1.0 Poseidon Perspective January 2010


THE POSEIDON PERSPECTIVE
… sound navigation through perilous cross‐currents …

30 January 2010

Dear Investor,
Year 2009 leaving the lingering thoughts from the Euro‐American axis, there will be
that much more needs to be done to no Eastern “coat‐tails” for the West to ride
resolve the US economic morass. As the upon. The furious growth in China
great rally in financial asset prices begins continues to benefit its Asian satellites and
to taper off, we note that the balance of large commodity‐producing countries.
economic power is now shifting from the Declining consumption in America means
West to the East. However, the emerging that global readjustment will continue.
economies are not of sufficient size or Meanwhile, securities’ markets worldwide
strength to pull the sagging West from a have shown a year of outstanding
continuing slump. While there may be a appreciation. Private equity was the sole
partial economic “de‐coupling” of Asia “loser” in 2009.

TABLE A A WORLD OF ASSET RETURNS
Index 2009 3 Years 5 Years 7 Years 10 Years 12 Years 15 Years
DJ Composite 15.6% (4.70)% 0.99% 5.98% 1.05% 2.64% 7.10%
S&P 500 23.5% (7.70)% (1.65)% 3.44% (2.72)% 1.17% 6.09%
US Bonds 7.03% 6.41% 5.21% 4.99% 6.54% NA NA
Dow REIT 20.9% (16.8)% (4.51)% 3.49% 4.58% NA NA
CRB Index 23.5% (2.66)% 0.00% 2.74% 3.33% 1.79% 1.21%
MSCI – EAFE 27.2% (8.27)% 0.77% NA 2.32% NA NA
MSCI ‐ EM 72.0% 2.27% 12.7% NA 5.75% NA NA
Global Bonds 5.97% 7.06% 5.14% 5.60% 6.47% 6.08% 6.85%
Private Equity (7.60)% 1.80% 7.99% NA 7.60% NA NA
Gold 24.0% 19.8% 20.1% 17.8% 14.3% 11.7% 7.26%
Note: Source for US Bond and Global Bond returns is Barclays Capital Composites (formerly Lehmann Bros. Aggregate).
Private Equity is from State Street Advisors Index which incorporates 1,650 partnerships, valued at $1.5 trillion. Private
Equity returns are measured as annual IRR thru Sept 30 for each period; other multi‐year figures are compound annual rates
of return.

We have noted various returns of many Table A. This presents an amazing mosaic.
asset classes over the past fifteen years in Year 2009, alone, was a time of financial
THE POSEIDON PERSPECTIVE 30 January 2010
crisis, economic recession, market collapse, REIT performed much more like an equity
and sudden surge in asset prices. Our investment than an inflation‐indexed bond
choice of indexes is an attempt to display or long‐term investment in “bricks and
an array of investment options. At the mortar.” Since 2007 this relationship
same time we have attempted to reveal appears to have a close correlation of risk.
some historic perspective. This may continue but credit de‐leveraging
will bring a cleansing of balance sheets in
We review a few of the asset classes in commercial real estate and, thus, weed out
more detail. One area of interest is shown marginal players and properties.
in Chart 1. Beginning in 2004 real estate Eventually inflation will return to support
investment trusts as indicated by the Dow real estate pricing and returns.

CHART 1 FOLLOWING THE DOWS

Source: PSI; StockCharts

Chart 2 shows the VIX, Wall Street’s fear appears to feed on itself. As the S&P 500
gauge, with an underlay of the S&P 500. has surged from its low in March 2009
We believe that the need for equity many institutional investors are very wary
portfolio insurance will continue to exhibit of the continued appreciation without
periods of rising concern throughout 2010. some period of serious correction. After
The VIX has been at historically high levels providing horrendous returns over a ten
since 2007; this continuing volatility year period which included two bubbles,
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those investors who purchased during the markets, as seen in Table A, during the
lows of 2008‐09 may look to take some past 10 years has supported the need for
profits at tax‐favorable, long‐term gains. prudent timing and selection in all
investment arenas. We believe that the
Sudden, explosive gains off the March 2009 securities’ markets in 2010 and going
low, continuing volatility, and economic forward will be dominated on a global
uncertainty should encourage investors to basis by supply/demand disconnects,
lower their allocation to equities. One continuing credit concerns, and political
conclusion we draw from the above responses to perceived crisis. A
returns is the old adage that “you make fundamental driver of volatility and
your money in the buying.” Thus, if one is returns will be government fiscal policies,
committed to a “buy and hold strategy” for international currency adjustments, and
equities, the timing of purchase(s) is of central bank monetary surprises.
great importance. The volatility of

CHART 2 CONTINUING JITTERS


The emerging markets’ return, MSCI‐EM, growth story. Asia in general has suffered
in 2009 was quite phenomenal. We view much less than the developed economies
this as a sharp return to high risk trading during the housing and credit crisis.
and the strength of China’s continuing China, in particular, acted quickly and
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aggressively to support continued has also supported the commodity markets
economic growth thru major fiscal for over a decade; the question is how
stimulus and tight currency and capital much longer will this continue. China may
controls. As seen in Chart 3 monetary and be in the midst of a huge housing, equity,
fiscal policy have provided the stimulus and credit bubble but right now much of
for resurgence in the Chinese equity the risk‐taking worldwide is riding on the
market as represented by the Shanghai upward path of the “dragon.”
Stock Exchange (SSEC). Chinese demand

CHART 3 THE EASTERN BAROMETER


In the US we view 2010 as a period of commercial real estate; and 4) world events
continued economic adjustment and an including sovereign default, political
end to aggressive risk‐taking. We note upheaval, and economic conflict. This
four dynamics which will put severe does not portend global collapse; this will
pressure on both stock and bond be a strategic retreat to those currencies
valuations. They are 1) continued high and securities which provide the specter of
unemployment; 2) continuing lower‐risk and real returns.
deterioration in the housing market with
increasing foreclosures and reduced A major concern of many market
valuations; 3) a severe dislocation in participants going forward is the end of
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the Fed’s “quantitative easing.” The Tobin’s q ratio measures the price of
engine of recovery in the US has been equities in comparison to the replacement
credit growth and even with the huge value to the assets. Justification for these
increase in bank reserves the economic valuation methodologies is based upon
recovery in the US has been feeble. There “Valuing Wall Street” by Smithers and
is underlying fear that when “quantitative Wright (2000). In a unique approach to his
easing” is withdrawn there may be a research Napier read “every copy of the
sudden collapse in demand for a multitude Wall Street Journal for two months before
of securities; thus, generating a global and two months after each bottom, which
retrenchment of risk‐taking. comes to 16 months of bear market
bottoms and about 70,000 articles in the
SOUNDINGS Wall Street Journal.”
In April 2009 Russell Napier, author of
“Anatomy of the Bear: Lessons from Wall Napier states that if there is one strategic
Street’s Four Great Bottoms,” gave a conclusion from his book “it is that all bear
presentation at the CFA Institute Annual markets are driven by disturbances to the
Conference. This was subsequently general price level, whether it is inflation
published in the Institute’s “Conference or deflation.” He also notes that valuation
Proceedings Quarterly” under the title, peaks result from the same illusion that
“Identifying Market Inflection Points.” We there is a “new economy” which embodies
would like to relate some of the more “low inflation and high growth.” While
pertinent points which Napier addresses the price disturbance which instigates a
with regard to current equity markets. His bear market is usually inflation, they
historical perspective is important because “usually end with deflation or deflationary
current financial analysis rarely goes risk as central banks finally overreact to
beyond the recent quarter or “year over inflation.” We believe that it is very
year” comparables. Napier’s examination important to note the crippling effect that
of the stunning market bottoms in August deflation can have on equities. The
1921, July 1932, June 1949, and August expectation of falling prices can quickly
1982 are the basis for his book since he destroy the return on assets which
believes that at the bottom the market themselves are falling in value. Thus, a
proves to be most interesting. The bottom company’s cash‐flow begins to recede at
area also provides the most attractive the same time that its fixed costs, especially
potential for investment returns. Napier debt burden, remains the same, equity
valued each market bottom according to its values are extinguished under the
cyclically adjusted price‐to‐earnings discounting of future returns. Importantly,
(CAPE) ratio and Tobin’s q ratio. CAPE is Napier summarizes his findings that the
a measure of the price of equities relative bottom in a deflationary‐induced bear
to 10 years of rolling average earnings and market reveals the following:
 Inventory in the system is low;
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 Commodity prices start to stabilize;  A significant short‐term rally in the
 Demand goes up at lower prices, equities market is likely. Investors
particularly for luxury goods or goods should watch corporate bonds,
in structural demand; commodities (particularly copper), and
 Certainty on general price levels and TIPS as indicators of equity market
valuations increases; and changes.
 Corporate bonds rally  The final stage of the equity bear
Given these historical factors we can market will be driven by a bear market
surmise that the market low in March 2009 in Treasuries.”
was a “bottom.” Commodity prices
bottomed with equities and both have now We take these conclusions under serious
recovered. Prices levels as measured by consideration as we look forward to equity
TIPS/Treasuries differential are rising. market performance during 2010 and
Two years ago TIPS were forecasting beyond. When Napier’s presentation was
deflation and now indicate a move to delivered the S&P 500 was priced at 857.
inflation expectations. Finally, corporate Thus a 50% decline would leave the S&P at
bonds which are a very good indicator of a a level around 430. We consider a drop to
market bottom, have rallied. this level a very low‐probability event.
Yet, a severe correction to the 700‐800 level
However, the Napier alerts us to some is much more realistic. We concur with the
evidence that the most recent market premise that prolonged deflation is
bottom, March 2009, may not be the final unlikely but we see continuing deflation
bottom. He notes short‐position indicators until bank reserves with the Fed are
and trading volume. He believes that the unwound in a new gyration of credit. We
most important factors which denote that a have seen a market rally of great strength;
final bottom has not been made are overall we must now watch for the correction.
volume statistics and turnover ratios. His Finally, we are watching Treasury
reading on these technical measures securities closely as we also believe, as
indicates that we have not arrived at an Napier, that a bear market in Treasuries
equity market bottom. Based upon his may ignite a grand sell‐off in equities.
studies and perceptions of current
conditions, Napier concludes: Given past occurrences and historical
 “To reach the record lows of 1921, 1932, postulates market‐timing is always a
1949, and 1982, US equities will have to critical issue. As we have seen with the
fall by 50 percent from their current housing crisis economic avalanches may
levels. take longer than expected to run their full
 Deflation produces record low equity course. Chart 4 exhibits twenty years of
valuations, but prolonged deflation in the Dow Jones Industrial Average which
today’s economy remains unlikely. encapsulates two bubbles, deflation,
reflation, and eventual recovery. Chart 4
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includes two of the bear market lows, 1921 and 1932, which Napier has studied.

