Sie sind auf Seite 1von 22

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH


SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013
FACTS:
On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident
of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended
Petition to Deny Due Course or to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of
petitioner on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations. On 27 March
2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling petitioners COC. In
addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have the one-year
residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Not
agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration on 8 April 2013. On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc
promulgated a Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit. Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of
the 13 May 2013 Elections. On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a
Certificate of Finality declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc final and executory, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have
elapsed from the date of promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining
its execution. On same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano R.
Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives. Petitioner has yet to assume
office, the term of which officially starts at noon of 30 June 2013.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is a
duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position
of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of
Marinduque.
RULING:
The term of office of the Members of the House of Representatives begins on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election. Section 17 provides that The
Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the
HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the House
of Representatives. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals assumption of
jurisdiction begins only after a candidate has become a member of the
House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
jurisdiction over the question. In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, citing Aggabao v.
COMELEC and Guerrero v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that once a winning candidate
has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the
House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating
to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction
begins. From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the
House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. The
petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because,
primarily, she has not yet assumed office. The term of office of a Member of the
House of Representatives begins only at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division is upheld.

HERMILINA ABAINZA vs ERNESTO ARELLANO and COMELEC


G.R. No. 181644, December 8, 2008
FACTS:
Private respondent Ernesto C. Arellano and petitioner Hermilina N. Abainza were
among the candidates for the position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Jovellar, Albay, in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections.
Private respondent received 2,983 votes and held the 9th spot. On May 21, 2007,
private respondent filed a petition for correction of the number of votes in Clustered
Precinct Nos. 46-A/47-A due to erroneous tally. Meanwhile, onJune 29, 2007,
petitioner took her oath of office. On September 3, 2007, the COMELEC 1st Division
rendered a Resolution annulling the proclamation of petitioner as councilor of
the Municipality of Jovellar, Albay, due to erroneous tally of votes. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration. However, the COMELEC en banc denied the same in a
Resolution dated January 30, 2008.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC has original jurisdiction over the petition for correction of
manifest error.
RULING:
We resolve to dismiss the petition. The COMELEC is empowered by the Constitution
to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election. It exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials. It is empowered to promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. Correction of
manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of results during the canvassing may be
filed directly with the Commission, even after a proclamation of the winning
candidates.
The
proclamation
of
petitioner
as
councilor
of
the Municipality of Jovellar, Albay, was due to a manifest error when what were
entered in the election return were 14 instead of 114 as the number of votes
obtained by private respondent. Despite the proclamation of the winning
candidates, the COMELEC still has jurisdiction to correct manifest errors in the
election returns for the Sangguniang Bayan candidates. It is true that this provision
deals with pre-proclamation controversies. However, it has also been held
applicable to cases when a proclamation had already been made, where the validity
of the candidates proclamation was precisely in question. With the finding by the
COMELEC of a manifest error in Election Return No. 2900930 from Clustered Precinct
Nos. 46-A/47-A, petitioners proclamation was, therefore, flawed from the very
beginning. It was not a valid proclamation. And when a proclamation is null and
void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all; thus, the proclaimed candidates
assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such
nullity and annul the proclamation. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO v COMELEC


G.R. No. 199082, July 23, 2013
FACTS:
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011
creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team (referred to as
Joint Panel) on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases. The Joint Committee was mandated to conduct the necessary
preliminary investigation on the basis of the evidence gathered and the charges
recommended by the Fact-Finding Team. The Fact-Finding Team, on the other hand,
was created for the purpose of gathering real, documentary, and testimonial
evidence which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be conducted by
the Joint Committee. Pursuant to Section 7 of the Joint Order, on August 23, 2011,
the Joint Committee promulgated its Rules of Procedure. In its Initial Report dated
October 20, 2011, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results
in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South
Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. On October 24, 2011, the Joint
Committee issued two subpoenas against petitioners. Thereafter, petitioners filed
before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel. On November 14, 2011, Mike
Arroyo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings before the Joint Committee, in view of the
pendency of his petition before the Court. On the same day, GMA filed before the
Joint Committee an Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to require Senator Pimentel to
furnish her with documents referred to in his complaint-affidavit and for the
production of election documents as basis for the charge of electoral sabotage. In
an Order dated November 15, 2011, the Joint Committee denied the aforesaid
motions of petitioners. GMA, subsequently, filed a motion for reconsideration. On
November 16, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated a Joint Resolution which was
later indorsed to the Comelec. On November 18, 2011, the Comelec en banc issued
a Resolution approving and adopting the Joint Resolution subject to modifications.
On November 18, 2011, GMA filed with the RTC an Urgent Omnibus Motion Ad
Cautelam with leave to allow the Joint Committee to resolve the motion for
reconsideration filed by GMA. On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the
assailed Decision stating that the constitutionality of the Joint Panel and the
proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of
the preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional
independence of the Comelec.
RULING:
In Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)
Party-List v. Commission on Elections, the constitutionality of Section 43 of RA
9369 had already been raised by petitioners therein and addressed by the Court.
While recognizing the Comelecs exclusive power to investigate and prosecute
cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code, the Court

