Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
DIF is the commonly used acronym for The National System for
Integral Family Development in Mexico, or Sistema Nacional para el
Desarrollo Integral de la Familia.
3
15
Pursuant to A.R.S. 8-533, a parents rights to a child under
the age of three who has been in an out-of-home placement for at least six
months may be terminated where the parent substantially neglect[s] or
willfully refuse[s] to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be
in an out-of-home placement, including refusal to participate in
reunification services offered by [DCS]. A.R.S. 8-533(B)(8)(b). Where
severance is based upon the length of time a child is in care, DCS must
also prove that it has made a diligent effort to provide appropriate
reunification services. Marina P. v. Ariz. Dept of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326,
329, 18 (App. 2007) (citing Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dept of Econ. Sec., 207
Ariz. 43, 47, 8 (App. 2004)); see also A.R.S. 8-533(B)(8), (D). Father
argues, first, that DCS did not make a diligent effort to provide
reunification services because it did not offer him in-person visitation
with Child at the port of entry into the United States and did not pay for
him to receive counseling.6
16
While sympathetic to the challenges Father faced as a result
of his financial limitations and inability to enter the United States, DCS
DCS contends Father waived any objection to the adequacy of the
services provided by remain[ing] silent on the issue until the day of the
severance trial. Because the trial court is in a much better position than
this court to evaluate the effectiveness and impact of the service
provided, a parent who does not object to the adequacy of services in the
trial court waives the issue on appeal. Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dept of Econ.
Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 178-79, 15-16 (App. 2014). Here, however, Fathers
counsel identified concerns with the services available to Father at the first
hearing and moved for a continuance of the severance trial until DCS
could arrange visitation at the port of entry. See id. at 179, 18 (noting
parent dissatisfied with the services actually being provided can raise the
issue with the juvenile court in a variety of ways, including at a
termination hearing). Thus, although early and often may be the better
practice for a parent seeking to maintain his parental rights, we cannot say
that Fathers objection made to the trial court was too late to preserve the
issue for appeal.
6
20
Father next argues the trial court erred in finding he
substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances
that caused Child to be in an out-of-home placement. At the time of
severance, DCS identified two major concerns: Father was unable to
financially provide for Child, and was either unable or unwilling to
appreciate the serious nature of Childs medical conditions and act
accordingly.
21
The record supports the trial courts findings as to each
circumstance. The DCS caseworker testified Father was the main source
of income for a family comprised of four adults and one newborn and
made barely enough to cover the expenses of the shared home.
Although Father did complete a parenting class, he presented as
immature and irresponsible. He did not participate in, follow-up on, or
inquire as to Childs medical treatment, and on the one occasion Father
was given information regarding Childs medical condition, he minimized
the effect on Childs well-being and was unsupportive of the treatment
being sought. Additionally, after fifteen months, Father had made no
effort to secure medical insurance for Child in Mexico, locate nearby
medical facilities, or even attempt to prepar[e] a plan to address [Child]s
medical needs, as specifically delineated in the case plan. Thus, the DCS
caseworker remained concerned as to whether Father could, or would,
react quickly and obtain medical care for Child.
22
Focusing on the level of the parents effort to cure the
circumstances, as we are required to do, Marina P., 214 Ariz. at 329, 20,
substantial evidence supports the trial courts findings that Father
substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy either the financial
impediments or DCSs articulated concerns with Childs medical needs
that prevented reunification. Nor are we persuaded by Fathers argument
that he was relieved of the responsibility of demonstrating his willingness
and ability to parent by waiting until the worst of Childs medical
conditions had resolved through the diligence and commitment of the
foster parents. Accordingly, we find no error.
23
A finding of one of the statutory grounds for severance
under A.R.S. 8-533, standing alone, does not justify the termination of
parental rights; it must also be proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the childs best
interests. Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 47, 8 (citing Michael J., 196 Ariz. at
249, 12). Father argues the trial court erred in determining the child
would be harmed if severance was not granted.
24
As an initial matter, to establish best interests, it must only
be shown the child would derive an affirmative benefit from termination
or incur a detriment by continuing in the relationship, not both. Oscar O.,
209 Ariz. at 334, 6 (emphasis added). The benefit to the child,
particularly when severance is sought based upon the childs length of
time in an out-of-home placement, is the opportunity for permanency
where parents maintain parental rights but refuse to assume parental
responsibilities. Id. at 337, 16 (quoting Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No.
JS-6520, 157 Ariz. 238, 243 (App. 1988)). In evaluating the childs
opportunity for permanency, the trial court considers whether there is a
current plan for the childs adoption and whether the current placement is
meeting the childs needs. Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dept of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz.
345, 350 (App. 2013) (citations omitted).
25
Here, the trial court found termination of the parent-child
relationship was in Childs best interests because he was placed in a
licensed foster home which is meeting [C]hilds needs and who intend to
adopt, and that severance would further the permanency plan of
adoption. The record reflects Child had been with the same placement
since his release from the hospital and had bonded to the foster parents
and their five other children. The court found Child had overcome an eye
condition, a heart defect, plagiocephaly, respiratory weakness, and
difficulties with feeding, hearing, and speech, largely through the
assistance and diligence of the placement. Additionally, Child is
adoptable, and the foster parents are willing to adopt Child and provide a
safe, stable environment that will meet his needs. Based upon these
circumstances, the DCS caseworker testified that if the termination were
not to proceed, Child would be harmed by continuing the dependency
because he would be deprived of permanency.
26
The best interests finding is supported by the record, and we
find no abuse of discretion.
:ama
10