POLK AND THE

OREGON

COMPROMISE

OF I846

was for the most part brilHOUGH his administration

liantlysuccessful in the attainmentof its objects, Polk

has not been kindlydealt withby historians. The great
event of his administration,the war with Mexico, is commonly
regarded as a wanton and unjustifiablespoliation of a weak
neighbor. The sinister shadow of sectional strifedarkens the
whole period, and the Whig and Abolitionistview of the president has passed into history. " Polk the Mendacious " is a
Machiavelli of unheroicproportions,by fortuitouscircumstances
the protagonist of the forces of slavery. Historians have
adopted the methods of the bar ratherthan of the bench and
have condemned him unheard. The recent publication of his
diary throwsnew lighton many of the questions of his administration. The president's purpose in keeping this journal was
to retain freshin memorythe events of the administrationas
they occurred day by day. There is no evidence that it was
intendedfor publication. It is, therefore,a record not only of
great importance but of far more value and trustworthiness
than the accounts which public men have writtenfor the perusal of others. It is difficult
to see why, in a documentof this
kind, the writer should seek to falsifyor distort the facts. A
transcriptof the diarywas prepared for the use of George Bancroft, Polk's secretary of the navy, and is included in the
voluminous Bancroft Collection of Manuscripts,but historians
have made littleuse of it. The purpose of this paper is to
reviewthe question of the Oregon boundary,which was finally
settled duringthe period covered by thisdiary,especially in the
light of the informationcontained in that document.
For more than a quarter of a centurybefore the election of
Polk the respective claims of the United States and of Great
Britain to territorywest of the Rocky Mountains had formed
a subject for diplomatic negotiationbetween the two governments. Whatever may have been the theoretical claims of
either, negotiation had proceeded upon the basis of division
443

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and compromise. The atttitudeof each governmenthad been

in the main consistent. The United States had proposed to
extend from the crest of the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific
Ocean the line of the forty-ninth
parallel, already its northern
boundary as far west as the mountains. Great Britain had
offeredas the boundarythe same line fromthe mountainsto its
intersectionwith the Columbia River, thence the mid-channel
of that river to the ocean. Neither governmentbeing disposed to make furtherconcessions, the device of a joint occupation of the disputed territorywas adopted in I8I8, and was
continuedby a conventionin I827, to last until terminatedby
either governmenton a twelve months'notice.
In the early forties the settlementof the Oregon boundary
became a vital question. The decisive factor in making a
definiteboundary line a necessity was the immigrationof
American citizens into the territory. Under such circumstances joint occupation could not last long withoutproducing
serious friction. In the Webster-AshburtonTreaty of I842
the question of the Oregon boundarywas not included,because
it was feared that this might endanger the settlementof the
northeasternboundary., Lord Ashburton, however, had received detailed instructionsfrom his governmentconcerning
Oregon, and Lord Aberdeen, the British foreign minister,was
anxious to effect a speedy settlement of the northwestern
boundary. Accordingly, in February, I844, Pakenham, the
Britishministerto the United States, introduced the subject to
Upshur, Tyler's secretary of state. The tragic death of the
latter,however,occurred before negotiationscould be begun,
and the duty of treatingwith Pakenham devolved upon Calhoun, Upshur's successor in the State Department. The Calhoun-Pakenhamnegotiationsproduced a repetitionof the offers
which both governmentshad made before on several occasions,
Calhoun proposing the forty-ninth
parallel fromthe Rockies to
the Pacific,Pakenham offeringthe same parallel to its intersection with the Columbia and thence the course of the river
to its mouth. During the negotiationsCalhoun took occasion
to advance the argumentof " manifestdestiny,"in these words:
1 FirstSession,29thCongress,Globe,Appendix,p. 23.

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COMPROMISE

Therecan be no doubt now that the operationof the same causes

whichimpelledourpopulationwestward
fromtheshoresoftheAtlantic
across theAlleghanyto thevalleyof the Mississippiwill impel them
onwardwithaccumulating
forceacross the RockyMountainsintothe
valleyof the Columbia,and that the whole regiondrainedby it is
destinedto be peopledbyus.'
The negotiationsending in a deadlock, the Britishministerproposed, in January, I 845, that the question be submitted to
arbitration.2 This offerwas rejected by the secretaryof state,
for the reason, among others,that the presidentstill hoped that
the question would be settledby direct negotiation.
President Tyler's annual message of December, I843, had
advanced the theoreticalclaim of the United States to the entire
Oregon territory,
stretchingnorthof 420, the northernboundary
of the Mexican province of California,to 540 40', the southern
limit of Russia's claims. It referredto the failureof preceding negotiations based upon the principle of compromise.
" While nothingwill be done," wroteTyler, " to compromitthe
rightsor honor of the United States, every proper expedient
will be resortedto in order to bring the negotiationsnow in the
progress of resumptionto a speedy and happy termination."
By I844, therefore,the Oregon question had become one of
first-classimportance,demandingan immediatesettlement. It
was on its own merits well worth the consideration of the
national nominatingconventionswhich met that year. While
the whole nationwas not convinced that " our titleto the whole
of the territoryof Oregon is clear and unquestionable; that no
portion of the same ought to be ceded to England, ..