pointed out that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such intention.
This exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that can very well be amended by
Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other
prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent
jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.In Comelec
Resolution No. 3467, the Comelec maintained the continuing deputation of
prosecutors and the Comelec Law Department was tasked to supervise the
investigatory and prosecutory functions of the task force pursuant to the mandate
of the Omnibus Election Code. However, with the amendment, the Comelec likewise
changed the tenor of the later resolutions to reflect the new mandate of the
Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government now exercising concurrent
jurisdiction. Thus, the Comelec Law Department and the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor of the DOJ were tasked to jointly supervise the investigatory and
prosecutory functions of the Comelec-DOJ Task Force. Considering, therefore, that
the later resolutions, including Joint Order No. 001-2011, were issued pursuant to
Section 43 of RA 9369 amending Section 265 of BP 881 which was declared
"constitutional" in Banat, there is no reason for us to declare otherwise. To maintain
the previous role of other prosecuting arms of the government as mere deputies
despite the amendment would mean challenging Section 43 of RA 9369 anew which
has already been settled in Banat. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motions
for Reconsideration are DENIED for lack of merit
CASAN MACODE MAQUILLING v COMELEC
G.R. No. 195649, APRIL 16, 2013
FACTS:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of
his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost
his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July
2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition was issued in his favor. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua
(Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte. Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner. On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First
Division) issued an Order requiring the respondent to personally file his answer and
memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof. Arnado failed to answer
the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence exparte. Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections
where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently
proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. In
the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with
Arnados claim that he is a Filipino citizen. Arnado sought reconsideration of the
resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling
(Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, intervened in the case and
filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an
Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that
while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under
Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case.
Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and the
nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable
to this case.
RULING:

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful


winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the
first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening
circumstances; his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election
date. Notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate
remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a
candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of
ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the
substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office. The ballot cannot
override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and
eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the
candidate. It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice
through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. With
Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he
obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates. A void
COC cannot produce any legal effect. With Amado being barred from even becoming
a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It
could not have produced any other legal effect. To hold that such proclamation is
valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Amado
possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of
Amado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to
the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Amado is declared to be not a candidate at
all in the May 201 0 elections. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his
favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on
succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MIGUEL R. VILLAFUERTE
G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were both candidates for the Gubernatorial position of the
Province of Camarines Sur in the May 13, 2013 local and national elections. On
October 25, 2012, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Verified Petition to deny due
course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy (COC) of respondent. That
respondent deliberately omitted his first name MIGUEL and inserted, instead LRAY
JR., which is the nickname of his father, the incumbent Governor of Camarines Sur,
LRay Villafuerte, Jr. On January 15, 2013, the COMELECs First Division denied the
petition for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the
COMELEC En Banc, which denied the same in a Resolution dated April 1, 2013.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent committed a material misrepresentation under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code so as to justify the cancellation of his COC.
RULING:
For the petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of one candidate to prosper,
the candidate must have made a material misrepresentation involving his eligibility
or qualification for the office to which he seeks election, such as the requisite
residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for local
elective office as provided in the Local Government Code. Respondents nickname
written in the COC cannot be considered a material fact which pertains to his
eligibility and thus qualification to run for public office. As we said, respondents
nickname is not considered a material fact, and there is no substantial evidence
showing that in writing the nickname LRAY JR. MIGZ in his COC, respondent had
the intention to deceive the voters as to his identity which has an effect on his
eligibility or qualification for the office he seeks to assume. Notably, respondent is
known to the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur as the son of the then

incumbent Governor of the province, popularly known as LRay. The appellation


LRAY JR., accompanied by the name MIGZ16 written as respondents nickname in
his COC, is not at all misleading to the voters, as in fact, such name distinguishes
respondent from his father, the then incumbent Governor LRAY, who was running
for a Congressional seat in the 2nd District of Camarines Sur. WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated April 1, 2013, of the Commission on
Elections En Banc, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND


LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ
G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013
FACTS:
On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of
candidacy with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional
office as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte. One of the
opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla filed a Verified Petition, alleging that
Richard, who was actually a resident of College Street, East Greenhills, San Juan
City, Metro Manila. Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year
residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. Juntilla prayed that Richards CoC be denied due course and/or
cancelled. On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a
Resolution granting Juntillas petition. Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration
but the same was denied by the COMELEC En Banc. Thereafter, in a Manifestation of
even date, Richard accepted the said resolution with finality "in order to enable his
substitute to facilitate the filing of the necessary documents for substitution. On
May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez filed her CoC together with a Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the partys
official substitute candidate vice her husband. The COMELEC En Banc, in the
exercise of its administrative functions, issued Resolution No. 889011 on May 8,
2010, approving, among others, the recommendation of the said department to
allow the substitution of private respondent. The said resolution was affirmed by the
Commission En Banc on May 04, 2010. The substitution complied with the
requirements provided under Section 12 in relation to Section 13 of Comelec
Resolution No. 8678 dated October 6, 2009. The following day, or on May 9, 2010,
Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the abovementioned COMELEC En Banc resolution. Pending resolution of Juntillas May 9, 2010
Motion, the national and local elections were conducted as scheduled on May 10,
2010. On May 11, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to resolve the

