Philosophical Review

Newton and Leibniz

Author(s): Ernst Cassirer
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Jul., 1943), pp. 366-391
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NEWTON AND LEIBNIZ

HE controversybetweenNewton and Leibniz is one of the
most important
phenomenain the historyof modernthought.
If we follow this controversystep by step,if we studythe correspondencebetweenLeibniz and Clarke,who acted as spokesman
for Newton,we are immediatelyaware that much more was at
stake than the particular physical and metaphysicalquestions
which are explicitlytreatedby the two adversaries.Newton and
Leibniz disagreednot merelyas to the solutionof thesequestions.
They not only had different
views on the nature and properties
of God, on the structureof the materialuniverse,the conceptsof
space and time,and the possibilityof an "action at a distance".
However importantall these questions may be, they have here
only a mediate and subordinatesignificance.They are overshadowed by anotherproblemwhichwas of vital interestfor the
futuredevelopmentof scientific
and philosophicthought.Modern
thoughthad reacheda partingof the ways whereit had to choose
between two alternatives.In the dispute between Newton and
Leibniz thesealternativeswere clearlyindicated.The two opposing theses were representedand defendedby two powerfuland
originalthinkerswho stoodwithouta rivalin contemporary
science
or philosophy.1
This is not, therefore,a mere scholasticdisputation.For behindthe catchwordsof the two schoolsof thoughtwe
feeltheclash and trialof strength
of two greatintellectualforces.
Nor is thissimplya controversy
betweenindividualthinkers;it is
rathera collisionbetweentwo fundamental
philosophicalmethods.
And it is thisfeatureof the disputewhichmakes it importantand
interesting
even for the present-dayreader.
Perusal of the various papers which passed betweenLeibniz
and Clarke in the years I715 and 17162 does not sufficefor an
of the fullmeaningand purportof thispolemic.At
understanding
firstsuch a perusal is very disappointing.Both sides repeat the
1 The fullauthenticity
of the Clarkepapersis provedby the factthatthe
outlinesof Clarke's replieshave been foundamongNewton'smanuscripts.
2 In the following
I referto the EnglisheditionpublishedafterLeibniz'
death: A Collectionof Papers whichPassed Betweenthe Late Learned
Mr. Leibniz and Dr. Clarke in the Years 17-5 and T716. Relatinq to the
Principlesof Natural Philosophyand Religion.By Samuel Clarke,Lon-

don I717.

366

GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 367

same argumentsover and over again until interactionbetween
theirviews seems impossible.For each partyobstinatelyholds its
ground refusingto enter into his opponent'sviews. Moreover,
was obscuredby personalinvecfromthe outsetthe controversy
the foundations
tive. Each side accused the otherof undermining
of naturalreligion.The more the discussionproceededthe more
thistone of arguingand reasoningtendedto prevail.Yet thiswas
natural and unavoidable. For Samuel Clarke, who pleaded for
Newton,was neithera scientistnor a philosopher.He was one of
of his time. In his
the best known theologicalcontroversialists
book A Demonstrationof theBeing and Attributesof God he had
undertakento demonstratethe existenceof God and all the other
fundamentaltruthsof the Christianreligionby merelylogical
argumentsand to answerall theobjectionsof the "free thinkers",
the sceptics,the deists,and atheists.3This book became so famous
thatVoltaire could not forbearpayinghis respectsto its author.
In his Lettres sur les Anglais Voltaire spoke of Clarke as "a
veritable reasoning machine" (une vraie machine 'a raisonnements) .4 And therewere stillotherfactorstendingto obscurethe
pointat issue. The old disputebetweenNewtonand Leibniz about
calculus was not
the priorityof the inventionof the infinitesimal
forgotten.Personal ambitionsand jealousies, even nationalprejudices, began to awake again. For us this side of the questionhas
lost its interest.After the most careful historicalinvestigations
thispointseemsnow to be entirelyclearedUp.5 We knowthatboth
Leibniz and Newton,on the basis of independentconsiderations,
had come to the same results; we know that each method,the
and integralcalmethodof fluxionsand that of the differential
culus, has its peculiarcharacterand its peculiarmerit."From the
pointof view of the historyof ideas"-it has been rightlysaid"there exists no controversyin the annals of science more deof theBeing and Attri3The full titleof the book is: A Demonstration
butesof God, the Obligationsof NaturalReligionand the Truthand Certaintyof the ChristianRevelation,More Particularlyin Answer to Mr.
Hobbs,Spinozaand theirFollowers.London1705/I706.
4Voltaire, Lettres sur les Anglais,VII, in Oeuvres, Paris i82i, chez
Lequien,XXVI 33 ff.
I referto MoritzCantor,Vorlesungen
6 For thehistory
of thiscontroversy
uiberdie Geschichteder MathematikIII (Leipzig i898) 274-3i6; and to
David Brewster,Memoirs of the Life, Writings,and Discoveriesof Sir
Isaac Newton,Edinburgh,I855,vol. II, chap.xv, pp. 36-83.

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plorableand less fertilethanthisdiscussionof the priorityof the

inventionof the infinitesimal
calculus. It is remarkablethat this
famous dispute which originatedunder quite accidentalcircumstancesdid notaffector modifyin any respecttheideas of thetwo
adversaries or the philosophicaltendenciesof their pupils. It
would be difficult
to show thata singlestep of progresswas made
by this controversy
over the new conceptionsof the infiniteand
the infinitely
small. As a resultof this conflictthe English school
and the Germanschoolof thoughtdeprivedthemselvesfor a long
time of all the advantageswhich they mighthave derived from
unitedefforts.
The quarrelbetweenNewtonand Leibniz, founded
upon mere personal rivalries,left the two philosophicalmethods
stationary.The detailed study of this quarrel supplies us in the
main with interestingobservationsconcerningthe psychologyof
Leibniz, of Newton,and of othereminentscholarsof theirtime.
But it givesus verylittleinformation
aboutthedistinctivefeatures
of the Leibnizian and Newtoniansystems.""
In orderto discoverthesedistinctivefeatureswe must,indeed,
trya different
approach.We mustendeavorto traceback the dispute betweenLeibniz and Newton to its real source,and to look
behindthescenesof the greatintellectualspectaclepresentedhere.
In thiscase we shall findthatthe ideas propoundedand defended
by these two adversarieshave by no means lost theirvalue and
interest.These ideas are still alive, and, to a certainextent,they
are stillin the focusof modernphilosophicaland scientific
thought
-even thoughwe may, indeed we must,express themin a differentmanner.There was no real dissensionbetweenLeibniz and
Newtonabout the fundamental
problem:thevalidityand necessity
of a mathematicalscience of nature. We may call Newton a
"physicist",and Leibniz a "metaphysician";but Leibniz himself
betweenmathewould neverhave subscribedto such a distinction
maticaland metaphysicalthought,forhe admittedno chasm here.
Whenever he mentionedhis metaphysicshe described it as a
"metaphysicof mathematics"."Ma Metaphysique",he wrotein a
letter,"est toutemathematique".7
e Leon Bloch,La Philosophiede Newton (Paris i908) II5 f.
7Leibniz, Letter to de L'Hospital, December27, i694. See Leibnizens
Halle I849 ff.) II 258.
Schriften(ed. C. I. Gerhardt,
mathematische

No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 369

It would be a morecorrectstatementof our problemto say that
Leibniz defendsa "deductive"ideal of scientificthoughtwhereas
Newtonspeaks as the championof an empirical,a merely"inductive" method.But even this distinctionwould be misleadingin
many respects. "Induction" and "deduction" are rather vague
terms.They have beenused in variousand widelydivergentsenses.
If we understandthe ideal of inductionin the sense of Bacon's
Novum Organum,or of some more recentlogicians,as, for instance,John Stuart Mill, then we must say that Newton never
recommendedor defended a strictly"inductive" method. The
type.What
methodintroducedby Newtonwas of a quite different
in Bacon's aphorismshad onlybeen dreamedof seemedsuddenly
to have become a reality.Newton's firstpupils reveredhim not
merelyas one of the greatestscientistsof all time.They saw in
him the veryincarnationof the philosophicspiritbecause he was
the firstto understandwhat a philosophyof nature reallyis and
who in
means. JohnFriend, an Oxford professorof Chemistry,
his PraelectionesChymicaewas one of the firstto try to apply
the Newtonian principlesof mechanics to chemical problems,
spoke of Newton as the "prince of mathematiciansand philosophers"."By his excellentgenius",he said, "he has taughtus a
of physicsand has fixednatural
sure way for the improvement
knowledgeon such weightyreasons that he has done more to
illustrateand to explain it than all philosophersof all nations."
Friend declared that Newton's conclusionsin philosophyare as
demonstrativeas his discoveries are surprising.9"It has been
objectedby some",wroteanotherof Newton'sdisciples,
ignorantly
"that the Newtonian philosophy,like all others before it, will
grow old and out of date and be succeededby a new system....
But thisobjectionis veryfoolishlymade. For nevera philosopher
before Newton ever took the methodhe did. For whilst their
systemsare nothingbut hypotheses,conceits,fictions,conjectures
and romancesinventedat pleasureand withoutany foundationin
8John Friend, in his remarksupon an account of his Praelectiones
PhilosophicalTransacChymicae,givenin the Acta Eruditorum,
i7ii.-See
tions,abridgedand disposedunderGeneralHeads, V 429 sq.
'See the English editionof his PraelectionesChymicae.Chymicallecare reduced to
tures: in which almost all the operationsof Chymistry
theirtrueprinciplesand the laws of nature,London I7i2, Appendix,174.

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thenatureof things,he, on the contrary,and by himselfalone, set

out upon a quite differentfooting.

. .

. The foundation is now

firmlylaid: the Newtonianmethodmay indeed be improved,and

furtheradvanced,but it can neverbe overthrown."'10
But what was the true characterof this method? By which
fundamentalfeatureis it to be distinguishedfromthatotherideal
of "induction"whichis represented
in Bacon's methodof "positive
and negativeinstances"?To answer this questionhistoricallywe
may say that Newton in his Principia carriedon and broughtto
completiontheworkof Galileo,not theworkof Bacon. There is a
fundamentaldifference
betweenGalileo's and Bacon's conception
of a true inductivemethod." Even Bacon was strivingfor a
"rational"methodof science.He was an empiricistbut no sensationalist.He has describedhis aim in a shortand characteristic
formulaby sayingthathis Novum Organumwas composedwith
the intentionof puttingan end to all those unfortunateconflicts
and dissensionswhichhithertohad disturbedthe human family;
and to establish,for all time,a firmand legitimatematrimony
between the empiricaland the rational facultiesof the human
mind.'2 But the Baconian ideal was an ideal of extensionand
whereasthe ideal of Galileo and Newton is one of
amplification,
intensionand simplification.
Bacon hoped to attain his end, he
hoped to promoteand secure the "advancementof learning",by
steadilyand incessantlyincreasingthe bulk of our empiricalevidence. If we collectand compareall the available data we shall be
in a positionto disclose and isolate the "pure forms"of things.
Newton imposeda different
task upon science.As a physicisthe
was not investigatingthese substantialforms-the formof heat
or the "essence" of gravity.He wished to reduce the phenomena
of nature to general laws and to derive these laws frommathematical principles.'3For this purpose the accumulativeand comparativeprocess of the Baconian inductionhad to be turnedinto
an analyticalprocess.Withoutthelatterall our empiricalevidence
would remainsterile;it could notbear its fruit.In all thedifferent
'William Emerson, The Principlesof Mecianics (London I773) v ff.
"Concerning this question I refer to my remarks in a recent article on
Galileo, published in The AmericanScholar (January i143) XII 5-I9.
12 See Bacon, Novum Orclanum,Praefatio.-Works, ed. by Ellis, Spedding,
and Heath, London i857 ff.,I, I3I.
13 Cf. Opticks,
Book III, part i; Principia,Preface to the firstedition.

No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

37I

fieldsof physicalinquiryNewton always insistedupon this character of his "analyticalinduction"."As in Mathematics,so in

Natural Philosophy",he said in his Opticks,"the investigation
of
difficult
thingsby the Methodof Analysis,ought ever to precede
the Method of Composition....

In the two firstbooks of these

Opticks,I proceededby this analysis to discover and prove the

originaldifferences
of theraysof lightin respectof refrangibility,
reflexibility
and colours.... And these discoveriesbeingproved,
theymay be assumedin themethodof compositionfor explaining
the phenomenaarisingfromthem."'14
Newton did not arrive at his principaltheoriesby simplycollectingnew facts. Most of the empiricalevidencehe needed for
constructing
his optical theoriesor his theoryof gravitationwas
containedin the work of formerscientistsor contemporaries-in
theworkof Galileo and Kepler,of Snelliusand Fermat,of Christian Huyghens,and of Halley-orHooke. Newton's real meritlay
in unitingand concentrating
the different
and dispersedachievements of these men. The most importantand the most characteristicfeatureof his workwas not so muchthediscoveryof new
facts as the new interpretation
of data already available. The
generallaw of gravityhad been discussedlong beforethe publication of Newton's Principia. All the great physicistsand astronomersparticipatedin thisdiscussion.They saw the problemand
examined the methodsof its solution. Even Newton's formula
was not an entirelynew discovery.ChristopherWren, Hooke,
and Halley, had developedtheirtheoriesof attractionin which,
on the basis of independentconsiderations,theywere led to the
conclusionthat the centripetalforce decreased in proportionto
the squares of the distancesreciprocally.Newtondid not denyor
underratethe meritsof his predecessors.When he publishedhis
Principia he added a special scholiumin which these meritsare
franklyacknowledged;he declaredthatWren,Hooke, and Halley,
had independently
deduced the law of gravityfromthe second
law of Kepler.'5
Since the time of Kepler the hypothesisof general attraction
betweenall the celestialbodies had, indeed,been underconsidera"4Newton, Opticks,Book III, part i; reprintedfromthe fourthedition
(London I730), New York I93I, p. 404 ff.
15 See Principia,Liber I, PropositioIV, Corollarium
6, Scholium.

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Kepler had assertedthat

tionby all thephysicistsand astronomers.
but
thestonealso attracts
not onlydoes theearthattractthestone,
the earth. And this conceptionplays an importantpart in his
reformof the Aristoteliancosmology.Twelve years before the
appearance of Newton's Principia Hooke had submitteda paper
to theRoyal Societyin whichhe investigatedthe natureand magnitudeof thisattractiveforce.He declares that the action of the
attractiveforcesof the celestialbodies increasesin proportionto
the proximityto theircentersof the body on whichthese forces
act. "Now what these several degreesare", continuedHooke, "I
verified,but it is a notionwhich,if
have not yet experimentally
fullyprosecuted,as it ought to be, will mightilyassist the astronomersto reduce all the celestial motionsto a certain rule,
whichI doubtwill neverbe done withoutit. He thatunderstands
the natureof the circularpendulum,and of circularmotion,will
easilyunderstandthewholeof thisprinciple,and will knowwhere
to finddirectionsin natureforthetruestatingthereof.This I only
of prosecuthintat presentto such as have abilityand opportunity
ing thisinquiry,and are notwantingof industryforobservingand
calculating,wishingheartilysuch may be found,having myself
manyotherthingsin hand whichI would firstcomplete,and thereforecannotso well attendit. But this I durstpromisethe undertaker that he will findall the great motionsof the world to be
thereinfluencedby thisprinciple,and thatthetrueunderstanding
of will be the trueperfectionof astronomy."'
We may inferfromthesewords thatNewton's discoverycould
not come as a surpriseto the astronomersand physicistsof his
own time.This eventwas carefullypreparedfor,both in its experimentaland in its theoreticalaspect. But the reallynovel, and
subsequentlydecisive, elementconsistedin Newton's systematic
proof of his theory.In this regardhe was entirelyoriginal.We
biographicalproof thatNewton saw
have indeed very interesting
his problemin this light.While preparingthe firsteditionof his
Principia in I786 he had a letterfromHalley in which he was
toldthatHooke had some pretensionswithregardto the firstdiscoveryof the law of gravity.Newton,when he heard of Hooke's
IG
Hooke, "An Attemptto Prove the Motionof theEarth",Philosophical
MemoirsI 286 f.
No. ioi, p. I2.-See Brewster,
Transactions,

No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 373

at theprospectof becominginvolved
claims,becameso frightened
on a questionof prioritythathe wishedto
in a publiccontroversy
suppress his third book rather than undergo such an ordeal.
liti"Philosophy",he wroteto Halley, "is such an impertinently
gious Lady, that a man had as good be engaged in lawsuits,as
have to do with her. I found it so formerly,and now I am no
sooner come near her again, but she gives me warning."'7 The
fact thatthereever was a momentin Newton's life in which he
seriouslyresolvedto suppressone of the mostimportantparts of
his classical work, is one of the greatestparadoxes in Newton's
biographyand in the whole historyof science. Many modern
writershave been at a completeloss to understandthis factwhich
character."One
seemedto be a blot on his personaland scientific
cannotexcuse Newton",says one of his most recentbiographers,
"for his decision to suppress the third book....

What manner of

cast offhis
a man was Newton who could thus contemptuously
own intellectual
child?There is certainlyno parallelto the incident
in all history.Did any otherman ever show a deeperjealousy and
vanitythan Newton,who could let the personal criticismof another,and a slightreflexionon his own character,outweighthe
workof his life and the fruitof his genius?"18
I think,however,that we can exculpate Newton from this
charge. It is true that duringhis whole life he feared nothing
more than involvementin public disputesabout his work. But to
ascribe this fact to a sort of moral weakness,let alone to mere
vanityor jealousy,seemsto me a verypoor psychologicalexplanation.Vanityand jealousy would have had theoppositeeffect;they
would ratherhave incitedhim to such disputationthan deterred
him fromit. There was more than the mere personal factorin
Newton's desire for peace. This desire originatedin his respect
task.If Newton
forhis workand forthegreatnessof his scientific
was ever able to bringhimselfto suppressthe thirdbook of the
Principia,he must have been convincedthat this omissioncould
17 Newtonto Halley,June20, i686.-The correspondence
betweenNewton
and Halleywas firstpublishedin theAppendixto Rigaud'sHistoricalEssay
on theFirst Publicationof the"Principia",Oxford I838. It has sincebeen
reprintedin Brewster'sMemoirs,I, AppendixNo. viii,437-456.
'8Louis TrenchardMore, Isaac Newton,a Biography,New York and
London I934, 3II.

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not affectthe fundamental

value of his work.He thoughtthatthe
firsttwo books had an independentmeaningand merit.And on
this point,I suppose,he was quite right.The traditionalview is
to connectNewton'sname with Newton'slaw. We usuallydo not
differentiate
betweenthe two: we see in the law of gravityhis
principalmeritand his real claim for immortality.
From theviewpointof the generalhistoryof ideas, however,we oughtto revise
this judgment.Paradoxical as it may sound, it mustbe conceded
thatevenwithoutthelaw of gravitythePrincipiawould stillstand
as one of thegreatestachievementsof modernscience.For in this
work Newtonbequeathedto posteritynot merelya universallaw
of nature,but also a universalinstrument
of scientific
thoughtand
of scientificresearch.No one beforehim had the same clear conceptionof what a "theoreticalphysics" is and means. Newton's
empiricaldiscoverieswere the ripe fruitsof this originalconception. In his ideal of a "scientificinduction"the empiricaland
theoreticalelementsare welded into an indissolubleunity.
Leibniz's natural philosophyexhibits throughouta different
orientation.Whereas Newtonstartedout withthestudyof certain
natural phenomena-withan investigationof optical phenomena
and with a theoryof the motionof the moon, Leibniz, on the
otherhand,began witha logicalanalysisof truth."As a man who
wishes to constructa buildingupon sandyground",he writesin a
fragment,"must continueto dig withhis spade untilhe comes to
a solid and stonybasis, as a man who wishes to untiean intricate
knot must findsome startingpoint,and as Archimedesrequired
an immovablepointin orderto be able to lifttheuniverse;-so we
are in need of a fixedpointas a foundationupon which we may
establish the elementsof human knowledge.And this starting
point is the analysis of the different
kinds of truth."'9Leibniz
fullyacknowledgesthe value of empiricaltruth.But to his mind
empiricaltruthis only a small part,a fragment,a single sector,
of theuniverseof truth.Behindindividualstatements
of empirical
fact, it is the task of the philosopherto discover the necessary
forms of thought.In physics we find factual truth; in logic,
arithmetic,
geometry,we have necessaryor eternaltruth.But the
19

See Leibniz,Opusculeset fragments

inedits,ed. Louis Couturat,Paris

I1903, 401.

No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 375

realmwhich,
factualtruthof physicsdoes not forman independent
opposed
to
the
truth
of logic and
character,
is
in its fundamental
mathematics.Both realms have, so to speak, theirown rational,
laws. "The great foundationof mathematics",says
constitutional
Leibniz in the second paper addressedto Clarke,"is the principle
or identity,that is, that a propositioncannotbe
of contradiction
trueand false at the same time; and thatthereforeit is what it is,
to
and cannot be what it is not. This one principleis sufficient
that
is,
all
and
geometry,
demonstrateevery part of arithmetic
principles.But in orderto proceedfrommathematics
mathematical
to natural philosophy, another principle is requisite . . . the prin-

reason, viz., that nothinghappens withouta

ciple of a sufficient
reason why it should be so ratherthan otherwise.And therefore
Archimedes,when proceedingfrommathematicsto naturalphilosophy,in his book De aequilibrio,was obliged to employa parreason."20It is
ticular case of the great principleof a sufficient
this principlethatmakes physicspossible,because it allows us to
to nature,to throwa bridge
make thegreatstep frommathematics
across thegap which,at firstsight,seemsto separatefactualtruth
(veritesde fait) fromnecessarytruth(veriteseternelles).
This is not,however,a solutionof the problem; it is only the
statementof the problem.What does Leibniz mean by his "prinreason"? We cannotgrasp his meaningso long
ciple of sufficient
as we take his termsand his argumentsat their face value. For
his own descriptionof his principle,as containedin his repliesto
Clarke, is rathervague. "The principlein question",he says, "is
reason, in order to any
the principleof the want of a sufficient
thing'sexisting,in orderto any event'shappening,in orderto any
truth'stakingplace. Is thisa principlethatneeds to be proved?"'21
seems scarcelyworthyof so great a logician
Such argumentation
as Leibniz. It was open to all the attackswhich Hume later directedagainst the objectivevalidityof the principleof sufficient
reason. To discoverthe true and deeper sense of Leibniz's principlewe mustconsultthewholeof his logicalwork.Leibniz always
insists that his principle is pregnantwith the most important
consequences.From it he expectsa real revolutionin philosophic
' Leibnizto Clarke,Second Paper, sect. i, p. 2I.
2 Ibid.,FifthPaper, sect. I25, p. 275.

