Class & the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) the use of language
referring both to class structure, and class struggle was frequent and
provocative. This language pervaded the political discourse not only of political
elites, but of the various mass-participation political groups that arose during the
period. However, whether the use of such rhetoric actually reflected the nature
of the political struggle that occurred during this period is debatable.
This essay shall attempt to answer the following questions: (1) in regards to both
official class designation and economic inequality, was the GPCR a struggle
between rival classes? (2) to what extent were internal power struggles within
the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) a cause of class struggle?
Or did political elites merely use the language of class struggle to further nonclass related goals? (3) What does the GPCRs emphasis on class teach us about
class structure and struggle socialism in general?
Following the barrage of criticism aimed at the Party during the Hundred Flowers
campaign, Mao came to be concerned about cultural and intellectual elites as
well as the children of the former capitalist classes. This was compounded by the
censure Mao received at the Lushan conference in 1959 due to the perceived
failures of the Great Leap Forward (GLF)1. It was at this time that Mao came to
also harbour suspicions about those within the party, and came to fear the rise of
a new form of bureaucratic class under socialist government.
If indeed the GPCR reflected class conflict in Chinese society, then it follows that
some sort of differentiation between classes must have existed. Therefore, we
must define what is meant by class.

1 Simon Leys, The Chairmans New Clothes Mao and the Cultural Revolution,
(London: Allison and Busby, 1977), p. 24.

Post-revolutionary China maintained an official and exceedingly rigid form of

class

structure.

Throughout

the

Yanan

period,

and

later

following

the

establishment of the PRC, a major part in the program of introducing socialism

was redistribution, especially of land. A system of classification was introduced
for the purposes of redistribution. These labels continued to be used by the CCP
in the years following the revolution, and came to be inheritable in the male
line2. The classification system specified three main groups, which were again
subdivided. They are listed as follows:
Good-class origins (jieji chengfen haode)3, or the five red kinds (hongwulei):

Politically red inheritances (families headed by pre-liberation Party

members, or the orphans of men who died in the revolutionary wars), this

group included revolutionary cadres, soldiers and martyrs.

Working-class, including industrial workers and their families, and former
poor and lower-middle peasant families.

Middle-class origins (yiban chengfen):

Non-intelligentsia middle-class, including small proprietors (such as

pedlars and store clerks, etc.) and former upper-middle peasant families.

2 Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen & Jonathan Unger, Students and Class Warfare: the
Social Roots of the Red Guard Conflict in Guangzhou (Canton), The China
Quarterly, p. 402.
3 The following is based on the lists found in Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen &
Jonathan Unger, Students and Class Warfare: the Social Roots of the Red Guard
Conflict in Guangzhou (Canton), p. 402; and Joel Andreas, Battling over political
and cultural power during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Theory and Society,
Vol. 31, 2002, p. 468.

Intelligentsia,

including

white-collar

employees

(zhiyuan4)

and

independent professionals.
Bad-class origins (jieji chengfen buhaode)5:

Capitalist families
Rich peasant families
Landlord families

The seeming contradiction between maintaining an inheritable class system

despite the fact that many of the former classes no existed in practice
(particularly in view of the Partys declaration of 1956 that the transition to
communism had been successfully achieved) was not as pronounced as one
might assume. Most Chinese still considered people to be either winners or
losers from the 1949 revolution6, and thus the class categories continued to
appear relevant. Under the system above, social mobility was possible; however,
it was far easier to move from a good class to a bad class than to move in the
other direction7.
4 This group included white collar government employees, teachers, managers
etc. The relatively low number of zhiyuan in terms of population in prerevolutionary China meant that their class position was higher than that of
comparable workers in other developing countries. See Joel Andreas, Battling
over political and cultural power during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, p. 511.
5 Under this category Chan et al. also include the families of counterrevolutionaries; families of Rightists (those labelled as such during the AntiRightist campaign for their criticisms of the CCP during the 1957 Hundred
Flowers campaign); and the families of bad elements (denoting criminal
offenders). The latter two categories do not rely on pre-revolution status. See
Students and Class Warfare: the Social Roots of the Red Guard Conflict in
Guangzhou (Canton), p. 402. Kraus has a slightly different list from both Chan et
al., and Andreas, see Richard Curt Kraus, The Cultural Revolution a very short
introduction, p. 25.
6 Joel Andreas, Battling over political and cultural power during the Chinese
Cultural Revolution, p. 510.
7 Richard Curt Kraus, Class Conflict and the Vocabulary of Social Analysis in
China, p. 66.

By the beginning of the GPCR general economic equality was prevalent. The
differentiation that did exist was mostly regional, but within a specific province
income levels were fairly homogenous. However, for two reasons there were
disparities between rural and urban areas. Administrative policy generally
favoured an autarkic system of development within the regions 8, thus rather than
developing specialisation through trade, each region would attempt to produce
all products sufficient for its needs. This was compounded by a lack of
infrastructure that would have encouraged trade to develop, especially for the
transportation of goods. Moreover, whilst China was still exceedingly poor in
terms of GDP per capita at this stage, many services were provided by
workplaces in industrial areas. This differed from rural practice, where individuals
were more responsible for their own provision of housing, healthcare, and other
essential services.
The relevance of relative economic equality is that class structure took on new
forms. Non-economic forms of power came to replace general economic notions
of class. This can be seen in what Mao considered the rise of the bureaucratic
class within the Party9. Based on analysis of the Soviet Union by Mao and other
radical theorists, the USSR has undergoing a peaceful evolution from socialism to
8 The concept of self-reliance, zili gengsheng, was applied at both the national
and regional level. At the regional level this was intended to reduce
transportation costs and bottlenecks. Richard Curt Kraus, The Cultural Revolution
a very short introduction, (Hants: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 67-68.
9 Line struggle is the reflection within the Party of the class struggle in society.
So long as classes, class contradictions and class struggle exist in society, there
must be the struggle between two lines within the Party; Mao Zedong, In branch
construction one must grasp line education, Mao Zedong, In branch
construction one must grasp line education, 26 February, 1971, quoted in
Richard Curt Kraus, Class Conflict and the Vocabulary of Social Analysis in
China, p. 65. For a discussion the struggle between lines or roads within the CCP
and its relation to class see Lowell Dittmer, Line Struggle in Theory and
Practice: The Origins of the Cultural Revolution Reconsidered, The China
Quarterly, Vol. 72, 1977, 680-681.

state capitalism, whereby state officials had become an exploiting class without
fundamentally changing social structure. Since China had followed the Soviet
model of development, Mao feared the Chinese social structure was also
harbouring the seeds of exploitation 10. Mao warned in 1965 that Party officials
were becoming an incipient bureaucratic class, declaring such people [the
bureaucrats] are already or are becoming capitalist vampires to the workers 11.
Chan et al. conclude that class structure during the GPCR was demonstrated by
Red Guard factionalism. The children of the former privileged and middle classes
were the strongest supporters of the Maoist faction within the CCP, as they
sought to benefit from the Maos attack on the CCP and the party cadres and
leaders who now had privileged access to state services at the expense of the
former privileged classes who, under a more meritocratic system, would gain a
greater share. However, those who came from families with connections to the
CCP sought to maintain their new privileges 12, and supported the more
conservative elements within the CCP led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. This
latter group propagated what came to be known as the bloodline theory
(xuetong lun), which highlighted their own role as children of revolutionaries 13.
10 Joel Andreas, The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization: a case study of
rebellion during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, American Sociological Review,
Vol. 72, June 2007, p. 442.
11 Mao Zedong, Notes on Comrade Chen Ceng-jens Report on his Squatting
Point, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, January 29, 1965, available at
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume9/mswv9_47.htm.
12 Richard Curt Kraus, Class Conflict and the Vocabulary of Social Analysis in
China, p. 70.
13 For a discussion see J oel Andreas, Battling over political and cultural power
during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, p. 478-479; Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen &
Jonathan Unger, Students and Class Warfare: the Social Roots of the Red Guard
Conflict in Guangzhou (Canton), p. 426.

Andreas differs somewhat in his analysis from Chan et al. He has explicitly
asserted that the most important aspects of class in post-revolutionary China
were political and cultural power14. Andreas finds, in contrast to the traditional
analysis of class and Red Guard factionalism as exemplified by Chan et al., a
convergence of interests of political and cultural elites based on a shared
hostility to the egalitarianism of the GPCR. Whilst he notes the antagonism
between the classes in certain instances, he also finds that the children of former
peasant revolutionaries who became political elites under CCP rule allied with the
children of the old educated elite, in order to oppose the radical assault on the
existing order, often led by children of peasant origin who possessed neither
cultural nor political capital15.
Rhetorically, it would seem that class played an important role in the GPCR. The
slogan never forget class struggle 16 was prominent and frequent at the
commencement of the GPCR. However, some have questioned the relevance of
class structure and struggle under socialism to the GPCR. Leys, for instance,
asserts that the GPCR was a power struggle within the leadership of the CCP 17,
rather than a movement aimed at combating the emergence of a new form of
class differentiation, and that the language of class struggle and revolution was

14 Concepts that appear to underlie the conclusions of Chan et al. although

these mechanisms are never explicitly stated.
15 Andreas finds that the traditional class dichotomy as identified by Chan et al.
was applicable at Tsinghua Attached Middle School (TAMS) an elite high school
attached to Tsinghua University (TU), whereas, the coalition of political and
cultural elites was prominent at TU. Joel Andreas, Battling over political and
cultural power during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, p. 464.
16 Long Live Mao Tse-Tungs Thought: In Commemoration of the 45 th Anniversary
of the founding of the Communist Party of China, Renmin Ribao, editorial 1 July,
1966, reprinted in Peking Review, Vol 9, No 27, July, 1966, available at
https://epress.anu.edu.au/subject/china/peking-review/1966/PR1966-27a.htm.

in fact deployed simply to mask the real nature and aim of the movement, that
is, of removing Maos rivals and detractors from the CCP. Some have even
referred to the GPCR as an instance of largely contrived class struggle 18. This
conception of the GPCR however, fails to recognise the wider importance of class
for the Chinese population. It is not clear without further research whether nonelites were particularly concerned with the continuity of class differentiation
under socialism, however, what does appear to have mattered to people was
preferential access to those goods and services that higher class status enabled.
Chan et al.s research of students in Guangzhou during the GPCR show that in
the years prior to its the launch of the GPCR (1963-65), students of the jieji
chengfen buhaode or zhiyuan classes were often subjected to (sincere)
exhortations during small-group sessions of classmates (as well as in the media),
to draw a line between themselves and their parents in order to further their
own opportunities to education, urban employment and political advancement 19.
Although such rhetoric may have been employed by Maoist elites to justify
purges within the leadership, it does not account for why such large numbers of
Chinese, especially youth, heeded Maos call to attack those in power. The
catalyst for action amongst radical youths was, in actuality, a response to
Chinas economic opportunities and their own self-interest based on class. This

17 Simon Leys, The Chairmans New Clothes Mao and the Cultural Revolution,
p. 13; Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Maos Last Revolution,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). For a critique MarFarquhar and
Schoenhals Mao-centred approach see Lynn White, Mao and the Cultural
Revolution in China, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008, p. 98-102;
Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System, The China
Quarterly, Vol. 38, 1969, p. 84.
18 Philip Bridgham, Maos Cultural Revolution: Origin and Development, p. 13.
19 Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen & Jonathan Unger, Students and Class Warfare:
the Social Roots of the Red Guard Conflict in Guangzhou (Canton), p. 414.

can be seen by the fact that students from the same inherited class were,
overwhelmingly, members of the same factions of Red Guards, and that the Red
Guard factions which opposed each other had as a base a certain class. As Chan
et al. demonstrate, by the mid-1960s urban high school students faced
narrowing prospects for upward mobility 20, this situation arose concurrently to a
shift towards greater reliance on class origin as a criterion on which educational
opportunities were offered21. Thus class origin became an important factor in
determining ones potential for advancement.
The re-emergence of class as a salient factor in Chinese political discourse was
initiated with the launch of the class struggle by Mao at the Tenth Plenum of the
Central Committee in September 1962 22. Although the reason behind this
campaign may have been the imperative to explain past failures of Party policy,
in particular the GLF, as largely the handiwork of foreign and domestic class
enemies23, rather than an ideological belief in the actual need for a widespread
campaign to battle class structure, the eventual result (i.e. the GPCR) was a class

20 This was due to the baby boom of the 1950s, coupled with a relatively young
established workforce with the result that more and more people were seeking to
fill a limited number of vacancies due to low rates of retirement. Moreover, since
education levels had greatly expanded in the post-revolutionary period, there
were many more educated youths who were in the position of not being able to
obtain urban employment, and were faced to move to more menial positions in
the countryside. Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen & Jonathan Unger, Students and
Class Warfare: the Social Roots of the Red Guard Conflict in Guangzhou
(Canton), p. 398-401.
21 This resulted in increased pressure to be accepted in the Communist Youth
League, and subsequent demonstration of exemplary political behaviour, which
was a further criterion of acceptance into higher education facilities.
22 Philip Bridgham, Maos Cultural Revolution: Origin and Development, The
China Quarterly, No. 41, 1970, p. 8.
23 Ibid. p. 9.

struggle, although a fractious one, with many parties, alliances of convenience,

and the use of language couched in Marxist terms that served only to obscure
the rival goals of each camp, as each claimed to represent the proletariat in a
struggle against those taking the capitalist road. However, there are good
reasons to think that the GPCR was not solely a manifestation of inter-elite power
struggles24.
Mao considered class struggle to be necessary for two reasons. First, he
considered class struggle to be an ongoing process, one that had to be renewed
each generation to ensure that the class beliefs of the former bad classes were
eradicated and not passed down through from generation to generation, and to
ensure that those who had only lived under CCP rule would not take the benefits
of socialism for granted. Second, he feared the remaining members of the old
exploiting classes being joined and supplanted by new class enemies 25. With the
high level of economic equality, and the absence of individual ownership over
the factors of production, Mao concluded that political power had come to
replace economic power as the basis of class distinction. Those with greater
control of the distribution of goods and services from the state, that is, the
bureaucratic and political elite, became a new privileged class, and began to
institutionalise the bequeathing of political power to their children 26 through
privileged

access

to

education,

Party/state

employment,

and

personal

acquaintance with other elites.

24 Michael Dutton, Policing Chinese Politics: A History, (London: Duke Univeristy

Press, 2005), p. 242.
25 Richard Curt Kraus, Class Conflict and the Vocabulary of Social Analysis in
China, The China Quarterly, Vol. 69, 1977, p. 62.
26 Ibid. p. 63.

Mao further developed an emerging theory of class relations, designed for

application to socialist societies, by noting how a revolutionary group can
degenerate, become estranged from the masses, usurp privilege and pursue selfinterested policies27. Thus, according to this theory, not only does class continue
under

socialism,

but

that

new

classes

arise

in

response

to

changed

circumstances28. As the Chairman himself declared, in a socialist society,

meanwhile, new elements of class of the bourgeoisie may emerge. Class and
class struggle remain during the entire period of socialism 29. This would appear
to be confirmed by the research undertaken by both Andreas, and Chan et al.,
described above, which demonstrated that class, based on political and cultural
power, rather than on economic power, was the most important determining
factor in the position taken by students, both in Beijing and in Guangzhou, in
either supporting or opposing the radical (Maoist) element of the CCP. From this
evidence, we can conclude that social class, whilst affected by the radical
changes of socialism, continues to exist, and will probably continue to exist
under any economic or political system where there exists the possibility of
differentiation.
To conclude, it would appear that the GPCR did constitute an instance of class
struggle. With possessors of cultural and political capital, the new elite classes,
both clashing with each other, and allying to defend their privileged positions
27 Such a theory, although absent from Marx, had preoccupied both Trotsky and
Djilas. Richard Curt Kraus, Class Conflict and the Vocabulary of Social Analysis in
China, p. 63-64. For instance, see Milovan Djilas, The New Class, (New York:
Praeger, 1957).
28 Michael Dutton, Policing Chinese Politics: A History, p. 233.
29 Mao Zedong, Talk At An Enlarged Working Conference Convened By The Central
Committee Of The Communist Party Of China, 30 January 1962, Selected Works of Mao
Tse-tung, available at http://marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume8/mswv8_62.htm.

against non-elites. Moreover, whilst the GPCR was certainly at one level a
internal power struggle within the CCP, this situation was exploited by those
outside the leadership as an opportunity to further their own class interests, by
either defending or attacking the status quo. Finally, we can conclude that
socialism as an economic and political system, whilst its class structure will be
different to that found under communist of feudal societies, is likely to still
witness

competition

between

classes.

In

fact,

considering

the

greater

centralisation of political and economic power, and thus the greater the benefits
accruing to those who obtain power, it seems intuitive that the factional struggle
for control over the state would be more intense under socialism than under
competing systems of government.

Jeremy Rees
208044
Bibliography:
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Cultural Revolution, Theory and Society, Vol. 31, 2002.

Andreas, Joel, The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization: a case study of
rebellion during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, American Sociological

Review, Vol. 72, June 2007.

Bridgham, Philip, Maos Cultural Revolution: Origin and Development,

The China Quarterly, No. 41, 1970.

Dittmer, Lowell, Line Struggle in Theory and Practice: The Origins of the

Cultural Revolution Reconsidered, The China Quarterly, Vol. 72, 1977.

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MacFarquhar, Roderick, and Michael Schoenhals, Maos Last Revolution,

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

Mao, Zedong, Talk At An Enlarged Working Conference Convened By The
Central Committee Of The Communist Party Of China, 30 January 1962,
Selected

Works

of

Mao

Tse-tung,

available

at

http://marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-

8/mswv8_62.htm.
Mao, Zedong, Notes on Comrade Chen Ceng-jens Report on his
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available

at

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-

works/volume-9/mswv9_47.htm.
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the 45th Anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China,
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at

https://epress.anu.edu.au/subject/china/peking-

review/1966/PR1966-27a.htm.
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