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In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of
Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same
judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented
in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is
immaterial in view of the above rule.
Anent petitioners insistence on the application of Section 3 of A.M. No. 0304-04-SC, a plain reading of said provision reveals that the provision invoked
only applies to petitions for custody of minors, and not to habeas corpus
petitions. Thus:
Section 3. Where to file petition. The petition for custody of minors shall be
filed with the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner resides
or where the minor may be found.(emphasis added)
Lastly, as regards petitioners assertion that the summons was improperly
served, suffice it to state that service of summons, to begin with, is not
required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas
corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil
actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the respondent.
G.R. No. 197174, September 10, 2014, FRANCLER P. ONDE,
PETITIONER, VS. THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS
PIAS CITY, RESPONDENT
Francler filed a petition for correction of entries in his Certificate of Live Birth,
under Rule 108, to correct the following entries: 1) on the Entry pertaining to
the Date and Place of Marriage of Parents, from December 23, 1983, Bicol
to Not Married; 2) First Name Of Mother, from Tely to Matilde; and, 3)
First Name, from Franc Ler to Francler).
His petition, however, only impleaded the Office of the Civil Registrar of Las
Pinas as sole respondent. The Regional Trial Court dismissed his petition,
noting that the first correction (the date and place of marriage of parents)
are substantial corrections, while the other corrections maybe made before
the City Civil Registry under Republic Act 9048. Francler moved to
reconsider, but the RTC denied it, hence he filed a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 to assail the ruling of the RTC.
The Supreme Court:
On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner
and his mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the
city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048. We note that petitioner no longer
contested the RTCs ruling on this point.[4] Indeed, under Section 1 of R.A.
No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be
corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil
registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended
by R.A. No. 10172, now reads:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change
of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors
and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of
birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or
typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Silverio v. Republic, we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with
administrative officers. The intent and effect of said law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and
108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first
filed and subsequently denied. The remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. In
Republic v. Cagandahan, we said that under R.A. No. 9048, the correction of
clerical or typographical errors can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. The law removed from
the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of clerical or
typographical errors. Thus petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy
for the correction of his and his mothers first name.
On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the
entry on petitioners birth certificate that his parents were married on
December 23, 1983 in Bicol to not married is a substantial correction
requiring adversarial proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will
affect his legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an
illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy, we held that corrections of entries in the
civil register including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, involve substantial alterations.
Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of
the appropriate adversary proceedings.
On the third issue, we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for
correction of entries. As mentioned, petitioner no longer contested the RTC
ruling that the correction he sought on his and his mothers first name can
be done by the city civil registrar. Under the circumstances, we are
constrained to deny his prayer that the petition for correction of entries
before the RTC be reinstated since the same petition includes the correction
he sought on his and his mothers first name.
We clarify, however, that the RTCs dismissal is without prejudice. As we
said, petitioner can avail of the administrative remedy for the correction of
his and his mothers first name. He can also file a new petition before the
RTC to correct the alleged erroneous entry on his birth certificate that his
parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol. This substantial
correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As we reiterated
in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City:
x x x This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia where we held that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 [of the Rules of Court] provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. x x x
xxxx
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner
are not merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would
affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as
well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such
nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in accordance with our
ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural
requirements are complied with. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
We also stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a
civil register must implead as parties to the proceedings not only the local
civil registrar, as petitioner did in the dismissed petition for correction of
entries, but also all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the correction. This is required by Section 3, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Eleosida, we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court, as the procedural requirements laid down by the Court to make the
proceedings under Rule 108 adversary. In Republic v. Uy, we have similarly
ruled that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including
those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court is
mandated. Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at least implead his
father and mother as parties since the substantial correction he is seeking
will also affect them.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of
all the real and personal properties of the decedent in the inventory.
However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his
possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known
to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as
the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true
inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can
be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of
another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and
appraisal of the estate of the decedent is "to aid the court in revising the
accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator,
and in malting a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and
otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate." Hence, the RTC that
presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion
on the question of what properties should be included in the inventory.
According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to
supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included
or excluded from the inventory in the absence of "positive abuse of
discretion," for in the administration of the estates of deceased persons, "the
judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not
interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be
shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion." As long as the RTC
commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected
as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate
court is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to
third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court
can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should
be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised. As
the Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate court or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with
the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons,
but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such
court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several
cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether
testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by
title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they
should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is,
then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort
to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience.
The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a
testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of
ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs
to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and
the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the
property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.
The inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and
submitted for the important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of
collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code
required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita
herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he
(or she) may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may
be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition." Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also
provided that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir
"may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir." Rule 90 thereby expanded the
special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the
matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing
it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title
to any compulsory heir by the decedent.
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or
included in the inventory of estate properties was well within the authority
and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination,
the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy
that it was best to include all properties in the possession of the
court found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate
was different from respondents signature appearing in some of her
government issued identification cards. The court thus made a categorical
conclusion that respondents signature in the marriage certificate was not
hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she
claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru
Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
National Statistics Office that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the
civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente
lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor
to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No.
8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil
registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil
registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented
to show the existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by
overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was
not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary
evidence clearly established that the only evidence of marriage which is
the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108
cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify
the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given
the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures
were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted
and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage
as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such
marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated,
in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling
the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the
marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
thru the Office of the Solicitor General averred that Edelina should have first
filed an appeal with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs on the denial of her
passport application, thus she failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
The Supreme Court:
First, with respect to her prayer to compel the DFA to issue her passport,
petitioner incorrectly filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. She
should have first appealed before the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, since her
ultimate entreaty was to question the DFAs refusal to issue a passport to her
under her second husbands name.
Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, which was
adopted on 25 February 1997, the following are the additional documentary
requirements before a married woman may obtain a passport under the
name of her spouse:
SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married, divorced or widowed
women shall be made in accordance with the following provisions:
a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides to adopt the surname
of her husband pursuant to Art. 370 of Republic Act No. 386, she must
present the original or certified true copy of her marriage contract, and one
photocopy thereof.
In addition thereto, a Filipino who contracts marriage in the Philippines to a
foreigner, shall be required to present a Certificate of Attendance in a
Guidance and Counselling Seminar conducted by the CFO when applying for
a passport for the first time.
b) In case of annulment of marriage, the applicant must present a certified
true copy of her annotated Marriage Contract or Certificate of Registration
and the Court Order effecting the annulment.
c) In case of a woman who was divorced by her alien husband, she must
present a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the
Philippine Embassy or consular post which has jurisdiction over the place
where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or
consular mission in the Philippines.
When the divorcee is a Filipino Muslim, she must present a certified true copy
of the Divorce Decree or a certified true copy of the Certificate of Divorce
from the Shariah Court or the OCRG.
d) In the event that marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband, the
applicant must present the original or certified true copy of the Death
Certificate of the husband or the Declaration of Presumptive Death by a Civil
or Shariah Court, in which case the applicant may choose to continue to use
her husbands surname or resume the use of her maiden surname.
From the above provisions, it is clear that for petitioner to obtain a copy of
her passport under her married name, all she needed to present were the
following: (1) the original or certified true copy of her marriage contract and
one photocopy thereof; (2) a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and
Counseling Seminar, if applicable; and (3) a certified true copy of the Divorce
Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post that
has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the
concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.
In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued a
Philippine passport under her second husbands name. Should her
application for a passport be denied, the remedies available to her are
provided in Section 9 of R.A. 8239, which reads thus:
Sec. 9. Appeal. Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the
application of this Act of the implementing rules and regulations issued by
the Secretary shall have the right to appeal to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs from whose decision judicial review may be had to the Courts in due
course.
xxx
Clearly, she should have filed an appeal with the Secretary of the DFA in the
event of the denial of her application for a passport, after having complied
with the provisions of R.A. 8239. Petitioners argument that her application
cannot be said to have been either denied, cancelled or restricted by [the
DFA], so as to make her an aggrieved party entitled to appeal, as instead
she was merely told that her passport cannot be issued, does not
persuade. The law provides a direct recourse for petitioner in the event of
the denial of her application.
xxx
Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second
marriage as valid, petitioner should have filed, instead, a petition for the
judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband.
In Garcia v. Recio, we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may
be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to
the national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing personal
law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law
on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the
alien must be alleged and proven and like any other fact.
While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed
before a trial court actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief, we
are still unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by the RTC, there
appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on record of both the
national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce
decree under that national law. Hence, any declaration as to the validity of
the divorce can only be made upon her complete submission of evidence
proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alien spouse, in an
action instituted in the proper forum.
CARAM VS SEGUI
Ma. Christina and Marcelino had an amorous relationship which made Ma.
Christina pregnant. She, however, did not disclose her pregnancy to
Marcelino, as she intends to put up her child for adoption by the Sun and
Moon Home for Children to avoid placing her family in a potentially
embarrassing situation. When she gave birth to Baby Julian, it was the
adoption agency who shouldered her hospital expenses. Ma. Christina then
voluntarily surrendered her child to the DSWD by way of a Deed of a
Voluntary Commitment. The DWSD, on November 27, 2009, issued a
certificate declaring Baby Julian as Legally Available for Adoption. A local
matching conference was held where Baby Julian was matched to spouses
Vergel and Filomena.
Meantime, on November 26, 2009, Marcelino died of a heart attack. During
the wake, Ma. Christina narrated that she had a baby with Marcelino and that
she gave up the baby for adoption due to financial distress and
embarrassment. Taken aback by the revelation, Marcelinos family vowed to
help Ma. Christina to recover and raise her baby. Thus, on May 5, 2010, Ma.
Christina wrote the DWSD asking that the adoption proceedings be
suspended and that she intends to take her baby back and make her family
whole again. Also, Marcelinos brother, Noel sent a letter to the DSWD,
informing them that a DNA testing is scheduled on July 16, 2010 at the UP.
The DSWD replied to Noel that they are no longer in a position to stop the
adoption process as the procedures taken to make the baby legally available
for adoption were followed to the letter. Thus, if Ma. Christina wants to take
custody of Baby Julian, she should institute appropriate legal proceedings
herself.
Thus, Ma. Christina filed a petition for issuance of a writ of amparo, alleging
that DSWD and the other respondents blackmailed her into surrendering
custody of Baby Julian to the DSWD utilising an invalid certificate of
availability for adoption which respondents allegedly used as basis to
misrepresent that all legal requisites for adoption of the minor child had been
complied with.
After several hearings, the Regional Trial Court denied the writ of amparo,
hence Ma. Christina elevated the case to the Supreme Court on pure
question of law, the issue being whether or not the writ of amparo is a proper
remedy to recover parental custody of a minor child.
The Supreme Court:
enforced separation from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an
enforced disappearance within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to
her position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby
Julians whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWDs May
28, 2010 Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody
of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides,
she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent
DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held
in the afternoon of August 5, 2010. There is therefore, no enforced
disappearance as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and
fourth elements are missing.
Christinas directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from
her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without
complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for
adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but
asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over
him.
Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of
child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all
intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the
Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to
victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a
similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or
omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is
envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and
security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of
life.
Petition denied.
motion for reconsideration was denied, Nilo elevated the case to the
Supreme Court. He argues that the CA erred in dismissing his appeal for nonpayment of docket fees. The respondents oppose the petition because Nilo
did not file a record on appeal as mandated under Section 2(a) Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court. Nilo countered, stating that his appeal was on the order of
the RTC denying his complaint in intervention, which is not the main case,
the intestate case. Since the intervention was not an independent
proceedings but merely ancillary to the main action, the rule on multiple
appeals does not apply. The respondents argue otherwise.
The Issue:
Whether or not Nilos appeal should be given due course.
The Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in
the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect
or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such
proceedings.1 If an intervention makes a third party a litigant in the main
proceedings, his pleading-in-intervention should form part of the main case.
Accordingly, when the petitioner intervened in Special Proceedings No. SP797, his complaint-in-intervention, once admitted by the RTC, became part of
the main case, rendering any final disposition thereof subject to the rules
specifically applicable to special proceedings, including Rule 109 of the Rules
of Court, which deals with appeals in special proceedings.
Section 1 of Rule 41 enunciates the final judgment rule by providing that an
appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable. In the context of the final judgment rule,
Section 1 of Rule 109 does not limit the appealable orders and judgments in
special proceedings to the final order or judgment rendered in the main case,
but extends the remedy of appeal to other orders or dispositions that
completely determine a particular matter in the case, to wit:
Rule 109. Appeals in Special Proceedings
ground that it had been filed beyond the reglementary period; hence, the
petitioner filed hisMotion for Reconsideration against the order denying due
course.3 On July 5, 1999, the RTC issued its order whereby it conceded that
the petitioner had timely filed the notice of appeal, but still denied theMotion
for Reconsideration on the ground that he had not perfected his appeal
because of his failure to pay the appellate court docket fees.4 Hence, he filed
a Motion to Set Aside Order, to which he appended the copies of the official
receipts of the payment of the appellate court docket fees.5 Nonetheless, on
August 13, 1999, the RTC denied the Motion to Set Aside Order, and a copy of
the order of denial was received by his counsel on August 27, 1999.6
In Lebin v. Mirasol,7 the Court has discussed the justification for requiring the
record on appeal in appeals in special proceedings, viz.:
The changes and clarifications recognize that appeal is neither a natural nor
a constitutional right, but merely statutory, and the implication of its
statutory character is that the party who intends to appeal must always
comply with the procedures and rules governing appeals, or else the right of
appeal may be lost or squandered.
As the foregoing rules further indicate, a judgment or final order in special
proceedings is appealed by record on appeal. A judgment or final order
determining and terminating a particular part is usually appealable, because
it completely disposes of a particular matter in the proceeding, unless
otherwise declared by the Rules of Court. The ostensible reason for requiring
a record on appeal instead of only a notice of appeal is the multipart nature
of nearly all special proceedings, with each part susceptible of being finally
determined and terminated independently of the other parts. An appeal by
notice of appeal is a mode that envisions the elevation of the original records
to the appellate court as to thereby obstruct the trial court in its further
proceedings regarding the other parts of the case. In contrast, the record on
appeal enables the trial court to continue with the rest of the case because
the original records remain with the trial court even as it affords to the
appellate court the full opportunity to review and decide the appealed
matter.
xxxx
The elimination of the record on appeal under Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 made feasible the shortening of the period of appeal from the original 30
days to only 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order. Section 3,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, retains the original 30 days as the period for
perfecting the appeal by record on appeal to take into consideration the
need for the trial court to approve the record on appeal. Within that 30-day
period a party aggrieved by a judgment or final order issued in special
proceedings should perfect an appeal by filing both a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal in the trial court, serving a copy of the notice of appeal and
a record on appeal upon the adverse party within the period; in addition, the
appealing party shall pay within the period for taking an appeal to the clerk
of court that rendered the appealed judgment or final order the full amount
of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. A violation of these
requirements for the timely perfection of an appeal by record on appeal, or
the non-payment of the full amount of the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees to the clerk of the trial court may be a ground for the dismissal of
the appeal.8
Considering that the petitioner did not submit a record on appeal in
accordance with Section 3 of Rule 41, he did not perfect his appeal of the
judgment dismissing his intervention. As a result, the dismissal became final
and immutable. He now has no one to blame but himself. The right to appeal,
being statutory in nature, required strict compliance with the rules regulating
the exercise of the right. As such, his perfection of his appeal within the
prescribed period was mandatory and jurisdictional, and his failure to perfect
the appeal within the prescribed time rendered the judgment final and
beyond review on appeal. Indeed, we have fittingly pronounced in Lebin v.
Mirasol:
In like manner, the perfection of an appeal within the period laid down by law
is mandatory and jurisdictional, because the failure to perfect the appeal
within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court causes the judgment or final
order to become final as to preclude the appellate court from acquiring the
jurisdiction to review the judgment or final order. The failure of the
petitioners and their counsel to file the record on appeal on time rendered
the orders of the RTC final and unappealable. Thereby, the appellate court
lost the jurisdiction to review the challenged orders, and the petitioners were
precluded from assailing the orders.9
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner lost his right to appeal through his
failure to file the record on appeal, and rendered the dismissal of his
intervention final and immutable. With this outcome, we no longer need to
dwell on the denial of due course to his notice of appeal because of the late
payment of the appellate court docket fees.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on October 30, 2002 subject to the foregoing clarification on
the correct justification for the dismissal of the appeal being upon the
petitioners failure to perfect his appeal in accordance with Section 2(a) and
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay
the costs of suit.