Science and culture

By its critics almost ad nauseam we must continue to insist that honesty in

experimentation, openness to rival views, and criticism of established views are
values honored in science, and to an extent enshrined in its institutions. As already
mentioned, experiments and observations must be repeatable, and reputations can
be made by well-grounded criticisms of established theories. Moreover, in most
fields of science, currently at least, there is no overall agreement on a single correct
theory, as we see with, for example, conflicting interpretations of quantum theory or
of biological evolution. All this, of course, contributes to an atmosphere of free
discussion in science and militates against the dominant of scientific thoughtprocesses by ideological or self-interested forces, whether they are within or without
science itself.
Science and technology
Why did the ancient greeks not achieve more in the field of technology? This most
ingenious and rational of people tended actually to despise the merely mechanical
or banausic, despite the interest in scientific and cosmological speculation. Maybe,
as jasper griffin has suggested, they esteemed aesthetic values higher than the
technical. If his was so, though, it buy no means implied that they did not prize
scientific knowledge, knowledge of causes, knowledge of nature. But these thing
were valued for their own sake and not for the manipulative advantages they might
bring with them.
The modern world, by contrast is largely governed by the concept of technical
progress, which sweeps all other consideration before it. Griffin points out that the
beauty of the riders on the Parthenon frieze depend on the absence of stirrups and
hints that realization of this beauty might have impeded experimentation with aids
no more efficient methods of riding on the part of the greeks. One cannot imagine
he modern world holding up technical progress on aesthetic grounds. Indeed, if the
so-called entertainment industry is a guide, technology has come to dominate
aesthetics even in the realm of art, to say of it effects on architecture and design
generally, thus fulfilling a thousand times a day goethes somber warning that
technology in alliance with bad taste in the enemy of art most to be feared.
We noted earlier how bacon saw science as a significant way of contributing to the
relief of mans estate by giving power of nature. Undoubtedly the rest of modern
science was accompanied by a growth in science-based technology, and the
prestige of modern science derives in large part from the success of technological
innovation. Undoubtedly, too, scientific research is often skewed towards
technological hopes, something which becomes more and more significant with the
increasing cost of scientific research.
In the light of the contemporary intertwining of science and technology, karl popper,
writing the mid-195os, comes across as firmly Hellenic and un - baconian in his
approach:

The unclear bomb (and possibly also the so-called peaceful use of atomic energy
whose consequence may be even worse in the long run) have, I think, shown us the
shallowness of the worship of science as an instrument of our command over
nature or the control of our physical environment: it has shown us that this
command, this control, is apt to be self-defeating, and apt to enslave u rather than
to make us free-if it does not do away with us altogether. And while knowledge is
worth dying for, power is not.
While some sections of the ecological and environmental movement might be
surprised to receive apparent support from such a source, these views are
consistent with poppers philosophy as a whole, in so far as they derive from a
strong sense of our ignorance about nature and about the effect our interventions
might have on nature. As we shall see shortly, realization of the extent of our
ignorance about the natural world poses critical problems of our thinking about
technology, problems which are often not fully appreciated by either its defenders
or its critics.
Before moving on this, however, it is worth pointing out once more that whatever
may be the moral and political faults of engineers and technologist, and of the
institution, politicians, and communities who rely on them, technology can have no
tendency to undermine the cognitive claims of science. Indeed, somewhat against
popper, the success or failure of the technological applications of theories are highly
relevant to assessing their truth or falsity. It is also worth emphasizing the obvious,
but often overlooked point that it is not scientists qua scientists who decide that a
society should order or encourage such thing as atomic bombs or nuclear power or
genetic engineering, however much individual scientists may press political
authorities or commercial interests to sponsor their work. But this separation of the
scientific from its social application raises the question of the assessment and
evaluation of a particular piece of technology.
The introduction of a piece of new technology is an experimental matter. The
entrepreneurial engineer moving into the market does so usually in order to solve
some perceived problem, such as satisfying a need or creating a desire in people, or
improving or correcting the unwanted effects of some existing device. He may, of
course, be wrong. There may be no gap his device fills, or he may fail to pick out a
desire anyone has even potentially, or his device may create more problems than it
solves. What is certain is that, like all human actions, a new answer to an old
problem will bring with it unforeseen and unforeseeable consequences, and some of
these will be seen as new problems, themselves requiring further new solutions,
which will bring yet more problems I their train, and so on and so on.
Part of the reason for the unforeseeability of the consequences of technological
innovations is something inherent in any new piece of scientific theorizing or
experimentation. That is, our ignorance of nature is such that until we test our
theory or carry out our experiment, we just do not know what the result will be. And
even a laboratory simulation of real-life conditions has an element of risk or
uncertainty about it. The laboratory simulation is one which fixes on certain factors
as being relevant in the real-life situation, and it may just be that some factor not

