Eleatic Monism and Advaita Vedanta:

Two Philosophies or One?

Andrew Domanski
School of Law, University of the Witswatersrand

... I was only then Contented,

when with bliss ineffable
I felt the sentiment of Being spread
Oer all that moves and all that seemeth still;
Oer all that, lost beyond the reach of thought
and human knowledge, to the human eye
Invisible, yet liveth to the heart
- William Wordsworth The Prelude Book I

Abstract

In this article, the monistic ontology of the Eleatic school of

ancient Greece is examined in juxtaposition with the nondualistic Advaita Vedanta philosophy of India. The Eleatic
ontology is studied through the texts of, firstly, Melissus of
Samos, and, secondly, Parmenides of Elea. The characteristic
features of Advaita doctrine are gathered from Upanishadic texts
and the writings of Sankara. This comparative treatment
demonstrates that Being, as described in the Eleatic fragments,
is practically identical to the Self (or atman) which lies at the
heart of Advaita doctrine. So close is this identity that the two
ontologies, the Western and the Eastern, can for all practical
purposes be treated as one. In the absence of convincing
historical evidence to show that the one ontology exerted a direct
influence upon the other, the ineluctable conclusion is that
knowledge of the One Being or Self, the immortal essence and
true common identity of every creature, was attained
independently if not indeed contemporaneously by sages in
archaic Greece and in ancient India. This conclusion, moreover,
has vital practical significance at the present time: the EleaticVedantic ontology is arguably the key to healing many ills which
beset our age.
Phronimon, Vol 8 (1) 2007 _________________________________________________ 39

Almost two and a half thousand years ago, Presocratic philosophers1 of the
Eleatic school developed an ontology which has exerted a powerful influence
on later ages, including our own.2 Being, as it emerges from the empirical
discovery of Parmenides of Elea and from the systematic formulation of his
follower, Melissus of Samos, transcends all peculiarities of time and place.
The validity of their ontology finds affirmation in the awe and reverence with
which the Platonic Socrates regarded the leader of the Eleatics,3 and in its
remarkable consonance with the descriptions of atman or Self in the
Vedantic philosophy of India. This consonance is as apparent in texts of the
ancient Upanishads as in the commentaries of Sankara (788820 CE), the
most famous philosopher of the Advaita Vedanta school. So close is the
correspondence between these ontologies, the Eastern and the Western, that
so I shall argue they must to a large extent be treated as one. In
particular, I shall conclude on the strength of a comparative investigation
that the living reality described as Being by the Eleatics of the West is
identical with the atman or Self which lies at the heart of the Advaita
philosophy of the East. Thus the object of this article is to show that these
philosophies of East and West share a common core of truth4. Moreover,
that common core of truth is of vital contemporary relevance, for it is
capable, if heeded, of bringing peace and unity to our deeply troubled
societies.
The origins of the Eleatic teaching on Being lie in the powerful,
penetrating mind of Parmenides, the first Greek and therefore the first
Western philosopher to probe deeply into the nature of ultimate Reality.
His findings, expressed in his poem On Nature, are the fruits of a revelation
said to have been granted to him by the goddess Dike. According to
Cornford:5
... Parmenides ultimate premisses are that God alone is, and that he is
One ... [Parmenides argues] with his unrelenting logic that the attributes of
unity, perfect continuity and divinity (now construed in the Olympian sense
of deathless immutability) exclude and negate plurality, discontinuity, and
the changing movement of life.

Of Parmenides, it has been well said by a modern commentator:6

The development of Western philosophy was once said by AN Whitehead
to have consisted in a series of footnotes to Plato. In a similar vein, and
with hardly more exaggeration, Platos own writings might be said to have
consisted in footnotes to Parmenides of Elea.

The spiritual and revelatory nature of the poem of Parmenides is alien to the
secular, analytical mindset of many modern scholars, a mindset which
derives ultimately from Aristotle. Many have found the poem obscure, if not
unintelligible.7
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The surviving fragment of Melissus8 is traditionally taken to be an