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thinking.If understoodin its fullestsense thisprinand scientific

ciple will alter the whole realm of metaphysics.It will make
whereas before it genmetaphysicsoperativeand demonstrative
erally consistedonly of emptywords.22"It must be confessed",
statesLeibniz, "thatthoughthis greatprinciplehas been acknowmade use of. Which is, in
ledged,yet it has not been sufficiently
greatmeasure,thereasonwhythePrima Philosophiahas notbeen
as it should have been."23
hithertoso fruitfuland demonstrative,
Whereinconsiststhe"greatness",the novelty,the revolutionary
reason?
power that Leibniz ascribes to the principleof sufficient
of the various
Leibniz began witha descriptionand classification
typesof truth.He insistedthat logical and mathematicaltruthis
"necessary",whereasempiricaltruthis "contingent".But he was
not contentwith this discrimination.According to Leibniz this
betweenfactualand necessarytruth,betweenthe"verites
distinction
de fait" and the "veriteseternelles",has only a relative,not an
absolute value. It is true that the two kinds do not belongto the
same class. They cannot be reduced to a commondenominator.
But that does not mean that theyare opposed to one anotheror
theymay be, yet they
are mutuallyexclusive.However different
by a
Leibniz liked to illustratethis interrelation
are interrelated.
mathematicalexample.We may say that"factual" truthis incomtruth.There appears
mensurablewith logical and demonstrative
to be no commonmeasure.But it is preciselythis conceptof inwhich can lead us to the rightsolution.If in
commensurability
geometrywe speak of incommensurablelengthswe mean that
theselengthscannotbe expressedby our ordinary"rational"numbers. They correspondto "surd" or "irrational"numbers.But
these irrationalquantitiesare by no means indeterminatequantities.If we cannotexpress themby an ordinaryfractionalnumber, we can findan infiniteseries of rationalnumbersby which
this value is fully determined.The fartherwe proceed in this
infiniteseries of rationalnumbers,the more nearlywe shall approximatethe "true" value of the surd quantity.It is the same
with empirical and rational truth.24Of course Leibniz admits
FourthPaper, sect.5, p. 95.
22Ibid.,
' Ibid.,FifthPaper, sect.2I, p. I73.
2Leibniz stresses this analogy in many passages. See especially"De
Nouvelleslettreset Opusculesineditsde Leibniz,par Foucherde
libertate",

No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 377

thatthereare wide areas of humanknowledgein which we have
to be contentwith mere factual truth.All we can do here is to
collect the empiricalevidence withoutbeing able to deduce the
factsfromhigherreasonsor principles.But thisis onlya firstand
preliminarystep. The philosopherand the scientistwill never be
satisfiedwiththisstateof affairs.They will continuetheiranalyses
untiltheycome nearerand nearerto theirultimategoal-the goal
not merelyof collecting,butalso of understanding,
thephenomena
of nature.Rational or necessarytruthmust be conceivedas the
ideal, the "limit"of empiricaltruth.This ideal is not immediately
given, but the search for it is the essentialtask of science and
philosophy.Rational truthis the eternalthemeof scientificand
philosophicalinvestigation.In this sense Leibniz often calls his
principlenot only the "principleof sufficient
reason", but the
"principiumreddendaerationis".25We do not know the reasons
behindall things,but we mustneverdespairof findingand proving these reasons. The progressof knowledgeis unlimited;nor
does knowledgeadmitof any fixedboundaries.The maxim "plus
ultra" was a favoriteof Leibniz's.26What the "principleof sufficientreason",or stillbetter,the "principiumreddendaerationis",
really means and emphasizesis that in the last analysis all empirical truthis describablein termsof rationaltruthand reducible
Behind everyscientificachievement
to the typeof rationaltruth.27
is in
we are sure to finda new scientific
problem.But this infinity
a
the
no sense opposed to genuinerationality.On
contrary,it is
the very expressionof such a rationality.It means thatthe individual stepstakenin the advancementof our empiricalknowledge
not a divergent,series. By virtueof this conforma convergent,
vergence,whichis ascertainedby theprincipleof sufficient
reason,
we can be sure that there is a constantapproximationtowards
truth,thatour empiricalknowledgeof particularfactswill,more
and more,be reduced to a knowledgeof general rules and universal principles.
Careil (Paris I857) i83; in PhilosophischeSchriften (ed. Gerhardt)VII

200.

25 Cf. "Specimen inventorum

de admirandisnaturae Generalisarcanis",
PhilosophischeSchriftenVII 309 Gerhardt.
26 Cf. "GuilelmiPacidii Plus Ultra, sive initia et speciminascientiae
generalis",ibid. VII 49-51.
2 Cf. Leibniz,Lettre'a Arnauld,JulyI4, i686, ibid. I 382.

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By way of this conceptionof empiricaland rationaltruthLeibniz was led to his fundamentalphilosophicalconcept,the concept
of a "Scientia generalis". The principal aim of this "General
Science" was to transformall mere factual truthinto rational
truth.By a completeanalysisof all our thoughtswe shall findthe
means to change mere "facts" into "concepts" and "theories".
Such a change is indeed a paradox; it would seem to involve a
How can we ever hope to resort of logical transubstantiation.
solve the conditionsof concrete,empiricalthoughtinto those of
abstract,rationalthought-to reduce "veritesde fait" to "verites
necessaires"? Leibniz was convincedthat he had succeeded in
findingthe solutionof this riddle.The task will be solved by the
power of symbolicthought.If we analyse all our ideas into their
simpleelements,if we expresstheseelementsby adequate symbols,
if we studythe rules of the connectionof these symbols,thenwe
shall finda clue of Ariadnewhichmay serveus as a reliableguide
in the labyrinthof human thought.Not only mathematical,but
also empirical,thoughtis capable of such a progressivesymbolization and formalization.If we understandLeibniz's principleof
reason in thisway, we can easily accountfor the role it
sufficient
plays in the general structureof his philosophy.Leibniz's discalculus was but one step in this dicoveryof the infinitesimal
rection.The plan of his "Scientia generalis", founded upon a
"Characteristicageneralis",had been conceivedlong before. It
becamethegreatunifyingforcein his thoughtand in his scientific
work. The mindof Leibniz has oftenbeen describedas "encyclopaedic". But such a descriptionis scarcelyadequate. For in additionto a desireto masterall sortsof knowledge,he endeavoredto
understandthe various formsof this knowledge;and to him this
meantderivingand deducingthe formsfromuniversalprinciples.
not an eclecticor merely
was of a systematic,
His encyclopaedism
cumulative,type.
The hopes which Leibniz built upon this plan of a "General
Science" may seem extravagantto us. His faithin his logical ideal
was unshakable.He was convincedthat nothingin natureor human life could ever resist the power of rational thought.He
applied his methodnot only to mathematicalor physical,but also
to political,social, and religiousproblems.As a youthof twenty-

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politithree in i659, he wrote his "Specimen demonstrationum

carum pro eligendo rege Polonorum novo scribendigenere ad
claram certitudinem
exactum".28This politicalpamphletwas indeed writtenin a new style.He triedto prove "moregeometrico",
by mere "argumentsin form",that,of all the candidatescompeting for the Polish throne,Stanislaus Letizinskywas the most
entitledand themostpromising.By thesame methodLeibniz tried
to convinceLouis XIV that it was much betterto attack Egypt
thanto conquerHolland.29Even problemsof Christiandogmatics
were treated in similar fashion. In i669 Leibniz published a
"Defensio trinitatisper nova repertalogica", in whichhe undertook to defend the Trinitariandogma against the objections of
Wissowatius.0 In like mannerhe attemptedto refute,by mere
logical arguments,the errors of Socinus and the adherentsof
Socinian

ism.3l

If we bear in mindthesecharacteristic
featuresof Leibniz's and
Newton'sphilosophywe can easily understandtheirdiscussionof
particularquestions.They differednot merelyin theirprinciples,
in theirgeneral frameof
but also in philosophicaltemperament,
mind. Leibniz was perhaps the most resolute championof rationalismwho ever appeared in the historyof philosophy.Not
even Hegel could outdo him in this respect.For Leibniz there
exists no separation,no chasm, between"reason" and "reality".
There is nothingin heaven or on earth,no mysteryin religion,
no secretin nature,whichcan defythe power and effortsof reason. "Le reel",he wrotein a letter,"ne laisse pas de se gouverner
parfaitementpar l'ideal et l'abstrait; c'est parceque tout se gouverne par raison et qu'autrementil n'y auroitpoint de scienceny
regle ce qui ne seroitpas conformeavec la naturedu souverain
principe."32

Newton's conceptionof the task of science was very different.

He too felt the pride of a great scientificgenius,but this pride
' Leibniz, Opera omnia,ed. Lodov. Dutens,Genevae I768, Tom. IV, 3,

522-630.

29"Specimen demonstrationis
politicae",in Leibniz' historisch-politische
und staatswissenschaftliche
Schriften(ed. Onno Klopp,Hannoveri864 ff.)
II Io~oif.
30 Opera omnia (ed. Dutens) I io ff.
'

Ibid., "Remarques . . . sur le livre d'un AntitrinitaireAnglais", I 24 ff.

2Leibniz,Letterto

Varignon,Feb. 2, I702, in Mathematische

Schriften
(ed. Gerhardt,Berlin-Halle,i849 ff.) IV 93 f.

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was combinedwith a great modesty.He never would have accepted the praise contained in Alexander Pope's well known
verses:
Nature and Nature's law lay hid in night,
God said, "Let Newton be", and -all was light.
To Newtonnaturewas accessibleto,but notpenetrableby,human
reason.Wheneverhe mentionedhis own discoveriesit was always
in a humbleway. "I do not know", he once said, "what I may
appear to theworld; but to myselfI seem to have been onlylike a
boy playingon the sea-shore,and divertingmyselfin now and
then findinga smootherpebble or a prettiershell than ordinary,
whilstthe great ocean of truthlay all undiscoveredbeforeme."33
Science may lead us very far,but it cannothope to probe intothe
real depthof the "ocean of truth".This depthremainsimmeasurable and unfathomable
to humanthought.
We are now in a positionbetterto understandthe different
role
which mathematicsplays in the systemsof these two men. As
regardstheobjectivevalue of mathematics
and its indispensability
fornaturalphilosophy,
thereis nottheslightestdifference
between
Leibniz and Newton. They both followthe maxim laid down by
Galileo; they are convinced that without mathematicsnature
would remaina sealed book. Moreover,Newtonand Leibniz made
the same progress in the general developmentof mathematical
thought.They createda new typeof mathematics:themathematics
of variable quantities.It is, however,a veryremarkablefactthat
even here Newton and Leibniz, thoughpursuingthe same end,
did not go the same way. As we have indicated,Leibniz's incalculus was merelya special applicationof his general
finitesimal
logicalmethod.It is the creationof a new symbolismwhichis the
most importantpoint in Leibniz's theory.This symbolism,in its
clarityand simplicity,
proved to be superiorto Newton'smethod
of fluxions,and, after a short struggle,its victorywas decided.
But it is not the technicalside of the problemwithwhichwe are
concernedhere. What is more importantis the generalmethodological aspect of the question.In order to express the difference
and integralcalculus and Newton's
betweenLeibniz's differential
" See Brewster, MemoirsII 407.

No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

381

methodof fluxionswe may say thatNewton,as a physicist,began

witha studyof facts,whereasLeibniz,as a logician,began witha
study of forms. Of all the facts of nature motionis the most
generalone. Accordingto Newton'smechanicsthereis no natural
phenomenonwhichis not reducibleto motionand its generallaws.
beHence followsthatwe shall never finda true correspondence
tween thoughtand reality,betweenmathematicsand physics,so
long as we exclude the conceptof motionfromthe realmof pure
mathematics.It was, however,preciselythisexclusionwhichconstitutedone of the fundamentaland most characteristicfeatures
of classical mathematics.Classical mathematicshad its originin
Platonic thought.All the great Greek mathematicians,from
Eudoxus and Theaetetusdown to Euclid, were, directlyor indirectly,pupilsof Plato. But froma Platonicpointof view it would
in termsto admita conceptlike motion
have been a contradiction
as a basic principleof geometry.Geometryhad been definedby
Plato as the realm of the a&eo'. The knowledgeat which it aims
is knowledgeof theeternal,and not of thatwhichis perishingand
transient. To introduceinto pure mathematicsthe categoryof
But thiswas
changewouldbe to undermineits truthand certainty.
preciselythe step taken by Newton. He was not exclusivelyor
primarilyinterestedin the solutionof abstractmathematicalproworkhe had combinedthe
blems.From the outsetof his scientific
studyof algebra or geometry-thestudyof infiniteseries,of the
methodsof drawingtangents,of the quadratureof curvedlineswith a study of natural phenomena,of optical and mechanical
questions. Constantlyand quite naturallyhe passed from one
field to the other. To such a mind there could be no gap, no
Platonic"severance",betweenthe ideal worldof mathematicsand
the empiricalworld of physics.In orderto findthe "mathematical
principlesof naturalphilosophy"Newton had to alter the traditional conceptionof mathematicsitself. If mathematicswas to
fulfillits principaltask, if it was destinedto give us a theoryof
nature, it could not overlook or minimize nature's principal
phenomenon.Motion could no longer be regarded as a mere
physical fact; it became a basic concept,a categoryof mathematics. Such was the problem solved by Newton's theory of
' Plato, RepublicVII 527a.