pending May 9, 2010 Motion relative to Resolution No. 8890. The said motion,
however, remained unacted. On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition for quo
warranto before the HRET. After due proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed
March 22, 2012 Decision which dismissed the quo warranto petition and declared
that private respondent was a qualified candidate for the position of Leyte
Representative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the HRET gravely abused its discretion in finding that Richard was
validly substituted by private respondent as candidate for Leyte Representative.
RULING:
Yes. The Court observes that the HRET wantonly disregarded the law by deliberately
adopting the COMELEC En Bancs flawed findings regarding private respondents
eligibility to run for public office which essentially stemmed from her substitution. In
this light, it cannot be gainsaid that the HRET gravely abused its discretion. Owing
to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a
bona fide candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte
when she ran for office, which means that she could not have been elected.
Considering this pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell on
the other issues respecting private respondents own qualification to office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22, 2012 Decision
rendered by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10031 (QW) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS


G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010
FACTS:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the
organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang
Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC. Before the
COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and underrepresented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point
guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base
consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its
platform of governance. On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners
evidence, the COMELEC dismissed the Petition on moral grounds. When Ang
Ladlad sought reconsideration, three commissioners voted to overturn the First
Assailed Resolution while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion
for Reconsideration. The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the
majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution. On January 4,
2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed
Resolutions and directs the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for
accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary

mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it
would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25,
2010.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC erred in denying the petition of Ang Ladlad to be
registered as a party-list.
RULING:
Yes. COMELEC mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for
the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related
to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled
in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, "the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941. We find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang
Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the
Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines
was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates
and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion
group. Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella
organization with affiliates around the Philippines. We find that Ang Ladlad has
sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated
allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever
found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization
under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.
The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof. As a
final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case
are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and
religious communities are divided in opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its
own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as
best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that
our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate. WHEREFORE, the
Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated
November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET
ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for
party-list accreditation.

ROBERTO DIZON v COMELEC


G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009
FACTS:
Roberto L. Dizon, is a resident and taxpayer of the Municipality of Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Marino P. Morales, is the incumbent Mayor of the Municipality of
Mabalacat, Pampanga. Petitioner alleges respondent was proclaimed as the
municipal mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga during the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004
elections and has fully served the same. Respondent filed his Certificate of
Candidacy on March 28, 2007 again for the same position and same municipality.
Petitioner argues that respondent is no longer eligible and qualified to run for the
same position for the May 14, 2007 elections under Section 43 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. Under the said provision, no local elective official is
allowed to serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms for the same position.
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY the instant Petition to
Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy and/or Petition for the Disqualification of Marino

P. Morales for lack of merit. Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC erred when it ruled that respondent morales did not
violate the three-year term limit when he ran and won as mayor of mabalacat
Pampanga during the 2007 election.
RULING:
The petition has no merit. For purposes of determining the resulting disqualification
brought about by the three-term limit, it is not enough that an individual has served
three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected
to the same position for the same number of times. There should be a concurrence
of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. Our
ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales involuntary severance from office with
respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of
time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity
of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was
effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayors office of our
decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to
30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no
matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales continuity of service.
Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. We
concede that Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following
periods: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30
June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007. However, because of his
disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term.
Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term.
Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he
was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales
occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007
cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-term limit.
Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes
of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is
effectively Morales first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution of the Commission
on Elections En Bancdated 14 February 2008 as well as the Resolution of the
Commission on Elections Second Division dated 27 July 2007.

ALDOVINO VS COMELEC AND ASILO


G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009
FACTS:
The respondent COMELEC ruled that preventive suspension is an effective
interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide
complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the
purpose of the three-term limit rule. The present petition seeks to annul and set

aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected councilor of
Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 20042007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office,
the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a
criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the
Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions
of his office and finished his term. In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of
candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino,Jr., Danilo B.
Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate
of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served
for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term
limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b)of RA 7160.
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in
its Resolution of November 28,2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule
did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the2004-2007 term
because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
ISSUE:
Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the
three-term limit rule; and .Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary
renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
HELD:
NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious. As worded, the constitutional provision fixes
the term of a local elective office and limits an elective officials stay in office to no
more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in
Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of
time three years during which an official has title to office and can serve The word
"term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law
describes that an officer may hold an office., preventive suspension is not a
qualified interruption. Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections presented the question
of whether the disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the
election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of
the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final
and executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the
disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully
served three consecutive terms The petitioner vacated his post a few months
before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance
with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that
effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of
service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral terms.
"Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule
is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective
official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for
an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8,
Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective
officials continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using
"voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an
interruption. Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that
preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an
elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot
simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in
office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the
office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials
continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the
authority to appoint one since no vacancy exist.