elucidation of the philosophy of Parmenides. In sharp contrast to the tone of
the latter, however, the statement of Melissus is a lucid, coherent description
of Being, insofar as words are capable of expressing ultimate reality. It has
been said that the greatness of Melissus consisted in this, that he was the
real systematizer of Eleaticism.9 Melissuss contribution is therefore more
than merely formal or stylistic: while he does indeed restate the teaching of
Parmenides, he corrects and therefore improves upon the latters
formulation in one substantively important respect which will be noted
below. Accordingly, in seeking to express the essential features of the Eleatic
ontology, I shall rely primarily on the formulation of Melissus. Given that the
substance of the two statements is virtually the same, however, I shall also
have occasion to refer to Parmenides. The formal and substantial hallmark
of the Eleatic philosophy, whether expressed through the revelation of
Parmenides or the rationalization of Melissus, is the total rejection of the use
of the senses as instruments for the investigation into Being or Reality. Pure,
unaided Reason is the only tool available to man for this purpose. Freeman
demonstrates cogently and powerfully why the senses, grounded as they are
in the ever-changing phenomenal world, are inherently incapable of
measuring the changeless One.10 Thus Being or Reality, whatever other
qualities It may turn out to possess, is beyond the reach of the senses.
Reason, as the highest intellectual faculty in the human make-up, is alone
qualified to conduct the inquiry into Being.
The title of the surviving fragment of Melissus has been variously
translated as On Being,11 About nature or reality,12 and On Nature or on
What Exists.13 Accordingly, the pronoun It, wherever it occurs in the
statement of Melissus, will be taken to indicate Being or Reality or What Is.
On the strength of axioms derived from Parmenides, Melissus deduces
certain characteristic features of Reality or Being.14 I proceed now to
examine the conclusions reached by Melissus, independently of the
reasoning which he employs in reaching them: it is not the object of this
article to consider the correctness or validity of the reasoning by which
Melissus arrives at his conclusions. Earlier commentators have performed
that exercise in hair-splitting detail, often generating more heat than light in
the process. The conclusions of Melissus, almost entirely in harmony with
those of Parmenides, are taken to be substantively true and to represent
collectively an accurate statement of the developed Eleatic ontology. They
will serve as a starting-point for further investigation into the nature of
Being.15
Melissus begins his articulation of Reality with the statement that It is,
always was, always will be, has no beginning or end, but is eternal.16
Anything which comes into existence, for example the physical body, has a
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41

beginning and an end, is ineluctably transient,17 and falls under the

dominion of time. In contrast, Being is ungenerated, undecaying,
indestructible18 and changeless. Durant puts it well: Beginning and end,
birth and death, formation and destruction, are of forms only; the One Real
never begins and never ends; there is no Becoming, there is only Being.19
Just as Being is eternal, so too is It infinite, that is, unlimited in
magnitude or spatial extent.20 Since It is infinite, there is no place where
Being is not: It is everywhere. On this vital point Melissus, who followed
Parmenides faithfully in every other respect, broke away from the latter:
whereas the One of Parmenides is finite and, indeed, spherical, the One of
Melissus is unequivocally declared to the annoyance of Aristotle to be
infinite in extent as well as in time.21
The infinite, all-pervasive nature of Being leaves no space for void or
emptiness anywhere, or of any kind. Being is full.22 And since it is full, Being
is also motionless or still, for in the absence of emptiness, there is nowhere it
could notionally move to.23 Thus stillness or rest is an essential feature of
Being.
As it is unlimited in time and in spatial extent, Being is necessarily
24
One. So It is eternal, unlimited, single and homogeneous. It can neither be
destroyed, nor become larger, nor change in organization, nor feel pain,
nor suffer loss, because if it were susceptible to any of these things, it would
no longer be One.25
Being, then, does not admit of duality of any kind. Its non-dualistic
character is highly significant for more than one reason. First, as we have
seen, Parmenides and Melissus unanimously held that reason alone and
not the senses is capable of inquiring into Being. This seems to presuppose
a dualistic process in which reason, the subject, inquires into Being, the
object. Such a process would violate the non-dualistic character of Being.
We are thus driven to the conclusion that reason must be identical with and
inseparable from Being, and that their apparent subject-object relationship
is illusory. Reason then, is simply an aspect of Being in Its human
manifestation, and the inquiry turns out ultimately to be a process in which
Being looks into Itself.26 It follows also that reason, as understood by the
Eleatics, is a faculty which, while possessed by everyone, is distinct from, and
higher than our familiar discursive mind. The vitally important functions of
the discursive mind typically include calculation, logical thinking, critical
analysis, evaluation, making of comparisons and formulating opinions. The
discursive mind, however, is able to perform these functions efficiently only
when it is free from its habitual noise, clutter and agitation, only, that is,
when it comes to rest in Being.
The human state of rest or stillness in non-dualistic Being could be
called the natural or default condition of man. It is his ultimate (and yet
42

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immediate), unmoving, ever-present point of reference.27 If Being were not

motionless, there could be no state of rest for the individual, no still point to
which everything else may be referred. Humanity would then be condemned
to an infernal condition of perpetual agitation and turmoil. This state of
inner stillness may be empirically verified by anyone sufficiently desirous of
doing so.
Secondly, the non-dualistic character of Being rules out identification
of Being with thinking.28 Any such identification is fallacious, for Being, as
we have seen, is motionless, while thinking, by definition, is a movement of
the discursive mind.29
Given that, according to Melissus, Being is not only full, but also free
from pain and grief, it must follow that Being is inseparable from unvarying
bliss or happiness. The absence of pain and grief cannot imply merely a
condition of emptiness or neutrality, for Being is inherently free from emptiness.
To sum up, then, Melissus holds that Being, the immortal, eternal,
changeless One, is incorporeal, indivisible, infinite, motionless, full, free
from pain and grief, indestructible, ungenerated and homogeneous. Being
is the one, unchanging factor in the world of continuous flux which we
observe both inside and outside ourselves. This statement of the Eleatic
doctrine of Being, as Melissus presents it in its refined form, will be used as a
point of reference for further discussion below.30 It is important to note,
however, that no words can encapsulate or define ultimate Truth or Reality.
In their statements, Parmenides and Melissus provide nothing more than
sign-posts, pointers, indicators.31 Whatever else it may be, Being as
signposted by the Eleatics is not a concept, notion, abstraction, object of
thought or any other mental construct.32 No, It is an actuality: It is the
consciousness or awareness that manifests only when all thinking, analysis
and argument subside, and deep stillness supervenes. It is living reality, the
true incorporeal substance of every creature, and it may be known only by
direct experience. Wordsworth understood this well:33
In such access of mind, in such high hour
of visitation from the living God,
Thought was not; in enjoyment it expired.34

Being inhabits, informs and pervades everything, and every living creature,
while remaining One and never becoming two, for it is indivisible. Being is
not confined to the inner world of the human individual. Yet that is the
obvious primary location for any experience of, or inquiry into It. Indeed it is
fully implicit in the discussion up to this point that Being is to be experienced
or discovered within the individual. Nowhere, however, does Parmenides or
Melissus (or even Zeno of Elea, the third of the Eleatic philosophers who has
not been mentioned until now) make this explicit. Nor do the Eleatics
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43

expressly take the final step of describing the most important feature of
Being: that It is the One true immortal essence or Self of every creature.35
While this immanence of Being is fully implicit in the Eleatic fragments, it
was left to the philosophy of Advaita Vedanta, founded on the Upanishads
of ancient India, to articulate non-dualistic truth in its fullness.36
In the revealed texts (sruti) of the Upanishads, we find the substance of
the Eleatic articulations of Being. Later on, the philosopher Sankara was to
deploy his formidable powers of intellect in restating, elaborating, refining
and synthesizing into a fully articulated philosophical system the nondualistic wisdom of the Upanishads.37 Thus Archaic Greece and Vedic India,
so far removed from each other in place and time, and quite independently
of each other according to available evidence,38 gave birth, as I shall now
proceed to show, to substantially identical descriptions of Being. In order to
demonstrate this remarkable consonance, I shall now consider a selection of
texts drawn from the Vedantic literature.
As we have seen, the conclusions of the Eleatics, Parmenides and
Melissus, were reached by reason alone, without any appeal to the senses.
In the Ribhu Gita, an authoritative Sanskrit treatise of great antiquity, albeit
of uncertain date, there occurs a text which resonates strongly here:39
Some may argue that this universe of duality ... is a factual second reality,
clearly seen by the senses operated by the mind. But then, are the senses
anything apart from the mind? Can they function without the support of the
mind in which they are embedded? What is this mind except a bundle of
thoughts? What are thoughts except evanescent ripples in the still, limitless
ocean of pure Being Awareness Self, which is the sole Existence without
a second?

Here the Ribhu Gita, unlike the Eleatic texts, does not merely discard the
senses, but explains step-by-step why they, together with the discursive mind
in which they are embedded, are inherently incapable of conducting the
inquiry into ultimate Truth or Reality: both the senses and the discursive or
thinking mind are strictly limited in their respective fields of application.
Senses and mind are adequate, indeed indispensable tools for the purpose
of ensuring human survival in, and adaptability to the physical world. That,
of course, is their function. But the investigation into limitless Being calls for
a tool which is itself limitless in its scope of operation. That tool can only be
reason, an aspect of Being itself. The principle underpinning this text
therefore, is that the limited can never comprehend the limitless: only the
limitless can comprehend the limitless.40
In the opening lines of the Way of Truth, the part of his poem that
follows on from the proemium, Parmenides refers to Being in these words:41
... I will tell you ... the ways of inquiry which alone are to be thought: the
one that IT IS, and it is not possible for IT NOT TO BE, is the way of
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credibility, for it follows Truth; the other, that IT IS NOT, and that IT is
bound NOT TO BE: this I tell you is a path that cannot be explored; for you
could neither recognize that which IS NOT, nor express it.

This text is strikingly similar in its import to Bhagavad Gita 2.16,42 which is
rather more clearly expressed:
That which is not, shall never be; that which is, shall never cease to be. To
the wise, those truths are self-evident.43

I turn now to consider a number of Vedantic texts which leave little doubt as
to the identity of Eleatic Being and the atman or Self. Chandogya Upanishad
6.8.4, to begin with, focuses on Being in its internal aspect, that is, as
embodied in every living creature:44
[A]ll these creatures [here] have Being as their root, Being as their restingplace (ayatana), Being as their foundation.

