POLITICAL LAW

RAMON A. GONZALES v. PHILIPPINES AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, et al.

429 SCRA 533 (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operators and/or management contracts, it is not
allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to
another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR can not delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata
potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been
expressly authorized to do so.
FACTS: Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, as a citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed a Petition
seeking to restrain respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) from continuing its
operations and prohibit it and its co-respondents Sports and Games Entertainment Corporation (SAGE), Best World
Gaming and Entertainment Corporation (BEST WORLD), Belle Jai-alai Corporation (BELLE) and Filipinas Gaming
Entertainment Totalizator Corporation (FILGAME)from enforcing: (1) the Grant of an Authority and Agreement for the
Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gambling executed between PAGCOR and SAGE; (2) the Grant of
Authority to Operate Computerized Bingo Games between PAGCOR and BEST WORLD; and (3) the Agreement
among
PAGCOR,
BELLE
and
FILGAME
to
conduct
jai-alai
operations.
In Del Mar v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., et al., the Court enjoined PAGCOR, BELLE, and FILGAME from
managing, maintaining and operating jai-alai games and from enforcing the agreement entered into by them for that
purpose. Then, PAGCOR et al. filed several motions for clarification, which the Supreme Court denied.
Respondents BELLE and FILGAME filed a Manifestation stating that they were impleaded in the instant petition by
reason of the agreement which they executed with PAGCOR. The said agreement was already declared invalid by
the Supreme Court. In its comment, the respondent BEST WORLD stated that it had been unable to operate its
bingo terminals and bingo games since its closure and shut down by PAGCOR and DILG.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1869, as amended (the PAGCOR Charter), is unconstitutional for
having been issued pursuant to an unlawful exercise of legislative power by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
2.
Whether or not the contracts entered into by PAGCOR with its BELLE and FILGAME are void for being
undue delegations by PAGCOR of its franchise to operate and maintain gambling casinos, sports, gaming pools and
the like
HELD:
That the P.D. 1869 has been rendered moot and academic
In assailing the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, Gonzales does not point to any inconsistency between it and the
present Constitution. Instead, it questions its issuance as an illegal exercise of legislative powers by then President
Marcos.
Indeed, while Gonzales made several poignant observations regarding the jurisprudence in the foregoing cases, the
Court is unable to accept his invitation to re-examine said cases for the simple reason that the power conferred on it
by the Constitution is limited to the adjudication of actual controversies and the determination of whether a branch or
instrumentality of the government has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Even with its expanded jurisdiction, it is beyond the powers of this Court to re-write history.

Since Gonzeles did not endeavor to show that P.D. 1869 itself is inconsistent with the Constitution, his prayer that
PAGCOR be enjoined from continuing its operations and doing acts in furtherance of its existence must necessarily
be denied.
Movants may derive some satisfaction in the knowledge that Gonzales prayer that respondents be enjoined from
enforcing the "Agreement" among PAGCOR, BELLE and FILGAME to conduct jaialai operations and the "Grant of
an Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gambling" between PAGCOR and
SAGE had been granted, albeit in the separate aforementioned cases of Del Mar and Jaworski.
That the contracts entered into by PAGCOR with BELLE and FILGAME is void
The second issue has already been raised in the Del Mar cases, this Court ruling that PAGCOR "has a valid
franchise to, but only by itself (i.e., not in association with any other person or entity) operate, maintain and/or
manage the game of jai-alai," and that, consequently, the Agreement of June 17, 1999 among PAGCOR, BELLE
and FILGAME was without force and effect.
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operators and/or management contracts, it is not allowed
under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity
such as SAGE. PAGCOR can not delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non
potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so. In Lim v.
Pacquing, the Court clarified that "since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so
operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila." By the
same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative franchise and not "ride on" PAGCORs franchise if it were to
legally operate on-line Internet gambling.