Penera vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), et al.


G.R. 181613; 11 September 2009
Facts:
The COMELEC disqualified petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera (Penera) as a candidate for
mayor of the Municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for unlawfully engaging
in election campaign before the start of the campaign period for the 2007
Synchronized National and Local Elections, in violation of Section 80 of Batas
Pambansa 881. The COMELEC found that Penera and her party-mates, after filing
their Certificates of Candidacy conducted a motorcade through Sta. Monica and
threw candies to onlookers, aboard trucks festooned with balloons and banners
bearing their names and pictures and the municipal positions for which they were
seeking election. COMELEC Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented. He
emphasized that under Section 15 of Republic Act 8436 (the law authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting
of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local
elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is now considered a
candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Thus, before the start of the
campaign period, there can be no election campaign or partisan political activity
because there is no candidate to speak of. Accordingly, Penera could not be
disqualified for premature campaigning because the motorcade took place outside
the campaign period when Penera was not yet a candidate. Sarmiento posited
that Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369, has practically made it
impossible to commit premature campaigning at any time, and has, thus, effectively
repealed Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Penera filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the Supreme Court to nullify the disqualification. She argued that
the evidence was grossly insufficient to warrant the COMELECs ruling. She
maintained that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned, and the
supporters merely joined her and the other candidates.
Issue:
Whether or not Penera should be disqualified for engaging in election campaign or
partisan political activity outside the campaign period.
Holding:
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits any person, whether a voter, a
candidate or a party, from engaging in any election campaign or partisan political
activity outside the campaign period (except that political parties may hold political
conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates within 30 days before
the campaign period and 45 days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential election).
And, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate declared by final
decision to have engaged in premature campaigning shall be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Said
candidate may also face criminal prosecution for an election offense under Section
262 of the same Code. Thus, Penera, who had been elected Mayor of Sta. Monica
before the COMELEC rendered its decision, was disqualified from holding the said
office. The proclaimed Vice-Mayor was declared her rightful successor pursuant to
Section 44 of the Local Government Code which provides that if the mayor fails to
qualify or is removed from office, the vice-mayor shall become the mayor. Section
80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant and applicable despite Section
15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended. (1) Republic Act No. 9369, which
amended Republic Act No. 8436, did not expressly repeal Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code. (2) There is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Thus, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his becoming a
candidate (prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts
described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign
or partisan political activity. However, it is only after said person officially becomes a
candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as
premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after

said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can
his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning.

Chato vs. HRET, G.R. No. 199149, January 22, 2013


Facts:
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato renewed her bid in the May 10,2010 elections as
representative of the Second Legislative District of Camarines Norte, composed of
the seven (7) Municipalities of Daet, Vinzons, Basud, Mercedes, Talisay, San Vicente,
and San Lorenzo, with a total of 205 clustered precincts. She lost to Elmer E.
Panotes who was proclaimed the winner on May 12, 2010 having garnered a total of
51,707 votes as against Chato's 47,822 votes, or a plurality of 3,885 votes. On May
24, 2010, Chato filed an electoral protest before the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal assailing the results in all the 160 clustered precincts in four (4)
municipalities. In its Resolution No. 11-208, the HRET directed the copying of the
picture image files of ballots relative to the protest.
Issues:
What are the two types of automated election system (AES)?
What system was adopted in the May 2010 Elections?
Whether or not the picture images of the ballots may be considered as official
ballots?
Ruling:
There are two types of AES identified under R.A. No. 9369: (1) paper-based election
system, which uses paper ballots, records and counts votes, tabulates,
consolidates/canvasses and transmits electronically the results of the vote count. ;
and (2) direct recording electronic election system, which uses electronic ballots,
records, votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electrooptical component that can be activated by the voter, processes data by means of
computer programs, record voting data and ballot images, and transmits voting
results electronically. The May 10, 2010 elections used a paper-based technology
that allowed voters to fill out an official paper ballot by shading the oval opposite
the names of their chosen candidates. Each voter was then required to personally
feed his ballot into the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machine which scanned
both sides of the ballots simultaneously, meaning, in just one pass. As established
during the required demo tests, the system captured the images of the ballots in
encrypted format which, when decrypted for verification, were found to be digitized
representations of the ballots cast. Yes. The SC agreed with the HRET that the
picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise
official ballots that faithfully captures in electronic form the votes cast by the
voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof
are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus,
may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.