It was asserted earlier that Being is mans still point of reference.45 This text
supports that assertion. By connecting with the stillness of Being within
himself, man gains access to the power of reason.
A positive assertion of the identity of Being with the true Self of every
creature occurs in Ribhu Gita 10.34:46
There is not an atom apart from the Self, which is the integral,
undifferentiated perfection of whole Being. Soul, world and Creator are
inseparable from the Self. The reality of these is the reality of the Self only.

Other texts in the same work are significant in the present context. According
to Ribhu Gita 12.2:47
... Existence alone is, for even non-existence acquires meaning only in
Existence. Simply put, everything exists always as Brahman Self only.

It was asserted earlier that only in the stillness of Being will the agitation and
confusion of the discursive mind subside.48 Ample confirmation of this fact is
to be found in the Vedantic texts. Thus, for example:49
... Abiding firmly in the experience of pure Brahman-Self, one finds that the
mind and all its confabulations are lost for ever.

All the aspects of Being enumerated by Melissus50 are declared by the

Vedantic texts to be aspects of atman. Thus atman, the true Self of everyone,
is held to be eternal,51 immortal,52 changeless,53 One,54 incorporeal,55
indivisible,56 infinite,57 motionless,58 full,59 free from pain and grief,60
indestructible,61 ungenerated62 and homogeneous.63 The equivalence of
Being and atman is therefore exact.64 The central argument which this article
seeks to substantiate is that these two terms of Eastern and Western
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45

philosophy are fully interchangeable, for they denote the same Truth.
Moreover, the Eleatic Vedantic philosophy, unlike all religious dogmas,
requires no belief or leap of faith on the part of its practitioners, because it is
verified in ones own experience by an empirical process of inner inquiry or
investigation.
The Self or atman is sometimes described in the Vedanta as an
indissoluble trinity of three elements, namely Being (sat), Consciousness (cit)
and Bliss (ananda). This suggests that even within the boundaries of the
Vedantic philosophy itself, Being and Self are so closely related as to be
identical.65
We have no conclusive evidence pointing to direct influence of the
Eleatic ontology upon the Vedantic, or vice versa.66 In the absence of such
evidence, the conclusion must be that Truth is not the exclusive preserve of
East or West. On the contrary, there exists a single absolute Truth, inborn in
every human being as his or her immortal essence. This Truth never changes
in the least from one time to another or from one place to another. This
Truth, call it Being or Self, found expression, quite independently, in Archaic
Greece and Vedic India.
What was the subsequent fate of the Eleatic and Vedantic ontologies in
the countries that gave birth to them? Thanks to the Eleatics and their
successors, Socrates and Plato, Greece attained a pinnacle of splendour
which has never been equalled in the West. Tragically, it was Aristotelian
materialism rather than the spiritual wisdom of the Eleatics and Platonists
that ultimately triumphed in the West. Today, therefore, secular materialism
is the dominant Western credo. The price that our own and earlier ages
have paid for ignoring the ancient Eleatic teaching of Being is a vast spiritual
void in which dishonesty, fraud, corruption and a multitude of other ills are
left free to flourish. In contrast, the achievement of India was that for century
after century, she never forswore the monistic wisdom of the Upanishads,
although its influence over such a long period inevitably waned (under the
influence, for example of Buddhism) and waxed again (under the influence,
for example, of Sankara). For disdaining the material world and dedicating
itself to the spiritual, India too has had to pay a price: poverty, squalor,
malnutrition and disease have been her lot during the millennia which saw
her bring forth one mighty spiritual teacher after another.67
The lesson for both East and West is plain: Only the rigorous
maintenance of a proper balance between the pursuit of spiritual truth and
the pursuit of wealth can cure the respective ills that beset them. In striking
this vital balance, precedence must invariably be given to the spiritual factor,
for it is fundamental. Thus, for example, children must be taught as early in
life as possible, and before all else, about Being, the ground of human
existence, the one immortal common substance of everyone, the Self of all.
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What would be the practical benefit for our age of disseminating, as

widely as possible, the teaching of Truth expressed in the Eleatic and
Vedantic ontologies? The benefits, I suggest, would be immense, but here I
shall briefly consider only one. The primary cause of hatred, discord and
violence among people in every age and place is the perception of
difference: difference of nationality, race, age, religion, wealth, class and so
on. Contemporary secular human rights doctrine, with its emphasis on
human equality, has failed to resolve these differences. The notion of human
equality is shallow and unconvincing, because it is not backed by the force
of spiritual truth. Far deeper and more potent in its ability to unite people is
the realization of the truth of human identity: beyond all differences of
national origin, skin colour, political and religious dogma, opinion and
belief, beyond all differences of body, mind and ego, is a core of truth
common to every human being. This is the truth of One Being or Self,68 the
true common identity of everyone proclaimed by the Eleatic Vedantic
philosophy. Where equality is shallow, identity runs deep. The would-be
murderer, rapist, assailant, thief or speaker of hurtful words will, if made
fully aware of his true identity, pause to reflect that his prospective victim is
not someone else, but is, notwithstanding outward appearances, his own
Self, the One Self of all. Thus any wrong or injury which I commit against
another person is in reality directed against my own Self.69 The reader is
left to ponder the condition of a society whose members are taught from
earliest childhood to act always in remembrance of their true common
identity.
The Eleatic-Vedantic philosophy was to be the precursor of many later
monistic doctrines.70 Given the potency of this philosophy, why is universal
Being or Self so seldom acknowledged in the everyday life of mankind? The
answer is given by the great sage of modern India, Ramana Maharshi:71
It is due to illusion born of ignorance that men fail to recognize That which
is always and for everybody the inherent Reality dwelling in its natural Heart
centre, and to abide in it, and that instead they argue that it exists or does
not exist, that it has form or has not form, or is non-dual or dual.

