LUNA vs PLAZA

FACTS:
This petition stemmed from a criminal action commenced
by the Phil. Constabulary investigator of Tandag, Surigao del
Sur when he filed with respondent MTC Judge Lorenzo
PLAZA a criminal case charging LUNA with the crime of
murder.
Supporting the complaint/information were sworn
statements of the witnesses for the prosecution, subscribed
and sworn to before the respondent Judge at the time of the
filing of the complaint.
Judge PLAZA examined the prosecution witnesses by
reading to them "all over again the questions and answers" in
their statements in writing, and the witnesses-affiants declared
before said Judge that the averments contained in their
affidavits were made by them. They also swore to the truth
thereof. Thereafter, they signed their respective affidavits in
the presence of Judge PLAZA, who also signed after the usual
procedure of administering the oath.
Considering the averments in these affidavits, the
stipulation in the complaint/information and on the strength of
other documentary evidence submitted to him (medico-legal
report, sketches of the crime scene, etc.), Judge PLAZA found
probable cause and issued the warrant of arrest, specifying
therein that no bail is fixed for the provisional release of the
accused.
However, upon motion from LUNA, Judge PLAZA granted
bail at P30,000, which, however was later revoked, in effect
again denying LUNA bail.
Thereafter, LUNA waived his right to PI. Hence, the case
was remanded to the CFI for hearing after the Provincial Fiscal
filed the necessary information charging LUNA with the crime
of murder.
LUNA filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the
CFI, claiming that he was being deprived of liberty without the
due process of law, on the ground that the imprisonment and
detention was the result of a warrant of arrest issued by
respondent Judge in violation of RA 3828, and praying for the
annulment of the order for his arrest and his discharge from
confinement.
Herein respondents (Judge PLAZA, the jail warden and the

city fiscal) all answered said petition and alleged that the
provisions of RA 3828 (Amendment to the Judiciary Act) have
been complied with.
Respondents also averred that a motion to quash, and not
a petition for habeas corpus was the proper remedy for LUNA;
but that LUNA's application for bail constituted a waiver of the
right to question the validity of the arrest.
As stated, the CFI ruled against LUNA and rendered herein
assailed decision denying his petition for habeas corpus,
hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Wether or not the CFI erred in denying the writ of
habeas corpus?
RULING:
NO. LUNAs appeal is devoid of merit. Perforce, the
decision of the CFI of Surigao del Sur is AFFIRMED.

No Denial of Due Process and Waiver of Rights

Preliminary examination/investigation is not an essential
part of due process of law. This is evidenced by the fact that
our rules of criminal procedure allow its waiver. Therefor, when
it is forgone for the reason thus stated, the same does not
constitute a denial of due process. It is merely a statutory right.
As borne by the records, LUNA waived his right to the
preliminary examination when he filed a petition for bail.
Consequently, this conduct of LUNA indicates that he had
waived his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the
preliminary examination conducted by respondent Judge
PLAZA prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
Also, no substantial right of LUNA had been violated
precisely because he has waived his right to preliminary
investigation after he was arrested, and that he took the step
of applying for bail before respondent Municipal Judge
constitute an implied admission on his part that here was a
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest
against him. Those acts of the petitioner constitute a waiver of
whatever irregularity, if any there was, that attended his arrest.

RATIO: On Compliance with RA 3828 and the Constitution

In this appeal, LUNA assails the conduct of the preliminary
examination by Judge PLAZA as being irregular as far as RA
3828 is concerned, hence, the warrant of arrest which issued
therefrom is also irregular this is UNTENABLE.
According to RA 3828 (Judiciary Act), judges doing
preliminary examination for purposes of issuing warrants of
arrests are required to personally examine (i.e. ask
searching questions) the complainant and her witnesses under
oath; and then reduce the same into writing (i.e. to make part
of the records such examination).
On the other hand, Art III, Sec 1 (3) of the 1935 Const.
provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.
A perusal of the records of the case would lead to the
conclusion that Judge PLAZA substantially complied with the
preceding requirements of the Constitution and the law (refer
to statement of facts).

Quashal and not Habeas Corpus is the Proper Remedy

The remedy available to the petitioner LUNA, under the
circumstances of this case, is not a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or
a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the respondent
Municipal Judge PLAZA or by the Provincial Fiscal.

to him.

ALIMPOOS vs CA

PARADA vs VENERACION

FACTS:

FACTS:

Reynaldo Mosquito has been accused of Robbery w/ less

Serious Physical Injuries. He was detained by virtue of a
warrant of arrest, which was issued without the observance of
the legal requirements for the issuance thereof. Mosquito filed
a petition for Habeas Corpus before the Trial Court. Mosquito
named as defendants in the case the Prov. Fiscal and the
private offended parties. He also filed a claim for damages
premised on Art 32 (4) and other applicable provisions of the
Civil Code.

Parada was accused of Estafa. He notified the court

through his attorney of his change of address but the
notifications were still sent to his old one so the Veneracion
(judge) held the trial in absentia.

As a rule, where a party appears by attorney in an action or

proceeding in a court of record, all notices required to be given
therein must be given to the attorney of record. Accordingly,
notices to counsel should be properly sent to his address of
record and unless the counsel files a notice of change of
address, his official address remains to be that of his address
of record.

A warrant of arrest was issued with no bail. His nonappearance also was construed as waiver to present
evidence.

Judge should have taken cognizance of new address when

it sent the notice of hearing after they were notified of change
of address.

He was convicted and he now files a complaint against

judge for gross ignorance of the law when he did not follow the
legal requirements of a valid trial in absentia which led to his
conviction and premature incarceration, that the order of his
arrest with no recommendation for bail was erroneous, and
that respondent Judge abused his authority when he issued
the June 8, 1994 order denying the motion of Paradas counsel
de oficio to allow him to present his evidence upon his arrest.