CHART 4 TWO DECADES OF RECOVERY

Source: StockCharts
As Napier noted copper is a well‐known 2004 when the world recognized the strong
proxy for economic development. Until development in BRIC emerging markets
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copper was dormant. This commodity like longer this demand will push the pricing
many others is currently driven by Chinese of base metals.
demand. A key question is how much

CHART 5 DR COPPER, THE INDUSTRIAL INDICATOR


However, the recent rise of the Yen untimely and unfortunate escalation in
demands that we revisit the Japanese value of the Japanese currency. We await
experience over the past twenty years. In the massive devaluation of the Yen in
Chart 6 the Nikkei Index of Japanese order for Japan to become much more
equities is shown with a currency competitive in an economic recovery under
underlay. While correlation is not Asian and Chinese dominance. Great
causation the sudden rise in the Yen as the import must be given to the recent
market collapsed in 1990‐1995 is notable. downgrade of Japanese sovereign debt to
This experience is not lost on the AA by Standard & Poor’s. The world’s
mandarins in China who are very second largest economy and largest
concerned about the impact of currency national debt load as percent of GDP will
appreciation on their export‐led economy. have serious reverberations. We believe
There is a strong current within China that that Japan may provide clues to the final
believes the crash of Japanese stocks and resolution of the US credit crisis. As the
the “lost decade” coincided with an currency and bond markets adjust to these
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dynamics we believe 2010 will be a equity markets.
tumultuous time for Asian currency and

CHART 6 TWO DECADES WITHOUT RECOVERY

Source: StockCharts

WEATHER WATCH countering those who claim “that
On January 3, 2010 Chairman Bernanke excessively easy monetary policy by the
utilized his status, reputation, and Federal Reserve in the first half of the
academic brilliance to crush any suspicions decade helped cause a bubble in house
that the monetary policy of the Federal prices in the United States.” Bernanke
Reserve was to blame for the housing mentions the recession of 2001 which he
bubble and subsequent credit crisis which admits was caused by the market collapse
has triggered global repercussions. His of the “dot‐com boom” without any
speech, “Monetary Policy and the Housing reference to monetary policy or margin
Bubble” requirements which is also a Fed bailiwick.
(www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/spee He reviews the reasons for aggressive
ch/bernanke) was a masterful discourse on monetary policy of low rates from 2001
the power of positive thinking and until 2004 and the raising of rates with
statistical persuasion. He readily admits clearly‐signaled “forward guidance.” The
that there was a lapse in regulation and justifications which include
oversight. However, he persists in unemployment fears and deflation
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expectations are clearly outlined. To defined by Wikipedia this type of model is
evaluate the decision‐making process in “used to capture the evolution and
tightening or easing of rates Bernanke interdependencies between multiple times
launches into an extensive discussion and series, generalizing the univariate AR
detailed critique of the “Taylor Rule.” [autoregression] models. All the variables
Thus, the policy decision of a committee of in a VAR are treated symmetrically by
thoughtful, brilliant economists is distilled including for each variable an equation
into a simple but always changing explaining its evolution based upon its
algorithm. Regarding one of the ten charts own lags and the lags of all the other
provided in the Attachments, the variables in the model.” The inherent
Chairman concedes that “the validity of irony is that Value at Risk (VAR) models
that conclusion depends on whether which are based upon AR models were the
specific assumptions and measurements risk management tools at many large
used to construct the Taylor rule’s policy banks which proved to be of small value
prescription are appropriate.” This need when the credit markets destroyed Bear
for proper assumptions is then extended to Stearns and Lehman Brothers.
CPI data and inflation, current values and
forecasting values, temporary expectations We will not attempt to dispute the findings
and lasting expectations. Of course, he of the highly respected Fed staff other than
mentions the “lag.” Then, he moves on to to note a) increasing the number of
more quantitative implications. We note variables in a regression increases the
that Bernanke must revert to research done overall ability of the regression to explain
by staff at the St. Louis Fed because the the relationship but may weaken the
Philadelphia Fed’s “Greenbook”, the significance some variables; b) there are
economic forecasts used by the FOMC, is “data mining” issues with this quantitative
released to the public with a five‐year lag. “proof”; c) there have been serious
This reversion to alternative data comes refutations to VAR analysis. We refer to
from the same man who committed to Bank of England Paper 18 “Vector Analysis
making the Fed more transparent. and the Great Moderation” by Benati and
Surico
Having refuted one closely‐watched policy (www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/e
mandate, Bernanke moves to other reasons xternalmpcpapers/extmpcpaper0018.pdf)
for the “run‐up” in housing prices. The which examines the analysis of the “US
foregone conclusion is that the magnitude Great Moderation” based on VAR
of price increases could not have been methods. At one point they conclude:
caused wholly or solely by monetary “These figures cast serious doubts on the
policy. At this point he brings in the heavy presumption that changes in the systematic
artillery of econometric modeling. The Fed component of monetary policy should
staff used “vector autoregression” models manifest themselves mostly as changes in
which incorporate seven variables. As the VAR coefficients. On the basis of this
Page 10
presumption, results from earlier while showing great dexterity at
contributions have been interpreted developing “vector auto regression”
according to the notion that strong analysis, could not see the housing bubble
evidence of breaks in the VAR innovation as it rapidly inflated from 2003 thru 2006.
variances, coupled with weak or no We are now expected to believe that their
evidence of breaks in the VAR coefficients, statistical gymnastics can substantiate that
is evidence against policy and in favour of the extended period of easy monetary
luck.” policy was in no way responsible for a
disastrous bubble and its tragic
Chairman Bernanke then rattles along unwinding.
about the effect of innovations in housing
finance including alternative mortgage We cannot accept his explanation. We
products and securitization. In this case he believe that the tremendous leverage
agrees that these products are “likely a key created by banks, both on and off their
explanation of the housing bubble.” balance sheets, was a key factor in
Chairman Bernanke examines development, securitization, and
international housing bubbles with dissemination of alternative mortgage
complex statistical measures to explain products. The great leverage was a result
away any relation between Fed monetary not only lax regulation but also extremely
policy and the US bubble. At this point his accommodative monetary policy. Our
arguments begin to reek of desperation, for contention is that Chairman Bernanke
now he pulls out his famous “savings glut” cloaked in his arrogant brilliance has
hypothesis. We are among the group who learned nothing from the crippling crisis
dispute this explanation for massive US and continuing recession. His
deficits as a result of Chinese savings. reappointment heralds a return to business
However, that is not the point. Of the as usual for the money‐center and
nations cited by the Chairman, most if not multinational banks which, in turn, will
all, did not have the complex and result in continuing market volatility,
sophisticated financials products and currency gyrations, and unconventional
secondary markets which the US banks government intervention in markets.
and “shadow” banks so adroitly exploited.
The global housing bubble was the result We present in Chart 8 an updated version
of excessive credit expansion. It was the of a common Shiller chart of housing
direct result of lax central banking not only prices, the top and the demise. Whatever
in the US but across the globe. Yet, the explanations for this surrealistic asset
Chairman Bernanke and the Fed staff bubble, its unwinding will have a long and
“modelers” are the same people who, deleterious impact on the US economy.

Page 11

CHART 8 HOUSING PRICE PEAK

Source: www.ritholtz.com/blog

Finally, we would like to note two major Secondly, in January 2010 Tishman Speyer
real estate dislocations during the past reneged on scheduled debt payments and
year. The first was the bankruptcy in April thus, ceded control of the Peter Cooper
2009 of General Growth Properties, a retail Village and Stuyvesant Town properties
mall developer and owner with debt of which include over 11,000 apartment units
$27.3 billion much of it taken on to in Manhattan. The result was a complete
accommodate the $11.3 billion acquisition loss of equity investment and, most
of Rouse Company in 2004. This leverage probably, all mezzanine investment. This
was provided during a time of very mortgage default is one part of Tishman’s
accommodating monetary policy complex senior debt of $4.45 billion and
promulgated by the Fed. mezzanine financing of $1.45 billion. The
problem was huge leverage undertaken on
the original transaction price of $5.4 billion
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which in November 2006 was the biggest The fiscal deficit in 2009 required over $1.5
residential deal in New York history. The trillion of new debt; foreign purchases
largest holders of the senior tranche subsumed about $300 billion, China alone
mortgage‐backed securities funding the taking $100 billion of this amount. The Fed
deal are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. was the buyer of the rest both directly and
Tishman invested only $56 million of it indirectly as they purchased both
own money to purchase the properties Treasuries and Agency mortgage (ie
Fannie and Freddie) debt, mostly 30‐year.
Once again we believe that monetary The sellers of that debt, such as Pimco,
policy is creating unintended then used the proceeds to purchase
consequences. The Fed’s FOMC has held Treasuries. Given this scenario we find it
the target funds rate close to zero for an hard to conceive of any Fed “exit” during
extended period. One day this will 2010. Who could absorb the immense
change. Chart 7 shows the current yield quantity of debt to be issued by the US
for 10‐year and 2‐year Treasuries. These Treasury as the government deficits
are reflective of Fed policy but fiscal policy continue to climb?
may bring their pricing power to a halt.

CHART 7 WHEN THE TIDE TURNS


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Meanwhile, the US economy is suffering a in both developed and emerging markets.
deceptive bout of deflation which the Fed In fact, we believe that up to 50% of any
continues to battle with its unprecedented equity allocation should be in markets
“quantitative easing” (i.e. money creation). outside the US. We prefer the
As Napier pointed out above, we believe uncompromised financial strength of large
this money creation will, in the next few multinationals in any given sector. Our
years, spiral rapidly into massive price mission during the tribulations of 2010 will
inflation. This will cause an interest rate be to undertake equity investments on a
escalation which the Fed will not be able to cost‐averaging basis. As we noted in Table
manage without even more drastic and A the past decade of poor equity returns
wildly unconventional practices. should provide an opening for future
equity returns when investment is
PROVISIONING undertaken at proper valuations. Patience
Going forward asset allocation demands is key!
careful timing, sector analysis, and security
selection on a global basis. While we find Over the years analysts have been
US equity markets to be overvalued by as hopelessly over‐optimistic in earnings
much as 20%, this equity price premium estimates for the S&P 500 and we expect
may increase as earnings are reported 2010 to be no different. Thus, we highly
during the first half of 2010. However, recommend buying only on weakness. We
opportunities will eventually arise with expect intermediate term deflation,
market corrections. We are prepared to strengthening of the US$, and some
capitalize on our currently large allocation unwinding in the carry trade as the risk of
to cash. The equity sectors which we deem being short the US$ grows substantially.
attractive, after any forthcoming Part of the US$ strength will not be US
correction, include telecommunications, economic strength but the fact that some
health‐care especially pharma, energy, and traders harbor fear that the euro may
raw materials. These sectors are not collapse as the GIIPS (Greece, Ireland,
restricted to US equity markets but may be Italy, Portugal, and Spain) debt loads
applied to numerous global opportunities become untenable.

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CHART 9 RESURRECTION OF THE RELIC


As usual we end with the case for gold. As (AEM), Yamana Gold (AUY), and BHP
seen above in Table A the investment Billiton (BHP). These stocks, at times,
returns for gold have been stellar over the track the equity market more closely than
past 10 years. We expect this to continue. gold bullion; see Chart 9 where we use
Additionally, after some correction to the Newmont Mining as an example. We
equity markets the metal‐mining stocks would defer purchase of their shares until
should display an exuberant rise as a later in 2010. However, once there is a
leveraged play on the precious metals. serious correction these names hold the
Within this sector we would recommend potential for great returns.
the Gold Miners Index (GDX) and the
more speculative juniors (GDXJ). For Chart 10 displays the prices of the Gold
direct holding of gold there are Gold Miners Index (GDX) and a major mining
Shares Trust (GLD), iShares Silver Trust company, the great ore and coal producer
(SLV) and Central Fund of Canada (CEF), BHP Billiton over the past 5 years. Once
the Canadian trust which holds both gold again note the relativity of gold producers
and silver bullion, and Swiss gold to general mining stocks. We believe this
holdings, SGOL. Individual names include spread will widen substantially as equity
Newmont Mining (NEM), Agnico Eagle
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markets correct and precious metals begin change and rising volatility. For this
a rise in prices during 2010Q3. reason our primary allocations remain in
cash, gold, short duration Treasuries, and
The past decade has been a period of mid‐short duration bonds. The gale storm
market turmoil. No one can predict the in credit markets may have passed but the
future; yet, as we view the past we must winds of change continue to blow.
prepare our portfolios for continuing

CHART 10 ALL THAT GLITTERS

While reviewing the past year and ruminating on events before and after the recent market
upheaval we have been challenged at how some analysts interpret and communicate
historical events. These thoughts immediately bring to mind the brilliance of Harvard
philosopher George Santayana who’s “Law of Repetitive Consequences” is frequently noted
as “Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.” Yet, how do we truly
learn from the past. Our cognitive faculties are easily overcome by emotion and information
overload.

We returned to that great master of philosophical meandering G.W.F. Hegel. As we read
thru the lectures which became the basis for his “The Philosophy of History” we quickly
remember how hard it was to read this German pedantic. Hegel demands reverence to the
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overriding importance of the dialectic process, thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Progress is the
successive movements which are resolutions from previous contradictions. Reflective history
is not confined to the limits of the times but retains a spirit which transcends the present. The
historian infuses the work with his own spirit; he is the creator of annals which bring the past
to life. Then we move on thru pragmatic history and critical history and, finally,
philosophical history. On and on with the great role of reason and then the all‐consuming
“Geist” which among its many translations, “spirit” is the most popular.

Suddenly, it was clear. This was similar to reading a Bernanke speech. Bernanke’s “geist” is
the grand modeling of econometrics. VAR is one of the quantitative spirits with its many
variables, coefficients, evolving relations, and continuing feedback loops. The role of
complexity and logic is to paralyze the mental processes with the exclusion of intuitive
knowledge. The evolution and interpretation of past events is only the result of assumptions
and algorithms. Rational quantification becomes the means to interpret the past and control
the present.

Right or wrong is not for us to decide at this time. What we must maintain throughout this
period of novel economic policy and financial upheaval is a healthy dose of skepticism.

Sincere regards,
Brian E. Shean, CFA
PRINCIPAL
POSEIDON STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS
_________________________________________________________________________________

The views expressed in this commentary are those of the author at the time of composition. The assumptions, analysis, and
conclusions are subject to change in conjunction with changes in the securities’ markets or discovery of additional or
conflicting information. All information conveyed herein has been deduced, compiled or quantified from sources thought to
be consistently reliable. This informational report is produced for general circulation and is not to be construed as a
solicitation to buy or sell securities, financial instruments, or investment products. Prior to entering any transactions for
investment products please consult a competent financial adviser and undertake proper due diligence. AMDG
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