Here, in conclusion, is a statement by Sankara of the Truth common to the

Vedantic and the Eleatic philosophies:72
That inner Self, as the primeval Spirit, eternal, ever effulgent, full and
infinite bliss, single, indivisible, whole and living, shines in everyone as the
witnessing awareness. That Self in its splendour, shining in the cavity of the
heart as the subtle, pervasive yet unmanifest ether, illumines this universe
like the sun. It is aware of the modifications of the mind and ego, of the
actions of the body, sense organs and life-breath. It takes their form, as fire
[takes] that of a heated ball of iron; yet it undergoes no change in doing
so. The Self is neither born nor dies, it neither grows nor decays, nor does it
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47

suffer any change. When a pot is broken the space inside it is not, and
similarly when the body dies, the Self in it remains eternal....

The recognition and practice of the Eleatic Vedantic philosophy of nonduality have much to offer us: in that philosophy lies the sovereign remedy
for many ills of our age.
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1. The Presocratics have been well described by Freeman as the metaphysical scientists of
the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. Their assumption, the basic axiom of metaphysics, was
that behind the changing phenomena presented by the universe to our senses, there lies a
reality which is unchanging, and that the pursuit of true knowledge consists in seeking out
this reality. From Thales onward, all inquiry into the nature of phenomena tended towards
one end: the answer to the question, what is the nature of the Whole? What is the nature of
the reality behind phenomena? (Kathleen Freeman The Pre-Socratic Philosophers A
Companion to Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker 2 ed Oxford (1949) xi).
2. The vast contemporary scholarly literature on the subject provides ample illustration
of this influence.
3. Plato Theaetetus 180e2, 183e-184b; Sophist passim. See also Freeman op cit note
1 at 152. On Parmenides, see two remarkable recent works by Peter Kingsley: In the
Dark Places of Wisdom London (2001), and Reality Inverness, California (2003), both

passim.
4. This article rests on the premiss that there exists one absolute truth, which never
changes from one time to another, or from one place to another. It is not in any sense
the purpose of this article to consider or evaluate the validity of the monistic position. The
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
49

method of the article, in other words, is not analytical but strictly expository. For modern
comparative treatments of Eastern and Western positions on nonduality, see Haridas
Chaudhuri Being, Evolution & Immortality Wheaton, Illinois (1974) passim; David E
Cooper World Philosophies An Historical Introduction Oxford (1996) 361371.
5.

FM Cornford From Religion to Philosophy Princeton (1991) 216.

6.

David Gallop Parmenides of Elea Toronto (1984) 3.

7. For a sample of academic responses, see Domanski The Journey of the Soul in
Parmenides and the Katha Upanishad (2006) 7(2) Phronimon 47-59 note 5 and text
thereto. Noteworthy is the response of Arnold Hermann (To Think Like God Pythagoras
and Parmenides Las Vegas (2004) xv):
[P]armenides is so difficult to interpret that for the first five or six years, I scored
failure after failure. By the time I had exhausted various possibilities the
cosmological, existential, metaphysical and so forth my writings on the subject
had ballooned to an unwieldy 40 000 pages, with a 1 200-page introduction. It
was not so much a manuscript as it was a logbook of various failures to achieve a
consistent interpretation that did justice to the whole Poem and not to only a few
select parts.

Not all commentators display Hermanns honesty and tenacity. Be that as it may, this
article is founded on a view which is diametrically opposed to the one quoted: the Eleatic
notion of Being is so utterly simple, truthful, clear and direct, that it must inevitably elude
the mindset which infests our contemporary academic enterprise, a mindset given to
complex, hair- splitting argumentation and tortuous analysis. See Kingsley Reality op cit
note 3 passim.
8. Robin Waterfield (The First Philosophers The Presocratics and the Sophists Oxford
(2000) 82) describes Melissus of Samos as something of an oddity in the history of
philosophy. He was as much a man of action as a philosopher. He was deeply involved
in the military and political affairs of Samos. Under his command, the Samian fleet
defeated the Athenians in 441 BC. Aristotle says that Pericles himself had earlier been
defeated by Melissus in a sea-battle. Appolodorus fixes the floruit of Melissus at 444-441
BC. The surviving fragments of Melissus are all preserved by Simplicius in his
Commentary on Aristotles Physics.
9.

