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pointed out that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such intention.
This exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that can very well be amended by
Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other
prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent
jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.In Comelec
Resolution No. 3467, the Comelec maintained the continuing deputation of
prosecutors and the Comelec Law Department was tasked to supervise the
investigatory and prosecutory functions of the task force pursuant to the mandate
of the Omnibus Election Code. However, with the amendment, the Comelec likewise
changed the tenor of the later resolutions to reflect the new mandate of the
Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government now exercising concurrent
jurisdiction. Thus, the Comelec Law Department and the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor of the DOJ were tasked to jointly supervise the investigatory and
prosecutory functions of the Comelec-DOJ Task Force. Considering, therefore, that
the later resolutions, including Joint Order No. 001-2011, were issued pursuant to
Section 43 of RA 9369 amending Section 265 of BP 881 which was declared
"constitutional" in Banat, there is no reason for us to declare otherwise. To maintain
the previous role of other prosecuting arms of the government as mere deputies
despite the amendment would mean challenging Section 43 of RA 9369 anew which
has already been settled in Banat. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motions
for Reconsideration are DENIED for lack of merit
CASAN MACODE MAQUILLING v COMELEC
G.R. No. 195649, APRIL 16, 2013
FACTS:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of
his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost
his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July
2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition was issued in his favor. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua
(Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte. Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner. On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First
Division) issued an Order requiring the respondent to personally file his answer and
memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof. Arnado failed to answer
the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence exparte. Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections
where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently
proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. In
the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with
Arnados claim that he is a Filipino citizen. Arnado sought reconsideration of the
resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling
(Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, intervened in the case and
filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an
Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that
while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under
Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case.
Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and the
nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable
to this case.
RULING:
pending May 9, 2010 Motion relative to Resolution No. 8890. The said motion,
however, remained unacted. On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition for quo
warranto before the HRET. After due proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed
March 22, 2012 Decision which dismissed the quo warranto petition and declared
that private respondent was a qualified candidate for the position of Leyte
Representative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the HRET gravely abused its discretion in finding that Richard was
validly substituted by private respondent as candidate for Leyte Representative.
RULING:
Yes. The Court observes that the HRET wantonly disregarded the law by deliberately
adopting the COMELEC En Bancs flawed findings regarding private respondents
eligibility to run for public office which essentially stemmed from her substitution. In
this light, it cannot be gainsaid that the HRET gravely abused its discretion. Owing
to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a
bona fide candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte
when she ran for office, which means that she could not have been elected.
Considering this pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell on
the other issues respecting private respondents own qualification to office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22, 2012 Decision
rendered by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10031 (QW) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it
would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25,
2010.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC erred in denying the petition of Ang Ladlad to be
registered as a party-list.
RULING:
Yes. COMELEC mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for
the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related
to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled
in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, "the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941. We find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang
Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the
Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines
was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates
and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion
group. Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella
organization with affiliates around the Philippines. We find that Ang Ladlad has
sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated
allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever
found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization
under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.
The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof. As a
final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case
are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and
religious communities are divided in opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its
own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as
best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that
our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate. WHEREFORE, the
Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated
November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET
ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for
party-list accreditation.
P. Morales for lack of merit. Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC erred when it ruled that respondent morales did not
violate the three-year term limit when he ran and won as mayor of mabalacat
Pampanga during the 2007 election.
RULING:
The petition has no merit. For purposes of determining the resulting disqualification
brought about by the three-term limit, it is not enough that an individual has served
three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected
to the same position for the same number of times. There should be a concurrence
of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. Our
ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales involuntary severance from office with
respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of
time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity
of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was
effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayors office of our
decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to
30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no
matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales continuity of service.
Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. We
concede that Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following
periods: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30
June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007. However, because of his
disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term.
Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term.
Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he
was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales
occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007
cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-term limit.
Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes
of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is
effectively Morales first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution of the Commission
on Elections En Bancdated 14 February 2008 as well as the Resolution of the
Commission on Elections Second Division dated 27 July 2007.
aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected councilor of
Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 20042007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office,
the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a
criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the
Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions
of his office and finished his term. In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of
candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino,Jr., Danilo B.
Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate
of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served
for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term
limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b)of RA 7160.
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in
its Resolution of November 28,2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule
did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the2004-2007 term
because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
ISSUE:
Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the
three-term limit rule; and .Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary
renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
HELD:
NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious. As worded, the constitutional provision fixes
the term of a local elective office and limits an elective officials stay in office to no
more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in
Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of
time three years during which an official has title to office and can serve The word
"term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law
describes that an officer may hold an office., preventive suspension is not a
qualified interruption. Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections presented the question
of whether the disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the
election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of
the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final
and executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the
disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully
served three consecutive terms The petitioner vacated his post a few months
before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance
with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that
effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of
service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral terms.
"Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule
is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective
official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for
an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8,
Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective
officials continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using
"voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an
interruption. Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that
preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an
elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot
simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in
office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the
office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials
continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the
authority to appoint one since no vacancy exist.
said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can
his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning.
pursuant to the Comelec Rules of Procedure. To break the legal stalemate in case
the opinion is equally divided among the members of the Comelec en banc, Section
6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates a rehearing where parties
are given the opportunity anew to strengthen their respective positions or
arguments and convince the members of the Comelec en banc of the merit of their
case. The Comelec, despite the obvious inclination of three commissioners to affirm
the Resolution of the First Division, cannot do away with a rehearing since its Rules
clearly provide for such a proceeding for the body to have a solicitous review of the
controversy before it. A rehearing clearly presupposes the participation of the
opposing parties for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, if any, and
further clarifying and amplifying their arguments. In the present case, it appears
from the records that the Comelec en banc did not issue an Order for a rehearing of
the case in view of the filing in the interim of the present petition for certiorari by
Sevilla. In both the cases of Juliano and Marcoleta, cited above, we remanded the
cases to the Comelec en banc for the conduct of the required rehearing pursuant to
the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Based on these considerations, we thus find that a
remand of this case is necessary for the Comelec en banc to comply with the
rehearing requirement of Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO KNOWN AS
ARARO PARTY-LIST vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 192803, December 10, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner, Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc.,(ARARO) was a duly
accredited party-list under Republic Act No. 7941. (ARARO) garnered a total of
(147,204) votes in the May 10, 2010 elections and ranked (50th). The Commission
on Elections En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers initially proclaimed
(28) party-list organizations as winners involving a total of (35) seats guaranteed
and additional seats. The result was based on the Commission on Elections count of
(121) Certificates of Canvass or a total of (29,750,041) votes for the Party-List
System. Petitioner then filed an election protest before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal questioning the Resolution of the Commission on
Elections that proclaimed the 28 party-list groups. Without waiting for the resolution
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the petitioner filed the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. In its November 12, 2010 Comment, the Commission
on Elections through the Office of the Solicitor General took the position that invalid
or stray votes should not be counted in determining the divisor.
ISSUE:
Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in its
interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC to determine the party-list
groups that would be proclaimed in the 2010 elections.
RULING:
We agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined
to be invalid due to no cause attributable to the voter should not be excluded in the
divisor. In other words, votes cast validly for a party-list group listed in the ballot but
later on disqualified should be counted as part of the divisor. To do otherwise would
be to disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good faith that that ballot
contained all the qualified candidates. However, following this rationale, party-list
groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the
elections and whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the
Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included
in the divisor. Not all votes cast in the elections should be included in the divisor.
Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes cast for the
party-list system shall be considered in the computation of the percentage of
representation. The total votes cast do not include invalid votes. Votes cast for the
party-list system should, however, include all votes cast for party-list groups
contained in the ballot even if subsequently they are disqualified by the Commission
third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr. On April 18, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc
conducted a hearing on SENIOR CITIZENS petition in E.M. No. 12-040. On June 27,
2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution in E.M. No. 12-040, dismissing the
petition of the SENIOR CITIZENS (Arquiza Group). The Datol Group filed A Very
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the above resolution, but the same remained
unresolved. Meanwhile, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their respective
Manifestations of Intent to participate in the Party-list System of Representation in
the May 13, 2013 Elections under the name of SENIOR CITIZENS. The Manifestation
of the Datol Group was docketed as SP No. 12-157 (PLM), while that of the Arquiza
Group was docketed as SPP No. 12-191. On December 4, 2012, the COMELEC En
Banc issued a Resolution in SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) and 12-191 (PLM). By a vote of 43, the COMELEC En Banc ordered the cancellation of the registration of SENIOR
CITIZENS. The rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS challenged the above resolution
before this Court by filing their respective petitions for certiorari. The petition filed
by the Datol Group was docketed as G.R. No. 204421, while the petition of the
Arquiza Group was docketed as G.R. No. 204425.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY ON TERM SHARING.
RULING:
The term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS was not
implemented. This fact was manifested by the Arquiza Group. Thereafter, in its
Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself
refused to recognize the term-sharing agreement and the tender of resignation of
Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy was created despite the
execution of the said agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol
Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all
intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his term as a
member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, if the term-sharing
agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that
SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily
penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR
CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg
to stand on. In sum, the due process violations committed in this case and the lack
of a legal ground to disqualify the SENIOR CITIZENS spell out a finding of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
COMELEC En Banc. We are, thus, left with no choice but to strike down the assailed
Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12191 (PLM). Having established that the COMELEC En Banc erred in ordering the
disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and
accreditation, said organization is entitled to be proclaimed as one of the winning
party-list organizations in the recently concluded May 13, 2013 election.
JOSE MARQUEZ PANLILIO V COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Panlilio and respondent Samuel de Jesus, Sr. ran against each other
for Mayor of Busuanga, Palawan, in the May 14, 2007 elections. De Jesus won. On
May 25, 2007 Panlilio filed an election protest. On March 7, 2008 the RTC declared
Panlilio the winner over De Jesus by two votes. De Jesus appealed the RTC decision
to the COMELEC. The RTC denied the motion. De Jesus filed a motion for
reconsideration but the RTC denied it. On May 15, 2008 the COMELECs Second
Division issued a 60-day TRO. On July 15, 2008 the Second Division issued a
resolution, granting respondent De Jesus petition and setting aside the RTCs orders
of April 17 and 28, 2008. On July 19, 2008 Panlilio filed a motion for reconsideration
of the July 15, 2008 order. n September 4, 2008 respondent De Jesus hurried to the
COMELEC en banc to seek relief. On September 5, 2008 the en banc set aside the
RTCs order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
enjoined the implementation of the RTCs order.
RULING:
The implementation of the main relief grantedthe setting aside of the RTCs orders
that allowed execution pending appealmay be deemed suspended when
petitioner Panlilio filed a motion for its reconsideration. But the preliminary
injunction component of the resolutionthe maintenance of the status quo that
existed before the RTC issued its April 17, 2008 orderis not suspended. It is
expressly kept in force. The Court does not have to resolve this issue considering its
ruling above. At any rate, it seems clear that the subject matter of the present
petition is the COMELEC en bancs order of September 15, 2008, enjoining the
parties to maintain the status quo directed by its Second Division. On the other
hand, the subject matter of petitioner Panlilios September 17, 2008 manifestation
urging action from the COMELEC en banc is the motion for reconsideration that he
filed from the resolution or decision of the Second Division. Since the Court did not
enjoin this, the COMELEC en banc was free to proceed with its adjudication of the
main case. ACCORDINGLY, the Court DISMISSES the petition and AFFIRMS the orders
of the Commission on Elections En Banc in SPR 76-2008 dated September 5 and 11,
2008.