MAMERTO T. SEVILLA, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RENATO R. SO


G.R. NO. 203833, March 19, 2013
FACTS:
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Sucat, Muntinlupa City during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections. On October 26, 2010, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed
Sevilla as the winner with a total of 7,354 votes or a winning margin of 628 votes
over So's 6,726 total votes. On November 4, 2010, So filed an election protest with
the MeTC on the ground that Sevilla committed electoral fraud, anomalies and
irregularities in all the protested precincts. So pinpointed twenty percent (20%) of
the total number of the protested precincts. He also prayed for a manual revision of
the ballots. Following the recount of the ballots in the pilot protested precincts, the
MeTC issued an Order dated May 4, 2011 dismissing the election protest. On May 9,
2011, So filed a motion for reconsideration from the dismissal order instead of a
notice of appeal; he also failed to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary
period. On May 17, 2011, the MeTC denied the motion for reconsideration on the
ground that it was a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 1, Rule 6 of A.M. No.
07-04-15-SC. In response, So filed a petition for certiorari on May 31, 2011 with the
Comelec, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Judge. So faults
the MeTC for its non-observance of the rule that in the appreciation of ballots, there
should be a clear and distinct presentation of the specific details of how and why a
certain group of ballots should be considered as having been written by one or two
persons. In its May 14, 2012 Resolution, the Comelec Second Division granted So's
petition. The Comelec en banc, by a vote of 3-3, affirmed the Comelec Second
Division's ruling in its October 6, 2012 Resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC validly rendered a decision with a only a vote of 3-3.
RULING:
We resolve to DISMISS the petition for having been prematurely filed with this Court,
and remand the case to the COMELEC for its appropriate action. The October 6,
2012 Comelec en banc's Resolution lacks legal effect as it is not a majority decision
required by the Constitution and by the Comelec Rules of Procedure. We have
previously ruled that a majority vote requires a vote of four members of the
Comelec en banc. In the present case, while the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the
Comelec en banc appears to have affirmed the Comelec Second Division's
Resolution and, in effect, denied Sevilla's motion for reconsideration, the equally
divided voting between three Commissioners concurring and three Commissioners
dissenting is not the majority vote that the Constitution and the Comelec Rules of
Procedure require for a valid pronouncement of the assailed October 6, 2012
Resolution of the Comelec en banc. In essence, based on the 3-3 voting, the
Comelec en banc did not sustain the Comelec Second Division's findings on the
basis of the three concurring votes by Commissioners Tagle, Velasco and Yusoph;
conversely, it also did not overturn the Comelec Second Division on the basis of the
three dissenting votes by Chairman Brillantes, Commissioner Sarmiento and
Commissioner Lim, as either side was short of one (1) vote to obtain a majority
decision. The October 6, 2012 Comelec en banc's Resolution must be reheard

pursuant to the Comelec Rules of Procedure. To break the legal stalemate in case
the opinion is equally divided among the members of the Comelec en banc, Section
6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates a rehearing where parties
are given the opportunity anew to strengthen their respective positions or
arguments and convince the members of the Comelec en banc of the merit of their
case. The Comelec, despite the obvious inclination of three commissioners to affirm
the Resolution of the First Division, cannot do away with a rehearing since its Rules
clearly provide for such a proceeding for the body to have a solicitous review of the
controversy before it. A rehearing clearly presupposes the participation of the
opposing parties for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, if any, and
further clarifying and amplifying their arguments. In the present case, it appears
from the records that the Comelec en banc did not issue an Order for a rehearing of
the case in view of the filing in the interim of the present petition for certiorari by
Sevilla. In both the cases of Juliano and Marcoleta, cited above, we remanded the
cases to the Comelec en banc for the conduct of the required rehearing pursuant to
the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Based on these considerations, we thus find that a
remand of this case is necessary for the Comelec en banc to comply with the
rehearing requirement of Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO KNOWN AS
ARARO PARTY-LIST vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 192803, December 10, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner, Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc.,(ARARO) was a duly
accredited party-list under Republic Act No. 7941. (ARARO) garnered a total of
(147,204) votes in the May 10, 2010 elections and ranked (50th). The Commission
on Elections En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers initially proclaimed
(28) party-list organizations as winners involving a total of (35) seats guaranteed
and additional seats. The result was based on the Commission on Elections count of
(121) Certificates of Canvass or a total of (29,750,041) votes for the Party-List
System. Petitioner then filed an election protest before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal questioning the Resolution of the Commission on
Elections that proclaimed the 28 party-list groups. Without waiting for the resolution
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the petitioner filed the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. In its November 12, 2010 Comment, the Commission
on Elections through the Office of the Solicitor General took the position that invalid
or stray votes should not be counted in determining the divisor.
ISSUE:
Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in its
interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC to determine the party-list
groups that would be proclaimed in the 2010 elections.
RULING:
We agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined
to be invalid due to no cause attributable to the voter should not be excluded in the
divisor. In other words, votes cast validly for a party-list group listed in the ballot but
later on disqualified should be counted as part of the divisor. To do otherwise would
be to disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good faith that that ballot
contained all the qualified candidates. However, following this rationale, party-list
groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the
elections and whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the
Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included
in the divisor. Not all votes cast in the elections should be included in the divisor.
Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes cast for the
party-list system shall be considered in the computation of the percentage of
representation. The total votes cast do not include invalid votes. Votes cast for the
party-list system should, however, include all votes cast for party-list groups
contained in the ballot even if subsequently they are disqualified by the Commission

on Elections or by our courts. Thus, the formula to determine the proportion


garnered by the party-list group would now henceforth be: Number of votes of
party-list ______________________________ = Proportion or Percentage of votes
garnered by party-list Total number of valid votes for party-list candidates. The total
votes cast for the party-list system include those votes made for party-list groups
indicated in the ballot regardless of the pendency of their motions for
reconsideration or petitions before any tribunal in relation to their cancellation or
disqualification cases. However, votes made for those party-list groups whose
disqualification attained finality prior to the elections should be excluded if the
electorate is notified of the finality of their disqualification by the Commission on
Elections. The divisor also shall not include invalid votes. WHEREFORE from the
above discussion:
1. The prayer to enjoin the Commission on Elections from proclaiming the qualified
party-list groups is denied for being moot and academic;
2. The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as used and interpreted
in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC, is MODIFIED as follows:
Number of votes. of party-list Total number of valid votes for party-list candidates
Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list. The divisor shall be the
total number of valid votes cast for the party-list system including votes cast for
party-list groups whose names are in the ballot but are subsequently disqualified.
Party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior
to the elections and whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the
Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included
in the divisor. The divisor shall also not include votes that are declared spoiled or
invalid. The refined formula shall apply prospectively to succeeding party-list
elections from the date of finality of this case.
ATONG PAGLAUM v COMELEC
G.R. No. 203766
FACTS:
This case partially abandoned the
rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs
COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC. Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were
disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for
various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors. Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition
for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
the said party-lists.
HELD:
No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the
COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned
some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as
follows: I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following
parameters: 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:
(1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and
(3) sectoral parties or organizations. 2. National parties or organizations and
regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do
not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector. 3. Political
parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the partylist system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections
can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. 4.
Sectoral
parties or organizations may either be marginalized and

underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough


that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political
constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. 5. A
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that
represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong
to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations
must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations. 6. National, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified. II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as
has always been the practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But,
since theres really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major
political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that they do so
through their bona fide sectoral wing. In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized
that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the
intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system
should be reserved for the marginalized sectors. III.The Supreme Court also
emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the marginalized and
underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. It
is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and causeoriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. As explained by the
Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic
Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups
of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
qualified as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political
constituencies as they are ideologically marginalized.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES v COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 206844-45
July 23, 2013
FACTS:
On March 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc accredited SENIOR CITIZENS as a partylist organization in a Resolution issued on even date in SPP No. 06-026. SENIOR
CITIZENS participated in the May 14, 2007 elections. However, the organization
failed to get the required two percent (2%) of the total votes cast. Subsequently,
SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. After the
conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all
the party-list candidates. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee, Rep.
Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho. The split
among the ranks of SENIOR CITIZENS came about not long after. According to the
Datol Groups petition, the members of SENIOR CITIZENS held a national convention
on November 27, 2010 in order to address "the unfulfilled commitment of Rep.
Arquiza to his constituents. Thenceforth, the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS had
been engaged in a bitter rivalry as both groups, with their own sets of officers,
claimed leadership of the organization. On December 14, 2011, Rep. Arquiza
informed the office of COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. in a letter dated
December 8, 2011 that the second nominee of SENIOR CITIZENS, Rep. Kho, had
tendered his resignation. The fourth nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, was to assume
the vacant position in view of the previous expulsion from the organization of the