John Burnet Early Greek Philosophy 4 ed (1930) 328.

10. Freeman op cit note 1 at 170. For a comprehensive, if somewhat dated survey of
the writings of the Eleatic philosophers, see WKC Guthrie A History of Greek Philosophy
Vol 2 Cambridge (1965) 1118.
11. Kathleen Freeman Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers Harvard (1948) 48.
12. GS Kirk & JE Raven The Presocratic Philosophers Cambridge (1960) 299.
13. Jonathan Barnes Early Greek Philosophy London (1987) 146.
14. It is a key premiss of this article that the monism articulated by Parmenides and
Melissus is an aspect of absolute Truth: in no sense can it be dismissed as an
epistemological state of mind. Here I differ strongly from the views of, inter alia
Waterfield (op cit note 8 at 82) and Hermann (op cit note 7 passim).
15. In my reading of Melissus and Parmenides, I follow mainly the translations by
Waterfield (op cit note 8 at 8486; 5866) and by Freeman (op cit note 11 at 4851;
4246).
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16. Fragment 2.
17. Fragment 4.
18. Fragment 6.1.
19. Will Durant The Life of Greece New York (1939) 350.
20. Fragment 3.
21. Kirk & Raven op cit note 12 at 300.
22. Fragment 6.7. The unlimited extent, coupled with the fullness of Being in the
account of Melissus has been misconstrued, deliberately perhaps, by the materialist
Aristotle. His motive may well have been to drive a wedge between the doctrines of
Parmenides and Melissus, in order to undermine the spiritual power of the Eleatic
teaching. Thus Aristotle holds that while the Being of Parmenides is incorporeal, that of
Melissus is corporeal (Metaphysics A5,984a29b4 and 986b10987a2; see also Physics
A3,185a10). According to Kirk & Raven (op cit note 12 at 300), Aristotle had a
profound but unjust contempt for Melissus, whom he dismisses with such words as
crude. See also Burnet op cit note 9 at 328. Aristotle concludes his cursory and
condescending dismissal of the Eleatics by repeating that they can safely be left out of
account. There is no substance in his attack, which fails altogether to recognize the
originality of the contributions of Parmenides and Melissus. Most later commentators
have correctly understood that Melissuss Being, indistinguishable from that of
Parmenides, is incorporeal. This, indeed, is what Melissus himself expressly states in
Fragment 7.
23. Fragments 5 and 8.
24. Fragments 6.1 and 8.
25. Fragment 6.7.
26. Compare the explanation given by Annamalai Swami (David Godman Living by the
Words of Bhagavan 2ed Tiruvannamalai, India (1995) 265): You have the idea that the
Self is something that you see or experience. This is not so. The Self is the awareness or
the consciousness in which the seeing and the experiencing take place. See further note
54 and text thereto.
27. See, in support of this statement, text to note 45 below. See also Kingsley In the
Dark Places of Wisdom op cit note 3 at 184192.
28. For an example of such identification, see Diels quoted in Freeman op cit note 1 at
147 n 1.
29. Yet this identification is precisely what Parmenides appears to posit in fragment 3 of
his poem. There he says that it is the same thing to think and to be. This apparent
identification of Being with thinking is uncritically adopted by all the translators and
commentators I have consulted. It is strongly arguable, however, that by thinking,
Parmenides must have meant here not the busy activity of the discursive mind, but the
altogether different operation of reason, a process of quiet reflection or meditation. That
reading alone would make sense in the context of the present discussion. In fragment 8
of his poem, Parmenides does express the true relationship between Being and the
thought-process of the discursive mind: For without what is [ie Being], in which it has
been expressed, you will not find thinking (translated by Barnes op cit note 13 at 135).
This statement makes it clear that Being, far from being identical with thinking, is the
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51

