SAN MIGUEL CORP., VS.

CA
G.R. NO. 146775, JAN. 30, 2002
Facts: On 17 October 1992, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Iligan District Office,
conducted a routine inspection in the premises of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in Sta. Filomena, Iligan
City. It was discovered that there was underpayment by SMC of regular Muslim holiday pay to its
employees. DOLE sent a copy of the inspection result to SMC and it was received by and explained to
its personnel officer Elena dela Puerta. SMC contested the findings and DOLE conducted summary
hearings on 19 November 1992, 28 May 1993 and 4 and 5 October 1993. Still, SMC failed to submit proof
that it was paying regular Muslim holiday pay to its employees. Hence, Alan M. Macaraya, Director IV of
DOLE Iligan District Office issued a compliance order, dated 17 December 1993, directing SMC to
consider Muslim holidays as regular holidays and to pay both its Muslim and non-Muslim employees
holiday pay within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the order.
SMC appealed to the DOLE main office in Manila. However, the appeal was dismissed for lack of merit
and the order of Director Macaraya was affirmed. SMC went to SC for relief via a petition for certiorari,
which the Court referred to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court modified the order with regards
the payment of Muslim holiday pay from 200% to 150% of the employee's basic salary. Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied for lack of merit, SMC filed a petition for certiorari before the SC
Issues:
1. Whether or not public respondents seriously erred and committed grave abuse of discretion
when they granted Muslim Holiday Pay to non-Muslim employees of SMC.
2. Whether or not SMC was not accorded with due process of law in the issuance of the
compliance order.
3. Whether or not regional director Macaraya, undersecretary Trajano and undersecretary Espanol
have jurisdiction in issuing the assailed compliance orders.
Ruling: The court ruled the issues in negative. Muslim holidays are provided under Articles 169 and 170,
Title I, Book V, of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws,
which states:
Art. 169. Official Muslim holidays. - The following are hereby recognized as legal Muslim holidays:
a) Amun Jadd (New Year), which falls on the first day of the first lunar month of Muharram;
b) Maulid-un-Nab (Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad), which falls on the twelfth day of the
third lunar month of Rabi-ul-Awwal;
c) Lailatul Isr Wal Mirj (Nocturnal Journey and Ascension of the Prophet Muhammad), which
falls on the twenty-seventh day of the seventh lunar month of Rajab;
d) d-ul-Fitr (Hari Raya Puasa), which falls on the first day of the tenth lunar month of
Shawwal, commemorating the end of the fasting season; and
e) d-l-Adh (Hari Raya Haji),which falls on the tenth day of the twelfth lunar month of
Dhl-Hijja.
Art. 170. Provinces and cities where officially observed. - (1) Muslim holidays shall be officially
observed in the Provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato,
Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, and Zamboanga and in such other Muslim provinces and cities as may
hereafter be created; (2) Upon proclamation by the President of the Philippines, Muslim holidays may
also be officially observed in other provinces and cities.
The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article 94 of the Labor Code, which
provides:
Art. 94. Right to holiday pay.
a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and
service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;

b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid
a compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate.
Petitioner asserts that Article 3(3) of Presidential Decree No. 1083 provides that "the provisions of this
Code shall be applicable only to Muslims." However, there should be no distinction between Muslims
and non-Muslims as regards payment of benefits for Muslim holidays. Wages and other emoluments
granted by law to the working man are determined on the basis of the criteria laid down by laws and
certainly not on the basis of the workers faith or religion. In addition, the 1999 Handbook on Workers
Statutory Benefits, categorically stated: Considering that all private corporations, offices, agencies,
and entities or establishments operating within the designated Muslim provinces and cities are required
to observe Muslim holidays, both Muslim and Christians working within the Muslim areas may not report
for work on the days designated by law as Muslim holidays.
On the question regarding the jurisdiction of the Regional Director Allan M. Macaraya, Article 128,
Section B of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7730, provides: Article 128. Visitorial and
enforcement power. (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases
where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his
duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the
labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor
employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of the
inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall issue writs of execution to the
appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer
contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by
documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection.
In the case before us, Regional Director Macaraya acted as the duly authorized representative of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment and it was within his power to issue the compliance order to SMC.
In addition, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the petitioner did not deny that it was not
paying Muslim holiday pay to its non-Muslim employees. Indeed, petitioner merely contends that its
non-Muslim employees are not entitled to Muslim holiday pay. Hence, the issue could be resolved even
without documentary proofs. In any case, there was no indication that Regional Director Macaraya
failed to consider any documentary proof presented by SMC in the course of the inspection.
Anent the allegation that petitioner was not accorded due process, the court finds that SMC was
furnished a copy of the inspection order and it was received by and explained to its Personnel Officer.
Further, a series of summary hearings were conducted by DOLE on 19 November 1992, 28 May 1993 and
4 and 5 October 1993. Thus, SMC could not claim that it was not given an opportunity to defend itself.

TAN VS. LAGRAMA

G.R. No. 151228; August 15, 2002
Facts: Petitioner Rolando Tan is the president of Supreme Theater Corporation and the general
manager of Crown and Empire Theaters in Butuan City. Private respondent Leovigildo Lagrama is a
painter, making ad billboards and murals for the motion pictures shown at the Empress, Supreme, and
Crown Theaters for more than 10 years, from September 1, 1988 to October 17, 1998.
On October 17, 1998, private respondent Lagrama was summoned by Tan and upbraided: "Nangihi na
naman ka sulod sa imong drawinganan." ("You again urinated inside your work area.") When Lagrama
asked what Tan was saying, Tan told him, "Ayaw daghang estorya. Dili ko gusto nga mo-drawing ka pa.
Guikan karon, wala nay drawing. Gawas." ("Don't say anything further. I don't want you to draw
anymore. From now on, no more drawing. Get out.")
Lagrama denied the charge against him. He claimed that he was not the only one who entered the
drawing area and that, even if the charge was true, it was a minor infraction to warrant his dismissal.
However, everytime he spoke, Tan shouted "Gawas" ("Get out"), leaving him with no other choice but to
leave the premises. Lagrama filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in
Butuan City. He alleged that he had been illegally dismissed and sought reinvestigation and payment of
13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, salary differential, and damages.
As no amicable settlement had been reached, Labor Arbiter Rogelio P. Legaspi directed the parties to
file their position papers. It declared that the dismissal illegal and order the payment of monetary
benefits. Tan appealed to the NLRC and reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent was illegally dismissed and thus entitled to payment of benefits
provided by law.
Ruling: The respondent was illegally dismissed and entitled to benefits. The Implementing Rules of the
Labor Code provide that no worker shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized cause provided by
law and after due process. This provision has two aspects: (1) the legality of the act of dismissal, that
is, dismissal under the grounds provided for under Article 282 of the Labor Code and (2) the legality in
the manner of dismissal. The illegality of the act of dismissal constitutes discharge without just cause,
while illegality in the manner of dismissal is dismissal without due process.
In this case, by his refusal to give Lagrama work to do and ordering Lagrama to get out of his sight as
the latter tried to explain his side, petitioner made it plain that Lagrama was dismissed. Urinating in a
work place other than the one designated for the purpose by the employer constitutes violation of
reasonable regulations intended to promote a healthy environment under Art. 282(1) of the Labor Code
for purposes of terminating employment, but the same must be shown by evidence. Here there is no
evidence that Lagrama did urinate in a place other than a rest room in the premises of his work.
Instead of ordering his reinstatement as provided in Art. 279 of the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter found
that the relationship between the employer and employee has been so strained that the latter's
reinstatement would no longer serve any purpose. The parties do not dispute this finding. Hence, the
grant of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is appropriate.
This is of course in addition to the payment of bac kwages which, in accordance with the ruling in
Bustamante v. NLRC should be computed from the time of Lagrama's dismissal up to the time of the
finality of this decision, without any deduction or qualification.
The Bureau of Working Conditions 32 classifies workers paid by results into two groups, namely; (1)
those whose time and performance is supervised by the employer, and (2) those whose time and
performance is unsupervised by the employer. The first involves an element of control and supervision
over the manner the work is to be performed, while the second does not. If a piece worker is
supervised, there is an employer-employee relationship, as in this case. However, such an employee is

not entitled to service incentive leave pay since, as pointed out in Makati Haberdashery v. NLRC 33 and
Mark Roche International v. NLRC, 34 he is paid a fixed amount for work done, regardless of the time he
spent in accomplishing such work.

LAMBO VS. NLRC

G.R. No. 111042; October 26, 1999
Facts: Petitioners Avelino Lambo and Vicente Belocura were employed as tailors by private respondents
J.C. Tailor Shop and/or Johnny Co on September 10, 1985 and March 3, 1985, respectively. They worked
from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. daily, including Sundays and holidays. As in the case of the other 100
employees of private respondents, petitioners were paid on a piece-work basis, according to the style
of suits they made. Regardless of the number of pieces they finished in a day, they were each given a
daily pay of at least P64.00.
On January 17, 1989, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents for illegal dismissal and
sought recovery of overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay on holiday and rest day, service incentive
leave pay, separation pay, 13th month pay, and attorneys fees. After hearing, Labor Arbiter found
private respondents guilty of illegal dismissal and accordingly ordered them to pay petitioners claims.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC held petitioners guilty of
abandonment of work and accordingly dismissed their claims except that for 13th month pay.
Petitioners allege that they were dismissed by private respondents as they were about to file a petition
with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for the payment of benefits such as Social
Security System (SSS) coverage, sick leave and vacation leave. They deny that they abandoned their
work.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the minimum benefits provided by law.
Ruling: The petitioners are entitled to the minimum benefits provided by law. There is no dispute that
petitioners were employees of private respondents although they were paid not on the basis of time
spent on the job but according to the quantity and the quality of work produced by them. There are
two categories of employees paid by results: (1) those whose time and performance are supervised by
the employer. (Here, there is an element of control and supervision over the manner as to how the
work is to be performed. A piece-rate worker belongs to this category especially if he performs his
work in the company premises.); and (2) those whose time and performance are unsupervised. (Here,
the employers control is over the result of the work. Workers on pakyao and takay basis belong to this
group.) Both classes of workers are paid per unit accomplished.
Piece-rate payment is generally practiced in garment factories where work is done in the company
premises, while payment on pakyao and takay basis is commonly observed in the agricultural industry,
such as in sugar plantations where the work is performed in bulk or in volumes difficult to quantify. 4
Petitioners belong to the first category, i.e., supervised employees.
In this case, private respondents exercised control over the work of petitioners. As tailors, petitioners
worked in the companys premises from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. daily, including Sundays and holidays.
The mere fact that they were paid on a piece-rate basis does not negate their status as regular
employees of private respondents. The term "wage" is broadly defined in Art. 97 of the Labor Code as
remuneration or earnings, capable of being expressed in terms of money whether fixed or ascertained
on a time, task, piece or commission basis. Payment by the piece is just a method of compensation and
does not define the essence of the relations. Nor does the fact that petitioners are not covered by the
SSS affect the employer-employee relationship.

As petitioners were illegally dismissed, they are entitled to reinstatement with back wages. The Arbiter
applied the rule in the Mercury Drug case, according to which the recovery of back wages should be
limited to three years without qualifications or deductions. Any award in excess of three years is null
and void as to the excess. The Labor Arbiter correctly ordered private respondents to give separation
pay.
Considerable time has elapsed since petitioners dismissal, so that reinstatement would now be
impractical and hardly in the best interest of the parties. In lieu of reinstatement, separation pay
should be awarded to petitioners at the rate of one month salary for every year of service, with a
fraction of at least six (6) months of service being considered as one (1) year. The awards for overtime
pay, holiday pay and 13th month pay are in accordance with our finding that petitioners are regular
employees, although paid on a piece-rate basis.
LAMBO VS. NLRC
G.R. No. 111042; October 26, 1999
Facts: Petitioners Avelino Lambo and Vicente Belocura were employed as tailors by private respondents
J.C. Tailor Shop and/or Johnny Co on September 10, 1985 and March 3, 1985, respectively. They worked
from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. daily, including Sundays and holidays. As in the case of the other 100
employees of private respondents, petitioners were paid on a piece-work basis, according to the style
of suits they made. Regardless of the number of pieces they finished in a day, they were each given a
daily pay of at least P64.00.
On January 17, 1989, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents for illegal dismissal and
sought recovery of overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay on holiday and rest day, service incentive
leave pay, separation pay, 13th month pay, and attorneys fees. After hearing, Labor Arbiter found
private respondents guilty of illegal dismissal and accordingly ordered them to pay petitioners claims.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC held petitioners guilty of
abandonment of work and accordingly dismissed their claims except that for 13th month pay.
Petitioners allege that they were dismissed by private respondents as they were about to file a petition
with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for the payment of benefits such as Social
Security System (SSS) coverage, sick leave and vacation leave. They deny that they abandoned their
work.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the minimum benefits provided by law.
Ruling: The petitioners are entitled to the minimum benefits provided by law. There is no dispute that
petitioners were employees of private respondents although they were paid not on the basis of time
spent on the job but according to the quantity and the quality of work produced by them. There are
two categories of employees paid by results: (1) those whose time and performance are supervised by
the employer. (Here, there is an element of control and supervision over the manner as to how the
work is to be performed. A piece-rate worker belongs to this category especially if he performs his
work in the company premises.); and (2) those whose time and performance are unsupervised. (Here,
the employers control is over the result of the work. Workers on pakyao and takay basis belong to this
group.) Both classes of workers are paid per unit accomplished.
Piece-rate payment is generally practiced in garment factories where work is done in the company
premises, while payment on pakyao and takay basis is commonly observed in the agricultural industry,
such as in sugar plantations where the work is performed in bulk or in volumes difficult to quantify. 4
Petitioners belong to the first category, i.e., supervised employees.
In this case, private respondents exercised control over the work of petitioners. As tailors, petitioners
worked in the companys premises from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. daily, including Sundays and holidays.

The mere fact that they were paid on a piece-rate basis does not negate their status as regular
employees of private respondents. The term "wage" is broadly defined in Art. 97 of the Labor Code as
remuneration or earnings, capable of being expressed in terms of money whether fixed or ascertained
on a time, task, piece or commission basis. Payment by the piece is just a method of compensation and
does not define the essence of the relations. Nor does the fact that petitioners are not covered by the
SSS affect the employer-employee relationship.
As petitioners were illegally dismissed, they are entitled to reinstatement with back wages. The Arbiter
applied the rule in the Mercury Drug case, according to which the recovery of back wages should be
limited to three years without qualifications or deductions. Any award in excess of three years is null
and void as to the excess. The Labor Arbiter correctly ordered private respondents to give separation
pay.
Considerable time has elapsed since petitioners dismissal, so that reinstatement would now be
impractical and hardly in the best interest of the parties. In lieu of reinstatement, separation pay
should be awarded to petitioners at the rate of one month salary for every year of service, with a
fraction of at least six (6) months of service being considered as one (1) year. The awards for overtime
pay, holiday pay and 13th month pay are in accordance with our finding that petitioners are regular
employees, although paid on a piece-rate basis.
R&E TRANSPORT VS. LATAG
G.R. No. 155214, Feb. 13, 2004
Facts: Pedro Latag was a regular employee of La Mallorca Taxi since March 1, 1961. However, he was
transferred to the petitioner R & E Transport, Inc. upon cessation of La Mallorcas business operations.
In January 1995, he got sick and was forced to apply for partial disability with the SSS, which was then
granted. Upon recovery, he reported back to work in September 1998 but was no longer allowed on
account of his old age. Latag asked the petitioner, through its administrative officer for his retirement
pay pursuant to Republic Act 7641 but he was ignored. Latag filed a case for payment of his retirement
pay before the NLRC.
Upon Pedro Latags death on April 30, 1999, he was substituted by his wife, the respondent Avelina
Latag. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favour of Latag. Petitioner filed the quitclaim and motion
to dismiss where the Labor Arbiter issued an order for Writ of Execution. Petitioners interposed an
appeal before NLRC. Appeal was dismissed for failure to post a cash or surety bond, as mandated by
law.
Issue:Whether or not Latag is entitled to retirement benefits considering she signed a waiver of
quitclaim.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent is entitled to retirement benefits despite of the
waiver of quitclaims.
As to the Quitclaim and Waiver signed by Respondent Latag, the CA committed no error when it ruled
that the document was invalid and could not bar her from demanding the benefits legally due her
husband. This is not say that all quitclaims are invalid per se. Courts, however, are wary of schemes
that frustrate workers' rights and benefits, and look with disfavor upon quitclaims and waivers that
bargain these away.
Undisputably, Pedro M. Latag was credited with 14 years of service with R & E Transport, Inc. Article
287 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7641, 30 provides: Retirement. In the
absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the
establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixtyfive (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five

(5) years in said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at
least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being
considered as one whole year. Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one halfmonth salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash
equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.
The rules implementing the New Retirement Law similarly provide the above-mentioned formula for
computing the one-half month salary. Since Pedro was paid according to the "boundary" system, he is
not entitled to the 13th month 32 and the service incentive pay; hence, his retirement pay should be
computed on the sole basis of his salary.
It is accepted that taxi drivers do not receive fixed wages, but retain only those sums in excess of the
"boundary" or fee they pay to the owners or operators of their vehicles. Thus, the basis for computing
their benefits should be the average daily income. In this case, the CA found that Pedro was earning an
average of five hundred pesos (P500) per day. We thus compute his retirement pay as follows: P500 x
15 days x 14 years of service equals P105,000. Hence, it is clear that the late Pedro M. Latag is entitled
to retirement benefits.
ASIAN TRANSMISSION VS. CA, 425 SCRA 478 [2004]
Facts: The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), through Undersecretary Cresenciano B.
Trajano, issued an Explanatory Bulletin dated March 11, 1993 wherein it clarified, inter alia, that
employees are entitled to 200% of their basic wage on April 9, 1993, whether unworked, which[,] apart
from being Good Friday [and, therefore, a legal holiday], is also Araw ng Kagitingan [which is also a
legal holiday].
Said bulletin was reproduced on January 23, 1998, when April 9, 1998 was both Maundy Thursday and
Araw ng Kagitingan.
Despite the explanatory bulletin, petitioner, Asian Transmission Corporation, opted to pay its daily paid
employees only 100% of their basic pay on April 9, 1998. Respondent Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor
Union (BATLU) protested.
The Voluntary Arbitrator favored the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU), and held that
Article 94 of the Labor Code provides for holiday pay for every regular holiday, the computation of
which is determined by a legal formula which is not changed by the fact that there are two holidays
falling on one day, like on April 9, 1998 when it was Araw ng Kagitingan and at the same time was
Maundy Thursday.
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator.
Issue: Whether or not daily-paid employees are entitled to be paid for two regular holidays which fall
on the same day.
Ruling: The Court dismissed the petition and ruled that petitioners should pay its employees 200% and
not just 100% of their regular daily wages for the unworked April 9, 1998 which covers two regular
holidays, namely, Araw ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday.
Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative that the State shall
afford protection to labor. Its purpose is not merely "to prevent diminution of the monthly income of
the workers on account of work interruptions. In other words, although the worker is forced to take a
rest, he earns what he should earn, that is, his holiday pay."
The provision is mandatory, regardless of whether an employee is paid on a monthly or daily basis.
Unlike a bonus, which is a management prerogative, holiday pay is a statutory benefit demandable
under the law.

AUTOBUS TRANSPORT SYSTEM VS. BAUTISTA

G.R. No. 156364, May 16, 2005
Facts:Respondent Antonio Bautista has been employed by petitioner Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc.,
since May 1995, as driver-conductor with travel routes Manila-Tuguegarao via Baguio, BaguioTuguegarao via Manila and Manila-Tabuk via Baguio. Respondent was paid on commission basis, seven
percent (7%) of the total gross income per travel, on a twice a month basis.
On January 2000, while respondent was driving Autobus No. 114 along Sta. Fe, Nueva Vizcaya, the bus
he was driving accidentally bumped the rear portion of Autobus No. 124, as the latter vehicle suddenly
stopped at a sharp curve without giving any warning. Respondent averred that the accident happened
because he was compelled by the management to go back to Roxas, Isabela, although he had not slept
for almost twenty-four (24) hours, as he had just arrived in Manila from Roxas, Isabela.
Respondent further alleged that he was not allowed to work until he fully paid the amount of
P75,551.50, representing thirty percent (30%) of the cost of repair of the damaged buses and that
despite respondent's pleas for reconsideration, the same was ignored by management. After a month,
management sent him a letter of termination. Thus, on 02 February 2000, respondent instituted a
Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Money Claims for nonpayment of 13th month pay and service
incentive leave pay against Autobus.
On 29 September 2000, based on the pleadings and supporting evidence presented by the parties,
Labor Arbiter decided that the complaint be dismissed where the respondent must pay to the
complainant
Issue:Whether or not respondent is entitled to service incentive leave.
Ruling:The respondent is entitled to service incentive leave.
The disposition of the issue revolves around the proper interpretation of Article 95 of the Labor Code
vis--vis Section 1(D), Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code
which provides: RIGHT TO SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE, (a) Every employee who has rendered at least one
year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay.
Moreover, Book III, Rule V: SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE also states that this rule shall apply to all
employees except: (d) Field personnel and other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the
employer including those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely commission basis, or those
who are paid in a fixed amount for performing work irrespective of the time consumed in the
performance thereof;
A careful examination of said provisions of law will result in the conclusion that the grant of service
incentive leave has been delimited by the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code to
apply only to those employees not explicitly excluded by Section 1 of Rule V. According to the
Implementing Rules, Service Incentive Leave shall not apply to employees classified as "field
personnel."
The phrase "other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the employer" must not be
understood as a separate classification of employees to which service incentive leave shall not be
granted. Rather, it serves as an amplification of the interpretation of the definition of field personnel
under the Labor Code as those "whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty."
The same is true with respect to the phrase "those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely
commission basis." Said phrase should be related with "field personnel," applying the rule on ejusdem

generis that the general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms that
they follow. Hence, employees engaged on task or contract basis or paid on purely commission basis
are not automatically exempted from the grant of service incentive leave, unless, they fall under the
classification of field personnel.
What must be ascertained in order to resolve the issue of propriety of the grant of service incentive
leave to respondent is whether or not he is field personnel?
According to Article 82 of the Labor Code, "field personnel" shall refer to non-agricultural employees
who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the
employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
This definition is further elaborated in the Bureau of Working Conditions (BWC), Advisory Opinion to
Philippine Technical-Clerical Commercial Employees Association 10 which states that:
As a general rule, field personnel are those whose performance of their job/service is not supervised
by the employer or his representative, the workplace being away from the principal office and whose
hours and days of work cannot be determined with reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid specific
amount for rendering specific service or performing specific work. If required to be at specific places
at specific times, employees including drivers cannot be said to be field personnel despite the fact that
they are performing work away from the principal office of the employee.
At this point, it is necessary to stress that the definition of a "field personnel" is not merely concerned
with the location where the employee regularly performs his duties but also with the fact that the
employee's performance is unsupervised by the employer. As discussed above, field personnel are those
who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business of the employer and
whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. Thus, in order
to conclude whether an employee is a field employee, it is also necessary to ascertain if actual hours
of work in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty by the employer. In so doing, an
inquiry must be made as to whether or not the employee's time and performance are constantly
supervised by the employer. Respondent is not a field personnel but a regular employee who performs
tasks usually necessary and desirable to the usual trade of petitioner's business. Accordingly,
respondent is entitled to the grant of service incentive leave.
The clear policy of the Labor Code is to grant service incentive leave pay to workers in all
establishments, subject to a few exceptions. Section 2, Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations provides that "every employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be
entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay."
Service incentive leave is a right which accrues to every employee who has served "within 12 months,
whether continuous or broken reckoned from the date the employee started working, including
authorized absences and paid regular holidays unless the working days in the establishment as a matter
of practice or policy, or that provided in the employment contracts, is less than 12 months, in which
case said period shall be considered as one year." It is also "commutable to its money equivalent if not
used or exhausted at the end of the year." In other words, an employee who has served for one year is
entitled to it. He may use it as leave days or he may collect its monetary value. To limit the award to
three years, as the solicitor general recommends, is to unduly restrict such right.
SAN MIGUEL CORP., VS. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 168194, Dec. 13, 2005
Facts: On April 17, 2000, respondent was employed by petitioner as key account specialist. On March
9, 2001, petitioner informed respondent that her probationary employment will be severed at the close
of the business hours of March 12, 2001. On March 13, 2001, respondent was refused entry to

petitioners premises. On June 24, 2002, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal
dismissal and underpayment/non-payment of monetary benefits.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is a regular employee of petitioner.
Ruling: Affirmative. In termination cases, like the present controversy, the burden of proving the
circumstances that would justify the employees dismissal rests with the employer. The best proof that
petitioner should have presented to prove the probationary status of respondent is her employment
contract. None, having been presented, the continuous employment of respondent as an account
specialist for almost 11 months, from April 17, 2000 to March 12, 2001, means that she was a regular
employee and not a temporary reliever or a probationary employee.
And while it is true that by way of exception, the period of probationary employment may exceed six
months when the parties so agree, such as when the same is established by company policy, or when it
is required by the nature of the work, none of these exceptional circumstance were proven in the
present case. Hence, respondent whose employment exceeded six months is undoubtedly a regular
employee of petitioner.
Moreover, even assuming that the employment of respondent from April 7, 2000 to September 3, 2000,
is only temporary, and that the reckoning period of her probationary employment is September 4, 2000,
she should still be declared a regular employee because by the time she was dismissed on March 12,
2001, her alleged probationary employment already exceeded six months, i.e., six months and eight
days to be precise. A worker was found to be a regular employee notwithstanding the presentation by
the employer of a Payroll Authority indicating that said employee was hired on probation, since it was
shown that he was terminated four days after the 6th month of his purported probationary
employment.
Neither will petitioners belated claim that respondent became a probationary employee starting
October 1, 2000 work against respondent. As earlier stated, the payroll authorities indicating that
respondents probationary status became effective as of such date are of scant evidentiary value since
it does not show the conformity of respondent. At any rate, in the interpretation of employment
contracts, whether oral or written, all doubts must be resolved in favor of labor.
Hence, the contract of employment in the instant case, which appears to be an oral agreement since
no written form was presented by petitioner, should be construed as one vesting respondent with a
regular status and security of tenure.
Regarding the argument of redundancy, Redundancy, for purposes of the Labor Code, exists where the
services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of
the enterprise. Succinctly put, a position is redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a
position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as overhiring of workers,
decreased volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously
manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.
The determination that the employees services are no longer necessary or sustainable and, therefore,
properly terminable is an exercise of business judgment of the employer. The wisdom or soundness of
this judgment is not subject to discretionary review of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, provided there
is no violation of law and no showing that it was prompted by an arbitrary or malicious act. In other
words, it is not enough for a company to merely declare that it has become overmanned. It must
produce adequate proof of such redundancy to justify the dismissal of the affected employees.
The following evidence may be proffered to substantiate redundancy: the new staffing pattern,
feasibility studies/proposal, on the viability of the newly created positions, job description and the
approval by the management of the restructuring.

In the case at bar, petitioner presented an affidavit of its Sales Manager and a memorandum of the
company both to the effect that there is a need to redeploy its regular employees and terminate the
employment of temporary employees, in view of an excess in manpower. These documents, however,
do not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
Moreover, the lingering doubt as to the existence of redundancy or of petitioners so called
restructuring, realignment or reorganization which resulted in the dismissal of not only probationary
employees but also of regular employees, is highlighted by the non-presentation by petitioner of the
required notice to the DOLE and to the separated employees. If there was indeed a valid redundancy
effected by petitioner, these notices and the proof of payment of separation pay to the dismissed
regular employees should have been offered to establish that there was excess manpower in
petitioners GMA-KAG caused by a decline in the sales volume.
In balancing the interest between labor and capital, the prudent recourse in termination cases is to
safeguard the prized security of tenure of employees and to require employers to present the best
evidence obtainable, especially so because in most cases, the documents or proof needed to resolve
the validity of the termination, are in the possession of employers. A contrary ruling would encourage
employers to prevent the regularization of an employee by simply invoking a feigned or
unsubstantiated redundancy program.
Granting that petitioner was able to substantiate the validity of its reorganization or restructuring, it
nevertheless, failed to effect a fair and reasonable criterion in dismissing respondent. The criteria in
implementing a redundancy are: (a) less preferred status, e.g. temporary employee; (b) efficiency; and
(c) seniority.
It is evident from the foregoing that the criterion allegedly used by petitioner in reorganizing its sales
unit was the employment status of the employee. However, in the implementation thereof, petitioner
erroneously classified respondent as a probationary employee, resulting in the dismissal of the latter.
Verily, the absence of criteria and the erroneous implementation of the criterion selected, both render
invalid the redundancy because both have the ultimate effect of illegally dismissing an employee.
Considering that respondent was illegally dismissed, she is entitled not only to reinstatement but also
to payment of full back wages, computed from the time her compensation was actually withheld from
her on March 13, 2001, up to her actual reinstatement. As a regular employee of petitioner from the
date of her employment on April 17, 2000, she is likewise entitled to other benefits, i.e., service
incentive leave pay and 13th month pay computed from such date also up to her actual reinstatement.
Respondent is not, however, entitled to holiday pay because the records reveal that she is a monthly
paid regular employee. Under Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code, employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days
therein, shall be presumed to be paid for all the days in the month whether worked or not.
Anent attorneys fees, in actions for recovery of wages or where an employee was forced to litigate
and thus incurred expenses to protect his rights and interests, a maximum of 10% of the total monetary
award by way of attorneys fees is justifiable under Article 111 of the Labor Code, Section 8, Rule VIII,
Book III of its Implementing Rules, and paragraph 7, Article 2208 of the Civil Code. The award of
attorneys fees is proper and there need not be any showing that the employer acted maliciously or in
bad faith when it withheld the wages. There need only be a showing that the lawful wages were not
paid accordingly, as in the instant controversy.
PENARANDA VS. BAGANGA PLYWOOD CORP.,
G.R. No. 159577, May 3, 2006
Facts: Sometime in June 1999, Petitioner Charlito Pearanda was hired as an employee of Baganga
Plywood Corporation (BPC) to take charge of the operations and maintenance of its steam plant boiler.

In May 2001, Pearanda filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against BPC and its
general manager, Hudson Chua, before the NLRC.
After the parties failed to settle amicably, the labor arbiter directed the parties to file their position
papers and submit supporting documents.
Pearanda alleges that he was employed by respondent Banganga on March 15, 1999 with a monthly
salary of P5,000.00 as Foreman/Boiler Head/Shift Engineer until he was illegally terminated on
December 19, 2000. he alleges that his services were terminated without the benefit of due process
and valid grounds in accordance with law. Furthermore, he was not paid his overtime pay, premium pay
for working during holidays/rest days, night shift differentials and finally claimed for payment of
damages and attorney's fees having been forced to litigate the present complaint.
Respondent BPC is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws and is
represented herein by its General Manager HUDSON CHUA, the individual respondent. Respondents
allege that complainant's separation from service was done pursuant to Art. 283 of the Labor Code. The
respondent BPC was on temporary closure due to repair and general maintenance and it applied for
clearance with the Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. XI, to shut down and to
dismiss employees. And due to the insistence of herein complainant he was paid his separation
benefits.
Consequently, when respondent BPC partially reopened in January 2001, Pearanda failed to reapply.
The labor arbiter ruled that there was no illegal dismissal and that petitioner's Complaint was
premature because he was still employed by BPC. Petitioners money claims for illegal dismissal was
also weakened by his quitclaim and admission during the clarificatory conference that he accepted
separation benefits, sick and vacation leave conversions and thirteenth month pay.
Issue: Whether or not Pearanda is a regular, common employee entitled to monetary benefits under
Art. 82 of the Labor Code and is entitled to the payment of overtime pay and other monetary benefits.
Ruling: The petitioner is not entitled to overtime pay and other monetary benefits.
The Court disagrees with the NLRC's finding that petitioner was a managerial employee. However,
petitioner was a member of the managerial staff, which also takes him out of the coverage of labor
standards. Like managerial employees, officers and member of the managerial staff are not entitled to
the provisions of law on labor standards.
The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code define members of a managerial staff as those with the
following duties and responsibilities:
1. The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies of
the employer;
2. Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment;
3. Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial employee whose primary duty consists of
the management of the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision thereof; or (ii)
execute under general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring special
training, experience, or knowledge; or (iii) execute under general supervision special assignments
and tasks; and
4. Who do not devote more than 20 percent of their hours worked in a workweek to activities which
are not directly and closely related to the performance of the work described in paragraphs (1),
(2), and (3) above."
The petitioners work involves:
1. To supply the required and continuous steam to all consuming units at minimum cost.

2. To supervise, check and monitor manpower workmanship as well as operation of boiler and
accessories.
3. To evaluate performance of machinery and manpower.
4. To follow-up supply of waste and other materials for fuel.
5. To train new employees for effective and safety white working.
6. Recommend parts and suppliers purchases. acEHSI
7. To recommend personnel actions such as: promotion, or disciplinary action.
8. To check water from the boiler, feedwater and softener, regenerate softener if beyond
hardness limit.
9. Implement Chemical Dosing.
10. Perform other task as required by the superior from time to time." 34
The foregoing enumeration, particularly items, 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7 illustrates that petitioner was a
member of the managerial staff. His duties and responsibilities conform to the definition of a member
of a managerial staff under the Implementing Rules.
Petitioner supervised the engineering section of the steam plant boiler. His work involved overseeing
the operation of the machines and the performance of the workers in the engineering section. This
work necessarily required the use of discretion and independent judgment to ensure the proper
functioning of the steam plant boiler. As supervisor, petitioner is deemed a member of the managerial
staff.
Noteworthy, even petitioner admitted that he was a supervisor. In his Position Paper, he stated that he
was the foreman responsible for the operation of the boiler. The term foreman implies that he was the
representative of management over the workers and the operation of the department. Petitioner's
evidence also showed that he was the supervisor of the steam plant. His classification as supervisors is
further evident from the manner his salary was paid. He belonged to the 10% of respondent's 354
employees who were paid on a monthly basis; the others were paid only on a daily basis.

LEYTE IV ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC VS. LEYECO IV EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU,

G.R. No. 1577745, October 19, 2007, citing Wellington Investment vs. Trajano, 245 SCRA 561 [1995],
and Odango vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 147420, June 10, 2004
Facts: On April 6, 1998, Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. (petitioner) and Leyeco IV Employees UnionALU (respondent) entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) covering petitioner rank-andfile employees, for a period of five (5) years effective January 1, 1998. On June 7, 2000, respondent,
through its Regional Vice-President, Vicente P. Casilan, sent a letter to petitioner demanding holiday
pay for all employees, as provided for in the CBA.Petitioner, on the other hand, in its Position Paper,
insisted payment of the holiday pay in compliance with the CBA provisions, stating that payment was
presumed since the formula used in determining the daily rate of pay of the covered employees is Basic
Monthly Salary divided by 30 days or Basic Monthly Salary multiplied by 12 divided by 360 days, thus
with said formula, the employees are already paid their regular and special days, the days when no
work is done, the 51 un-worked Sundays and the 51 un-worked Saturdays.
Issue: Whether or not Leyte IV Electric Cooperative is liable for underpayment of holiday pay.
Held: Leyte IV Electric Cooperative is not liable for underpayment of holiday pay.The Voluntary
Arbitrator gravely abused its discretion in giving a strict or literal interpretation of the CBA provisions
that the holiday pay be reflected in the payroll slips. Such literal interpretation ignores the admission
of respondent in its Position Paper that the employees were paid all the days of the month even if not
worked. In light of such admission, petitioner's submission of its 360 divisor in the computation of
employees' salaries gains significance.
This ruling was applied in Wellington Investment and Manufacturing Corporation v. Trajano, 43
Producers Bank of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission. In this case, the monthly
salary was fixed by Wellington to provide for compensation for every working day of the year including
the holidays specified by law and excluding only Sundays. In fixing the salary, Wellington used what it
called the "314 factor"; that is, it simply deducted 51 Sundays from the 365 days normally comprising a
year and used the difference, 314, as basis for determining the monthly salary. The monthly salary thus
fixed actually covered payment for 314 days of the year, including regular and special holidays, as well
as days when no work was done by reason of fortuitous cause, such as transportation strike, riot, or
typhoon or other natural calamity, or cause not attributable to the employees.
It was also applied in Odango v. National Labor Relations Commission, where Court ruled that the use of
a divisor that was less than 365 days cannot make the employer automatically liable for underpayment
of holiday pay. In said case, the employees were required to work only from Monday to Friday and half
of Saturday. Thus, the minimum allowable divisor is 287, which is the result of 365 days, less 52
Sundays and less 26 Saturdays (or 52 half Saturdays). Any divisor below 287 days meant that the
employees were deprived of their holiday pay for some or all of the ten legal holidays. The 304-day
divisor used by the employer was clearly above the minimum of 287 days.
In this case, the employees are required to work only from Monday to Friday. Thus, the minimum
allowable divisor is 263, which is arrived at by deducting 51 un-worked Sundays and 51 un-worked
Saturdays from 365 days. Considering that petitioner used the 360-day divisor, which is clearly above
the minimum, indubitably, petitioner's employees are being given their holiday pay. Thus, the Voluntary
Arbitrator should not have simply brushed aside petitioner's divisor formula. In granting respondent's
claim of non-payment of holiday pay, a "double burden" was imposed upon petitioner because it was
being made to pay twice for its employees' holiday pay when payment thereof had already been
included in the computation of their monthly salaries.

BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES VS. CHUA,

G.R. No. 162195, April 8, 2008, citing Cagampan vs. NLRC, 195 SCRA 533 [1998]
Facts: Reynaldo Chua, herein respondent, was under the employ of Bahia Shipping Services, Inc.,
herein petitioner, as a restaurant waiter on board the M/S Black Watch , a luxury cruise ship liner. His
employment is pursuant to a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) approved
employment contract dated October 9, 1996 for a period of nine (9) months from October 18, 1996 to
July 17, 1997.
On October 18, 1996, respondent, on board the cruise ship, left Manila for Heathrow, England. About
four months into his employment, or on February 15, 1997, responded reported to work an hour and a
half (1 ) late. Due to the incident, respondent was issued a warning-termination form by the master
of the cruise ship, Thor Fleten on February 17, 1997, who likewise conducted an inquisitorial hearing to
investigate the incident on March 8, 1997.
Thereafter, on March 9, 1997, respondent was dismissed from service on the strength of an unsigned
and undated notice of dismissal. Attached to the dismissal notice is the alleged minutes or records of
the investigation and hearing.
On March 24, 1997, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims. He
claims that he was underpaid in the amount of US$110.00 per month for a period of five (5) months,
since he was only paid US$300.00 per month, instead of US$410.00 per month, which was stipulated in
his contract. Aside from underpayment, he alleged that US$20.00 per month was also deducted from
his salary by petitioner for union dues.
Issue: In the computation of the award, should the guaranteed overtime pay per month be included
as part of his salary?
Ruling: There is no factual or legal basis in the inclusion of his "guaranteed overtime" pay into his
monthly salary computation for the entire unexpired period of his contract.
The Court ruled in Cagampan v. National Labor Relations Commission, that although an overseas
employment contract may guarantee the right to overtime pay, entitlement to such benefit must first
be established, otherwise the same cannot be allowed.
Petitioners contention that there is no factual or legal basis for the inclusion of said amount since
respondents repatriation is well-taken.

PNCC SKYWAY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY DIVISION WORKERS ORGANIZATION,

GR No. 171231, Feb. 17, 2010
Facts: Petitioner PNCC Skyway Corporation Traffic Management and Security Division Workers'
Organization (PSTMSDWO) is a labor union duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). Respondent PNCC Skyway Corporation is a corporation duly organized and
operating under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines. On November 15, 2002, petitioner and
respondent entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) incorporating the terms and
conditions of their agreement which included vacation leave and expenses for security license
provisions.
A memorandum was passed by the respondents scheduling the leaves of the laborers. Petitioner
objected to the implementation of this memorandum and contended that their union members have
the preference in scheduling their vacation leave. On the other hand, respondent argued that Article

VIII, Section 1 (b) gives the management the final say regarding the vacation leave schedule of its
employees. Respondent may take into consideration the employees' preferred schedule, but the same
is not controlling.
Issue: Whether or not it is the prerogative of PNCC to schedule leaves of its employees.
Ruling: Yes. The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, its meaning
should be determined without reference to extrinsic facts or aids. The intention of the parties must be
gathered from that language, and from that language alone. Stated differently, where the language of
a written contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract must be taken to mean that which, on its
face, it purports to mean, unless some good reason can be assigned to show that the words used should
be understood in a different sense.
In the case at bar, the contested provision of the CBA is clear and unequivocal. Article VIII, Section 1
(b) of the CBA categorically provides that the scheduling of vacation leave shall be under the option of
the employer. The preference requested by the employees is not controlling because respondent
retains its power and prerogative to consider or to ignore said request. Thus, if the terms of a CBA are
clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulation shall prevail. In fine, the CBA must be strictly adhered to and respected if its ends have to
be achieved, being the law between the parties.

RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC. VS. YBAROLA

Facts: Respondents Domingo Z. Ybarola, Jr. and Alfonso E. Rivera, Jr. were hired on June 15, 1977 and
June 1, 1983, respectively, by RMN. They eventually became account managers, soliciting
advertisements and servicing various clients of RMN.
The respondents services were terminated as a result of RMNs reorganization/restructuring; they
were given their separation pay P 631,250.00 for Ybarola, and P 481,250.00 for Rivera. Sometime in
December 2002, they executed release/quitclaim affidavits.
Dissatisfied with their separation pay, the respondents filed separate complaints (which were later
consolidated) against RMN and its President, Eric S. Canoy, for illegal dismissal with several money
claims, including attorneys fees. They indicated that their monthly salary rates were P 60,000.00 for
Ybarola and P 40,000.00 for Rivera.
The respondents argued that the release/quitclaim they executed should not be a bar to the recovery
of the full benefits due them; while they admitted that they signed release documents, they did so due
to dire necessity.
The petitioners denied liability, contending that the amounts the respondents received represented a
fair and reasonable settlement of their claims, as attested to by the release/quitclaim affidavits which
they executed freely and voluntarily. They belied the respondents claimed salary rates, alleging that
they each received a monthly salary of P 9,177.00, as shown by the payrolls.
The Labor Arbiter Patricio Libo-on dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint, but ordered the payment
of additional separation pay to the respondents P 490,066.00 for Ybarola and P 429,517.55 for Rivera.
On appeal by the petitioners to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the NLRC set aside
the labor arbiters decision and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It ruled that the withholding
tax certificate cannot be the basis of the computation of the respondents separation pay as the tax
document included the respondents cost-of-living allowance and commissions; as a general rule,
commissions cannot be included in the base figure for the computation of the separation pay because

they have to be earned by actual market transactions attributable to the respondents From the NLRC,
the respondents sought relief from the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
The CA granted the petition and set aside the assailed NLRC dispositions. It reinstated the labor
arbiters separation pay award, rejecting the NLRCs ruling that the respondents commissions are not
included in the computation of their separation pay. It pointed out that in the present case, the
respondents earned their commissions through actual market transactions attributable to them; these
commissions, therefore, were part of their salary.
The appellate court declared the release/quitclaim affidavits executed by the respondents invalid for
being against public policy, citing two reasons: (1) the terms of the settlement are unconscionable; the
separation pay the respondents received was deficient by at least P 400,000.00 for each of them; and
(2) the absence of voluntariness when the respondents signed the document, it was their dire
circumstances and inability to support their families that finally drove them to accept the amount the
petitioners offered. Significantly, they dallied and it took them three months to sign the
release/quitclaim affidavits.
Issue:Whether or not the release/quitclaim affidavits are invalid for being against public policy.
Ruling: Release/Quitclaim; Separation pay. The release/quitclaim affidavits are invalid for being
against public policy for two reasons: (1) the terms of the settlement are unconscionable; the
separation pay for termination due to reorganization/restructuring was deficient by Php400,000.00 for
each employee; they were given only half of the amount they were legally entitled to; and (2) the
absence of voluntariness when the employees signed the document, it was their dire circumstances and
inability to support their families that finally drove them to accept the amount offered. Without jobs
and with families to support, they dallied in executing the quitclaim instrument, but were eventually
forced to sign given their circumstances. To be sure, a settlement under these terms is not and cannot
be a reasonable one, given especially the respondents length of service 25 years for Ybarola and 19
years for Rivera. Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. and Eric S. Canoy vs. Domingo Z. Ybarola, et al. G.R.
No. 198662. September 12, 2012.