12th Danube Rectors Conference

Summer School on Regional Cooperation

Vienna

Counterterrorism and
European Security

Defining terrorism

No internationally agreed judicial definition of terrorism

Failed UN-efforts (A more secure world, our shared
responsibility)
EU-definition only since 2002
Political implications of the term terrorism
Terrorism as a pejorative term
One mans terrorist is another mans freedom fighter

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Counter-terrorism

Clausewitz

Non-positivist definition of war

War as a continuum of policy by other means
War as an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our
will
War as a physical as well as psychological duel on extensive
scale

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Counter-terrorism

as Christopher Daase has called it - post-positivist definition of the term, defining it with recourse
on Clausewitz
This helps us to grasp the strategic logic of terrorism. Which is important not only for Social
Scientist, but also if you want to engineer a counter terrorist campaign
Clausewitz was theorizing on war -define terrorism as a specific kind of warfare
-> War as a continuum of policy by other means
-> You have a political objective and war is the means to achieve this objective.
-> War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.
-> War is further defined as physical as well as psychological duel (on extensive scale, as
Clausewitz notes)
Hence it is possible to define war with Clausewitz by identifying three elements:
political objective,
military means and
military aims that help achieve the political ends.

Strategic approach

Direct approach: Terrorism as psychological war of attrition,

creating fear in the targeted population (+ potentially
international attention & pressure), forcing political concession.

Indirect approach (1): Propaganda by deed - educating the

group on whose behalf terrorists claim to act how to confront
oppression.

Indirect approach (2): Terrorism as act to provoke overreaction

to turn the victim into the perpetrator.

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Counter-terrorism

Direct approach: Seeking direct impact. Terrorism as a strategic

approach
MORE COMMON:
Terrorism as a tactical tool (indeirect approach)
Two dimensions:
1)Propaganda by deed: educating the suppressed masses (the group
on whose behalf terrorists are claiming to act) how to confront
oppressor
2)Provoking an overreaction from the state and its apparatus, turning
the victim into a perpetrator (overreaction must be seen as an
overreaction either be the groups on whose behalf terrorists are
claiming to act OR (even better) by population altogether

One of many definition

...deliberate creation of fear through violence or the threat of
violence in the pursuit of political change....Terrorism is
specifically designed to have far reaching psychological effects
beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack
() Through the publicity generated by their violence terrorists
seek to obtain leverage, influence and power they otherwise
lack to effect political change on either a local or an international
scale.
Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 1998, pp. 43-44

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Counter-terrorism

No mentioning whether terrorism is substate phenomenon only, but

Hoffman holds this view...

Distinction as a point of
departure?
Differences and similarities between
terrorists, warlords, guerrillas, criminals:
Motivation? Geographic outreach?
Organisational structure and mode of
operation? Interest in publicity?
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Counter-terrorism

Social science methodological instrument that can be useful if there is a

problem in finding closed categories for a social phenomenen: Pure types
(Idealtypen, Max Weber) stress certain elements common to most cases
of the given phenomena-> Not existing in reality, not the statistical
average, but accentuation of particular elements that are especially
characteristic

The EUs role in

Counterterrorism

Historical background

Social revolutionary terrorism in the 1970ties

Cooperation through TREVI-network
National terrorism
1990ties: Organised crime tops the domestic security agenda
Declarations of Madrid (La Gomorra), Dublin: Terrorism as
threat to international security
Directory of Skills & Countering terrorist finance
Since 9/11: Terrorism as a top priority for European Security.
Threat-perception re-enforced through Madrid (2004), London
(2005) etc.
Euopean Council 21/09/2001: Guidelines for counter-terrorism
policy and action plan

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Counter-terrorism

TREVI (you know what it is)

Working groups on terrorism, illicit drugs and arms trafficking,
hooliganism
Defined as national terrorism (nationality of terrorists, target, political
goals)
-> after Maastricht coexisting with EU, later integrated.
In the 1990ties: Organized Crime (fall of the iron curtain, illigal migration,
organized crime)
Political declaration of Madrid (1995) Declaration of la Gomra /ER in
Dublin 1996;
Practical Measures: Facilitated Extradition (1995); Directory of Skills
(1996); countering terrorist finance (1999)

TREVI

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Counter-terrorism

TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, Violence international) 1975

strictly kept outside the formal frame of the EC
Cooperation in countering terrorist campaigns (RAF in Germany, Red
Brigades in Italy, Action Directs in France and IRA in UK) We will talk
about this next Monday
Later also including illicit drugs and arms trafficking and hooliganism.

The EU Action Plan

Deepen international consensus and enhance international

efforts to combat terrorists
Fighting terrorist finance
Maximise capacity within EU to detect and pursue terrorist
Increase efficiency of border control and transport security
Enhance capacities for consequence management
Address factors that contribute to recruitment and support for
terrorism
Targeted action towards third countries where the capacity to
combat terrorism is underdeveloped.