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A physical concept,the conceptof velocity,was adfluxions.35

mittedto geometryand algebra. The increase and decrease of
abstractquantitieswas describedin termsof mechanics-as an
increaseor decrease in velocities.In orderto determinethe ratios
quantitiesNewton described
of the incrementsof indeterminate
by theterm"moments";and to thevelocitieswith
theseincrements
whichthe quantitiesincreasehe gave the names "motions","velocitiesof increase",and "fluxions".He consideredquantitiesnot as
composed of indivisibles,but as generatedby motion.36"Quantitatesmathematicas",he writes,"non ut ex partibusquam minimis constantessed ut motu continuodescriptashic considero."7
This was not in itself an entirelynew conception.We findthe
same view of a "generation"of curved lines or solids by continuous motionsin Descartes' geometryor in Kepler's "Stereometriadoliorum".But in these cases the term"motion" is used
in a mere metaphoricalsense. It had not yet been naturalizedin
the realm of mathematics.To legitimatizethis conceptof motion
was one of theprincipalaims of Newton'stheoryof fluxions.For
thispurposehe had to changethe wholehierarchyof the sciences.
In his systemmechanicsis no longer subordinatedto geometry;
it becomesthe verybasis of geometry."It is the gloryof geometry",says Newtonin thePreface to thePrincipia,"thatfromfew
principlesbroughtfromwithout,it is able to produce so many
things.Thereforegeometryis foundedin mechanicalpractice,and
is nothingbut thatpart of universalmechanicswhich accurately
proposes and demonstratesthe art of measuring."38In Leibniz
we find the classical hierarchicorder of scientificknowledge.
are subordinatedto logic: all theirtruths
Geometryand arithmetic
can be derived fromthe mere principleof contradiction.In mechanics and physicsit is necessaryto introducea new principle,
"For the historyof the theoryof fluxionsand for all technicaldetails
I must referthe reader to the monographson the subject. See, for instance,Ferdinand Rosenberger,Isaac Newton und seine physikalischen
Prinzipien,Leipzig i895; and Leon Bloch, La philosophicde Newton,
Paris i908.

furtherdetailssee Brewster,MemoirsII ii ff.

"De quadratura curvarum",Introductio;in Isaac Newtoni Opuscula
mathematicaphilosophicalet philologia (ed. JohannCastillioneus,Lausanneand Geneva I744) I 203.
by AndrewMotte
edition,Englishtranslation
a Principia,Prefaceto first
in I729; reprintedin the editionof the Universityof CaliforniaPress,
Berkeley,California,1934.
88For
ST

No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 383

the principleof sufficient
reason. But even mechanicsis simplyan
"applied" arithmeticsand geometry-a studyof geometricaland
arithmeticalrelationsin concrete.By virtue of Newton's new
orientationof mathematicalthought,by the introductionof the
conceptof velocityinto "pure" mathematics,all this was completelychanged.If we considerabstractquantitiesas generatedby
continuousmotions,this is not a mere figureof speech. It expresses a real fact,"Hae geneses", declared Newton in his work
on the quadratureof curved lines, "in rerumnatura locum vere
habentet in motucorporumquotidiecernuntur."39
In otherwords,
such generationsof quantitiesas are supposedin the new calculus
are not figmentsof the human mind,nor are theymere mathematical conventions.They have a "fundamentumin re"-a supportand basis in the natureof things.We do not merelyconceive
or imagine,we see and experience,thesegenerations.
Leibniz's approach to the infinitesimal
calculus was quite different.He saw the problemfromtheviewpointof logic,not from
thatof thephysicist.As a mathematician
Leibniz always remained
faithfulto the great classical tradition.He spoke as a resolute
Platonist.To him mathematics
was a branchof logic. But it was
logic itselfwhichin the philosophyof Leibniz had assumeda new
shape. He by no means despisedthe methodsof traditionallogic,
of Aristotleand the Schoolmen.He defendedtheirrightagainst
the attacksof the moderns.In his Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendementhumainhe praises the inventionof the various formsof the
syllogismas one of the most beautiful,and as one of the most
important,achievementsof the human mind. "It is a species of
universal Mathematics",he asserted,"whose importanceis not
sufficiently
known; and it may be said that an infallibleart is
thereincontained,providedwe know and can use it, whichis not
always allowed."40The same view is given in a letterof Leibniz
to Gabriel Wagner (i696), which was writtenfor the express
purpose of defendingthe Aristotelianlogic against its modern
On the otherhand the syllogisticscience
criticsand detractors.41
"Newton, "De Quadraturacurvarum",Introductio,Opuscula,ed. Castillioni,I 204 f.
40 Nouveaux Essais, Livre IV, chap. 17, sect. 4.-Eng. translationby
A. G. Langley,seconded., Chicagoand London,i9i6, p. 559.
41 See Philosophische
Schriften,ed. Gerhardt,VII 514 ff.

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[VOL. LII.

of Aristotledid not representfor Leibniz the whole extentof

logic,but only a small portion.In his "Characteristicageneralis"
he had foundand studiedtypesof arguingand reasoningentirely
fromthose containedin the classical logic. "You appear
different
to apologize for common logic", replies Philalethes in the
Nouveaux Essais, "but I see clearlythatwhat you bringforward
belongs to a more sublime logic, to which the commonis only
whatthealphabetis to scholarship."42Leibniz had in view not the
destruction,but the perfection,of classical logic. He wished to
analyseall thepossibletypesof deductivereasoningand give them
The new calculuswas but a single
adequate symbolicexpression.43
chapterin this larger work. It was not based on the observation
of naturalphenomena;it was derivedfroma mathematicalconcept which firstbecameexplicitin the thoughtof Leibniz-in the
general conceptof function.Leibniz's analysis broughtthis conceptinto focusso thatit becameone of the mostpowerfulinstruIn thisregardwe cannotlook upon
mentsof modernmathematics.
Leibniz and Newtonas rivals or adversaries.They set themselves
means.
different
tasks,and theyperformedthesetasksby different
Newtonattainedhis end by a new orientationof physicalthought;
Leibniz attainedhis by a new orientationof logical thought.
Looking at the conflictin this lightwe can give bothmen their
due. We can freetheircontroversyfromall those accidentaland
merelypersonal circumstanceswhich have obscured it fromthe
start.Even one of the most intricateproblemsappears now in a
new perspective.For a modernreader thereis perhaps no more
thanthatof space and time.
problemin thiscontroversy
interesting
of
philosophicand
On this issue the crisis
seventeenth-century
scientific
thoughtsuddenlydeveloped.For Newtonspace and time
were notonlyreal things,but theveryframeworkof reality.They
belong not merelyto the materialworld; theyare absolute attributesof God. All thisis assertedby Leibniz to be radicallywrong.
Time and space are not separateexistences;theypossess no substantialrealityof theirown. They are "forms" or "orders",not
things; they are not absolute,but merelyrelative.Here Leibniz
4 NouveauxEssais, Livre IV, chap. 17, sect.7.-Eng. tr.,p. 566.
" For all details I referto the excellentaccountin Louis Couturat,La
Logique de Leibniz,Paris 1903.

No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 385

envisageda problemwhichonlyin recenttimeshas receivedclear
and explicit statement.For him space and time have no independentphysical or metaphysicalexistence. Space is the order
whichrendersbodies capable of beingsituated,and by whichthey
whentheyexist together;time
have a situationamongthemselves,
"In order
is thatorderwithrespectto theirsuccessivepositions.44
to have an idea of place, and consequentlyof space, it is sufficient
to considerrelationsand the rules of theirchangeswithoutneeding to fancyany absoluterealityout of the thingswhose situation
we consider."45
I cannotenterintoa systematicdiscussionof theproblemitself.
I wish only to elucidate the historicalside of the question. In
Leibniz's and Newton's theoriesof space and time we findthe
same fundamentaloppositionwhich we were able to observe in
all otherfields.This oppositiondoes notoriginatein a meredispute
betweenindividualthinkersor in a conflictbetweenphilosophical
schools. Newton and Leibniz apply differentstandardsof truth
and they employdifferentframes of reference.Newton argues
upon a principlethatat firstsightseems to admitof no doubt.If
thereis any truth,it mustbe found"in rerumnatura". All truth
must be based on facts. Even mathematicaltruth-the so-called
"ideal truth"-forms no exceptionto this general rule. Newton
had found a new type of mathematics-themathematicsof variablequantities.He was convincedthatthisformof mathematics,
the doctrineof "fluxions",would not be possible withouta substantialfoundation,a substratumin reality.We cannotstudythe
relationsbetween variable quantitieswithoutpresupposingthat
uniform and continuousmotion which we call "duration" or
"fluxof time".If we take away thissubstratumall physicalthings
and all mathematicaltruthlose their foundation.Absolute,true,
and mathematicaltime is no mere concept; it is a fundamental
realitywhichof itselfand fromitsown natureflowsequablywithLeibniz, too, is convincedthat
out relationto anythingexternal.46
if not identity,between"truth"and
there must be conformity,
"reality".There is no chasm betweenthe "ideal" and the "real"
" Leibniz,Third Paper to Clarke,sect. 4, p. 57; FourthPaper, sect.41,

p. 113.

4 Leibniz,FifthPaper, sect.47, p. 199.

"See Newton,Principles,Book I, Definition8, Scholium.

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world; theyare unitedby a "preestablished

harmony".But Leibniz
stressesthe oppositepole. The natureof thingsand the natureof
mindagree.Yet veryoften-Leibniz objectsin criticizingLocke"the considerationof the natureof thingsis nothingelse thanthe
knowledgeof the natureof our mind,and of those innateideas
whichwe have no need to seek outside."47To Newton's realistic
theoryof space and timeLeibniz opposes his own idealistictheory.
But the term"idealism" is not sufficient
to give us a clear characterizationof the difference.
As a resultof the wide varietyof
senses in whichthistermhas been used in the historyof idealism,
it has become vague and misleading.There are almost as many
formsof "idealism"as thereare philosophicalschoolsor systems.
Leibniz's idealismis an "objective",not a "subjective" idealism;
a mathematical,not a psychologicalidealism; a Platonic, not a
Berkeleyanidealism. Thus when Leibniz asserted the "ideality"
of space and time he never meant to cast any doubt upon the
objectivetruthof theseconcepts.He always comparesthisideality
withthe idealityof numbers.Numberbeing the very foundation
of mathematics,it is logically immuneto attack. But Leibniz
objects to the interpretation
of the objective truthof space and
time containedin Newton's system.For Leibniz space and time
are relationsor orders,not absoluteexistencesor entities.Space
is the "order of coexistences";time the "order of successions".
"These thingsconsistonlyin the truthof relations,and not at all
in any absolute reality."48
This truthof relationsis dealt with in
Leibniz's logic. For him the theoryof space and timebelongs to
logic, not to physics.These conceptsare parts of a greateruniverse,of theuniverseof logical formsor, as Leibniz calls it,of the
intellectss ipse".
We may conclude,then,thatthe theoriesof space and timeof
Newton and Leibniz, while diametricallyopposed ontologically,
have, nevertheless,a point of contact.This becomes clear when
we approach the problemfromthe epistemologicalangle. Epistemologicallythe two theorieshave a common featurebecause
theyhave a commonadversary.They bothresistthe thesisupheld
by all theschoolsof Englishempiricismand sensationalism.Space
ouveauxEssais, I, I, 21 (Englishtranslation
by A. G. Langley,p. 74).
Leibniz,Fifth Paper, sect.47, p. 205.

A7

No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 387

and timecannotbe describedand definedin termsof mere senseperception.With thisnegativestatementNewton and Leibniz are
in completeagreement.But even here theirjudgmentsare based
reasons.For Newtonit is clear thatspace and time,
upon different
as absolute entities,are beyond the reach of immediatesenseexperience.For Leibniz, on the otherhand, theyare pure intellectual formswhich involve a constructivepower of the human
mind. The equal and uniformfluxof time signifiedfor Newton
an ultimatesubstantialreality;for Leibniz,however,it amounted
hypothesis.If, withour
to a necessaryassumption,a fundamental
in
conventionalhistorical classifications mind, we study the
famous scholiumof Newton's Principia, in which he insists on
the distinctionbetweenabsolute and relativemotion; we are at
witha curiousparadox. Newtonbeginsby sharply
firstconfronted
betweenthe conceptsof "the vulgar" and the true
distinguishing
concepts.Commonpeople conceivespace, time,and moscientific
tion,accordingto no othernotionsthan the relationsthese concepts bear to sensibleobjects. But fromsuch a habit of thinking
certainerrorsand prejudices arise which have to be eradicated
by philosophicthought.Because the parts of absolute space cannot be seen or distinguishedfromone anotherby our senses,we
tend to substitutesense measures for absolutemeasures.This is
withoutinconveniencefor the purposes of everydaylife, but it
will not do for philosophy.Here we wish to know the true
natureof things,and to thisend we mustabstractfromour senses
and consider the things themselvesas distinguishedfrom our
measuresof thingsaccordingto the standardsof the senses alone:
"in philosophicisabstrahendum
est a sensibus."49Who is speaking
here,we are temptedto ask. Is it Newton,the great empiricist,
and rationalistLeibniz? As
or his adversary,the "intellectualist"
a matterof fact both Newton and Leibniz reject the standards
of sensationalism.The senses, taken in themselves,cannot yield
us thetruth.But here again thetwo thinkerspursue thisprinciple
in a twofolddirection.Newton is intentupon determiningthe
homogeneous
substantialrealityof space and timeas two infinite,
things,independentof any sensible object. Leibniz no longer
by
'See Principia,Book I, Definition8, Scholium.-Englishtranslation
Motte,New Edition,Berkeley,Calif.,I934,p. 8 ff.

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admits such a reality.Accordingto him,if we wish to findthe

ultimatesource of our ideas of "pure space" and "pure timely,
we shall have to inquire into the nature of our intellectrather
is veryclearlyexthan into the natureof things.This difference
pressed in a passage of the Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement
humain. "A successionof perceptionsawakes in us the idea of
duration,but it does not make it. Our perceptionsneverhave a
constantand regularto correspondto that
successionsufficiently
of time,whichis a continuumuniformand simple,like a straight
line. Changingperceptionsfurnishus the occasion for thinking
of time, and we measure it by uniform changes.

So that

motions,we can always referthem

knowingthe rulesof different
to the uniformintelligiblemotions. . .. In this sense time is
the measure of motion,i.e., uniformmotionis the measure of
We have here the key to Leibniz's oppomotion."50
non-uniform
sitionto all sensationalisttheoriesas well as to his oppositionto
Newton's realistictheory.
It is usual, and it appears to be natural,to look upon the controversybetween Newton and Leibniz as a collision between
scientificand metaphysicalthought.But if we accept this interHow can we
pretationwe are faced with a grave difficulty.
account for the fact that our moderntheoriesof space and time
have adopted the "relativistic"theoryof Leibniz, whereas they
have very severelycriticizedthe Newtonianconceptsof absolute
space and time? Shall we say that since the time of Newton
science has developed froman empiricalstate to a more "metaphysical" state? This would of course be a very strange and
dubious way of stating the problem.To regard Newton as a
mere "empiricist"would be just as wrong as to regard Leibniz
centurywe cannot
as a mere "metaphysician".In the seventeenth
draw such a line of demarcationbetweenmetaphysicaland mathematical,betweentheologicaland physicalthinking.5'What both
Newton and Leibniz call "natural philosophy"is still embedded
in the greaterwhole of metaphysics.Leibniz could not develop
Nouveaux Essais, Livre II, chap. 14, sect. i6: English translationby
Langley,p. 156.
"' In the case of Malebranchethishas been shown in a veryinteresting
and suggestivearticle by Paul Schrecker,"Le Parallelisme theologicochez Malebranche",Revue PhilosophiqueLXIII (1938) 87mathematique
124.

No. 4.] GALILEO

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his theoryof space and time withoutconstantlyreferringto his

fundamentalmetaphysicalconceptions,to his monadology,his
principleof the "identityof indiscernibles",and his systemof
"preestablishedharmony".Newton,on the other hand, however
reservedin his judgmentabout the "ultimatecauses" of natural
phenomena,never could avoid metaphysicalproblems.He had
very definiteconceptionsof the nature of the deity,and of the
general structureof the spiritualworld and its connectionwith
the materialuniverse.52In the "queries" added to his Opticks
Newtontreatedall thesequestionsexplicitly.To speak of Newton
as if he were a precursorof Comteand his positivisticphilosophy
is, indeed,impossible.The whole intellectualatmosphereof Newton's thoughtand scientificwork is in flagrantcontradictionto
When Newton'sPrincipia firstappeared
the spiritof positivism.53
it was hailed not onlyas the workof a great scientist,but also as
the work of a great theologianand of a great religiousthinker.
The most influentialtheologicalschools in England were unanimous in this judgment.In Newton's book they saw the firmest
strongholdagainst those systemsof natural philosophywhich
threatenedto subvertthe foundationsof naturalreligionand the
The modernreader's interestin all this is little
Christianfaith.54
more than historical.What he seeks and findsin the documents
of the dispute betweenLeibniz and Newton is somethingquite
It is a logical and epistemological,
not a metaphysical,
different.
problem.As has been shown,it is the logical structureof space
and time which was seen in a new light in the philosophyof
Leibniz. Insteadof propoundinga theoryof theabsolute"essence"
of space and time, Leibniz began with a critical study of the
"meaning" of theseterms.It was thiscriticaltendencyof thought
which proved to be pregnantwith far-reachingconsequencesfor
both science and philosophy.When Einstein,two centurieslater,
2 For fullerdocumentation
I referto the detailedaccountof the metaphysicalbackground
of Newton'stheoryof space and timein mybook,Das
Erkenntnisproblem,
thirdedition,Berlin 1922, II 442-472.
" The bestand mostconvincing
refutation
of a "positivistic"
interpretation
of Newton'sworkhas been givenby Prof. E. A. Burtt,The Metaphysical
Foundationsof ModernPhysicalScience,1924, RevisedEdition,New York
I932. See especially
pp. 223 ff.
" For this problemI referto the very interesting
materialcontainedin
the book of Helene Metzger,Attractionuniverselleet religionnaturelle
chez quelques commentateurs
anglais de Newton,Paris I938.

390

THE PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW

[VOL.

LII.

developedhis special theoryof relativityhe found it necessary,

firstand foremost,to analyse the "meaning"of time.This seems
to me to be the real pointof contactbetweenthe views of Leibniz
and those of modernscience.
In the eighteenthcenturythe great scientistsstill had implicit
faithin Newton's authority.In I748 Euler wrotehis Reflexions
in which he tried to prove that withsur lespace et le temps,55
out the Newtonian concepts of an absolute space the law of
inertia and, accordingly,the whole systemof mechanicswould
become meaningless.The results of Newton's physics were so
closelyinterwovenwith his fundamentalconceptsthat it seemed
impossibleto give up or change the latterwithoutendangering
the former.Any such attempt-it was felt-was bound to end
in completescepticismand anarchy. To many great physicists
Leibniz's theories concerningthe relativityof space and time
appeared to be subversivethoughts.An entirelynew and fresh
intellectualimpulsewas requiredto perceivethatthese subversive
thoughtscould be turnedinto constructivethoughts,that a new
systemof physicscould be builtupon the ruinsof the Newtonian
conceptsof space and time. "Several men had writtensystems
of philosophybefore Sir Isaac", declared William Emerson in
his commentaryon Newton's Principia (I770), "but, for their
ignoranceof nature,none of themcould stand the test. But his
principlesbeing built upon the unerringfoundationof observations and experiments,must necessarilystand good till the dissolution of nature itself."56Even as late as the mid-nineteenth
century commentatorsand biographersof Newton were still
talkingin a similarvein."To have beenthechosensage summoned
to the studyof that earth,these systemsand that universe,-the
favouredlawgiverto worlds unnumbered,the high-priestin the
temple of boundless space", exclaimed David Brewster in his
Memoirs of the Life, Writings,and Discoveries of Sir Isaac
Newton,"was a privilegethat could be grantedbut to one member of the human family;-and to have executedthe task was an
" Histoirede l'AcademieRoyale des Sciences et Belles Lettresa Berlin,
Annee I748.
William Emerson,"A Short Commenton Sir Isaac Newton'sPrincipia", in The MathematicalPrinciplesof Sir I. Newton (New Edition,
London i803) III 86.

No. 4.] GALILEO

AND THE SCIENTIFIC

REVOLUTION

39i

achievementwhich in its magnitudecan be measured only by

the infinitein space, and in the durationof its triumphsby the
infinitein time. That Sage-that Lawgiver-that High-priest
was Newton."57No modern scientistwould subscribe to this
judgmentwithoutcriticalreservations.Yet this apparentdetraction takes nothingaway fromthe fundamentalmeritsof Newton. For it is not the methodof Newton but the dogmaticfaith
in his results,and the uncriticaluse made of his principles,which
had to be overcome by the furtherdevelopmentof scientific
thought.As Einstein said in an articlepublishedat the second
centenaryof Newton's death,58theoreticalphysicsoutgrewNewton's framework,which for nearly two centurieshad provided
fixityand intellectualguidance for science.
From the dispute betweenLeibniz and Newton and its prolongationthroughthe two followingcenturieswe may draw a
general conclusion.Conflictswithinthe realm of scientificand
philosophicthoughtappear to be unavoidable.But amid these incessant combatsit is comforting
to see thatthe opposingpowers,
insteadof beingmutuallydestructive,
are of mutualassistanceto,
and steadilycooperate with, one another.If, as in the case of
Newtonand Leibniz,thebattleis foughtbetweentwo thinkersof
equal intellectualstature,then the struggledoes not end in the
defeator victoryof one party; it leads ratherto a new synthesis
of scientificand philosophicthought.
ERNST CASSIRER
YALE

UNIVERSITY

57Brewster,
MemoirsI 319.

"Manchester Guardian,March

i9,

1927.