Horizontalism or Verticalism?

Proclus vs Plotinus on the Procession of Matter

GERD VAN RIEL

One of the central topics of the Neoplatonic debate on matter is the question of how it relates to the One Good. The basic Neoplatonic claim is
clear enough. If one maintains that the Good is the rst and omnipresent
principle of reality, then matter, too, must be originated by the Good. This
indeed is the claim that distinguishes Neoplatonism from gnostic dualism. Most Neoplatonists, particularly in the later tradition, took it that matter for this reason cannot be evil. But even those in the school who held
that matter is evil (this was Plotinuss own thesis) did accept that, ultimately, matter stems from the One Good. Of course, the latter position
requires a subtle argument to prove that an offspring of the Good can turn
out to be evil.
In the present article, we shall brie y present Plotinuss explanation of
matters being evil while stemming from the One, and confront it with the
doctrine of the later Neoplatonists. We intend to show that the central
point of difference between Plotinus and his successors on the issue results
from a difference in perspective. Plotinus, on the one hand, proposed a
vertical or hylemorphic scheme: he considered the emanation of reality from the One as a process in which a substratum (generated by a
higher level) receives its speci c form from above. The later Neoplatonists, on the other hand, presented a horizontal scheme: they held that
the procession consists in the combination of two elements at the same
level, which are modalities of a duality of primordial principles. We shall
argue that this shift between Plotinus and his successors is the result of a
new reading of Platos Philebus.
1. Plotinuss Hylemorphism
In Plotinuss treatise on evil (Enn. I 8, no 51 in the chronological order),
matter and evil are said to be identical: they are non-being, not in the
sense of a mere otherness (terthw, cf. Plato, Soph. 257 c-258 c), but as
the contrary of being, 1 without, however, losing real existence. Plotinus is
1

Enn. I 8, 3.7-9; cf. II 4, 16.1-5: Is matter, then, the same thing as otherness? No,

Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2001

Phronesis XLVI/2

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aware of possible objections against this thesis, the most important one
being raised from an Aristotelian point of view. For, according to Aristotle, being has no contrary. An opposition can only exist between characteristics or attributes within one single genus or species; in that case, the
contraries are those characteristics that are at the greatest possible distance from one another. 2 Plotinus answers that this objection is valid, if
one con nes being (osa) to concrete individual substances. But at a
general level, being as such does have a contrary. It consists more precisely in the absence of everything that determines being.3 Needless to say,
Plotinus here makes a shift from the Aristotelian notion of osa (translated as substance), to the Platonic osa, which is intelligible being,
the separate existence of the forms. In this perspective, the contrary of
being must have a very speci c nature: as opposed to beings full determination, it must be fully undetermined; it must lack all measure, all limit,
all quality and form, etc. It is mere indeterminacy, a limit concept that
can only be grasped with a bastard reasoning (nyow logismw) based on
its effects.4 Moreover, the privation of the forms is the privation of the
Good, since, as Plotinus explains in Enn. VI 7 [38], 15-18, a form is
rather it is the same thing as the part of otherness which is opposed to the things which
in the full and proper sense exist, that is to say rational formative principles. [all the
quotations of Plotinuss Enneads are taken from the Armstrong translation]
2
Arist., Cat. 3 b 24-26; 6 a 17-18: Substances never have contraries. How could
rst substances have them this man, for example, that animal? Nothing is contrary
to them; neither is anything contary to man or animal [i.e., in general, taken as
genus or species]. . . . We call those things contrary which, being within the same class,
are most distant the one from the other. [tr. Cooke, modi ed]
3
Enn. I 8, 6.27-42: But if the Good is substance, or something which transcends
substance, how can it have any contrary? That there is nothing contrary to substance
is established by inductive demonstration in the case of particular substances; but it
has not been demonstrated that this applies in general. But what can there be contrary
to universal substance and, in general, to the rst principles? Non-substance is contrary to substance, and that which is the nature and principle of evil to the nature of
good: for both are principles, one of evils, the other of goods; and all the things which
are included in each nature are contrary to those in the other; so that the wholes are
contrary, and more contrary to each other than the other contraries. For the other contraries belong to the same species or the same genus and have something in common
as a result of this belonging. But things which are completely separate, and in which
there are present in one the contraries to whatever is necessary for the ful lment of
the being of the other, must surely be most of all contraries, if by contraries we mean
things that are furthest of all removed from each other.
4
Cf. Plato, Tim. 52 b 2, quoted at Enn. II 4, 10.6-11, and 12.33. See also I 8,
9.14-18.

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gayoeidw,5 i.e., it conforms to the nature of the Good, and it transmits

goodness to the lower realms. According to Plotinus, the existence of this

non-being can be deduced in analogy with the af rmation of the existence
of the ideas: just as that which is measured (t memetrhmnon) cannot be
measure itself (t mtron), that which is unmeasured (t metron) cannot
be unmeasuredness as such ( metra).6 So there is a kind of participation, pointing towards the existence of an essential form that plainly and
fully is that which is participated in by concrete things. If, then, we nd
ways in which things fall short of determination, then the absence of all
determination should have an existence in itself, with this oddity that the
common character of the participants in this case is the absence of any
characteristic. This pure absence of all determination is evil, primary evil,
which is participated in by all particular, secondary evil things. 7
The basis of this theory is the Aristotelian concept of prime matter, to
which if we can assume that he believed in it Aristotle himself appears
to attribute indeterminacy.8 However, according to Aristotle, that does not
mean that matter is privation. As he says in the Physics (192 a), privation and matter are one in substratum, but two in de nition. This means
that privation is the absence of a certain characteristic that should, or
could, be present in a given substratum. Plotinus disagrees with this weak
de nition of privation. Again, he accepts the suitability of Aristotles theory
in the case of individual, concrete substances, but he radicalises the theory
by accepting that the substratum, matter as such, is privation. This identi cation of the substratum and privation entails that when a form or characteristic is imposed on matter, its privation is not extinguished, but rather
preserved. It undergoes the imposition of the forms, without being altered
itself, i.e., without losing its essential indeterminacy. 9
The Neoplatonic version of hylemorphism thus assumes not a mere
abstract difference between matter and form, but rather a contrariety or
contradiction, a loose combination of two independent elements. It is matter that makes that a thing is de cient in comparison with the forms.
Because of matter, a thing is not what it should be or could be.10 Matter
is receptivity for the forms, but at the same time and on this point the
5
6
7
8
9
10

Cf. Plato, Rep. VI, 509 a 3.

I 8, 3.23-35.
I 8, 4.1-12.
Arist., Met. IX 7, 1049 a 24 b 3.
II 4, 16; cf. OBrien 1996, 178-181.
Corrigan 1996, 32-33.

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Neoplatonists depart from Aristotle matter displays a fundamental resistance to the forms.11 It will never be completely formed, since it has a
force that devours, or corrupts, the forms.12
The characterisation of matter as the totally indeterminate substratum
requires an explanation of how this substratum is produced. Plotinus
asserts that matter is a stage (the very last stage, to be precise) in the emanation of reality from the Good. In the ongoing multiplication of things
by which the distance from the Good increases the force of the Good is
ever decreasing. Matter is to be situated at the point where the force of
the Good comes to an end in a total lleiciw. Hence, it is evil.
2. Procession through the Creation of a Substratum
Enn. V 4 [7] is one of the main texts in which Plotinus expounds his views
of the procession of reality from the One. Here he writes if there is anything after the First, it must necessarily come from the First; it must either
come from it directly or have its ascent back to it through the beings between,
and there must be an order of seconds and thirds, the second going back
to the rst and the third to the second.13 Plotinus immediately chooses
the second option: reality comes from the rst principle through clearly
determined stages, each of them producing the subsequent realm. The
question is then raised how the First can produce multiplicity without losing its uniqueness and self-suf ciency. If the rst principle, Plotinus
answers, is the most perfect of all, and the primal power, it must be the
most powerful of all beings and the other powers must imitate it as far
as they are able.14 The rst is the principle of everything, because it is
the dnamiw tn pntvn.15 In this sense, the One is unlimited: it cannot
have anything outside it, and hence, it cannot be bound within limits.16
Aristotle also held that the receptivity of matter sets limits on the imposition of
the forms, stating that not any portion of matter is susceptible to any form. Plotinus
radicalises this idea, putting the emphasis on the proper dynamic of the predisposition
of matter, which in itself is refractory and goes counter to the form. Plotinus nds
support for this idea in a passage of Platos Timaeus (41 b), where it is asserted that
the universe is composed of now and ngkh, this necessity being interpreted as the
refractory nature of matter. The same goes for the ancient nature (rxaa fsiw) of
the Politicus (273 b), which, according to Plotinus, is matter before it has been structured by the demiurge; cf. I 8, 7.6.
12
I 8, 8.19-28.
13
V 4, 1.1-5.
14
V 4, 1.23-26.
15
III 8, 10.1.
16
V 5, 10.18-23, where Plotinus paraphrases Plato, Parm. 137 d 4-8.
11

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133

Moreover, being perfect, it contains everything in it. The Aristotelian

notion of potency is enlarged here to an active power to produce the
lower,17 even though Plotinus does not use the term active potency, as
do Aristotle18 and later Neoplatonists. 19 Plotinus uses a more simpli ed
terminology, drawing an opposition between the dnamiw (or creative
power) and t dunmei (meaning the receptive potentiality, which is restricted
to the sensible world).20
This account should not lead to premature conclusions. For the statement that the One is the power of everything does not mean that the
generative power in question can be attributed to the rst principle without quali cation. If that were the case, then this attribution would certainly threaten the Ones absolute unity. Therefore, this phrase should be
taken in a weaker sense, assuming that this so-called power of the One
can only be demonstrated ex effectibus. Indeed, the procession of lower
reality from the One follows a very speci c procedure. It does not imply
any kind of creation, but rather it assumes a self-development of the
lower. For the One does not give being, it only provides the possibility to
develop being. In a famous formula, Plotinus states that It [i.e., Intellect]
received from the One a potency to produce and to ll itself with its offspring; thus, the One gives what it does not have itself.21 Indeed, the One
cannot have a power, since that would jeopardize its unity. This power,
then, will only have true existence at the level of Intellect, where it reveals
itself as a trace of the higher.
The procedure through which the One produces a potency, i.e., an
indeterminate substratum that subsequently develops its speci c mode of
being, can be followed in the rst place on the level of Intellect. As we
have seen, Intellect receives a potency to produce and to ll itself with its
offspring. 22 This potency, Plotinus says, is transmitted from the One to
Intellect in the same way as re emits warmth, or as smelling objects
Cf. Bussanich, 1988, 30; Narbonne 1993, 29.
Arist., Met. IX 1, 1045 b 35 1046 a 35.
19
In Proclus, the distinction between active (or perfect) and passive (or imperfect)
potency is one of the central features of the doctrine of dnamiw; cf. infra.
20
Enn. II 5. Corrigan 1996, 106-115 argues that the omission of the Aristotelian
terminology is an effect of Plotinuss conviction that matter is identical with privation:
in fact, although matter is said to be potentially all things, it is not affected by the
imposition of the forms, and, hence, it cannot be said to have a passive potency. It
is not shaped by the forms, but merely receives them.
21
VI 7, 15.18-20.
22
This means that the Intellect actualises the potency of the One. Consequently, the
Intellect can be called the rst nrgeia of the Good (I 8, 2.21; cf. III 8, 11.1-5; V
3, 12.27).
17
18

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spread their perfumes: they do so as an additional result of their proper

activity, i.e., as a superabundance that does not affect the substantial activity or the essence of the bearer.23
The production of Intellect is realised in two different phases. Originally, the Intellect was completely absorbed by the One. It did have the
capacity to contemplate, but without thinking (blepen notvw).24 So there
was no now, but only a direct contact (yjiw ka oion paf),25 a state
which, in the description of the return of reality towards the One is
called the loving intellect (now rn).26 In a second phase, Intellect
receives the compressed power to produce everything. Since, however, this
power was too strong, the Intellect had to fragment (sunyraue) it in order
to make it bearable. In this way, Intellect became a unity-in-plurality: it
lled itself with separate parts. These parts are the Forms, which thus stem
from the One (being the result of the power of the One), but which only
become Forms on the level of Intellect, and according to the speci c mode
of being that prevails in that hypostasis. 27 Thus, the Forms have the form
of the Good, and the Intellect is good as well, being the unity of all the
Forms: it is a polychrome goodness (gayn poiklon).28
A similar explanation can be found in Enn. III 8, in a passage where
Plotinus raises the question of how the Intellect can become a multiplicV 1, 6.30-37; V 4, 2.26-34.
VI 7, 16.14.
25
V 3, 10.42; cf. Trouillard 1955, 46.
26
VI 7, 35.23-27.
27
Hlye d [sc. t yevromena] ew atn [sc. tn non] ox w ke n, ll w
atw sxen (VI 7, 15.13-14). Hadot 1988 translates: Ces Formes sont venues dans
lEsprit, non pas telles quelles taient dans le Bien, mais telles que lEsprit les a
acquises. Armstrong writes: But they came to it, not as they were there, but as
Intellect itself possessed them. And Br hier has: Le Bien vient en elle [sc. lIntelligence],
non tel quil est dans sa transcendance, mais telle quelle peut le recevoir. The latter interpretation is not correct: the Good itself does not descend. The subject of the
phrase is not t gayn, but t yevromena. However, the real problem with this sentence lies in w atw sxen : this cannot mean here as intellect itself possessed
them (Armstrongs translation; cf. also Sleeman-Pollet 1980, s.v. xein Ad). For
Intellect did not possess the Forms before. Presumably, this consideration inspired
Hadot and Br hier to render sxen as it acquired or received the Forms, although
this meaning of the word is not attested elsewhere. The best solution is to give w
sxen the meaning of xv followed by an adverb: to be (such and such) [attested
with w in Plotinus: cf. Sleeman-Pollet 1980, s.v. xein Ba]. The objects that are contemplated can only become objects when they assume the typical mode of being
that governs the realm of Intellect. Cf. VI 7, 32.34-36: the beauty of the Good is formless, and manifests itself in a different way (llon trpon) in the Forms.
28
VI 7, 15.23-24.
23
24

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135

ity, if originally it formed a unity with the One. His answer is that when
Intellect contemplates the One, it never does so as if it were a unity (in
that case, indeed, there would be no Intellect at all). But beginning as
one (rjmenow w n) it did not stay as it began, but, without noticing it,
became many, as if heavy (bebarhmnow), and unrolled itself because it
wanted to possess everything how much better it would have been for
it Plotinus ironically laments,29 not to want this, for it became the second. 30
In this way, Intellect reveals the unlimited power of the One. As a matter of fact, Intellect is the rst to be truly unlimited, since, as we have
seen, this kind of attribute cannot apply to the One without denying its
unity. This unlimitedness of the Intellect is the substratum that undergoes
the operation of the One. In that sense, it can be called (intelligible) matter: For in the intelligible world, too, matter is the unlimited, and it would
be produced from the unlimitedness or the power or the everlastingness
of the One unlimitedness is not in the One, but the One produces it.31
Subsequently, this substratum receives its de nite structure, not by an
additional operation of the One, but rather by a self-development of the
substratum. Thus, the limit, measure, or order, is not imposed on the substratum as an external factor; rather, it appears at the decisive moment at
which a certain being develops its own speci c nature. This self-development is accomplished through a return to the One. At Enn. V 1, 7, Plotinus
writes the following: How does it [i.e., the One] generate Intellect?
Because by its return to it, it sees: and this seeing is Intellect. (. . .)
Intellect, certainly, by its own means even de nes its being for itself by
the power which comes from the One (. . .). Intellect sees, by means of
itself, like something divided proceeding from the undivided, that life and
thought and all things come from the One, because he is not one of all
things; for this is how all things come from him, because he is not
con ned by any shape; that One is one alone: if he were all things, he
would be numbered among beings. For this reason that One is none of
the things in Intellect, but all things come from him. This is why they are

Obviously, Plotinus does not consider it as a real possibility that the Intellect
would have chosen its own fall. This interpretation, which was held by Ph. Merlan
(1975, 124), was convincingly refuted by Bussanich (1988, 82-83), following Rist
(1967, 341): [this passage] does not mean that it [i.e., intellect] recklessly broke away,
but that it has faced up to living apart after its generation indeed it had no option.
30
III 8, 8.30-36.
31
II 4, 15.17-20; cf. V 1, 5.6-9, where the Pythagorico-platonic dyad is identi ed
with intelligible matter (cf. Szlezk 1979, 77 and 85; Narbonne 1993, 65; Bussanich
1988, 119).
29

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substances; for they are already de ned and each has a kind of shape.
Being must not uctuate, so to speak, in the inde nite, but must be xed
by limit and stability; and stability in the intelligible world is limitation
and shape, and it is by these that it receives existence.32
Thus, apart from the unlimitedness, Intellect also receives limit from
the One, albeit in an indirect way, i.e., when it turns itself towards the
Principle. At that moment, it truly becomes Intellect (ka now dh n).33
This scheme of production is repeated at every level of reality: rst, the
power of a certain being brings forward an undetermined substratum at a
lower level, and subsequently, by turning itself to its origin, this substratum develops its own speci c being. That is to say, this substratum is not
completely undetermined: 34 it has the capacity to develop its own shapes
and forms. Or, in other words, the forms are not imposed from elsewhere,
but they are potentially present within the substratum; they only need
the return towards the origin to be actualised.
At the lowest level of reality, this scheme returns in a very particular
way. In order to be active and fertile, the soul has to produce a place
(tpow) to live. Thus, the (lowest, i.e., the vegetative) soul produces an
undetermined substratum that will undergo its activity, just as was the case
at the higher levels. However, this lower substratum is very particular, in
that it completely lacks the possibility to develop its own determination:
Just as everything which was produced before this was produced shapeless, but was formed by turning towards its producer and being, so to
speak, reared to maturity by it, so here, too, that which is produced is not
any more a form of soul (for it is not alive) but in this case, it is absolute
inde niteness. For even if there is inde niteness in the things before it, it
is nevertheless inde niteness within form; the thing is not absolutely inde nite
but only in relation to its perfection; but what we are dealing with now
is absolutely inde nite. 35 This particularity is due to the fact that the
power that originally came from the One has been extremely weakened.
We have reached the edge, and there is nothing below it. The last product of the emanation, i.e., matter, brought forward by the soul, is not
capable itself of turning itself to its producer. This means that any determination will have to be imposed on the substratum. In other words, the
32
V 1, 7.5-6;13-14;17-27. Cf. II 4, 5.31-34: The movement and otherness that
came from the First are unde ned, and need the First to de ne them; and they are
de ned when they turn to it; see also V 3, 11.1-15.
33
VI 7, 16.20.
34
Cf. III 4, 1.12-14.
35
III 4, 1.8-14.

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soul will have to deliver a second effort. After having produced the substrate, the soul has to turn back to the lower stage, in order to bring beauty
and form in it.36 The determination, then, remains entirely external to the
substratum: as we have seen before, matters indeterminacy is not extinguished by the souls imposition of forms, it just undergoes it without
losing its own nature.37 In that sense, Plotinus declares that the soul only
conveys an image (edvlon) of form to matter.38 The rst aspect of determination is the introduction of a receptivity: the completely indeterminate
substratum is perfected (teleiomenon) in the sense that it is made capable of undergoing the determination of the forms: When it is perfected
it becomes a body, receiving the form appropriate to its potentiality, a
receiver for the principle which produced it and brought it to maturity. 39
This receptivity in itself, then, is good. Without the receptivity of matter,
evidently, the forms would be powerless in the sensible world. Hence,
Plotinus states that matter spreads itself out under the soul and is illumined.40 So, ultimately, there is an element of goodness in matter, which
is really the last thinkable stage the good can reach: an openness or receptivity to the good. However, in itself, matter is mere darkness, and immediately darkens the sparkle that comes from the soul. In that sense, matter
can be seen as the cause of evil: the soul has to turn back to the lower
in order to bring the forms in it. When the circumstances are favourable,
the soul does so without losing sight of the higher (which it takes as the
paradigm of the images it produces). However, it always risks going astray
when it just looks down. For the lower has a refractory nature, resisting
the operation of the soul; this always threatens the soul with being merged
in matter, and so with being cut off from its elevated origin. 41
This gives us an account of how matter can be derived from the One.
It is the totally inde nite substratum, in which the power of the Good
comes to an end. Its production re ects the way in which all other levels
of reality come to be, with the difference that the lowest substratum is
wholly incapable of developing determination out of itself.
The scheme is a vertical, or hylemorphic one, placing the indeterminacy at a lower level (and ultimately, the true or complete indeterminacy
IV 3, 10.20-42.
Cf. II 4, 5.15-18 (the body as a nekrn kekosmhmnon).
38
IV 3, 10.38-41.
39
III 4, 1.14-17.
40
I 8, 14.38.
41
IV 3, 10.22-27; for Plotinuss theory of the cause of evil, see OBrien 1993, 1949; Corrigan 1996, 32-101 and 180-256; Schfer 2000, 1-35.
36
37

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at the bottom of the system), and bringing in determination from above.

This makes it very dif cult, in the end, to explain how matter can be
derived from the good, and how it is not a separate principle of evil. For
this reason, the later Neoplatonists refused to take over Plotinuss view.
3. Procession through a Triadic Structure
According to the later Neoplatonists, matter proceeds from the Good in a
straightforward way. Matter is not evil at all. It is good and even divine
(nyeon).42 The basis for this claim is to be found in the later Neoplatonists interpretation of Platos Philebus. Here (i.e., Phil. 23 c-30 e), they
argue, Plato presents a very important analysis of the highest levels of
reality, stating that the One Good, or the Cause, is immediately followed
by a duality of principles (praw, or the Limit, and peiron, or the Unlimited).
These principles are present throughout all reality, everything being a
combination of the two. Hence, at every level of reality, there are two elements, each belonging to either one of the two principles.
This new interpretation was established by Iamblichus, 43 who because
of his Neopythagorean interests paid particular attention to the fourfold
classi cation, and especially to the duality of praw and peiron presented
in this dialogue. From Iamblichus onwards, this high esteem for the principles of the Philebus becomes common doctrine in the Neoplatonic
school. Furthermore, it was combined with the dual scheme of parjiw
and dnamiw that gures in the Chaldaean Oracles.44 Of course, there were
debates on more than one of the implications of this interpretation (such
as, e.g., on the possibility of accepting a contrariety at this very high level
of reality, a point raised by Damascius, as we shall see below), but on
the general outline of the theory, all authors agreed.
Thus, we have a very sophisticated scheme in which the nature of matter can be linked to the nature of the Good. We shall concentrate on Procluss
presentation of the issue, as it is the best documented version. In his view,
Limit and the Unlimited receive their pstasiw from the rst principle,
being a revelation of its nature. Hence, they are the central elements in
the explanation of the production of multiplicity from the First cause. For,

Procl., De malorum subsistentia X, 34.17 (quoted below).

For Iamblichuss interpretation: see Van Riel 1997, 31-46.
44
Or. Chald. fr. 4 Des Places. Cf. OMeara 1989, 93: Iamblichus produced an
enormous Chaldaean Theology in which the Chaldaean Oracles were interpreted with
the help of the Pythagoreans and of Platos Philebus.
42
43

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139

in the rst place, the principle can only produce unity, and this unity
is as it were crystallised in the principle of Limit. In order to explain
the existence of multiplicity, another element is required: a principle that
governs the development of the lower from the absolute One. These two
principles are directly linked to the First, of which they are the rst manifestations, while at the same time being the ultimate stage in the ascent
towards the First. Apparently, the plenitude of the First can only be expressed
by a duality of principles.
According to Proclus, the rst of these two principles, i.e., praw, is that
which de nes the limits of a being, thus providing a separate existence:
The Limit determines (forzei) every being, it circumscribes ( perigrfei) it and places it within its own boundaries (sthsin n okeoiw roiw) . . .
so that every being has its own nature, boundary, property and place
through the rst Limit.45
Thus, the existence of a being is the result of the rst Limits (t prton
praw) delimitation of the being as a separate entity. 46 It receives a proper
existence (the parjiw of the Chaldaean Oracles) as a result of the operation of praw. For a being would not be able to exist without constituting a separate unity. So the operation of praw consists primarily in the
uni cation that is required for a beings existence.
Hence, Proclus declares that praw is the rst One, or the One in the
true sense of the word, as opposed to the First principle, which could
only be called One in a metaphorical sense: The First is not truly one,
for it is superior, as it has been declared many times, even to the one.
Where, then, to situate the one that is completely one in the true meaning of the word? There is a one that precedes being, which even produces
being, and which is primordially the cause of being, since that which precedes this one transcended even the unity and the cause; it had no relation with anything and was imparticipable, exceeding everything. 47
The principle of Limit is the rst real One, which gives a lasting property (mnimow dithw)48 to beings, and everywhere in reality it guarantees
the mon, i.e., the preservation of unity within the multiplication. 49
This principle governing the mon does not give rise to multiplicity.
Since the principle of Limit can only produce unity, the production of

45
46
47
48
49

Procl., In Crat. 42, 13.21-22 and 24-26.

Cf. In Tim. III 176.1: row ka t praw forzei tn parjin kstou.
Theologia Platonica (TP) III 8, 31.12-18 [ed. Saffrey-Westerink, my translation].
TP III 9, 37.25-26.
TP III 8, 32.15-25.

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GERD VAN RIEL

multiplicity from the One must be due to the operation of a different principle. Clearly, the procession of reality is brought about by a generative
power (gennhtik dnamiw)50 of the higher. Since it is impossible to ascribe
anything, including a power, to the First, this generative power must
occupy a separate place in the system, apart from the First and from Limit.
Like the Limit, the generative power constitutes a series, having members at every level of reality: every being is productive in one way or
another, since producing is a characteristic of being itself. The series is
governed by the principle of Unlimitedness (t peiron), which causes the
procession of reality.51
Why is this peiron immediately associated with creative dnamiw?
First, of course, there is the evidence of the Chaldaean Oracles, which
posited dnamiw as a complementary term over against parjiw. Proclus
also provides a more substantial argument. He agrees with Plotinus 52 that
on the intelligible level the unlimitedness can only be a qualitative one,
stated in terms of dnamiw.53 For true being does not have any extension
or any part. It is the most similar to the One, as standing closest to it,
and it is most nearly akin to it.54 If, then, actual multiplicity is opposed
to the One (i.e., it is to be situated at the opposite side of reality), then
potential multiplicity must stand as close as possible to the One. Multiplicity qua dnamiw is inversely proportional to actual multiplicity. 55 In
other words: on the basis of this analysis, Unlimitedness qua dnamiw is
linked to the highest levels of reality, where the actual multiplicity is
minimal, if it exists at all. The closer to the One, the greater the dnamiw.
This identi cation of peiron with dnamiw, combined with a hierarchy
of the different manifestations of dnamiw (depending on the distance from
the One), leads to the conclusion that the peiron itself exists in different
degrees. In his Elements of Theology, prop. 95, Proclus expresses this idea
in the following way: The more uni ed potency is always more in nite
than one which is passing into plurality.56 The argumentation given in
50
TP III 8, 31.18-23; III 12, 45.4-6; Elementatio Theologiae (ET) 56, 54.21-22;
125, 112.9-10 [ed. Dodds].
51
TP III 8, 32.21-23.
52
Plot., Enn. II 4, 7.13-20; 10.1-35. Plotinus dwells on Aristotles analysis of the
peiron in Physics III, 4-8.
53
ET 86, 78.19-20: Pn t ntvw n peirn stin ote kat t plyow ote kat
t mgeyow, ll kat tn dnamin mnhn [tr. Dodds].
54
ET 86, 78.26-27: noeidstaton, te gguttv to nw tetagmnon, ka t n
suggenstaton.
55
ET 86, 78.28-80.14.
56
ET 95, 84.28-29: Psa dnamiw nikvtra osa tw plhyunomnhw peirotra.

HORIZONTALISM OR VERTICALISM?

141

support of this proposition restates the thesis presented at prop. 86: when
things are divided or multiplied, the potency becomes manifold as well.
Division enfeebles the potency, while multiplication breaks its unity.
But how can something be more in nite than something else? To
explain this paradoxical statement, Proclus refers to the hierarchical structure of reality, claiming that all in nitude in things which have Being
is in nite neither to the superior orders nor to itself. 57 Apparently,
in nitude is a quali cation attributed to that which is at a higher level,
to indicate the incomprehensibility of its compressed power. This is due
to the fact that the lower is produced by the higher, not because the higher
wishes to produce, but because of a superabundance of its power (perbol
or periousa dunmevw).58 This superabundant power of a higher level is
incomprehensible for the lower, in which the actual multiplicity is greater.
There is, then, a chain of successive in nite powers: every being is produced by the in nite power of a higher being, and has in its turn an in nite
power to produce a lower being. This scheme presupposes a twofold
understanding of the notion of dnamiw. On the one hand, it is the lower
beings participation in the dnamiw of the higher, which brings it about
that the lower being can exist; on the other hand, it is the dnamiw of the
lower itself that brings it about that it can produce the subsequent level
of reality. This twofold understanding is deduced from Platos Sophist,
where the Eleatic Stranger makes the following observation: I suggest
that everything which possesses any power of any kind ( t poianon
[tina] kekthmnon dnamin), either to produce a change in anything of any
nature or to be affected even in the least degree by the slightest cause,
though it be only on one occasion, has true being. For I set up as a de nition which de nes being, that it is nothing else than power (dnamiw).59
Proclus discusses this text twice in the third book of the Platonic Theology.60 He always stresses the distinction between what Plato calls t poianon kekthmnon dnamin and dnamiw. Although this does not seem to
correspond to Platos intentions (probably Plato only wanted to introduce
some variation in his terminology, using dnamiw as a metonymy of
everything that possesses any power of any kind), Proclus recognises a
hierarchical structure in the text: The Eleatic Stranger rst calls being
57

ET 93, 84.1-2: Pn t peiron n tow osin ote tow perkeimnoiw peirn stin

ote aut .
58
ET 27, 30.25-32.9; 71, 68.9-16; 121, 106.16-22; 133, 118.18-19; cf. Gersh 1978,
33-34.
59
Plato, Sophist, 247 d 8 e 4 [tr. Fowler].
60
TP III 9, 39.4-14 and 21, 74.11-18.

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GERD VAN RIEL

endowed with power (dunmenon ),61 because it was produced, so to

speak, by the presence (metousa) of the rst dnamiw, and it participates
in existence (parjiw) thanks to the Limit (praw), and in dnamiw, thanks
to the Unlimitedness (peira). Then he de nes being as dnamiw, because
it produces and generates everything, and because it is everything in a
unitary way (noeidw).62 Being is used here to denote what is called
elsewhere the monad of being,63 the rst being that contains all beings
in a unitary way. It is the rst mixture of Limit/parjiw and the Unlimited. This being, Proclus maintains, possesses dnamiw in two ways. It
not only participates in the rst Unlimitedness, but it also is dnamiw itself,
being that which produces all the subsequent levels. As the rst offspring
of atperaw and atoapeira,64 this rst being is exemplary for everything that will follow. Everywhere in reality, peira will be present, and
all beings will have an in nite generative power vis--vis the lower.65
As S. Gersh has remarked, this scheme implies an interesting transformation of the Aristotelian doctrine of dnamiw. The author reveals two central modi cations: (1) the Neoplatonists apply the doctrine per analogiam
to the intelligible world: the gods, the divine intellects, and the divine
souls. Thus, one is entitled to use the terms of act and potency within
theology, bearing in mind that they only dimly re ect processes which
transcend mans full understanding. With regard to the sensible world,
the authority of Aristotle is not challenged, and the scheme remains valid
without any modi cation. (2) The doctrine is combined with the Neoplatonic theory of emanation. The succession of the different levels is now
explained as the actualisation of that which was potential at the previous level. 66
61
Coni. Saffrey-Westerink pro dnamin ex dunamen() mss. Proclus must envisage
here what was called t kekthmnon dnamin in the Sophist. If the conjecture of
Saffrey-Westerink is correct (which seems to be the case, given the fact that the same
term is repeated, in an identical context, and without textual problems, at 21, 74.11),
one may say that Procluss rendering of the text is rather free. Nevertheless, he gives
the impression of considering dunmenon to be a literal quotation (in III 9, 39.4-14
and 21, 74.11-18 alike). Hence, we think that Procluss Sophist in fact did read dunmenon here. Perhaps, the interpolation of [tina] in the textual tradition of the Sophist
passage can be explained as the remainder of a variant (poivson) duna(menon).
62
TP III 9, 39.5-10.
63
TP III 9, 36.2-3: gr atoousa pntvn st tn ntvn krthw ka oion monw
sti tn lvn.
64
For the terms atperaw and atoapeira, see In Parm. VI, 1121.21 and 33; ET
92, 82.30.
65
See, e.g., TP III 12, 45.3-6, and III 9, 39.11-14, quoted below.
66
Gersh 1978, 32-33.

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143

Although these remarks reveal the core of the Neoplatonic modi cations of the Aristotelian doctrine, one should add another element of equal
importance. Apart from the application of the scheme of dnamiw nrgeia
to the intelligible world, the distinction between the potential and the
actual is adapted to the dnamiw itself. This explains the occurrence of
expressions like dnamiw kat nrgeian: the power that becomes operative in actu. This actual dnamiw is opposed to the dnamiw that is not yet
active, called krufa dnamiw, as in the following passage: Everywhere, the power (dnamiw) is the cause of the creative processions (gonmvn prodvn) and of all multiplicity: the hidden power (krufa dnamiw)
is the cause of the hidden multiplicity (krufou plyouw), whereas the
power that is actualised and that has manifested itself is the cause of complete multiplicity ( d katnrgeian ka autn kfnasa, to pantelow).67
The krufa dnamiw is a kind of potentiality, but it would be too
simple to identify it with Aristotles notion of t dunmei.68 For the
Aristotelian potentiality is the receptivity of a substratum, awaiting the
imposition of the form. Procluss krufa dnamiw is not receptivity, but
the generative power that is not yet actualised.
To understand fully what Proclus meant by indicating the potentiality of the power with the term latent or hidden (krufa), one should
be aware of the fundamental difference he makes between dirhmnvw
and krufvw. In the procession of reality, each level is the manifestation of that which was hidden at the previous stage: The multiplicity is
present in a hidden way and without distinctions in the rst beings,
whereas it is present in a divided way in the subsequent beings. For the
more a being is akin to the one, the more it hides the multiplicity and is
determined only according to unity. 69
A higher level in reality is always more uni ed than its offspring.
This implies that the gradual procession can only take place when the
multiplicity is present potentially in the higher. However, this potential
multiplicity does not threaten the unity of the higher: it is a multiplicity
67
TP III 9, 39.11-14. The dnamiw kat nrgeian (i.e., the actualisation of the generative power) should not be confused with the dnamiw to kat nrgeian which is
discussed in, among other passages, ET 78, 74.15-16. The power of that which is
actual comprehends the entire generative power, whether it be potential or actual. It
is the power through which one act can produce another.
68
Gersh 1973, 43, does not make the distinction between the krufa dnamiw and
t dunmei: The notion of the occult nature of power is full of religious signi cance
for Proclus, but despite this added level of meaning, we can easily recognize it as that
which is, in more prosaic moments, simply styled potentiality.
69
TP III 9, 39.20-24.

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GERD VAN RIEL

without any distinction, which will only reveal itself when it becomes
actual at a lower level.70 Proclus thus indicates that the multiplicity is present in nucleo, or compressed, in the higher. For the high degree of unity
at that level did not allow the multiplicity to reveal itself.71
This relation of kfansiw marks the relation between the First and the
principles of praw and peiron themselves. Proclus often quotes a phrase
from the Philebus, where Plato says that the god has shown praw and
peiron (tn yen lgomn pou t mn peiron dejai tn ntvn, t d
praw, Phil. 23 c 9-10). Proclus consistently replaces the dejai of the
Platonic formula with the term kfanein, thus stressing the fact that, in
his interpretation, the two principles are the manifestations of the First.
This manifestation has a peculiar meaning: Proclus deduces from the
quoted phrase that the god is the postthw of the two principles. 72
Thus, making use of the principles of praw and peiron as the rst
manifestations of the First principle, Proclus is able to explain the preservation of unity as well as the production of multiplicity in the procession
of reality. For the unity (warranted by the operation of praw at every
level) always potentially contains the multiplicity of the lower, while the
principle of multiplicity governs the transition from a hidden to a manifest dnamiw. Being the manifestations of the First, the principles of praw
and peiron themselves must stand as close as possible to the origin of
all reality. They will reappear everywhere in reality, constituting all beings
as a combination of two elements at the same level.
The rst miktn, which is the result of the operation of the principles
of praw and peiron, is intelligible being (noht osa), encompassing all
beings. At TP III 9, Proclus explains how this miktn is produced from
the preceding principles: The mixed proceeds from the First, as we have
said, and it is not only composed of the two principles that come after the
First, but it also proceeds from them. It is triadic: in the rst place, it participates in the ineffable unity and in the entire hypostasis that comes from
the God; from the Limit, it gets its existence, its uniformity and its lasting property, and from the Unlimited it has its power and the hidden
<inclusion> of everything in it.73 For, generally speaking, since it is one
70

Thus, e.g., concerning the production of the intellective level (noern) by the
intelligible (nohtn): In Parm. IV 973.17-21 and TP III 3, 12.23-13.1; concerning the
relation between the discursive reasoning of the soul and the unitary vision of the intellective realm: In Parm. III 808.6-24.
71
Cf. the notion dnamiw niaa in ET 121, 106.10-12.
72
TP III 7, 29.28-30.2; 8, 30.19-21; 32.3-4. Cf. Van Riel 2000, 402-406.
73
mss. ka tn n at krfion tn pntvn ***. In a footnote, Saffrey and
Westerink add <perioxn>, without, however, adopting the conjecture in the text. In

HORIZONTALISM OR VERTICALISM?

145

and not one, its one exists in accordance with the Limit, its not one in
accordance with the Unlimited, while the mixture and totality of these two
is derived from the First.74
From this presentation of the rst miktn, we can deduce how Procluss
system works: the miktn possesses pstasiw as well as parjiw and dnamiw.
It receives its pstasiw from the First,75 while its parjiw is derived from
praw, and its dnamiw from peira. Thanks to the Limit it is a separate
entity with a lasting existence, and thanks to the Unlimited it receives a
generative power and potentially contains everything.
The question, then, is which role should be attributed to the First. How
to explain that, on the one hand, everything gets its unity from the
First,76 while, on the other hand, the krfiow nvsiw proceeds from the
existence of the One (p tw prjevw to nw)77 a formula which, as
we have seen, serves to denote praw? As we have seen before, praw is
the One in the true sense of the word. This could seem to suggest that
the operation of Limit is identical to that of the First. However, there is
an important difference between the two. The unity provided by praw is
mere existence, without any further determination. The unity that comes
from the First, on the other hand, is the combination of this act of being
with generative power. This combination gives rise to a real being: a
being that has a proper character and a proper place in the structure of
reality. These elements are constitutive for the pstasiw,78 which is provided by the First.79
any case, the meaning is clear: Proclus intimates the presence in the rst being of a
multiplicity which is not yet actually developed (Saffrey and Westerink highlight the
parallel with krfion plyow at 39.2-3). See also the term krufa periox at ET 152,
134.11.
74
TP III 9, 37.21-38.3: Preisi mn < on> k to prtou t miktn, sper epomen,
ka ok stin k tn met t n rxn mnon, preisi d ka k totvn, ka sti triadikn, tn mn prthn k to yeo metxon nsevw rrtou ka tw lhw postsevw, k d to pratow tn parjin ka t monoeidw ka tn mnimon dithta lambnon, k d tw peiraw tn dnamin ka tn n at krfion tn pntvn ***. Olvw
gr, pe ka n sti ka ox n, t mn n at kat t praw prxei, t d ox n
kat t peiron, d totvn mfotrvn smmijiw ka lthw k to prtou.
75
Cf. TP III 7, 29.28-30.2: the First as posttiw.
76
TP III 8, 34.16-17: mn nvsiw tow psin k to prtou. Cf. III 9, 37.23-25
(quoted above).
77
TP III 8, 32.1-2.
78
For this technical meaning of the term pstasiw , indicating the fact that a being
receives a speci c character and a proper place in the procession of reality, see In
Parm. 1054.27-28; Steel 1994, 81.
79
In Van Riel 2000, 410-413, we argued that, in the system of Proclus, the Philebus
only provides the abstract ontological scheme of the triadic constitution of a being,

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GERD VAN RIEL

Every miktn receives its combined unity from the First principle. This
means that on each level of reality, the combination has to be established
anew. Apparently, the mixed is not capable of transmitting its property
(i.e., the mixedness itself ). This is of central interest in respect of the
relation between the mixed and the other principles (the First, praw and
peiron): for the miktn cannot have the same status as the others, since
it does not communicate its formal character to other beings. That is not
to say that the mixed is not productive: it does produce other things, but
it can only do so by virtue of its elements, which are modalities of Limit
and the Unlimited. They generate a new existent thing and endow it with
generative power; this newly existing thing will derive its proper being
(pstasiw) not from the previous miktn, but from the First cause.
Accordingly, Proclus makes a principal distinction between the way in
which the miktn is produced, and the way in which praw and peiron
proceed from the First cause: Therefore, suggesting the immense difference between the way in which the two principles are generated, and the
mode of generation of the mixed, Socrates says that the god has shown
the Limit and the Unlimited (for they are henads that derive their existence from the one, and, so to speak, manifestations coming from the
unparticipated and rst unity), while he makes the mixed and composes
it through the rst principles. Hence, to the extent that making is inferior to manifesting, and a generation is inferior to a manifestation, to
the same extent has the mixed received a procession from the one that is
inferior to that of the two principles. 80
This reveals the essential difference between the miktn and the two
principles: the miktn is made, combined by the First, whereas, as we
have seen before, the two principles must be seen as the manifestations
(kfnseiw) of the First. Like them, the miktn receives its pstasiw from
the First, but in this case, the First does not directly produce the mixed
as Its own revelation. The procession is accomplished through the intermediary principles of praw and peiron, and the First only provides, or
makes the combination.
As a consequence of the implicit statement that the combination of
Limit and the Unlimited has to be realised anew in every separate being,
Proclus holds that praw and peiron have a twofold existence: they appear
as the principles that constitute the miktn, and as the elements that are
whereas the concrete, speci c nature and place of beings (i.e., their proper pstasiw )
is deduced from the Parmenides.
80
TP III 9, 36.10-19.

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147

present within the mixed. For the two principles do not merge once and
for all in the rst combination: they reappear within the mixed, and will
thus produce the lower. The miktn qua miktn is not the cause of its
own elements.81 The latter are produced in a second prodow (the rst
prodow being the production of the miktn itself ) by the principles of
praw and peiron.82
Thus, the whole reality is governed by a duality, from the highest to
the lowest levels, before as well as within every miktn. In a certain sense,
the unity that characterises the miktn seems to be too weak to exclude all
duality. Damascius will raise this point to criticise Proclus: how to explain
that the unity given by the First principle itself is not strong enough to
overcome all duality? Moreover, how can one posit a duality at the level
of reality immediately below the First? Should not that level be the highest possible unity? 83
Although this criticism is correct, it should not lead to a precipitous
judgement. Proclus does indeed stress the true existence of a contradistinction
on the level of the principles, but, on the other hand, he is cautious to
safeguard unity. This is testi ed by his claim that the in nite generative
power always is inherent in the Limit: If, then, this One [i.e., the rst
real One, meaning praw] is a cause and produces being, then there must
be within this One a power that generates being.84 This implies that the
Unlimited (which will manifest itself as the generative power) never exists
apart from praw: Of this triad [i.e. praw peiron miktn] the Limit
is a deity that proceeds at the top of the intelligible world from the unparticipated and primordial god; it gives measure and demarcation to all
things . . . whereas the Unlimited is the inexhaustible power of that deity.85

81

TP III 10, 41.19-20: (. . . stoixevn,) n t miktn ok n ation kay son st

miktn.

TP III 10, 42.5-26.

Damascius, De Princ. II 22.1-31.6; Damascius generally denies any real contradistinction on the level of the principles; concerning the production of the mixed
(which he calls the Uni ed), he argues that the First can only be the cause of unity,
not of a combination (smfusiw ); as a consequence, there must be another principle,
the miktn itself, which does communicate its proper formal character to the lower,
and which thus governs a series (28.7-22).
84
TP III 8, 31.18-20: All e atin sti toto t n ka postatikn to ntow,
dnamiw n n at gennhtik to ntow prxoi.
85
TP III 12, 44.23-45.4: Vn t mn praw st yew p kr t noht proelyn
p to meyktou ka prvtstou yeo , pnta metrn ka forzvn . . . t d peiron
dnamiw nkleiptow to yeo totou.
82
83

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GERD VAN RIEL

Proclus states more than once 86 that the triadic scheme of Limit, Unlimited
and Mixed reappears at every level of reality, from the highest levels of
the intelligible world87 down to the lowest realm (i.e., nature, consisting
in a combination of form and matter). The manifestations of Limit and of
the Unlimited constitute two separate series (seira or sustoixai), headed
by the two principles.88
This multiplicationor proliferationof the triadic structure is one of
the most remarkable features of Procluss system. It is grounded in a concern to account for the fact that the procession constitutes a gradual and
continuous process, without any void. 89 Although a theoretical explanation
always needs static notions (which actually break the continuity of the
process into separate moments) in order to explain anything at all, Proclus
tries to establish a system in which the distance between the moments is
as small as possible.
4. Procluss Hylemorphism
At the lowest level of the two series we nd the couple of form and matter. Here, in the sensible world, peira undergoes a remarkable inversion.
The peiron no longer presents itself as a productive power, but is reduced
to mere receptivity. Matter (the bottom line of the system) is devoid of all
determination and creativity, but it displays an in nite capability of being
determined,90 which is the lowest possible modality of the principle of the
Unlimited.
The distinction between a power to generate and a potency to be determined was present in nucleo in the passage of the Sophist quoted above,
where Plato differentiates between the capability of a being to make
something (poien) and to undergo something (psxein ). However,
86
TP III 8, 33.3-34.5; In Parm. VI 1119.4-1123.21; cf. Beierwaltes 1979, 55-57 for
a discussion of these texts.
87
The rst triads of the intelligible world are the following: 1st triad: praw
peiron osa (predominant element = praw); 2nd: praw peiron zv (predominant element = peiron); 3rd: praw peiron now (predominant element =
miktn). Proclus thus integrates the triad osa zv now of Platos Sophist (248
e); cf. Hadot 1968, 262-263.
88
Cf. In Tim. I 176.6-177.2.
89
Cf. In Tim. I 378.25-26: tn ntvn prodow sunexw sti ka odn n tow osin
polleiptai kenn. TP III 4, 15.24-26; De mal. Subsist. 13.9-10; 14.13 ( processus
continuus).
90
Proclus takes over the Aristotelian formula: dunmei lh t pnta: TP III 8,
34.7 (Arist., De an. III 5, 430 a 10-11).

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149

Plato did not develop this idea further, and it was Aristotle who established a clear distinction between an active and a passive potentiality. The former is the principle of change in something other or in itself
qua other (rx metabolw n ll llo), while the latter is the
capability of being produced or changed by something else.91 This distinction was taken over by the Neoplatonists after Plotinus, 92 and it
appears in an elaborate form in the system of Proclus, who restates it in
terms of a difference in the degree of perfection. There are two kinds
of potency, he writes, the rst belonging to that which is active, the
other to that which undergoes something. The former is the mother of the
act, while the latter is the receptacle of perfection.93 The power of that
which is active is the generative power discussed above, which produces
the actual existence of the lower in two phases (from a hidden to an
actual power). On the basis of its in nite productive power, this dnamiw
is called perfect (telea).94 It is opposed to the imperfect dnamiw,
which needs the actual existence of something else in order to proceed to
act itself.95
For a gignmenon in the sensible world, the passive potency is as indispensable as the generative power of the higher. Moreover, the link
between the generative and the receptive power is not fortuitous: not any
generative power can be combined with any receptivity. The operation of
the higher can only be directed to that which is capable of undergoing
precisely this causal activity. So the speci c generative power of the producer requires a speci c receptivity of the product. This speci c receptivity is termed tness or suitableness (pithdeithw).96
Arist., Met. IX 1, 1046 a 4-35; cf. Ross 1953, 242.
The earliest occurrence is Porph., ad Gaurum I 2, 33.14ff. K. Cf. Segonds 198586, 122 n. 2 [notes compl. p. 195]; Saffrey-Westerink III 34 n. 3 [notes compl. p. 122].
93
In Alc. 122.9-11 (p. 101 Segonds): ditt gr dnamiw, mn to poiontow,
d to psxontow: ka mn mthr tw nergeaw, d podox tw teleithtow.
94
ET 78, 74.15-16: ste telea mn to kat nrgeian dnamiw, nergeaw osa
gnimow.
95
Ibid. 74.11-12: d llou tou deomnh to kat nrgeian pro#prxontow, kay
n dunmei ti stin , telw.
96
The term pithdeithw had been used previously by Aristotle and Plotinus (Enn.
VI 4, 15.1-3) and also by Iamblichus (apud Simplic., In Cat. IX, 302.29-36
Kalb eisch), albeit in a different sense: he used it to indicate the active power of the
agent, i.e., the suitableness of the agent vis--vis the patient (a suitableness which
does not necessarily require corporeal contact, as Iamblichus declares against the
Stoics). Proclus takes up the notion in the sense given to it by Aristotle and Plotinus.
He emphasises that this pithdeithw diversi es the generative power of the higher (In
91
92

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GERD VAN RIEL

Proclus reduces this passive potency of matter to the principle of the

peira taken from the Philebus. However, it only imitates the principle,
just as the sensible form only imitates the operation of the Limit. For the
plenitude and perfection of the higher is found lacking in this world: That
which is eminently present in the rst things is de ciently present in the
last. 97 In this sense, the receptive power imitates the generative power by
inverting the perfection of productivity into the imperfection of receptivity.
This reversion of the operation of the principles marks the transition
from the intelligible to the sensible world. At a certain moment in the procession of reality, something is produced which is not capable of returning to the higher, or of preserving actual unity. 98 This weakening of the
power of the principles was inevitable, says Proclus, because the gifts of
the rst principles are transmitted everywhere in reality; they do not only
generate the more perfect things, but also those things that are less perfect in their mode of being.99 Or in other words: the Good cannot be sterile.100 At any level, it will produce its offspring, and it will not stop doing
so until it reaches the nal point where its force is so weakened that there
is nothing left to produce. Nevertheless, even this stage remains good, but
the fertility of the Good is inverted here, in the sense that it is reduced
to being a merely passive suitableness to undergo the operation of that
which is productive.
In this way, we nd an inverted proportion between a powers productivity and its receptivity. The productive and receptive power appear in a
pure way at the extremes of the system: the purely productive power is
located at the top, whereas the completely receptive power occupies the
bottom of reality. Between them, there is a gradual transition in the intermediary realms, in which the productivity is always in decrease, while the
receptivity increases.

Parm. IV, 842.37-843.23); thus, the suitableness functions as the principium individuationis in the causal prodow. Moreover, it implies the mutual dependence of the
causans and the causatum (cf. ET 79, 74.24-26). For a thorough discussion of other
aspects of the theory, see Steel 1996, 124-135.
97
TP III 10.41.2-4: T gr n tow prtoiw nta kay peroxn, tata n tow sxtoiw st kat lleicin.
98
TP III 10, 40.10-41.12; III 8, 34.1-11.
99
TP III 10, 41.12-15: Toto d omai sumbanein ngkh diti tn prtvn rxn
a dseiw ka mxri tn sxtvn dikousi, ka o mnon t teleitera gennsin ll
ka t telstera kat tn pstasin .
100
In Tim. I 372.27-373.3 raises the question why the procession is not limited to
perfect things. Proclus answers that if the prodow were to stop with the gods, then
the gods themselves would not be good, for goodness implies fertility: t gr yeon

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151

Thus, in later Neoplatonism, Plotinuss vertical scheme is replaced

by a horizontal one, placing limit and unlimitedness at the same level.
The undetermined is no longer conceived as a substratum, but rather constitutes a very important principle that rules the emanation of reality from
the One. On the basis of this new viewpoint, the later Neoplatonists criticise Plotinus, as Proclus does in the following passage: The undetermined
is not the matter of determination; rather it is its power. And neither is
determination the form of the undetermined; rather it is its existence. And
a being is constituted by those two.101 Thus, the undetermined is seen as
a separate principle that is operating throughout the entire reality.
Matter concludes the series of the manifestations of the Unlimited. It
is the lowest level, but nevertheless, it is a member of the series. Hence,
one must conclude that even matter is produced by the One Good: If, as
we have said, the god produces all kinds of unlimitedness, then he also
produces matter, which is the ultimate unlimitedness. This, then, is the
rst and ineffable cause of matter.102
Thus, the absence of determination can no longer be associated with
evil. On the contrary, it can be demonstrated that it stems from the good.
As a direct consequence, Proclus af rms that it is impossible to associate
matter with evil in any way whatsoever: In the Philebus, [Plato] produces
matter itself and the whole nature of the unlimited from the One, and, in
general, places the divine cause before the distinction between limit and
the unlimited. Thus he will admit that matter is something divine and good
because of its participation in and origin from god, and that is never evil.
(. . .) That it is wrong to posit matter as the primary evil, is, I think,
suf ciently demonstrated by Socrates in the Philebus, where he argues that
unlimitedness is generated from god. (. . .). For god is the cause both of
the existence of limit and the unlimited and of their mixture. This <unlimited>, therefore, and the nature of body, qua body, must be referred to one
cause, namely god, for it is he who produced the mixture. Hence, neither
body nor matter is evil, for they are the progeny of god, the one as a mixture, the other as unlimitedness. 103
gonon enai pw gayn; stai d gonon, e sxaton. See also ET 122: t mgistn
stin o t gayoeidw, ll t gayourgn. Cf. Trouillard 1977, 105-107.
101
TP III 9, 40.4-6: O gr stin lh to pratow t peiron, ll dnamiw: od
edow to perou t praw, ll parjiw: j mfon d t n.
102
In Tim. I 384.30-385.3: e on, sper epomen, yew psan peiran fsthsi ,
ka tn lhn fsthsin, sxthn osan peiran. ka ath mn prvtsth ka rrhtow
ata tw lhw. Cf. Ibid. 385.9-17.

De malorum subsist. 34.9-35.14 (transl. Opsomer-Steel). We thank J. Opsomer

and C. Steel for having made their translation available to us before publication.
103

152

GERD VAN RIEL

In this way, the triadic scheme taken from the Philebus provides the
key to a new understanding of the structure of reality. Not only does it
enable Proclus to refute Plotinuss identi cation of matter with evil, it also
makes it possible to harmonise the hylemorphic explanation of the physical world with the analysis of the principles in the intelligible world. In
his commentary on the Timaeus, Proclus points out that this dialogue
reveals two principles (i.e., matter and form) that are transcended by a
cause that brings them together (i.e., the Demiurge). However, Proclus
continues, in the Philebus this scheme is made more universal (kayolikteron).104 For the principles of the Philebus govern the entire reality,
whereas those in the Timaeus are restricted to the intra-mundane ( t
gksmia).105 The analyses of the latter ought to be read in the broader perspective provided by the Philebus, for, as Proclus says, every gignmenon
is a miktn, but not every miktn is a gignmenon.106 The same should be
said, mutatis mutandis, for the relation between the Philebus and the
Parmenides, which was considered to be Platos standard work on theology. For the latter (more precisely, the second hypothesis) exclusively uses
the triadic structure to explain the divine, or intelligible, world. 107 The
Philebus offers a framework that is indispensable for integrating the analysis of the intelligible and the sensible world into one complete synthesis.
Institute of Philosophy
University of Leuven
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