NIGERIA STABILITY AND RECONCILIATION PROGRAMME

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REPORT ON THE STUDY OF

COMMUNITY-LEVEL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
MECHANISMS
IN THE NIGER DELTA, MIDDLE BELT AND NORTH EAST,
ZONES OF NIGERIA

Volume 1: Analytical report

Abuja, December 2012

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Community-level Conflict Management Mechanisms study was carried out by
research teams at conflict research centres based in three Nigerian universities. The
teams were as follows:
1. NIGER DELTA REGION
Centre for Ethnic and Conflict Studies (CENTECS), University of Port Harcourt,
Choba (Dir. Professor M. Anikpo)
Lead Researcher: Onyinye Onyido-Durueke
Researchers: Grace Scent, Paul Nyulaku, Charles Mezie-Okoye and Gbenemene
Kpae
Field assistants: Kate Enukweri, Love Turaa-Amadi, Brown Meshack, Maurice Timizi
and Endurance Uzobo
2. MIDDLE BELT REGION
Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies (CECOMPS), University of
Jos, Jos (Dir. Professor Audu N. Gambo)
Lead Researcher: Chris M. A. Kwaja
Researchers: Dr. Elias Lamle, Samuel Obadiah, Barr. Nafisat Musa, and Dr. Hafsat
Lawal
Assistant Researchers: Barr. Fatima Shittu, Ishaq Abdulsalam, Barr. Emmanuella
Katukah, Kingsley Madueke and Danjuma Jise
3. NORTH EAST REGION
Centre for Peace, Diplomatic and Development Studies (CPDDS), University of
Maiduguri, Maiduguri (Dir. Professor H. D. Dlakwa)
Lead Researcher: Dr. Ibrahim Umara
Researchers: Dr. Hadiza Isa Bazza, Dr. Zainab Bala, Anthony Rufu and Professor J.
P. Dada
Field Assistants: Bukar G. Aji, Baba Auno Musa, Mustapha A. Ali, Idris Haruna and
Yakaka Abubakar
The research project was designed and overseen by a team from the Nigeria
Stability and Reconciliation Programme, led by Dr Sarah Ladbury (NSRP Technical
Team Leader) and including Atinuke Opeseitan (Resources Officer), Eleanor
Nwadinobi (Gender Adviser), Ere Amachree (Programme Officer), Hamsatu AllAmin
(Regional Co-ordinator, NE), Imran AbdulRahman (Regional Co-ordinator, Middle
Belt), Judy El-Bushra (Conflict and Peacebuilding Adviser), Maxwell Anyaegbu
(Operations Manager), Patrick Naagbanton (Regional Co-ordinator, Niger Delta),
Paul Francis (Social Development Adviser) and Ukoha Ukiwo (Conflict and Political
Adviser).
The research centres and NSRP are profoundly grateful to the community members
who participated in the study and shared their stories, their views and their
knowledge with the research teams.

CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ACRONYMS USED IN THE TEXT
GLOSSARY
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
OVERVIEW REPORT
ZONAL REPORTS:
A. NIGER DELTA
B. MIDDLE BELT
C. NORTH EAST

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme commissioned this study on
community-level conflict management mechanisms as background research for its
design phase. Research institutes attached to the Universities of Port Harcourt, Jos
and Maiduguri carried out the research. The findings presented here draw on
interviews with community members, in which they described their experience of
conflict and their views as to how it can best be dealt with. In addition to talking with
community members, the research teams interviewed key informants, held focus
group discussions, and consulted existing documentation.
This volume of the report presents the three zonal reports covering the Niger Delta,
Middle Belt and North East regions respectively. These regional reports are
preceded by an overview chapter. The zonal and overview reports each analyse the
types of conflict, and the mechanisms for managing conflict described by
respondents, and go on to make recommendations for NSRP. A selection of
interview transcripts is presented in Volume Two of this report.
Five main types of conflict were identified by the three studies. Conflicts relating to
land and other natural resources were the most widespread in all zones, though
especially so in the Niger Delta. Domestic violence and violence against women
were also common in all three zones. Ethno-religious identity lies at the root of much
serious violent conflict, especially in the Middle Belt. Struggles over control of local
traditional and religious institutions were noted as causes of conflict in all three
zones. Finally, political conflicts were also common to all three zones. However, the
foremost example of these is the crisis in the North East entailing radical Islamic
militancy.
Of the conflict management mechanisms identified, traditional and religious dispute
resolution mechanisms were the most trusted, as well as the most accessible,
especially to the poor. However they were not always seen as immune to corruption.
Respondents mentioned various community-based mechanisms, including interfaith
projects, community development approaches, and womens groups. However these
are relatively recently established mechanisms that have yet to build a record of
achievement. Respondents described as useful various government mechanisms for
dispute resolution, such as rent tribunals, and welcomed the intervention of senior
statesmen in specific violent crises. Respondents also commended the police and
security forces for intervening in crises as peace-keepers. However, in many
situations these agents were seen to have done more harm than good through their
disproportionate use of force against innocent citizens.
The study concludes that people are desperate for peace, yet have little confidence
in the capacity of their leaders to deliver it. The fundamental driver of conflict in the
three zones is revealed as being a crisis of governance. Confidence can be restored,
however, if government shows itself to be pro-active in addressing a range of
problems. The most important of these are unemployment and poverty,
unaccountable security forces, a poorly functioning judicial system, governments
perceived indifference to peoples suffering, and constitutional barriers to equal
treatment. NSRP can support this process by strengthening local capacities for nonviolence, and by spreading and building on examples of local initiatives that have
been shown to work. The programme should also seek to promote conflict-sensitive
discourse in all its own activities, and to promote the healing of deeply entrenched
antagonisms in all its communications work.

ACRONYMS USED IN THE TEXT

ANPP
ASTC
BAYODA
BBC
CAN
CCMM
CDC
CECOMPS
CENTECS
CNN
COCIN
CPDDS
CSO
DPO
FGD
FGN
GBV
GRA
IIDEA
JAS
JIBWIS
JNI
JPRM
JTF
KII
KK
KSDPC
LGA
LGC
MACBAN
MOPOL
MOSOP
MOU
NAPEP
NDDC
NEMA
NEPA
NGO
NNPC
PDP
PRTVC
SEMA
SPDC or Shell
SS
SSS
STF
UMTH
UPTH
UST or RSUST
VOA

All Nigerian Peoples Party

Agricultural Services and Training Centre
Bakin Rijiya Youth Development Association
British Broadcasting Corporation
Christian Association of Nigeria (Christian umbrella organization)
Community-led Conflict Management Mechanisms
Community Development Committee
Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies (University of
Jos)
Centre for Ethnic and Conflict Studies (a unit of the Faculty of Social
Sciences, University of Port Harcourt, Choba)
Cable News Network
Church of Christ in all Nations
Centre for Peace, Diplomatic and Development Studies (of the
University of Maiduguri, Maiduguri)
Civil Society Organisation
Divisional Police Officer
Focus Group Discussion
Federal Government of Nigeria
Gender Based Violence
Government Reserve Area
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
Jamaatul ahl al-sunnah li daawati wal jihad (radical Islamic
organization commonly known as Boko Haram)
Jamaatu Izalatu Bida Wa Ikamatus Sunnah
Jamaatu Nasr al Islam (Islamic umbrella organisation)
Justice, Peace and Reconciliation Movement
Joint Task Force
Key Informant Interview
Klansmen Konfraternity
Kaduna State Development and Property Company
Local Government Area
Local Government Council
Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria
Mobile Police
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
Memorandum of Understanding
National Agency for Eradication of Poverty Program
Niger Delta Development Commission
National Emergency Management Agency
Nigerian Electric Power Authority
Non-Governmental Organisation
Nigerian National Petroleum Company
Peoples Democratic Party
Plateau Radio and Television Corporation
State Emergency Management Agency
Shell Petroleum Development Company
Senior Secondary
State Security Service
Special Task Force
University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital
University of Port Harcourt Teaching Hospital
Rivers State University of Science and Technology, Port Harcourt
Voice of America

GLOSSARY
Acha
Achaba
Almajiri
Aja
Alwali

Amanikpo
Ardo
Arne
Belle
Boko Haram
Brutali
Bulama
Butu
Chima Njibe
Dumba
Da Gwom Rwei
Deebam
Deewell
Egbesu
Egelege
Elegam Face
Emir
Garri
Gbenemene
Gen
Going
Greenlanders
Gwom Kassa
Gwom Kwok
Gwom Rwei
Gwom Sho
Haba
Hakimi
Icelanders
Imam
In sha Allah!
Juju
Jihad
Kabon
Kachalla
Kaikai
Kobo
Laga

A medicinal cereal for diabetic patients, Plateau State

Commercial motorcycle (same as okada)
Quranic student (pl. almajirai)
District head (Kanuri)
Representative (Arabic); in this context, a person (usually male) who
gives a bride away on behalf of her father or takes a bride on behalf
of the groom
An indigenous religious society in Ogoniland, exclusively for people
of middle age
Fulani traditional chief
Unbeliever; derogatory term in Hausa for non-Muslims
Pregnancy (pidgin English - pronounced bll)
Name popularly given to JAS
Cattle-routes (Fulani)
Village head (Kanuri)
10% return on produce (or tithe) from farmland (Kanuri)
Officials charged with managing water resources (Kanuri)
Dyke (Kanuri)
Berom paramount chief
A cult group
A cult group
An Ijaw deity
Aluu cultural festival of wrestling
A vigilante group (literally dont look at faces)
Paramount ruler (Hausa)
Cassava granules usually made into meal and eaten with different
local soups
Ogoni paramount ruler
Electricity power generating set
Another name for commercial motorcycle
A cult and militant group
Chief of Kassa village (Berom ethnic group)
Chief of Kwok village (Berom ethnic group)
Berom district head
Chief of Sho village (Berom ethnic group)
Oh no! Please! (Hausa)
Village head (Hausa)
A cult and militant group
Islamic prayer leader
God willing! (Arabic)
Indigenous religious institution
Islamic struggle (Arabic)
Those who constitute the local authority of a community (Ogoni)
Custodian (of the lake water, market, etc) (Kanuri)
Popular locally brewed alcoholic drink
Penny, cent (Nigerian currency)
Palm frond (Ogoni) usually pinned on the border between warring
parties or communities, especially violent ones, ordering a ceasefire
leading to negotiation. Disobedience attracts sanctions. Laga has
spiritual and symbolic meaning, and its pinning is accompanied by
incantations and invocations of spirits.

Lawan
Mago-mago
Mai(s)
Mai anguwa(s)
Mallam
Masquerades

Matching ground

Mene
Mishkaham
Mwaghavul
Miigia

Numana
Obenema
Oha or Uha

Okada
Operation Yaki
Ponzhi
Sallah
Sarki
Sarkin arne
Sarkin Hausawa
Sharia
Shehu
Sulhu
Torbake

Tom and Jerry

Town crier
Ulama
Umuada
UniPort
Wahala
Wakili
Wallahi
Waziri
Yussufiyah

Ward head (Kanuri)

Dishonest activity (Pidgin English)
King(s) (Kanuri)
Head(s) of a hamlet
Teacher, learned man (Hausa)
A feature of some indigenous religions. Masquerades are
ceremonial occasions involving masked dancers. The masks depict
deities, which play a key role in resolving disputes between devotees
by emphasizing relationship building, rewards and sanctions.
An illegal appeasement fee paid to a landowner or neighbours of
recently acquired land before commencing work on the land: more
recently demanded before the start or continuation of any project by
mostly jobless youths in an area.
Ogoni chief
Mwaghavul paramount leader
A cultural and spiritual festival particular to the Gokana people in
Ogoniland. Miigia is usually performed before the planting season to
request the gods to ensure good yam yields.
An indigenous ethnic group in Sanga LGA, Kaduna State
Traditional ruler in Imiringi
Tree forming a shrine worshipped by some groups or persons in
Aluu. The leaves are edible and are used in oha soup, eaten mostly
in the eastern part of the country
Commercial motorcycle
Security framework set up by Federal Government to manage
internal security in Kaduna State
Tarok paramount ruler
Muslim festival
Chief (Hausa)
Derogatory Hausa term meaning chief of unbelievers
Chief (Hausa); the leader of the Hausa community in a given place
Islamic legal system
Paramount traditional ruler (Hausa)
Islamic mediation process
A traditional divorce ceremony in Gokana, in which a marriage is
dissolved through the pouring of libations and speaking of
incantations
Cat and mouse (Disney cartoon characters)
Village messenger who goes around the town with a gong making
announcements
Teachers, learned men (Arabic)
A grouping consisting of daughters of a family, married or unmarried
(Ikwerre)
Common name for University of Port Harcourt
Trouble (Pidgin English)
Scribe or secretary (Kanuri)
By God! (Arabic)
Prime Minister (Hausa)
Another name for JAS (derived from the name of the late JAS leader,
Muhammed Yusuf); JAS members are sometimes referred to as
Yussufiyah

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1. RATIONALE AND AIMS OF THE STUDY
The Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) commissioned the
Community-level Conflict Management Mechanisms study (CCMM) in January 2012.
The study formed part of the background research for NSRPs design phase. NSRP,
which is initiated and funded by the UK Governments Department for International
Development, seeks to help reduce the negative impact of violent conflict on the
most vulnerable, in eight target states: Kano, Yobe, Borno, Kaduna, Plateau, Delta,
Bayelsa and Rivers.
NSRP is designed around four main strands of work. These deal respectively with:
Improving conflict management mechanisms
Reducing grievances about economic opportunities and distribution of
resources
Reducing violence against women and promoting womens active
involvement in peacebuilding
Contributing to improved policy and practice around stability and
reconciliation in Nigeria.
Early on in the design phase, the NSRP inception and design team identified a gap in
the existing knowledge base, namely that few detailed descriptions of the conflict
context of the target states were available. Such knowledge was necessary for the
design of all four components. The team aimed to fill the gap with two studies: a
review of conflict prevention actors and initiatives operating at state level; and an
examination of community-level mechanisms for managing conflicts. While informed
by the first study, the main purpose of the present report is to summarise the findings
of the second.
The overall purpose of the CCMM study was to document a peoples experience of
security and insecurity, in order to provide the evidence base for the community
dimension of NSRPs work. The study gathered evidence from people at community
level about aspects of security that affect them, and identified formal and informal
mechanisms for security, mediation and protection operating at community level
including traditional and religious leadership, local government, NGOs/womens
groups, media, police, army, and so on. Finally the study aimed to show the extent to
which these mechanisms link to LGA, state and national level responses, and to
suggest how NSRP could contribute to enhancing these.

2. METHODOLOGY
Locations and timing
The CCMM study took place in six states within three Programme zones: Yobe and
Borno in the North East, Kaduna and Plateau in the Middle Belt, and Bayelsa and
Rivers in the Niger Delta zone.1 NSRP commissioned three research centres to
carry out the research. These were:
The Centre for Ethnic and Conflict Studies (CENTECS), University of Port
Harcourt

1

Kano State was not included in the CCMM study, as it did not form part of NSRPs original slate of
target states.

 The Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies (CECOMPS),

University of Jos, and
The Centre for Peace, Diplomatic and Development Studies (CPDDS),
University of Maiduguri.
During January, February and March 2012, the research teams held several
meetings in Abuja to agree the detailed research plans for the three zones, and
develop the research methodology. Fieldwork was conducted between March and
April. The teams came together in several further meetings over April - June to
discuss the progress of the fieldwork, and to share findings.
Each research team first identified five communities to be the research sites. For the
purpose of the study, community was defined as a group either with a common
identity, or living under a common authority structure (or both). Communities in
Nigeria differ widely in form according to context, and research teams were directed
to take a common-sense approach to selecting an appropriate unit of analysis for the
study, adopting the unit most appropriate to the circumstances.
The primary criterion for selection of the research sites was experience of violent
conflict. Weight was also given to achieving a spread of urban and rural contexts.
Care was taken to ensure that, where communities had been divided on ethnic or
other grounds, all parties were included in the interview schedule. Priority was given
to communities where extensive social research had not previously been undertaken.
Researchers excluded locations in which they had personal contacts (with the
exception of the North East, discussed below). Finally, the physical accessibility of
the location and the safety of the researchers were also factors in selection.
Accessing communities and respondents
In all the sites selected, the research teams identified fieldwork assistants who would
act as gatekeepers into the community. These were residents of the communities
known to the centres in some capacity (often as university staff or as previous
research collaborators), who were willing to arrange the required permissions and
introductions, set up interviews and focus groups, assist with logistics, and so on. In
the North East, because of the extremely high security risks at the time, this plan was
modified, with researchers being deployed to their own residential areas, where they
were well known and could remain safe, thus acting as their own gatekeepers.
Researchers took a variety of approaches to sampling. In some areas it was
possible to be relatively systematic, whereas in others the teams relied on the
research assistants to identify individuals who were willing to be interviewed. By and
large the teams managed to follow the general guidance of interviewing roughly
equal numbers of men and women, and older and younger persons (i.e. above and
below 30 years of age).
Interview methods
The main method used in the research was open-ended interviews, designed to
allow respondents to tell their stories about the conflicts that they had encountered
and whether and how these had been resolved. The interviews were recorded by
hand in writing, as close to verbatim as possible.
The aim of this approach is two-fold: on the one hand, it gives researchers and
policy-makers access to real-life situations and views from the grass roots, while
on the other it provides respondents with a rare opportunity to articulate their feelings
and concerns and to channel these to people in authority.

Lead researchers practiced the methodology (through role plays, etc.) at workshops
in Abuja, and then trained their research teams in their zones. The approach, which
is relatively new in the Nigerian context,2 requires researchers to depart from the
more familiar structured and semi-structured interviews. In the event, interviewers
achieved varying degrees of success in managing this open-ended process, with the
result that some interview sets are more closely structured than others.
Nevertheless, the fact that ordinary community members took centre-stage in the
research process, articulating their experiences and opinions, is significant. It is their
narratives that provide the primary evidence for the analyses presented in this
volume.
The research team complemented these narratives with several other methods:
Focus group discussions with specific groups of informants (e.g. market
women, unemployed youth);
Semi-structured interviews with key informants (for example local government
chairmen, traditional and religious leaders, and civil society leaders); and
Secondary sources of information such as other research reports, local
government meeting minutes, etc.
The material generated by these methods supplements the narratives with its own,
unique insights into the conflict dynamics of the communities participating in the
study.
In total, 244 individual interviews were recorded, together with around 50 key
informant interviews and some 20 focus group discussions (each of which was made
up of 5-7 informants).3 The study as a whole has thus drawn on conversations with
approximately 410 individuals.
Constraints encountered in the fieldwork
In the North East, the fieldwork period coincided with a grave deterioration of the
security environment, especially in Maiduguri. This meant that considerable
adaptation was required in the deployment of researchers and the timing of visits to
communities. It also made communication with, and between, the research team
difficult. Security difficulties also hindered work in the Middle Belt, and adaptations
were similarly required to the composition of research teams on the ground.
Many respondents were keen to participate in the project by telling their stories.
However, for varying reasons, all the teams encountered a degree of unwillingness
on the part of individuals to be interviewed. In the Niger Delta, the study was carried
out during the farming season, and people were reluctant to leave their farm work to
be interviewed. In the Middle Belt, security problems created logistical difficulties,
and in some places it was necessary to field only female researchers to interview
women. In the North East, the team encountered a range of challenges, including
suspicion, especially from security personnel, expectations of monetary reward by
interviewees, and women being obliged to seek the consent of their husbands before
they could speak to the research team. However, anticipating these constraints, the
teams were able to respond effectively, for example by fielding women-only teams in
certain contexts, and providing clear explanations of the purposes of the research.

2

For an account of the oral testimony methodology, and examples of the approach from elsewhere, see
http://panos.org.uk/our-work/our-methodologies/voice
3

The verbatim texts of selected narratives are reproduced in Volume Two of this report. Transcripts of
the key informant interviews and focus group discussions were used mainly as background material
and, with a few exceptions, are not directly quoted in the reports.

10

Analysis
The narratives were analyzed through three related processes. In the first, a series
of meetings were convened in which the research teams reported back to each other
and to NSRP and presented their first cuts of typologies of conflict types and conflict
management mechanisms. These typologies were honed by discussion and mutual
comment. Secondly, the teams worked through the texts of the narratives, selecting
and codifying passages that threw light on or raised questions about the
emerging typologies, in order to build up a complete picture of the issues that was
rooted in the evidence from the interviews. Thirdly, draft reports prepared by the
lead researchers went through several iterations, as NSRP offered an external eye
and asked critical questions with a view to bringing bring out additional points.
While broadly consistent in their findings, the three zonal reports differ slightly in
format and in presentation. This is partly because of differences in the regional
contexts, which highlight different issues, and partly because research teams
developed somewhat distinctive frameworks from their own discussions.

3. WHAT IS IN THIS VOLUME

The report of the Community-level Conflict Mechanisms Management Study
comprises two volumes. The present volume, Volume One, contains four sections.
The first summarises the overall findings of the study, while sections two to four
present the respective findings from the three zones.
The reports in Volume One make liberal use of excerpts from the narratives in
illustrating the points made. A selection of these narratives is presented in full in
Volume Two.4
The overview continues with a brief description of the conflict background to the
three zones. This is followed by a review of the overall findings on the types of
conflict identified in the study and on the mechanisms for conflict management
encountered in the communities under study. The final section summarises the
overall conclusions of the study and its implications for NSRP. The three zonal
reports each have a broadly similar structure.

Narratives selected for inclusion are those that are quoted from in the reports. Code numbers link the
excerpts with the full versions.

11

OVERVIEW REPORT
1. BRIEF CONFLICT BACKGROUND TO THE THREE ZONES
1.1 NIGER DELTA
The states covered by the CCMM study, Rivers and Bayelsa, are two of the three
core Niger Delta states. 5,6 These states are dominated by oil and gas extraction,
and by grievances arising from the perceived marginalization of their local
populations from the benefits accruing nationally from oil wealth.
Much of the violent conflict in the two states has been anti-state and anti-oil
multinational, and has taken the form of attacks on oil infrastructure, oil personnel
and security agencies. In the past decade there has been a significant reduction in
outbreak of intra-communal and inter-communal violent conflicts. Moreover, many of
the past (and present) communal conflicts can be attributed to so-called divide and
rule strategies of the state and the oil companies. As part of their social license to
operate, oil companies are expected to invest some of their profits in community
development investment. However, to the extent that they have done so at all, they
are seen as having done so in ways that can inflame conflict within and between
communities, such as through the policy of selectively rewarding host communities.
Such conflicts involve friction over two main resources: on the one hand, the territory
from which oil is extracted, and on the other, the selection or election of community
leaders and representatives, designated to mediate relations with oil companies.
Alongside the general grievance narrative of resource control are other emergent
class, generational, gender and occupational perspectives. Youths generally blame
poverty, unemployment, lack of opportunities and corruption among traditional and
political elites for the violent conflicts. Other social groups, including women,
community elders, and government officials, for example, increasingly perceive the
resource control narrative as an excuse for indiscriminate violence and criminality
against the rest of society.
Ethnic grievance also seems to be reducing in intensity in the two states. The
creation of Bayelsa State in 1996, carved out from Rivers State, gave room for the
aspirations of the Ijaw people. In Rivers State, historical rivalry between Ikwerre and
Okrika has been managed politically and has not led to violent conflict in the past
decade. However, ethnic grievance remains particularly pronounced among the
Ogoni, who still recall the military brutality of the 1990s. Ogoni communities continue
to refuse to allow resumption of oil exploration and exploitation activities in
Ogoniland. In addition, the Ogoni are advocating for a separate state to be carved
out from Rivers State.
1.2 MIDDLE BELT
Plateau and Kaduna States, situated in the Middle Belt of Nigeria, share a number of
7
similarities in terms of their socio-economic and demographic characteristics. They
are multicultural societies, containing most of Nigerias minority ethnic groups, as

5

This section draws on Ukiwo and Naagbanton (2012) Mapping conflict prevention actors and
initiatives in selected states: report for Bayelsa and Rivers States NSRP.
6
The third core state is Delta State.
7
This section draws on Abdulrahman and Nwadinobi (2011) Mapping conflict prevention actors and
initiatives in selected states: Report for Plateau and Kaduna States NSRP.

12

well as a large number other ethnic groups, and including adherents of both
Christianity, Islam and African traditional religions.
The historical transformation of Jos, capital of Plateau State, to a cosmopolitan city
can be traced to the establishment of the tin mining business in the early 20th
century. This attracted miners and auxiliary workers from different parts of the
northern region of Nigeria. Kaduna, in contrast, emerged as a cosmopolitan city as a
result of having been the seat of government of Nigerias northern region during both
the colonial and the post-colonial regimes.
Conflict in these states has become progressively more and more violent since the
1980s and 1990s, triggered initially by disagreements over local government issues.
The divergent interests underlying this violence derive fundamentally from political
and economic factors. These include competition for land, livelihoods, and political
power and influence. The issue of indigeneity is a key component here: much
conflict is around the question of who can lay claim to and who is excluded from
ownership of land and other resources and benefits by virtue of being considered a
son of the soil. Different population groups put forward conflicting interpretations of
historical events to justify their competing claims.
Many inhabitants now perceive religious difference to be the main driver of violent
conflict. However, religion is arguably merely a vehicle for the expression of
differences: it has become a marker of identity, manipulated by political elites to
generate support. As a result of successive waves of inter-communal violence, the
pattern of settlement in key parts of the Middle Belt is now polarized along ethnoreligious lines. For this reason, the ethno-religious dimension of the conflict is often
construed as the main cause of conflict, as against the underlying structural factors
of bad government, corruption and political disenfranchisement.
1.3 NORTH EAST
In the past, Borno and Yobe had the reputation of being the most peaceful states in
the country. 8 However, in many parts of the zone (especially the state capitals and
main towns) extreme violence against citizens, by both militant Islamists and the
security forces, has of late become an everyday occurrence.
Both states experience widespread poverty, illiteracy and unemployment,
exacerbated by desertification and migration to urban areas, especially Maiduguri
(capital of Borno State). Maiduguri is also a famous historical centre for Islamic
religious instruction, and draws in thousands of religious students from across the
North every year. These students, known as almajirai, rely on charitable donations
for their survival. Population pressure in Maiduguri has led to the growth of
unplanned settlements around the town, many with no infrastructure or services.
These house thousands of vulnerable families with little means of making a living.
Young men in particular are vulnerable to being exploited, both by political interests
and radical ideologues.
The increase in violent actions by the Islamist group Jamaatul ahl al-sunnah li
daawati wal jihad (JAS),9 which saw a sudden spike around the end of 2011, has
brought untold danger to the population of the North East states, especially of their

8

This section draws on Isa and Allamin (2011) Mapping conflict prevention actors and initiatives in
selected states: Report for Borno and Yobe States NSRP.
9
Jamaatul ahl al-sunnah li daawati wal jihad (or JAS for short) is the name the group gives to itself,
while Boko Haram is the name that others ascribe to it. NSRP policy is to refer to it by its proper name.

13

main cities. This has only been exacerbated by the heavy-handed responses of the
security forces, which often seem intent on punishing, rather than protecting, the
population.10 As in the Middle Belt, many inhabitants of the North East view religion
as the driving factor in this conflict. However, the JAS phenomenon, and the
response to it, are perhaps more instructively seen as a reflection of failure of
governance and of deteriorating institutions and values a lack of communication
between government and governed, unpopular government policies, youth poverty,
illiteracy and unemployment, political violence, and the militarisation of youth.

2. TYPES OF CONFLICT ENCOUNTERED

At one level, the evidence presented by the narratives about the types of conflict
encountered in the different zones tallies broadly with existing characterizations of
those zones, with the Niger Delta dominated by resource conflict, the Middle Belt by
ethno-nationalist identity conflict, and the North East by the JAS crisis. However, at
the same time, the evidence demonstrates the danger of over-simplification. A wide
variety of types of conflict, including violent conflict, was found in all areas, the
difference between the three zones being one of emphasis.
The three zonal studies employ slightly different typologies in analyzing the conflicts
enumerated by respondents, reflecting, as already noted, both differing local
circumstances and the respective analytic perspectives of the research teams.
However, the conclusions of the analysis are broadly similar across the three zones.
Evidence was gathered in the study about different forms of conflict, including the
following broad categories:
domestic and family conflicts, such as marital discord, arguments between cowives, disagreements between brothers over inheritance, and some rare (and
mild) cases of disagreement between parents and children;
inter-personal conflicts, for example boundary disputes between neighbours,
problems between landlords and tenants, competition between young people
over boyfriends and girlfriends;
intra-communal conflict, ranging different sections of a community against
each other (such as indigenes and settlers, adherents of different religions,
followers of competing leaders, or different users of a natural resource such as
water);
inter-communal conflict, in which neigbouring communities conflict over land or
access to services, often entailing mutual retaliation over generations;
conflict between communities and the authorities, often expressing general
discontent arising from indifference on the authorities part, poor governance,
unequal access to services, and poor or poorly implemented policies. Youth
unemployment is consistently the most urgent and critical complaint.
Research teams also explored the content of conflicts mapped (noting some overlap
with its forms as listed above). Predominant themes are conflicts over resources,
domestic violence (including violence against women and girls or VAWG), ethnoreligious identity conflicts, traditional rulership tussles, and political conflicts.
2.1 CONFLICT OVER RESOURCES
Land and land-related resources emerge as possibly the single most consistent and
widespread objects of contention, frequently entailing bitter and often violent conflict,

10

Amnesty International (2012) Nigeria: trapped in the cycle of violence London, Amnesty International

14

in all three zones. Contention over such resources features as the content of
disputes in all the forms of conflict listed above. Land disputes divide families, as
when brothers compete over their inheritance, and competition for scarce land often
underlies inter-communal strife. In the Niger Delta, respondents frequently alluded to
encroachment on neighbouring land (for example by farmers allegedly disregarding
or moving traditional boundary markers). Land is frequently implicated in political
conflict, including complaints of officials presiding over corrupt land allocation
arrangements.
Conflict arises both over rights of land ownership and over rights of use. The latter is
particularly prevalent in the North East and Middle Belt, where conflicts between
settled farmers and nomadic cattle-keepers are widespread. Farmers accuse
pastoralists of allowing animals to damage their crops and pollute domestic water
sources, while pastoralists complain of encroachment on their traditional
transhumance routes and grazing land, as well as of cattle-rustling by farmers.
Water is another major source of conflict, especially where it is a key factor in
sustaining livelihoods. In addition to the Middle Belt, where shared access to water
by animals and humans was raised by several respondents, the communities in the
North East which border Lake Chad also report major conflicts over water
management. In this case the issue is over-fishing by Hausa immigrants (building
catchment dams across those already built by others), which threaten traditional
conservation practices and provide Hausa fishermen with a commercial advantage
over the indigenous Kanuri and Shuwa.
Resource conflict is most prevalent, however, in the Niger Delta, where oil
exploration and extraction have had multiple and devastating impacts on the natural
and political environment. Environmental degradation caused by oil spills and gas
flaring has drastically reduced the viability of agriculture and fishing, once the main
sources of livelihood for the majority of Delta communities. After years of
campaigning, activists obtained promises of compensation from oil companies, and
some such measures have been undertaken. Forms of compensation include both
cash payments to owners of oil-bearing land, and in-kind benefits such as
employment, scholarships and community development projects. However,
respondents frequently expressed the view that these measures were not only too
little, but were being administered in a way that divided communities. They also
accuse local leaders of colluding with oil companies to channel benefits for
themselves and their associates.
There are several deep-seated reasons for the prominence of natural resources, and
land in particular, as sources of conflict. Firstly, these are a key economic resource,
which figures prominently in the livelihoods strategies of individuals, communities,
and groups. When demand starts to outstrip supply, demand for land rises to critical
levels, and competition becomes acute. Secondly, peoples personal, emotional
attachment to land and associated property has a significance which goes beyond
the economic, and represents a motivating force in decisions about where and how
to live. Displacement is a fact of life in all three zones to some extent or another,
though nowhere more so than in the Middle Belt. Many Middle Belt respondents
described the emotional traumas of being driven from their homes and waiting for the
moment they could return. Thirdly, as territory, land is intricately tied in with
questions of group identity, with contested histories of arrival, displacement,
settlement and resettlement, and with associated values of rights, entitlements, and
belonging.
2.2 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS (VAWG)

15

Domestic violence and violence against women were reported to be commonplace in

all three zones. Many husbands are said to beat their wives, to fail to provide for
them economically, to seek to control their behaviour, and to restrict their access to
economic opportunities. Although such behavior was widely said to be deviant, only
a few cases were reported where protests for example by the wifes family were
successful in restoring peace. Polygamy may also generate friction between women
of the same household or neighbourhood, for example conflict between co-wives, or
competition between women marrying into a household for the approval of the
elders.
Beyond the household, respondents considered young girls to be particularly
vulnerable to sexual abuse by older and more powerful men in the community.
Poverty exacerbates this vulnerability. The presence of security personnel, such as
Joint Task Forces in some areas, was said by some respondents to present a risk to
girls. Girls are often driven by economic necessity into hawking or other economic
activities that take place in public space, and may find themselves dependent on
soldiers for protection and support. These protectors may then take advantage.
Respondents asserted that criminal gangs exploit women in similar ways.
There were many reports of women being abused during episodes of violence, by all
sides. As one respondent from the Middle Belt commented:
What the media has failed to do is to stress the plight of women in the crisis so
that the whole will know how terribly women are affected by the crisis. I know
of about fifty women in this community who suffered from sexual violence
during the crisis. Nothing has been done to help these women (B3.1).
Indeed, sexual violence against women at times of conflict has become an
inseparable part of the reality and discourse of ethnic strife, with each side alleging
that they themselves protect women and respect their rights, while the other
consistently fails to do so.
2.3 ETHNO-RELIGIOUS IDENTITY CONFLICT
Identity conflict is most pronounced, and has had most violent repercussions, in
Plateau and Kaduna States. As indicated above, ethno-nationalist dynamics have
been an increasing feature of this multi-cultural zone although they are often
represented as being religious in nature. Hausa and Fulani on the one hand are
predominantly Muslims, and both of these are relatively recent incomers into the
zone. On the other hand the indigenous communities (Tarok, Berom and other
smaller groups) are mainly Christian. Conflicts over land or over political influence
may have an ethnic or political basis, or be simply a matter of economic interest, but
will most likely be viewed as having a religious colour.
Whereas in the past conflicting groups lived together in relative peace, successive
waves of violence have led to what one respondent called Tom and Jerry behaviour
(B1.1), or mutual reprisals and counter-reprisals. These events have progressively
split communities, forcing one side or the other to relocate to a safer environment.
Their subsequent attempts to regain land, houses and other property are generally
fraught with confusion over title, and often in turn give rise to further antagonism. A
notable feature of inter-communal antagonism in the Middle Belt is that all sides feel
excluded and discriminated against, and perceive the other as being privileged in
access to services, treatment by security forces and the media, and the like.

16

Similar identity conflicts between indigenes and settlers occur in the North East. The
current conflict with JAS could itself be described as ethno-religious, in that ethnic
grievances in the context of the Federal state have been translated into a militant
religious discourse. Moreover, the religious discourse of JAS has led to large
numbers of Christian non-indigenes leaving the zone as a result of the threat of
violence. Little ethnic conflict was referred to by informants in the Niger Delta.
2.4 TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP TUSSLES
Conflicts around political positions and appointments were common in all zones.
In the North East, many respondents expressed disquiet that titles and roles
that had traditionally been inherited, such as ward headships, are now elected.
This has left the door open for politicians to manipulate voting to ensure the
success of their own clients. Accounts were given of hereditary occupants and
their supporters being discriminated against, and sometimes physically attacked.
In the Niger Delta, a high proportion of respondents similarly complained that
chiefs and local government leaders have been corrupted, in this case by the
introduction of monetary and non-monetary benefits given out by oil companies.
These community leaders play a key role in distributing these benefits in the
community, and are not averse, it is said, to making secret deals in their own
favour.
In both the North East and the Middle Belt, respondents mentioned disputes
connected with the emirate system. This system, originally established in the time of
Northern Nigerias pre-colonial Muslim empires, and adapted for the purposes of
colonial indirect rule, still exists. Although the emirs have much reduced statutory
powers, traditional title-holders remain influential. Questions were raised in some
narratives over the extent of the emirs jurisdictions, including their jurisdiction over
non-Muslims in their areas.
2.5 CONFLICTS WITH OR ABOUT POLITICAL AUTHORITIES
Conflicts that could broadly be described as political appear in the narratives in a
number of guises. In the Middle Belt, for example, the issue of indigenes and
immigrants is highly complex, given the patchwork of ethnic communities interwoven
throughout the zone. In these circumstances, political representation in governance
institutions, such as local government councils, is fraught, and a frequent focus of
discontent.
The most significant single political conflict documented by the CCMM study is the
conflict in the North East involving the JAS. The extreme and indiscriminate violence
meted out by JAS, and subsequently by the security forces in response, has had
extremely wide and serious impacts on those living in the zone. Narrators gave
many graphic descriptions of the loss of life, property, livelihoods, services and
businesses that this violence has engendered. They also regretted the social impact,
in terms of the reduced social interaction between neighbours and the reduced
diversity of the population. Many non-indigenes have felt obliged to relocate
elsewhere. Since these were often key actors in the local economy, their departure
has had a further negative effect on local markets and services.
Opinions differ as to whether the JAS conflict is best described as political, religious
or social. However it is defined, it appears to be an expression of discontent with
government and with governance generally, and such restiveness is a common

17

thread running through the three zonal studies. Everywhere, people decry a
government and a political system whose members appear to be exclusionary, out of
touch and indifferent to peoples suffering. The vision of one respondent from the
Middle Belt, who depicted political leaders as sitting in their mansions watch[ing] us
die on CNN (B4.11) sums up the general mood.

3. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS

3.1 TRADITIONAL AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
Traditional institutions arose from the pre-colonial and colonial systems of
governance and were subsequently integrated into the modern governance structure,
although playing an ancillary role and subsidiary to elected (or military) governments.
State governments and local government councils both have subsidiary, advisory,
structures incorporating traditional leadership. Having been in place for many
generations, they are recognized locally as being an inherent part of the culture of
the community concerned. In Nigeria, government assigns these institutions limited
roles on the bottom rung of the ladder of judicial, political and administrative
authority, for example as mediators in marital disputes. Religious institutions include
churches, mosques, and their organizations, as well as those of traditional religions.
There is some overlap between traditional and religious, since in some
communities traditional temporal leaders such as emirs are closely linked to their
spiritual counterparts. Institutions here refers to both the organizations (churches,
mosques, etc.), and the authority-holders (chiefs, ward heads, pastors, imams,
priests, for example), as well as practices such as praying for peace or carrying out
sulhu mediation.
It is clear from the narratives from all three zones that traditional and religious
institutions are by far the most widespread and most trusted mechanisms for
resolving disputes between individuals and families on an everyday basis, and that
they have on occasion played significant roles in mediating in inter-communal
violence and in promoting peace.11 Respondents ascribed their popular acceptance
to their closeness to the people and the trust people have in their integrity. Moreover,
approaches to dispute resolution used by traditional and religious institutions tend to
be restorative (aiming at dialogue and compromise) rather than retributive (i.e.
seeking to allocate blame to one side or the other). Respondents frequently
commented that traditional and religious methods of dispute resolution get to the
bottom of problems, while formal processes merely pass judgment, allowing the
cause of the problem to resurface at a later date. The fear of mystical sanction is
also said to be a factor in the effectiveness of traditional religious arbitration, which
often involves oaths and other ritual mechanisms, believed to have severe
consequences for those who do not respect the truth or abide by the decisions of the
priests or elders.
However, despite the faith that people have in these mechanisms, respondents also
made it clear that they are not immune to corruption. Especially in the Niger Delta
and in parts of the North East, researchers were told that some chiefs and other local
authority-holders use their positions for personal gain for example by selling land
titles to more than one buyer, or by charging illegal arrangement fees for granting
land access and that people may get better justice by going through the courts, if
they can afford it. Generally speaking, traditional and religious mechanisms are seen

11

A particularly important example is the inter-faith dialogues which have proved significant in
peacebuilding efforts in the Middle Belt.

18

as the poor mans high court: if the less privileged are drawn to these, it may be
because they have no real choice.
Women tend to be relatively poorly served by traditional and religious mechanisms:
the functionaries, advisers or mediators are mostly men, and the status quo, which
they are inclined to uphold is generally a patriarchal one. However, examples of
women mediators in the traditional or informal sphere do emerge from the narratives.
Many communities (see particularly the Niger Delta report) have womens leaders,
who in some cases have the power to call men to account, or who have taken part in
formal peace negotiations between communities. While these were largely
responsible for managing a fairly limited range of issues (mainly domestic disputes
and conflicts between women) this was not always the case, and there appears to be
no effective bar on women taking more onerous responsibilities in such structures.
3.2 COMMUNITY INITIATIVES
Some community-based and non-governmental organizations (CBOs and NGOs)
have played a role in solving intra- and inter-community conflicts. These include:
Interfaith reconciliation and peacebuilding projects: these are found mainly in
the Middle Belt, where Christian and Muslim leaders and associations hold joint
meetings and other activities to exemplify values of mutual tolerance and
respect. In Dadin Kowa (Middle Belt) for example, local leaders have agreed a
practice of publicly exploring and resolving every incident of inter-communal
violence in turn, while urging their co-religionists to resist the temptation to
respond. This method appears to have reduced the incidence of violence by
modeling non-violent responses in preference to reprisals.
Womens groups: womens groups and women leaders have traditionally
played a role in settling disputes between women, in several parts of the three
zones. Respondents from Omuokiri in the Niger Delta described how women
leaders have also played roles in reconciliation initiatives in the wider
community, albeit mainly within the confines of domestic disputes. Although it is
rare to find women playing political roles of any sort, some women respondents
have taken part in dispute resolution, including at the inter-community level.
Community development projects: given the universally-articulated view that
poverty and unemployment are the major drivers of conflict in all three zones, it
is surprising that so few respondents referred to initiatives to address the
economic dimensions of violence through community development. However, a
few such projects - for example micro-credit programmes for youth were
mentioned.
Individual initiatives: some narratives describe efforts by individuals to swim
against the tide and reach out to the other side. Often the individuals who stand
out in such narratives are local office-holders such as LGA chairmen or village
heads, who take their responsibilities to serve all citizens impartially
exceptionally seriously. These may involve an exceptional level of bravery
which is rarely acknowledged. An example quoted by a Middle Belt respondent
was the village head who was assassinated after negotiating safe passage for a
group that was under attack (B1.7). It is also appropriate to mention the former
governor who sent relief supplies to Barkin Ladi after a violent incident, and
insisted in the face of opposition from his own people that both Christians
and Muslims should receive them (B1.11). These individual initiatives stand out,
however, as being exceptional.

19

3.3 OFFICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

Government has often played a positive role in conflict management, through the
police and the judiciary, through regulatory bodies such as rent tribunals and social
welfare committees, and through its efforts at mediation and crisis management.
Respondents in all three zones commended the police for their role in patrolling crisis
zones, and in maintaining order by pursuing miscreants. However they do not
consider that the police have lived up to expectations in this regard. While people
acknowledge that the police are constrained by lack of resources, they also allege
that they are often excessively slow to respond, or that their response is less than
impartial. A narrative from the Middle Belt, for example, describes an incident in
which police waited outside a village while an attack was taking place, later claiming
that they had not received an order to intervene (B1.7). While there have been recent
moves to develop stronger police-community links,12 respondents in the study made
no discernable references to these.
At the political level, government (state and LGA) has often in major violent disputes.
In the war between K-Dere and B-Dere for example, state and local government
officials played an acknowledged role (alongside the security forces, religious
leaders, and others) in promoting a cessation of hostilities and setting up monitoring
committees. Respondents saw state government policies and interventions as
having been essential in bringing the activities of militant cults in the Delta under
control. However, effective actions of this sort appear surprisingly few and far
between, and stem largely on the commitment of individuals willing to use their
authority to promote non-violent conflict management.
3.4 PEACEKEEPING BY SECURITY FORCES
Generally speaking, respondents did not question the legitimacy of armed forces
presence in their zones for the purpose of keeping the peace. This has become
necessary in the Niger Delta zone because of the criminal activities of some cults
and confraternities and the criminal activities; in the Middle Belt by the frequent
outbreak of inter-communal violence, including that exacerbated by the activities of
JAS; and in the North East by the rise of JAS and its violent militancy. There is no
doubt that the armed forces (typically Joint Task Forces or variants as deployed to
the different zones) have been effective at times, and on such occasions have
earned the respect of the population. In the K-Dere-B-Dere conflict mentioned
above, the JTF intervened to keep the peace swiftly, and followed up with patrols
which continued until the situation had been stabilised. In this instance, the JTF
maintained effective links with the monitoring committees, who provided it with early
warning information that enabled it to make rapid responses when security appeared
threatened. Respondents from other areas also sometimes mentioned positive
examples of JTF involvement, for example where a local JTF commander helped
resolve a dispute or gave constructive advice.
However these examples elicited comment because they were the exception rather
than the rule. In contrast, respondents also described incident after incident in which
army (and sometimes police) personnel exercised disproportionate and unjustified
force, resulting in the deaths and injuries of innocent people. Respondents claim that
many women have been unjustly widowed, and many girls abused, by security

12

Security, Justice and Growth Programme (2010) Safety and Security: summative review and toolkit
Abuja, DFID and British Council.

20

forces, and that no acknowledgement or compensation had been forthcoming. Many

narratives signify that the security forces have lost peoples confidence through their
violent and discriminatory behaviour. This is the case in all three zones, but is
particularly marked in the North East.
In general, then, mechanisms for resolving conflicts do exist, and are being applied in
all types of conflict. However their effectiveness and reach are in all cases limited.

4. IMPLICATIONS FOR NSRP

The message from the CCMM narratives is clear: people are desperate for peace,
but have little confidence in the capacity of their leaders to deliver it. Moreover,
although they desire peace, many find it hard to overcome mistrust of the other.
While a few individuals are prepared to make strenuous efforts for peace, they are
swimming against the tide.
The narratives underline five key conflict factors that reappear in each of the three
zones:
Unemployment, and especially youth unemployment, which raises levels of anxiety
and discontent in the population at large and renders young people (and especially
young men) vulnerable to manipulation by politicians and criminal gangs. Moreover,
unemployment is so widespread, and so apparently intractable, that it instills a sense
of hopelessness and lack of ambition for the future, a sentiment expressed time and
again by respondents, and especially male respondents under the age of 30. This
hopelessness is fertile soil for the violent acting out of grievance. The narratives
suggest strongly that economic revitalization of poor communities in the three zones,
including the generation of employment and self-employment opportunities for young
men, is likely the single most significant strategy that government could adopt to limit
violent conflict.
Violence by security forces: The JTFs mission is to keep the peace and protect
citizens, and for the most part citizens in principle accept this mission. However, on
the evidence of the CCMM narratives, security forces repeatedly overstep the mark
by responding disproportionately to militant threats. This adds to the reluctance of
the population to cooperate and share information with the security forces, further
limiting their capacity to respond. Promoting a more constructive relationship
between the security forces (especially the JTFs, the army and the police) and the
populations they are responsible for protecting, must be seen as a security priority.
Lack of access to justice: Citizens often struggle to find effective mechanisms to
resolve disputes. The formal court system is beyond the reach of the most
disadvantaged, both because of its cost (in lawyers fees, etc) and the length of time
taken to process cases, and because of its cultural distance from the traditional
mechanisms of arbitration with which people feel most comfortable. However
traditional mechanisms too have disadvantages, as traditional authorities themselves
lose credibility, as allegations of corruption and political interference grow
increasingly frequent.
Indifference by government: The fact that government (LGA and state) is perceived
as being distant from the people is clearly a cause for concern. Politicians are
discredited as self-seeking and corrupt, and government officials frequently viewed
as being partial to their own people. The feeling that the authorities cannot be
depended on comes through the narratives strongly and repeatedly. In these

21

circumstances it is hardly surprising that people turn to their own communities for
resolution, or to take matters into their own hands.
Indigeneity: Narratives from all three zones reveal tensions between indigenes and
settlers, insiders and outsiders. These find their expression in low-level conflicts,
such as between landlords and tenants, but can also escalate to serious acrimony
between communities of settlers and outsiders over access to employment, services,
property, and political positions. In the Middle Belt this tension has long reached
crisis proportions, with the issue of indigeneity driving repeated waves of violence
and consequent displacement, impoverishment and retaliation. The CCMM
narratives lend weight to the view that the indigeneity provisions in the Nigerian
constitution may need to be critically reviewed.
In short, the fundamental driver of conflict in the three zones is revealed to be a crisis
of governance. Faced with what they see as indifference, or worse, on the part of
the authorities, people will increasingly be tempted to take matters into their own
hands. Confidence can be restored, however, if government shows itself to be proactive in addressing the problems of unemployment, unaccountable security forces,
poverty, a poorly functioning judicial system, and constitutional barriers to equal
treatment.
The narratives suggest some possible ways forward for NSRP and others seeking to
reduce the now acute levels of violence in the three zones. The first approach is
strengthening local capacities for non-violence. Perhaps the central lesson to be
drawn from the CCMM study is the importance of community-based mechanisms for
conflict management. People have most trust in mechanisms that belong to the
culture of their own communities mechanisms that they are familiar with, whose
personnel are trusted members of the community, and which promote community
cohesion as well as decisions on individual cases. Because these are trusted, they
also serve most effectively to limit aggressive or violent conflict.
However there is no doubt that these mechanisms could be made more effective,
most particularly by strengthening local leadership and enhancing the capacity of
local leaders to manage conflict non-violently. Many cases are remembered of
individuals who have made personal sacrifices for peace. But these are generally
isolated examples how can we learn from them and spread their impact?
A second strategy is to promote conflict-sensitive discourse. However much
respondents yearn for peace, the persistence of heartfelt and long-standing
grievances in one faction or community against another is clearly a major
impediment to achieving reconciliation. Each violent incident hardens the resolve of
those targeted to defend themselves by hitting back. In the long run, however, the
only solution is dialogue, and the slow progressive healing of deeply-entrenched
antagonisms. NSRP and its partners especially its media partners - can promote
non-violent communication, and also model it themselves though conflict-sensitive
ways of working and communicating.

22

A. NIGER DELTA REPORT

INTRODUCTION
The Niger Delta region comprises nine of Nigerias 36 states. It occupies a landmass
of 70,000 square kilometres, and is inhabited by about 30 million people and some
40 ethnic groups. It is a densely populated region, and an area of high ecological
value, a third of which is wetland. It is believed to contain the worlds third largest
mangrove and fresh water swamp.
The Niger Delta has nearly 200 oil fields with well over 400 oil production and
storage facilities scattered within its swamps and creeks. Facilities includes flowstations (plants which separate oil and gas) and manifolds (pipes that carry oil or gas
across land areas, for example to a tank for measurement or storage, or to a
production line). Multinational firms, including Shell, Mobil, Chevron, Total, Agip and
Panocean, operate these facilities in joint ventures with the Nigerian National
Petroleum Company (NNPC).
The presence of the oil industry has exacerbated conflict throughout the region.
Residents have for many years had expectations that the presence of the oil industry
in their communities would bring material advantages, but they generally feel that it
has not translated into any meaningful development. The consequences of oil
production and its impact on the environment and society of the Delta are well
known. The region is widely affected by environmental degradation caused by oil
spills, as well as protest movements against the failure, by both government and oil
industry, to protect the interests of inhabitants. These have led to the growth of
militias, cultism and criminality as means of livelihood (curtailed somewhat since
2010 by the Niger Delta amnesty). What is less well known is the ways in which
these phenomena have contributed to conflict and violence at the local level, the
impact on local people and communities, and the ways in which they have learned to
cope with the resource curse of oil.
The Niger Delta study was carried out by the Centre for Ethnic and Conflict Studies
(CENTECS), which was established in 2003 (though it became functional in 2005) as
a unit of the Faculty of Social Science, University of Port Harcourt. The Universitys
aim in establishing CENTECS was to enhance its capacity to research critical issues
facing the region. CENTECS has developed expertise in conducting research that
provides evidence-based information to contribute to addressing the problem of
conflict in the Niger Delta, in Nigeria, and in Africa more generally. The NSRP
inception study on documenting community level conflict management mechanisms
fits with CENTECS programme and its history of research on community-level
conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms (for example on the Ogoni of Rivers
State) even though this is its first study specifically on mechanisms for managing
conflict.
The aim of the Niger Delta study was to provide the NSRP with information and
analysis about community-level conflict management mechanisms in the Niger-Delta
region (specifically Bayelsa and Rivers States), with particular reference to the formal
and informal conflict management and security mechanisms which operate in the
zone.

1. METHODOLOGY

23

The main component of the study was fieldwork, which took place over
approximately five weeks during March and April 2012, in five locations in Rivers and
Bayelsa States, namely:
1. Omuokiri-Aluu in Ikwerre Local Government Area of Rivers State
2. K-Dere and B-Dere in Gokana Local Government Area of Rivers State (two
villages in close physical proximity to each other)
3. Diobu in Port Harcourt Local Government Area of Rivers State, focusing on the
largest community in Diobu, Nkpolu-Oroworuokwu
4. Ogboloma in Yenogoa Local Government Area, Bayelsa State
5. Imiringi in Ogbia Local Government Area of Bayelsa State
These communities were chosen because they are known to be the sites of violent
conflicts, they are easily accessible, and there is limited existing documentation
about them.
The methods used for collecting data were qualitative, mainly comprising openended questions administered to a range of stakeholders. Methods included indepth individual interviews (of which 106 were conducted), key informant interviews
(KIIs, of which there were 22) and, in three cases, focus group discussions. For the
in-depth interviews, data was collected in the form of narratives from people who
have direct personal experience of different types of conflicts in their communities
and the ways in which they had been managed. Focus groups were an opportunity to
hear issues which might not emerge from interactions with individuals. This is
because participants may be reminded in a group of an issue which they might
otherwise forget,. The purpose of key informant interviews was to collect information
from individuals such as community leaders or those with professional knowledge of
the community.
These community experts, with their knowledge and understanding, were able to
provide insight into the nature of problems and the management mechanisms
present in their communities, and present recommendations for solutions.
Fieldwork was complemented by a review of secondary sources. In addition, the
lead researcher asked two groups of people to comment on the first draft of the
report. Firstly, the full research team held a meeting to provide their comments on
the analysis presented in the report. Secondly, the full research team held a
validation meeting to confirm the conclusions. Key respondents from each of the five
communities attended this validation meeting.

2. CONTEXT DESCRIPTIONS
1. Kegbara-Dere and Baranyonwa-Dere (commonly known as K-Dere and BDere, and together as K-Dere/B-Dere) are two communities separated by a main
road which make up Dere, a community in Gokana Local Government Area of Rivers
State. The population of Gokana Local Government as at the 2006 census was
228,828.
K-Dere and B-Dere are rural communities. The main occupation of the people in KDere is trading. B-Dere however is a farming community, and has many intercommunal conflicts over land with neighbouring communities.

24

Dere hosts the giant Bomu oil field (situated in K-Dere) and has many of the 96 oil
wells in Ogoni land. Oil is also pumped through the Bomu manifold13 from
elsewhere. However, oil is not currently being produced in K-Dere. This is because
the inhabitants put a stop to oil production in their communities in 1993, as a result of
environmental degradation and also because the oil companies refused to pay
royalties to them and assist with the development of the community. Despite its
contribution to the wealth of the country, there is no evidence of development in this
community.
2. Diobu (Nkpolu-Oroworokwo), Port Harcourt LGA of Rivers State, is an urban
area. Nkpolu-Oroworokwo is the largest of the three communities that make up
Diobu, and its population is estimated to be between 25,000 and 30,000. It is this
community that hosts the Rivers State University of Science and Technology (UST).
It also hosts the biggest market in Port Harcourt, and the large village called Ikoku,
known as a mechanics village because of the large number of car mechanics and
vehicle spare-part shops that are there. As a result of this, they claim their
community is the economic heartbeat of Port Harcourt LGA and even of Rivers State
as a whole.
This community has many problems relating to land; according to the inhabitants,
government and outsiders have confiscated their land, and so they do not have any
land to farm. Therefore, most of them work as civil servants or are engaged in trade.
The domination of the area by cults has been a key factor promoting conflict in
Nkpolu-Oroworokwo. The two main cults were Deebam and Deewell, which were
affiliated to the (more widespread) Klansmen Konfraternity (KK) and Vikings cults
respectively. Cults drew members from amongst the youth of most of the
communities in the area, although not all young people in the communities joined
cults. Many young people, supported by elders and chiefs, opposed the cults and
set up vigilante groups to resist them. A combination of initiatives by police and
security forces has helped to constrain the influence of the cults, which is now
negligible.
3. Omuokiri-Aluu, Ikwerre LGA, Rivers State, is a peri-urban area and one of the
nine communities that make up Aluu town. The main language spoken here is
Ikwerre, though there are other ethnic groups in the community because Omuokiri is
close to the University of Port Harcourt, and so staff and students from diverse ethnic
backgrounds have made it their home. The dominant religion is Christianity, as the
people of the community claim they have dispensed with their traditional religion;
there is also a small Muslim community, to which the chief of the community in fact
belongs. The major occupation in this community is farming, although there is
scarcity of land, an issue reflected in the large number of conflicts relating to land
which plague the community.
Omuokiri is governed by the council of chiefs, who represent the paramount ruler of
Aluu. Currently there is a chieftaincy crisis, in which the legitimacy of the present
incumbent is questioned. The chieftaincy of Omuokiri hereditary, and alhough the
person on the throne a member of the ruling family, he is not its oldest man and
some claim that he does not therefore qualify to lead the community.
4. Ogboloma, Yenogoa LGA, Bayelsa State, is one of the ten communities that
make up the Gbarain clan in Bayelsa State; it is a rural community, with a population

13

The Bomu Manifold is a major pipeline collection centre that conveys crude oil from Shells Eastern
Division operations through the Bomu-Bonny trunk-line to the Bonny oil export terminal.

25

of around 7,000. The dominant occupation in this community used to be fishing, but
the inhabitants claim that due to oil spillage, they hardly see fish in the creeks, and
fishing in this community is now minimal.
The people of Ogboloma have a very structured dispute resolution mechanism. It is
hierarchical in nature and follows this order: compound heads14 Ogboloma town
council Ogboloma council of chiefs - Gbarain council of chiefs (the chiefs of the ten
Gbarain communities). This structure is inter-linked in the sense that a case is first
taken to the compound head before it is referred to the town council or council of
chiefs depending on it severity.
There is a heavy presence of Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC or
Shell) and oil servicing companies conducting oil exploration in this community.
5. Imiringi is a rural community pertaining to the Kolo clan in Ogbia LGA, Bayelsa
State; it. The inhabitants speak the minority language of Ogbia, a dialect of the Ijaw
language. Their tradition traces their origin to Ogbeyan, who is the founder of all the
clans in Ogbia communities.
The predominant occupation of the people in Imiringi was farming, with a few
persons engaged in minor occupations like fishing during the fishing seasons and
lumbering. However, with the emergence of Shell Exploration Company, most of
these economic activities have had to be abandoned as a result of environmental
degradation.
The people have a democratic political system in the sense that they choose their
traditional rulers through the ballot box or voting system. However, at the family level
the oldest man in the family is automatically its head.

3. TYPES OF CONFLICT IN THE STUDY AREA

Conflict seems endemic to the Niger Delta. According to Okoh (2005), the typology
of conflicts in the Niger Delta region is as follows:
inter-community conflicts (as a result of long-standing disputes between two
or more communities; unsettled boundary problems; disputes over oil-bearing
land; or incursions into community land);
intra-community (due to long standing disputes between individuals within a
community; political marginalisation by a ruling ethnic group or class; an
unacceptable traditional ruler, or embezzlement of compensation by community
leaders);
community versus oil companies (presence of oil installations in a
community; non-payment or inadequate payment or unduly delayed payment of
compensation for polluted land and water resources, abject poverty due to
displacement, loss of livelihood arising from pollution of farm lands or fishing
waters); and
community versus government (caused by the parlous state of existence
and material conditions prevalent in the Niger Delta region, low level of
government presence, nonchalant attitude of government towards the plight of
the people of the Niger Delta and marginalisation by government).

14

Ogboloma is made up of five compounds. Compounds are made up of people of the same kindred
i.e. they have a common ancestry going back several generations.

26

This typology accurately describes the conflicts encountered in this study. However,
the research team found it rather narrow compared to the range of conflicts
encountered in the field, and rather limited in terms of the themes around which
conflicts are manifested. Accordingly, the team adopted the following categories:
land conflicts (including conflicts over environmental issues), leadership disputes,
inter- and intra- communal conflicts, and interpersonal conflicts.

3.1 Conflicts over land and environmental resources

As well as being the origin of Nigerias oil wealth, the Delta is a densely populated
zone. There is thus intense demand for, and pressure on land. The Delta, is also
one of the most fragile ecosystems in the world (Ojo 1996).
Conflict over land is prevalent in all the communities studied, and manifests in a
variety of ways. In some cases, these are boundary disputes between neighbouring
communities; in others there are competing claims over the ownership of farmlands,
especially where land is fertile. Conflict over land is of course intensified, when a
disputed area is expected to yield royalties from oil companies. Another form of
conflict is that between communities and oil companies when environmental
degradation has been caused by oil exploration or extraction.
Many interviewees attested that conflict over land was acute, not only in their own
communities but over the whole Niger Delta. One of the main occupations of people
in the Niger Delta is farming. During the farming season, there is a lot of tension
between farmland owners, with neighbours and even brothers accusing each other of
encroaching on their land to plant crops or build houses. Where the encroachment is
considered to be deliberate and mediation fails, the issue may result in violence.
Inter-communal conflicts may also involve conflicts over farmland, as in the case of
B-Dere and Biara, in which the two communities accused each other of encroaching
onto their farmland. According to a respondent, the Biara crisis was over our
farmland. The Biara people have been encroaching on our farmland and we sent
people to tell them to desist from that, and the reply to our message was an attack
from them. (A1.1)
Some land conflicts arise from contested sales of family- or community-owned land,
for example when one section of a family sells off land which is considered to belong
to the wider family, and thus not to be sold without the agreement of the whole
compound. Such problems are exacerbated in oil-bearing communities, because of
the compensation that landowners get when oil companies discover oil on their land.
As the following quotation illustrates, an expression of interest by an oil company can
foment or revive earlier disputes over land:
The second land dispute usually occurs when oil is discovered in a piece
of land that rightfully belongs to a compound or an individual family. The
compound or individual that has a boundary with the piece of land that oil
has been discovered in will start laying claims to that land. This is done in
order to be part of the people that will get compensation from SPDC.
(A4.1)
In both Ogboloma and Imiringi, landlords (i.e. those on whose land oil has been
discovered or an oil facility built or pipelines established) find themselves in conflict
both with each other, and the wider community, especially over the formula whereby
compensation is shared between the land-owners and the community. In Ogboloma,
land belongs to the individual and so the individual or the family is expected to
benefit more from royalties:

27

Another serious cause of conflict is in the community among the landlords

themselves. For instance, if oil is struck or discovered in that community,
landlords fight among themselves that the land belongs to them. A lot of
these disputes over land amongst the landlords end up in court. (A4.7)
the family I married into has land with oil. Another family will lay claim to
that land. If the other family is faster, they go ahead of us to collect money
from Shell. When we go to Shell, they say but you people have collected
the money. That is, the other family has come before me to collect the
money meant for us, and this causes serious confusion. (A4.14)
In Imiringi,
The conflict they have amongst themselves is where the owners of land
that have oil are claiming sole ownership of the oil, instead of claiming it
with the community. As a result of this, there is division in the community.
They are in conflict over the formula whereby the value accruing from oil
discovered in peoples land is shared between the owner of such land and
the community. Some are advocating for one-third for the owner of such
land and his family, and two-thirds for the community. (A5.2)
Respondents differed as to the role of chiefs and elders in improper land sales. For
some, sale by individuals is undermining the power of chiefs as custodians of the
land, whereas others see the chiefs themselves as acting against the interests of
their people.
today there is a lot of corruption among these so-called chiefs and
elders. What they do now is to go to the bush with a surveyor and mark
out the plots of land the way they like. What is in the survey plan is
different from what is actually or physically on ground. The extra will be
later sold by them without anybody knowing. families start seeing
different faces on their land claiming ownership of certain portion of land
when they know that never sold any portion to anybody. (A3.2)
Young men in Omuokiri were particularly incensed at these practices by
their elders:
It happened that the elders were taking the land and selling to outsiders
instead of giving to us who deserve it. It was supposed to be given to us,
that is, we the youths, when we get to marriageable age. The greedy
chiefs, instead of giving us, prefer to sell to strangers so they make profit.
If they give it to us, it is free of charge. They will not make any money
from it, but when they give it to the strangers they will make millions.
(A3.18)
In Omuokiri, there is tension with the University of Port Harcourt, which occupies
community land which belonging to the community.15 According to this respondent:
We have issues with the University of Port Harcourt over land as well as
other things that came up because the university is one of our tenants. ... I

15

In October 2012, six months after the fieldwork for this study was carried out, four University of Port
Harcourt students were killed by a lynch-mob in Omuokiri, ostensibly as a reprisal for thefts of computer
equipment. See http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/10/uniport-four-different-versions-of-why-they-wereth
killed/ (accessed 5 December 2012).