Tecson Vs. Comelec Case Digest

Tecson Vs. Comelec
424 SCRA 277
G.R. No. 161434
March 3, 2004
Facts: Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of
an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan
F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second,
even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
respondent.
Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.
Held: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and,
in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino

citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from
the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year
1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon
his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death,
such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected
in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship
to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Mercado Vs. Manzano
307 SCRA 630
G.R. No. 135083
May 26, 1999
Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of
Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner of the said election but the
proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private respondent.
Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC
granted the petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local
Government code that provides that persons who possess dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public
position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. Petitioner
sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision and declared private
respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers
proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC
and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.
Issue: Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.
Held: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres
to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is
considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of
the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries
which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the
laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of
the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship
and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of
this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession
as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
People Vs. De La Torre
380 SCRA 586
G.R. Nos. 137953-58
March 11, 2002
Facts: Wilfredo dela Torre, appellee, has three children from a common-law relationship, the eldest of which is Mary
Rose. When Mary Rose was 7 yearsold, her mother left them together with her youngest brother so she and her
other brother were left to the care of her father.
Mary Rose was the brightest in her class despite their poverty. However, in January 1997, a sudden change in Mary
Roses behavior behavior was noticed. She was twelve years old at that time. She appeared sleepy, snobbish and
she also urinated on her panty. When confronted by her head teacher, Mary Rose admitted that she was abused
repeatedly by her father. Her father, however, denied vehemently the charges being imputed to him by her daughter.
The RTC convicted appellee of two counts of acts of lasciviousness and four counts of murder. However, the RTC
refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained that there were circumstances that
mitigated the gravity of the offenses such as the absence of any actual physical violence or intimidation on the
commission of the acts, that after the mother of Mary Rose left the conjugal home, for more than five years,
Wilfredo, Mary Rose and her brother were living together as a family and Mary Rose was never molested by her
father.
The prosecution seeks to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty of death of the accused. It
argues that it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the accused, and that she was below eighteen years old
when the rapes took place. As a consequence, the trial court should have been imposed the penalty of death
pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. 7659. .
Issue: Whether or Not the Court erred in penalizing the appellee with reclusion perpetua in each of the four
indictments of rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A. 7659.
Held: Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from a judgment or
final order unless the accused will be put in double jeopardy. In People vs. Leones, it declared that:
while it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort, there are allegations of error committed by a lower court
which we ought not to look into to uphold the right of the accused. Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution
seeking to increase the penalty imposed upon the accused for this runs afoul of the right of the accused against
double jeopardyWhen the accused after conviction by the trial court did not appeal his decision, an appeal by the
government seeking to increase the penalty imposed by the trial court places the accused in double jeopardy and
should therefore be dismissed.
The ban on double jeopardy primarily prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of
harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves as a deterrent
from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State,
following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.
Being violative of the right against double jeopardy, the appeal of the prosecution cannot prosper.
Esmena Vs. Pogoy

102 SCRA 861

G.R. No. L-54110
February 20, 1981
Facts: Petitioners Esmea and Alba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of Cebu City for allegedly
forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to be given to them because
the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded Not Guilty. No trial came in after the
arraignment due to the priests request to move it on another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an order
setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal informed the court that it received a telegram stating that the complainant
was sick. The accused invoked their right to speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case because the trial
was already dragging the accused and that the priests telegram did not have a medical certificate attached to it in
order for the court to recognize the complainants reason to be valid in order to reschedule again another hearing.
After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to revive the case and attached the medical certificate of the priest proving the
fact that the priest was indeed sick of influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmea and Alba filed a motion to
dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due to complainants failure
to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy
Held: Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been
dismissed already without the consent of the accused which would have an effect of an acquittal on the case filed.
The dismissal was due to complainants incapability to present its evidence due to non appearance of the witnesses
and complainant himself which would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. For double
jeopardy to exist these three requisites should be present, that one, there is a valid complaint or information filed
second, that it is done before a court of competent jurisdiction and third, that the accused has been arraigned and
has pleaded to the complaint or information. In the case at bar, all three conditions were present, as the case filed
was grave coercion, filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last the
accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or the information. When these three conditions are
present then the acquittal, conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case without his
express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. In the case, it
was evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and asked for the trial of the case and not
its termination which would mean that respondents had no expressed consent to the dismissal of the case which
would make the case filed res judicata and has been dismissed by the competent court in order to protect the
respondents as well for their right to speedy trial which will be equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would
be a bar to further prosecution.
People Vs. Relova
149 SCRA 292
G.R. No.L-45129
March 6, 1987
FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of
Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of
double jeopardy and denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together
with personnel of Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of
Batangas to search and examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel
Opulencia. They discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city government
and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or
decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the plants electric meter. The case was dismissed on the

