Gonzales vs. Abaya GR No.

164007 August 10,

2006
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
FACTS:
On July 27, 2003, more than 300 officer of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), led by Navy
Lt. Antonio Trillanes IV, entered the Oakwood
Premier Luxury Apartments, disarmed the guards,
and planted explosives around the building.
Through media, they announced their grievances
against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos government and
demanded that she along with her cabinet
members and the top brass of the AFP and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) resign.
President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427,
declaring a state of rebellion, and General Order
No. 4, which called upon the PNP and AFP to
suppress the rebellion taking place in Makati. The
government also sent negotiators to dialogue with
the soldiers, in order to prevent a bloody
confrontation.
After several hours of confrontation, the negotiators
succeeded and the soldiers laid down their arms
and defused the explosives around the premises. A
total of 321 soldiers were surrendered to the
authorities.

Instead of filing their answer to Colonel Magnos

charge, the petitioners filed with the Supreme Court
a Petition for Prohibition, praying that the
respondents desist from charging them with a
violation of Article 98 of the Articles of War. They
cited the RTCs determination that the offense for
violation of Article 98 is not service-connected, but
is absorbed in the crime of coup detat, hence, the
military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its
jurisdiction.
The petitioners also claim that the offense charged
against them before the General Court Martial has
already prescribed. They claim that, almost two
years after the incident, only Lt. Trillanes was
arraigned. They claimed that the offense prescribed
on July 25, 2005.
The respondents counter, under R.A. No. 7055, the
offense
charged
against
them
(conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) is serviceconnected and properly cognizable by the court
martial. They further assert that, contrary to the
petitioners claim, the accused were duly arraigned
on July 13 and 18, 2005.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to
the writ of prohibition.
HELD:

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the

Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) respectively recommended that those
involved be charged with coup detat, and the filing
of the corresponding information against them.
General Narciso Abaya, herein respondent, also
ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers and
directed AFP to conduct their separate investigation
regarding it.
The accused in the criminal case filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), invoking Republic Act
(RA) No. 7055, prayed that the trial court also
assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with
the military tribunal.
However, Colonel Julius A. Magno, the officer-incharge of the Judge Advocate Generals Office
(JAGO) recommended that 29 of the officers
involved in the incident, including the herein
petitioners, be prosecuted before the general court
martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of
War. On June 27, 2004, Colonel Magnos
recommendation was approved.

NO, the petitioners are not entitled to the writ of

prohibition.
Article 2 of the Articles of War (C.A. No. 408)
provides that all officers and soldiers in the active
service of the AFP are subject to military law.
On the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055
provides the general rule that those persons
subject to military law who commit crimes or
offenses punishable under the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), other special laws, and other government
ordinances, shall be tried by the proper court. The
law provides for the sole exception that serviceconnected offenses shall be tried by the court
martial. The law also provides, as an exception to
the exception, that the President, in the interest of
justice, may order or direct, at any time before
arraignment, that any such crimes or offenses be
tried by the proper civil courts.
The law specified the term service-oriented
crimes in the following paragraph, stating that

these service-oriented crimes are limited to those

defined in Article 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and
Articles 95 to 98. This delineation is necessary in
order to preserve the peculiar nature of the military
justice system over military personnel.
The Court ruled that the offense for the violation of
Article 96, or conducting unbecoming an officer and
a gentleman, is indeed service-connected. They
emphasized the wordings used in the Information
filed against them i.e., their alleged violation of
their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution and that their behavior allegedly
caused dishonor and disrespect to the military
profession was indicative of the of the serviceconnected nature of the offense, as it has a
bearing on their professional conduct or behavior
as military officers. Also, the penalty prescribed for
the offense that is, dismissal from the service is
also indicative of the same.
The Court also ruled that they cannot sustain the
RTCs declaration that the offense is not serviceconnected, but rather absorbed in the furtherance
of the alleged crime of coup detat, as it practically
amended the law. As such, the declaration made by
the RTC is void.
Hence, as the offense for the violation of Article 96
of the Articles of War is clearly service-connected
and cognizable under the military court, their
petition for prohibition must fail.
CONCURRING OPINION: (Callejo, Sr., J.)
Common crimes committed in furtherance of a
political crime, such as rebellion and coup detat,
are therein absorbed. Being part and parcel of the
political crime, the common crime acquires the
political character of the latter, hence, cannot be
punished separately from the principal offense or
complexed with the same to justify the imposition of
the grave penalty. While the principle of absorption
applies to crimes defined and penalized by special
laws, that rule does not apply to crimes which, by
statutory fiat, are sui generis, like those punished
under the Articles of War.

However, it must be emphasized that not all

service-connected punitive acts under the Articles
of War may be prosecuted before the courts-marital
independently of the crime penalized under the
RPC against the same accused before the same
set of acts. The Congress may criminalize a
service-connected punitive offense under the
Articles of War, such as what they did when the
crime of coup detat was incorporated in the
Revised Penal Code precisely to criminalize mutiny.
Without Article 134-A, they would only be charged
and penalized for mutiny under Article 67 of the
Articles of War
SEPARATE
OPINION
Dissenting): (Tinga, J.)

(Concurring

and

R.A. No. 7055 generally restored civil jurisdiction

over offenses involving members of the AFP.
Justice Tinga is of the position that the broad
propositions adopted by the majority practically
render inutile the intent of the law that is, the
restoration of civilian supremacy of the military.
Justice Tinga reasoned that the R.A. No. 7055
precisely authorizes the civil court to independently
determine whether the offense in the information
before it is actually service-connected. It is
therefore for the trial courts to determine, before
arraignment, whether or not the offense is serviceconnected. If the trial court does determine that the
offense is not service-connected, the military court
will have no jurisdiction over the acts constituting
the offense.
His concurrence is based on the peculiar nature of
Article 96 of the Articles of War. Not only does
Article 96embody a rule uniquely military in nature,
it also prescribes a penalty wholly administrative in
character, which the civilian courts are incapable of
rendering. For that reason alone, Justice Tinga
concurred that the petitioners should be made to
face the civilian trial, as well as the courts-martial,
for their crimes. However, had the petitioners faced
other charges instead of the sole Article 96 charge,
he would have voted to grant their petition.