.."

as was

affirmedin the Democratic platform,the claim of the United

States to the whole was by no means novel. The theorythat
the Oregon plank was insertedin the platformand coupled with
the demand for the " reannexation" of Texas merelyto make
the acquisition of slave territorymore palatable to the northern
wing of the Democracy, by creating a makeweight,as it were,
of free territory,
leaves out of consideration the intrinsicim1 FirstSession,29thCongress,Globe,Appendix,p. 26.

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[bid. p.

29.

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portance of Oregon., Had the annexation of Texas not been

in contemplation,therewould still have been an Oregon question to be settled by Great Britainand the United States at no
distantday.
During the early months of his term as president,Oregon
occupied the thoughts of Polk more than all other subjects.2
to understand,if we succeed in freeingourNor is this difficult
selves from the notion that during this period there were no
very importantquestions in the historyof the United States
save those connectedwithslavery. It is not strangethatOregon,
threateningas it did war with England, loomed even larger on
Polk's politicalhorizonthanTexas, threateningwar withMexico.
The president'sinauguralstated that our titleto Oregon was
"clear and unquestionable." That he may have been sincerely
of thisopinion does not seem to be regarded by most historians
as possible. It was " a diatribe for political effect,"" stage
thunder,"" bluff." Controlled,as it is assumed that he was,
by the interestsof the " slavocracy," Polk, it is argued, could
have taken no real interestin the bleak Northwest,where,by no
stretchof the imagination,could cotton be introduced. Calhoun, who regarded himselfas the particularsponsor of compromise on the forty-ninthparallel, considered the statements
of the inaugural "unfortunate" and a " profound blunder."
Indeed, he had tried,though in vain, to influencethe president
against the too bold course which he took. The true policy
of the United States, according to Calhoun, was " to be quiet, to
do nothingto excite attentionand leave time to operate." 3
In order to understand how Polk, elected on a platform
which asserted the right of the United States to all Oregon,
came to make an offerof compromise to the British government,it mustbe rememberedthat at the time of his inaugura1 " Afterthe electiontherewas no enthusiasm
on the Oregon question; an agreeupon the line of
of Democraticdissatisfaction,
mentwas made, withouta murmur
p. 228. This is a sample of much
490 . Stanwood,Historyof the Presidency,
thathas foundits wayintohistorieson thissubject; it is also an exampleof thecompletesacrificeof factsto theories.

2Diary, vol. i, p. 4.
'Letters of Calhoun, Annual Report of the AmericanHistoricalAssociation,
I899, vol. ii, pp. 653, 656, 66o.

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447

tion the negotiationwhich had been carried on by Pakenham

and Calhoun was regarded as still pending., An abrupt termination of this negotiationwould be likely to precipitatewar.
The election,moreover,had been close, and the Whigs, as well
as many Democrats, were opposed to the extreme American
claim. Polk must have known that the nation would not support his administrationin a war waged for " fifty-four
forty,"
untilevery efforthad been made to secure a satisfactorysettlementof the question withoutwar. At any rate, the president
decided to await the result of furthernegotiation. A compromise on the forty-ninth.
parallel, he believed, would not
materiallyinjure the interestsof the United States, since the
best part of the Oregon territorylay south of that line. The
part lyingnorthof 490 was believed to be unfitfor agriculture
and of value only for the furtrade.2 There was surelyabundant precedentfor an offerof compromiseon this line. If the
United States again offeredand Great Britain again rejected
the forty-ninth
parallel, and war resulted,the formerwould be
in the rightand could then insiston its claims up to 540 40'.3
The renewal of negotiations in July, 1845, is sometimes regarded as evidence that Polk never had any intentionof carrying out the Oregon plank in his platform,and that in realityhe
was always in favor of compromiseon the forty-ninth
parallel.
We have, however, officialtestimonyto the contrary. In a
letterwrittento the United States ministerat London on the
day on which the president's offerwas made, Buchanan, then
secretaryof state, said that,were the question a new one, the
presidentwould not have presented such a proposition4; and
on anotheroccasion he wrote that nothingbut deferenceto the
I Accordingto Benton,Polk's inauguralhad the effect
of arousingpublic sentiwas in a dilemma. To insiston 540 40,
mentin England,and the administration
meantwar,to recede fromit was to abandon the platform. Benton,who represents
himnself
as the real heroof the Oregon negotiationswhich resultedin the treatyof
of state,consulted
1846, tellsus thatearlyin April I845, Buchanan,Polk's secretary
on the forty-ninth
him,and thathe said he was in favorof compromise
paralleland
wouldsupportsuch a propositionif made by the administration.See ThirtyYears'
View,vol. ii, p. 66I.