28

will appreciate it if the university will give us more of what she has given
us already. If you check the number of senior staff of the university from
this community, you will see that it is very small. Im suggesting that this
should be increased and the number of our children been admitted
increased as well. (A3.2)
When these expectations are not met, conflict arises between the community and the
University.
One of the perhaps perverse consequences of the high profile of land conflict in
Rivers and Bayelsa States is that many families encourage their children to study
law. This phenomenon was particularly encountered in Diobu, where a respondent
explained that this is because of the level of litigation over land in their community:
In fact, because of the rampant fight over land in Diobu, most families
have decided to educate at least one of their children in college or
university to become a lawyer, so as to defend the family when dispute
over land arises. (A2.4)
This point also suggests the courts are seen as having a key role in resolving land
disputes: people feel the community-centered mechanism, particularly the council of
chiefs, can be compromised, producing outcomes favourable to the wealthier party.
Going to the courts, as long as you have a good lawyer, is considered to offers a
better chance of getting justice than using a compromised community mechanism.
The presence of oil companies, and the confusions introduced by their practices, is a
major problem in these communities. According to Platform, a London-based
campaign group focusing on the social, economic and environmental impacts of the
global oil industry:
...oil companies in the Niger Delta are widely accused of having their own
unwritten divide and rule policies to control local opponents and enforce
continuous oil extraction. Shell and other companies have made huge
payments to a wide range of groups in order to buy compliance and stave
off hostility. This serves Shells short-term business interests, but the
infusion of cash has fed conflict and instability. (Platform 2011: 26)
Many respondents opined that the existence of oil, and the potential wealth it might
bring to those on whose land it is found, exacerbates the potential for conflict over
land. In part, this is because more is at stake, they are inclined to fight harder.
However, oil companies exacerbate matters by get embroiled in local divisions when
they approach communities to discuss compensation. Respondents reported that
Shell in particular was guilty of divide and rule tactics. A common complaint is that
the oil companies employ the divide and rule strategy deliberately, to cause
disaffection and conflict among and within communities, and that they achieve this
through discordant compensation. According to Ejibunu (2007), the divide and rule
tactic used by Shell is a major source of the Niger Delta crisis, and is deliberately
directed towards those who are vocal and stubborn. This is what respondents had to
say:
SPDC also uses divide and rule style to create problems amongst us.
They will give money to some chiefs here whenever we request for
something. When we insist on getting what we are demanding for, they
will tell us that they have given so, so and so chiefs money for the
community and this generates a lot of trouble for the community. (A4.2)

29

Shell always makes use of divide and rule policy in this community and it
always brings conflicts among our people. This has always stifled our
infrastructural development here. There is no unity among my people.
They suppose to work together and decide on what to ask the SPDC to
do for the community so that everybody will benefit. The general masses
are denied what they suppose to gain from the oil companies. (A5.1)
There is also the issue of environmental degradation. The oil companies are
perceived to be wrecking the fragile ecosystem of the region through continuous oil
spillage and gas flaring. Gas flaring converts hydrogen sulphide to sulphur dioxide,
which, when it mixes with oxygen and water in the atmosphere, produces (sulphuric)
acid rain. As described by a respondent, If you build a house the zinc roof changes
because of gas flaring all sorts of sicknesses, and our crops do not do well (A4.1).
On top of this, oil companies have generally failed to live up to their promises of
bringing development to the communities they have despoiled, and a frequent
complaint from respondents was the high levels of underdevelopment both in the
region as a whole and in the particular communities affected, which regularly lack
even basic services:
SPDC has been operating in this our community, but there is nothing to
show for it in terms of infrastructural development. Look at our community
and tell me if it looks like a place where SPDC has operated for decades!
SPDC has flow station and manifold here but the company has not done
much to better our lives. Shell has only built a six-classroom block for the
community. SPDC has not provided employment for our youths. (A4.2)
You know that out of the 96 oil wells in Ogoni, about 54 of such oil wells
are located in K-Dere, but nothing to show for it. You know that
unemployment among the youths portend trouble in the community. Most
of youths have nothing doing. Some are graduates and they are
wallowing and wasting in the community and they will embrace any form
of vandalizing and conflict because an idle mind is a devils workshop.
(A1.5)

3.2 Leadership tussles

Another common form of conflict in the Niger Delta is struggle over traditional
chieftaincy. All the communities visited had experience and views to share on this
issue. The general view expressed was that most people who vie for chieftaincy titles
do so because of the royalties they can obtain from oil companies operating in their
community, along with other material benefits:
On the issue of chieftaincy positions, people are greedy and hide under
the guise of community interest to advance their selfish interests. People
who hold these positions are usually consulted on all contracts and vacant
jobs available - this is why they struggle for the title. (A5.7)
The major conflict in our community is the chieftaincy problem. When the
former paramount leader was not leading the community properly and he
was about to be replaced, instead of stepping down, he formed his own
group to fight those trying to remove him. This problem is most serious
when money comes into the community. (KIIs Dere 2)
Conflict can be especially bitter when an incumbent who is challenged refuses to
step down. For example, in Omuokiri, the chieftaincy is owned by a family,

30

specifically the first son. If the heir to the throne is not old enough and there is no
male adult in the family, the throne is given to someone in another family to act,
pending a time when the heir is old enough to rule. But, as a respondent described:
Conflict ensues when the original family that owns the kingship now has a
legitimate son that can take over the kingship, and demands for this, and
the family that was given the kingship pending a time when the original
family that owns the kingship would produce somebody, now refuses to
relinquish the throne. (A3.1)
Another situation arises when the family, instead of installing the first son, goes
ahead to install a younger one, maybe because he has more money or influence
than his brother. A case in point is the current chieftaincy holder in Omuokiri, whom
much of the community has rejected:
Although one Chief A is the paramount ruler of Omuokiri, he enjoys less
support from most community members, especially members of his own
family. The contention is that he is not the most senior member of the
family. The parties are still contesting the chieftaincy case in court. (A3.5)
However, the eldest son rule may be tempered by other factors such as the
primacy of the founding family. In the Omuokiri case, one faction in the village
sought divination from an oracle, which confirmed that the rightful chief was not
only the eldest, but the eldest specifically of the founding family:
where the oldest man came from, the family is not the founder of the
community. The first son was among the other two families which by
inference the staff of office should be handed to the rightful person.
(A3.17)
For K-Dere/B-Dere, according to a key informant, the chieftaincy crisis they had in KDere was caused by politicians who meddle in the chieftaincy issue by imposing their
candidate on the community, particularly because of what they will gain from the oil
wells in the community:
But there was a time when the traditional stool became politicised by
politicians. They tried to deny the traditional ruler his right to the stool.
This brought about misunderstanding and conflict of interest and other
vices. (KIIs Dere 8)
The consequences of leadership vacuums when such conflicts occur can be crippling
to the life of a community, though they rarely lead to physical violence. The Omuokiri
crisis for example was described as having the following consequences:
The situation led to a balkanization of the community and no recognition
of the Community Development Committee (CDC) leadership, youth
leader and elders. Disputes are resolved within the family and not with the
chiefs. there is no group to resolve conflict There is no central
shrine, land and boundary adjustment Prior to the leadership tussle,
the CDC was a medium through which disputes were resolved and the
community was organized. Since the death of the paramount ruler and the
tussle over who replaces him, there is no recognition of the current
leadership (of the chief and the CDC chair) (The chief) can only call
personal meetings, and the meeting of the community at the village
square between people do not recognize him. (A3.7)

31

In Imiringi, despite a system of election for chiefs, a dispute over chieftaincy

paralised the communitys ability to negotiate for the provision of basic services such
as water and electricity the position of a paramount ruler became more contentious
because of the money that comes to the community through the paramount ruler
from the oil company (A5.6). The conflict began to become violent and was only
resolved through the intervention of the Joint Task Force (JTF), and its insistence on
joint rule by acting chiefs representing the two factions involved in the conflict.

3.3 Divisions between and within communities

Inter-communal conflict in October 2010 between the two communities composing
Dere led to serious loss of life and property and was reported in the press at the time.
B-Dere respondents also described other, less high-profile, conflicts with
neighbouring communities, over land encroachment and over motorcycle transport
franchises. The other four study locations did not report significant conflicts with
other communities.
In K-Dere/B-Dere, on 19th December 2010, a minor disagreement over an English
premier league football match being watched at a football viewing centre in B-Dere
community, led to a bloody communal war between the two communities. This
involved killings, and the burning of houses on both sides over two days. According
to press reports, the problem started when members of K-Dere community visited
neighbouring B-Dere community (separated from their own community only by a
street) to watch a Manchester United vs. Arsenal match. During the match, a
member of the host community (B-Dere), supporting Arsenal, angry at seeing his
team loosing, attempted to switch off the generator powering the TV. The visiting
members of K-Dere community felt aggrieved, tempers flared, and soon the quarrel
assumed a communal dimension.
Members of the two communities tell the tale in different ways. From B-Dere:
The cause of B-Dere and K-Dere conflict started from a football viewing
centre A K-Dere boy alleged that his handset was stolen when the
generating set at the viewing centre went off while they were watching the
match. When power was restored, he insisted that everybody there must be
searched, which was done but no handset was found... Once they crossed
over to their side of the community, they raised the alarm, saying that BDere people stole his phone and were beating him and his friends. K-Dere
people trooped out that night and without warning started beating B-Dere
people living along the road and burning their houses along that major road
that divided the two communities. (A1.2)
From the K-Dere side, the view was rather different:
The B-Dere crisis was as a result of some young men watching football
match and in the process fight broke out because someone was accused of
stealing telephone. The football game is the immediate cause of the crisis,
while jealousy over K-Dere oil wells is the remote cause of the conflict.
(A1.9)
Each community had a story that emphasized their own role as the victims:

32

K-Dere people especially the youths came out in great numbers and
started burning B-Dere houses along the major road that divided the 2
communities. (A1.1)
The next thing that happened that night was that B-Dere youths started
burning the K-Dere houses along the road. (A1.7)
From the perspective of key informants who were members of the joint peace
committee constituted as a result of this conflict, the crisis resulted from a battle for
supremacy between cultists.16 There were cult groups in both communities, and
these had a long history of rivalry: the football match and the lost (or stolen) handset
created an opportunity to clash:
Somebody from K-Dere said while watching his handset was charging
and when he went and asked for it, it had been stolen and with his cultist
attitude, he said if it is not found, he will cause trouble. (KIIs Dere 8)
In the view of some respondents, the incident during the football match was just the
trigger for long-standing enmity between the two communities to erupt The target
of this attack is not just phone or football match but a long strong foe between the
two communities that had lingered to the point that we dont intermarry, especially
our girls (A1.21).
The effects of the conflict were many and far-reaching:
The conflict brought a lot of instability in the community; everybody feared
for his or her life. Women were not going to their farms and market. Men
who normally go out in the night to drink and meet with their friends were
no longer doing that. Everybodys movement was restricted and children
were not going to school. Non-indigenes in the community ran away for
safety of their lives. (A1.4)
B-Dere boys burnt my house, the whole compound. I was on the way
running when they were burning it The compound has been in
existence for 30 years and one day some useless boys come and burnt it
down to ashes. We ran down to Kpor during the crisis. We stayed in Kpor
for 4 months. We heard from Kpor that our compound was burnt. I felt
very bad. All my documents, property, everything that I had struggled for
was burnt in one day because when we were running away, we were
running for our dear lives we had to escape because the boys were killing
people...It affected my health so much. As you can see I have aged so
much, I am not as old as you see me I am even using a walking stick
because of my health, which went down as a result of all the things that I
lost during the crisis. (A1.12)
Conflicts between communities tend to be of long standing and to be
manifested in numerous ways. Competition between B-Dere and Kiara, for
example, was described thus by one respondent:
Presently, there is no conflict between B-Dere and Kiara people because
B-Dere has avoided using the road belonging to Kiara because Kiara
people said B-Dere people should not use the road. The worse aspect of
the conflict situation, beside the stabbing and beating of B-Dere okada

16

Members of Deebam and Deewell cult groups

33

riders, was that Kiara people went to our farms to destroy our yams and
cassavas. This destruction of B-Dere farmlands were all consequences of
the conflict between both communities. (A1.10)
Intra-communal conflicts described by respondents included many different types,
often linked to the issues of land, leadership positions, and access to development
benefits arising from the presence of oil companies, as described above. Tensions,
generally not violent, were also described between youth and elders, between
indigenes and incomers, between Christians and pagans, and between those who
have money (who are able to gain access to political office and influence decisions)
and those who do not.
The pagans have an organisation called amanikpo17 society, whose
festival comes up about the Christians Easter period and this caused a
hell lot of trouble. We reasoned with them and told the amanikpo
society to shift their festival after the Easter period because the Christians
in our community cannot shift Easter celebration themselves, as it is a
global thing. (A1.7)
conflict arises when some individual from some families want to
continue in office indefinitely without adhering to the single tenure already
agreed on. This political office makes them rich because of the
amount of money they steal but it also makes them some god in the
community. (A2.10)
another problem we are facing is conflict between the indigenes and
immigrants or strangers in our midst. prior to this time when our boys
were angry with each other, they can hardly tolerate any misbehaviour
from strangers in our midst. However, now our boys have decided to
ignore conflict situation as a way of maintaining peace in the community.
(A2.9)
During election people are blackmailed for voting the party that is
not of the opinion of others.At election grounds during election,
sometimes fight break out because of conflict over who is to be
voted for. A person is usually forced to vote for a candidate against
their choice. (A1.6)
Since landowners are generally indigenes, tension between indigenes and incomers
is often overlaid by parallel disagreements between landlords and tenants. Tenants
complain that landlords make frequent and unjustified rent increases. Non-indigenes
may also lament their restricted access to justice and employment. Cultural
differences (or stereotypes) may also reflect and add to tensions. As one woman with
a business said:
I have noticed that work is only for the people of Imiringi. Also as a nonindigene, you must get permission before you do anything in this
community. There are cases of a married man dating many women in
this community. Also there are many women getting children from different
men here. It is common among these people and only God knows how they
manage such atrocities. The women like their men folks are also very
lazy and any money they get end off in drinking beer and local gin. (A5.4)

17

Amanikpo is an indigenous religious society in Ogoniland in which only people of middle age are
allowed to participate. Members have to undergo an initiation process.

34

Tension between the educated and the uneducated was also documented. Some
educated people feel the uneducated reflect badly on the community, and are
resentful at the absence of the opportunities to which they consider their education
should entitle them. The uneducated, on the other hand, say that the educated lord
it over them and believe that they should make all the decisions in the community:
Look at the type of people that are made the paramount chief and CDC
chairman - stack illiterates, and the so-called CDC chairman is always
drunk. With these kinds of people how can this community move forward?
My father ruled this community as a substantive paramount chief for 18
years, and with a masters degree I am teaching in one of the schools here
in the community. I never enjoyed any form of scholarship from my state
government or SPDC. (A5.1)
There is a lot of grievance and fighting between the educated and the
uneducated. Some lay allegation on the educated at the village shrine or
pick unnecessary quarrel out of the grievance of not being educated.
(A3.13)
Such attitudes to education even penetrate the formation of cult gangs. As the same
respondent pointed out, members of the Deewell cult (which is associated with
Icelanders) tend to be uneducated, while the Deebam cult is linked with the Vikings
and consists mainly of undergraduates.
Cults were implicated in a number of conflicts described by respondents, most
particularly in Diobu, where the community was dominated by the Deewell and
Deebam cults. This led to a serious crisis, resolved only when other youth from the
community fought back:
The most prominent of all conflicts was the Deebam and Deewell cult
groups. The Deebam was affiliated to the bigger cult group known as KK,
whereas Deewell was affiliated to the Vikings cult group. The conflict
caused by these two cult groups manifested in 2006 when a popular and
prominent member of this community was killed in a cold blood. (A2.2)
The crisis caused by the cult groups had a very destabilising effect on the
community. During the period of violent conflict caused by the cult groups,
most of tenants18 ran away with their families. Some relocated to other
communities and states. The revenues we were getting from the shops
and residents ceased. The communitys reputation went down. The
children were not going to school and there was no night life again.
Everybody was afraid even to move about during the day. People locked
themselves in their houses once it is 6.00 pm. (A2.1)
Cult groups have in many cases transmuted into criminal gangs, whose ready
access to firearms has hardly been reined in by the amnesty.19, In some cases, their
activities have been checked by local vigilante groups, although, as in the case
below, only by taking the law into their own hands:

18

Tenants are non-indigenes, that is, those living in the community but not from there; most of them live
in rented apartments.
19
The government of Umaru Yar Adua introduced an amnesty for Niger Delta militants in 2009 in an
effort to disarm them, restore peace and stability, and remove obstacles to oil production. Beneficiaries
receive a stipend and are offered opportunities to train and find employment. The amnesty is widely
perceived to have succeeded in reducing violence, at least to some extent.

35

The cult groups have now dispersed and engage in serious criminal
activities such as armed robbery and car snatching. These cult groups
have grown because they have leadership recognized by the government.
The situation is made worse because after the government granted them
amnesty, many of them did not surrender their arms. They use these guns
and firearms to commit crime. The young boys in the community formed
vigilante groups [which] applied the jungle justice method (i.e. instant
execution) for any suspected cult members arrested or caught. (A2.10)

3.4 Interpersonal conflicts:

Most of the interpersonal conflicts described by respondents took place within the
family. Often this is connected with inheritance, especially conflicts over the division
of property between the wives of a polygamous household after the death of the
husband. Conflicts over inheritance also occur when the deceased has concubines
who have born children to him. Generally speaking, women do not inherit property,
but may access it through their children. Conflicts then arise between the children of
wives, i.e. between half-brothers.
The case of inheritance is still present in our community. This is because
an average Ikwerre man always marries more than one wife. There is
always a conflict whenever the man dies. The trouble is always who gets
what. (A2.3)
A man died in this our community leaving behind four wives and 15
children. his children were small, and before he died two of the wives
had separated from him. Being that the first wife was still marrying him
before he died, the first wife and the son seized the whole property. After
some years when the other small children grew up, they confiscated their
fathers property. The younger sons ganged up and beat the elder son
for not giving them their share and they chased him out of the house.
They also ran out for fear that their elder brother will retaliate later.
(A5.14)
The inheritance of businesses can also be a cause of contention, as happened in a
long-running saga in Omuokiri, in which two wives failed to agree on how to share
their late husbands shop:
The man had many houses and he gave the first wife his store in the
market and the younger one a room to do her beer parlour business.
the first womans children narrated that it was their mother who suffered
with their father to build the house before the second wife was married.
So just because of partiality, their mothers right was given to the second
wife. The argument became tense because the both women came with
their kinsmen to deliberate on the matterThe children of the second
women decided to go and be selling but all the money gathered were
taken by the other elder womens children. (A3.21)
Respondents talked as well about divorce, marital conflict and domestic violence.
The type of conflict I am aware is prevalent is gender based violence
(GBV). I have experienced on many occasion men beating up their wives
to the point of injuring them. In one occasion, a man injured his wife

36

because she beat up children born by another wife, they engaged in a

quarrel and he injured her and she was hospitalized. (A3.12)
One of the respondents this community gives us a personal experience:
My problem is with my husband. He physically abuse me by beating me
and threatening me with a knife. I caught him cheating with my sales girl.
When I ordered the girl out of his car, he became very furious, and said I
was embarrassing him. Then my husband used knife to chase me out of
the house and threatened to kill me. The knife threat made me become
helpless and have a feeling of less worth, and low self-esteem I was
forced to move back to my family house. (A3.9)
Another form of conflict within the household is conflict between women living in one
compound, including between co-wives:
The first wife did not have children after eight years of marriage. When the
second wife was brought in, three months after, the first wife had to leave
the house. This led to the meeting of the wives in the compound and the
husband was asked to bring back the first wife. When the woman returned
back the love of the first wife and the husband became very strong to the
point that the second wife became jealous. (A3.20)
Unwanted teenage pregnancy is widespread in the study areas and also a
source of conflict. Thie following narrative encapsulates some of the issues
concerned:
For youth and unplanned pregnancies, this always occurs because young
ones are unemployed and an idle mind is the devils workshop, some of
our youth both males and females are unemployed and at times
relationships ensue and pregnancies occur. However, we dont see such
as a big thing because most of the times, the youths in question come
together as husbands and wives. It is only on rare occasions that the boy
denies, and when such happens, the boys family is told to pay what we
call damage fee to the girls family. The baby is given to the boys family
and the boy when the baby is over a year of age. (A4.4)

4. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND MEDIATION PROCESSES

The effectiveness, or otherwise, of the management of conflict is itself largely
dependent on how well the causes of the conflict have been understood, and no-one
understands them better than those in the community itself. According to Oruwari:
For successful peace building, it is necessary to establish
institutions and mechanisms for: sustaining and expanding peace;
revitalizing cultural norms and reconstructing governance systems;
and for strengthening communities and stakeholders to have the
capacity and skill to contain to conflicts and able to reach out for
reconciliation with one other. (Oruwari 2006)
An advantage of community-based methods is that they gives participants an equal
chance to express their views, generate options and influence the final decision. The
approach to arbitration tends to be are restorative rather than retributive, so that
judgments permit friendships and other relationships to be restored. All of the
communities that we visited have effective conflict management mechanisms which

37

are still being used, even though some complain about them being polluted by
corruption, as this respondent says:
Some of the educated and enlightened members of this community have
advised the council on the manner they adjudicate over matters and the
need for transparency in their judgment. This has not been adhered to
and that is why people who can afford it seek redress in the court of law
because they feel they cannot get a fair judgment from these corrupt
chiefs and elders together with the village cabals. (A3.2)
Similarly, according to Nweke (2012), the role of traditional institutions in
managing social conflicts in the Niger Delta communities has been reduced to
nothing but vested economic interests. The study confirmed this: participants made
complaints that most times, traditional mechanisms are compromised by the
avariciousness of office-holders, allowing the most influential or richest person, even
if in the wrong, to triumph.
Yet despite these shortcomings, most people are still more inclined towards in
community mechanisms than more formal methods, which may be very slow in
reaching judgment, and involve considerable expense:
For me I prefer community management because if you use lawyers they
will cut your head with their prices... Also, court cases last too long. If I
have a case, I prefer to solve it in the community than going to court.
(A4.11)
Traditional arrangements generate peace more than the political because
each community knows what is expected of them. It is settled by giving
them different roles in the community so they will function properly.
(A3.17)
The study identified five management or mediation mechanisms operating at the
community level, namely: traditional governance institutions, religion, communitybased organisations, security forces (the joint task force and the mobile police), and
the government.

4.1 Traditional governance institutions:

Orji and Olali, (2010:402) describe traditional institutions as the indigenous
political arrangements whereby leaders with proven track records are appointed and
installed in line with the provisions of their native laws and customs. According to
Nweke,
Traditional institutions are the custodian of their peoples norms, cultures
and practices. In most African settings, just as it is obtainable in the Niger
Delta, selection of persons into the offices of traditional institutions is
hereditary or by selection or election by the instrument of relevant
traditional methods. (Nweke 2012:206)
Conflicts are managed through these institutions based on the customs and
traditions of the community. In all the communities visited, respondents attested to
the fact that the traditional institutions of governance played the lead role in conflict
management in their communities. The situation of Ogboloma is representative of the
five study locations:

38

The council of chiefs is the highest conflict management forum in this

community and all the rulings of these councils are documented. The
council of chiefs manages conflicts, apportions blames where necessary
and imposes fines, and also asks the guilty party to apologize to the other
party. (A4.2)
Traditional institutions of governance see to any type of conflict from land to marital;
in fact in some communities, they see to the issue of unwanted pregnancy. In
Ogoniland, the council of chiefs have a particular approach to handling marital
conflict:
About community problems, like husband and wife own, it is the work of
the council of chiefs in the community...They call both parties and ask the
fault. If they cannot marry together, they tell them that if they cant live
together they should separate but if they can live together they give
advice and tell them to go... If both of them refuse to marry again, 20 there
is something called torbake21. That is when the council of chiefs will
stand, the man will touch the libation and it will be said to him with effect
from today go in peace, nothing will happen to you, I wont think bad
about you, stay in peace. From that day, divorce starts. This method is
stronger than courts. If you do anything against the woman or the man,
you will die. If the man says he wants to marry the woman again, you
have to redeem everything22 and it is tough. (A1.2)
Regarding land cases, the five communities follow a process broadly similar to that of
Ogboloma:
The issue of land is always by the council of chiefs. The parties involved
are invited to appear before the council after one person must have
reported the case to it. The council of chiefs will go and see the land
physically and pins or plant a live tree at the boundary after they have
heard all the evidence brought on the matter. (A4.3)
In Ogoni land, the paramount chief or gbenemene, along with community-level
chiefs, plays a key role in regulating inter-community conflict. After mediating in
violence between two Ogoni communities, the gbenemene and his council of chiefs
arrange a cease-fire which is symbolised by the pinning in a public place of a laga23
or palm frond. The pinning of the laga is accompanied by pronouncements made by
the chiefs administering, telling both parties that once the laga is pinned they have
agreed to a ceasefire and should be ready for dialogue, which should lead to peace.
Non-respect of this agreement, which has been agreed by the whole clan, is
thereafter not tolerated:
If we do not like the fight, the gbenemene and council of chiefs come and
pin the laga. When they pin the laga, if anyone removes it they fall into a
lot of trouble. All the Gokana people, when they pin it, they call
representatives from the whole of Gokana. The aim of laga is to stop fight
and seal an oath. (A1.12)

20

I.e. if they refuse to continue in the marriage.

Torbake is a traditional divorce ceremony in Gokana.
22
I.e. make a repeat bridewealth payment.
23
A raffia palm frond used to symbolise a cessation of hostilities between communities.
21

39

They pinned the laga in Biara and B-Dere town square with an oath that
we should not fight anymore. They believe that the laga is the toughest
law among the elders. If the laga is not respected the whole of Gokana
will turn against the community. The whole Ogoni uses it. (A1.2)
Chiefs are selected by a variety of methods. In some communities, the chief is the
eldest son, or the eldest son of the founding family. In others, the main families in
the community hold the chieftaincy in rotation, while in Imiringi all chiefs above the
level of the family are elected. Very few chiefs are female, though some
communities include in their governance structures women and youth leaders, and
some chiefs councils include, or at least co-opt, respected women. Women
respondents generally did not indicate any dissatisfaction with their treatment at the
hands of the chiefs. However, a story told by an Omuokiri man illustrates conflicting
attitudes by chiefs towards women as constituents:
There was a time a woman from this community summoned a paramount
chief to the Aluu council of chiefs. A chief protested that no woman has
the right to summon them; another chief opposed him and said that
anybody that is wrongly treated has the right to summon the council of
chiefs. The chief that objected that a woman should summon them raised
the argument that it will be shameful on them if a woman should defeat a
paramount chief before the council. The woman was allowed to state her
case and after the whole hearing, the judgment was delivered in favour of
the woman. (A3.2)
Several communities covered in the study are structured around established clans,
subdivided into families. Elder male members of these families oversee the
behaviour of individuals within these structures. For example, in Diobu an elders son
exhibited anti-social behaviour: compound elders imposed sanctions, backed up by
the chiefs, with the threat of ostracism:
The compound elders had to summon him to appear before the council
and he refused. A meeting was fixed and the town crier went round and
announced the time for the meeting. The chiefs gathered with the elders
family and counselled his first son of his action. While the son was trying
to defend himself the father, who is one of the chiefs, ordered him to keep
quiet. At that point he knelt down and apologizedThe final judgment
was that he will pay for the treatment of the youths that were badly
injured, pay the fine of N10,000. However, if he refuses to pay he should
leave the community. The chiefs reminded him that if he does not pay,
subsequent land allocation will not get to him and nobody will cook in any
of their family burial. This method of ostracism makes one an outcast and
nothing good like sharing of royal rights gets to you. (A2.20)

4.2 Religion
Religion also has a role in managing conflicts. Christian churches often intervene in
disputes for example, an Anglican Church dignitary, along with the Gokana council
of churches, was instrumental in managing and resolving the conflict between KDere and B-Dere. Pastors are also called upon to assist in family disputes, as in this
case of a conflict between two brothers:
The church pastor brought out a Bible, water and salt and mixed them
together. He read a portion of the Bible and they all prayed. At that point
the Bible was given to the younger brother to say love will exist among

40

them. The elder brother responded amen. The elder one also was given
the Bible to hold and affirmed the same statement love will exist among
them. The younger also responded amen. The salt and water was given
to them to drink and swear that no more will harm each other. After they
drank the water, the elders asked them to embrace each other. Their
mother started crying and later prayed for the son and asked the spirit of
their father to forgive the boy. (A3.22)
Indigenous religious beliefs are also invoked in disputes: the leader of the religious
group, representing the deity, acts as mediator in disputes, gives advice to the
parties, and oversees the implementation of mediated decisions. An important
element of religious conflict-management, especially with the indigenous religions, is
that it has the capacity to impose binding sanctions to ensure that decisions taken by
chiefs, elders etc. are followed.
Specific rituals also have conflict management functions for instance in property
disputes, inter-community conflicts, and divorce. In Gokana Kingdom, for example of
which Dere is a part, people resolve hostilities between communities by pinning up a
laga (raffia palm), in a visible communal area in both communities. When there is a
conflict between two communities, the council of chiefs from the entire kingdom
come together and call a meeting to start the process. Once an agreement is
reached and a ceasefire called, the chiefs go to both communities and pin the laga,
at the same time pouring a libation (of alcohol) and making pronouncements about
what will happen to those who fail to respect the agreement. This represents a
ceasefire rather than a final resolution of the conflict. After the laga has been pinned,
anyone who removes it would be fined heavily and the chiefs may also impose other
sanctions. The laga was pinned during the K-Dere and B-Dere crisis.
Some types of dispute, such as adultery and land conflicts are frequently resolved in
the priests shrine. In fact, disputants may sometimes, instead of reporting a case to
the paramount ruler, simply proceed to a priests shrine to lodge a complaint. The
priest invites both parties and settles the matter. People resort to the shrine because
they believe it cannot be compromised and mystical judgment is quicker and more
effective.
Modern and traditional religions exist side-by-side in the Delta, interacting in varying
ways. Respondents did not follow any consistent pattern in the way they relate to
Christianity and local religions. Some communities said they have done away with
their traditional deities, and only a few maintain their traditional religion, through
which an individual can be summoned to the shrine and obliged to take an oath:
due to civilization, in this community they have discarded the previous
methods of shrines and taking oaths. The third party in place of the oracle
is the church. They have substituted with the civilized equivalent. (A3.16)
An informant in Omuokiri told a story illustrating the demise of traditional
mechanisms of solving conflicts, even though they had proved successful in solving
a dispute over land between two brothers:
When the argument became very tough the chiefs decided to consult the
oraclethe custodian of the big oha24 tree never play with truth when it

24

The oha tree produces the vegetable used to make oha soup. Some families who still worship idols
use the oha tree as a shrine and the chief priest in charge is a truthful person because of the
consequences from the oha tree if he lies.

41

comes to land cases. So the chief priest was consulted to come and libate
to the gods of their forefathers. asked them to bring the soil from the
land to the shrine and he libated and made some incantations. The two
brothers were asked to come under the tree to pinch the soil and swear
oath with the soil in their hand. Today the priest in charge is dead, and
because of Christianity nobody is serving the oha tree. The shrine had
been destroyed by the church and a building has been erected by the
church. (A3.19)
Some individuals resort to both traditional religions and Christianity, depending on
the nature of the case. Chiefs cooperate with both churches and traditional religious
institutions. Traditional systems are seen, by Christians as well as others, as being
harsher and hence offering a more effective deterrent:
Christianity has really changed a lot of things in our land. People will take
your things and swear to the Bible, and God being a merciful God will
spare them and await their repentance, but if you are guilty and you swear
by the juju or deity, you will die. We still prefer the traditional methods of
managing conflicts to that of the court of law. I am a Christian but people
will not do most of the bad things they are doing now if juju25 is managing
some of these conflicts, especially the land issues. (A2.18)
the oath is strong and it kills, so if you are wrong, you become scared.
The oath is powerful and it still works. Forget that there is Christianity, the
oath still works. Even Christians take the oath. If problem happens
between two people and I say I am innocent, the oath is administered. If I
am innocent, I will not die but if I am guilty, I die. (A1.13)
For this reason, oath-taking may be used as a last resort for those who are
dissatisfied with judgments of the courts or the chiefs, since they know that no-one
will swear an oath if they are knowingly at fault, on pain of death.
The two belief systems have different approaches to dispute resolution, and some
interviewees compared their effectiveness in this field:
The case led to K-Dere hiring a juju man from a foreign country and this
man prepared a charm to create confusion in B-Dere. Then the man was
taken to the main road but the power of B-Dere resisted the charm, and it
was discovered that the umbrella protects B-Dere as a result of their
incessant fasting and prayer. So the juju man did another charm to stop
B-Dere from praying. The most terrible thing was that as soon as he
got to his country, he collapsed and died. The fearful story led to the KDere people seeking for peace since their confidence had been shattered
after hearing the death of their juju man. (A1.21)
Their [the amanikpo cults] laws are that no man sees their activity except
you pay goat and you are a member. One period a woman went to peep
their activities and they pursued her, then the people returned to their
deity and decided to place curse on her. After some years the woman
became pregnant and she delivered a funny creature that looked like the
amanikpo masquerade. The family of the leader of the cult and that of the
woman who got the problem went to see the chief and the matter was not

25

The term juju may be used in common speech to refer to an indigenous religious tradition.

42

settled. Later the baby died and the church came to conduct deliverance
and that was how the problem was solved. (A1.17)

4.3 Community-based organisation (CBOs)

CBOs encountered in the sample communities include women's groups, the town
council in Ogboloma, the joint peace and security committee and joint surveillance
committee in K-Dere and B-Dere, and vigilante groups.
Women's groups mainly handle issues relating to women.
We have our women house. If you do wrong or naked26 someone, you
will pay fine. Even if you utter some words which are negative you pay
fine. We have a women's leader. (A1.2)
For women and their wahala27 I will invite them to the general meeting to
state their case. We are not to apportion blame on anybody. We will tell
the guilty party to kneel down before the other woman and apologize.
(A2.18)
Disputes amongst women, such as women fighting in the market, are
usually handled by the women group. The group mediates into conflict
among group members. The guilty party is usually fined certain amount of
money. If she fails to pay the fined sum, she will be ostracized from the
group. The women group has a leader known as the chairlady that
presides over dispute mediation process. (A2.4)
In Omuokiri, they have a women group called Omirinya. The Omirinya are all the
daughters of the community whether married out of the community or not. The
ideology of the Omirinya concerning conflict management and resolution is as
follows:
...conflict is a community problem and resolution reflects this approach as
all members are related. There are elements of mercy and compromise,
give and take and persuasion. Settlement emphasizes the need to keep
and strengthen traditional bond that binds all. (KIIs Omuokiri 3)
In Omuokiri and Imiringi, the women's group can mobilize men and summon
anybody, women and men. It can mediate not only in womens issues but in other
conflicts too, though their jurisdiction is generally limited to domestic issues. Women
are not involved in the town council in Ogboloma: this (male) respondent explains
why:
Women are not members of the council because it is a law-making body
and we need strong men. They have a women's leader and they settle
their issues in the women's meeting. If it is above the women, they bring it
to the council. (A4.11)
In K-Dere, women were involved in the signing of the peace accord between K-Dere
and B-Dere, and take part in community decision-making:

26
27

Remove a persons clothes during a fight or a disagreement

A pidgin word meaning trouble

43

I was part of those who signed the peace accord between K-Dere and BDere with the government and other top ministers that was involved in the
resolution of the K-Dere and B-Dere conflict. I signed the peace accord on
behalf of the women group in my community. (KIIs K-Dere/B-Dere 5)
Even among our traditional chiefs, we have women there, if there is
something important they will ask women for their opinion. If they are on
the same page, they carry out the issue. (A1.2)
In Ogboloma, there is a town council consisting of 10 members, 2 from each family in
Ogboloma. Their main function is judicial, making local by-laws for the community to
be submitted to the council of chiefs. Any case is brought first to the town council. If
an individual is not satisfied with the decision of the town council and has good
cause, he or she refers it to the council. In fact, if an individual or group by-passes
this stage, and takes the matter directly to the council of chiefs, the case will be
referred back to the town council. The town council is believed to be as old as the
community and the whole of the Gbarain clan. Women are not involved in this
council and this is a form of exclusion.
One of the responses to the crisis in K-Dere and B-Dere was the constitution of a
joint peace and security committee and a joint surveillance committee. These
committees were the outcome of intervention by the Ogoni Contact Group,28 the
churches, and the local government, which provided funds for the committees
operating expenses. The joint peace and security committee is made up of 6
credible men from each community (12 members in total). The purpose of the
committee is to ensure that there is peace in the community. They hear cases from
both communities and ensure that conflict does not arise again. The surveillance
team is made up of 20 young men, 10 from each community. The surveillance
committee is the watch-dog of the community; they are the ones who notice if there
is a problem and go to investigate, then refer the case to the joint peace committee.
The people attest to the fact that the constitution of both committees has brought
lasting peace to the community: Since then I must confess that there has been
peace. We go to their market now and they come to ours. We visit them and they
visit their relatives here as well. (A1.5)
In the crisis caused by the cult groups in Nkpolu-Oroworokwo, the community formed
a vigilante group called Elegam Face, meaning Dont look at faces. The Elegam
Face was a group of young men from different ethnic groups whose aim was to quell
the cult mayhem. The group were disbanded by the government because of the
vigilantist methods they employed extending to the execution of suspects.. Such
jungle-justice is abhorred as sometimes the innocent are killed. In addition, such
groups may use their vigilantism on behalf of the community as a cover for killing
their enemies or other crimes. Instead of dousing the crisis, this vigilantism created a
lot of tension, hence the state government decided to intervene before the situation
escalated into another crisis.

4.4 Joint Task Force (JTF) and MOPOL

The security forces have a place in conflict management in the communities
researched. For example, during their conflict, MOPOL 5629 was deployed to K-Dere
and B-Dere communities, where they remain stationed along the major road that

28

The group was made up of Ogoni elites and was formed to promote the development of Ogoni land.
It is now defunct.
29
Mobile Police Squad based in Saakpenwa in Tai Local Government Area of Rivers State.

44

separates the two communities and continue to patrol to ensure stability. The
presence of MOPOL 56 is considered to have brought relative calm to the
communities. Another example of police intervention referred to by respondents was
the conflict between the okada riders of B-Dere and Kiara:
Our okada boy from B-Dere was attacked by the Kiara bike boys. He was
beaten and he sustained injury because he was stabbed in three places
(stomach, chest and waist). This action led to the carefulness of our
people and our youths regrouped for revenge, while some boys went to
Kiara to find out why their boy was attacked. This movement led to riots in
Kiara. On the process of the riot police intervened through the patrol
team. So after the police intervention the case was settled. (A1.19)
The JTF has also been deployed in other parts of Rivers State, where their presence
has contributed to securing peace. The JTF was similarly deployed in the violence
between Imiringi and Emeyal. The JTF was also commended by the people of BDere for reducing oil bunkering. According to a key informant:
...oil bunkering has reduced, due to the interventions of JTF, who is
guarding the pipeline where crude oil is drilled illegally. Without the
presence of JTF, oil bunkering would have continued because of the
connivance of the police. (KIIs Dere 1)

4.5 Government
Government intervention was cited as significant in calming violent conflict in the
region, most notably by respondents in K-Dere/B-Dere and Diobu. The Rivers State
Government and the Gokana Local Government played a part in the management
of the K-Dere and B-Dere conflict. For example the vice-chairman of the joint peace
committee commented that government said the conflict must stop and everyone
gathered for prayer. The committee I am in was formed and till date no conflict.
Another respondent commented, in relation to the cultism crisis:
Governor A came to power at the height of this conflict. He made it as a
policy to get rid of all forms of cultism from Rivers State. The community
at the time also formed a vigilante group to counter the cult group. The
rest is history today. The splinter group came up, giving room to all sorts
of groups, but today, the government of Rivers State under Governor A
has quelled all these groups. (A2.1)
A womens leader from Diobu declared that the cult group issue was managed well
by Rivers State Government in sending police and army to handle the conflict and
work alongside the council of chiefs, elders and youths.
The court system is mainly used when the people are not satisfied with the judgment
they receive from community fora. Most often, the court they resort to is the
customary court, i.e. that which is governed by the customary law of the area.
Customary courts settle cases according to customary law, adjudicating in cases
concerning land, matrimony, guardianship and custody of children, and inheritance.
The difference between the customary court and the traditional conflict management
mechanisms is that the former is recognised by the constitution of the nation and it is
part of the formal judicial system, though it is the lowest level.30

30

The court system in Nigeria is as follows (from the lowest to the highest): customary court
magistrates court high court court of appeal supreme court.