Due Proccess - accused must be given a change to be

heard. This is guaranteed by the constitution.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the writ of Habeas Corpus if the proper
remedy for Mosquito?
2. Whether or not damages may be awarded in a Habeas
Corpus case?
3. Whether or not private offended party may take part in the
case?
HELD:
1. The Habeas Corpus is not the proper remedy. When a
warrant of arrest is being assailed for improper preliminary
investigation, the remedy is a petition to quash the warrant of
arrest or petition for reinvestigation of the case. It is the
general rule that Habeas Corpus should not be resorted to
when there is another remedy available.
2. No. Damages cannot be awarded. The sole function of the
writ is to relieve from unlawful imprisonment and ordinarily it
cannot be properly used for another purpose.
3. While the issuance of the writ connotes the commencement
of a civil action, the proceeding for Habeas Corpus is
technically not yet a suit between private parties. The proper
party is the Chief of Police or the person having the accused in
detention and not the private offended party. It is also only the
fiscal who may appeal the order granting the writ as mandated
by Sec. 19, Rule 41 of the ROC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge was guilty of gross
ignorance of the law?
RULING:
YES
Section 14 (2), Article 3 of the Constitution provides, inter
alia, that trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure
to appear is unjustifiable. The requisites then of a valid trial in
absentia are: (1) the accused has already been arraigned; (2)
he has been duly notified of the trial; and (3) his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.
In the subject criminal cases, requisite numbers two (2) and
three (3) of a valid trial in absentia are clearly wanting. Parada
had not been duly notified of the trial because the notice of
hearing dated April 27, 1994 was sent to the former address of
Paradas counsel despite the fact that the latter formally
notified the court of his change of address. His failure to
appear therefore in the June 3, 6, 7 and 8, 1994 hearings is
justified by the absence of a valid service of notice of hearing

The warrant of arrest with no recommendation for bail

that was issued by respondent Judge on June 3, 1994 is a
downright violation of Paradas constitutional right to bail.
The rule is clear that unless charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of
guilt is strong, all persons detained, arrested or otherwise
under the custody of the law are entitled to bail as a
matter of right. It should be noted that the crime with
which Parada was charged is estafa which is undoubtedly
a bailable offense. This circumstance could not have
escaped the attention of the respondent judge when he
issued on June 3, 1994 the order of arrest of Parada with
no recommendation for his bail. In so doing, respondent
judge exhibited that degree of ignorance so gross which
the Court can not countenance. Judges are required by
Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct to be
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
They are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is
imperative that he be conversant with basic legal
principles.

SEC. OF NATIONAL DEFENSE vs MANALO

FACTS:
> Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that several
uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU
summoned
to
a
meeting
all
the
residents
of
their barangay. Respondents were not able to attend as they
were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of
the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.
> Several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants
and army boots, entered their house. They asked him if he
was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was
Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both
cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then
handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the
ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand
and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the
road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers
stopped her and told her to stay.
> He and his brother were sent to Camp Tecson.
> Before the hearing, respondents were brought to their
parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However,
their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were
brought back to Camp Tecson.
> When they freed from captivity, both of them executed an
affidavit affirming the contents of affidavit insofar as they
related to matters they witnessed together.
> Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of
respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino
specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the
Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of
human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was
involved.
> Petitioners dispute respondents account of their alleged
abduction and torture. And that the respondents were not at
any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held
incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the
military.
> Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he
assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware
of the Manalo brothers alleged abduction.
> Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General
to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU
auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative liability of said
auxiliaries, if any.
> The result: Based on the foregoing statements of
respondents in this particular case, the proof of linking them to
the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and

Reynaldo Manalo that their alleged involvement theretofore to

that incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict
them as charged in this investigation and they be exonerated
from the case.

torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond

Manalos familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such
as the DTU, as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt.
Col. Jimenez to be the Division Training Unit. firms up
respondents story that they were detained for some time in
said military facility.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in giving full credence to
the testimony of Manalo?
RULING:
YES. While constitutional rights can be protected
under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction
or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a
petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102, these remedies
may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However,
with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ
of amparo through summary proceedings and the availability
of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under
the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil
law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine
experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats
thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes
of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the
petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that
will require full and exhaustive proceedings.
When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007,
they moved to have their petition treated as an amparo petition
as it would be more effective and suitable to the
circumstances
of
the
Manalo
brothers
enforced
disappearance. The Court granted their motion.
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond
Manalos statements were not corroborated by other
independent and credible pieces of evidence. Raymonds
affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of
respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical
reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the
pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on
respondents, also corroborate respondents accounts of the

With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the

torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically
holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal
will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their
account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their
written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be
corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left
by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in
the places where they were detained. Where powerful military
officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface
and testify against them comes as no surprise.

