USCA1 Opinion

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit
____________________

No. 96-1676

CARLOS YAMIL AYBAR, MARIA I. MORALES-LABOY,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

DIGNA CRISPIN-REYES, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge]

___________________

____________________

Before

Stahl, Circuit Judge,

_____________
Aldrich and Campbell, Senior Circuit Judges.
_____________________

____________________

Eduardo M. Joglar
__________________

with whom

Esther Crispin
_______________

was on

brief

appellants.
John F. Navares
_______________

with whom Lizzi M. Portela

_________________

were on brief for appellees.

____________________

and Smith & Neva

_____________

June 26, 1997

____________________

STAHL,
STAHL,

Circuit Judge.
Circuit Judge.
______________

This appeal

concerns the

district

court's

reconsider

dismissal

of

and

plaintiffs-appellants' 42

against two law enforcement

subsequent refusal

U.S.C.

1983

to

claims

officials of the Commonwealth of

Puerto Rico.

Background
Background

On

Assistant

March 25, 1993, appellees Sonia Otero-Martinez,

District

Attorney of

Rico, and Diana Crispin-Reyes,

police

officer, filed

Carlos Yamil

criminal

the Commonwealth

of Puerto

a Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

charges

Aybar for the commission

against

appellant

of sexual misconduct,

based on the allegations of a witness named Emily Rivera.

April 29,

1993, officer Crispin-Reyes visited

of employment,

Wometco of Puerto Rico,

On

Aybar's place

and informed Aybar's

superiors of

terminated

termination

On July

then

the charges against him.

Aybar's

employment.

resulted from

According

and

to Aybar,

Crispin-Reyes' visit

13, 1993, appellant Maria

girlfriend

Wometco subsequently

future wife

his

to Wometco.

I. Morales-Laboy, Aybar's

who

also

was a

Wometco

employee, resigned from her position at Wometco citing as the

cause

of

her

resignation

harassment

concerning the charges against Aybar.

district court

On

of Puerto Rico dismissed

Aybar.

-22

from

co-workers

July 1,

1994, the

all charges against

On July

complaint

in

1, 1994,

federal

Aybar and Morales-Laboy

district

court

naming

filed a

numerous

defendants and deriving from the prosecution of Aybar and his

subsequent

termination of employment.

Otero-Martinez

Federal Civil

and

Crispin-Reyes

Rights Act, 42

malicious prosecution

not to

be

subject to

with

U.S.C.

of Aybar,

The complaint charged

violations

of

the

1983, allegedly

for

violation of

defamation, and

Aybar's right

infringement of

his

right

to

secure

continuous

employment.

tort and,

relationship,

Morales-Laboy

with Aybar,

both stemming

Aybar's civil rights.

injury to

from the alleged

alleged

their conjugal

violations of

Aybar and Morales-Laboy also named the

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,

Pedro Rossello (the Governor of

Puerto Rico), Pedro Pierluisi (the Attorney General of Puerto

Rico), and

Pedro Toledo

Police) as

defendants both

personal capacities.

(the Puerto Rico

in their

On August

Superintendent of

official and in

9, 1994, Aybar and

their

Morales-

Laboy amended the complaint to increase the damages sought.

On

Pierluisi

dismiss

(in

the

September

13,

his

official

claims

against

1994,

the

Commonwealth

capacity) filed

them

the

based

on

motion

and

to

immunity

afforded by

the Eleventh Amendment to the

November 30,

capacity,

1994, Rossello

joined

the

supplemental memorandum

Constitution.

and Pierluisi, in

motion

to

dismiss

in support thereof.

On

his personal

and

filed

On February 7,

-33

1995,

Toledo

also joined

the motion

to dismiss.

Neither

Otero-Martinez nor Crispin-Reyes joined in the motion.

Aybar

and Morales-Laboy failed to respond to the motion.

On

March

15, 1995,

the

district of Puerto Rico (Fuste,

pursuant to

complaint

and

Fed. R. Civ. P.

against

Crispin-Reyes.

appellants'

prosecution

1983 claim

Aybar's

district

including Otero-Martinez

court

determined

that

against all appellees for malicious

did not state a claim for either a procedural or

that although

The district court also

appellants' actions

Fourth Amendment

statute of

the

12(b)(6) dismissing appellants'

a substantive due process violation.

found

court for

J.) entered a final judgment

all defendants,

The

district

rights,

limitations barred this

the

may

have violated

applicable one

claim.

With

year

respect to

appellants'

claimed

violation of

Aybar's

right

to secure

employment, Judge Fuste ruled that Aybar, as an employee of a

private

corporation, did

protected by

not

the Fourteenth

possess a

Amendment.

property

The

interest

district court

also concluded that defamation alone "cannot be the basis for

a claim under 42 U.S.C.

that the

The court further indicated

Eleventh Amendment barred appellants'

Puerto Rico,

court held

1983."

Rossello, Pierluisi, and Toledo.

that

appellants' claims

were barred because

against

suit against

Finally, the

Otero-Martinez

Otero-Martinez enjoyed absolute immunity

as a state prosecutor prosecuting the state's case.

-44

On March

reconsideration

31, 1995,

of

this

appellants filed a

judgment

claiming,

motion for

among

other

things, that the statute of limitations had tolled because he

was a minor during the relevant period.

the district court denied the

On January 30, 1996,

motion, again finding that the

statute of limitations barred the malicious prosecution claim

based on

the alleged

Fourth Amendment violation.

Although

the district court acknowledged that Aybar was a minor during

much of the

fact

time preceding

the filing of

the complaint

(a

which normally would toll the running of the statute of

limitations),

the

"emancipated" him

tolling.

court

concluded

that

under Puerto Rico law,

Aybar's

marriage

and thus precluded

The district court upheld its earlier rulings for

substantially the same reasons it previously had enunciated.

Undaunted,

the

appellants

then filed

motion,

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52(b) and 59(e),

to amend and reconsider the district court's January 30, 1996

order.1

In this motion, appellants contended that Aybar was

not married during

date

of

the period

Aybar's arrest)

between March

and April

16,

25, 1993

1994 (the

(the

date of

____________________

1.

Rule 52(b)

states

motion filed no later

the court may
and

may amend

accompany

part:

"On

than 10 days after entry

the

judgment accordingly.

a motion for

filed no

a new

"Any motion
later than

10

findings--

The motion

trial under
to alter or

party's

of judgment,

amend findings--or make additional

59(e) dictates:
shall be

in pertinent

Rule 59."
amend a

days after

may
Rule

judgment

entry of

the

judgment."

-55

Aybar's marriage to Morales-Laboy), and,

therefore, that his

minority status in

until the

denied

Aybar

fact did toll the statute

latter date.

this motion.

actually

preceding the

On

May 7, 1996, the

Although

was not

represented to the court

reminding

pursuant

that

the

the

during

the

much of

that in fact he was

that Aybar

married during

to Morales-Laboy as his

their conjugal relationship.

appellants

of

time

their

duties

to

wife

After

the

court

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, the district court concluded

appellants

"erroneously

followed.2

injury to

recognized that

complaint, he found

the relevant time by referring

and claiming

district court

Judge Fuste

married

filing of the

of limitations

assessed

had

failed

their

to

demonstrate

averments."

This

that

it

appeal

Standard of Review
Standard of Review

Our standard

of review of a

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is well

well-pleaded

facts

as

true

established.

and

we

inferences in favor of the appellants.

Found.
______

dismissal pursuant to

draw

all

earliest

basis for

reasonable

See Washington Legal

___ ________________

v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d

_________________________

Cir. 1993).

We accept all

962, 971 (1st

"Because a dismissal terminates an action at the

stages

of litigation

decision, we

without a

must carefully

developed factual

balance the

rule of

____________________

2.

Aybar

court's

and

Morales-Laboy

dismissal as

do

to either

not

the

the Commonwealth

Rico or Rossello, Pierluisi, and Toledo.

-6-

appeal

district
of Puerto

simplified

civil pleadings

against our

conclusory

allegations."

Id.
___

As

need for

we

more than

previously

have

explained, however, "once a motion to dismiss or a motion for

summary

judgment has

substantial

discretion

proceedings

in

been granted,

order to

in

the district

deciding whether

allow

the

to

court has

reopen the

unsuccessful party

to

introduce new material

or argue

City of Boston,
________________

F.2d

969

a new theory."

1273,

1279

(1st

Mackin
______

Cir.

v.

1992).

"Consequently, we will overturn the trial court's decision on

such a matter only

if an appellant can persuade

refusal to grant favorable

of discretion."

Id.;
___

36 (1st

Cir. 1994)

court's

motion to

abuse of

us that the

reconsideration was a clear abuse

see Vasapolli v. Rostoff, 39

___ _________
_______

(explaining

alter or

that "[w]e

amend a

discretion"); Fragoso v.
_______

F.3d 27,

review a

trial

judgment for

manifest

Lopez, 991 F.2d

_____

878, 886

(1st Cir. 1993) ("The trial court's decision on such a motion

will

be overturned only

if the appellant

convinces us that

the court committed a clear abuse of discretion.").

Discussion

Discussion

To

determine the

must resolve a threshold

Reyes

argue that

order of

motion.

May 7,

If

issue.

Aybar appealed

this appeal,

only the

whether or not the

district court's

second reconsideration

the only substantive

-77

we first

Otero-Martinez and Crispin-

1996, denying their

true, then

resolution entails

scope of

issue for

our

district court abused

its discretion in

determining that Aybar's Fourth

claim

due to

was barred

limitations.

pertained

the expiration

of the

Amendment

statute of

If, on the other hand, Aybar's notice of appeal

not only

to the May

7th order,

but also

to the

underlying judgment, then we must consider a number of issues

in addition to Aybar's Fourth Amendment claim.

"Under Fed.

Rules .

original

52(b)

judgment, and

R. App.

and 59

P. 4(a) timely

suspend

the time

motions under

the finality

for appeal from

of

the

both that

judgment and denial of the motions runs from the entry of the

order

denying

the motions."

Fiore
_____

v. Washington County
__________________

Community Mental Health Ctr.,

_____________________________

1992);

see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)

___

appellants

timely

reconsideration

1995

960 F.2d

order

of

filed

their

the district

dismissing their

district court's denial of

1996, appellants filed

229, 234

& (C).

(1st Cir.

In this case,

first

motion

court's initial

claims.3

for

March 15,

Subsequent to

the

appellants' motion on January 30,

a renewed motion

for reconsideration

____________________

3.

Although

motion

for

appellants

did not

reconsideration,

label

this

"regardless

a Rule
of

how

59(e)
it

is

characterized, a post-judgment motion made within ten days of

the entry
judgment

of judgment

that questions

the correctness

of a

is properly construed as a motion to alter or amend

judgment under Fed. R.

of Okla., 797 F.2d 881,
_________
Villalobos v.

Civ. P. 59(e)."
883 (10th Cir.

Hernandez, 22 F.3d

Skagerberg
__________

v. State
_____

1986); see Acevedo___ ________

384, 390 (1st

Cir. 1994).

__________

_________

The motion was timely

motion to alter
later

because Rule 59(e) provides

or amend

than 10 days after

the judgment shall

entry of the

that "[a]

be served

judgment."

not

See also
___ ____

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a).

-88

on

1996

February 13, 1996.

denial

appellants

of

the

appealed

Following the district court's May 7,

latter

to this

motion

court on

for

May

reconsideration,

16, 1996.

The

appellants

thus

followed

preserve their appeal

the

of the

procedural

guidelines

May 7th order.

See
___

to

Mariani________

Giron v. Acevedo-Ruiz, 945 F.2d 1, 2 n.3 (1st Cir. 1991).

_____
____________

The appellants, however, did

underlying

judgment.

Fed.

R. App. P

"the notice of appeal required

not timely appeal the

4(a)(1) dictates that

by Rule 3 must be filed

with

the clerk of the district court within 30 days after the date

of entry of

the judgment or order appealed from."

initial motion

for reconsideration filed within

the entry of the final

litigant must

ten days of

judgment tolls the period in

file a notice of

59(e); Fiore, 960 F.2d

_____

While an

appeal, see Fed. R.

___

at 234; Feinstein v. Moses,

_________
_____

which a

Civ. P.

951 F.2d

16,

18

(1st

Cir.

reconsideration served

1991),

subsequent

within ten days of

motion

for

the order denying

the initial motion for reconsideration but more than ten days

after the entry of

the original judgment does not

toll "the

time for appealing from that judgment," Acevedo-Villalobos v.