'Works of Buchanan(ed. by J. B. Moore), vol. vi, p.

'Ibid. p. I9I.

I91.

4lbid. p. 193.

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repeated actions of his predecessors and the desire to preserve

friendlyrelationswith Great Britain had induced the president
" to depart from his well-knownopinions." Since Polk's offer

withof JUlyI2, I845, thoughproposing490 as a compromise,

held a concession upon whichthe Britishgovernmentlaid great

stress and which earlier administrationshad been willing to
make, namely,the free navigationof the Columbia, and since
the settlementofferedwas thereforedecidedly less favorableto
Great Britain than otherswhich that countryhad rejected,it
seems questionable whether the president entertainedthe expectation that it would be accepted. Buchanan wrote:

willbe relievedfromtheembarrassShouldit be rejected,thePresident

mentin whichhe has been involvedby the acts, offersand declaraifthedifficulty
can onlybe retionsof his predecessors.Afterwards,
solvedby thesword,we maythenappeal withconfidenceto theworld
fortheequityand justiceofourcause.'
This letterof Buchanan was official; the sentimentsexpressed
were those of the president. The offerof July 12 was rejected
by Pakenham on the 29th, and the hope was expressed by the
Britishministerthat some furtherproposal would be made by
the United States," more consistentwithfairnessand equity and
with the reasonable expectationsof the Britishgovernment."
If the traditionalview, that Polk was really in favor of the
parallel, be correct, he must have received Pakenforty-ninth
ham's reply to his offerwith regret. Such, however,was not
the case. The president was not sorry. Since his offerhad
been rejected,he said, he would no longer be willing to compromise on the same terms.
2

further
remarked
. . . thatthoughhehad givenhisassent
The President
to compromise
at 49', he mustsayhe did notregret
to theproposition
thatit had been rejectedby theBritishMinister. We had shownby
it ouranxiousdesireto do fulljusticeto Great Britainand to preserve
peace, butit havingbeen rejectedhe feltno longerbound by it, and
i Worksof Buchanan,vol. vi, pp. 193, 194.
2 For the offerof JulyI2, see Works of Buchanan,vol. vi, pp. 194 et seQ. For
Pakenham'srejection,see ibid. pp. 212 CeSe9.

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POLK ANiD THE OREGON

COMPROMISE

449

would not be now willingto compromiseon that boundary. Mr.

viewswerecarriedout,
thatifthePresident's
Buchananthenintimated
we wouldhavewar. To whichthe Presidentreplied,if we do have
war, it will not be our fault. Mr. Buchanan . . . expressedthe opinion

thatthepeopleof theUnitedStateswouldnotbe willingto sustaina

differed
withMr.
warforthecountry
northof490....
The President
and he thought
we had the
Buchananas to the popularsentiment,
seen thatthepeoplewould
evidencethatwas to be anywhere
strongest
in thecoursewhichhe
be promptand readytosustaintheGovernment
proposedto pursue.'
In a cabinet meetingof August 26 the presidentexplained
his future policy in the Oregon question. Buchanan's note in
answer to Pakenham's rejectionof the American offershould
assert our right to all Oregon from 42' to

540

40'.

It should

distinctlystate that the offerhad been made in deference to

acts of predecessors and to preserve peace; that it had been
rejected by the Britishministerin language " scarcelycourteous
or respectful"; thatno counterpropositionhad been submitted;
and that the offerwas now withdrawnby the United States, to
be no longer considered as pending for the considerationof the
Britishgovernment. Polk desired the matterto rest unless the
Britishministerchose to renewthe negotiation.2 Buchanan was
for holding out the olive branch by insertingin his replyto
Pakenham a paragraph to the effectthat the United States
would consider any furtherpropositionwhich the Britishminister might submit. Polk objected to this on the ground that
Pakenham would infer thatwe were prepared to accept terms
less favorableto the United States than those which had been
offered,since he could not be expected to propose terms more
favorable to the United States than those he had just rejected.3
The British minister,Polk insisted,must take the initiative,if
negotiationswere to be renewed; and this propositionthe president maintained throughout the discussion of the question.
Buchanan favored postponing the replyto Pakenham until it
should be knownwhether therewas to be war with Mexico or
not4; but Polk declared that there was no necessaryconnection
' Diary,vol. i, p. 4.

AIbid.p. 2.

'Ibid. p. 3-

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4Ibid. p. 4.