ILAGAN vs ENRILE
FACTS:
Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City by
elements of the PC-INP and detained at Camp Catitipan on
the basis of a Mission Order allegedly issued by the Ministry of
National Defense. On that same day, fifteen lawyers from the
IBP Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan.
One of the visiting lawyers, Atty. Antonio Arellano, was also
arrested and detained on the basis of an unsigned Mission
Order. The military sent word to the IBP Davao Chapter that
Attorney Marcos Risonar would likewise be arrested. The
latter went to Camp Catitipan to verify his arrest papers and
was detained on the basis of a Mission Order signed by
General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander.
PETITIONERS: their arrests were illegal and violative of the
Constitution, since arrests cannot be made on the basis of
Mission Orders. and that there appears to be a military
campaign to harass lawyers involved in national security
cases.
The Court issued the Writ, required a Return, and set the
petition for hearing.
RESPONDENTS: contended that the detained attorneys
were arrested on the basis of a PDA issued by the President;
that the Writ of habeas corpus is suspended as to them by
virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A; and that pursuant to the
ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Ponce Enrile, et al, Courts lack the
authority to inquire into the cause and validity of detention of
persons held pursuant to the suspension. Respondents further
expounded on the state of rebellion in Davao City on the basis
of seized subversive documents, implying that the detained
attorneys played active roles in organizing mass actions of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National
Democratic Front. Respondents then prayed for the denial of
the petition.
Due to lack of evidence linking the detained attorneys with
the alleged subversive activities, the Court resolved to order
the temporary release of the detained attorneys on the
recognizance of the principal counsel of petitioner's, namely,
retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and retired
Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes. The Court further resolved to
give petitioners ten days within which to file a traverse to the
Return of the Writ and the respondents ten days to file a Reply
thereto.
The next day, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion
stating that the detained attorneys had not yet been released
and praying that they be released to the custody of the

principal counsel of petioners at the Supreme Court.

RESPONDENTS:
- filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's
Order of Release reiterating that the suspension of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus has the effect of ousting the Court of its
jurisdiction to hear the case, and attached thereto classified
documents consisting of the Report of respondent Brig. Gen.
Tan-Gatue stating that the detained attorneys "were arrested
not on the basis of their 'lawyering' but for specific acts of
rebellion and economic sabotage as well as for their
leadership in the CPP" ... "even to the extent of attending CPP
and NPA rites and using their profession as lawyers as coverup for their activities in furtherance of CPP goals and
objectives;" and that the detained attorneys were involved in
the Welgang Bayan in Davao City, a mass action "with
demands for the armed overthrow of the government." Sworn
statements of several persons also implicated the detained
attorneys in alleged subversive activities. Respondents added
that, while there is a Court Order directing release, they, too,
are under orders, pursuant to the PDA, to hold in custody the
detained attorneys until ordered released by the President or
by his duly authorized representative, and that the PDA, when
issued, constitutes authority to preventively detain them for a
period not exceeding one year.
- filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that an
Information for Rebellion was filed on May 27, 1985 against
the detained attorneys before the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City,; that a Warrant of Arrest had been issued against
them; and praying that this Petition be dismissed for having
been rendered moot and academic.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE FILING OF THE
INFORMATION AGAINST PETITIONERS BAR THE
APPLICATION OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS- YES
(WHAT A BULLSHIT CASE, KAYA PALA NIREREVISIT TO
IN LIGHT OF THE MORONG 43 CONTROVERSY)
RATIO:
The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is
to inquire into the legality of one's detention. Now that the
detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order
in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them
before the Regional Trial, the remedy of habeas corpus no
longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose.
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.-If
it appears the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a

court or judge or by virtue of a judgment, or order of a

court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction
to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment or order. Nor shall anything in this rule
be held to authorize to discharge of a person charged with
or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
(Rule 102)
If the detained attorneys question their detention because
of improper arrest, or that no preliminary investigation has
been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the
Warrant of Arrest, and /or the Information on grounds provided
by the Rules or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of
the case.
Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of
commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the
Information filed against the accused. So is it explicitly
provided for by Section. 14, Rule of 102 of the Rules of Court,
reading:
SEC. 14. When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted and
when let to bail.- If it appears that the prisoner was lawfully
committed, and is plainly and specifically charged in the
warrant of commitment with an offense punishable by death,
he shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully
imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having committed an
offense not so punishable, he may be recommitted to
imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the court
or judge.
That the writ may not be allowed only where the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by the court or judge, and
that there are only two recognized processes which
justify deprivation of liberty, viz., (1) commitment order
and (2) warrant of arrest. The contention is not only a
deliberate misreading of Section 4 of Rule 102 limiting its
application to the first part of the first sentence and
disregarding the rest, but is also an undue and
unwarranted restriction of the term process. A
commitment order and a warrant of arrest are but species
of judicial process.

ON ISSUE OF LACK OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

Pursuant to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, no
Information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having
been first conducted, except as provided for in Section 7 of
Rule 112. The Information filed by the City Fiscal before the
Regional Trial Court of the City of Davao fell within the
exception. Thus, the Verification reads:
VERIFICATION I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am filing this
Information in pursuance with Rule 112, Section 7 of the 1985
Rules on criminal Procedure, wherein after examining the
affidavits of the government witnesses and other documents
attached to the records, I found sufficient ground to hold
respondents for trial.
Section 7, Rule 112, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure above referred to provides:
SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for
an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the
complaint or information may be filed by the offended
party, peace officer or fiscal without preliminary
investigation having been first conducted on the basis of
the affidavit of the offended party or arrested officer or
person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or
information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this
Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the
assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a
lawyer, a responsible person of his choice.
Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as
provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation
must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, the accused
may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the
filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation
with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the
manner prescribed in this Rule.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the same Rules enumerates the
instances when an arrest without warrant is lawful.

Paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Rule refer to cases when a

suspect is caught in flagrante delicto or immediately thereafter,
while paragraph (c) refers to escaping prisoners. As to
whether the detained attorneys fall under either of the first two
instances enumerated is a question of fact, which will need the
presentation of evidence and is more properly within the
province of the trial Court.
The question of absence of a proper preliminary
investigation is also better inquired into by the Court below.
When so raised, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Claudio Teehankee, has held that the trial Court is called upon
"not to dismiss the information but hold the case in abeyance
and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a
reinvestigation.
As stressed in People vs. Casiano, this is the proper
procedure since the "absence of such investigation did not
impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render it
defective. Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance". The right to a preliminary investigation, being
waivable, does not argue against the validity of the
proceedings, the most that could have been done being to
remand the case in order that such investigation could be
conducted.
The Nolasco case, which petitioners invoke, wherein this
Court ordered the release of two of the accused, is not on all
fours with the case at bar as, in that case, the accused were
charged only with Illegal Possession of Subversive documents
under Presidential Decree No. 33, which is punishable by
prision correccional in its minimum period, and the trial Court
had granted bail; whereas in this case, petitioners are charged
with the capital offense of Rebellion, and the trial Court has
not allowed bail.
DISPOSITIVE: petition for Habeas Corpus is hereby
dismissed for having become moot and academic. Petitioners
are now detained by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City in relation to the criminal
case for Rebellion filed against them before said Court.