source from which all thinking arises, and which alone makes possible all thoughts, all
concepts, all notions. Thus in the true relationship between them, Being is the
independent and higher factor, thinking the dependent and lower. It follows that use of
the discursive mind or any of its faculties in order to understand what the Eleatics call
Being is a priori doomed to failure. See also text to note 40 below.
30. See text to note 50.
31. Parmenides makes this point clearly in fragment 8 of his poem.
32. For an example of the common error of treating Being, which is living reality, as a
mere notion, see Antony Flew ed A Dictionary of Philosophy 2 ed revised London (1983)
4041.
33. The Excursion I, quoted in Alan Jacobs ed Poetry for the Spirit London (2002) 242.
See also Kingsley Reality op cit note 3 at 1847.
34. There are those (see, for example MC Howatson ed The Oxford Companion to
Classical Literature 2 ed (1989) 410) who hold, quite erroneously, that the doctrines of
Parmenides offend against experience. On the contrary, as the testimony of Wordsworth
and many others shows, it is only in ones own personal experience that Being, as
described by the Eleatics, can be discovered and verified.
35. The true Self discussed in this article, is not to be confused with the little self or ego.
The subject-matter of the Eleatic philosophy can by now be seen to be of the most
elevated order dealing as it does with Being, the true Self of man. It is therefore all the
more ironic that commentators have misconstrued It to the extent of describing It as being
of the most prosaic order! (Kirk & Raven op cit note 12 at 265). Such a description is a
product of the contemporary academic mindset discussed earlier: see, for example, text
to note 7.
36. The presence of Being, both within and outside the individual, is well expressed by
Professor RC Zaehner in his comment on Chandogya Upanishad 7.25 (Dominic Goodall
Hindu Scriptures London (1996) xv):
[T]he One indwelling the human spirit realizes its own identity with the same One
which is the unchanging ground of the phenomenal world outside. This is the
lesson tirelessly rammed home in the Upanishads: it is an expression of
something, that cannot be logically formulated, but can only be hinted at in
paradox....

For modern accounts of Advaita philosophy, see Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad Eastern

Philosophy London (2005) 3541 and passim; S. Radhakrishnan ed History of
Philosophy Eastern and Western Vol 1 London (1952) 140; 272304. For comparative
discussions of the monistic Advaita position and the dualistic Samkhya approach in
Indian philosophy, see RC Zaehner Hinduism Oxford (1966) 6779; Cooper op cit note
4 at 3037.
37. It is important to note, however, that the Upanishads do not always uphold monism,
because they are revealed scriptures, not systematic treatises expounding and defending
a single world view.
38. See, however, Thomas Mc Evilley The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative
Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies New York (2002) passim.
39. Ribhu Gita 2.34, translated by NR Krishnamoorthi Aiyer The Essence of Ribhu Gita
Tiruvannamalai, India (2002) 3. See also Ribhu Gita 32.34 op cit 16, in very similar vein.
52

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40. See also note 29 in fine.

41. Fragment 2, translated by Freeman op cit note 11 at 42. The Presocratic doctrine
most radically opposed to the Parmenidean vision of changeless, unmoving Being was
perhaps that of Heraclitus. According to Kenny, Heraclitus was the proponent of the
theory that everything was in motion, while Parmenides championed the view that
nothing was in motion (Anthony Kenny Ancient Philosophy Oxford (2004) 17). For a
more detailed treatment of the opposition between these thinkers, see McEvilley, op cit
note 38 at 4301. See also AH Armstrong An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy 3ed
(1965) 13; Werner Jaeger Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture transl Gilbert Highet 2ed
vol. 1 Oxford (1945) 1834; Kingsley Reality op cit note 3 at 505559.
42. Shri Purohit Swami The Geeta London (1935) 21. See also, in particular,
Chandogya Upanishad 6.2.1-2: Goodall op cit note 36 at 132-3. Compare Ribhu Gita
35.24: Krishnamoorthi Aiyer op cit note 39 at 18.
43. For an explanation of Sankara's commentary on this text, see S. Radhakrishnan The
Bhagavadgita London (1948) 106.
44. Transl. Goodall op cit note 36 at 136. See also Chandogya Upanishad 6.8.6.
45. See text to note 27.
46. Krishnamoorthi Aiyer op cit note 39 at 6.
47. Ibid. See also Avadhut Gita 1.10: HP Shastri Avadhut Gita of Mahatma Dattatreya
4ed London (1978) 14.
48. See text to notes 33 and 34.
49. Ribhu Gita 36.25: Krishnamoorthi Aiyer op cit note 39 at 19.
50. See text to note 30.
51. Chandogya Upanishad 8.7.3: Goodall op cit note 36 at 157; Katha Upanishad
3.15: Goodall op cit 176; Vivekachudamani: Arthur Osborne ed The Collected Works of
Ramana Maharshi York Beach, USA (1997) 139; Ribhu Gita 17.29, 35.24, 40.10,
43.28: Krishnamoorthi Aiyer op cit note 39 at 7, 18, 20, 22; Devikalottara v. 58-60:
Osborne op cit 115; Ramana Maharshi Upadesa Undhiyar v. 28: Osborne op cit 85
(translated as Upadesa Saram: The Essence of Instruction); Bhagavad Gita 2.18, 2.20:
Purohit Swami op cit note 42 at 21-2; Avadhut Gita 1.13, 1.19-21: HP Shastri op cit note
47 at 14-15.
52. Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 2.3.4-5, 2.5.1-14, 3.7.3-23: Goodall op cit note 36 at
63, 66-8, 74-6; Chandogya Upanishad 8.3.4-5, 8.8.3, 8.11.1: Goodall op cit note 36
at 154-5, 158, 160; Bhagavad Gita 2.17, 2.20, 7.25, 8.3: Purohit Swami op cit note 42
at 21, 22, 49, 51; Avadhut Gita 1.7, 1.20, 1.24: Shastri op cit note 47 at 13, 15.
53. Katha Upanishad 3.15: Goodall op cit note 36 at 176; Vivekachudamani: Osborne
op cit note 51 at 139; Bhagavad Gita 7.24: Purohit Swami op cit note 42 at 49; Ramana
Maharshi Supplement to the Forty Verses v. 9: Osborne op cit note 51 at 78; Avadhut
Gita 1.6: Shastri op cit note 47 at 13.
54. Katha Upanishad 5.9-13: Goodall op cit note 36 at 180; Sveta vatara Upanishad
3.1-2: op cit 191; Ribhu Gita 43.28: Krishnamoorthi Aiyer op cit note 39 at 22;
Ashtavakra Gita 1.12: HP Shastri Ashtavakra Gita London (1949) 4; Devikalottara v 28-9:
Osborne op cit note 51 at 113; Ramana Maharshi Upadesa Undhiyar v 23, 24, 26:
Osborne op cit note 51 at 85. The last reading cited sheds light on the oneness of the Self:
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53

