(c) The armour is the core of the motorised army.

Everything
turns on it, and other formations are mere auxiliaries. The war of
attrition against the enemy armour must be therfore be waged as far
as possible by the tank destruction units. One's own armour should
only be used to deal the final blow.
(d) Reconnaissance reports must reach the commander in the
shortest possible time' he must take his decisions immediately and
put them into effect as fast as he can. Speed of reaction decides the
battle. Commanders of motorised forces must therefore operate as
near as possible to their troops, and must have the closest possible
signal communication with him.
(e) Speed of movement and the organisational cohesion of one's own
forces are decisive factors and require particular attention. Any sign
of dislocation must be dealt with as quickly as possible by
reorganisation.
(f) Concealment of intentions is of the upmost importance in order to
provide surprise for one's own operations and thus make it possible
to exploit the time taken by the enemy command to react. Deception
measures of all kinds should be encouraged, if only to make the
enemy commander uncertain and cause him to hesitate and hold
back.
(g) Once the enemy has been thoroughly beaten up, success can be
exploted by attempting to overrun and destroy major parts of his
disorginized formations. Here again, speed is everything. The
enemy must never be allowed time to reorganise. Lightning
regrouping for the pursuit and reorganisation of supplies for the
pursuing forces are essential.
Concerning the technical and organisational aspect of desert
warfare, particular regard must be paid to the following points:
(a) The prime requirements in the tank are maneuvrability, speed and
a long-range gun-for the side with the bigger gun has the longer arm
and can be the first to engage the enemy. Weight of armour cannot
make up for the lack of gun-power, as it can only be provided at the
expense of manevrability and speed, both of which are indispensable
tactical requirements.
(b) The artillery must have great range and must, above all, be
capable of great mobility and of carrying with it ammunition in large
quantities.
(c) The infantry serves only to occupy and hold postions designed
either to prevent the enemy from particular operations, or to force
him into other ones. Once this object has been achieved, the infantry
must be able to get away quickly for employement elsewhere. It
must therefore be mobile and be equipped to enable it rapidly to take

up defence postions in the open at tactically important points on the

battlefield.
It is my experience tha bold decisions give the best promise of
success, But one must differentiate between strategical or tactical
boldness and a gamble. A bold operation is one in which success is
not a certainty but which in case of failure leaves one with sufficent
forces in hand to cope with whatever situation may arise. A gamble,
on the other hand, is an operation which can lean to either victory or
to the complete destruction of one's forces. Situations can arise
where even a gamble may be justified-as, for instance, when in the
normal course of events defeat os just merely a matter of time, when