ground of prescription for the complaint was filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to
discovery that the act being a light felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case
was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas Ordinance
regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount
of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The
Assistant fiscals claim is that it is not double jeopardy because the first offense charged against the accused was
unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the approval and necessary authority from the City
Government which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the second
offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code making it a different crime
charged against the 1st complaint against Mr.Opulencia.
Issue: Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the second offense
charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of electricity punishable by a statute
against the Revised Penal Code.
Held: Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense because as tediously
explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of double jeopardy. The first
would be that No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense and the second
sentence states that If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another
prosecution for the same act. In the case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will
fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the
same act. It further explains that even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing that the first charge
constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the
fact that the two charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the
ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that
Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the same
identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.
People Vs. Court Of Silay
74 SCRA 248
G.R. No. L-43790
December 9, 1976
Facts: That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico who were
then scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar
canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report cards), Apparently, it was proven and shown that there was
padding of the weight of the sugar canes and that the information on the tarjetas were to be false making it appear
to be heavier than its actual weight. The three accused then were charged with Falsification by private individuals
and use of falsified document.
After the prosecution had presented, the respondent moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that
the evidences presented were not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on the motion,
respondent court issued its order dismissing the case on the ground that the acts committed by the accused do not
constituted the crime of falsification as strictly enumerated in the revised penal code defining the crime of
falsification which was charged earlier and that their case be dismissed. People asserts that the plea of double
jeopardy is not tenable even if the case at bar was dismissed because according to them, it was done with the
consent of the accused therefore waiving there defense of double jeopardy. The accused on the other hand,
reiterated the fact that the dismissal was due to lack of merits of the prosecution which would have the same effect

as an acquittal which will bar the prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust and unconstitutional
for the accused due to double jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the plaintiff.
Issue: Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico in
double jeopardy
Held: Yes the revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been
dismissed earlier due to lack of merits. It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on a motion of
the accused however this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for the evidence
beyond reasonable ground which the prosecution had not been able to do which would be tantamount to acquittal
therefore will bar the prosecution of another case. As it was stated on the requirements of a valid defense of double
jeopardy it says: That there should be a valid complaint, second would be that such complaint be filed before a
competent court and to which the accused has pleaded and that defendant was previously acquitted, convicted or
dismissed or otherwise terminated without express consent of the accused in which were all present in the case at
bar. There was indeed a valid, legitimate complaint and concern against the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico
which was filed at a competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. It was also mentioned that the accused
pleaded not guilty and during the time of trial, it was proven that the case used against the accused were not
sufficient to prove them guilty beyond reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the case which translates to acquittal.
It explained further that there are two instances when we can conclude that there is jeopardy when first is that the
ground for the dismissal of the case was due to insufficiency of evidence and second, when the proceedings have
been reasonably prolonged as to violate the right of the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites given, it was
the first on that is very much applicable to our case at bar where there was dismissal of the case due to insufficiency
of evidence which will bar the approval of the petition in the case at bar for it will constitute double jeopardy on the
part of the accused which the law despises.

Paulin Vs. Gimenez

217 SCRA 386
G.R. No. 103323
January 21, 1993
Facts: Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were smothered with dust when they were overtaken
by the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, Mabuyo followed the vehicle until the latter entered the
gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby security guard for the identity of the owner of the vehicle. Later
that day, while engaged in his duties, petitioners allegedly pointed their guns at him. Thus, he immediately ordered
his subordinate to call the police and block road to prevent the petitioners escape. Upon the arrival of the police,
petitioners put their guns down and were immediately apprehended.
A complaint grave threats was filed against the petitioners (Criminal Case No. 5204). It was dismissed by the court
acting on the motion of the petitioners. Mabuyo filed a MOR thus the dismissal was reversed. Thereafter, petitioners
filed for certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief of preliminary injunction and the issuance of a TRO (CEB9207). Petition is dismissed for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading and ordered to proceed with the trial
of the case. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue:
1.
Whether or Not the dismissal of 5204 was a judgment of acquittal.
2.

Whether or Not the judge ignored petitioners right against double jeopardy by dismissing CEB-9207.

Held: For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused.
Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused, he has deemed to have

waived his protection against double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of the
petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach.
Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The latter is always based on merit that shows that
the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not guilty. While the former, in the case at bar, terminated the
proceedings because no finding was made as to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners.
The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the order of dismissal for the reception of further evidence
by the prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and dismissed the case
without giving the prosecution the right to complete the presentation of its evidence. The rule on summary procedure
was correctly applied.
People Vs. Obsania
23 SCRA 1249
G.R. L-24447
June 29, 1968
Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He
pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the info.
Said motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the prosecution appealed.
Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy.
Held: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained in the
original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d)
defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss.
The doctrine of double jeopardy as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed with the
express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense
because his action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the
reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of
conviction against him.
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of the accused but
even upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment
against him is revived by the fiscal.
People Vs. Balisacan
17 SCRA 1119
G.R. No. L-26376
August 31, 1966
Facts: Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being arraigned, he entered
into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted y counsel. At his counsel de officio, he was allowed to present
evidence and consequently testified that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense. In addition, he stated that he
surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On the basis of the testimony of the accused, he was
acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed.
Issue: Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.

Held: The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is an essential requisite to double
jeopardy. The accused had first entered a plea of guilty but however testified that he acted in complete self-defense.
Said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a
new charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. Therefore, there
has been no standing of plea during the judgment of acquittal, so there can be no double jeopardy with respect to
the appeal herein.

Pascual Vs. BME

28 SCRA 345
G.R. No. 25018
May 26, 1969
Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners. It was
alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants
announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of
record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner
then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of
grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness stand
and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be
availed of in an administrative hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the
complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal
by respondent Board.
Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the Self-Incrimination
Clause.
Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel
the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in
accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against
himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The
constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and
his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain
silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine
will."
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that
while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be
accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human
personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is
the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens

Beltran Vs. Samson Case Digest

Beltran Vs. Samson
53 Phil 570
G.R. No. 32025
September 23, 1929

Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered
by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against
him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish
evidence against himself.

Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's
handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence
against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.

Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever
from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for
comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing
means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition
of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of
producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege,
there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a
specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot
be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not
granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it
should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it
is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason
for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may
succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the
privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.
Villaflor Vs. Summers
41 Phil 62
G.R. No. 16444
September, 1920
Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject
herself into physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the determine the crime of
adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical examination interposing the defense that
such examination was a violation of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioners constitutional rights against selfincrimination.
Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of
the accused is permissible

US Vs. Tan Teng

23 Phil 145
G.R. No. 7081
September 7, 1912
Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of
the victim and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place his private parts
over hers. Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about
what had happened and reported it to the police.
Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. He was then stripped of his clothing
and was examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a
portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science. The
results showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.
The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired came from the defendant
herein. Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged
that the said evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination.
Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendants rights against selfincrimination.
Held: The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of the said right. He was
neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was taken from his body
without his objection and was examined by competent medical authority.
The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be
the same as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence against
him.
People Vs. Acabal
226 SCRA 694
G.R. No. 103604
September 23, 1993
Facts: The accusatory portion in the information for murder. Facts are as follows:
"That sometime in the evening of the 28th of January, 1980, at Nagbinlod, Municipality of Sta. Catalina, Province of
Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, including several 'John
Does', conspiring and confederating with one another, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident
premeditation and being then armed with bolos and 'pinuti', did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously

attack, assault and use personal violence on the person of one Rizalina Apatan Silvano while the latter was about to
leave her house and inflicting upon her injuries, to wit: 'right leg amputated below the knee; left leg hacked behind
the knee; abdomen hacked with viscerae evacerated,' and did then and there set the house on fire while the
aforementioned Rizalina Apatan Silvano was inside said house trying to escape therefrom, and allowing her to be
burned inside said house which was burned to the ground, thereby causing upon said Rizalina Apatan Silvano her
death and burning her beyond recognition.
But on 16 May 1987, a fire gutted the building where Branch 37 was located and the records of these two cases
were burned. The records were subsequently reconstituted upon petition of the prosecuting fiscal. The testimonies
of the witnesses were retaken, however, before it could commence, accused Engracio Valeriano jumped bail and
the warrant for his arrest issued on 16 November 1987 was returned unserved because he could not be found. An
alias warrant for his arrest was issued on 26 June 1989, but he remains at large up to the present.
After the completion of the re-taking of the testimonies of the witnesses in Branch 37, Criminal Cases Nos. 4584 and
4585 were re-raffled to Branch 33 of the trial court, then presided over by Judge Pacifico S. Bulado.
The decision of the trial court, per Judge Pacifico S. Bulado, dated 31 October 1991 but promulgated on 20
December 1991, contained no specific dispositive portion. Its rulings are found in the last two paragraphs which
read as follows:
"The elements of murder in this case, Criminal Case No. 4585 for the killing of Rizalina Apatan-Silvano having been
proved by the prosecution beyond doubt, the accused JUANITO RISMUNDO, MACARIO ACABAL and ABUNDIO
NAHID, considering the attendant qualifying aggravating circumstances of nighttime, use of fire by burning the
house of victim Rizalina Apatan-Silvano in order to forcibly drive her out of her house and hack her to death, the
abuse of superior strength, the penalty impossable [sic] here will be in its maximum degree, that is reclusion
perpetua taking into account Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty now for murder is Reclusion
Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua, and for all the accused to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of Thirty
Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos since this case occurred [sic] in 1980. For the wounding of the victim Wilson A.
Silvano, this Court believes that simple frustrated homicide only is committed by the accused Engracio Valeriano
only.
But since the person who actually inflicted the injuries of victim Wilson Silvano, accused Engracio Valeriano only is
nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or at large, no penalty could be
imposed on him since he is beyond the jurisdiction of this court to reach. All the other two (2) accused, JUANITO
RISMUNDO and ABUNDIO NAHID are hereby ordered and declared absolved from any criminal responsibility from
frustrated homicide.
The bail bond put up by the three accused, namely: Juanito Rismundo, Macario Acabal and Abundio Nahid are
hereby ordered cancelled and let a warrant of arrest be issued for their immediate confinement."
Issue:
1.
Whether or not the judgment complied with the Rules of Court.
2.
Whether or not the cancellation of the bail bonds of the accused is valid.
3.
Whether or not the accused may be tried in absentia.
4.
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of frustrated murder.
Held: We find that the decision substantially complies with the Rules of Court on judgments as it did sentence the
accused-appellants to reclusion perpetua. A judgment of conviction shall state (a) the legal qualification of the
offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances
attending the commission, if there are any; (b) the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense,
whether as principal, accomplice or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the
civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there
is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived.
It is obvious that they clearly understood that they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 4585. Were it
otherwise, they would not have declared in open court their intention to appeal immediately after the promulgation of
the decision and would not have subsequently filed their written notice of appeal.

Accused-appellants contend that the trial court did not impose any sentence and so cannot cancel anymore their
bail bonds and direct their arrest and immediate commitment because it already lost jurisdiction over their persons
when they perfected their appeal.
The decision did impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since the order cancelling their bail bonds and directing
their arrest is contained in the decision itself, it is apparent that their abovementioned contention is highly illogical. At
the time the order in question was made, the trial court still had jurisdiction over the persons of the accusedappellants.
The trial court further erred in holding that no penalty could be imposed on accused Engracio Valeriano in Criminal
Case No. 4584 because he "is nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or
at large." The court ignored the fact that Engracio jumped bail after he had been arraigned, just before the retaking
of evidence commenced. Paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Constitution permits trial in absentia after the
accused has been arraigned provided he has been duly notified of the trial and his failure to appear thereat is
unjustified. One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for his non-appearance during the trial.
Accordingly, after the trial in absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and promulgation may be made by
simply recording the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his counsel, provided that the
notice requiring him to be present at the promulgation is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel.
In conclusion, because of reasonable doubt as to their guilt, the accused-appellants must be acquitted. Every
accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved; that presumption is solemnly guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. The contrary requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind. Short of this, it is not only the right of the accused to be freed; it is even the constitutional
duty of the court to acquit him.
People Vs. Magpalao
197 SCRA 79
G.R. No. 92415
May 14, 1991]
Facts: Eleven (11) people rode in a Ford Fiera going to Baguio. Namely they are: Felizardo Galvez, Jimmy Jetwani,
Simeon Calama, Rene Salonga, Eduardo Lopez, Adolfo Quiambao, Aliman Bara-akal, Anwar Hadji Edris, Gumanak
Ompa and defendant-appelants in this case, Omar Magpalao and Rex Magumnang.
After an hour of driving, the car stopped so that one of the passengers could urinate. While the car was stopped the
Bara-akal, Edris, Ompa, Magpalao and Magumnang pointed guns and knives at the other passengers and divested
them of their properties.
On of the robbers then ordered Galvez to drive the car towards the precipice (bangin). When the car was near the
precipice, Galvez then stepped to the brakes. The other passengers jumped out of the car and went to different
directions to escape. Galvez however, was left in side the car and was stabbed by one of the robbers. The robbers
then escaped. Quiambao, who owned the car helped Galvez to get to a hospital. Galvez died in the hospital. The
robbers were then apprehended with the exception of Edris who remain at large. Mangumnang however escaped
while being in detention and Bara-akal died inside the jail. Since Mangumnang was not arrested, the trial in absentia
continued as to him. Ompa, Magpalao, and Magumnang were all held guilty as principal by direct participation of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Issue: Whether or Not the lower court erred in failing to apply the Constitutional mandate on the presumption of
innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt when it allowed the trial in absentia to push through on the part of
defendant-appellant Magumnang.

Held: The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The reason is that the lower court has jurisdiction over
Magumnang the moment the latter was in custody. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties
but until the case is terminated. Since all the requisites of trial in absentia are complete, the court has jurisdiction
over Magumnang.
In addition, Magumnang was presumed innocent during his trial in absentia. The prosecution had strong evidence
against him as proof beyond reasonable doubt that he is a principal by direct participation in the crime of Robbery
with Homicide. Thus, the Constitutional mandate was not violated.
People Vs. Salas
143 SCRA 163
G.R. No. L-66469
July 29, 1986
Facts: At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992, a 60 year old woman, identified as Virginia Talens was
found lying dead in a canal at Bo. San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga; she was last seen alive at about 3:00 o'clock
early morning of March 6, 1992 by Orlando Pangan and Richard Pangan who were with her going home coming
from the wake of one Leonardo Flores; both Orlando and Richard Pangan testified that accused was with them in
going home at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992; Orlando and Richard Pangan reached first their
house and left the two on the way and that was the last time Virginia was seen alive; just a few minutes after
reaching his house and while inside his house, Orlando Pangan heard a shout; another woman, one Serafia
Gutierrez, testified that she likewise was awakened by a shout at about 3:00 in the morning; Dr. Aguda who
autopsied the victim found hematoma on the head and chest, an abrasion on the left chin and stabwound on the
neck which stabwound, the doctor claims, was the cause of death of the victim; Police Investigator Gonzales who
immediately responded upon report, recovered at the scene a pin, the victim's wristwatch, earring, a ring and
P135.00 money; he likewise found on March 9, 1992 when he continued his investigation bloodstain on the front
door of the house of the accused which bloodstain when submitted for examination was found to be of human
blood; one Resultay was with Virginia Talens at about 5:00 afternoon of March 5, 1992 in going to the wake, who
claims that Virginia had money on a purse as while they were on the way Virginia bet on a jueteng she saw Virginia
got money from her purse a P500.00 bill but as she had no change she instead took P8.00 from her other pocket;
one Ramil Talens, a son of the victim corroborated the claim of Resultay that Virginia had with her at that time
money worth P2,000.00 as in the morning of March 5, 1992 he gave her mother for safekeeping the sum of
P1,500.00 which he claims his mother placed in her purse and claims further that at the wake, he asked and was
given P50.00 by his mother as he also participated in the gambling thereat, however, the purse of Virginia containing
about P2,000.00 was no longer to be found when she was found dead; Orlando Pangan saw the accused gambled
in the wake; Virginia likewise gambled at the wake; accused had been working for three days before March 6 at Sta.
Ana, Pampanga and up to March 5, 1992, but the following day, he did not anymore report for work at Sta. Ana,
Pampanga, was no longer to be found and was last seen at about 3:00 morning together with Virginia Talens on
their way home coming from the wake; the parents of [the] accused were informed by Investigator Gonzales that
their son was the suspect and adviced them to surrender him, but since March 6, 1992 when accused left Mexico,
Pampanga, he returned only on September 19, 1992 at Arayat, Pampanga, not at Mexico, Pampanga where he was
ultimately apprehended by the Mexico Police on September 22, 1992 after chancing on a radio message by the
police of Arayat to their Provincial commander that a vehicular incident occurred at Arayat, Pampanga where one
Elmer Salas was the victim and was hospitalized at the district hospital at Arayat, Pampanga where he used the
name of Rommel Salas and not Elmer Salas. The trial court rendered convicting Salas for Robbery with Homicide .
Issue:
1.
Whether or Not there is evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction of the appellant of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide.
2.
Whether or Not the appellants crime homicide or robbery with homicide.
Held: There was no eyewitness or direct evidence; either to the robbery or to the homicide and none of the things
allegedly stolen were ever recovered. However, direct evidence is not the only matrix from which the trial court may
draw its findings and conclusion of culpability. Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential when to insist on direct
testimony would result in setting felons free.

For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the theory that the accused is guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other possible, rational hypothesis excepting that
of guilt. All the circumstances established must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one and fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing solely to the accused, to the exclusion of all other persons, as the author of the
crime. The facts and circumstances consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence can
constitute evidence which, in weight and probative value, may be deemed to surpass even direct evidence in its
effect on the court.
The fatal stabbing of Virginia Talens occurred at around 3:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant hastily abandoned his
house in Barrio San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga, his residence since childhood, on that very date. Appellant was
nowhere when his co-worker and barrio mate, Eduardo Bagtas, came to appellant's house to fetch him for work at
around 6:30 to 7:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant also abandoned his job as a painter in Sta. Ana, Pampanga,
on March 6, 1992, the date of the crime, leaving behind an unfinished painting project. He was not seen again from
said date. Police investigators found human bloodstains on the front door of appellant's house, on his clothing, and
on his yellow slippers after the victim was killed. Despite efforts of the police to find appellant as the principal
suspect, a fact known to appellant's family and neighbors, appellant did not present himself to the authorities.
Appellant was apprehended only a full six months after the date of the crime, following his confinement in a hospital
in Arayat, Pampanga because he was sideswiped by a Victory Liner bus in Arayat. When hospitalized, appellant
used the alias Rommel Salas, instead of his true name Elmer Salas. These circumstances denote flight, which when
unexplained, has always been considered by the courts as indicative of guilt.
Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake they attended. The victim was, in fact, enjoying a winning streak
when her son, Ramil Talens, came to fetch her but which he failed to do because his mother was winning, and she
refused to leave. The purse of Talens containing cash was gone when her corpse was found in the canal with a stab
wound and bruises. What was left was a safety pin which victim used to fasten the missing purse to her clothes.
Denial is an inherently weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit
credibility. Denial is negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimonies of
credible witnesses who positively testified that appellant was at the locus criminis and was the last person seen with
the victim alive.
The absence of evidence showing any improper motive on the part of the principal witness for the prosecution to
falsely testify against the appellant strongly tends to buttress the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and
that the testimony of said witnesses deserve full faith and credit.
The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit
himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wants to save the State the
trouble of having to effect his arrest. Spontaneity and intent to give one's self up are absent where the accused went
into hiding for six months after the incident and had to resort to an alias when he was involved in an accident being
investigated by the police authorities.
Robbery with Homicide is a special complex crime against property. Homicide is incidental to the robbery which is
the main purpose of the criminal. In charging Robbery with Homicide, the onus probandi is to establish: "(a) the
taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property belongs to
another; (c) the taking is characterized with animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason
thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in the generic sense, was committed." Although there was no witness
as to the actual robbing of the victim, there is testimony that the victim had more or less P2,000.00; and wore gold
earrings valued at P750.00. These were never recovered.
While there is indeed no direct proof that Virginia Talens was robbed at the time she was killed, we may conclude
from four circumstances that the robbery occasioned her killing: (1) Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake.
(2) The appellant knew that victim was winning. (3) The victim was last seen alive with appellant. (4) The victim's
purse containing her money and earrings were missing from her body when found.
The decision of the regional trial court is affirmed. Costs against appellant. So ordered.
Re: Request For Live Tv Of Trial Of Joseph Estrada

360 SCRA 248

A.M. No 01-4-03-Sc
June 29, 2001
Facts: The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the Court to allow live media
coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E.
Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino and, still later, by Senator
Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.
Issue: Whether or Not live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former
President Joseph E. Estrada should be permitted by the court.
Held: The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the other hand, along with the
constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race
against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not
lifted about its individual settings nor made an object of publics attention and where the conclusions reached are
induced not by any outside force or influence but only be evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting
dignity and calm ambiance is demanded.
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or
liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be
unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial, it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in
the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. It also
approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the
proceedings to the public. Nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount
right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.

People Vs. Tampal

244 SCRA 202
G.R. No. 102485
May 22, 1995
Facts: Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, Samuel Padumon, Pablito Suco, Dario Suco and
Galvino Cadling were charged of robbery with homicide and multiple serious physical injuries in the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga with Hon. Wilfredo Ochotorena as presiding judge. However, only private respondents, Luis
Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, and Samuel Padumon were arrested, while the others remained at
large.
The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero moved for
postponement due to his failure to contact the material witnesses. The case was reset without any objection from
the defense counsel. The case was called on September 20, 1991 but the prosecutor was not present. The
respondent judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case for

failure to prosecute. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsidereation, claiming that his absence was because
such date was a Muslim holiday and the office of the Provincial prosecutor was closed on that day. The motion was
denied by respondent judge.
Issue:
1.
Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of their
cases.
2.

Whether or Not the dismissal serves as a bar to reinstatement of the case.

Held: In determining the right of an accused to speedy disposition of their case, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. What are
violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial are unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an
unreasonable length of time. In the facts above, there was no showing that there was an unjust delay caused by the
prosecution, hence, the respondent judge should have given the prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its
case.
The private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. In several cases it was held that
dismissal on the grounds of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar another prosecution for
the same offense, but in this case, this does not apply, considering that the rights of the accused to a speedy trial
was not violated by the State. Therefore, the order of dismissal is annulled and the case is remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings.