Philosophy 523/Problems of Philosophy: Epistemology

Themes from Boghossian, Christensen and DeRose

Princeton University
Spring 2009
Wednesdays, 7-9:45(ish), Marx 201
Thomas Kelly
221 1879 Hall
tkelly@princeton.edu
In this seminar, we will look at a number of central topics in
contemporary epistemology. We will approach these topics through the
recently published and forthcoming work of three leading figures in the
field: Paul Boghossian (NYU), David Christensen (Brown) and Keith
DeRose (Yale), each of whom will visit the seminar over the course of the
semester. In addition, we will also read some work by their critics (e.g.,
Williamson, Hawthorne, Harman and Rosen).
Specific topics to be addressed include the following: contextualism
about knowledge and its rivals; contextualism as a response to the skeptic.
Epistemic relativism. Recent debates over epistemic conceptions of
analyticity and whether the traditional project of accounting for a priori
knowledge by appeal to analyticity is viable. Rationality over time
(diachronic principles of conservatism, reflection, etc.) and across persons
(the epistemic significance of disagreement).
All readings listed below will be available on the Princeton blackboard site for the course
https://blackboard.princeton.edu/pucourse/PHI523_S2009 under Course
Materials>Readings.
1. February 4th. Overview
*February 11th. Seminar will not meet this week. (Note: in order to make up for this
session, we will have an additional meeting of the seminar on Thursday, 5/7this is
the week after classes officially end.)
Part I. Contextualism, Knowledge, and Skepticism (Keith DeRose)
2. February 18th. Contextualism as a Response to the Skeptic

2
*Keith DeRose, Solving the Skeptical Problem, Philosophical Review 104 (1995).
Available online via JSTOR at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2186011
DeRose, How Can We Know that Were Not Brains in Vats? The Southern Journal
of Philosophy (2000) Vol. XXXVIII, Supplement: 121-138.
David Lewis, Scorekeeping in a Language Game, Journal of Philosophical Logic 8
(1979): 339-359. Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers, vol.1.
3. February 25th. The Case for Contextualism (I)
*DeRose, chapters 1,2, and 4 of his manuscript The Case for Contextualism. (Some
pages to be omitted.)
4. March 4th. The Case for Contextualism (II): Knowledge as the Norm of
Assertion.
*DeRose, Assertion, Knowledge, and Context, chapter 3 of The Case for
Contextualism.
Timothy Williamson, Assertion. Chapter 11 of his Knowledge and Its Limits
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 238-269.
5. March 11th.

Keith DeRose visits the seminar.

Additional reading for this session:

*DeRose, Chapters 6 and 7 of The Case for Contextualism.
John Hawthorne, Contextualism and the Puzzle. Chapter 2 of his Knowledge and
Lotteries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004). [Excerpts]
March 18th. No Seminar/Spring Break
Part II. Relativism in Epistemology; Analyticity and A Priority (Paul Boghossian)
6. March 25th. Epistemic Relativism.
*Paul Boghossian, selections from Fear of Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006).

3
Gideon Rosen, The Case Against Epistemic Relativism Episteme: A Journal of
Social Epistemology 4.1 (2007): 10-29. Available online at
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/episteme/v004/4.1rosen.pdf
Crispin Wright, Fear of Relativism? forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
John MacFarlane, Boghossian, Bellarmine, and Bayes, forthcoming in Philosophical
Studies.
7. April 1st. Analyticity (1): The Background
*Boghossian, Analyticity. In Bob Hale and Crispin Wright (eds.) A Companion to
the Philosophy of Language (Blackwell, 1997): 331-368.
Gilbert Harman, Reasoning, Meaning and Mind, pp.119-129, 144-152.
8. April 8th. Analyticity (2): The Boghossian-Williamson Debate
*Timothy Williamson, Epistemological Conceptions of Analyticity. Chapter 4 of his
The Philosophy of Philosophy (Blackwell, 2007).
*Boghossian, Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic, forthcoming in
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Paul Boghossian visits the seminar.

Part III: Rationality Through Time and Across Persons (David Christensen)
9. April 15th. Rationality Through Time.
*David Christensen, Diachronic Coherence vs. Epistemic Impartiality, Philosophical
Review 109 (2000): 349-371. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2693694
Christensen, Conservatism in Epistemology, Nous (1994): 69-89. Available online
via JSTOR at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215920
10. April 22nd. Disagreement (1).
*Christensen, Epistemology of Disagreement: the Good News Philosophical Review
116 (2007): 187-217. Available online at

4
http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/2/187.pdf
Christensen, Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. At
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/faculty/christensen/Compass%20Article.pdf

.
11. April 29th. Disagreement (2).
*Christensen,Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-criticism. At
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/faculty/christensen/Conciliationism.pdf
Thomas Kelly, Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence. Forthcoming in
Feldman and Warfield (eds.) Disagreement and in Goldman (ed.) Social
Epistemology. [excerpts]
12. May 7th. David Christensen visits the seminar.
Further readings for this session: TBA