third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr. On April 18, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc
conducted a hearing on SENIOR CITIZENS petition in E.M. No. 12-040. On June 27,
2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution in E.M. No. 12-040, dismissing the
petition of the SENIOR CITIZENS (Arquiza Group). The Datol Group filed A Very
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the above resolution, but the same remained
unresolved. Meanwhile, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their respective
Manifestations of Intent to participate in the Party-list System of Representation in
the May 13, 2013 Elections under the name of SENIOR CITIZENS. The Manifestation
of the Datol Group was docketed as SP No. 12-157 (PLM), while that of the Arquiza
Group was docketed as SPP No. 12-191. On December 4, 2012, the COMELEC En
Banc issued a Resolution in SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) and 12-191 (PLM). By a vote of 43, the COMELEC En Banc ordered the cancellation of the registration of SENIOR
CITIZENS. The rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS challenged the above resolution
before this Court by filing their respective petitions for certiorari. The petition filed
by the Datol Group was docketed as G.R. No. 204421, while the petition of the
Arquiza Group was docketed as G.R. No. 204425.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY ON TERM SHARING.
RULING:
The term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS was not
implemented. This fact was manifested by the Arquiza Group. Thereafter, in its
Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself
refused to recognize the term-sharing agreement and the tender of resignation of
Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy was created despite the
execution of the said agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol
Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all
intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his term as a
member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, if the term-sharing
agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that
SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily
penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR
CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg
to stand on. In sum, the due process violations committed in this case and the lack
of a legal ground to disqualify the SENIOR CITIZENS spell out a finding of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
COMELEC En Banc. We are, thus, left with no choice but to strike down the assailed
Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12191 (PLM). Having established that the COMELEC En Banc erred in ordering the
disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and
accreditation, said organization is entitled to be proclaimed as one of the winning
party-list organizations in the recently concluded May 13, 2013 election.
JOSE MARQUEZ PANLILIO V COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Panlilio and respondent Samuel de Jesus, Sr. ran against each other
for Mayor of Busuanga, Palawan, in the May 14, 2007 elections. De Jesus won. On
May 25, 2007 Panlilio filed an election protest. On March 7, 2008 the RTC declared
Panlilio the winner over De Jesus by two votes. De Jesus appealed the RTC decision
to the COMELEC. The RTC denied the motion. De Jesus filed a motion for
reconsideration but the RTC denied it. On May 15, 2008 the COMELECs Second
Division issued a 60-day TRO. On July 15, 2008 the Second Division issued a
resolution, granting respondent De Jesus petition and setting aside the RTCs orders
of April 17 and 28, 2008. On July 19, 2008 Panlilio filed a motion for reconsideration
of the July 15, 2008 order. n September 4, 2008 respondent De Jesus hurried to the
COMELEC en banc to seek relief. On September 5, 2008 the en banc set aside the
RTCs order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
enjoined the implementation of the RTCs order.
RULING:
The implementation of the main relief grantedthe setting aside of the RTCs orders
that allowed execution pending appealmay be deemed suspended when
petitioner Panlilio filed a motion for its reconsideration. But the preliminary
injunction component of the resolutionthe maintenance of the status quo that
existed before the RTC issued its April 17, 2008 orderis not suspended. It is
expressly kept in force. The Court does not have to resolve this issue considering its
ruling above. At any rate, it seems clear that the subject matter of the present
petition is the COMELEC en bancs order of September 15, 2008, enjoining the
parties to maintain the status quo directed by its Second Division. On the other
hand, the subject matter of petitioner Panlilios September 17, 2008 manifestation
urging action from the COMELEC en banc is the motion for reconsideration that he
filed from the resolution or decision of the Second Division. Since the Court did not
enjoin this, the COMELEC en banc was free to proceed with its adjudication of the
main case. ACCORDINGLY, the Court DISMISSES the petition and AFFIRMS the orders
of the Commission on Elections En Banc in SPR 76-2008 dated September 5 and 11,
2008.

ROMULO PECSON v COMELEC


FACTS:
Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty position in
the Municipality of Magalang, Province of Pampanga in the May 2007 elections.
On May 17, 2007, Cunanan was proclaimed the winning candidate. Pecson filed an
election protest. On November 23, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision in Pecsons
favor. Cunanan filed a Notice of Appeal the day after. Pecson, filed on November 28,
2007 an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal. The RTC granted
Pecsons motion for execution pending appeal. Cunanan moved to reconsider the
Order. Cunanan filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Application of Preliminary
Injunction with Prayer for Status Quo Ante Order/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
with Prayer for Immediate Raffle. The Second Division of the COMELEC issued

on January 4, 2008 a 60-day TRO. The COMELECs Second Division denied


Cunanans petition in a Resolution dated March 6, 2008. Pecson thus asked for the
issuance of a writ of execution via an Ex-Parte Motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing
the decision of the RTC which granted the motion for execution pending appeal.
RULING:
We find the petition meritorious.
We do not agree with the COMELECs view that there are two presumptive
winners prior to its ruling on the protest case. We likewise cannot support its
balancing act view that essentially posits that given the pendency of the appeal
and the lack of finality of a decision in the election protest, the unseating of the
protestee, and the need for continuity of public service, the balance should tilt in
favor of continuity or non-disruption of public service; hence, the execution pending
appeal should be denied. What comes out clearly from this examination of the
COMELEC ruling is that it looked at the wrong material considerations when it
nullified the RTCs Special Order. We disagree once more with the COMELEC en
banc in this conclusion, as it failed to accurately and completely appreciate the
Second Divisions findings. Unfortunately, the COMELEC en banc simply glossed
over the RTCs cited reasons and did not fully discuss why these reasons were not
sufficient to justify execution pending appeal. In light of all these considerations, we
conclude that the COMELEC erred in nullifying the RTCs Special Order in a manner
sufficiently gross to affect its exercise of jurisdiction. Specifically, it committed
grave abuse of discretion when it looked at wrong considerations and when it acted
outside of the contemplation of the law in nullifying the Special Order.

JAIME C. REGIO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND RONNIE C. CO


G.R. No. 204828, December 03, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Jaime C. Regio (Regio) and private respondent Ronnie C. Co (Co), among
other candidates, ran in the October 25, 2010 barangay elections in Barangay 296,
Zone 28, District III of the City of Manila for the position of punong barangay. Regio
was proclaimed winner for the contested post of punong barangay. On November 4,
2010, Co filed an election protest before the MeTC. He claimed, among other things,
that the Board of Election Tellers (BET) did not follow COMELEC Resolution No. 9030.

During the preliminary conference, the trial court allowed the revision of ballots. Co
limited his offer to the revision committee report, showing that he garnered the
highest number of votes. Regio, on the other hand, denied that the elections were
tainted with irregularities. The trial court, in its Decision of May 4, 2011, dismissed
Cos
protest
and
declared
Regio
as
the
dulyelected punong barangay of Barangay 296. In a Resolution dated August 23, 2011,
the COMELEC First Division12 dismissed the appeal, noting, as the MeTC did, that Co
failed to show that the integrity of the ballots in question was in fact preserved. Co
then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In its assailed December 7, 2012 Resolution,
the COMELECEn Banc17 reconsidered the August 23, 2011 Resolution of the First
Division, and accordingly declared Co as the duly elected punong barangay.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT CO HAD SUCCESSFULLY DISCHARGED THE BURDEN OF
PROVING THE INTEGRITY OF THE BALLOTS SUBJECTED TO REVISION.
RULING:
Private respondent Co has not proved that the integrity of the ballots has been
preserved. this Court rules that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that private respondent had successfully discharged the burden
of proving that the ballots counted during the revision proceedings are the same
ballots cast and counted during the day of the elections. It is well to note that the
respondent Co did not present any testimonial evidence to prove that the election
paraphernalia inside the protested ballot boxes had been preserved. He mainly
relied on the report of the revision committee. This leads us to no other conclusion
but that respondent Co failed to discharge his burden. Co cannot simply rely on the
report of the revision committee, and from there conclude that the report itself is
proof of the preservation of the ballots. We find that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion in ruling that private respondent had discharged the burden of proving
the integrity of the ballots. We rule, on the contrary, that there is utter lack of
evidence to that effect.

SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, EDWIN ELIM TUPAG and


RODOLFO Y. ESTRELLADA
G.R. No. 193314, June 25, 2013
FACTS:

This Resolution resolves the Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 8 March 2013,
filed by Edwin Elim Tumpag and Rodolfo Y. Estrellada (private respondents) and the
Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 March 2013, filed by Svetlana P. Jalosjos
(petitioner) in connection with the Decision of the Court promulgated on 26
February 2013. The claim of actual and physical residence in Brgy. Tugas since 2008
is contradicted by the statements that petitioner was staying in Mrs. Lourdes Yaps
house while her residential unit was being constructed; and that by December 2009,
the construction was still ongoing. While her house was being constructed, she used
to stay at the residence of Mrs. Lourdes Yap in Brgy. Punta Miray.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the temporary stay of Svetlana Jalosjos at the residence of Mrs.yap
is considered as a valid 1 year residency.
RULING:
A temporary stay in a strangers house cannot amount to residence. To be an actual
and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where one
resides no matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a
parcel of land does not make it ones residence. The fact that the residential
structure where petitioner intends to reside was still under construction on the lot
she purchased means that she has not yet established actual and physical
residence in the barangay, contrary to the declaration of her witnesses that she has
been an actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008. Petitioners stay in
the house of Mrs. Yap in Brgy. Punta Miray, on the other hand, was only a temporary
and intermittent stay that does not amount to residence. It was never the intention
of petitioner to reside in that barangay, as she only stayed there at times when she
was in Baliangao while her house was being constructed.8Her temporary stay in
Brgy. Punta Miray cannot be counted as residence in Baliangao. Petitioner failed to
show by what right she stayed in Mrs. Yaps house. Except for the declarations of
her witnesses that she stayed there while her residential unit in the resort was
being built, she presented no other evidence to show any basis of her right to stay
in that particular house as a resident. The finding of the COMELEC that petitioner
lacks the one year residency requirement to run for local elective position in the
municipality of Baliangao directly contradicts her sworn declaration that she is
eligible to run for public office. The fact that petitioner failed to prove that she has
been a resident of the locality for at least one year prior to the elections reveals the
falsity of her assertion in her COC that she is qualified to run for a local elective
position. This false material representation justifies the cancellation of her COC.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated
08 March 2013 is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated 27
March 2013 is hereby DENIED with FINALITY. AGNE V. YAP, SR. is hereby declared the
duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental in the 10
May 2010 elections. This resolution is immediately executory.

DIGESTED CASES
ON ELECTION LAW
SUBMITTED BY:
RHOAN I. HIPONIA
JURIS DOCTOR IV

SUBMITTED TO:
ATTY. JOSE EDMUND GUILLEN
PROFESSORIAL LECTURER

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen