**Fabian vs. Desierto G.R. No.

129742, September 16, 1998

Facts: Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and President of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation which was engaged in the construction
business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin was the District Engineer of the First Metro
Manila Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the bidding for
government construction projects, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage
of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair
lasted for some time, in the course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with
public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his
office. When petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused
and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of
harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against
private respondent.
Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty
of suspension without pay for 1 year. After private respondent moved for
reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the private respondents new counsel
had been his classmate and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself. The case was
transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman who exonerated private respondent from
the administrative charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the SC in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is valid
Held: The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under the
present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but
only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. 1 thereof.
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to
be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and
conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.
**Nitafan Vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue G.R. No. L-78780
Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial Court seek to
prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries or compensation for such would tantamount to a
diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. Earlier however, or on June 7, 1987,

the Court en banc had already reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice which directs
the continued withholding of taxes of the justices and the judges of the judiciary but
the SC decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the issue once and for all.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of
income tax.
HELD: No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their
deliberations, was NOT to exempt justices and judges from general taxation. Members
of the judiciary, just like members of the other branches of the government, are subject
to income taxation. What is provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges
may not be decreased during their continuance in office. They have a fix salary which
may not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the
judges shall be subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the
judiciary.
But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be increased?
Yes. The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the members of the
judiciary and such increase will immediately take effect thus the incumbent members of
the judiciary (at the time of the passing of the law increasing their salary) shall benefit
immediately.
Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the judiciary but
such will only be applicable to members of the judiciary which were appointed AFTER
the effectivity of such law.
**Fernando Poe Jr. Vs. GMA
Facts: On June 24, 2004, the Congress as the representatives of the sovereign people
and acting as the National Board of Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call vote,
proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) as the duly elected President of the
Philippines. She obtained the highest votes, followed by the second-placer, Fernando
Poe, Jr. (FPJ). She then took her Oath of Office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court on June 30, 2004.
Refusing to concede defeat, Mr. FPJ, filed an election protest before the Electoral
Tribunal. Both parties exchanged motions to rush the presentation of their respective
positions on the controversy. Together with the formal Notice of the Death of Protestant
on December 14, 2004, his counsel has submitted to the Tribunal, dated January 10,
2005, a "MANIFESTATION with URGENT PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE AS A
SUBSTITUTE FOR DECEASED PROTESTANT FPJ," by the widow, Mrs. Jesusa
Sonora Poe. She claims that because of the untimely demise of her husband and in
representation not only of her deceased husband but more so because of the
paramount interest of the Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and
substitute for her late husband in the election protest initiated by him to ascertain the
true and genuine will of the electorate in the 2004 elections.
Issue:

1.

Who between the Protestant and the Protestee was the true winner in the May 10,
2004 Presidential Elections
2.
Whether or not the Protestants widow could intervene and/or substitute for the
deceased party.
Held: WHEREFORE, the motion of movant/intervenor JESUSA SONORA POE a.k.a.
SUSAN ROCES to intervene and substitute for the deceased protestant is DENIED for
lack of merit.
Acting on the protest and considering the Notice of the Death, submitted by counsel of
protestant RONALD ALLAN POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., we also resolve that
Presidential Electoral Tribunal Case No. 002, entitled Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a. Fernando
Poe, Jr. v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, should be as it is hereby DISMISSED on the
ground that no real party in interest has come forward within the period allowed by law,
to intervene in this case or be substituted for the deceased protestant.
**Estrada Vs. GMA and Desierto
Joseph Erap Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Eraps term, he
was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp
descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of Estrada,
went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of
pesos from jueteng lords. The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On
January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the Erap informed then
Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of
Eraps surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, Arroyo immediately
discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of
power, Eraps legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was
confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the
Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving
the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any
kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the
disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to
serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve
the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge
that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Estradas reference is to a
future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and
(5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national

spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release
was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past
tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government
cannot be reviewed by this Court.
**Marcos Vs. Manglapus
Facts: Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into
exile. Corazon Aquinos ascension into presidency was challenged by failed coup
attempts as well as by plots of Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses themselves. Marcos,
in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But President
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood firmly
on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for
mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue
traveldocuments to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin
the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Issues: Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the
Philippines. Assuming that she has the power to bar, was there a finding made that
there is a clear and present danger to the public due to the return? And have
therequirements of due process been complied with in the making of the finding?
HELD: Petition Dismissed.
The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional
provisions, it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those
residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in to the paramount duty
residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. Such request or demand
should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to
determine whether it must be granted or denied.
It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral
arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein
petitioners and respondents were represented, that there exist factual bases for the
President's decision. Hence, this act cannot be said to have been done arbitrarily or
capriciously. Further, the ponencia (the coups, the communist threat, peace and order
issues especially in Mindanao, Marcos loyalists plotting) bolsters the conclusion that the
return of Marcos will only exacerbate the situation in the country.
Another reason of the Court...We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is
only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the

economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of
whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the
Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the
enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.
**Sps. Constantino Vs. Cuisia
Facts: Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into
exile. Corazon Aquinos ascension into presidency was challenged by failed coup
attempts as well as by plots of Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses themselves. Marcos,
in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But President
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood firmly
on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for
mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue
traveldocuments to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin
the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Issues: Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the
Philippines. Assuming that she has the power to bar, was there a finding made that
there is a clear and present danger to the public due to the return? And have
therequirements of due process been complied with in the making of the finding?
HELD: Petition Dismissed.
The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional
provisions, it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those
residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in to the paramount duty
residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. Such request or demand
should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to
determine whether it must be granted or denied.
It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral
arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein
petitioners and respondents were represented, that there exist factual bases for the
President's decision. Hence, this act cannot be said to have been done arbitrarily or
capriciously. Further, the ponencia (the coups, the communist threat, peace and order
issues especially in Mindanao, Marcos loyalists plotting) bolsters the conclusion that the
return of Marcos will only exacerbate the situation in the country.
Another reason of the Court...We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is
only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the
economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of
whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the
Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the
enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.

**Luego Vs. CSC

Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by
Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as permanent but the CSC approved it
as temporary, subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private
respondent and another employee.
Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner
for the contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said
position in place of the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private
respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor.
The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the
validity of the respondents appointment.
Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the
ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of
this finding, order his replacement.
Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was
therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was
permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to
reverse him and call it temporary.
Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have
inter alia the power to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to
positions in the civil service .and disapprove those where the appointees do not
possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment
extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing
the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is
qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws. CSC is
without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was
better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city
mayor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a
permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the
appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not
empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment
in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified

and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil
Service Commissions resolution is set aside.
**Neri Vs. Senate
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)
for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18,
2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and
power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he
admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate
averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he
would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and
abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the
case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is
because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such
as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these
powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications
privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor
of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely
contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege
on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under
conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials necessary
in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited
by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second,
the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the
operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability
of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner
did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during
the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only

that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the
Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of
Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.