Legal Ethics Practice of Law

1. Cayetano V. Monsod
In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on Elections. His appointment
was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Monsods appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano
on the ground that he does not qualify for he failed to meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that
the chairman of the COMELEC should have been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.
Monsods track record as a lawyer:
Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.
Immediately after passing, worked in his fathers law firm for one year.
Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held various positions in
various foreign corporations.
In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local corporations until 1986.
In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC. What constitutes practice of law?
HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The members of the
bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law
who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more
time doing what is loosely described as business counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working day
the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines,
legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers
of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no
means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator
who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and
negotiation.

2. IN RE CUNANAN (CASE DIGEST) 94 PHIL. 534

FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was,
An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed
to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general
average in subsequent bar examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As
per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes
a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to
take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was
declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate
preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice
of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The
rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment
of the court on who can practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void.
Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court
resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to

3. In Re Integration Bar of the Philippines 49 SCRA 22 January 9, 1973

FACTS:
[T]he Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the earnest recommendation on the basis
of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 of the Court, and consistently with
the views and counsel received from its [the Commissions] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming
nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar that (the) Honorable (Supreme) Court ordain the
integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate
Court Rule. The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the
Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and
other local Bar associations.
ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
HELD:
YES. On all issues.
RATIO:
[T]he Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article
VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning x x x the admission to the practice of law.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm.
Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of
the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable, within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an
imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
[T]he Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, ordained the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines effective January 16, 1973.

4. Petition for Leave to Reclaim Practice of Law of Benjamin Dacanay

n 1998, Atty. Benjamin Dacanay went to Canada to seek medical help. In order for him to take advantage of
Canadas free medical aid program he became a Canadian citizen in 2004. In 2006 however, he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act 9225 of the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003. In the same year, he returned to the Philippines and he now intends to resume his practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay may still resume his practice of law.

HELD: Yes. As a rule, the practice of law and other professions in the Philippines are reserved and limited only
to Filipino citizens. Philippine citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar. So when Dacanay became a
Canadian citizen in 2004, he ceased to have the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. However, under RA
9225, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires his Filipino citizenship in accordance with RA 9225. Hence, when Dacanay
reacquires his Filipino citizenship in 2006, his membership to the Philippine bar was deemed to have never been
terminated.
But does this also mean that he can automatically resume his practice of law right after reacquisition?
No. Dacanay must still comply with several conditions before he can resume his practice of law, to wit:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is especially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a
lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
5. Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999

Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar vs. Vicente D. Ching
Facts:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, was born on April 11,
1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines
He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar
Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court the following documents
as proof of his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of his
place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was scheduled on May 5, 1999.
Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take oath.
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the
Philippine Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so, unless upon reaching the
age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 265 "an act providing for the manner in which the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be
declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does, it would already
be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.

Issue:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".
Rulings:
1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time.
The reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3 years from "upon reaching the age of
majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of
majority which the court considered not within the reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his
election of Philippine citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest
civil registry.