chosen for representation in the laboratory simulation turns out to be relevant, often
to the detriment of the real-life application of the technology. This is not, of course,
an argument against laboratory testing of new technologies or theories, but a
caveat about the inherent limitations of such testing. Many disasters are prevented
by such things, but not all. So our ignorance of nature and its effects means that,
however careful are we in devising theory or piece of technology, we must always
accept that there may be unforeseeable outcomes in testing the theory or applying
the technology.
But a piece of technology is not just an intervention in nature. It is also intervention
in the human, social world. In this sense, there will always be an entrepreneurial
dimension to engineering. Will our new technology catch on with the public? And, if
it does, what will be its effects more generally? Here we reach another dimension of
uncertainty, and ignorance, at least as critical as our ignorance of the natural world.
For the effects of social actions are subject to multiple uncertainties, due both to the
extent of their effects and the way those effects depend in part on the
unpredictable responses of individuals. The unpredictability of response is standards
of living by choosing the products of better technologies, and to strangle native
industries by making them stick with outdates and eventually unprofitable goods,
leading in the end to the eventually decline of those industries in the world market,
and ta home as well once foreign competition gets a foothold.
On the other hand, admitting the spuriousness of technological forecasting does not
mean that we should not monitor the effects of technology closely. Indeed, the very
reason for the failure of technology forecasting - our profound ignorance of the
future evolution and effects of technology makes the monitoring of its effects that
much more pressing. In this context, it is surely significant that it is precisely those
societies which go in most for the attempt centrally to control technological
development which suffer the worst pollution of their environment by technology. If
we want the evolution of technology to proceed with the least cost humanly and
environmentally, we should concentrate our efforts on a sensitive monitoring of its
effects, in order to gain a clear understanding of its unforeseen consequences and
of the new problems it sets us to solve. And if the scientific community is, ideally, a
microcosm of an open society, in that criticisms and ideas are permissible from any
quarter, it may well follow that a politically open society is the best arena for an
acceptable evolution of technology, for in such a society, the citizens will be free to
choose among competing technologies, and to draw public attention to and, if
necessary, legislate against the unacceptable effects of existing technologies.
In a free society, citizens individually or collectively will be able to resist and
question the so-called technological imperative, by refusing technologies by find
morally or in some other way objectionable, just as Griffins greeks might have
refused to entertain the stirrup. Absence of probably counter - productive center
planning of technological development in no way implies lack of controls, social or
legal, against undesirable technological results. The moral for healthy technological
development seems to be not to interfere with its spontaneous evolution by
attempting to control or plan its development by centrally directing and curbing
technological enterpreneurship on the basis of technological forecasting, but to be

severely critical of any adverse effects. Such a policy would, in effect, be simply a
version of popperian falsificationism applied to technology, rather than to
theoretical science.
What, though, of the Aristotelian - popperian hostility to the instrumental uses of
science? Like much else in which there is a grain of truth, such hostility is something
which can surely be overdone. It is true that there is a sense in which the desire to
know the truth about nature is worth while in itself, independent of any
instrumental side effects. Indeed, part of understanding who and what we are will
be dependent on our knowledge of natural world. On the other hand, the relief of
mans estate is a noble and worthwhile goal too, and one which should not be
disparaged as merely instrumental.

Oleh kritikus hampir memuakkan - kita harus terus bersikeras bahwa kejujuran
dalam eksperimen, keterbukaan terhadap pandangan saingan, dan kritik dari
pandangan didirikan adalah nilai-nilai kehormatan dalam ilmu, dan ke mana
diabadikan dalam lembaga-lembaganya. Seperti telah disebutkan, percobaan dan
pengamatan harus diulang, dan reputasi dapat dilakukan dengan kritik cukup
beralasan teori didirikan. Selain itu, dalam sebagian besar bidang ilmu
pengetahuan, saat ini setidaknya, tidak ada kesepakatan secara keseluruhan pada
teori yang benar tunggal, seperti yang kita lihat dengan, misalnya, interpretasi dari
teori kuantum atau evolusi biologis bertentangan. Semua ini, tentu saja,
memberikan kontribusi untuk suasana diskusi bebas dalam ilmu dan militates
terhadap dominan pemikiran-proses ilmiah oleh pasukan ideologi atau kepentingan
sendiri, apakah mereka berada di dalam atau tanpa ilmu itu sendiri.