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between the two questions, and he objected to a postponement

of the reply because it would suggest indecisionon the part of
the United States. On August 27 the secretaryof stateread in
the cabinet the answer he had prepared.' The presidentobserved thatit was an "1admirable paper," and that the argument
for the claims of the United States was unanswerable. " In
this opinion," wrote Polk, " all the members of the Cabinet
concurred. The PostmasterGeneral remarked that,if he had
heard that argument before the compromiseof 490 was proposed, he would not have agreed to it." The note of Buchanan,
withdrawingthe American offer,was deliveredto Pakenham on
August 30.
The action of the presidentin formallywithdrawinghis offer,
after it had been rejected by the British minister,while quite
consistentwiththe viewsexpressed in his inaugural,is explained
by Benton as a concession to the radical democracy of the
Northwest,which insisted on 540 40' and, having learned of
Polk's offerof compromise,raised such a stormof protestthat
the administration" quailed-recoiled-and withdrewits offer
of 49'."3
According to Benton, however, the president remained secretlyin favor of a compromise on the forty-ninth
parallel.
The withdrawalof the American offerevidentlyproduced an
impression on the British government. A dispatch from
McLane, United States ministerat London, dated October 3,
described an interviewbetween himself and Lord Aberdeen, in
which his lordshipexpressed regretthat Pakenham had rejected
the propositionmade by the United States and desired to know
if the president would negotiate further. Polk took this as
evidence that the Britishgovernmenthad "' lowered theirtone."
He remarked that any furtherproposition fromthe other side
would be received and considered,but repeated that he would
not now accept the termswhichhe had previouslyoffered. He
saw no reason to believe that any proposition would be made
which could be accepted; and this opinion he expressed on
2

I\Vorks

of Buchanan, vol. vi, pp. 23I el seq.

I Diary, vol. i, p- 7-

3 Benton, Thirty Years' View, vol. ii, p. 662.

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451

several subsequent occasions. If a proposition were received

he would eitherreject it or submitit to the Senate for advice.'
Pakenham professedregret that the American offerhad been
withdrawn. He was informed by Buchanan that the United
States would respectfullyconsider any proposition that Great
Britainmightmake; but beyond that the president refusedto
go. Buchanan personallyfavored a more conciliatory policy
and feltthat no effortshould be spared to secure a compromise.
Indeed a serious differenceof opinion developed on this subject
betweenthe secretaryof state and the president.2
Polk was naturally anxious to learn the sentimentof the
Congress which was to meet in December and to ascertain the
views of its leaders. On October 24, in the course of a conversation with Senator Benton, Polk said that since his offer
had been rejected he was disposed to assert our extremeclaims.
He believed that Great Britaindesired the renewal of the offer
which had been withdrawn,but he saw no probabilitythat the
Oregon boundary could be settled by negotiation. The president and Benton agreed that the year's notice necessary to terminatethe conventionof 1827 ought to be given.3 During the
interviewBenton remarked that Great Britain had as good a
titleto the Frazer River as the United States had to the Columbia. Polk, however,thoughtthatthe Monroe Doctrine ought to
be assertedwithrespectto both Oregon and California. Benton
agreed that no foreign power should be permittedto acquire
California; and the president concluded that he did not think
that the Monroe Doctrine applied to territorynorth of 490,
drainedby the Frazer River, where the Britishhad established
tradingposts and forts.
On October 25, Polk read to his cabinet that part of his
coming annual message which dealt with Oregon. A few days
later Buchanan drew up a paper " modifyingand softeningthe
tone" of the president's draft. To Buchanan's suggestions
1 Bentonsays that the plan of submission
to the Senate fortheirpreviousadvice,
whichwas followedin theOregonTreatyof I846, was suggestedto the Presidentby
him,and impliesthatit was just beforethe treatywas made. ThirtyYears' View,
vol. ii, p. 674.

'Diary, vol. i, pp. 8i, 97, 98.

8Diary,vol. i, pp. 69, 70.

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Polk did not yield. He was, in fact, becoming convinced

that the demand for all Oregon was growing in popular favor.
In reply to Buchanan's statementthat the nation would not
justifya war for the territorynorthof 490 and that the president was in danger of being attacked for his belligerency,Polk
said that his greatestdanger was that he had yielded to his predecessor's example in offeringto compromise. Had that offer
been accepted by Great Britain,his administration,he thought,
would have encounteredgreat opposition.'
The message, then,so far as it related to Oregon, evidently
expressed the views of the president rather than those of the
secretary of state.2 Polk announced that his offer of compromisewas withdrawnand the American title to all Oregon
asserted. He recommended that notice be given to abrogate
the convention of I827 and to terminatethe joint occupation.
The Monroe Doctrine was reaffirmedin strong terms. The
United States would not permitEuropean interferenceon this
continent,nor could the principleof the balance of power be
extended to North America in order to prevent the United
States fromadding to its territory. It is noteworthythat the
message devoted almost as much space to Oregon as to Texas
and Mexico. That its recommendations,if carried out, would
probably lead to war was the opinion of the press and the
nation.3 It was, however, well received-" better received,"
wroteBuchanan, " than any similarcommunicationto Congress
in my day." 4 Though the president could not have foreseen
the exact resultswhich his message would produce, there can
be littledoubt that the decided and bold tone whichhe assumed
was a factorof great importancein causing the Britishgovernmentto renewthe negotiationswhich resultedin the settlement
of the Oregon question.5
The difference
of opinion between Buchanan and Polk, which
has been referredto, was illustratedin the preparationof a disI

Diary,vol. i, pp. io6,

107.

