PEOPLE vs DONATO

RULING:

FACTS:

YES. Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as

amended, also provides:

> An original information which was later amended charging

the accused Salas and his co-accused with the crime of
rebellion being a member of CPP-NPA, taken arms throughout
the country against the Philippine Government for the purpose
of overthrowing the Government.
> The above-named accused in their capacities as leaders of
the aforenamed organizations, in conspiracy with, and in
support of the cause of, the organizations aforementioned,
engaged themselves in war against the forces of the
government, destroying property or committing serious
violence, and other acts in the pursuit of their unlawful
purpose.
> A day after the filing of the original information, a petition for
habeas corpus for private respondent and his co-accused was
filed with this Court was dismissed on the basis of the
agreement of the parties under which herein private
respondent "will remain in legal custody and will face trial
before the court having custody over his person" and the
warrants for the arrest of his co-accused are deemed recalled
and they shall be immediately released but shall submit
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person.
> Private respondent filed with the court below a Motion to
Quash the Information alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do
not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished.
> Respondent Judge denied the motion to quash.
> Instead of asking for a reconsideration, private respondent
filed a petition for bail.
> President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among
others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full
force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it
existed before the amendatory decrees. Thus, the original
penalty for rebellion, prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
P20,000.00, was restored.
> Respondent Judge, taking into consideration Executive
Order No. 187, granted private respondent's petition for bail.
> Unable to agree with said Order, petitioner commenced this
petition submitting therein the following issues.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion and in excess of his jurisdiction
when he granted bail to the respondents?

Bail, a matter of right : exception. All persons in custody

shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of
right, except those charged with a capital offense or an
offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and
at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of
discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To
that extent the right is absolute.
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by
reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall
be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's
discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of
guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of
guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right.
Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present
evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a
matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is
discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must
be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time,
all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court
should resolve the motion for bail.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the
presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the
prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and
circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the
accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not
the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the
accused is under bond in other case. . . .
Consequently, having agreed to remain in legal custody,
private respondent had unequivocably waived his right to
bail.
But, is such waiver valid? YES.
. . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of
any character, and, since the word "waiver" covers every
conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may

waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable
right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to
him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by
contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution,
provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are
intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of
others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege
is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy;
and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to
waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule
made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in
his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and
relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without
detriment to the community at large. . . .
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege
conferred by statute or guaranteed by constitution may be
waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not
favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes
on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or
morals and the public interest may be waived.
While it has been stated generally that all personal rights
conferred by statute and guaranteed by constitution may be
waived, it has also been said that constitutional provisions
intended to protect property may be waived, and even some of
the constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty are
subjects of waiver.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the
constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is
personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized
by law.
The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting bail to the private respondent.

LAVIDES vs CA
FACTS:
Manolet Lavides was arrested for child abuse under R.A. No.
7610 (an act providing for stronger deterrence and special
protection against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination,
providing penalties for its violation, and other purposes). His
arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an
entrapment conducted by the police. It appears that the
parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the
police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been
contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at
petitioners room at the Metropolitan Hotel. Apparently, this
was not the first time the police received reports of petitioners
activities.
When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him with
Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear,
whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement
of complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers,
which were submitted at the inquest, an information for
violation of Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed against
petitioner.
Petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate
Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful
Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse
Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be
Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on
Which He is Charged.
Nine more informations for child abuse were filed against
petitioner by the same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and
by three other minor children.
No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed
separate applications for bail in the nine cases.
TRIAL COURT: 2. The accused is entitled to bail in all the
above-entitled case. He is hereby granted the right to post bail
in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of
P800,000.00 for all the cases under the following conditions:
. A.)
B.) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail
bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited,
warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and
the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;
C.)

D.) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the
arraignment to enable this Court to immediately acquire
jurisdiction over the accused;
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him.
Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to
suspend the arraignment scheduled. He filed a motion in
which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to
P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to
his arraignment.
The trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioners motions
to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to
suspend arraignment. Accordingly, petitioner was arraigned
during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him
and then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds.
The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid
but declined to pass upon the validity of condition (d) on the
ground that the issue had become moot and academic.
Petitioner takes issue with the Court of Appeals with respect to
its treatment of condition (d) of the May 16, 1997 order of the
trial court which makes petitioners arraignment a prerequisite
to the approval of his bail bonds. His contention is that this
condition is void and that his arraignment was also invalid
because it was held pursuant to such invalid condition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the condition is void and the
arraignment invalid?
RULING:
YES. Bail should be granted before arraignment,
otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion
to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is
dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of
the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure
the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by
granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the
proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b) of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail
is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court
whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while
under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at the
arraignment is required.

To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment

between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release
on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a
motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and
thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly
undermine the accuseds constitutional right not to be put on
trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to
charge him with a crime and his right to bail.
The condition imposed in the trial courts order that the
accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he
must be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in
accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under
Rule 114, 2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear at
the trial without justification despite due notice to him or his
bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to
be present on the date specified in the notice. In such case,
trial shall proceed in absentia."
Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia
allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain
stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea,
whether of innocence or of guilt, (b) during trial whenever
necessary for identification purposes, and (c) at the
promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in
which case the accused may appear by counsel or
representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his
presence is required and cannot be waived.
IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THE ARRAIGNMENT OF
PETITIONER ON MAY 23, 1997 WAS ALSO INVALID.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the arraignment did not
emanate from the invalid condition that "approval of the bail
bonds shall be made only after the arraignment." Even without
such a condition, the arraignment of petitioner could not be
omitted. In sum, although the condition for the grant of bail to
petitioner is invalid, his arraignment and the subsequent
proceedings against him are valid.

SERAPIO vs SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner
Edward Serapio, assailing the resolutions of the Third Division of
the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for a
reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas
corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder
wherein petitioner is one of the accused together with former
President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose Jinggoy P. Estrada and
several others.
Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal
Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, nonprofit foundation established in February 2000 ostensibly for the
purpose of providing educational opportunities for the poor and
underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students, and
support to research and advance studies of young Muslim
educators and scientists.
Petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its behalf a
donation in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200
Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson.
Accused by Singson. Informations filed.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including
petitioner. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with
the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which was set
for hearing on May 4, 2001. For his part, petitioners co-accused
Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent
Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail as a matter of
right.

considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules

of Court, whatever evidence is adduced during the bail hearing
shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial.
The bail hearing did not proceed because petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the amended Information on
the grounds that as against him, the amended Information does
not allege a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
constitutive of plunder; as against him, the amended Information
does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy. By way of riposte, the prosecution
objected to the holding of bail hearing until petitioner agreed to
withdraw his motion to quash. The prosecution contended that
petitioners motion to quash the amended Information was
antithetical to his petition for bail.
He also filed a petition for Habeas Corpus.
Meanwhile, Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan
a motion praying that said court resolve his motion to fix his bail.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners
motion to quash the amended Information. The motion to fix bail
filed by Jose Jinggoy Estrada was also denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed a petition for certiorari for the
nullification of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his
motion to fix bail.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before
hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted?

During the hearing on petitioners Urgent Petition for Bail, the

prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the
accused earlier than the June 27, 2001 schedule. However,
the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the prosecution and
issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and
should be heard before petitioners arraignment and even
before the other accused filed their respective petitions for
bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the
reception of evidence on petitioners petition for bail.

(2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended

Information during the pendency of his petition for bail?

The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance

of petitioner as well as all the other accused during the hearings
on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of cross-examination.
The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to proceed with the
trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to
orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case, directed
the other accused to participate in the said bail hearing

RULINGS:

(3) Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and
those of the other accused is mandatory?
(4) Whether the People waived their right to adduce evidence in
opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner and failed to adduce
strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged?

1. NO. The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to

the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is
allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his
liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An

accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a

petition for bail.
In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before
arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from
filing a motion to quash.
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to
mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times
precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person
deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary
surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his
liberty, even before a complaint or information is filed against
him. The Courts pronouncement in Lavides should be
understood in light of the fact that the accused in said case
filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the
informations filed against him. Hence, we explained therein
that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has
to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay
his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be
resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing
the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at
once and thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine
his constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid
complaint or Information sufficient to charge him with a crime
and his right to bail.
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned
before the conduct of hearings on his application for bail. For
when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and
be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The ruling in
Lavides also implies that an application for bail in a case
involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned.
Further, if the court finds in such case that the accused is
entitled to bail because the evidence against him is not strong,
he may be granted provisional liberty even prior to
arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be authorized
under the circumstances. In fine, the Sandiganbayan
committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before
proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail.
2. YES. The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists
between an application of an accused for bail and his filing of
a motion to quash. Bail is the security given for the release of
a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as
required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of

Court. Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a

person charged with an offense until his conviction while at the
same time securing his appearance at the trial. As stated
earlier, a person may apply for bail from the moment that he is
deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary
surrender.

echo the observation of the United States Supreme Court, the

State has a stake, with every citizen, in his being afforded our
historic individual protections, including those surrounding
criminal prosecutions. About them, this Court dares not
become careless or complacent when that fashion has
become rampant over the earth.

On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the

mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on
its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the
face of the Information. An accused may file a motion to quash
the Information, as a general rule, before arraignment.

4. NO. Petitioners claim that the prosecution had refused to

present evidence to prove his guilt for purposes of his bail
application and that the Sandiganbayan has refused to grant a
hearing thereon is not borne by the records. The prosecution
did not waive, expressly or even impliedly, its right to adduce
evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. It
must be noted that the Sandiganbayan had already scheduled
the hearing dates for petitioners application for bail but the
same were reset due to pending incidents raised in several
motions filed by the parties, which incidents had to be resolved
by the court prior to the bail hearings. The bail hearing was
eventually scheduled by the Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001
but the hearing did not push through due to the filing of this
petition on June 29, 2001.

These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily

antithetical to each other. Certainly, the right of an accused
right to seek provisional liberty when charged with an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, or when charged with an offense punishable by
such penalties but after due hearing, evidence of his guilt is
found not to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the
validity of the Information charging him with such offense. It
must be conceded, however, that if a motion to quash a
criminal complaint or Information on the ground that the same
does not charge any offense is granted and the case is
dismissed and the accused is ordered released, the petition
for bail of an accused may become moot and academic.
3. NO. There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan
governing the hearings of two or more petitions for bail filed by
different accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be
heard simultaneously with the trial of the case against the
other accused. The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint
hearing of two or more petitions for bail filed by two different
accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the
trial against another accused is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. Unless grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court
will not interfere with the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its
discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the
Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the
convenience of the State, including the prosecution, but also
that of the accused and the witnesses of both the prosecution
and the accused and the right of accused to a speedy trial.
The Sandiganbayan must also consider the complexities of
the cases and of the factual and legal issues involving
petitioner and the other accused. After all, if this Court may

The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioners application

for bail is therefore not imputable solely to the Sandiganbayan
or to the prosecution. Petitioner is also partly to blame
therefor, as is evident from the following list of motions filed by
him and by the prosecution.
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution
has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. However, the determination
of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a
matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This
discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be
exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court
at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced
before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of
judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of
cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in
rebuttal.
Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention
until the Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing of his
application for bail and resolve the same in his favor.
Even then, there must first be a finding that the evidence
against petitioner is not strong before he may be granted
bail.

TEEHANKEE vs DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

FACTS:
By virtue of a resolution, Haydee Herras Teehankee, a political
detainee, be forthwith released from official custody. The
resolution upset a previous order of the fifth division of the
People's Court denying her petition for bail.
Judge Antonio Quirino, a member of said division, speaking in
the presence of newspaper reporters and for publication,
criticized this Supreme Court for allegedly "committing its
biggest blunder" because it "robbed" the People's Court of its
"inherent power" to decide cases for bail.
But the respondent, judge of a court of recent creation, hated
the beaten path. He sought to blaze a new trail. He knew so
he asserted that, as a private citizen, he had the privilege to
criticize this Court's pronouncements, in the exercise of his
constitutional privilege of free speech.
Now, realizing that little respect is due to a court that will
hesitate to check or discipline any of its attorneys or officers
who are so devoid of professional ethics, we required
respondent to answer why he should not be punished for such
contemptuous behavior.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such act of the Judge is justifiable?
RULING:
NO. Appearing in his own behalf, Judge Quirino
argued in exculpation, that, at the time he made the caustic
remarks, the Teehankee litigation was no longer pending,
because said detainee was already at liberty, under bail. The
fact remains, however, that this court had not written its fulldress decision and the dissenting opinion, as it had
announced. And Teehankee's liberty was subject always to
any adverse conclusion which this court might arrive at, in a
motion for reconsideration, if any. It may be explained at this
juncture, that the release of said detainee, pending the
promulgation of an extended opinion, was ordered in the
exercise of this court's power to make such orders as may be
necessary to expedite proceedings in special civil actions, and
to render judgment for such relief prayed for as the petitioner
is entitled to . . . . as justice requires. The Court had not yet

exhausted its power over the litigation. There was something

yet to be done in the premises, and the publication of the
criticism, aside from its strongly intemperate language, tended
to embarrass this Court in the performance of its functions. To
be specific: At the time of adopting the resolution, the majority
members made up their minds to announce in the extended
decision that, as a general rule, in cases of abuse of
discretion in the matter of bail, our judgment should be to
return the case to the People's Court with a direction for
the granting of bail; but in this particular case, in view of
the long process which the petitioner had to undergo, the
majority thought it conformable to equity and justice that
she should be bailed immediately. After the criticism had
been launched, it became a bit embarrassing for said majority
members to expound that view in the full-dress opinion,
because the public might suspect they had receded somewhat
from their stand, falsely represented as "robbing" the People's
Court of its power to grant bail. Again, the minority members
proposed to question our authority directly to grant bail. After
Judge Quirino, without waiting for their dissent, had publicly
raised the same doubt, said minority felt uneasy to appear as
taking the cue from him.

PEOPLE vs SAN DIEGO

FACTS:
In criminal case, the information charged the defendants,
Mario Henson, Rafael Gonzales, Angel Mendoza, Rogelio
Lazaro and Bienvenido Wijangco, as principals of the murder
of Jesus Lapid with the qualifying circumstances of treachery,
evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength and with
the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, aid of armed men
and craft or fraud.
The prosecution and the defense agreed that the motions
for bail of the defendants would be considered in the course of
the regular trial instead of in a summary proceeding.
In the course of the regular trial, after the prosecution had
presented eight witnesses, the trial court resolved the motions
for bail granting the same despite the objection of the
prosecution on the ground that it still had material witnesses to
present.
The orders granting bail in the amount of P50,000 for each
defendant on the ground that the evidence of guilt was not
strong must have made Fiscal Oscar Inocentes very angry
because in his motion for reconsideration of the orders
granting bail he used contumacious language for which he
was forthwith cited for contempt. Fortunately, after the fiscal
had submitted his answer and explanation, the trial judge, in a
forgiving mood, did not punish him for contempt on condition
that the contumacious words be deleted from his motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was deprived of
procedural due process?
RULING:
YES. HENCE THE QUESTIONED ORDERS ARE
NULL AND VOID
We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion
for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense
be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a
regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to

present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may

desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion
for bail.
If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil
action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity,
there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the
order of the court granting bail should be considered void on
that ground.
The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be
exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented
by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and
might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court's order
granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
The orders granting bail to the five defendants are defective in
form and substance because they do not contain a summary
of the evidence presented by the prosecution. They only
contain the court's conclusion that the evidence of guilt is not
strong. Being thus defective in form and substance, the orders
complained of cannot, also on this ground, be allowed to
stand.

OCAMPO vs BERNABE
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Eduardo Ocampo to set
aside an order issued of the People's court denying his
application for bail.
The petitioner was arrested by the Counter Intelligence Coprs
of the Armed Forces of the United States and confined in
Muntinglupa Prisons, and pursuant to Executive Order No. 6555
he was turned over to the Commonwealth of the Philippines and
later on filed with the Peoples Court his application for bail under
Act No. 682.
At the hearing of the application, the special prosecutor stated
that petitioner with having pointed out Placido Trinidad as a
guerilla to the Japanese and for that reason Placido Trinidad was
shot to death.
No evidence, however, was presented by the special
prosecutor and all that he did at the hearing was to recite the
contents of an affidavit which has no referrence to count No. 4,
and to state further that he had 27 more affidavits.
Petitioner made an objection stating that a mere recital is not a
evidence and that evidence cannot be considered strong which
has not been subjected to the test of cross-examination.
He testified in his own behalf in denying all the charges
preferred against him and stated that said charges are mere
intrigues of his political enemy Marcelo Trinidad.
Under all these circumstances, the Fourth division of the
People's Court composed of Judges Jose Bernabe, Emilio
Rilloraza and Angel Gamboa, issued an order denying the
application for bail. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not no proof was presented by the special
prosecutor to show that the evidence of guilt is strong, thus,
the People's Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
denying the application for bail?
RULING:
YES. We have held in Teehankee vs. Director of
Prisons, that all persons shall before conviction be bailable
except when charge is a capital offense and the evidence of
guilt is strong. The general rule, therefore, is that all persons,

whether charged or not yet charges, are, before their

conviction, entitled to provisional release on bail, the only
exception being where the charge is a capital offense and the
evidence of guilt is found to be strong.
At the hearing of the application for bail, the burden of showing
that the case falls within the exception is on the prosecution,
according to Rule 110, section 7.
The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong is, as stated in Teehankee case, a matter of judicial
discretion. This discretion, by the very nature of things, may
rightly be exercise only after the evidence is submitted to the
court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
weight of evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly
exhibited or produced before the court (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45
Phil., 362), it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial
discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to
the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination
and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.
Mere affidavits or recital of their contents are not sufficient
since they are mere hearsay evidence, unless the petitioner
fails to object thereto.
And this is the prevailing doctrine in the United States. In
some states of the American union, the burden of showing that
proof is evident or the presumption great, lies on the
prosecution while in others on the petitioner, but the rule
seems to be uniform to the effect that no matter which side
bears the burden of proof, the evidence of guilt should be
adduced before the court for a proper determination of its
probative force
In corpus Juris Secundum the rule is summarized as follows:
- Unless the presumption from an indictment for a capital
offense is conclusive against accused which has been
considered in section 34 b(2) (b)the determination as to
whether the proof is evident or the presumption great must, on
an original application, be determined from the evidence
adduced on the application no matter which side bears the
burden of proof. Where accused under a capital indictment
bears the burden of proof he should offer the witnesses whose
names are endorsed on the indictment, although he is not
limited to such witnesses.
- The court should hear all material and relevant evidence
offered by either party, such as the grand jury minutes, and
should consider the evidence as a whole.

Upon the hearing it is proper to require the prisoner to begin

the evidence, although it imposes upon him the necessity of
producing evidence upon which the state intended to rely for
his conviction on the final trial. But the accused will not by this
procedure be denied the opportunity of cross-examining the
people's witnesses.
The evidence for the state, as well as that for the accused,
should be presented (1) by the petitioner in an application for
bail. (2) But the petitioner, by proper procedure, may test the
probative force of the testimony for the state in order to fully
present his case for the purposes of the hearing.
Where on a motion to admit to bail after the indictment, the
evidence of the witnesses who testified before the grand jury
does not make a prima facie case against the accused, he is
entitled to bail, and it is an error to refuse bail upon the
statement of the district attorney that he has other evidence
which he will not disclose for fear of weakening the state's
case.
And this is in conformity with the former rulings of this
Court.
True that in the same case of Teehankee vs. Director of
Prisons, we said that the hearing of an application for bail
should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court.
By "summary hearing" we meant such brief and speedy
method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing
which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence for
purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court "does not sit to try
the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that
ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against accused,
nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further evidence may be therein offered and admitted."
The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the
court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as
has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of
witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount
of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to
the purpose of the hearing.
It appearing in the instant case that on the hearing of the
application for bail filed by the petitioner no proof was offered
by the prosecution to show that the evidence of guilt is strong,
the Fourth Division of the People's Court committed a grave

abuse of discretion in denying the bail applied for.

SIAZON vs JUDGE
FACTS:
At the outset it should be mentioned that the instant petition
is formally defective in that the petitioner appears to be the
State Prosecutor handling the case below instead of the
People of the Philippines, who should properly be represented
in this proceeding by the Solicitor General.
At the outset, let it be stated that after the arraignment of
the accused and before the commencement of the trial, the
applications for bail, were heard

At the hearing of the application for bail the burden of showing

that the case falls within the exception is on the prosecution,
according to Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion, which in the very
nature of things may rightly be exercised only after the
evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Neither
under the old nor under the new Rules is there any specific
provision defining what kind of hearing it should be, but in the
two cases cited at the footnote hereof it was stated that the
hearing should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of
the court.

The Court ruled and ordered a joint hearing of the cases on

the merits and of the applications for bail. On this same
occasion the Court also considered the motion filed by the
prosecution to discharge the defendant Angelico Najar.
Without any objection on the part of the defense, said motion
to discharge was granted and accused Najar was discharged
to become state witness pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court.

"By 'summary hearing,' this Court added, "we mean such brief
and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence
of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the
evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does
not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to
the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or
against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the
trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and
admitted.

As the trial progressed, with the prosecution presenting

several witnesses whose testimonies have not established
evidence directly linking the accused Escribano and Padilla to
the conspiracy alleged in the informations in these cases, the
defense filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration of the
order given in open Court ordering a joint hearing of the cases
on the merits and of the applications for bail, to which the
prosecution also filed its opposition.

The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the

court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as
has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of
witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum at the
amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not
essential to the purposes of the hearing."

The Court reconsidered its previous order and ordered that

the applications for bail be first heard to which the prosecution
gave its assent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a proceeding in an application for bail
is still summary in nature as it was under the old rule?
RULING:
YES. As a general proposition, all persons shall
before conviction be bailable except when the charge is a
capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong.

We do not see that the addition of the provision Sec. 7, Rule

114 has materially changed the nature of the hearing on a
petition for bail to the extent of depriving the Court of its
discretion to confine the evidence to the extent necessary for
the proper determination of the question of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong. The only change that has been
introduced is that such evidence shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial in order to avoid
unnecessary repetition.
The prosecution had had three months since the hearing
started until the questioned order was issued and had called
27 witnesses just to lay a sufficient corroborative basis for the
testimony of its principal witness, Angelico Najar. The plea that
this witness will reveal the names of persons who have some
knowledge of circumstances which tend to connect the two

accused with thecrimes and who presumably will also be

called to testify, and whose willingness to do so may thereby
be adversely influenced by such revelation, does not appear to
be convincing, since the record of the cases already contains
the testimony which Najar gave at the preliminary
investigation, aside from his three sworn statements consisting
of 16 pages typed single-space in question and answer form.
The proviso that any witness may be recalled at the trial for
additional examination underscores, if anything, the difference
between the hearing for purposes of the petition for bail and
the trial on the merits. This is as it should be, because one has
for its purpose, from the endpoint of the prosecution, to show
that strong evidence of guilt exists while the contemplates
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The right of the prosecution to control the quantum of
evidence and the order of presentation of the witness while not
to be disregarded, must nevertheless be equated with the
purpose of the hearing, which is to determine whether the
accused falls within the exception to the general rule that he is
constitutionally entitled to bail before conviction.
To allow the prosecution to conduct the hearing as if it were a
full-dress trial on the merits who defeat the purpose of the
proceeding.
DISPOSITIVE:
The petition is dismissed and the temporary restraining order
issued by this Court is lifted, with instructions to the
respondent Court to resume the hearing forthwith for the
presentation of Angelico Najar as witness for the prosecution,
without prejudice to said Court's allowing, in the exercise of its
discretion, the presentation of such other prosecution as it
may deem advisable, in the interest of justice.

MAMOLO vs NARISIMA
FACTS:
Criminal complaint for murder was filed against Antonio
Balagot and Ariel Acha for the murder of Daniel Mamolo,Jr., son
of complainant
After Judge Rogelio R. Narisma conducted the requisite
preliminary examination he issued the corresponding warrants of
arrest against the accused. Respondent Judge recommended no
bail since murder is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt
was strong. Acha was later arrested while Balagot surrendered to
the PC Provincial Command.
Subsequently, Balagot through counsel filed a Petition For
Admission to Bail and set the same for hearing. At the scheduled
hearing defense counsel informed the court that Balagot was ill
and asked the court to dispense with the submission of his
petition and, instead, to allow Balagot to be treated at the hospital.
MAMOLO: claims that despite the fact that respondent Judge
recommended no bail for both accused he nevertheless allowed
Balagot to put a bail of P150,000.00 without giving the
prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence to prove that
the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong.
MAMOLO: also avers that on several occasions he saw
respondent Judge and counsel for accused Balagot together and
engaged in a series of private talks at a nearby restaurant.
In his Memorandum, approved by Court Administrator Ernani
Cruz Pao, Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez found
that respondent Judge disregarded procedural due process in
granting bail to the accused. He opined that the prosecutions
waiver to present evidence ought to have prompted respondent
Judge to ask the prosecution to present its witnesses at another
date set for the purpose (of asking) clarificatory questions from
which he may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt of the
accused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not JUDGE NARISIMA ACTED
INAPPROPRIATELY IN RECOMMENDING THE BAIL FOR
BALAGOT?
RULING:

YES. The procedure of conducting a hearing on the

application for admission to bail should provide the basis for
judges to determine whether the prosecutions evidence is
weak or strong. In the case at bench, while respondent
conducted a hearing on Balagots petition for bail such
proceeding did not elicit evidence from the prosecution to
guide respondent in the proper determination of the petition.
The deferential attitude of the prosecution cannot excuse
respondents disregard of his peremptory duty. It is worthy to
note that in the resumption of the hearing in the afternoon, the
prosecution prefaced its submission with a statement of its
serious vehement objection to the petition for bail. Such
manifestation ought to have alerted respondent of the next
appropriate steps in resolving the petition. In Borinaga v.
Tamin we delineated a clear guideline on the exercise of
judicial discretion in hearing petitions for bail -x x x (w)hile the
determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion, this discretion by the nature of
things may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at such hearing. Whether the motion for
bail of an accused who is in custody in a summary proceeding
or in the course of a regular trial the prosecution must be given
an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court may
resolve the motion for bail. If the prosecution should be denied
of such an opportunity, there would be a violation of
procedural due process, and the order of the court granting
bail should be considered void on that ground x x x (E)ven
where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may
ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the
strength of the states evidence or judge the adequacy of the
amount of bail x x
The failure of respondent Judge to adhere to a basic,
fundamental procedure cannot be lightly overlooked. As
correctly perceived by OCA, this omission by respondent
constitutes gross ignorance of the law since it resulted in
depriving the prosecution the time-tested and enduring
procedural due process.
It is an oft-repeated dictum that a judge should exhibit more
than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules. For the role of judges in the administration of
justice requires a continuous study of the law and
jurisprudence. Indubitably, the industry of a judge in keeping
abreast with the law and court rulings will enhance the faith of
our people in the administration of justice since litigants will be
confidently and invariably assured that the occupants of the

bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp

of legal principles.

CORTES vs CATRAL
FACTS:
> A sworn letter complaint was filed by Flaviano Cortes
charging Judge Segundo B. Catral of the RTC with Gross
Ignorance of the Law.
> Respondent Judge as complained in particular cases,
granted bailbond in murder cases without hearing and even
reduced bailbonds but no hearing was also done.
> Respondent judge branded the complainant as a self
anointed concern who has gained notoriety as a character
assassinator, a public nuisance and most often called speaker
for hire during election time.
> The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the
dismissal of the complaint saying that there is nothing in the
allegations of the complainant that would warrant the
imposition of administrative sanction against respondent
judge.
> In recommending the dismissal of the complaint against
respondent judge, the Office of the Court Administrator noted,
complainant failed to show any indication that bad faith
motivated the actuation of the respondent in granting and
reducing the amount of bail of the accused in some of the
criminal cases that were assigned in his sala. It is crystal clear
that the increase or reduction of bail rests in the sound
discretion of the court depending upon the particular
circumstances of the case. It should be noted further that the
reduction in the amount of bail of the accused in the criminal
cases in question were all done by the respondent with the
knowledge and conformity of the Public Prosecutor concerned.
Moreover, the actions taken by the respondent were in the
exercise of judicial discretion that may not be assailed in an
administrative proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the OCA was correct?
RULING:
NO. Bail is the security required by the court and
given by the accused to ensure that the accused appears
before the proper court at the scheduled time and place to
answer the charges brought against him or her. It is awarded
to the accused to honor the presumption of innocence until his

guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to

prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior
to conviction.
Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of each
case. The amount fixed should be sufficient to ensure the
presence of the accused at the trial yet reasonable enough to
comply with the constitutional provision that bail should not be
excessive. Therefore, whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given
to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must be asked for his
recommendation because in fixing the amount of bail, the
judge is required to take into account a number of factors such
as the applicants character and reputation, forfeiture of other
bonds or whether he is a fugitive from justice.
When a person is charged with an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail is a matter
of discretion. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court states:
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when
the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal action. Consequently,
when the accused is charged with an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the judge is
mandated to conduct a hearing, whether summary or
otherwise in the discretion of the court, not only to take into
account the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, but primarily to determine the existence of
strong evidence of guilt or lack of it, against the accused.
A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of
receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is
merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of
bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or
to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be
allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further
evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course of
inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may
confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross examination.
Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an
accused charged with murder, without having conducted any
hearing as to whether the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong.

The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the determination of

whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion, It may rightly be
exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at
the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of
evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if
not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious
that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the
evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner
having the right of cross examination and to introduce
evidence in his own rebuttal.
Be that as it may, we reiterate the following duties of the
trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion,
notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of
the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt
of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court
to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on
the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19)
Otherwise petition should be denied.

PEOPLE vs TUPPAL
FACTS:
On appeal is the joint decision of the RTC, finding appellant
Saturnino Tuppal guilty of robbery with homicide and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
Appellant remained at large for almost nine (9) years after
the filing of the aforesaid cases. It was only on March 5, 1998
that appellant was arrested in Cainta, Rizal and in connection
with another case for robbery.
Appellant was arraigned. Assisted by counsel, he pleaded
not guilty to the charges. The cases were then consolidated
and trial ensued.
The prosecutions evidence established that:
On the evening of December 22, 1989, the spouses
Bonifacio and Florfina Solito and their four-year-old child,
Efren, attended the wedding of Florfinas younger sister, Loida
Atuan, at Barangay Banguro, Reina Mercedes, Isabela. At
about 11:30 P.M., the Solitos accompanied by Bartolo Atuan,
Jr., Florfinas 26-year-old brother, left the wedding reception.
They had barely traveled some 300 meters away and were in
front of the house of Felix Sacang, when they were waylaid by
appellant and his four companions, now the co-accused.After
Ben Tuppal announced a heist, Danilo Tuppal immediately ran
off with Florfinas handbag containing P2,500.00 in cash.
Appellant then shot Florfina with a short firearm, hitting her in
the abdomen. Bartolo Atuan, Jr., tried to shield Florfina from
further harm but Marcelo Tuppal then shot Bartolo, killing him
on the spot.
Florfina took advantage of the situation and scurried
towards a nearby banana plantation. The malefactors gave
pursuit and continued to fire at her hitting her further at the
buttocks and in the arm. She pretended to be dead and fell to
the ground. The ploy worked because she heard accused
Pedro Tuppal say, Let us go, she is already dead.
In the meantime, upon hearing the gunshots, Bonifacio
Solito and his son Efren scampered towards the house of Felix
Sacang. Co-accused Ben Tuppal ran after both father and
son. He aimed the gun at them, but the gun jammed and did
not fire.
In the present cases, appellant raised the defense of denial
and alibi.

CRIMPRO ISSUE:

appellant and his brothers as the malefactors.

Whether or not the fact that the trial court had held
during the bail hearing that the prosecution evidence was
weak, it is estopped from rendering a contrary ruling after the
trial?

Appellants defense of alibi is untenable.

RULING:
NO. Said findings should not be construed as an
immutable evaluation of the prosecutions evidence.
It is settled that the assessment of the prosecution evidence
presented during bail hearings in capital offenses is
preliminary and intended only for the purpose of granting or
denying applications for the provisional release of the
accused.
OTHER ISSUES:
Whether or not the evidence now on record is sufficient to hold
appellant Saturnino Tuppal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery with homicide? YES
The court a quo found the prosecutions evidence credible.
It disbelieved appellants bare denials. Eyewitness Florfina
Solitos testimony on the hold-up incident was replete with
material details. She testified that after being shot in the
abdomen, she grappled with appellant for possession of the
gun. Meanwhile, co-accused Danilo Tuppal dashed off with
her bag and its contents, according to her. She also described
the firearm used in shooting her and killing her brother. These
details could not have sprung from her imagination, but only
from her vivid recollection of the fatal incident implicating the

Whether or not the conspiracy among the accused was

established? YES
After accused Ben Tuppal announced the hold-up, coaccused Danilo Tuppal took Florfinas handbag containing
P2,500.00. Appellant Saturnino Tuppal then shot Florfina with
a handgun, hitting her on the left side of her abdomen.
Their concerted action shows their unity of purpose to rob
the victim, at all cost. These concerted acts of appellant and
his co-accused manifestly disclose concurrence of wills, unity
of action, joint purpose and common design. Hence, although
appellant did not himself shoot Bartolo Atuan, Jr., he is still
liable for Bartolos death as principal because the existence of
conspiracy makes the act of one the act of all.
The charges against appellant and his co-accused,
constitute only one special indivisible or composite crime as
defined in Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
The prosecution amply established the following elements
of robbery with homicide: (a) the taking of personal property is
perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a
person, (b) the property taken belongs to another, (c) the
taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi,
and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof,
the crime of homicide, in its generic sense, is committed.