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Counter-terrorism

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First really crosspillarized policy field of European Integration (EU)

Including measure from all pillars!
Action plan regularly updated and refined
New structure after 2005

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Premises of the EUs role in

Counterterrorism

Al-Qaeda-type of Terrorism is perceived as a common risk by all

Member States.
Initially: al-Qaeda terrorism seen as new kind of global threat,
but now primarily regarded as topic for domestic (or for that
matter inner-European) security -> No externalisation of the
threat.
The EU provides a framework that enables the national
authorities to cooperate more smoothly.
Leadership and ultimate responsibility lies in the hands of the
member states (underscored in the Treaty of Lisbon)

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Counter-terrorism

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1) Terrorism as common threat (perception shared by GOVERNMENTS and

PUBLICS)
Counter-terrorism already topic in the 1970ties (TREVI) -> But seen as common
problem, but national security challenge (also related to the motives that were
pursued by the groups)
Common risk perception:
-> as indicated in various statements on EU level,
-> but also in relevant documents of the member states &
-> in EU wide public opinion survey such as Eurobarometer, in which a
constant 70-80 % of the people polled said they expected a common
European approach on counterterrorism
Since 9-11, bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) -> common risk that
requires common action (even though one has to say that this especially
apparent in central and western European countries, less in the new member
states in the East (security debates there are still dominated by Russia)

2)
Terrorism is primarily regarded as topic for domestic (or for that matter innerEuropean) security -> No externalisation of the threat.
BUT: Initially: al-Qaeda terrorism as new kind of global threat.
3) The EU provides a framework for joint planning and that enables the national
authorities to cooperate more smoothly.
Various strategy papers & comprehensive regularly updated Action Plan
including mechanism for monitoring implementation

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Fields of Activity

Development of common strategies & practical measures

Establishment of legal standards (e.g. Framework decision on
Terrorism of June 2002)
Information and Intelligence sharing (SIS I&II, VIS, Treaty of
Prm)
Strengthening common institutions (Europol, Eurojust, European
Police Chiefs Task Force, CT-Group)

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Counter-terrorism

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1) Action Plan & common strategies as guideline for national activities.

Best practice
2) The establishment of legal standards, necessary to engage terrorism within
the rule of law (as opposed to engage it within the state of exception,
Ausnahmezustand, Carl Schmitt)
this is done e.g. with the already mentioned framework decision on terrorism,
agreed upon by the Council in June 2002 and finally ratified a year ago. This
framework decision included a definition of the legal elements defining
terrorism As well as the European Arrest warrant, which presupposes the
mutual recognition of judicial decisions. (-> again something which has been
included in the ToL)
3) intelligence and information-sharing, e.g. through the establishment,
maintenance, enhancement of databases such as SIS, VIS, SIS II (->
Research tool instead of being an information board, problematic terms such
as: violent troublemakers, suspected terrorists, including biometric
data) or, the linking of national databases, e.g. through the Treaty of Prm,
which has been incorporated into the EU-framwork under German
presidency. (Linking national databanks on hit/ no hit basis)
Moreover, the EU creates environment in which the cooperation functions ever
more smoothly, even though there is room for improvement, of course. Not
only in terms of cooperation but also with regards to aspects like data
protection. E.g. Counter terrorist Group which is outside the EU
4) Strengthening of the common Institutions such as the European Police
Office Europol, Eurojust which links the national prosecution offices of the
Member States, the Counter Terrorist Group which assembles the heads of
national intelligence agencies and Task Force of the European Heads of

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Implementation of the EU counterterrorism strategy

EU Counter-Terrorism strategy
Prevention of terrorism
Prosecution of terrorists
Protection of citizens and infrastructure

Generally: strong focus on individuals (and not on material and

ideological structures)
Focus on prevention of terrorism -> secondary and tertiary
prevention
Primary prevention only on a limited scale
Reduction of vulnerabilities and establishment of crisismanagement capacities hardly addressed on EU level.

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Counter-terrorism

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Generally: strong focus on individuals, on the actors real terrorists,

accused and potential (and not on material and ideological structures) ->
Envisaged in strategic documents, but not mirrored by concrete action.
Focus on prevention of terrorism -> secondary and tertiary prevention, i.e.
targeting
Primary prevention only in limited scope -> focus on individuals at risk of
becoming radicalized, not on structures and ideologies -> root causes
Reduction of vulnerabilities and establishment of crisis-management
capacities hardly addressed on EU level.

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Terrorism and European Security

Terrorism is likely to remain one of our top security problems

home grown terrorists, infiltration, leader-less
Syria and Libya: Jihad-tourism and radicalisation (e.g. 320
German nationals fighting for IS in Syria)
tools to conduct terrorist operations are easy to acquire.
Likely scenarios are car bombs and assaults like the ones we
know from Madrid (2004) and London (2005), Paris (2015).
Should the term Terrorism be reserved for sub-state actors
only?

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Counter-terrorism

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EU creates environment in which the cooperation functions ever more

smoothly, even though there is room for improvement, of course. Not only
in terms of cooperation but also with regards to aspects like data
protection.
Political communication on terrorism has become much less alarmist
over the last months, especially Britain is a good example for an approach
that puts terrorism in the right perspective, labeling it as criminal activity,
leaving aside any WARMetaphor.

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