G.R. No.

208566 Political Law Constitutional Law Local Government

Invalid Delegation

of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is
approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power

Presidential Pork Barrel

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the
GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)
the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been
around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived
from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since
about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum,
discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several
legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority
Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel
is integrated in the annualGeneral Appropriations Act (GAA).

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy,
exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system
had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping
lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs
(non-government organizations) which would make it appear that
government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact
going to ghost projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission
on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.

Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following
manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down
to P40 million for hard projects (infrastructure projects like
roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects
(scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various
petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the
pork barrel system.

b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million

for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100
million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of

funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the realignment

II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being,

legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate
further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.

HELD:

Exceptions to the rule are:

I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is

unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:

(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall
involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other
national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.

a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of
funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements
the laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the
executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system,
whats happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the
legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should
be allocated to a clear act of implementing the law they enacted a
violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case
of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF
or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the
legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to
identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of
the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate
funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it)
collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in
the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to
the individual member of Congress.

This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the
executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the
president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be
inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the
fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the
project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The
Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as

the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the

appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA again, Congress
cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless.

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of

an appropriation made by law.

d. Local Autonomy

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the
Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which
amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the

earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation
from a particular legislation.

As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local
affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can
develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But
with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of
representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either
bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own.
This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is
a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and
this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel
system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part
of legislators.

(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others,
collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special
fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy
resource development and for other purposes which the President may
direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of
PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential
Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article
VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not
have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation
as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel
is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of
the Constitution which provides: