Sie sind auf Seite 1von 4

PHIL DIAMOD HOTEL v MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL EEs UNION

GR NO 158075
JUNE 30, 2006
The union filed a Petition for CE seeking certification as the exclusive bargaining representative
of its members. DOLE-NCR denied the petition for failure to comply with the legal
requirements and that the CE was seen to fragment the EEs of the ER. The unions president
notified ER of its intention to negotiate a CBA for its members. ER advised the union that it was
not certified by the DOLE as the exclusive bargaining representative and ER could not recognize
the union as such. Because of this, the union filed a Notice of Strike and thereafter, conciliation
proceedings were conducted. However, a day before a scheduled conciliation meeting, the
union suddenly went on strike! ER filed a petition to declare the strike illegal. NLRC- the strike
was illegal. CA- the strike was illegal.
Argument of union: it sought to bargain for its members only and that the ERs refusal to bargain would
prompt the union to engage in concerted activities.
ISSUE: Can the union represent its members in the negotiations for a CBA?
RULING: No. As per LC 255 (now 267), the labor organization designated or selected by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive
representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. Only the
labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit is the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining.
The union is admittedly not the exclusive representative of the majority of the EEs of the ER,
hence, it could not demand from ER the right to bargain collectively in their behalf.
Union insists, however, that it could validly bargain in behalf of "its members," relying on LC
242 (now 251) - A legitimate labor organization shall have the right: (a) To act as representative
of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining. Unions reliance on said article, a
general provision on the rights of legitimate labor organizations, is misplaced, for not every
legitimate labor organization possesses the rights mentioned therein. Article 242 (a) (now 251- a)
must be read in relation to above-quoted Article 255 (now 267).
On respondents contention that it was bargaining in behalf only of its members, the appellate
court, affirming the NLRCs observation that the same would only "fragment the employees" of
petitioner,41 held that "what [respondent] will be achieving is to divide the employees, more
particularly, the rank-and-file employees of [petitioner] . . . the other workers who are not
members are at a serious disadvantage, because if the same shall be allowed, employees who are
non-union members will be economically impaired and will not be able to negotiate their terms
and conditions of work, thus defeating the very essence and reason of collective bargaining,

which is an effective safeguard against the evil schemes of employers in terms and conditions of
work."42 This Court finds the observation well-taken.
It bears noting that the goal of the DOLE is geered towards "a single employer wide unit which
is more to the broader and greater benefit of the employees working force."43 The philosophy is
to avoid fragmentation of the bargaining unit so as to strengthen the employees bargaining
power with the management. To veer away from such goal would be contrary, inimical and
repugnant to the objectives of a strong and dynamic unionism.44
Petitioners refusal to bargain then with respondent can not be considered a ULP to justify the
staging of the strike.

R TRANSPORT CORP v LAGUESMA, CLOP, NAFLU, and ALU-TUCP


GR NO 106830
NOVEMBER 16, 1993
CLOP filed with the Med Arbiter a Petition for CE among the RnF EEs of ER. The Med Arbiter
dismissed the petition on the ground that the bargaining unit sought to be represented by
respondent did not include all the eligible employees of petitioner but only the drivers,
conductors and conductresses to the exclusion of the inspectors, inspectresses, dispatchers,
mechanics and washerboys. CLOP rectified its mistake and filed a second Petition for CE. ER
moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds of res judicata. MA denied the motion and
ordered the conduct of CE. ALU-TUCP intervened and alleged that it has members in the
proposed bargaining unit. NAFLU filed a separate Petition for CE and a motion to consolidate
related cases to avoid confusion. ER filed an MR on the decision of MA, it was denied.
Argument of ER: (1) Res judicata. (2) The second petition for a certification election by CLOP, NAFLU
and ALU-TUCP were barred at least for a period of one year from the time the first petition of CLOP was
dismissed pursuant to Section Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code as
amended.
ISSUE: Is the second Petition for CE barred by res judicata?
Is the second Petition for CE barred by the one-year bar/certification year rule?
RULING: Both NO. Before the principle of res judicata can be operative, the following requisites
must be present: a) the former judgment or order must be final; b) it must be a judgment ororder
on the merits; c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subjectmatter and the parties; and d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of
parties.
In the case at bench, it cannot be said that the parties in the first and second actions were
identical. The first action was dismissed by the Med-Arbiter because it excluded parties essential
to the bargaining unit such as inspectors, inspectresses, dispatchers and washer boys. The
second petition included all the employees who were excluded in the first petition. Therefore,
the Med-Arbiter was correct when he gave due course to the second petition for certification
election after CLOP corrected its mistake.
Likewise untenable is ERs contention that the second petition for certification election should
have been filed after one year from the dismissal of the first petition certification election under
Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code as amended. Said
section provides as follows:
When to file In the absence of collective bargaining agreement duly registered in accordance with
Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election may be filed any time. However, no

certification election may be held within one year from the date of the issuance of a final certification
election result (Emphasis supplied).
Apparently, ER misread the above-mentioned provision of law. The phrase "final certification
election result" means that there was an actual conduct of election i.e. ballots were cast and there
was a counting of votes. In this case, there was no certification election conducted precisely
because the first petition was dismissed, on the ground of a defective petition which did not
include all the employees who should be properly included in the collective bargaining unit.