During the preliminary conference, the trial court allowed the revision of ballots. Co
limited his offer to the revision committee report, showing that he garnered the
highest number of votes. Regio, on the other hand, denied that the elections were
tainted with irregularities. The trial court, in its Decision of May 4, 2011, dismissed
Cos
protest
and
declared
Regio
as
the
dulyelected punong barangay of Barangay 296. In a Resolution dated August 23, 2011,
the COMELEC First Division12 dismissed the appeal, noting, as the MeTC did, that Co
failed to show that the integrity of the ballots in question was in fact preserved. Co
then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In its assailed December 7, 2012 Resolution,
the COMELECEn Banc17 reconsidered the August 23, 2011 Resolution of the First
Division, and accordingly declared Co as the duly elected punong barangay.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT CO HAD SUCCESSFULLY DISCHARGED THE BURDEN OF
PROVING THE INTEGRITY OF THE BALLOTS SUBJECTED TO REVISION.
RULING:
Private respondent Co has not proved that the integrity of the ballots has been
preserved. this Court rules that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that private respondent had successfully discharged the burden
of proving that the ballots counted during the revision proceedings are the same
ballots cast and counted during the day of the elections. It is well to note that the
respondent Co did not present any testimonial evidence to prove that the election
paraphernalia inside the protested ballot boxes had been preserved. He mainly
relied on the report of the revision committee. This leads us to no other conclusion
but that respondent Co failed to discharge his burden. Co cannot simply rely on the
report of the revision committee, and from there conclude that the report itself is
proof of the preservation of the ballots. We find that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion in ruling that private respondent had discharged the burden of proving
the integrity of the ballots. We rule, on the contrary, that there is utter lack of
evidence to that effect.
This Resolution resolves the Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 8 March 2013,
filed by Edwin Elim Tumpag and Rodolfo Y. Estrellada (private respondents) and the
Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 March 2013, filed by Svetlana P. Jalosjos
(petitioner) in connection with the Decision of the Court promulgated on 26
February 2013. The claim of actual and physical residence in Brgy. Tugas since 2008
is contradicted by the statements that petitioner was staying in Mrs. Lourdes Yaps
house while her residential unit was being constructed; and that by December 2009,
the construction was still ongoing. While her house was being constructed, she used
to stay at the residence of Mrs. Lourdes Yap in Brgy. Punta Miray.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the temporary stay of Svetlana Jalosjos at the residence of Mrs.yap
is considered as a valid 1 year residency.
RULING:
A temporary stay in a strangers house cannot amount to residence. To be an actual
and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where one
resides no matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a
parcel of land does not make it ones residence. The fact that the residential
structure where petitioner intends to reside was still under construction on the lot
she purchased means that she has not yet established actual and physical
residence in the barangay, contrary to the declaration of her witnesses that she has
been an actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008. Petitioners stay in
the house of Mrs. Yap in Brgy. Punta Miray, on the other hand, was only a temporary
and intermittent stay that does not amount to residence. It was never the intention
of petitioner to reside in that barangay, as she only stayed there at times when she
was in Baliangao while her house was being constructed.8Her temporary stay in
Brgy. Punta Miray cannot be counted as residence in Baliangao. Petitioner failed to
show by what right she stayed in Mrs. Yaps house. Except for the declarations of
her witnesses that she stayed there while her residential unit in the resort was
being built, she presented no other evidence to show any basis of her right to stay
in that particular house as a resident. The finding of the COMELEC that petitioner
lacks the one year residency requirement to run for local elective position in the
municipality of Baliangao directly contradicts her sworn declaration that she is
eligible to run for public office. The fact that petitioner failed to prove that she has
been a resident of the locality for at least one year prior to the elections reveals the
falsity of her assertion in her COC that she is qualified to run for a local elective
position. This false material representation justifies the cancellation of her COC.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated
08 March 2013 is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated 27
March 2013 is hereby DENIED with FINALITY. AGNE V. YAP, SR. is hereby declared the
duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental in the 10
May 2010 elections. This resolution is immediately executory.
DIGESTED CASES
ON ELECTION LAW
SUBMITTED BY:
RHOAN I. HIPONIA
JURIS DOCTOR IV
SUBMITTED TO:
ATTY. JOSE EDMUND GUILLEN
PROFESSORIAL LECTURER