__________________

Hernandez,
_________

22 F.2d 384, 389

Maytag Corp., 90
_____________

F.3d

72,

(1st Cir. 1994);

74

(2d Cir.

see Glinka v.
__________

1996)

("Allowing

subsequent motions to repeatedly toll the filing period for a

notice

of

appeal

would

encourage

frivolous

motions

and

undermine a fundamental canon of our legal system, to promote

-99

the finality of

Inc.,
____

judgments."); Wright v. Preferred Research,

______
____________________

891 F.2d 886, 889 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Both the language

and purpose of Rule 4(a)(4) indicate that the time for appeal

is

postponed

only

specified.

I.e.,
____

of

motion

such a

appeal.") (quoting

by

an

original
________

motion

a motion to reconsider

will not

further

of

the

type

an order disposing

postpone the

9 Moore's Federal Practice

time

to

204.12[1]);

Charles L.M. v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist.,

_____________
____________________________

870 (5th

motion

Cir. 1989) ("[T]he

for

reconsideration,

authority in this

the

884 F.2d 869,

second motion was

condemned by

a successive

well-established

and other circuits. . . .

[T]he filing of

second motion did not toll the running of the thirty-day

time for appeal . . . .").

In

this

case,

the

appellants' amended complaint on

filed their

1996,

district

court

March 15, 1995.

initial motion for reconsideration

thus tolling Rule 4's

thirty day appeal

dismissed

Appellants

on March 31,

period.

The

district court denied

appellants' motion for reconsideration

on January 30, 1996.

Because the appellants'

for

second motion

reconsideration -- filed on February 13, 1996 -- was not

filed within ten days

day appeal period

filed their

of the initial judgment --

of Rule 4

May 16, 1997

expired well before

notice of

appellate jurisdiction to consider

court's

March

15,

1995

appeal.

appellants

We thus

lack

an appeal of the district

dismissal

-1010

the thirty

of

the

appellants'

complaint.

See Glinka, 90 F.3d at 74; Hernandez,

___ ______
_________

390; Wright,
______

22 F.3d at

891 F.2d at 889; Charles L.M., 884 F.2d at 870____________

71.4

Because this appeal

"concerns only the

Rule 59(e)

denial,5 the question properly before us is whether the trial

____________________

4.
an

The

Charles L.M. court

____________

initial

motion

reconsideration motions

for

explained the difference between

reconsideration

as follows:

and

successive

"[W]here an

appellant

files a second motion to reconsider 'based upon substantially

the
of

same grounds as urged in the earlier motion,' the filing

the second motion does

not interrupt the

running of the

time for appeal, and the appeal must be dismissed."

884 F.2d

at 870 (quoting Ellis

_____

721 (5th

v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 720,

__________

Cir. 1973) (per curiam)); see Hernandez, 29 F.3d at

___ _________
the

instant

case,

appellants'

second

390.

motion

In
for

reconsideration returned to an issue raised unsuccessfully in

the first
the

motion for reconsideration, namely

statute of

Rico.
no

limitations for

the running of

1983 action

in Puerto

As the Charles L.M. court further explained, "there is

____________

tolling

where

an

order

'den[ies] timely
________

postjudgment

motions under [rule 59] and leave[s] the original judgment in

effect and

unchanged.'"

Co., 807 F.2d

___
this

first motion

123,

128

district court's

denial of

for reconsideration did not

of their

conclusion.

(quoting Brown v.
_____

1239, 1242 (5th Cir. 1987) (per

case, the

dismissal

Id.
___

complaint

See Harrell
___ _______
n.4

(5th

summary judgment

United Ins.
___________
curiam)).

the appellants'

alter its previous

because it

reached the

v. Dixon Bay Transp. Co.,

_____________________

Cir. 1983)

(indicating

was unchanged by

In

that

amended judgment

same

718 F.2d
original
because

both judgments denied all relief); 9 Moore's Federal Practice

204.12[1]

(indicating

that

in

order

for

second

reconsideration motion again to toll appeal period, the trial

court's

disposition of the first motion

judgment which is substantively

"must result[] in a

altered").

"The interest of

finality requires that parties generally get only one bite at

the

rule 59(e)

apple for

bringing an appeal."

5.

tolling the

time for

Charles L.M., 884 F.2d at 871.

____________

We note that appellants

to appeal the district

purpose of

argue that they clearly intended

court's underlying dismissal of their

claims.

See
___

In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire

_____________________________________________

Litigation, 45 F.3d 564,

__________
"mistake

567 (1st Cir. 1995) (ruling

in designating a

judgment in the

will not ordinarily result in a

that a

notice of appeal

loss of the appeal 'as

long

-1111

court abused its

discretion in

second]

to

motion

Acevedo-Ruiz,
____________

vacate

945 F.2d

at 3.

denying .

the

In

judgment

. .

of

their second

[appellants'

dismissal."

motion for

reconsideration,

appellants argued

that the

district court

improperly ruled

that their Fourth Amendment

claim was time

barred on the grounds that one year had elapsed from the time

of Aybar's arrest and

that Aybar's marriage to Morales-Laboy

functioned to preclude application of the rule permitting the

one

year statute

plaintiff

of limitations

until

the

Appellants supplied

they were not

the district

insisted that the

court

arrest on March

one year statute of

Amendment claim had not expired

____________________

tolled for

twenty-first

married until April 16,

months after Aybar's

Fourth

minor's

to be

a minor

birthday.6

with evidence

that

1994, almost thirteen

25, 1993.

Appellants

limitations for their

because Aybar was an

as

the

intent to

appeal from

fairly inferred from the notice,

specific judgment

can be

and appellee is not

misled

by the mistake'"

(quoting Kelly v.
_____

94,

Cir. 1990))).

93 n.3 (1st

assertion,
lack

however, in

We

light of

appellate jurisdiction

United States, 789

_____________

to

need not

evaluate this

our determination
consider an

F.2d

that we

appeal of

any

decision other than the May 7, 1996 order in this case.

6.

The applicable statute of limitations in this

is one

year.

(1st Cir.

See
___

1994).

Muniz-Cabrero v. Ruiz,
_____________
____
This one year

plaintiff's twenty-first
plaintiff is

a minor at the

P.R. Laws

Ann. tit.

plaintiff

marries

limitations

32,
while

in

the

254(1) (1991).
still

tit. 32,

minor,

of the date
932, 933

event

If,
the

that

the

filed.

See
___

however, a
statute

of

of the marriage.

(1991); Martinez v.
________

Estado Libre Asociado, 110 P.P.R. 877 (1981).

_____________________

-1212

607, 610

tolled until

time the action is

ceases to toll as

See P.R. Laws Ann.

___

23 F.3d

period is

birthday

1983 case

unemancipated

statute of

minor

during this

limitations

was tolled

birthday on February 7, 1994.

filed

time

and,

until

his

therefore, the

twenty-first

Appellants indicated that they

their complaint on July 1, 1994, less than five months

after Aybar turned twenty-one and thus more than seven months

before

the one

year

limitations period

would expire,

and

argued, therefore, that their claim was not time barred.

The

district court

concluded that

the appellants

made representations

that led it

to believe that

they were

married at the time of the alleged constitutional violations.

Specifically,

appellants "alleged damages

partnership. . . . Morales

alleged

according

alleged damages stemming from the

malicious prosecution

to

the

to their conjugal

of her

district court,

husband."

appellants

Moreover,

had

several

opportunities to clarify their pleadings, but failed to do so

when

they amended

their complaint

respond to the motion to dismiss.

or when

they

failed to

Consequently, the district

court ruled that it "reasonably inferred that plaintiffs were

married at the time of the alleged incidents."

We consider the district

court's decision in light

of the law governing the disposition of a Rule 59(e) motion.

"Rule 59(e) allows a party

to direct the

district

court's

discovered

attention

material

evidence

to

newly
or

manifest error of law or fact and enables

the court
thus

to correct its

avoid

own errors and

unnecessary

appellate

procedures.

The rule does not provide a

vehicle

for

party

to undo

its

own

-1313

procedural

failures,

does not allow a

and

it

certainly

party to introduce

new

evidence or advance arguments

and

should

have been

that could

presented

to the

district court prior to the judgment.

Moro v.
____

Shell Oil Co.,

______________

(citations omitted);

91 F.3d

872, 876

see Vasapolli, 39 F.3d

___ _________

(7th Cir.

1996)

at 36-37; Hayes
_____

v. Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 8 F.3d 88, 91 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993);

______________________

F.D.I.C.
________

v.

World Univ. Inc., 978

_________________

1992);

National
Metal
Finishing
Co.,
Inc.
______________________________________________

BarclaysAmerican/Commercial,
___________________________

1990).

In

directed

their

this case,

899

we do

F.2d

F.2d

10, 16

119, 123

not question

(1st Cir.

(1st

v.

Cir.

that appellants

the district court to a "manifest error of fact" in

second

reconsideration

district court's determination,

motion:

Contrary

appellants were not

to

the

married

during the period in question.

That the appellants

however, does

not necessitate

court's decision.

newly discovered

to

the

illuminated an error of

that we reverse

"Except for

motions to

fact,

the district

amend based

evidence, the trial court

on

is only required

amend its findings of fact based on evidence contained in

record.

interest in

To do

otherwise

the finality of

would defeat

litigation."

the compelling

Fontenot
________

v. Mesa
____

Petroleum Co., 791 F.2d 1207, 1219 (5th Cir. 1986); see Lyons
_____________
___ _____

v. Jefferson Bank & Trust,

_______________________

793 F. Supp. 989,

991 (D. Colo.

1992), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 994 F.2d 716 (10th Cir.
_____________________________

-1414

1993).

In the instant

case, as in Fontenot
________

and Lyons, the

_____

district court

drew

an

from

the

relied
findings

eminently reasonable
evidence

on that

in

the

inference in

of fact.

That

inference
record

and

making its

other evidence

not in the record may negate the

[d]istrict [c]ourt's

inference is beside

the point.

Blessed with the acuity of

hindsight, [appellants]
realize that .

. .

may

now

. . [they] did not make .

. . [their] initial case as compelling as

. . .

[they]

might have,

but .

. .

[they] cannot charge the [d]istrict

[c]ourt

with

responsibility

for

that

failure through this Rule 52(b) motion.

Fontenot, 791 F.2d at

________

("Unlike the

burns.

potentially

1220; see Vasapolli, 39 F.3d

___ _________

Emperor Nero,

party

who

plaintiff's motion

Univ.,

in silence[]

relevant information

information presented

unavailable

litigants cannot fiddle

sits

peril."); Hayes, 8 F.3d at

_____

at 36-37

does

withholds

at

his

91 n.3 (noting that "none of

the

so

district court in

support of

for reconsideration] was new,

nor was it

when the

978 F.2d at 16

[to the

[and]

as Rome

summary

judgment

was filed");

(indicating that there

World
_____

was no reason

_____

why appellant could not have asserted its argument before the

district court and appellant's argument did not present newly

discovered evidence).7

____________________

7.

We

recognize that this case

comes to us

dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

as having been

rather than Rule 56, at

which stage courts afford plaintiffs substantial

develop

their claims.

latitude to

See Acadia Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor

___ ___________________
__________

Co., 44 F.3d 1050, 1059 (1st Cir. 1995).

___

This fact, however,

does not persuade

the district

us that

in this case

-1515

court

In this case, as in Fontenot, Vasapolli, Hayes, and

________ _________ _____

World Univ.,
____________

support

the

evidence

the argument

their second

unavailable at

on March 15,

Pierluisi, and

that

appellants

submitted

to

for the

first time

in

they advanced

motion for reconsideration was

the time the district

1995.

In their motion

Toledo argued

neither new nor

court entered judgment

to dismiss,

that the

Rossello,

one year statute

of

limitations period for appellants' Fourth Amendment claim had

expired.

motion,

The

and

appellants chose

thus

did

not

not to defend

reveal the

fact

against this

that

Aybar's

minority status tolled the

and

Morales-Laboy

were

statute of limitations because he

not

married

until

April

1994.8

F.3d

at 391

____________________

abused

its

discretion.

(upholding

district

See
___

court's

Hernandez,
_________
denial of

22

second

motion seeking reconsideration of district

Rule

59(e)

court's dismissal

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)); Figgie Int'l, Inc. v. Miller, 966

__________________
______
F.2d

1178,

1180

(7th

Cir

1992)

(ruling,

in context

of

district court's initial dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

that "[b]ecause Figgie presented
was

not

previously

[subsequent]

decision

no competent evidence

available,
denying

the

district

Figgie's

motion

that

court's
under

the

traditional standards governing Rule 59(e) did not constitute

an abuse of discretion").

8.

At oral argument before this

court, appellants indicated

that Otero-Martinez and Crispin-Reyes did not join the motion

to

dismiss

Rossello,

and explained
Pierluisi,

and

that

appellants

Toledo's

did not

motion

because

desired to drop these three defendants from the suit.

interesting to note, however, that in their
motion,

appellants

petitioned

the

oppose
they
It is

first Rule 59(e)

district

court

to

reconsider
Martinez

not
and

only

its sua
___

Crispin-Reyes,

sponte
______
but

Rossello, Pierluisi, and Toledo.

their

also

its

as

to Otero-

ruling

as

to

Appellants' explanation for

failure to raise the evidence

before the

ruling

district court rendered

of their marital status

its judgment

dismissing

Aybar's marital

status in

their claims thus is unpersuasive.

-1616

Appellants

their

did not

first motion

even mention

for reconsideration,

in which

they did

assert that

Aybar's minority

statute of limitations.9

second

Rule

59(e)

status functioned to

It was not until they

motion

that

appellants

toll the

filed their

informed

the

____________________

9.

Appellants, in fact, referred

and "wife" in

this first Rule

Morales-Laboy

"suffered not

loss of husband's
_________

suffering

of her

59(e) motion, asserting

only her

wife but also suffered a sense

____
[sic],

to each other as "husband"

own humiliation

as a

of loss of pride, self esteem

income, as well as

husband's
_________

that

own

the day by day

humiliation, physical

and

mental anguish, depression and loss of reputation." (emphasis

added).

-1717

district

court that they were not married during the time in

question.10

In light

district

court

did

of these circumstances, we

not

clearly abuse

denying appellants' second motion

its

find that the

discretion

for reconsideration.

in

See
___

Vasapolli, 39 F.3d at 27; Hernandez, 22 F.3d at 391; Hayes, 8

_________
_________
_____

F.3d at 91 n.3;

Fragoso, 991 F.2d at 888;

_______

World University,
________________

978 F.2d at 16;

1180

Figgie Int'l, Inc. v. Miller, 966 F.2d 1178,

__________________
______

(7th Cir. 1992);

affirm

the district

Fontenot, 791 F.2d at

________

court's

decision to

1220.

deny

We thus

appellants'

second motion for reconsideration.

____________________

10.

Appellants contend that they had no cause to provide the

evidence

of

their

court's denial
had

no

determine

status prior

to

the

district

of their first Rule 59(e) motion because they

reason to
that

question.

marital

believe

they

were

that

married

Appellants assert

indicated that they were

the district

that

during

court

the

period

their pleadings

married at the time they

complaint and that Morales-Laboy

would
in

merely

filed the

could claim injury to their

conjugal partnership before their marriage because they lived

as

common law

goods at this

husband and
time.

See
___

wife and

shared a

P.R. Laws Ann.

community of

tit. 31,

3622,

3623, 3641(3) (1991); Caraballo Ramirez v. Acosta, 104 P.P.R.

_________________
______
474, 481 (1975).

We doubt that the authority appellants cite

supports
husband

the

conclusion that

and wife

legitimately

during

could

partnership.

the period

claim

We believe

they

constituted
in question,

injury

to

their

conjugal

to the appellants, see Acadia

___ ______

Motors, 44 F.3d at 1059, reasonably concluded

______

delve into this

and thus

the district court, considering the

pleadings in a light favorable

married at the

common law

time of Aybar's

arrest.

We

that they were

do not need

issue, however, because appellants'

to

failure

to adequately elucidate the relevant facts of the case either

when they faced a motion to dismiss or
first Rule

court of

an

obligation to correct its erroneous factual determination

in

this case.

59(e) motion relieves

when they filed their

the district

See Fontenot, 791 F.2d at 1220.

___ ________

-1818

Costs to appellees.
Costs to appellees

-1919