VELASCO vs CA
FACTS:
> Warrant of arrest was issued against accused Lawrence
Larkins in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92 for violations of B.P.
Blg. 22.
> Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a complaint-affidavit accusing
Larkins of the crime of rape allegedly committed against her.
> Special Investigators proceeded to the office of Larkins and
arrested the latter, who was thereupon positively identified by
Alinea as her rapist. Larkins was then detained.
> Larkins posted his bail in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92
and an order recalling and setting aside the warrant of arrest
issued and directing the Jail Warden to release Larkins from
confinement "unless otherwise detained for some other
cause."
> Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum refused to
release Larkins because he was still detained for another
cause, specifically for the crime of rape for which he would be
held for inquest.
> Larkins, through his counsel filed an Urgent Motion for
Bail wherein he alleged, inter alia, that the evidence of guilt
against him for rape is not strong.
> Trial court denied the aforesaid motions.
> Unable to accept the ruling, Larkins' common-law wife filed
before the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas
corpus with certiorari.
> Court of Appeals rendered that Larkins was detained without
a warrant of arrest for rape did not meet the legal
requirements.
> The petitioners insist that the respondent court erred in
granting the petition for habeas corpus because Larkins had
already been charged with the crime of rape and the trial court
had denied his application for bail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in granting the petition
for habeas corpus?
RULING:
YES.

Concededly, the private respondent has the personality to institute

on behalf of her common-law spouse, Lawrence Larkins,
the habeas corpus aspect of the petition, as she falls within the
purview of the term "some person" under Section 3, Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court, which means any person who has a legally
justified interest in the freedom of the person whose liberty is
restrained or who shows some authorization to make the
application. She is not, however, the real party in interest in
the certiorari aspect of the petition. Only Larkins could institute a
petition for certiorari to set aside the order denying his motions for
bail and for the dismissal of the complaint against him.
It does not, however, follow that if certiorari is available to Larkins,
an application for a writ of habeas corpus will absolutely be
barred. While ordinarily, the writ of habeas corpus will not be
granted when there is an adequate remedy by writ of error or
appeal or by writ of certiorari, it may, nevertheless, be available in
exceptional cases, for the writ should not be considered
subservient to procedural limitations which glorify form over
substance. It must be kept in mind that although the question
most
often
considered
in
both habeas
corpus and certiorari proceedings is whether an inferior court has
exceeded its jurisdiction, the former involves a collateral attack on
the judgment and "reaches the body but not the record," while the
latter assails directly the judgment and "reaches the record but
not the body."

The Court of Appeals granted the writ of habeas

corpus because it found that the warrantless arrest of Larkins
for the crime of rape "did not meet the legal requirements
provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court." It could have in
mind Section 5 thereof on lawful warrantless arrest.
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events
may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be
inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the
earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus,
for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by
reason of some supervening events, such as the instances
mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the
time of the filing of the application. Among such supervening
events is the issuance of a judicial process preventing the
discharge of the detained person.
Another is the filing of a complaint or information for the
offense for which the accused is detained, as in the instant
case. By then, the restraint of liberty is already by virtue of the
complaint or information and, therefore, the writ of habeas
corpus is no longer available. Section 4 of Rule 102 reads in
part as follows:

Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it

appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall
not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of
a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
While it may be true that on 6 December 1994, or four days
after the filing of the Urgent Motion for Bail, Larkins, thru a new
counsel, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Dismissal of the
Complaint and for Immediate Release based on the alleged
illegality of his warrantless arrest, the said motion was a mere
afterthought which came too late in the day. By then, the trial
court had firmly acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Moreover, the trial court's order of 5 January 1995 denying the
urgent motion for bail was an unequivocal assertion of its
authority to keep in custody the person of Larkins. This order
comes under the purview of the word order under the first
sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102 reading: "If it appears that
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer . . . by virtue of [an] order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to . . . make
the order, the writ shall not be allowed. . . ."
We thus rule that the order of 5 January 1995 of the trial court
also qualifies as a process within the meaning of Section 4 of
Rule 102.
Hence, even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested, still
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will not prosper
because his detention has become legal by virtue of the filing
before the trial court of the complaint against him and by the
issuance of the 5 January 1995 order.
Even as we thus decide in favor of the petitioners, we are,
nevertheless, disturbed by certain incidents relative to the
warrantless arrest of Larkins. Firstly, assuming that it was
lawful, the facts before us disclose that the arresting officers
failed to strictly comply with (1) the last paragraph of Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court requiring that the person
lawfully arrested without a warrant shall forthwith be delivered
to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded

against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112; and (2) Article

125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, providing that
he be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within thirtysix hours, the crime with which Larkins was charged being
punishable by an afflictive penalty. Although the arrest was
made in Makati where there is a police station and a municipal
(now city) jail, Larkins was brought to the NBI Detention Cell at
Taft Avenue, Manila, and though the complaint of the offended
party was executed on 23 November 1994, it was not until 2
December 1994 that the said complaint was actually filed in
court.
Unless satisfactorily explained, the non-compliance by the
arresting officers with the said provisions merits nothing but
disapproval from the Court. In the performance of their duty
and in their commendable pursuit to stamp out crimes and
bring criminals to the bar of justice, law enforcement
authorities should make no shortcuts, but must comply with all
procedures to safeguard the constitutional and statutory rights
of accused persons. The rule of law must always be upheld.

MONCUPA vs ENRILE
FACTS:
> Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was
arrested and was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay
where he was detained. On the allegation that he was a
National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and eight
(8) other persons.
> After two separate investigations, it was ascertained that the
petitioner was not a member of any subversive organization.
Both investigators recommended the prosecution of the
petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal
possession of subversive documents under Presidential
Decree No. 33.
> Consequently, two separate informations were filed against
the petitioner, one, for illegal possession of firearms and the
other for violation of P.D. 33.
> The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the
validity of petitioner's detention on the ground that the privilege
of the writ had been suspended as to the petitioner. The
petitioner was temporarily released from detention on orders
of the Minister temporary of National Defense with the
approval of the President. The respondents stated. "Since the
petitioner is free and no longer under the custody of the
respondents, the present petition for habeas corpus may be
deemed moot and academic as in similar cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the instant petition has become moot
and academic in view of the petitioner's temporary release?
RULING:
NO. The petitioner stresses that his temporary
release did not render the instant petitioner moot and
academic but that "it merely shifted the inquiry from the
legality of his actual detention to the legality of the conditions
imposed by the respondents."
The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions
attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitute
restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit

the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical

restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas
corpus.
In the light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas
corpus has not become moot and academic. Other precedents
for such a conclusion are not wanting.
[Toyoto, et al v. Hon. Fidel Ramos] Ordinarily, a petition for
habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the
restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either
temporarily or permanently. We have so held in a number of
cases. But the instant case presents a different situation. The
question to be resolved is whether the State can reserve the
power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of
competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An
affirmative answer is the one suggested by the respondents
because the release of the petitioners being merely
'temporary' it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime
despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. We
hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the government of
laws and not of men principle. Under this principle the moment
a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be
detained or re-arrested for the same offense. This concept is
so basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration.
In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one
which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person
continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due
process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but
appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of
freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent
developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or
those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the
privilege of the writ.
The respondents have failed to show why the writ may not
issue and why the restraints on the petitioner's freedom of
movement should not be lifted.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The conditions
attached to the temporary release of the petitioner are
declared null and void. The temporary release of the petitioner
is declared ABSOLUTE.

NAVIA vs PARDICO
FACTS:
> Vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived
at the house of Lolita M. Lapore. When Lolita went out to investigate,
she saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One
of them immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son
Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him
that he and Ben should go with them to the security office
of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for
theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision.
> In the course of the investigation on Bens disappearance, it
dawned upon Lolita that petitioners took advantage of her poor
eyesight and naivete. They made her sign the logbook as a witness
that they already released Ben when in truth and in fact she never
witnessed his actual release. The last time she saw Ben was when
she left him in petitioners custody at the security office.
> Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her
husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC
of Malolos City. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance,
the amparo court issued an Order dated June 26, 2008 directing,
among others, the issuance of a writ of amparo and the production
of the body of Ben before it on June 30, 2008.
> A Writ of Amparo was accordingly issued and served on the
petitioners.
> Court hereby grants the privilege of the writ of amparo, and deems
it proper and appropriate.
> Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by
the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trail court erred in ruling that respondent
is entitled to the privilege of writ of amparo?
RULING:
YES. Virginias Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally
defective and must perforce be dismissed, but not for the
reasons adverted to by the petitioners.
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was
promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to

provide an expeditious and effective relief to any person

whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
Here, Bens right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as
the parties do not dispute his identity as the same person
summoned and questioned at petitioners security office on the
night of March 31, 2008. Such uncontroverted fact ipso
facto established Bens inherent and constitutionally enshrined
right to life, liberty and security. Article 6 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes every
human beings inherent right to life, while Article 9 thereof
ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The
right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty
and security cannot be impaired except on grounds provided
by and in accordance with law. This overarching command
against deprivation of life, liberty and security without due
process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.
The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Bens
disappearance as alleged in Virginias petition and proved
during the summary proceedings conducted before the court a
quo, falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and relevant
laws.
It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and
disappearances or threats thereof.

(d)
that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject
person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ
of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons
subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be
shown and proved by substantial evidence that the
disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same
or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing
persons, with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply
put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of
proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of
government participation.
In the present case, we do not doubt Bongs testimony that
Navia had a menacing attitude towards Ben and that he
slapped and inflicted fistic blows upon him. Given the
circumstances and the pugnacious character of Navia at that
time, his threatening statement, Wala kang nakita at wala
kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben, cannot be taken lightly. It
unambiguously showed his predisposition at that time. In
addition, there is nothing on record which would support
petitioners assertion that they released Ben on the night of
March 31, 2008 unscathed from their wrath. Lolita sufficiently
explained how she was prodded into affixing her signatures in
the logbook without reading the entries therein. And so far, the
information petitioners volunteered are sketchy at best, like the
alleged complaint of Mrs. Emphasis who was never identified
or presented in court and whose complaint was never reduced
in writing.

enforced

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance,

thus, we can derive the following elements that constitute
it:
(a)
that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any
form of deprivation of liberty;
(b)
that it be carried out by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;
(c)
that it be followed by the State or political
organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information on
the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of
the amparo petition; and,

But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of

disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to
establish that such disappearance was carried out with the
direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the
government. This indispensable element of State participation
is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any
allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence
presented tend to show that the government or any of its
agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its
agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated
in Virginias amparo petition whether as responsible or
accountable persons. Thus, in the absence of an allegation or
proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Bens
disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary
diligence
in
investigating
his
case,
the
Court

will definitely not hold the government or its agents either asre
sponsible or accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a
writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But
even if the person sought to be held accountable or
responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or
entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance
remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere
security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy.
Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a
private entity. They do not work for the government and
nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to
some covert police, military or governmental operation. As
discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be
attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of
State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance
case from an ordinary case of a missing person.

PEOPLE vs ALOJADO
FACTS:
In two separate Complaints, JULETTE Pearanda and
GERRA Rustia, both assisted by their mothers, charged
appellant Edgar ALOJADO with statutory rape. Both
Complaints were later amended to include the allegation that
the accused used a deadly weapon in committing the offense.
After preliminary investigation, said Complaints were
subsequently treated as Informations. ALOJADO pleaded not
guilty on arraignment and the two cases were jointly tried.
The FACTS as presented by the prosecution are as follows:
That, on Oct 1994, complainants JULETTE and GERRA (both
Grade III pupils of Amsic Elem School) during recess, went to
the house of JULETTE to get a dress.
On their way back to school, they met ALOJADO who
talked to them, showed them a picture of a woman and asked
them if they knew the woman in the picture.
They told ALOJADO that they did not know said woman but
ALOJADO prevailed over them to help him look for her as they
were all on their way back to the direction of the school.
The two girls acquiesced and accompanied ALOJADO who
was then riding a green bicycle. The three of them rode
towards Amsic Elem School.
Upon reaching a grassy/bushy area along the way,
ALOJADO stopped and brandished a knife at the girls.
Scared, the girls scampered but ALOJADO prevented them
from escaping. He tied their hands and feet and taped their
mouths. Thereafter, ALOJADO made both girls suck his sex
organ and proceeded to rape them one after the other.
After sating his lust, he told the two victims to stay as he
would just rest. ALOJADO then left.
Fortunately, the girls managed to untie their hands and feet
at that point and were able to walk toward the nearest house
to ask for help. The owner of the house saw them from her
gate as they were approaching wearing barely any clothes and
bleeding. She and her neighbors immediately brought the girls
to the hospital.

At the hospital, the physician who attended to the victims

found blood clots and lacerations on the genital area of both
girls, which, as he noted in their medical records, could have
been caused by an erect penis.
ALOJADO was later accosted and subsequently brought to
the hospital where he was positively identified by JULETTE as
the person who raped them.
For the DEFENSE, ALOJADO interposed an alibi where he
claimed to be somewhere else at the time of the commission
of the crime. He said he was at his youngest sons Day Car
Center. The DEFENSE also presented a witness who testified
that, being near the site of the crime at that time, she allegedly
saw a man emerge from the bushes with bloody arms and
legs but it was not ALOJADO.
Ultimately, RTC Angeles City was swayed by the
prosecutions case and rendered herein assailed judgment
convicting ALOJADO of two counts of rape and sentencing
him to two terms of reclusion perpetua; hence, this appeal
raising the following.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the prosecution presented sufficient
evidence to sustain the conviction of rape beyond reasonable
doubt?
2. Whether or not his arrest was invalid such that the RTC
never acquired jurisdiction over his person?
RULING:
Appeal is devoid of merit. Of course the prosecution
has adduced sufficient evidence to maintain the conviction for
rape beyond reasonable doubt, which, among others includes
the positive identification of the appellant by the victims as
their rapist and their respective testimonies therefor. As to the
illegality of his arrest, the same has been belatedly raised. The
assailed decision is AFFIRMED.
1. YES. This, however, is not a relevant issue for our
purposes. I wont provide a detailed exposition of the ruling
anymore. Suffice it say that the testimonies of the victims
positively pointed to ALOJADO as their assailant and being of
tender age, they could not have concocted the crime of rape

committed against their persons. Their testimonies, as

observed by the RTC, were straightforward and honest.
ALOJADOs alibi cannot defeat the positive identification made
by the victims of him being their assailant, there being no
showing that the girls were prompted by improper motives to
impute the crime to him. It was also not physically impossible
for ALOJADO to be at the site of the crime considering his
alibi. He also did not present any witness to bolster such
claim. In the same vein, the defenses witnesss testimony
cannot also be given weight to tilt the balance in ALOJADOs
favor. For starters, she did not actually witness the rape. Her
testimony is also dented by some inconsistencies as contrary
to human experience. Finally, her testimony cannot likewise
defeat the positive identification by the victims of ALOJADO as
the assailant.
2. NO. Anent the validity of his arrest, ALOJADO maintains
that he was illegally arrested. This argument, however, comes
too late in the day, because appellant failed to allege it prior
to his arraignment. The Court has previously emphasized
that an objection to the legality of an arrest must be
submitted to the trial court before the accused enters his
plea. ALOJADO is estopped from questioning the legality of
his arrest.
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made
before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived. Any defect concerning his arrest was cured by
his voluntary, submission to the jurisdiction of the trial
court when he entered his plea during his arraignment,
and when he actively participated in the trial thereafter
Finally, ALOJADO avers that the police did not have reason to
arrest him because he did not match the description provided
by the victims in their affidavits. This is of no moment because
when he was presented to the victims, they positively
identified him as their assailant. The description in
questioned is couched on highly subjective terms. Hence, it
matters not that he fit said description. The material fact is that
the victims were able to recognize him as their assailant upon
presentation. This positive identification was repeated on trial.

PEOPLE vs RONDERO
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Dagupan
RTC finding herein appellant Delfin RONDERO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua .
On the evening of March 25, 1994, the 9yo daughter of
MAXIMO Doria named MYLENE went missing.
MAXIMO sought the help of their neighbors to search for
her. He also asked the Barangay Captain for assistance in the
search. The search team looked everywhere but the it yielded
nothing for hours.
Tired and distraught, MAXIMO started his way back home
when, at about 5 meters away from his house, he saw herein
accused-appellant Delfin RONDERO pumping the artesian
well. He had an ice-pick clenched in his mouth and was
washing his bloodied hands.
His suspicion aroused, MAXIMO hastily returned to the
local elementary school where the search team was then
conducting the search and told persons thereat what he saw.
Then, the team proceeded with the search and after some
time, they found MYLENEs lifeless body near the canteen.
Her right hand was raised above her head, which was
severely bashed, and her fractured left hand was behind her
back. She was naked from the waist down and had several
contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body.
Tightly gripped in her right hand were some hair strands.
30mins later, policemen arrived at the scene and conducted
a spot investigation. Thereafter, MAXIMO led the policemen to
the artesian well where he had seen RONDERO earlier
washing his hands. The policemen found that the artesian well
was spattered with blood.
After investigation, the policemen, acting on the lead as
guided by MAXIMO, arrested RONDERO. Thereafter,
appellant was formally charged with the special complex crime
of rape with homicide and he pleaded not guilty at his
arraignment.
Meanwhile, the hair strands which were found on the
victims hand, together with hair specimens taken from the
victim and RONDERO, were sent to the NBI for laboratory

examination.
The NBI chemist, however, found it difficult to conduct the
tests because the sample provided to her were not viable for
comparison with the strands found clutched in MYLENEs
hand - hair from both MYLENE and RONDERO must be
pulled, not cut.
Thereupon, appellant RONDERO, who executed a waiver
of detention including a waiver of his custodial rights (under
Sec 12, Article III, Const.), was allegedly convinced by a police
superior to give sample hair strands.
Another police officer went to the Dorias residence to get
hair samples from MYLENE, who had not yet been interred
With viable samples now at hand, the NBI conducted the
necessary tests and it found that the hair strands found on the
right hand of the victim had similar characteristics to those of
RONDEROs.
On trial, RONDERO did not testify. He instead presented
his wife and father as witnesses to account for his
whereabouts on the night of the crime.
As earlier stated, the RTC ultimately found against
RONDERO. Initially, however, it ruled to convict RONDERO of
murder and sentenced him to death by electrocution. But upon
reconsideration, it entered herein assailed decision convicting
him of the crime charged (homicide) and sentencing him
accordingly.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt?

1. NO, the RTC correctly found him guilty beyond reasonable

doubt. This issue is, again, not too relevant for our purposes.
Suffice it to say that the pieces of circumstantial evidence
adduced by the prosecution were more than enough to form a
moral certainty in the mind of the judge of appellants guilt.
Several circumstances which the prosecution proffered as
evidence, when pieced together, all point to RONDEROs guilt
(e.g. MAXIMOs testimony of him washing his bloodied clothes
and hands, the hair clutched in the hand of MYLENE, etc.)
2. YES. Anent the second issue, RONDERO first questions
the admissibility of some pieces of evidence, which according
to him were taken without his permission and hence an affront
to his right against self-incrimination. This refers to the hair
samples taken from him this allegation must FAIL.
True, custodial rights under Sec 12 and the right against
self-incrimination under Sec 17, all of Art III of the Constitution,
are rights that must be upheld in favor of an accused, at all
times. But, it must similarly be stressed that what is actually
proscribed by said provisions of the Bill of Rights is the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from an accused and not the inclusion of
his body in evidence when it may be material.
Consequently, although RONDERO here insists that hair
samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the
NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be
admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the
use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative
in nature acquired from the accused under duress
Finally, RONDERO questions the validity of his arrest. And
indeed, it might be true that RONDEROs warrantless
arrest was not lawful

RULING:

The police officers who arrested him had no personal

knowledge of facts indicating that he was the perpetrator of
the crime just committed. His warrantless arrest was not
based on a personal knowledge of the police officers
indicating facts that he has committed the gruesome crime but
solely on MAXIMOs suspicion

The appeal has no merit. However, the decision of the

Dagupan RTC is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Delfin
Rondero is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the charge of special complex crime of rape with homicide and
is accordingly sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH.

NEVERTHELESS, it is hornbook knowledge that any

irregularity attending the arrest of an accused is deemed
WAIVED when, instead of quashing the information for
lack of jurisdiction over his person, the accused
voluntarily submits himself to the court by entering a plea
during the arraignment and actively participating in the

2. Whether or not the verdict can be sustained violations of his

constitutional rights and illegally of his arrest and detention?

proceedings.

BAGCAL vs VILLARAZA
FACTS:
This case stemmed from a petition for the issuance of a
Writ of Habeas Corpus by herein petitioner Jose BAGCAL,
who alleged that he was illegally arrested and detained.
The Court issued said Writ returnable to the Executive
Judge of the CFI Cagayan de Oro (Judge Rosete) for proper
hearing on the petition for release.
The FACTS are as follows: BAGCAL was arrested on Feb
28, 1982, by the Philippine Constabulary. The arrest was
without warrant. He has been detained at Camp Alagar,
Cagayan de Oro City, since his arrest to the present.
On Aug 6, the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro filed an
information for murder against petitioner Bagcal with the
MTC of Cagayan de Oro presided by herein respondent Judge
Rolando VILLARAZA.
Said information was accompanied by the several
affidavits from different persons. However, said affidavits were
not subscribed before Judge VILLARAZA who did not ask the
affiants to ratify their oaths nor did he ask them searching
questions.
Also, the information submitted before the MTC has no
certification by the City Fiscal that he had conducted a
preliminary investigation.
Indeed, if preliminary investigation was duly conducted, the
information should have been filed in the CFI (not MTC) which
had jurisdiction to try the case on its merits.
From the forgoing, it is quite obvious that the
information was filed with Judge VILLARAZA so that he
would conduct the preliminary examination and thereafter
issue a warrant of arrest.
Ultimately, Judge VILLARAZA issued a warrant for the
arrest of petitioner BAGCAL.
As a result of the issuance of said warrant of arrest, taken
together with BAGCALs actuations in response thereto,
Executive Judge Rosete (tasked to hear BAGCALs petition for
release pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus previously

issued) was constrained to rule that BAGCAL should remain in

custody pending hearing and resolution for bail.
BAGCAL now questions the legality of such warrant under
the attendant circumstances, raising the same as the sole
issue of this petition.
ISSUE:

BROWN vs ILLINOIS
FACTS:
Police officers broke into Browns apartment, searched it,
and arrested Brown without a warrant or probable cause in
connection with a murder investigation. He was acquaintances
with the victim.

Whether or not the issuance of warrant of arrest cured

the illegality of his previous warrantless arrest meriting his
immediate release from detention?

He gave to statements after he was informed of his Miranda

rights. He was then formally charged with the murder

RULING:

He now tries to suppress the statements as evidence,

which was used in his trial and resulted in his conviction.

NO. At the outset, it must be stressed that herein

respondent Judge VILLARAZA should not have issued the
subject warrant of arrest to begin with. Judge Rosete and
BAGCAL are in agreement, and now, the Court as well, on this
point. As provided in the records, it was never refuted that
Judge VILLARAZA did not personally examine the witnesses
of the prosecution before issuing the questioned warrant of
arrest. This is a glaring mark of the irregularity in Judge
VILLARAZAs actuations. But does this mean that, under
the attendant circumstances, BAGCAL should be
released? NO. The above discussion notwithstanding, the
denial of BAGCALs petition for release is hereby UPHELD. As
provided in Judge Rosetes decision in the petition for release
(pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus issued), although the
warrant of arrest was irregularly issued, any infirmity attached
to it was cured when petitioner submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by applying for bail, submitting a
memorandum in support thereof, and filing a motion for
reconsideration when his application was denied.

Did the fact that he was informed of his Mirada rights

break the causal chain of his illegal arrest and
subsequent confession making it admissible as
evidence??? NO
In Wong Sun, the Court pronounced the principles to be
applied where the issue is whether statements and other
evidence obtained after an illegal arrest or search should be
excluded. Fruit of the Poison Tree

DISPOSITIVE:

The exclusionary rule, however, when utilized to effectuate

the Fourth Amendment, serves interests and policies that are
distinct from those it serves under the Fifth. It is directed at all
unlawful searches and seizures, and not merely those that
happen to produce incriminating material or testimony as
fruits. In short, exclusion of a confession made without
Miranda warnings might be regarded as necessary to
effectuate the Fifth Amendment, but it would not be sufficient
fully to protect the Fourth. Miranda warnings, and the
exclusion of a confession made without them, do not alone
sufficiently deter a Fourth Amendment violation.

Judge Rosetes decision is affirmed with modification that the

hearing for bail be heard by him, the Executive Judge of CDO
RTC and not by Judge VILLARAZA of the CDO MTC. If
evidence of guilt is strong, the petition for bail should be
denied, otherwise, the same must be granted.

In order for the causal chain between the illegal arrest and
the statements made subsequent thereto to be broken, Wong
Sun requires not merely that the statement meet the Fifth
Amendment standard of voluntariness, but that it be
"sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.
Brown's first statement was separated from his illegal arrest
by less than two hours, and there was no intervening event of
significance whatsoever. In its essentials, his situation is
remarkably like that of James Wah Toy in Wong Sun. [We
could hold Brown's first statement admissible only if we

overrule Wong Sun. We decline to do so. And the second

statement was clearly the result and the fruit of the first.
The illegality here, moreover, had a quality of
purposefulness. The impropriety of the arrest was obvious;
awareness of that fact was virtually conceded by the two
detectives when they repeatedly acknowledged, in their
testimony, that the purpose of their action was "for
investigation" or for "questioning." The arrest, both in design
and in execution, was investigatory. The detectives embarked
upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that something
might turn up. The manner in which Brown's arrest was
effected gives the appearance of having been calculated to
cause surprise, fright, and confusion.
We emphasize that our holding is a limited one. We decide
only that the Illinois courts were in error in assuming that the
Miranda warnings, by themselves, under Wong Sun always
purge the taint of an illegal arrest.

committed a public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and

such inferior courts as may be established by law". (Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution.)
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised
Penal Code can not be construed to include the fiscal of the
City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a
warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement
of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person
arrested without warrant.

SAYO vs CHIEF OF POLICE

FACTS:
> Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the
petitioners with having committed the crime of robbery,
Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman, arrested the petitioners and
presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office.
When the petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court was
heard, the petitioners were still detained or under arrest, and
the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an
information with the proper courts justice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are being illegally restrained of
their liberty, is the following: Is the city fiscal of manila
a judicial authority within the meaning of the provisions of
article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
RULING:
NO. Taking into consideration the history of the
provisions of the above quoted article, the precept of our
Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions
of Rules of Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus, we are
of the opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in
said article, mean the courts of justices or judges of said
courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary
detention or confinement of a person charged with having

The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper

preliminary investigation in case of temporary absence of both
the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace
from the municipality, town or place, are the municipal mayors
who are empowered in such case to issue a warrant of arrest
of the caused.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in
article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, would be to authorize
the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period
longer than that permitted by law without any process issued
by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may not,
after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an
information or prosecuting the person arrested and release
him, after the latter had been illegally detained for days or
weeks without any process issued by a court or judge.
In view of all the foregoing, without making any
pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers who
intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for the policeman
Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the absence of a
clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied
with the mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners
within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter
might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were being
actually detained when the said policeman filed a complaint
against them with the city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners
are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is
hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a
process issued by a competent court of justice.