The factis," wrotePolk, "that the tariffpart of the messageand everyother

partof it is myown." Ibid. vol. i, p. 124.
2

"

3Worksof Calhoun (ed. by Crall6), vol. iv, pp.

4Works of Buchanan,vol. vi, p. 342.

260,

26I.

5Diary,vol. ii, p. i68.

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453

patch writtento McLane on December I 3, I 845. Buchanan's

draftcontained the statementthat if Great Britainshould offer
the forty-ninth
parallel and abandon its claim to the free navigation of the Columbia, the United States at the same time
yieldingthe southerncape of Vancouver's Island, the president
would feel inclined to submit such a propositionto the Senate
for its advice. The presidentcaused this to be altered so as to
read, in substance,that,should the Britishgovernmentmake a
new proposition,the presidentwould judge of its character,and
if,in his opinion,itwas such as to justifyit,he would feel inclined
to submitit to the Senate for " previous advice" before acting
on it,since the decision on such a propositionmightinvolve the
issue of war or peace.' Buchanan thought that the president's
alteration gave McLane no real information,and that,unless
Polk was willing to let the dispatch stand as he had writtenit,
the United States had betterprepare for war.
On January29, I 846, the secretaryof state wrote to McLane
that the extreme claim to Oregon was growing more and more
popular. He referredto resolutionsof state conventions and
legislatures in favor of

540

40';

and he suggested that McLane

cautiouslyinformthe Britishgovernmentthat,while the president would never abandon his position as regarded the American claim to all Oregon, and would not now authorize the
conclusionof a treatyon the basis of the offerhe had previously
made, the Senate was then in session. The question of peace
or war mightbe involved in the issue. Since the Senate was a
part of the war-makingas well as of the treaty-makingpower,
the presidentwould feel it his duty to submit to that body for
its previous advice a proposition similar to thatwhich he had
offeredand withdrawn.2 In a privateletterof February 26, he
told McLane that a proposition to compromiseon the fortyninth parallel would probably receive a two-thirdsvote of the
Senate. Public opinion, however,was more radical than Congress. "Discreet friends of peace clearly perceive that the
question must be settled peacefullywithinthe year or war may
be the consequence." 3
p.

I Diary, vol. i, pp. 122, 123.

For the letter,see Worksof Buchanan,vol. vi,

341.

'Works of Buchanan, vol. vi, pp. 367, 368.

3Ibid. pp. 385, 386.

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To arbitratewas the proposal withwhich the Britishminister

sought to reopen the discussion of the Oregon question. Arbitration,it will be remembered,had been offeredbefore by
Pakenham and refusedby Calhoun. Learning that the British
ministerwould soon propose it again, the cabinet now agreed
unanimouslythat it could not be accepted. In the firstplace,
they thought that a compromiseof this kind was not a fitsubject for arbitration;in the second place, an impartial umpire
could not be found., On December 27, IPakenhamformally
proposed the submissionof the question of an " equitable division" of Oregon to arbitration. He spoke of the "effervescence" of popular feeling,which might greatlyinterferewith
the effortsof Great Britain and the United States to preserve
peace.2 Pakenham suggested as possible arbitratorsSwitzerland, Hamburg or Bremen. Buchanan, in jest, proposed the
pope.3 He explained thatarbitrationimpliedthe rightof Great
Britainto a part of the territory,
while the presidentwas convinced of the validityof the American titleup to 540 40'. On
January3, the offerwas formlially
declined.4 On Januaryi6,
Pakenham, returningto the subject, asked if the United States
would submit to arbitration,first,the question of the title of
either party to the whole territory,
and then,if neither were
found to have a valid claim to the whole, the division of the
territorybetweenthe two according to the justice of the claims
of each.5 On February 4, this question was answered in the
negative.6
The Twenty-ninthCongress convened amidst loud talk of
war. This was the epoch of "Fifty-fourForty or Fight."
Great Britainand the United States stood, indeed, on the brink
of hostilities. The former,moreover,was knownto be making
extensive warlike preparations. Pakenham, it is true,assured
Buchanan that they had no connection with Oregon, but the
administrationwas manifestlyuneasy, and McLane was instructedto bringthe subject to the attentionof Lord Aberdeen.
IDiary, vol. i, p. 134.
'Ibid.

pp. 351,

5Zbid.P 358.

352.

2Worksof Buchanan,vol. vi, p. 349.

4Ibid. p. 355.
6lbid. pp. 370 etseq.

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45 5

On December 23, the question of war was seriouslydiscussed

in the cabinet. The presidentfavoredvigorous preparationsto
put the countryin a state of defence. Buchanan, too, thought
we should prepare forwar. The secretariesof war and of the
navy were directed to consultwiththe chairmenof the military
and naval committees of the two houses, communicateto them
the views of the cabinet and aid in draftingsuitable bills.In a cabinet meetingheld February28, I 846, Buchanan suggested that the president send a message to Congress recommendingprovisionfor the public defence. Most of the cabinet
favored this proposal, but Polk feared that such a message
mightcreate a panic. He wished that Congress had put the
countryin a betterstate of defence quietlyand withoutarousing
unnecessaryalarm,and he thoughtthat the stateof our relations
withGreat Britain and Mexico required that this should be
done. It was finallyagreed to postpone the furtherconsideration of a special message untilthe arrivalof the next mail from
England.2
In answer to an inquiryof the Senate, whetherin his judgmentthe state of our foreign relationsrequired an increase of
naval or militaryforce,the presidentsent a special message to
that body on March 24.3 In this document he referredto the
warlikepreparationsmakingboth in England and in the British
possessions in North America, which, he said, were proceeding
witha view of the possibility of war with the United States.
He accordinglyadvocated the increase of the land and naval
forces. He still adhered, he said, to the recommendationsof
his annual message.
The presidentwas especially desirous that Congress should
pass the measures recommended in his message, particularly
the notice necessary to terminatejoint occupation. Until that
was done, he believed the Britishgovernmentwould yield none
of its claims. In Polk's words: " The only way to treat John
I Diary, vol. i, pp.
Von Hoist accepts the Whig view thatPolk had
I33, 134.
in realityno idea of war, and wouldnot hesitateto back down,if necessary,to avoid
and PoliticalHistoryof the UnitedStates,vol. iii, p. 192.
it. Constitutional
2Diary,vol. i, pp. 257, 258, 270.
3 Richardson,Messagesand Papersof the Presidents,
vol. iv, pp. 426 el seq.

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Bull was to look him straight in the eye." I The debate on

the question of giving the notice showed, however, that if
the president should refuse a British offer of compromise
on the forty-ninth
parallel he would split his party. The attitude of Calhoun was particularlyimportant,on account of his
influence over the southern wing of the Democracy. Calhoun was opposed to giving the notice recommended by the
president,which he regarded as a warlike measure,because he
was stronglyin favor of peace and believed that compromise
was still possible.2 In the course of an interviewwith the
presidenton JanuaryIO, he remarkedthat those who voted for
the notice would do so from differentmotives. Some, the
radicals, would regard it as a measure which would prevent
any compromise; others would support it in the belief that,
when the matter was broughtto a crisis,a compromise would
be the result. Calhoun himself stronglyfavored the fortyninthparallel, and considered that Great Britainhad as good a
claim to the Frazer as the United States had to the Columbia.
Polk, indeed, concluded that Calhoun would soon be in opposition to his admninistration.3
Benton, too, was known to favor
compromise, ridiculing "fifty-four forty.-" The southern
Democracy, it was clear, would break with the administration
if an offerto compromise on 490 were refused. But the
northwesternDemocrats were clamorous for all Oregon.
Senator Allen of Ohio, a leader of the " Fifty-fourForties"
told Polk that the acceptance of a proposition such as Calhoun
and Benton favoredwould destroythe popularityof the administration.4 Colonel Tod of Ohio, Democratic candidate for
governor,said that if a compromisewere accepted the Democratic partywould be beaten in Ohio.5 A large majorityof the
people of Ohio, he thought,favored war. Senator Turney of
Tennessee impressed upon Polk the obvious fact that he was
between two firesand could not avoid displeasing a part of the
Democracy whatevercourse he followed.6
IDiary, vol. i, p. 155.

2Ibid., vol. i, pp. '3",

3Diary,vol. i, p. 132.

154.

Worksof Calhoun (ed. by CrallM),vol. iv, p.

4Ibid. p. 248.

5Ibid. p.

242.

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6Ibid. p.

261.
I4I.

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POLK AND THE

OREGON

COMPROMISE

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A plan was devised by southern senators,notablyCalhoun

and McDuffie of South Carolina and Colquitt of Georgia, to
bring forwardin executive session of the Senate a resolution
advisingthe president to reopen negotiationson the subject of
Oregon and to settle the matter by a compromise. Senator
Haywood of North Carolina, himself in favor of compromise,
in informingthe president of this scheme said that Calhoun
and his followerswould be willing to settlewith Great Britain
on any terms.! Calhoun, it is known,believed that if war with
England were averted,as he hoped it would be, there would
probably be no war with Mexico.2 The president was, of
course, opposed to the plan of the southernsenators,which,if
carried out, would have taken the real conduct of negotiations
out of his hands. In a conversationwithCalhoun and Colquitt
on February 25, however,he remarked that if the Britishgovernmentoffered490 he should probably feel it his duty to submit this offerto the Senate for its previous advice. Calhoun
thought that the president could again propose 490 "' without
national dishonor." Polk, however,remainedfirmin his decision that furtherproposals must come fromGreat Britain.
really favored comThe rumorgot abroad that the presidehnt
promise. In a speech delivered in the Senate, early in March,
Senator Haywood made the statementthat Polk favored comparallel; and he undertookto show
promise on the forty-ninth
that,since American citizens had never settled north of that
line, the word " reoccupation," used in the platformof I844,
could not apply to territorynorth of 490. According to
Benton, Haywood expressed the sentimentsof the president,
" personallyconfided to him, and to prepare the way for his
to them."3 That Polk was foolish enough
action in conformity
to authorize the statements of Haywood seems unlikely;
and we have his own testimonythat such was not the case.
Senator Hannegan of Indiana, one of the leaders of the
" Fifty-fourForties," replied to Haywood that if the opinions
1Diary,vol. i, p. 246.
2Thiswas beforeTaylor'smarchto the Rio Grande.
3ThirtyYeats' View, vol. ii, p. 663. Von Holst followsBenton; see Constitutionaland PoliticalHistoryof the UnitedStates,vol. iii, p. 219.

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he voiced were really those of Polk, the president was consigned to " a damnationso deep that the hand of resurrection
will never be able to drag him forth." Hannegan himself
called on the presidentand asked if he stood for 540 40' or for
compromise. Polk replied: " I am charged with the foreign
relations of the country, and it was unheard of that the
president should declare in advance to anyone out of his cabinet his intentionsin referenceto them." Senator Allen tried
to commitPolk to 54' 40', and asked for permissionto tell the
Senate that the president had not changed his views on the
Oregon question. Polk declined to allow anyone to speak for
him. "I told him I stood on my published opinions and
acts."
On January24, the president suggested to the cabinet a new
plan for thesettlementof theOregon question,by whichit might
be possible for the United States to secure the whole territory.
There was in his judgmentno likelihood that a divisioncould be
agreed upon. Buit a treatyof commerce between the United
States and Great Britaii. mightbe made the basis for an adjustmentof the Oregon dispute. Each countrymightagree to
relax its restrictivesystem with respect to the other. The
reduction of our tariffwould certainlybe regarded withfavor
by Great Britain; and in order to secure it the Britishgovernment might be willing to abandon all claim to Oregon, on receiving a sum of money withwhich to indemnifythe Hudson's
Bay Company for the improvementsit had made there. The
suggestion was made merely as a possibility.3
Resolutions for giving the notice in a qualified formwere
finallypassed in the House by a large majority. In the Senate
the " Fifty-fourForties" constituteda small minority. During
the course of the long debates, public sentimentwas growing
more favorable to compromise, and a large majoritv of the
Senate favored a settlementof the question on that basis. On
March i6 Calhoun announced that the aspect of thingswas so
differentfromwhat it had been when the annual message was
published that he should vote for the notice in a modifiedform,
I

IDiary, vol. i, pp. 270-274.

2Ibid. p. 279-

'Ibid.

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p. i9i.

No. 3]

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COMPROMiMSE

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because he regarded it as preliminaryto a compromise.' By

the votes of the Whig senators and of those Democrats who
favored compromisea resolutionto give the notice was passed.
A preamble,moreover,stated that its object was to promote an
amicable settlenment
between the two nations. Congress finally
authorized the president to give the notice at his discretion.
Though Polk would have preferredan unqualified notice, he
signed the resolution on April 28, and the formal notice was
soon given. Benton suggested that the president should ask
the Senate whether,in giving the notice, he should not renew
the offerof 49'. Senator McDuffie and Vice-PresidentDallas
desired a renewal of the president's former offerwhen the
notice was given. But the presidentinsistedthat futurepropositions must come fromGreat Britain.2
As Polk viewed it, the excitement in the Senate over the
question of giving notice was caused by the political ambitions
of the leaders. Calhoun, he thought,hoped by his early oppositionto the notice to become the leader of the peace partyand
" advance his views on the presidency." Allen would probably
consider war advantageous; Cass, too, was using " fifty-four
forty"forhis own purposes. The presidentwrote in his diary:
The truthis thatin all thisOregondiscussionin theSenate,too many
DemocraticSenatorshavebeen moreconcernedaboutthePresidential
electionin '48 than theyhave been about settlingOregon eitherat
" has been withthemthegreatques490 or 540 40'. " Forty-eight
tion,and hencethedivisionsoftheDemocraticParty.On June 3, I846, a dispatch from McLane was received,
writtenafterit was known in England that Congress had passed
the notice. This dispatch contained the substance of a proposal which McLane had learned from Aberdeen would be
offeredby the Britishministerat Washington. From the information sent by McLane, Polk was in doubt whether,when the
proposal was formally made, he ought to submit it to the
Senate or not. If he rejected it and made no counter' For thisspeech, see Worksof Calhotin(ed. by CralJ6),vol. iv, pp. 258 etseq.
'Diary, vol. i, pp. 325, 348, 372.

fIbid. pp. 265, 280, 344, 345.

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proposition,therewould probably be war. " If I submit it to

the Senate and they should advise its acceptance I should be
bound by theiradvice, and yet I should do so reluctantly.I On
June 6 Buchanan read to the cabinet the officialofferwhich he
had just received fromPakenham, in the formof a convention.
It provided, in substance, that Oregon be divided by the fortyninthparallel fromthe Rocky Mountainsto the Straitsof Fuca.
The Hudson's Bay Company and all British subjects in actual
occupancy of lands south of 490 were to be secured in their
titles but subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
The navigationof the Columbia was to be free to the Hudson's
Bay Company and to British subjects trading with that company but not to Britishsubjects in general. Most of the cabinet advised the submission of the offerto the Senate for its
previous advice. Buchanan, however,now displayed a strange
change of front. He had before been stronglyin favor of the
forty-ninthparallel. He now observed that the " Fifty-four
Forties" were true friendsof the administration,and he wished
no backing-down. He favored the submission of the offerto
the Senate, provided the president accompanied it with a message reiteratingthe opinions he had previouslyexpressed; he
declined, however,to have any hand in the preparationof such
a message. Polk concluded that Buchanan intended to avoid
all responsibilityfor the submission of the proposal to -the
Senate, and thus stand well in the favor of the " Fifty-four
Forties," with a view to advancing his presidentialambitions.2
On June IO, the president submitted the Britishofferto the
Senate for its previous advice. For this unusual procedure he
found precedentsin our early national historyand said that it
mightproperly be revived. The Senate was a branch of the
treaty-makingpower and by consultingit in advance the president secured harmonyof action between that body and himself.
The Senate was also a branch of the war-makingpower, and
the president might very properly take its advice in advance
upon a question which mightinvolve the issue of war or peace.
He stated that his own views as expressed in his annual mes1Diary,vol. i, pp. 444, 445.

2Ibid. p. 456.

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No. 3]

POLK AND 7fHE OREGON

COMPROMISE

46I

sage remainedunchanged. If the Senate by a two-thirdsvote

advised the acceptance of the British offer,he would follow its
advice. Otherwisehe would reject it.'
The Senate advised acceptance by a vote of 37 to I2, and
later ratifiedthe treaty,4I to I4. The Whig senators and
those Democrats who favored compromisevoted in the affirmative; the " Fifty-fourForties" in the negative.
The treatywas clearlynot a partymeasure. It was in accordance neitherwiththe Democratic platformof I 844 nor withthe
president'sinaugural nor with his annual message. The president had declined all responsibilityfor it. It was the Senate's
treaty. Because Polk refusedto assume the responsibility
forwar
with Great Britain,for the disruption of his partyand for the
failureof his administration-and these apparentlywould have
been the resultsof rejectingthe Britishoffer-we need not infer that he had been playing a double game. In considering
the testimonyof Benton,the well-knownviewsof thatstatesman
on the Oregon question and his obvious desire to take for himself the centerof the stage and pose as the confidentialadviser
of the presidentmust be taken into account. That Polk was in
great haste to settle the Oregon question in order to have a free
hand in his dealings with Mexico is a suppositionwholly inconsistentwith the evidence. If there had existed in his mind any
such connectionbetween Oregon and the dispute with Mexico,
it is inconceivable that he should have ordered the movement
of American troops to the Rio Grande, thus precipitatingwar
withMexico, beforethe Britishproposal had been made.2 Had
this proposal been delayed only a few days, news of the war
between the United States and Mexico would have reached
England, and it would probably not have been offered. The
credit for averting hostilities between the United States and
Great Britain belongs to the Governmentof Sir Robert Peel,
which wisely decided to make the best terms it could without
riskinga war to increase the British possessions on the Pacific.
COLUMBIAUNIVERSITY.

R. L. SCHUYLER.

' Richardson,vol. iv, pp. 449, 450.

2 Lettersof Calhoun,Annual Report,AmericanHistoricalAssociation,1899, vol.

ii, p. 698.

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