23. As there is no second being to know that which is, that which is is conscious.
We are that.
24. Creatures and Creator both exist. They are One in Being. Their differences
are the degrees of their knowledge and other attributes.
26. To know the Self is to be the Self as there are not two separate selves. This
(state) is thanmaya nishta (abiding as That).

See further note 26 and text thereto.

55. Chandogya Upanishad 8.12.1: Goodall op cit note 36 at 161; Upanishad v 8:
Goodall op cit 165; Avadhut Gita 1.20, 1.24: Shastri op cit note 47 at 15.
56. Vivekachudamani: Osborne op cit note 51 at 139; Avadhut Gita 1.2, 1.12: Shastri
op cit note 47 at 13-14; Ribhu Gita 44.51: Krishnamoorthi Aiyer op cit note 39 at 23.
57. Chandogya Upanishad 7.25.1: Goodall op cit note 36 at 151; vetasvatara
Upanishad 3.9, 15: Goodall op cit 192-3; Avadhut Gita 1.7, 1.11, 2.11: Shastri op cit
note 47 at 13-14, 21.
58. Upanishad v 4-5: Goodall op cit note 36 at 164; Ribhu Gita 35.33:
Krishnamoorthi Aiyer op cit note 39 at 18.
59. Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 5.1 (Invocation): Goodall op cit note 36 at 99;
Vivekachudamani: Osborne op cit note 51 at 139.
60. Upanishad v 8: Goodall op cit note 36 at 165; Brhadaranyaka Upanishad
3.9.26: Goodall op cit 81; Avadhut Gita 1.7, 1.8: Shastri op cit note 47 at 13.
61. Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 3.9.26, 4.3.23-30: Goodall op cit note 36 at 81, 90-1;
Bhagavad Gita 2.17, 18: Purohit Swami op cit note 42 at 21; Avadhut Gita 1.2: Shastri
op cit note 47 at 13.
62. Vivekachudamani: Osborne op cit note 51 at 139; Devikalottara v 59: Osborne op
cit 115; Bhagavad Gita 2.20: Purohit Swami op cit note 42 at 22; Avadhut Gita 1.13,
1.38: Shastri op cit note 47 at 14, 17.
63. Avadhut Gita 1.4: Shastri op cit note 47 at 13.
64. The Vedantic texts do, however, mention many additional aspects of the Self which
the Eleatic writings do not mention in relation to Being. This, of course, merely goes to
show that the surviving Vedantic literature, scriptural or otherwise, is immensely rich and
voluminous by comparison with the sparse fragments which have come down to us from
the Eleatics.
65. See, for example, Ribhu Gita 40.10: Krishnamoorthi Aiyer op cit note 39 at 20; Drik
Drisya Viveka, a work by Sankara, translated by Ramana Maharshi: Osborne op cit note
51 at 176.
66. S. Radhakrishnan Eastern Religions and Western Thought 2ed (1959) 134. But see
McEvilley op cit note 38 passim.
67. It is only in recent decades that India has begun in earnest to cultivate a policy of
economic growth. As an Asian economy, she now ranks second only to China.
68. The principle is well expressed in Bhagavad Gita 6.32 (Purohit Swami op cit note 42
at 45): He is ... perfect ... who, taught by the likeness within himself, sees the same Self
everywhere, whether the outer form be pleasurable or painful.
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69. To argue here that the Self or Being cannot be hurt or injured is, of course, to miss
the point.
70. One example is Spinozas doctrine of a single substance on which everything
depends. The monistic position has never been without its critics, who include the
Presocratics themselves: for the attack of Leucippus and Democritus, see JV Luce An
Introduction to Greek Philosophy London (1992) 728.
71. Ulladu Narpadu (Forty Verses on Reality) 34: Osborne op cit note 51 at 75.
72. Vivekachudamani: Osborne op cit note 51 at 139.

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