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation
of professional ethics.[5]
Here, respondent Mijares chose not to be heard on his evidence. Technically, the only evidence on record
that the Court can consider is the Universitys evidence that he got P500,000.00 from complainant for
expenses in facilitating and processing its title application; that he undertook to return the money if he did
not succeed in his purpose; that he falsely claimed having obtained the MMDA approval of the
application; and that he nonetheless refused to return the money despite repeated demands. Unopposed,
this evidence supports the finding of guilt of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of
Governors.
Besides, even if the Court were to consider the defense that Mijares laid out in his answer, the
same does not rouse sympathy. He claims that he gave the P500,000.00 to Undersecretary Lacuna, with
the Universitys conformity, for a favorable MMDA endorsement to the Mayor of Manila.He also claims
that, in a complete turnaround, Lacuna later said that he could not provide the endorsement because, as it
turned out, the MMDA had previously given such endorsement of the Universitys earlier application and
the Mayor of Manila did not act on that endorsement.
But, if this were so, there was no reason for Mijares not to face the University and make it see
that it had no cause for complaint, having given him clearance to pass on the P500,000.00 to
Lacuna. Instead, Mijares kept silent. He did not deny that the University went all over town looking for
him after he could not return the money. Nor did he take any action to compel Lacuna to hand back the
money that the University gave him. More, his not showing up to testify on his behalf at the investigation
of the case is a dead giveaway of the lack of merit of his defense. No evidence exists to temper the doom
that he faces.
Even more unfortunate for Mijares, he admitted under oath having bribed a government official
to act favorably on his clients application to acquire title to a dried-up creek. That is quite dishonest. The
Court is not, therefore, inclined to let him off with the penalty of indefinite suspension which is another
way of saying he can resume his practice after a time if he returns the money and makes a promise to
shape up.
The Court is also not inclined to go along with the IBPs recommendation that the Court include in its
decision an order directing Mijares to return the P500,000.00 that the University entrusted to him. The
University knowingly gave him that money to spend for facilitation and processing. It is not nave. There
is no legitimate expense called facilitation fee. This term is a deodorized word for bribe money. The Court
will not permit the conversion of a disbarment proceeding into a remedy for recovering bribe money lost
in a bad deal.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar, GUILTY of
violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 15, Rule 15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18,
Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and imposes on him the penalty

of DISBARMENT. He is, in addition, directed to return to complainant Arellano University, Inc. all the
documents in his possession covering the titling matter that it referred to him.
Let the sworn statement of respondent Mijares, forming his Answer, be forwarded to the Office of the
Ombudsman for whatever action it deems proper under the circumstances.
SO ORDERED.

(56)
JOSEFINA M. ANION,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 5098


Present:

- versus -

BRION, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
PERALTA,*
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
April 11, 2012

ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR.,

Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. who is charged of: (1)
violating the lawyers duty to preserve confidential information received from his client; [1] and (2)
violating the prohibition on representing conflicting interests. [2]
In her complaint, Josefina M. Anion (complainant) related that she previously engaged the legal
services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of
land owned by her late common-law husband, Brigido Caneja, Jr. Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated her
confidence when he subsequently filed a civil case against her for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in
behalf of Zenaida L. Caete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainant accused Atty. Sabitsana
of using the confidential information he obtained from her in filing the civil case.
Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and execution of the Deed of
Sale. However, he denied having received any confidential information. Atty. Sabitsana asserted that the
present disbarment complaint was instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the
disbarment complaint who lost a court case against him (Atty. Sabitsana) and had instigated the complaint
for this reason.
The Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
In our Resolution dated November 22, 1999, we referred the disbarment complaint to the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation dated November 28, 2003, IBP Commissioner
Pedro A. Magpayo Jr. found Atty. Sabitsana administratively liable for representing conflicting interests.
The IBP Commissioner opined:
In Bautista vs. Barrios, it was held that a lawyer may not handle a case to nullify a
contract which he prepared and thereby take up inconsistent positions.Granting that
Zenaida L. Caete, respondents present client in Civil Case No. B-1060 did not initially
learn about the sale executed by Bontes in favor of complainant thru the confidences and
information divulged by complainant to respondent in the course of the preparation of the
said deed of sale, respondent nonetheless has a duty to decline his current employment as
counsel of Zenaida Caete in view of the rule prohibiting representation of conflicting
interests.
In re De la Rosa clearly suggests that a lawyer may not represent conflicting
interests in the absence of the written consent of all parties concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. In the present case, no such written consent was secured by
respondent before accepting employment as Mrs. Caetes counsel-of-record. x x x
xxx
Complainant and respondents present client, being contending claimants to the same
property, the conflict of interest is obviously present. There is said to be inconsistency of
interest when on behalf of one client, it is the attorneys duty to contend for that which his

duty to another client requires him to oppose. In brief, if he argues for one client this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. Such is the case
with which we are now confronted, respondent being asked by one client to nullify what
he had formerly notarized as a true and valid sale between Bontes and the complainant.
(footnotes omitted)[3]
The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year.[4]
The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully supported by the
evidence on record, the applicable laws and rules. [5] The IBP Board of Governors agreed with the IBP
Commissioners recommended penalty.
Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but the IBP Board of Governors denied his
motion in a resolution dated July 30, 2004.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests.
The Courts Ruling
After a careful study of the records, we agree with the findings and recommendations of the IBP
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest
level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full
disclosure of the clients most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of
information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her
lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part,
is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. [6] Part
of the lawyers duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule
15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility quoted below:
Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. [7] The prohibition also
applies even if the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to
oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information
acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. [8] To be held
accountable under this rule, it is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose
the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of
themwould affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. [9]

Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the above rule is
present in a given case.
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf
of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a
lawyers argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the
other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon
in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired
through their connection or previous employment.[10] [emphasis ours]
On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find substantial evidence to support Atty.
Sabitsanas violation of the above rule, as established by the following circumstances on record:
One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her interest over a
certain property. The records show that upon the legal advice of Atty. Sabitsana, the Deed of Sale over the
property was prepared and executed in the complainants favor.
Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Caete to discuss the latters legal interest over the property
subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty. Sabitsana already had knowledge that Zenaida Caetes
interest clashed with the complainants interests.
Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty. Sabitsana
accepted the engagement from Zenaida Caete.
Four, Atty. Sabitsanas actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients was
demonstrated by his own actions: first, he filed a case against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida
Caete; second, he impleaded the complainant as the defendant in the case; and third, the case he filed was
for the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he had previously prepared and executed for the complainant.
By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another client in the
same action; he also accepted a new engagement that entailed him to contend and oppose the interest of
his other client in a property in which his legal services had been previously retained.
To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides an exception to the
above prohibition. However, we find no reason to apply the exception due to Atty. Sabitsanas failure to
comply with the requirements set forth under the rule. Atty. Sabitsana did not make a full disclosure of
facts to the complainant and to Zenaida Caete before he accepted the new engagement with Zenaida
Caete. The records likewise show that although Atty. Sabitsana wrote a letter to the complainant
informing her of Zenaida Caetes adverse claim to the property covered by the Deed of Sale and, urging
her to settle the adverse claim; Atty. Sabitsana however did not disclose to the complainant that he was
also being engaged as counsel by Zenaida Caete. [11] Moreover, the records show that Atty. Sabitsana failed
to obtain the written consent of his two clients, as required by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we find as the IBP Board of Governors did Atty. Sabitsana guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests. We likewise agree with the penalty of suspension for one (1) year from

the practice of law recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. This penalty is consistent with existing
jurisprudence on the administrative offense of representing conflicting interests. [12]
We note that Atty. Sabitsana takes exception to the IBP recommendation on the ground that the
charge in the complaint was only for his alleged disclosure of confidential information, not for
representation of conflicting interests. To Atty. Sabitsana, finding him liable for the latter offense is a
violation of his due process rights since he only answered the designated charge.
We find no violation of Atty. Sabitsanas due process rights. Although there was indeed a specific
charge in the complaint, we are not unmindful that the complaint itself contained allegations of acts
sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule on the prohibition against representing conflicting
interests. As stated in paragraph 8 of the complaint:
Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. accepted the commission as a Lawyer of ZENAIDA CANEJA, now
Zenaida Caete, to recover lands from Complainant, including this land where lawyer
Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. has advised his client [complainant] to execute the second sale[.]
Interestingly, Atty. Sabitsana even admitted these allegations in his answer. [13] He also averred in
his Answer that:
6b. Because the defendant-to-be in the complaint (Civil Case No. B-1060) that he
would file on behalf of Zenaida Caneja-Caete was his former client (herein complainant),
respondent asked [the] permission of Mrs. Caete (which she granted) that he would first
write a letter (Annex 4) to the complainant proposing to settle the case amicably between
them but complainant ignored it. Neither did she object to respondents handling the case
in behalf of Mrs. Caete on the ground she is now invoking in her instant complaint. So
respondent felt free to file the complaint against her.[14]
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be
informed of the charge against oneself and to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the
opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.[15] These opportunities were all afforded to Atty. Sabitsana, as shown by the above
circumstances.
All told, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.[16] In the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession. We likewise aim
to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who, by
their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney.[17] This is all that we did in this case. Significantly, we did this to a degree
very much lesser than what the powers of this Court allows it to do in terms of the imposable penalty. In
this sense, we have already been lenient towards respondent lawyer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty.
Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in
violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
Atty. Sabitsana is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so that we
can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.

SO ORDERED.

(57)
ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR.,
Complainant,

- versus -

A.C. No. 8243


Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,*
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

Promulgated:
ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ,
July 24, 2009
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case stems from an administrative complaint [1] filed by Rolando Pacana, Jr. against Atty.
Maricel Pascual-Lopez charging the latter with flagrant violation of the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[2] Complainant alleges that respondent committed acts constituting conflict of
interest, dishonesty, influence peddling, and failure to render an accounting of all the money and
properties received by her from complainant.
On January 2, 2002, complainant was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications
Corporation (MCC). MCC is an affiliate company of Multitel International Holdings Corporation
(Multitel). Sometime in July 2002, MCC changed its name to Precedent Communications Corporation
(Precedent).[3]
According to complainant, in mid-2002, Multitel was besieged by demand letters from its
members and investors because of the failure of its investment schemes. He alleges that he earned the ire
of Multitel investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after
being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at
Real Bank.
Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent who also happened to be a member of
the Couples for Christ, a religious organization where complainant and his wife were also active
members. From then on, complainant and respondent constantly communicated, with the former
disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent and Precedents relation with Multitel.
Respondent gave legal advice to complainant and even helped him prepare standard quitclaims for
creditors. In sum, complainant avers that a lawyer-client relationship was established between him and
respondent although no formal document was executed by them at that time. A Retainer
Agreement[4] dated January 15, 2003 was proposed by respondent. Complainant, however, did not sign the
said agreement because respondent verbally asked for One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as
acceptance fee and a 15% contingency fee upon collection of the overpayment made by Multitel to
Benefon,[5] a telecommunications company based in Finland. Complainant found the proposed fees to be
prohibitive and not within his means.[6] Hence, the retainer agreement remained unsigned. [7]
After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter from
respondent[8] asking for the return and immediate settlement of the funds invested by respondents clients
in Multitel. When complainant confronted respondent about the demand letter, the latter explained that
she had to send it so that her clients defrauded investors of Multitel would know that she was doing
something for them and assured complainant that there was nothing to worry about. [9]
Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the persistent
demands made by Multitel investors against complainant. On these occasions, respondent impressed upon
complainant that she can closely work with officials of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Immigration and

Deportations (BID),[10] and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) [11] to resolve complainants
problems. Respondent also convinced complainant that in order to be absolved from any liability with
respect to the investment scam, he must be able to show to the DOJ that he was willing to divest any and
all of his interests in Precedent including the funds assigned to him by Multitel. [12]
Respondent also asked money from complainant allegedly for safekeeping to be used only for his
case whenever necessary. Complainant agreed and gave her an initial amount of P900,000.00 which was
received
by
respondent
herself.[13] Sometime
thereafter,
complainant
again
gave
[14]
respondent P1,000,000.00. Said amounts were all part of Precedents collections and sales proceeds
which complainant held as assignee of the companys properties. [15]
When complainant went to the United States (US), he received several messages from respondent
sent through electronic mail (e-mail) and short messaging system (SMS, or text messages) warning him
not to return to the Philippines because Rosario Baladjay, president of Multitel, was arrested and that
complainant may later on be implicated in Multitels failed investment system. Respondent even said that
ten (10) arrest warrants and a hold departure order had been issued against him. Complainant, thereafter,
received several e-mail messages from respondent updating him of the status of the case against Multitel
and promised that she will settle the matter discreetly with government officials she can closely work with
in order to clear complainants name. [16] In two separate e-mail messages, [17] respondent again asked money
from complainant, P200,000 of which was handed by complainants wife while respondent was confined
in Saint Lukes Hospital after giving birth,[18] and another P700,000 allegedly to be given to the NBI.[19]
Through respondents persistent promises to settle all complainants legal problems, respondent
was able to convince complainant who was still in the US to execute a deed of assignment in favor of
respondent allowing the latter to retrieve 178 boxes containing cellular phones and accessories stored in
complainants house and inside a warehouse. [20] He also signed a blank deed of sale authorizing respondent
to sell his 2002 Isuzu Trooper.[21]
Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent may not be able to handle his legal problems,
complainant was advised by his family to hire another lawyer. When respondent knew about this, she
wrote to complainant via e-mail, as follows:
Dear Butchie,
Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your
friend and lawyer. The charges are all non-bailable but all the same as the SEC report I
told you before. The findings are the same, i.e. your company was the front for the fraud
of Multitel and that funds were provided you.
I anticipated this, that is why I really pushed for a quitclaim. Rolly is willing to return the
Crosswind, laptap (sic) and [P]alm [P]ilot. Manny Cancio really helped.
Anthony na lang. Then, I will need the accounting of all the funds you received from the
sale of the phones, every employees and directors[] quitclaim (including yours), the funds
transmitted to the clients through me, the funds you utilized, and whatelse (sic) is still
unremitted, every centavo must be accounted for as DOJ and NBI can have the account
opened.
I will also need the P30 M proof of deposit with Real [B]ank and the trust given [to] you.
So we can inform them [that] it was not touched by you.
I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I know
him very well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you hire him

but I will be hands off. I work differently kasi. In this cases (sic), you cannot be
highprofile (sic) because it is the clients who will be sacrificed at the expense of the fame
of the lawyer. I have to work quietly and discreetly. No funfare. Just like what I did for
your guys in the SEC. I have to work with people I am comfortable with. Efren Santos
will sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work. He can help with all his
connections. Vals friend in the NBI is the one is (sic) charge of organized crime who is
the entity (sic) who has your warrant. My law partner was the state prosecutor for
financial fraud. Basically we have it covered in all aspects and all departments. I am just
trying to liquidate the phones I have allotted for you s ana (sic) for your
trooper kasi whether we like it or not, we have to give this agencies (sic) to make our
work easier according to Val. The funds with Mickey are already accounted in the quit
claims (sic) as attorneys (sic) fees. I hope he will be able to send it so we have funds to
work with.
As for your kids, legally they can stay here but recently, it is the children who (sic) the
irate clients and government officials harass and kidnap to make the individuals they
want to come out from hiding (sic). I do not want that to happen. Things will be really
easier on my side.
Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you
hire Coco, I will give him the free hand to work with your case. Please trust me. I
have never let you down, have I? I told you this will happen but we are ready and
prepared. The clients who received the phones will stand by you and make you the hero
in this scandal. I will stand by you always. This is my expertise. TRUST me! That is
all. You have an angel on your side. Always pray though to the best legal mind up there.
You will be ok!
Candy[22]
On July 4, 2003, contrary to respondents advice, complainant returned to the country. On the eve
of his departure from the United States, respondent called up complainant and conveniently informed him
that he has been cleared by the NBI and the BID. [23]
About a month thereafter, respondent personally met with complainant and his wife and told them
that she has already accumulatedP12,500,000.00 as attorneys fees and was willing to give P2,000,000.00
to complainant in appreciation for his help. Respondent allegedly told complainant that without his help,
she would not have earned such amount. Overwhelmed and relieved, complainant accepted respondents
offer but respondent, later on, changed her mind and told complainant that she would instead invest
the P2,000,000.00 on his behalf in a business venture. Complainant declined and explained to respondent
that he and his family needed the money instead to cover their daily expenses as he was no longer
employed. Respondent allegedly agreed, but she failed to fulfill her promise. [24]
Respondent even publicly announced in their religious organization that she was able to help
settle the ten (10) warrants of arrest and hold departure order issued against complainant and narrated
how she was able to defend complainant in the said cases. [25]
By April 2004, however, complainant noticed that respondent was evading him. Respondent
would either refuse to return complainants call or would abruptly terminate their telephone conversation,
citing several reasons. This went on for several months. [26] In one instance, when complainant asked
respondent for an update on the collection of Benefons obligation to Precedent which respondent had
previously taken charge of, respondent arrogantly answered that she was very busy and that she would
read Benefons letter only when she found time to do so.

On November 9, 2004, fed up and dismayed with respondents arrogance and evasiveness,
complainant wrote respondent a letter formally asking for a full accounting of all the money, documents
and properties given to the latter.[27] Respondent rendered an accounting through a letter dated December
20, 2004.[28] When complainant found respondents explanation to be inadequate, he wrote a latter
expressing his confusion about the accounting. [29] Complainant repeated his request for an audited
financial report of all the properties turned over to her; otherwise, he will be constrained to file the
appropriate case against respondent.[30] Respondent replied,[31] explaining that all the properties and cash
turned over to her by complainant had been returned to her clients who had money claims against
Multitel. In exchange for this, she said that she was able to secure quitclaim documents clearing
complainant from any liability.[32] Still unsatisfied, complainant decided to file an affidavitcomplaint[33]against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of respondent.
In her Answer-Affidavit,[34] respondent vehemently denied being the lawyer for Precedent. She
maintained that no formal engagement was executed between her and complainant. She claimed that she
merely helped complainant by providing him with legal advice and assistance because she personally
knew him, since they both belonged to the same religious organization. [35]
Respondent insisted that she represented the group of investors of Multitel and that she merely
mediated in the settlement of the claims her clients had against the complainant. She also averred that the
results of the settlement between both parties were fully documented and accounted for. [36] Respondent
believes that her act in helping complainant resolve his legal problem did not violate any ethical standard
and was, in fact, in accord with Rule 2.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[37]
To bolster her claim that the complaint was without basis, respondent noted that a complaint for
estafa was also filed against her by complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon
City citing the same grounds. The complaint was, however, dismissed by Assistant City Prosecutor
Josephus Joannes H. Asis for insufficiency of evidence. [38] Respondent argued that on this basis alone, the
administrative case must also be dismissed.
In her Position Paper,[39] respondent also questioned the admissibility of the electronic evidence
submitted by complainant to the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent maintained that the email and the text messages allegedly sent by respondent to complainant were of doubtful authenticity and
should be excluded as evidence for failure to conform to the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 017-01-SC).
After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez issued a Report and
Recommendation[40] finding that a lawyer-client relationship was established between respondent and
complainant despite the absence of a written contract. The Investigating Commissioner also declared that
respondent violated her duty to be candid, fair and loyal to her client when she allowed herself to
represent conflicting interests and failed to render a full accounting of all the cash and properties
entrusted to her. Based on these grounds, the Investigating Commissioner recommended her disbarment.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, [41] but the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Recommendation[42] denying the motion and adopting the findings of the Investigating Commissioner.
The case now comes before this Court for final action.
We affirm the findings of the IBP.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides:

Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste [43] and, more importantly,
upon necessity. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with
the clients case, including its weak and strong points. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and
guarded with care. No opportunity must be given to him to take advantage of his client; for if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof. [44] It behooves lawyers not only to
keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing
for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in
the administration of justice.[45] It is for these reasons that we have described the attorney-client
relationship as one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. [46]
Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with
complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led
to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot shield herself from the inevitable
consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in
the form of friendly accommodations, [47] precisely because at the time she was giving assistance to
complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been referred to her by
the SEC.[48]
Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that no written
contract for the engagement of her services was ever forged between her and complainant. [49] This
argument all the more reveals respondents patent ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts and of basic
ethical standards expected from an advocate of justice. The IBP was correct when it said:
The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a
professional relationship between the parties. Documentary formalism is not an
essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or
implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an
attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. [50] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should have done was
either to advise complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already representing
the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel
for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and
violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,[51] we explained the concept of conflict of interest, thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers
duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In
brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues
for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications
have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require

the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to
use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test
of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent
an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
[52]

Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainants hapless situation, initially, by giving him
legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, respondent impressed
upon complainant that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the properties
entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the
same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that she was doing everything
to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel. Respondent herself admitted to complainant that
without the latters help, she would not have been able to earn as much and that, as a token of her
appreciation, she was willing to share some of her earnings with complainant. [53] Clearly, respondents act
is shocking, as it not only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [54] but
also toyed with decency and good taste.
Respondent even had the temerity to boast that no Multitel client had ever complained of
respondents unethical behavior.[55] This remark indubitably displays respondents gross ignorance of
disciplinary procedure in the Bar. As a member of the Bar, she is expected to know that proceedings for
disciplinary actions against any lawyer may be initiated and prosecuted by the IBP Board of
Governors, motu proprio or upon referral by this Court or by the Board of Officers of an IBP
Chapter[56] even if no private individual files any administrative complaint.
Upon review, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and recommendations of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, on the admissibility of the
electronic evidence submitted by complainant. We, accordingly, adopt the same in toto.
Finally, respondent argues that the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar her
on the grounds of deceit, malpractice and other gross misconduct, aside from violation of the Lawyers
Oath, has been rendered moot and academic by voluntary termination of her IBP membership, allegedly
after she had been placed under the Department of Justices Witness Protection Program. [57] Convenient as
it may be for respondent to sever her membership in the integrated bar, this Court cannot allow her to do
so without resolving first this administrative case against her.
The resolution of the administrative case filed against respondent is necessary in order to
determine the degree of her culpability and liability to complainant. The case may not be dismissed or
rendered moot and academic by respondents act of voluntarily terminating her membership in the Bar
regardless of the reason for doing so. This is because membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions.[58] The conduct of a lawyer may make him or her civilly, if not criminally, liable to his client
or to third parties, and such liability may be conveniently avoided if this Court were to allow voluntary
termination of membership. Hence, to terminate ones membership in the Bar voluntarily, it is imperative
that the lawyer first prove that the voluntary withdrawal of membership is not a ploy to further prejudice
the public or to evade liability. No such proof exists in the present case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez is hereby DISBARRED for
representing conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in
violation of her Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and
notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

(58) Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985


ADRIANO
E.
DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A.
TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS,
LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG,
JR., respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin
Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a
law firm organized in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker &
McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares
of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He
requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is
your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the
instant complaint.

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1,
Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a
professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities
around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm
name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes
a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality
to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3,
respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here.
(See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.

SO ORDERED.

(59) GEORGE C. SOLATAN, A.C. No. 6504


Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
ATTYS. OSCAR A. INOCENTES Promulgated:
and JOSE C. CAMANO,
Respondents. August 9, 2005
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The present case focuses on a critical aspect of the lawyer-client relationshipthe duty of loyalty.
The fidelity lawyers owe their clients is traditionally characterized as undivided. This means that lawyers
must represent their clients and serve their needs without interference or impairment from any conflicting
interest.
This administrative case traces its roots from the manner by which Attys. Jose C. Camano and
Oscar A. Inocentes responded to the efforts of complainant, George C. Solatan, to lease a certain Quezon
City apartment belonging to the attorneys clients. On the basis of acts branded by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) as bordering on technical extortion, accepting funds and giving unsolicited advice to
an adverse party, and casting doubts as to the procedure of levy, the IBP resolved [1] to recommend the
suspension of Atty. Camano from the practice of law for one (1) year. It likewise recommended the
reprimand of Atty. Inocentes, whom it held liable for the aforementioned acts of his associate, under the
principle of command responsibility.
Only Atty. Inocentes has elected to contest the resolution of the IBP, as he questions the propriety
of his being held administratively liable for acts done by Atty. Camano. [2] However, the recommendation
to suspend Atty. Camano shall also be passed upon by virtue of Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.[3]
Attys. Inocentes and Camano were both engaged in the practice of law under the firm name
of Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office. Atty. Inocentes held office in his home located at No. 19
Marunong St., Central District, Quezon City, while Atty. Camano was stationed at an extension office of
the firm located in 3rd/F, 956 Aurora Blvd., Quirino Dist., Quezon City.

The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was retained by spouses Andres and
Ludivina Genito (spouses Genito), owners of an apartment complex (the Genito Apartments) located
at 259 Tandang Sora cor. Visayas Avenue, Quezon City, when the Genito Apartments were placed
under sequestration by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) on 9 July 1986.
[4]
The law office represented the spouses Genito before the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan, and
subsequently, with authority from the PCGG. [5] in ejectment cases against non-paying tenants
occupying the Genito Apartments.[6]
Complainants sister, Gliceria Solatan, was a tenant in Door 10, Phase B of the Genito Apartments.
It appears from the records that Gliceria Solatan left for the United States in 1986, and since then, the
apartment was either intermittently used by members of her family or placed under the charge of
caretakers.[7] In August 1987, a complaint for ejectment for non-payment of rentals was filed against
Gliceria Solatan.[8] On 3 March 1988, in a judgment by default, a Decision[9] was rendered ordering
Gliceria Solatan to vacate the premises of the apartment, pay the spouses Genito the amount of Thirty
Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P30,600.00) as unpaid rentals from February 1986 to July 1987 with
interest at 24% per annum from 20 August 1987 until the premises are vacated, Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) as attorneys fees, and costs of the suit. [10]

Complainant was occupying the subject apartment when he learned of the judgment rendered
against his sister. On 10 May 1988, prior to the implementation of a writ to execute the judgment,
complainant and his mother, Elvira Solatan, approached Atty. Inocentes at his home office.

Complainant informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to arrange the execution of a lease contract by
virtue of which complainant would be the new lessee of the apartment and thus make possible his
continued stay therein. Atty. Inocentes referred complainant and his mother to his associate, Atty.
Camano, the attorney in charge of the ejectment cases against tenants of the Genito apartments. After
the exchange, complainant went to Atty. Camano at the satellite office of Atty. Inocentess firm. From
here on out, events quickly turned sour. Different versions of subsequent events were presented. The
facts reproduced hereunder are by and large culled from the findings of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, Siegfred B. Mison.
During the meeting with Atty. Camano, a verbal agreement was made in which complainant
and his mother agreed to pay the entire judgment debt of Gliceria Solatan, including fifty percent of
the awarded attorneys fees and One Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P1,600.00) as costs of suit
provided that Atty. Camano would allow complainants continued stay at Door 10, Phase B of the
Genito Apartments. As partial compliance with the agreement, complainant issued in the name Atty.
Camano a check for Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) representing half of the P10,000.00 attorneys
fees adjudged against complainants sister.

Complainant and his mother failed to make any other payment. Thus, the sheriff in
coordination with Atty. Camano and some policemen, enforced the writ of execution on 22 June 1988
and levied the properties found in the subject apartment. An attempt at renegotiation took place at the
insistence of complainant, resulting in Atty. Camanos acquiescence to release the levied properties
and allowing complainant to remain at the apartment, subject to the latters payment of costs incurred
in enforcing the writ of execution and issuance of postdated checks representing installment rental
payments. Complainant, thus, issued four (4) checks drawn on Far East Bank and Trust Company
dated the fifteenth (15th) of July, August, September, and October 1988 each in the amount of Three
Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (P3,400.00).[11] Half of the amount represented complainants monthly
rental, while the other half, a monthly installment for the payment of Gliceria Solatans judgment debt.
On 28 June 1988, acting on the advice of Atty. Camano, complainant presented an Affidavit of
Ownership to the sheriff who then released the levied items to complainant. However, a Northern Hill 3burner gas stove was not retuned to complainant. The stove was in fact kept by Atty. Camano in the unit
of the Genito Apartments wherein he temporarily stayed [12] and, thereafter, turned over the same to a
certain Recto Esberto, caretaker of the Genito Apartments. [13]

On 1 August 1988, complainant filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty.
Inocentes and Atty. Camano. [14] After formal investigation, and despite conflicting testimonies on the
tenor and content of agreements and conversations, several disturbing facts were revealed to have been
uncontrovertedAtty. Camanos acceptance from complainant of attorneys fees and the costs of
implementing the writ of execution, possession of complainants leviedNorthern Hill oven, and advice to
complainant on how to recover the latters levied items. Thus, IBP Investigating Commissioner Siegfred
B. Mison, made the following recommendations, viz:
Based on the facts revealed in their respective Memoranda, the penalty of six (6)
months suspension is therefore recommended to be imposed on Respondent Camano for

committing the following acts that adversely reflects (sic) on his moral fitness to continue
to practice law[:]
1. He received money (P5,000 then P1,000) from the adverse party
purportedly for attorneys fees and for reimbursement of sheriffs
expenses. Such act of accepting funds from the adverse party in the
process of implementing a writ, borders on technical extortion
particularly in light of the factual circumstances as discussed.
2. He gave unsolicited advice to the adverse party in suggesting the filing
of an Affidavit of Ownership over the levied properties, a suggestion
evidently in conflict with [the interest of] his own client, supposedly,
the Genitos.
3. He failed to turn over the gas stove to either party thereby casting
doubt as to the procedure of the levy.

Based on the facts revealed, the penalty of Reprimand is therefore recommended


to be imposed on Respondent Inocentes for committing the following acts that adversely
reflects (sic) in his fitness to continue to practice law[:]
1. He allowed Camano to perform all the aforementioned acts, either
by negligence or inadvertence which are inimical to the legal
profession. He cannot claim ignorance or feign innocence in this
particular transaction considering that the Complainants themselves went
to his office on different occasions regarding this transaction.
Ultimately, he exercised command responsibility over the case and
had supervisory control over Respondent Camano inasmuch as he
received periodic reports either by phone or in person from the
latter.
2. The letter disclaimer executed by Mr. Genito filed by Respondent
Inocentes does not mitigate any liability whatsoever since the
wrongdoing done against the profession cannot be undone by a mere
letter from a third party.[15] (Emphasis supplied.)
The IBP Board of Governors approved the aforequoted recommendation, with the modification of
an increase in Atty. Camanos period of suspension from six (6) months to one (1) year, in a resolution
stating, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the of the Investigating
Commissionerfinding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and for accepting funds from adverse
party in the process of implementing a writ borders on technical extortion, for giving

unsolicited advice to the adverse party a suggestion evidently in conflict with [the interest
of] his own client and for casting doubts to the procedure of the levy, Atty. Jose C.
Camano is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, likewise, Atty.
Oscar Inocentes is hereby REPRIMANDED for he exercised command responsibility
over the case inasmuch as he received periodic reports either by phone or in person. [16]
The IBP held that Atty. Camanos act of giving unsolicited advice to complainant is a culpable act
because the advice conflicted with the interest of his clients, the spouses Genito. The rule on conflicting
interests, established in Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, deals with conflicts in the
interests of an attorneys actual clients among themselves, of existing and prospective clients, and of the
attorney and his clients. It states that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

The relation of attorney and client begins from the time an attorney is retained. [17] An attorney has
no power to act as counsel or legal representative for a person without being retained. [18] To establish the
professional relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney are sought and received
in any manner pertinent to his profession. [19] At the time the questioned statement was made, Atty.
Camano had called the police to restrain complainant from surreptitiously pulling out the levied
properties from the apartment complex by virtue of which the latter was brought to the police station for
questioning. The statement was made in response to complainants insistence at the police station that the
levied properties were owned by him and not by the judgment debtor. [20] No employment relation was
offered or accepted in the instant case.
More fitting, albeit, to the mind of this Court, inapplicable to the case, is Canon 15 of the same
Code which encompasses the aforementioned rule. In general terms, Canon 15 requires lawyers to
observe loyalty in all dealings and transactions with their clients. [21] Unquestionably, an attorney giving
legal advice to a party with an interest conflicting with that of his client resulting in detriment to the latter
may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, far be it that every utterance of an attorney which may have
afforded an individual some relief adverse to the formers client may be labeled as a culpable act of
disloyalty. As in every case, the acts alleged to be culpable must be assessed in light of the surrounding
circumstances.
While the levy was made on chattel found in the apartment of the judgment debtor, Gliceria
Solatan, the complainant was the true owner of the properties. Consequently, the latter had a right to
recover the same. In fact, considering the circumstances, the questioned statement is in consonance with
complainants foremost duty to uphold the law as an officer of the court. The statement of Atty. Camano in
such a context should not be construed by this Court as giving advice in conflict against the interest of the
spouses Genito as in fact the latter have no interest over the incorrectly levied properties.

We, thus, note that the act of informing complainant that the levied properties would be returned
to him upon showing proof of his ownership thereof may hint at infidelity to the interest of the spouses
Genito, but, in this circumstance, lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal of the latters
confidence so as to deserve outright categorization as infidelity or disloyalty to his clients cause.
Nonetheless, after having noted the foregoing, we remain convinced with the propriety of meting the one

(1) year suspension from the practice of law on Atty. Camano, as recommended by the IBP, based on his
other culpable acts which tend to degrade the profession and foment distrust in the integrity of court
processes.
On the other hand, Atty. Inocentes seeks to distance himself from the events that transpired and
the reprimand resulting therefrom by asserting that he was incorrectly punished for Atty. Camanos acts
when his mere participation in the fiasco was to refer complainant and his mother to Atty. Camano.

However, it is precisely because of such participation, consisting as it did of referring the


complainant to his associate lawyer, that Atty. Inocentes may be held administratively liable by virtue of
his associates unethical acts. His failure to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge
of his law firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. The term command responsibility, as Atty. Inocentes
suggests, has special meaning within the circle of men in uniform in the military; however, the principle
does not abide solely therein. It controls the very circumstance in which Atty. Inocentes found himself.
We are not unaware of the custom of practitioners in a law firm of assigning cases and even entire
client accounts to associates or other partners with limited supervision, if at all. This is especially true in
the case of Attys. Inocentes and Camano who, from the records, both appear to be seasoned enough to be
left alone in their work without requiring close supervision over each others conduct and work output.
However, let it not be said that law firm practitioners are given a free hand to assign cases to seasoned
attorneys and thereafter conveniently forget about the case. To do so would be a disservice to the
profession, the integrity and advancement of which this Court must jealously protect.
That the firm name under which the two attorneys labored was that of Oscar Inocentes and
Associates Law Officedoes not automatically make Atty. Inocentes the default lawyer acting in a
supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano. It did, however, behoove Atty. Inocentes to exert ordinary
diligence to find out what was going on in his law firm. It placed in Atty. Inocentes the active
responsibility to inquire further into the circumstances affecting the levy of complainants properties,
irrespective of whether the same were in fact events which could possibly lead to administrative liability.
Moreover, as name practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the responsibility to make
reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should act in conformity to the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[22] It is not without reason or consequence that Atty. Inocentess name is that
which was used as the official designation of their law office.
With regard to the actual existence of Atty. Inocentess supervisory capacity over Atty. Camanos
activities, the IBP Investigating Commissioner based the same on his finding that Atty. Inocentes received
periodic reports from Atty. Camano on the latters dealings with complainant. This finding is the linchpin
of Atty. Inocentess supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano and liability by virtue thereof.

Law practitioners are acutely aware of the responsibilities that are naturally taken on by partners
and supervisory lawyers over the lawyers and non-lawyers of the law office. We have held that lawyers
are administratively liable for the conduct of their employees in failing to timely file pleadings.
[23]
In Rheem of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Zoilo R. Ferrer, et al.,[24] partners in a law office were
admonished for the contemptuous language in a pleading submitted to court despite, and even due to, the

fact that the pleading was not passed upon by any of the partners of the office. We held therein that
partners are duty bound to provide for efficacious control of court pleadings and other court papers that
carry their names or the name of the law firm. [25]
We now hold further that partners and practitioners who hold supervisory capacities are legally
responsible to exert ordinary diligence in apprising themselves of the comings and goings of the cases
handled by the persons over which they are exercising supervisory authority and in exerting necessary
efforts to foreclose the occurrence of violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility by persons
under their charge. Nonetheless, the liability of the supervising lawyer in this regard is by no means
equivalent to that of the recalcitrant lawyer. The actual degree of control and supervision exercised by
said supervising lawyer varies, inter alia, according to office practice, or the length of experience and
competence of the lawyer supervised. Such factors can be taken into account in ascertaining the proper
penalty. Certainly, a lawyer charged with the supervision of a fledgling attorney prone to rookie mistakes
should bear greater responsibility for the culpable acts of the underling than one satisfied enough with the
work and professional ethic of the associate so as to leave the latter mostly to his/her own devises.
While Atty. Camanos irregular acts perhaps evince a need for greater supervision of his legal
practice, there is no question that it has been Atty. Inocentes practice to allow wide discretion for Atty.
Camano to practice on his own. It does constitute indifference and neglect for Atty. Inocentes to fail to
accord even a token attention to Atty. Camanos conduct which could have brought the then impending
problem to light. But such is not equivalent to the proximate responsibility for Atty. Camanos acts.
Moreover, it appears from the records that Atty. Inocentes is a former judge and a lawyer who, as of yet,
is in good standing and it is the first time in which Atty. Inocentes has been made to answer vicariously
for the misconduct of a person under his charge. An admonition is appropriate under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated 16
April 2004 is AFFIRMED in respect of the sanction meted out on Atty. Camano. Atty. Inocentes is hereby
ADMONISHED to monitor more closely the activities of his associates to make sure that the same are in
consonance with the Code of Professional Responsibility with the WARNING that repetition of the same
or similar omission will be dealt with more severely.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

(60) [A.C. No. 5170. November 17, 1999]


LILIA FERRER TUCAY, complainant, vs. ATTY. MANUEL R. TUCAY, respondent.

R ES OLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Complainant Lilia F. Tucay, feeling deeply aggrieved by the immoral conduct of her husband Atty. Manuel
Tucay, seeks the latter's disbarment in the instant administrative proceedings.

Complainant and respondent have long been married, the two taking their vows years back on 14 July 1963 at
the St. Ignatius church, Camp Murphy, in Quezon City.For thirty years, the couple have lived together with their
children.

Just a few days before their thirtieth anniversary or on 07 July 1993 to be exact, with the first marriage still
subsisting, respondent lawyers contracted another marriage with one Myrna C. Tuplano, herself married since 1983
to a certain Florante T. Tabilog. Respondent left the conjugal dwelling in July 1993 to cohabit with Myrna Tuplano.

Complainant also caused the filing of bigamy charge against respondent lawyer and his second wife, docketed
Criminal Case No. Q-94-54709, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, of Quezon City, which case still
pends. In an attempt to defeat the early prosecution of the criminal case, respondent filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking the judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage. The petition
was later dismissed due to lack of interest; subsequently, however, respondent filed a second petition for the same
purpose, this time with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. In both petitions, he averred that neither he nor the
other supposed party to the second marriage was physically present on the date of its alleged celebration thereby
rendering void any such marriage, if at all, under the provisions of Article 3, paragraph 3, and Article 6 of the Family
Code.

The IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Jaime V. Vibar gave neither credence nor validity to the explanation of
respondent and recommended to the IBP Board of Governors the disbarment of Atty. Tucay for gross misconduct
and failure to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of every member of the Bar. On 13
December 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIII-97-164 which "RESOLVED to ADOPT
and APPROVE" the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner after being satisfied that the
latter's findings were amply supported by the evidence on record.

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not respondent did contract a bigamous marriage, a
matter which apparently is still pending with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. It is enough that the records of
this administrative case sufficiently substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP
Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, grossly
immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This
detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his
license confers upon him.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious
deportment unbecoming of an attorney. The grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, including deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice of law, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so, are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of
impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer at no time must be wanting in
probity and moral fiber which not only are conditions precedent to his entrance to, but are likewise essential demands for his
continued membership in, a great and noble profession.

The Court concurs with the IBP-CBD and IBP Board of Governors in their findings and thus accepts their recommendation that respondent
lawyers, having ceased to meet and possess the qualifications required of every lawyer, must forthwith be disbarred. ACCORDINGLY, the
Court resolved to disbar respondent Atty. Manuel Tucay immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution. Let a copy hereof be made a part of the
records of said respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and copies to be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and circulated to all courts. SO ORDERED.

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