45

In all but one of communities researched, it was said that if a person seeks redress in
court after the council has ruled on a case, the council sends delegates to the court
to inform them of its resolution.
Anybody that loses a case or feels that he didnt get a fair hearing from
the council can seek redress in the law court. Where that is done, the
council normally sends a delegate to the court to intimate them that the
case has been settled in the community by the council and give the court
the councils written ruling. (A4.7)
If the case concerns a conflict in the community, the aggrieved cannot bypass the
traditional method. Most times, the court is the last resort. In Omuokiri, if an someone
attempts to shortcut this procedure, they will be liable to a fine.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS TO NSRP
The main recommendation arising from the research is that NSRP should support
and encourage the positive initiatives already being undertaken in the communities.
In K-Dere and B-Dere, the joint peace committee and the joint surveillance group,
have done much to ensure that the conflict between the two communities does not
arise again. This committee should be encouraged by organising training workshops
for them. It was also noticed in this community that there are a lot of youths milling
around and they claim it is as a result of unemployment. This makes them ready
tools for any mischief-maker. Therefore, it will be important to organise a skills
acquisition or empowerment programme for the youths in the community, and
arrange for start-up loans for them so the issue of capital does not arise after
learning the skills.
For Diobu, the main issue of contention is land, and the way in which rich people and
the government bully them out of their rightful property. Cases generally end in
litigation but unfortunately, most community members cannot afford a good lawyer
and so lose the case and their land. Legal aid mechanisms could provide them ways
of asserting their rights more effectively. Also, in this community, youth
unemployment is rampant. It will be important to also organise skills acquisition
training for the youths of this community.
Womens groups are active and organized in all the communities visited (in B-Dere,
Ogboloma and Imiringi they are called women's houses). It is important to recognise
the role of women which women play in conflict management. In order to promote
their inclusion in the processes in their community, measures such as sponsoring
trainings to develop womens conflict management skills should be supported.
For those communities where oil companies are present, NSRP should work with
the companies to assist them in understanding and implementing their corporate
social responsibility to the people. There should also be local peace conferences in
all the communities to create a synergy between all the stakeholders identified in
the respective communities.

References

46

Abegunde A. A. (2009) The role of community based organizations in economic

development in Nigeria: the case of Oshogbo, Osun State in International NGO
Journal No. 5, pp 236-252. http://www.academicjournals.org/ INGOJ accessed on
27.11
Ejibunu, H.T. (2007) Nigerias Niger Delta crisis: root causes of peacelessness
EPU Research Papers, Issue 07/07, Stadtschlaining, Austria, European University
Center for Peace Studies (EPU),
El-Jack, A. (2003) Gender and armed conflict overview report Brighton, Institute of
Development Studies http://www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/reports/CEP-Conflict-Report.pdf
Fisher, S. (2000) Working with conflict: skills and strategies for action London, Zed
Books
Nweke, K. (2012) The role of traditional institutions of governance in managing
social conflicts in Nigerias oil-rich Niger Delta communities: imperatives of peacebuilding process in the post-Amnesty era Available at
http://www.bjournal.co.uk/paper/BJASS_5_2/BJASS_05_02_06.pdf. accesed on
9.5.12
Ojo, O. (1996) Socio-economic and socio-cultural impact of climate and sea-level
rise in west and central Africa in Robert W. Steel (ed.) Global Change and the
Commonwealth Hong Kong, Chinese University Hong Kong.
Okoh, R. (2005) Conflict management in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria: a
participatory approach in African Journal of Conflict Resolution vol. 5, no. 1, pp
91-114
Orji, K. E. & Olali, S. T. (2010) Traditional institutions and their dwindling roles in
contemporary Nigeria: the Rivers State example. In T. Babawale, A. Aloa and B.
Adesoji (eds.) Chieftaincy institution in Nigeria Lagos, Concept Publication Ltd
Oruwari, Y. (2006) Post-conflict peace building and democracy in an oil region: the
role of womens groups in the Niger Delta, Nigeria in Niger Delta Economies of
Violence Working Paper 13 Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University of
California
Platform (2011) Counting the cost: corporations and human rights abuses in the
Niger Delta Available at http://platformlondon.org/2011/10/03/counting-the-costcorporations-and-human-rights-abuses-in-the-niger-delta/ accesed 9.5.12

47

B: MIDDLE BELT REPORT

INTRODUCTION
The Middle Belt region has been the site of protracted violent conflict. Ethnic and
religious identity, and its manipulation, have been major drivers of this conflict, along
with criminality as well as economic and political factors, together posing what
Kaplan (1994) has described as strategic danger. These conflicts, which occur along
inter- and intra-community lines (Alemika 2002; Dunmoye 2003; Mohammed 2005),
stem from fear of domination, competition for land, and access to political power (in
the form of both formal political positions and traditional chieftaincy). Notable
conflicts in the Middle Belt region, where underlying tensions have broken out in
violence, include: the Hausa-Fulani versus Kataf in Zagon Kataf of Kaduna State; Tiv
versus Azara in Nasarawa State; Tiv versus Jukun in Taraba State, Bachama versus
Hausa in Adamawa State; and the indigenous ethnic groups Afizere, Anaguta and
Berom versus Hausa-Fulani in Jos North Local Government Area (LGA) of Plateau
State.
Efforts towards ending violence and impunity in the Middle Belt region have been
fraught with challenges. Made up of medium and small ethnic identities, the Middle
Belt hosts about two thirds of Nigerias estimated 383 ethnic nationalities, as well as
400 linguistic groups. In this society, religious and ethnic groups constitute the widest
and deepest expression of popular politics (Paden 2008), and it is this expression
which has driven individuals and groups seeking justice and access.
This motivation has been largely unaddressed under Nigerias federal political
system. The key conflict drivers in the Middle Belt associated with ethnicity and
religion reflect the challenge of managing diversity in Nigeria as a whole. Since
Independence in 1960, the issue of diversity has been central to the Nigerian political
problematic, and has contributed to the increasing inability of the state to meet the
security needs of the people (Kwaja 2009). Identity, deficits in governance (perceived
state complicity) and weak state capacity to respond effectively to early warning
signs, are central drivers of violent conflict in the country as a whole. Above all,
Nigerias statutory framework on indigeneship has created opportunities and
incentives for the politicization of ethnicity, which has escalated inter-communal
violence in the especially in the Middle Belt region (Kwaja 2011). The consequences
of these conflicts in the region have been the waste of enormous human and material
resources, threats to security of life and property, loss of confidence in the economy,
and heightened fragility of the economy and the political process (Babangida 2002).
It is in the light of the foregoing that the Centre for Conflict Management and Peace
Studies (CECOMPS) undertook this research as part of a strategic partnership with
the British Council under the Nigeria Stabilisation and Reconciliation Programme,
with a view to highlighting community-level conflict management mechanisms
(CCMM) in Kaduna and Plateau States. One of CECOMPS key goals is to work
towards becoming a leading centre for research on peace and conflict studies in
Africa. Since 2003, CECOMPS has provided training for peace practitioners as well
as supported scholarship through its post-graduate diploma and masters
programmes in peace and conflict studies. The importance of the study for
CECOMPS is its alignment with the core mandate of CECOMPS programme, which
is to support efforts towards strengthening the capacity of groups and institutions
through research, policy advocacy and training.
The CCMM study is significant for two key reasons. First, it suggests entry points for
NSRP in its community-level work. Secondly, it throws light on violent confrontations
in the Middle Belt region, where ethnic nationalism and religious extremism have

48

risen to grave proportions, by analyzing the local and community context of these
conflicts and assessing the mechanisms for managing them at the community level.
The Middle Belt component of the study aims to collect, examine, analyse and
interpret data on the various community-level conflict management mechanisms in
the Middle Belt region, thereby redressing current limitations in the knowledge base
available on the subject matter. Specifically, the study aims to:
1. Identify and document issues of security, prevention, protection, mediation and
reconciliation as they are perceived by community members, organizations and
leaders;
2. Identify formal and informal mechanisms for security, mediation and protection
operating at the community level;
3. Explore the effectiveness of co-ordination mechanisms, and of linkages to Local
Government Areas (LGAs) and state-level response; and
4. Explore the implications of the findings for NSRP programme design.

1. METHODOLOGY
The study was guided by the following research questions:
1. Are there information and data on community-level conflict management
mechanisms in the Middle Belt region?
2. Are there formal and informal mechanisms for security, mediation and protection
that are functional?
3. How effective are co-ordination mechanisms, in terms of their linkage to responses
at the local and state government levels?
4. What are the implications of the findings for NSRP programme design?
Fieldwork for the study was carried out between March 19th and April 22nd 2012, by a
research team consisting of a lead researcher, four researchers, and four research
assistants. Methods consisted of key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group
discussions (FGDs), which were used in generating approximately 100 interviews
and FGD transcripts. Five locations were chosen, of which three were in Plateau
State and two in Kaduna State. These sites include both rural and urban
communities, and were chosen on the basis of their experience of violent conflict.
Where populations have divided geographically into exclusively Muslim and Christian
settlement, interviews in both places were carried out to ensure balance. A
thumbnail sketch of the communities chosen is presented in section 2 below.
A purposive sampling method was used, in which gender, religion and ethnicity were
the key indicators for identifying respondents. Fieldwork was complemented by a
review of published and archival documents as secondary sources. Few
comprehensive empirical studies exist on the role and contribution of communitylevel conflict management mechanisms in the Middle Belt. However, some empirical
and theoretical studies have been carried out on the roles and activities of formal
state institutions and civil society organisations (CSOs) as well as development
partners in conflict and post-conflict settings. Although there have been varied
experiences among Middle Belt communities in conflict prevention and management,
and in spite of their growing relevance and dominance at the community level, these
have been under-studied, and this study aims to fill this gap.

2. THE CONTEXT

49

As both a concept and a political expression, the Middle Belt is seen to represent the
voice of what were ethnic minorities under the former Northern Region of Nigeria
(Yoroms 2002). The history of the Middle Belt, and its location between the northern
and southern poles of Nigeria, created the basis for conflicts along ethnic and
religious fault-lines, thereby making it a region in a permanent state of identity crisis.
Even the naming of the area contentious; whereas the minority ethnic groups prefer
to be regarded as Middle Belters, the Hausa-Fulanis on the other hand, who
dominated the Northern Region as a whole and who had, and still have, direct links
with the Islamic north, prefer the term North Central zone: Middle Belt carries with it
the association with Christian and minority persectives. As noted by the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA):
Those who are fanatical about the Middle Belt identity are Christian and nonHausa ethnic nationalities in the minority areas of the North. They define the
Middle Belt not only in terms of religious and ethnic marginalization, but extend
its boundary to include all the ethnic nationalities in the North. Membership of
the Middle Belt Forum approximates this conception of the zone. Here,
minorities from Adamawa, Taraba, Southern Kaduna, Gombe, Kebbi, Yobe and
Borno, in addition to the states in the North Central Zone attend the meetings of
the Middle Belt Movement and fully associate with that identity (International
IDEA 2000:291).
However for NSRP, which does not share the more extreme perspectives of some of
its users, the term Middle Belt is simply a convenient descriptor of the areas
geographical location.
The five areas covered by the study are:
1. Barkin Ladi and Foron, Barkin Ladi LGA, Plateau State (rural)
2. Rikkos and Furaka, Jos North LGA, Plateau State (urban)
3. Wase and Kadarko, Wase LGA, Plateau State (rural)
4. Rigasa and Sabon Tasha, Kafanchan LGA, Kaduna State (urban)
5. Kafanchan Town, Kafanchan LGA, Kaduna State (rural)
Plateau State is divided administratively into three zones: northern, central and
southern. These zones are further broken into 17 local government areas (LGAs).
While the central zone has witnessed relative stability, the northern and southern
zones have experienced several violent disturbances within the last decade. Three of
the five study areas are located in Plateau State.
1. Barkin Ladi LGA falls within Jos North, in Plateau State, and has five district
areas:
Ropp: includes Barkin Ladi town, the headquarters of Barkin Ladi LGA
Gashish: located on the road to neighbouring Bokkos LGA south of Barkin Ladi,
where a large number of Fulani pastoralists live together with the Berom and
other native ethnic groups. The famous Kura Falls is situated in Gashish District
Heipang: the district that hosts both Plateau State Polytechnic and Jos Airport
Foron: a missionary settlement since the early 20th century, when missionary
activities started on the Jos Plateau
Fan: shares borders with parts of Bauchi State and Mangu LGA in Plateau State.
Barkin Ladi LGA hosts a number of ethnic groups, both indigenous and otherwise.
The main native group is the Berom, while others such as the Mwaghavul, Ron,
Ngas, Hausa and Fulani have settled in the area at different times from the beginning

50

of the 20th century. The incomers were largely drawn to work in the colonial tinmining industry, though this has now virtually collapsed, and to the opportunities for
agricultural production, for which the climate is suited. The abundant pasture found
in the area, together with the additional feed source of crop residues, led to
significant in-migrations of Fulani pastoralists. While the agricultural communities are
predominantly Christian (apart from the Hausa), the Hausa and Fulani settlers are
predominantly Muslims. Ancestors of the current settler community acquired land
from indigenes in ways that were at the time legal, but which the indigenes in
retrospect dispute.
Barkin Ladi and Foron, where the interviews were conducted, follow this pattern.
Here, there has been increasingly intense competition over natural resource use
between different ethnic and occupational groups. Over-concentration of Fulani
cattle in Barkin Ladi and its environs has generated conflict between farmers and
pastoralists, and violent confrontation between Fulani herdsmen and Berom farmers
has been a regular occurrence. More generally, there are mutual resentments over
land shortage, and conflicting claims to land between indigenes, who see the land as
theirs, and settlers, who feel they have legitimate claims to it.
Until November 2011 Barkin Ladi had earned a reputation as a peace constituency
as it had generally been peaceable, especially in Barkin Ladi town, in spite of the
crises that rocked Jos from 1994 onwards. Although there were occasional spillovers
of the conflict in Jos into Barkin Ladi, this only happened in certain areas, such as
Heipang, Foron and Fan. Ropp, which hosts Barkin Ladi town, and Gashish have
hardly experienced any serious spillovers. Unfortunately, Barkin Ladi town collapsed
as a peace constituency on 23rd November 2011 after a violent encounter left many
lives lost and much property destroyed, with over a thousand people displaced by the
violence between the native Berom and the Hausa and Fulani groups and other
ethnic groups resident in the area. Most of the narratives describe this incident, from
a number of different viewpoints. Since then, there has been a series of attacks and
reprisal attacks, the most recent of which witnessed the massive invasion of nine
Berom settlements, by what were believed to be Fulani herdsmen, leading to the
massacre of over a hundred people, including two prominent citizens of the state.31
Aside from the deployment of security personnel by the state to prevent further
spread of violence, other conflict management initiatives involve the leaders of the
communities. For instance, the traditional council has held several meetings towards
addressing the conflict in the area. Its composition includes, among others, the
Gwom Rwei (district head of Ropp), the district heads of Fan, Garshish, Heipang,
and Foron, other smaller Berom chiefs like Gwom Kwok, Gwom Sho, and Gwom
Kasa, and the Ardo (traditional chief of the Fulani), the Sarkin Hausawa (the Hausa
chief), the Mishkaham Mwaghavul (the Mwaghavul chief), and the chiefs of other
smaller ethnic groups.
2. Rikkos and Furaka communities of Jos North LGA in Plateau State are located
within the Jarawa District of the LGA, and coincide with the core historical base of the
Afizere or Jarawa people. Until 2008, Rikkos was a multi-ethnic settlement, mainly
peopled by Afizere, Berom and Anaguta and with a significant population of Muslim
Hausa and Fulani, and of Yorubas, some of whom are Muslims. Furaka was a

31

This incident took place after the fieldwork for this study and hence is not referred to here. The
th
invasion, which took place on Saturday 7 July 2012, saw the death of over sixty people. While
mourners were carrying out a mass burial for the victims, another invasion took place, leading to the
death of Senator Gyang Dantong and Honorable Gyang Fulani, Senator of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria and member of the Plateau State House of Assembly respectively. Both men are of Berom
extraction.

51

majority Christian area that included a minority Muslim population. However, at

present, as in most if not all of the many flashpoints of unrest in Jos, settlements are
partitioned along religious fault-lines.
These two communities have witnessed violent ethno-religious confrontations of
grave proportions since 2001. Outbreaks occurred in 2001, 2008, 2010, 2011 and
2012, and have progressively over the years led to a clear-cut segregation of
settlement (Samuel et al 2011) between the predominantly Christian population
made up of the Afizere, Berom and Anaguta who are located in Furaka, and the
Hausa-Fulani who are predominantly Muslims, occupying Rikkos. Violence has
increased steadily to the extent that bomb explosions are becoming a recurring
experience in some parts of Jos, leading some residents to describe the town as
having a bomb culture.
Conflicts in this area are two-fold. At one level there have been disagreements,
though not violent, between the Afizere ethnic group and the Beroms and Anagutas
over historical boundaries of cultural heritage and affinity. There are claims and
counter-claims over who really holds ownership of Jos North, with each of these
groups relying on historical records to justify their claims. At another level, the more
deep-seated and deadly confrontations have been between the Afizere, Berom and
Anaguta on the one hand, and the Hausa and Fulani on the other, over the claims to
indigeneship of Jos North LGA by the Hausa-Fulanis, who refer to themselves as
Jasawa, an appellation that reinforces their claim.
3. Wase and Kadarko communities fall under Wase LGA, situated in the southern
zone of Plateau State. Wase LGA, which includes Kadarko town, has a population of
around 160,000, and is situated near the border between Plateau and Taraba States.
Among the major ethnic groups in Wase LGA are the Tarok, Hausa, Fulani, Jukun,
Boghom, Jahr, Basharawa, Kwalla, Burum, Sayawa, Tiv, and Ngas. Wase LGA is
made up of 4 districts namely Wase, Bashar, Lamba and Kadarko, and includes four
chiefdoms. While the majority of people in Wase are Hausa-Fulani and Muslims,
Kadarko is also inhabited by the Tarok, who are mostly Christians and farmers.
Between 2002 and 2004 the zone became an area of wide-scale violence across
religious and ethno-cultural boundaries. The conflict, triggered by a combination of
indigene-settler rivalry, chieftaincy disputes, political rivalry, cattle rustling, and
unease over relationships between Christian and Muslim girls and boys, began in
Yelwa-Shendam, an important commercial centre which had attracted waves of
immigrants from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. The Yelwa-Shendam
conflict involved the dominant indigenous group (the Goemai) and a group that had
settled in the area (the Jarawa). Soon, other ethnic groups like the Tarok and the
Fulani were drawn in, and violence spilled over into other LGAs including Wase.
As is the case in other Plateau flashpoints, in Wase and Kadarko too, contested
legitimacy in claiming indigeneship is at the root of much conflict. The Hausa-Fulani
and the Tarok have different accounts of the history of Wase, the former tracing it to
the jihad of Uthman Dan Fodio in 1804 and the latter to their settlement in the area
during the 18th century. A further basic source of contemporary contention is the
competing demand for land by Tarok farmers and Fulani herdsmen, resulting in
frequent accusations by Tarok that Fulani cattle destroy crops and pollute water
sources, and by Fulani of Tarok cattle rustling.

52

These violent ethno-religious confrontations led to the imposition of a state of

emergency in the state, in which all democratic structures were suspended.32 The
decision by then President Olusegun Obasanjo points to a failure of leadership at the
highest level of Plateau State as far as conflict management and the management of
diversity was concerned. President Obasanjo argued that:
If anything, some of his [the State Governors] utterances, his
lackadaisical attitude and seeming uneven-handedness over the
salient and contending issues present him as not just a part of
the problem, but also as an instigator and a threat to peace
(Plateau State Government, 2004).
4. Sabon Tasha and Rigasa, in Kafanchan LGA, Kaduna State, are settlements that
have become differentiated on ethnic and religious lines. They have an
overwhelming presence of uneducated and unemployed youths, and a large number
of social problems such as drug-taking. The historical rivalry between Christians and
Muslims in Kaduna can be traced to both the pre-colonial and colonial eras, and is
associated with the fear of domination by Hausa-Fulani Muslims on the part of ethnic
minorities that are predominantly Christian from the southern zone. The polarization
of Kaduna into north and south has provided the basis for the segregated settlement
pattern. During episodes of violent conflict, Sabon Tasha, which is a Christiandominated area, becomes a no-go area for Muslims, while Rigasa, which is a
Muslim-dominated area, becomes a no-go area for Christians, as a result of deepseated hatred that resulted from decades of violent conflict. People, houses, places
of worship and markets belonging to the perceived enemies become subjects of
attack by belligerent youths.
5. Kafanchan has been another focus of violence in Kaduna State over the years.
Kafanchan has been a site of violent confrontation across ethnic and religious faultlines, largely triggered by a disagreement between Christian and Muslim students on
campus in 1987 (Abdu 2002). Some of the violent conflicts witnessed in Kafanchan
are tied to the issue of the relocation of the Zangon Kataf market in 1992, and a
chieftancy tussle in Jemaa, a neighbouring community which has a close link with
Kafanchan.
A number of key conflict factors cut across all the research sites, and lead to a group
of social categories being particularly vulnerable to violence everywhere. Women,
youth and children are primary victims across the region. Additionally, since ethnonationalist sentiment is so prevalent, whichever is the minority community in any
particular location is vulnerable to discrimination. There have also been a number of
spill-over communities, where conflicts spread or spill over to other areas, resulting in
retaliatory attacks. In fact, all the communities covered under the Middle Belt region
have experienced instances whereby violence from one community resulted in
killings and destruction of properties in other communities.
A further major feature common throughout the region is unemployment, and with it,
youth disenfranchisement, poverty and hopelessness, seen by many respondents as

th

1. On 18 May 2004, President Obasanjo declared a state of emergency in Plateau State, which
culminated in the suspension of Governor Joshua Dariye, his deputy, and all democratic structures in
the state. During the emergency Major-General Chris Alli (rtd) was Sole Administrator of the state.
Emergency rule lasted for six months May to November 2004.

53

key drivers of conflict. One asked: What about the unemployed, how does the
government want them to survive? No wonder there are crises! (B4.8).
What government should provide to help matters is job, job, job
for the youths. In a society where people are jobless, normally
it will start from minor disturbances like stealing, raping, then it
will rise to robbery and transform to tribal and religious crisis.
Because in peoples heart no love, no hope, only frustration and
hatred. No community can stay peacefully for too long without
work (B4.10).
Others summed up the relationship between poverty and violence thus:
When you are poor, you have nothing to loose. The life is
frustrating, so even your life becomes nothing to you (B4.6).
Some of us envy those that are a bit able, because we are
hopeless, and hopelessness causes frustration and that leads to
anger. So at any given time such an angry hopeless person is
tempted to cause conflict (B 4.1)
There is a widespread perception among respondents in the region that
unemployment among youth in the communities has rendered them vulnerable to
recruitment into criminal violence.
In terms of economic aspect, job creation for the youths because
the idle mind is the devils workshop. A lot of the youths who
were caught committing heinous acts including murder, were
said to have been given peanuts as low as N1000.00 by their
sponsors to do it (B2.10).
There is the need to create job opportunities and get youth
empowered. It was Satan that used the youth (B1.2).

3. TYPES OF CONFLICT ENCOUNTERED IN THE STUDY

3.1 Ethno-nationalist conflict
Conflict environments in the region are characterized by an atmosphere of deepseated mistrust, failed attempts at mediation by both state and non-state actors,
pervasive atrocities by armed and belligerent groups, and humanitarian tragedies
that have resulted from large-scale atrocities and indiscriminate attacks on
individuals, groups and communities, often at night and using guerrilla tactics. In the
aftermath of explosions in both Plateau and Kaduna states, indiscriminate reprisals
have also occurred, which are often characterized by the blocking of roads and
attacks on persons perceived to be from a different religion.
The frequency and intensity of violent conflict in the region has accelerated
tremendously, posing serious complex challenges to the peaceful resolution of
conflict, with devastating consequence for peace, security and stability in the region.
There are also allegations and counter-allegations of arms proliferation, arms
stockpiling and arms trafficking, to the extent that people have been arrested for
being in possession of arms, either during routine house-to-house searches, working
on tip-offs, or at checkpoints.

54

Ethno-nationalism has gained currency in the Middle Belt. Ethnic and religious
groups are pitched against each other, each group manifesting a strong feeling of
injustice and ill-treatment due to the politics of exclusion, as expressed in the we
versus them syndrome (Joireman 2003; Metumara 2010). These feelings have built
up in stages over a number of years through successive incidences of intercommunal violence, so that now people who once lived together in peace are now
unable to stay together. Those who have been displaced continue to make claims
on their previously occupied property, and the inability to resolve conflicting claims
perpetuates division.
We use to be in peace with the Christians before the crisis. They
visit us and we also visit them especially during social occasions
like weddings, naming ceremonies etc. Now we are all alone
with some having left us to the border like Nassarawa
community. Those whose houses are in the Christian community
have left also (B2.5).
Sabon Tasha was once a settlement of the Kataf, Gbagi, Kaje
and the Hausa-Fulani. With the frequent crisis every now and
then the Kataf and Kaje people chased the Hausa away, which
is why at the moment we dont have any Hausa man living in
Sabo. Presently we have the Igbos, Idomas, Igalas, Yorubas
and so many other tribes who are Christians living in Sabo, we
only have few Kataf and the Gbagyi among us now, because
most of them sold their lands to some of the above mentioned
tribes and relocated to neighbouring villages close by. But they
still claim and own this part of town Wickedness and hatred
is growing, causing detestation in the sense that you find two
people or tribes or religions existing together in grudges waiting
for a slight opportunity to get back at each other (B4.8).
the 2001 Jos crisis and series of crises in Bukuru and in some
other parts of the state have led to forced migration of people
into Barkin Ladi to seek refuge. As these people come, they
have their own stories of woes and pains to tell and this has
worsened and further severed the already weak and fragile
relationship (B1.4).
Violence takes place in a continuing cycle of reprisals, each side unable to ignore
what they see as the slights and threats to their identity:
The following day, which was Monday, a reprisal attack by the
members of Berom community took place, which led to the
death of a Hausa driver from Barkin Ladi. Since then, the people
started living like Tom and Jerry with a serious loss of trust and
confidence, suspicion and unharmonious co-habitation (B1.1).
Just as both Christians and Muslims accuse the media of bias against their side, so
both also perceive the other to be in receipt of favours and services from the
government which they themselves have been deprived of:
You will notice that some communities are well tarred with good
road networks and other infrastructural services but most of the
areas settled by the Muslims have not had such government
projects. The roads, most of which are old, were made by the

55

military. Such total neglect does not encourage our people

(B2.7).
The water problem we have here has persisted only because we
are Tarok and Christians. Go to places where the population is
Muslim like Wase town and Bashar, you will find potable water,
good roads and health facilities (B3.3).
3.2 Competition for land and water
One of the primary causes of conflicts in the Middle Belt region is the struggle over
land, an important factor in the relationship between peasant farmers and herdsmen.
Since land is central to survival, diversity in terms of religious and ethnic identity has
further compounded this economic challenge in the region. In Barkin Ladi for
instance, the Beroms accused the Fulanis of encroaching onto their farmlands,
destroying their crops, and contaminating their domestic water sources, while the
Fulanis accused the Beroms of denying them space for grazing, of cattle rustling and
of assault.
Lack of sufficient water for grazing and human consumption has been a major source
of conflicts in Kadarko too, where water is extremely scarce. There have been violent
confrontations between the Taroks and Fulanis as pointed out by respondents in the
area.
Lack of water has been a major cause of conflict in this
community. The only water source we have is a river. We drink
and cook with the water from this river but the Fulani take their
cattle there. This usually spoils the water and makes it unfit for
human consumption. We have had many conflicts with the
Fulani because of this issue but they have refused to change.
We told them that it is not right for animals and humans to use
the same water source but they are always taking their cattle
there (B3.1).
Many of the problems posed by shortages of water in Wase and Barkin Ladi LGAs
would be addressed if more water sources such as dams and boreholes were
constructed and drilled:
We sometimes give them land to graze and farm but after using
the land for some time they claim ownership. Our water source
is contaminated by their cattle. Our animals are dying because
of lack of water. If water is made available, it will help a lot to
reduce the conflict. We have land dispute with the Fulani
because when we returned after the crisis most of our farmlands
were taken over by the Fulani. We go as far as ten kilometers to
get the nearest water source which is a river. The women carry
it on their heads all the way back to the community (B3.7).
Moreover, several respondents felt that bringing the parties together to solve waterrelated disputes would be a positive peacebuilding strategy:
Presently we drink from the wells with the Fulani. That is the only
thing that brings us together so I think if there is enough source
we can work collaboratively with the Fulani to maintain and
sustain because they need water and we need water too (B3.2)

56

Respondents also referred to the 2002 violence in Kadarko, which was as a result of
disagreement over the ownership of locust-bean trees in Yelwa-Shendam community
of Shendam LGA, Plateau State.
Urbanisation and overcrowding are other aspects of the pressure on land, which a
number of respondents mentioned as contributing to conflict. These factors have not
only led to competition for resources but have also generated the need for new forms
of living, not all viewed positively.
Women are exploited in the community due to exposure to men
because of limited space that would have afforded them some
privacy, but you see there is no enough space in Rikkos, where
many of our people from other places who were affected by the
crisis have come to live (B2.7).
Sources of conflict include the denial of common pool
resources like stream water, well water and even our own place
of burial - I mean cemetery - which we have been using for long
and now suddenly somebody lays claim to it as his land. We feel
deprived in many ways (B2.8).
We need to return to the community way of living because the
city life, which encourages individualism, does not give us the
opportunity any more to share the collective life and the
community spirit (B2.12).
3.2 Governance and policy-making
In terms of the political drivers of conflict in the Middle Belt region, the problem of
political inclusion or participation in governance has been a serious challenge in Jos
North, Barkin Ladi, Wase and Kafanchan. Both sides of ethnic and religious divides
see government as discriminating against them in the provision of services and as
failing to ensure equal representation in local governance for all sections of the
community:
we are denied of our rights, not even residence permit can we
obtain from the issuing authority let alone the indigene paper.
At the ward level, we are denied making representation that is,
producing a counselor - in spite of our population (B1.10).
We were born here With the long number of years of
residence and contributions, we are still not recognized at the
local government level, not to talk of the state. We do not
enjoy the government in any way, it is only during elections that
we are recognized as bona fide citizens. Let the dividend of
democracy be seen by all. We need to encourage inclusivity to
forge ahead as a community (B1.9).
In Jos North in particular, access to and control of political power have been a major
driver of conflict. In Kadarko for example, the Sarkin Kadarko, the Hausa leader, is
appointed by and answerable to the Emir of Wase and thus has jurisdiction over the
whole of Kadarko. The Ponzhi Kadarko on the other hand claims to be the true
leader of the Taroks in Kadarko village. In the words of one of the respondents in
Wase: the Tarok people do not want to respect the emir. This is very bad

57

because the emir is like a father to everyone and they are supposed to respect him
(B3.12). Tarok people on the other hand see things differently:
The emir of Wase has always wanted to lord it over the Tarok
we do not usually agree to fall under their oppressive emirate
structure. Thank God we now have our chiefdom which gives us
the right to choose one of own as our district head (B3.7).
The creation of Jos North, Jos South and Jos East LGAs out of the old Jos LGA, was
seen as an attempt by the Federal Government, under General Ibrahim Babangida,
to favour the Hausas and Fulanis. This did not go down well with the indigenous
communities (Afizere, Anaguta and Berom) who viewed the development as part of
an expansionist agenda on the part of the Hausas and Fulanis to dominate other
minority ethnic groups. In the case of Jos, ethnic nationalism and religious
extremism have been used as tools for the struggle over political control of the area
between the indigenous ethnic groups, made up of the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom
that are predominantly Christians on one hand, and the Hausas and Fulanis that are
predominantly Muslims on the other hand.
In Rikkos the Muslims (Hausas) drew attention to the alleged killing of water vendors
and motorcycle riders by youths in the Christian-dominated areas of Angwan Rukuba
and Tudun Wada. The perception among respondents was that government
pronouncements associated with the ban on the activities of motorcycle operators
were aimed at putting them at a disadvantage, which in turn is meant to deny them
their means of livelihood, leading to disempowerment. Hence attempts to resist such
policies become a major conflict trigger. On the other hand, the Christian-dominated
community of Furaka, which stretches to Tina Junction, also alleged that the Muslims
have orchestrated many silent killings (reprisal assassinations) of Christian boys
who ride motorcycles for business, as well as passengers, with students of the
University of Jos being major casualties.
For many respondents, government is distant and faceless, and cares little about the
ordinary people; they feel it has the capacity to resolve the various crises and ensure
peoples security if it wants, but chooses not to bother:
We feel government does not care about us. No school for our
children, no job and no communication with us. So out of
frustrations anytime we feel we are being oppressed we react
to a government that is not listening to our plea (B4.3).
The Nigerian government has answer to these issues but they
enjoy to see us dying, while they sit back in the reserve
mansion. Watch us die on CNN (B4.11).
I am not happy with the crisis. Leaders are to work for peace.
There is no justice. There are silent killings. That is how I have not
seen my son Aminu who was 12 years old since 2008. He left with
his friends to the market. Only one of them came back with blood
as a result of the cuts in his body (B2.6).
Another point of contention was the alleged resolution by the Christian Association of
Nigeria (CAN) in Yelwa-Shendam banning Christian ladies from having affairs with

58

Muslim men, since the Muslims do not allow their ladies to have affairs with
Christians, whom they see and refer to as arna (pagans).33
What happened was the boy, who is a commercial motorcyclist,
took the girl to town to see her boyfriend who is a Hausa-Fulani
Muslim. On getting there the Muslim tried to force the girl to stay
back in Wase even though she did not want to. The Tarok boy
who felt for his Tarok sister asked the Hausa-Fulani boys to let
her go. That was when they attacked the boy and killed him. The
Hausa-Fulani boys are fond of demeaning our girls so that was
not the first time this kind of thing was happening (B3.2).
In exploring the dynamics of ethnic nationalities as it relates to the challenges of
governance in Nigeria, Babangida summed up the causality of conflicts, which also
affects the Middle Belt region, to include the fact that:
The most fundamental and underlying forces which propel ethnic
nationalism in Nigeria are those of pervasive poverty, mass
unemployment, under-development of productive forces and
non-absorbance of the economy. The absence of developed
productive forces constrains the transformation of the structures
of the economy and society. Mass poverty and unemployment
create alienation and insecurity, which in turn encourage
Nigerians to experience and prefer accommodation within the
social insurance system of ethnic nationalities. In this regard,
people are easily excited about injustice - of other groups
against their own groups. Poverty also creates frustration and
divisiveness (Babangida 2002:34).
3.4 Domestic and family-related conflict and violence against women and girls
At the domestic level, the family is a major source of violence against women in the
Middle Belt region, which respondents described as being widespread. There are
instances where men, who are supposed to be the bread-winners for their families,
do not live up to expectations. In such circumstances, where the men want to
demonstrate their supremacy, while not catering for the family, physical assaults on
women and children become quite prominent.
For husbands and wives the major cause of conflict is when the
husband does not cater for the needs of the wife and the
children. This attitude has led to so many fights between
husbands and their wives. Many times the wives are beaten up
by their husbands. Sometimes they run to their parents homes,
other times they stay and sort it out (B3.1).
My neighbour usually shouts sometimes when they are fighting
with her husband. I wonder why she is always screaming and

33
The use of derogatory terms such as arna, meaning pagans, is sometimes used by Muslims in
Northern Nigeria to refer to Christians or other non-Muslims. This has often resulted in violent
confrontation. See the Plateau Peace Conference Report titled Plateau Resolves, September 2004,
which lighted this issue as something to be looked into in rebuilding relationships between Christians
and Muslims across the state.

59

my younger brother told me that he saw her husband hitting her

on the head. So men usually beat women.That is why I want
to marry a man that will not beat me. I do not like men that are
always shouting at their wives like my neighbour (B3.12).
In its report on the extent to which the lives of girls and women are being improved in
Nigeria, the British Council (2012) drew attention to the fact that issues such as rape
cannot easily be raised publicly by the victims, and that there is a conspiracy of
silence which conceals the nature and extent of the problem. However, many of the
respondents in our study were willing to acknowledge the existence of violence
against women in their communities, including one woman who spoke openly about
her own experience:
There is conflict at the family level between husbands and wives
or children and their parents. I often have conflicts with my
husband. Sometimes he beats me up. The last time he hit me I
reported to my father who intervened. I only came back after he
came and begged for me at home (B3.6).
Respondents in Wase drew attention to the fact that when there is conflict, there is
violence everywhere:
Hoodlums and miscreants always take advantage of the
situation to satisfy their sexual desires. In the process of killing
and looting when they stumble on a helpless woman or girl, the
next thing is to rape her. I personally do not know anyone that
was raped during the crisis but I have heard that there were
many cases of rape. It will not be surprising that this is true
because in every conflict worldwide, these things happen (B3.9).
What the media has failed to do is to stress the plight of women
in the crisis so that the whole world will know how terribly women
are affected by the crisis. I know of about fifty women in this
community who suffered from sexual violence during the crisis.
Nothing has been done to help these women. The women do
not want to talk about what happened because they do not want
to recall, but I think they need help (B3.1).
Another respondent argued that:
men are always beating women. Even some of the boys
around are always fighting us girls and because they are
stronger than us, they always beat us up. I have heard from
my mother that the Tarok people took away many Muslim girls
and women and gave them pig and dog meat to eat. This is very
bad because in Islam, you are not allowed to eat these things. I
pity those women and pray that God will punish those that made
them go through all these things (B3.12).
while for others the economic vulnerability of girls lays them open
to sexual abuse:
They go for hawking and sometimes get waylaid by men and
even get pregnant. It will bring trouble between the parents of
the two parties, and the parents are very poor. This happens

60

even after so many warnings on TV and radio to stop abuse of

girl children hawking, but they do not heed (B4.7).
3.5 The inter-personal dimension
The interviews indicate that conflict not only affects the political and public domain,
but is interwoven in peoples personal and intimate lives. Conflicts can be triggered
over cross-cultural liaisons, as happened in Wase and Kadarko; patterns of
intermarriage break down as the balkanization of communities deepens; men and
women are widowed, parents lose their children and children are orphaned;
friendships across conflict divides cease. Violent situations push people into risky
sexual behaviour:
Many of the girls here use sex as a bargain for monetary favours
from the soldiers, which they use to feed their impoverished
families. I know about over ten girls who are presently sleeping
with the soldiers just for such favours (B3.6).
Another major form of conflict, which I think is connected to the
wider conflict between the Tarok and the Hausa-Fulani, is the
conflict between parents and their children. This form of conflict
may seem very harmless but it is the major thing that causes the
child to be rebellious and becomes part of the violence once it
starts. Apart from calming the situation, we must make efforts to
foster good parent-child relationships too. It is this kind of
conflict that results in children being drug addicts or hooligans
and nuisance to the society (B3.9).
One womans story highlights how the personal and the political can collide:
I did not see my husband since 2001 crisis when he was picked
by fake soldiers from our house. We searched all places - the
hospitals, prisons and camps within and outside the state. We did
not see him. I was told to get married after eight years. I had four
children with my old husband. I have one child with the new.
During the 2010 crisis, my husband was also taken away from
the home. I went to the prisons to take food for him. To my
surprise, I saw two hands stretching to collect the food. They
were my old and new husbands. I bursted into tears. They were
all released and I am now back with my old husband as I was
given choice by Islam. After all he did not divorce me (B2.5).

4. COMMUNITY-LEVEL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS

4.1 Peacekeeping interventions by security forces
A number of respondents praised the intervention of security agencies, making the
point that it was only their intervention that contained violence at key moments.
However, the interviews also yielded a large number of complaints about the
partiality, brutality and ineffectiveness of security forces.
The special task force (STF) was established in 2010 as part of efforts towards
addressing the challenges posed by violence and insecurity in the region, particularly
in Plateau State. The STF was established by the Federal Government and is not
under state command.

61

The federal government, not the state government, tried by

sending in military personnel and mobile police to take charge of
the situation before it gets out of hand. If they had not
intervened, only God knows what would happen. With their
military know how, they were able to either kill or arrest the
people who were going around killing others (B3.10).
Faced with rising insecurity, provision of security by the state is fast becoming
negligible, in the wake of the emergence and dominance of non-state security
providers.34 These include religious groups, ethnic associations, and commercial
entities as well as community-backed and -supported vigilantes. These non-state
security providers have proven to be trusted, accessible and affordable.
In this community we have a vigilante. It is made up of a group
of able-bodied young men who keep watch around the
community at all times. Once there is a problem the group
reports the problem to the community head, who notifies the
police or takes appropriate action as the case may be. We
are very vigilant because we cannot let what happened to us
before happen again. We do not want to be taken unawares
again (B3.4).
Security agencies, in contrast, have limited capacity to address the recurring conflicts
and episodic attacks in villages in parts of Kaduna and Plateau state. For instance,
between 2010 and the first quarter of 2012, there have been six commanders of the
special task force deployed to Plateau State for the management of internal security,
leading to a growing loss of confidence in the security agencies by the populace.
Also, there has been a massive build-up of illicit arms by both sides of the conflict
divide in both Kaduna and Plateau States, despite the seizure of arms by the STF.35
Moreover, there is a perception of state complicity or partiality in the conflicts. For
instance, in Plateau State, while the Christians prefer the police, the Muslims prefer
the army. Following the ban on the activities of motorcycle operators in Plateau
State, Hausa and Fulani youths were engaged in violent confrontations with the
police over the enforcement of the ban, while the reluctance of the military to enforce
the ban was viewed as an attempt to support the Hausas and Fulanis that were
opposed to the ban. Security forces were also frequently described as arriving too
late on the scene to take effective action in a disturbance, and of committing abuses
against the population.
we contacted the security men who reported in the good nick
of time but could not come into the scene of the attack until 6.00

34

Vigilantism has become a major phenomenon in Nigeria in the light of rising insecurity, criminality and
general loss of confidence on the security agencies as it relates to the provision of security for the
people.
35
On 17th May 2012 a combined team of military joint task force (JTF) from Borno State and the special
task force (STF) in Plateau State, police and state security services (SSS), trailed some men to a
hideout in Rikkos. After a conducting a search in the building, the following items were found: a laptop
computer, external hard disk, eight cell phones, 23 sim cards, 11 prepared improvised explosive
detonators, one AK-47 rifle, four magazines fully loaded with 7.62mm special ammunition, 150 rounds of
7.62mm ammunition, 347 rounds of 9mm ammunition, eight bags of urea nitrate fertilizer, two
generators, four improvised explosive devices, 395 sniper ammo and 60m of cortex wire, four
containers of sodium oxide, one potassium chloride, three lead nitrate, two aluminum metal powder, one
remote control, chromic cat-cut and white sulphurs.

62

am. They said the reason why they could not come in in good
time was that they were waiting for the order from above; this
aside, that they could not identify the road that would lead them
into the earth of the village. a boy volunteered to lead them
in but still they needed to get the order from the superior(s)
before they would come in (B1.7).
We have the police station where we can report conflicts but as
you know our police are always late (B4.9).
though the security had intervened in good time, their roles
were short of expectationsWe have to make reference to this
when one considers the level of extra-judicial activities that were
carried out; they killed our children, entered peoples houses,
forced some of the inmates out and shot or got them wounded
(B1.9).
I have over twenty friends and none of us is employed. We are
hard working but there is no way we can help ourselves because
we do not even have capital to start any form of business. This is
another form of conflict in itself because a hungry and an idle
man is an angry man. The soldiers are not helping matters
because they go around arresting innocent people. They have
arrested several of friends who are just innocent people going
about their legitimate activities (B3.10).
4.2 Traditional and religious and other local community leaders
Though traditional rulers do not have any constitutional role in governance in Nigeria,
historically they have been involved in peace-related activities as custodians of the
peoples cultures and traditions. All communities in the Middle Belt region recognize
the centrality of the traditional institutions in the maintenance of peace and stability.
They have also been engaged by government in this light as a way of garnering
public support and trust in government-related peace endeavours.
Religious institutions have become one of the central pillars of community peace,
security and stability in view of the role that religious leaders play in society, as well
as the influence they have on their adherents. A respondent in Kafanchan opined
that the pastors and imams meet monthly to discuss issues that affect the peace and
security of the area (B5.5). Other testimonies affirm that people with family
problems often consult religious leaders and that pastors and imams enjoy a good
degree of confidence as spiritual or religious leaders.
In Rigasa community of Kaduna state, the sulhu approach to reconciliation is an
effective method used by the traditional rulers (mai anguwa local chiefs - or hakimi
village heads), whereby together with some respected personalities in the
community, they resolve conflicts in a way that ensures relationships are rebuilt for
the common good, rather than rely on the formal court processes, which are often
used as a last resort.
However, notwithstanding the positive role that religious institutions and their leaders
can play in engendering peace in communities, it is evident that religion has been
exploited for political and other interests, to the extent that the use of abusive and
provocative language as well as the hate message of we versus them has been

63

responsible for deep-seated tensions, ill-feelings and intolerance between Christians

and Muslims.
In each of the LGAs in the region, the role of government in the management and
provision of security is quite evident through the peace and security committees,
which are modeled after those of the state and federal governments. Membership of
the security committee is drawn from all the security agencies, leadership of the local
government and some traditional leaders respectively. The security committee
provides a platform and opportunity for exchange of ideas and intelligence on
security matters and how they can be resolved. Though sometimes weak in terms of
capacity to respond to early warning signs, they prove useful with respect to having
first hand information on threat analysis.
4.3 Community-level peace initiatives
Many respondents talked with nostalgia about times in the past when different ethnoreligious groups lived together in peace and when ties of neighbourhood, friendship
and intermarriage kept them bound together. Although most consider that the
increasing balkanization of communities has changed this, not everyone would
agree:
Our parents before us lived in peace with the TarokI make
sure I tell my Tarok friends of any naming ceremony, marriage,
or any celebration for that matter. We are very close and I
personally consider them my brothers. Many Tarok people have
mingled with my people and even converted to Islam. We give
them our daughter to marry and they live among us without a
single difference. In fact one of us refused to give his daughter
to a fellow Fulani man. Instead he gave her to a Tarok boy who
had stayed with him and reared his cattle and had become like a
son to him. He sponsored the boy to school and now the boy
and the girl are living as husband and wife, so you see what we
are saying. There is nothing better than peace. Before the crisis
there were thousands of Tarok boys living with the Fulani. I can
tell you none of these boys was harmed during the crisis. (B3.9).
One respondent drew attention to the fact that every community has their ways of
managing conflicts. But most communities today are planning vengeance instead of
peaceful co-existence (B1.1). This view is echoed by a respondent who
commented: It looks as if, in spite of the cordial relationship that had existed for
years between us, people had not built a mechanism that will promote oneness
(B1.8). These comments underline the fact that although communities within the
Middle Belt region have in place structures and mechanisms for managing conflicts
for example by facilitating dialogue, reconciliation and trust between or among
people - they appear now to be largely cosmetic, and critically weak as a result of
deep-seated hatred and the protracted nature of some of the conflicts, leading to
what can be regarded as balance of force or fire for fire.
Interviewees also suggest that the reduction and resolution of community-level
conflicts in the region largely depends on communities appreciating the value of
cooperation to address threats, as well as understanding the consequences of not
cooperating. Through cooperation they will be well placed to check the movement of
persons in and out, track early warning signs to conflicts, and contain the likelihood
of conflicts from elsewhere spilling over into their communities. As a respondent
from Rikkos observed:

64

Some sources of conflict in the community are the rumours of

the crisis in some community. If one person comes into this
community with blood wounds and he said they were done to
him by youth of a certain community, it will bring tension. Now
what happens is that a committee is set up to investigate the
problem. The committee will work to calm the people and enjoin
them to be patient. If the incident is correct, the people are told
to stay at the border for protection of the community. This is
different from before, when people just go to fight (B2.2).
Several community-based peacebuilding initiatives have been designed and
implemented by state and non-state actors in Plateau and Kaduna state. One of such
has been microcredit schemes for women and youths as a vital tool for conflict
mitigation and empowerment. The best-known examples of community-driven peace
initiatives are those in Congo-Russia of Jos North LGA, Rantya and Dadin Kowa of
Jos South. These have proven to be models for peace and stability that are well
known and respected locally and that can be replicated. The Dadin Kowa initiative in
particular was frequently mentioned by respondents, especially those in Rikkos and
Furaka. In Rigasa community of Kaduna State, the role of women leaders has
proven to be a model that should be appreciated in terms of their ability to mediate
and settle disputes among Hausa women.
Respondents also referred to inter-faith initiatives. A respondent from Kafanchan
gave this catalogue, for example, of community peacebuilding activities initiated
jointly by Muslim and Christian leaders:
CAN, the bishop of Kafanchan, Jamaatu Nasil Islam, have
organized peace seminars. A cardinal from Rome who was
invited by the bishop to talk on peaceThe emir has formed a
committee for both Muslims and Christians and district heads
from other chiefdoms, where the chairman is a Christian. There
is a subcommittee for public enlightenment of youths on the
effects of drugs. This committee has gone round all the district
inside and outside of Kafanchan. The committee have as part of
its programmes organized peace football match won by Baju
Bombers. The Peace and Reconciliation Committee formed by
the Emir of Jamaa bought the trophies for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
positions, while the bishop contributed N300,000.00 to buy
prizes for all participatory teams. The emir and bishop singlehandedly sponsored the final competition. These are things the
government should be interested to sponsor, not individuals
(B5.5).
Respondents were also aware of humanitarian initiatives to support victims of
violence by providing relief supplies and assistance with rebuilding their homes. In
some cases these were deliberately intended as gestures of support to the other
side, as when the Governor of Bauchi sent relief supplies and personally came to
ensure that both Muslim and Christian families had received them (described by
respondent B1.11).
In addition, a number of narratives testify to the initiative of individuals, often
described as council chairmen, religious leaders, and other local functionaries, who
played key roles in supporting victims of violence, reducing tension and keeping
people together, often at extreme risk to themselves. One respondent quoted the

65

example of his father, then village head, who had helped Hausas in fear of attack to
relocate out of the area, but was eventually attacked and killed for his pains:
To ensure their safety and protection, my dad arranged for a
security escort for the transiting population of the Hausas who
were grateful for the assistance. When the attack was taking
place, we recognized the voice of some of the attackers who
were contemplating to burn the house of my dad or not. While
some had objected to that, others were of the opinion that his
house should be burnt because he is sarkin arne meaning the
head of unbelievers (B1.7).

5. PATHWAYS FOR THE NSRP ON THE MIDDLE BELT REGION

The situation on the ground in the Middle Belt reveals that discontent with past
approaches and efforts at conflict management has grown. It has also become
obvious that sustainable peace in the communities cannot be effected without
productive and constructive partnership between communities, government, civil
society and development partners respectively. It is evident that in the absence of
such partnership, and without community support and buy-in, peace will be a mirage.
Dialogue, reconciliation and accommodation are viable strategies that should be
adopted by both state and non-state actors for the management of inter-group
relations in the region.
NSRPs role in strengthening the link between communities and other formal state
institutions will be a significant step towards stabilization and reconstruction in the
Middle Belt. This can be done by providing support for traditional institutions at the
community level to build confidence and strong partnerships between communities,
governments and development partners.
The patriarchal nature of politics and governance is reflected in conflict management
to the extent that neither traditional nor modern political institutions allow for the
involvement of women and youth. The potential for synergy between these
institutions and actors should be effectively utilized for the common good. An
analysis of the political economy of the Middle Belt should take into account the
critical role that women and other vulnerable groups play as far as the dynamics of
violence in the region is concerned.
The involvement of government institutions at the local, state and federal levels is
central to effective policy response and intervention, with emphasis on conflict
management and poverty reduction. Many respondents urged government to be
more pro-active in solving problems, specifically in communicating with communities,
creating youth employment, promoting economic growth and supporting vulnerable
people through credit facilities, and so on. The perception was that conflicts would
be much reduced if these initiatives were taken.
It is particularly important to design programmes that focus on strengthening the
capacity of youth groups, neighbourhoods and communities on peace-related
matters. This will help address challenges associated with the breakdown in
community relations or harmony. Youth councils exist in most places; in the Middle
Belt there are several youth specific groups that have been established and to an
extent supported by government at all levels. Some of such groups have benefited
from donor support. A development approach was recommended by one
respondent thus:

66

the development approach to conflict management. When the

state and other stakeholders provide basic amenities and create
job for the idle army of youths, it is already managing or even
preventing conflict. This is because people who have nothing
have nothing to protect, nothing for which to fear, and so would
easily resort to burning and mass killing as a way of expressing
their anger against the system which is unjust and unfair to them
(B2.9).
Strengthening the link between state and non-state security providers as it relates to
security provisioning at the community level, should be a central focus of donor
intervention. This approach will go a long way in addressing the absence of synergy
and coordination between formal state institutions and the array of non-state
providers. One major challenge that resonates in the discourse on violence and
criminality in Plateau and Kaduna states is also tied to the question of killings and
attacks, in the face of a security system that is also deficient in terms of proactiveness in tackling such problems.
The lingering issues of indigeneship, is a major source of conflict in Jos North and
Kafanchan in Plateau and Kaduna states respectively. The inability of the federal
government to address this issue through a constitutional amendment or review
process constitutes a major problematic in the management of diversity and efforts
towards accommodation and inclusivity. The NSRP can support advocacy on clearer
definitions of residency, to address the indigene/settler dichotomy in the polity.
This research into community-level conflict management in Plateau and Kaduna
States, which are part of the Middle Belt region, identified and listened to peoples
testimonies and experiences relating to the drivers of conflicts in these areas. Some
of the key issues arising include rising youth unemployment, criminality and violence,
and the way ethnicity and religion are used as bases for mobilization by the
conflicting parties. Religion and ethnicity have played grave roles as far as
criminality, violent conflict, instability and underdevelopment in the Middle Belt are
concerned.
Both formal and non-formal mechanisms exist for the regulation of relations between
groups that are potentially in conflict. However, though these were seen to have
worked well in the past, successive waves of violence have driven communities
apart, and the structures that once linked them are now largely non-existent. This
suggests that rebuilding these structures of linkage could be a sound peacebuilding
strategy. The commonalities associated with the experiences of people and
communities as far as conflicts in the Middle Belt region are concerned provide a
sound basis for a coordinated and strategic approach for NSRPs design and
implementation.

References
Abdu, H. (2002) Ethno-religious crisis in Kaduna: impact on women and children in
Alemika, O.E.E. and Okoye, F. (eds) Ethno-religious conflicts and democracy in
Nigeria: challenges Kaduna, Human Rights Monitor
Alemika, O.E.E. (2002) Sociological analysis of ethnic and religious conflicts in the
Middle Belt of Nigeria in Alemika, O.E.E and Okoye, F (eds) Ethno-religious conflicts
and democracy in Nigeria: challenges Kaduna, Human Rights Monitor

67

Babangida, B.I (2002) Ethnic nationalities and the Nigerian State: the dynamics and
challenges of governance in a plural Nigeria Distinguished annual lecture, National
Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Kuru, Nigeria
British Council (2012) Gender in Nigeria report 2012: improving the lives of girls and
women in Nigeria Nigeria, British Council
Dunmoye, R. A. (2003) General survey of conflicts in the Middle Belt zone in Africa
Review Special Edition, Abuja, Centre for Peace Research and Conflict, National
War College
International IDEA (2000) Democracy in Nigeria: continuing dialogue(s) for nation
building Stockholm, IIDEA
Joireman, S. F. (2003) Nationalism and political identity London and New York,
Continuum
Kaplan, D. R. (1994) The coming anarchy The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994
Kwaja, A.M.C. (2009) Strategies for rebuilding state capacity to manage ethnic and
religious conflict in Nigeria Journal of Pan African Studies Vol. 3 No. 3, September
2009
Kwaja, A.M.C (2011) Nigerias Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-Religious Conflict, Africa
Security Brief, Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS), available
www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/Africa-Security-Brief/ASB-14.pdf
Metumara, M.D. (2010) Democracy and the challenge of ethno-nationalism in
Nigerias fourth republic: interrogating institutional mechanics in Journal of Peace,
Conflict and Development Issue 15, March 2010
Mohammed, S.A. (2005) The impact of conflict on the economy: the case of Plateau
State of Nigeria available at www.odi.org.uk/events/docs/122.pdf
Paden, N. J. (2008) Faith and politics in Nigeria: Nigeria as a pivotal state in a
Muslim world Washington D.C., United States Institute for Peace Press
Plateau Peace Conference (2004) Plateau resolves
Plateau State Government (2004) Making peace: the Plateau experience, an official
account of the state of emergency, May-November, 2004 Jos, Matchers Publishing
Limited
Samuel, O. et al (2011) The challenges of post-conflict partitioning of contested
cities in Northern Nigeria: a case study of Jos North LGA in Best, S.G. (eds) Religion
and post-conflict peacebuilding in Northern Nigeria Ibadan, John Archers Publishers
Limited
Yoroms, G. (2002) Dynamics of ethnic and religious conflicts in the Middle Belt in
Alemika, O.E.E. and Okoye, F. (eds) Ethno-religious conflicts and democracy in
Nigeria: challenges Kaduna, Human Rights Monitor

68

SECTION C: NORTH EAST

INTRODUCTION
Nigeria has been beset with many conflicts since the return of the country to
democratic government in 1999. While some conflicts may have been relatively easy
to contain, others, such as the current insurgency in the North East, pose more
serious structural questions. It is with a view to understanding these conflicts so as
to be able to contain them that the University of Maiduguri established the Centre for
Peace, Diplomatic and Development Studies (CPDDS), in October 2005. Its
objective is to promote developmental issues and contribute to conflict management
in the north-eastern states of Nigeria. Its mission is to conduct research and facilitate
capacity building, training, good governance, human rights and development. Since
its establishment, the Centre has carried out a number of research projects on peace
and conflict management strategies in its areas of operation. The Nigeria Stability
and Reconciliation Programme, which is aimed at promoting non-violent
management of conflicts in Nigeria and reducing their impact on the most vulnerable,
is consistent with the Centres mission and this is the basis for the present
collaboration.
This report on the North East component of the CCMM aims to:
1. Outline issues of security, prevention, protection and reconciliation as they are
perceived by various organisations and members of the communities in the study
area
2. Identify formal and informal mechanisms for mitigating conflicts in the northeastern states of Nigeria.
3. Examine the effectiveness of these mechanisms in mitigating conflicts in the
region
4. Make recommendations for NSRP priorities.
1. METHODOLOGY
The approach for this research was based on both structured and unstructured
interviews to elicit information from respondents in the affected communities. Around
two thirds of those interviewed were ordinary residents of the study areas who had
been directly affected by conflict, while the remainder were key informants (for
example traditional rulers, politicians, community leaders, youth leaders, women
leaders and security officials). A total of 164 respondents of both types were
recorded. In addition, focus group discussions were employed to generate
information from stakeholders, including youth associations, womens associations,
traditional institutions and religious groups. This report presents findings from the
interviews and group discussions in the selected areas.
The research team took place in March and April 2012, in five locations in the North
East. These were:
1. Maiduguri Metropolitan LGA, Bornu State
2. Lower Ngada (Jere and Mafa LGAs, Borno State)
3. Biu LGA, Borno State
4. Marte LGA, Borno State
5. Potiskum LGA, Yobe State

69

The research team consisted of a lead researcher assisted by nine researchers and
a consultant, and with the support and guidance of the Director of CPDDS.
2. CONTEXT
The Borno Empire, which historically dominated the North East of Nigeria, was one
of the earliest in pre-colonial Africa. It gave to the North East region a long tradition
of peace, which was due in part to the existence of institutions - both political and
spiritual - that bind people together and help regulate conflicts. This chain of social,
economic and political relationships shaped the growth and development of the
Empire before the current period of modernization and democracy.
To a large extent the structures that were in place during the Bornu Empire continue
to this day. The empire was ruled by mais (kings) and later by shehus (presidents).
Posts that still exist within the traditional political authority structure include the shehu
(president and commander in chief), waziri (prime minister), aja (district head), lawan
(village head), and bulama (ward head). Spritually the chief imam is the head of all
the ulama or learned religious masters. He appoints the imams who lead Friday
prayer congregations, and gives out what is to be read in the sermon for those
occasions. These local imams of wards and streets are highly respected as spiritual
authorities, and people refer to them first in matters such as family, house and farm
boundary disputes. They then summon the people collectively to settle the matter. If
the matter cannot be settled at that level, individuals can, if they wish, refer it to the
bulama or lawan. However, those who refuse to accept the authority of the local
imam are likely to suffer social isolation, and this is the source of obedience to them.
In the present day, the North East geopolitical zone is one of the most disadvantaged
regions of Nigeria, with levels of illiteracy, disease, poverty and insecurity that are
generally higher than in other regions of the country. It is therefore not surprising to
see the region engulfed in various conflicts that have negatively impacted the lives of
the people living in the region.
The study in the North East was carried out in five locations, of which a brief
description follows:
Maiduguri Metropolitan: The Borno Empire had several different capitals in the
course of its history. Maiduguri was enshrined by the British colonial powers in 1900
and thus became the political seat of all the ethnic and religious identities present in
the region. Once the capital of the former North Eastern State, and now capital of
Borno State, the city has maintained its status as the regions commercial and
industrial hub, and this, coupled with its strategic location, has led to its continued
expansion, both in size and in population. It is currently estimated to have a
population of 521,492. The relative peace the city enjoyed since its establishment
has also attracted many to settle permanently in Maiduguri, even though its principal
inhabitants are from the Kanuri ethnic group. Many non-Kanuri ethnicities are found
in Maiduguri, both Nigerians and those from other parts of the Chad Basin borders.
Maiduguri is gradually being transformed by urbanization.
Lower Ngada: Lower Ngada community falls within the jurisdiction of Jere and Mafa
Local Government Areas of Borno State, and has a combined population of around
400,000. It is located alongside River Ngada, which stretches from the centre of
Maiduguri eastward up to Wuda Kaya. The area is bounded to the east by Mafa
Local Government, in the west by Lake Alau, in the north by Ladi Mbuta, and

70

Ngowom village to the south. Communities in Lower Ngada include Zabarmari,

Koshibe, Agaya1, 11 and 111 and Gongulong, among others.
The climate is characterized by a long dry season and a short rainy season during
July to September. Temperatures reach 43C in May. Socio-economic activities in
Lower Ngada are mostly farming, fishing and trading. Farming is the most dominant
economic activity; the main crops produced are rice and vegetables such as onion,
okra, red pepper, lettuce and tomatoes. Fishing activity commences when the River
Ngada starts to flow from August to December. When the river gets dry, fishing
activity stops and trading continues.
The original inhabitants of lower Ngadi are Kanuri and Shuwa. However, due to the
fertility of the soil and the opportunities for fishing, Hausa have moved into the area
in great numbers. Land in this area is owned by indigenes but leased in various
ways to settlers, many of whom are more active and resourceful farmers than the
original owners. Leasing of land may be done privately between owner and lessee,
or may be facilitated by ward heads (bulama) or village heads (lawan). The lessee
pays a tithe (butu) of ten percent of the harvest to the owner, or as the case may be
to the bulama or lawan. Many conflicts arise over land leasing arrangements, as
well as over conflicting access needs by settled farmers and nomadic pastoralists.
Biu: is an urban LGA in Borno state. It is flanked by Hawul LGA to the south, Askira
Uba LGA to the east, Shani LGA to the south, and Damboa LGA to the north. Biu is
peopled by the Babur-Bura ethnic group, who are of Kanuri stock. They are
predominantly agrarian, mainly engaging in rainy and dry season agriculture, as is
appropriate for the climatic condition. Having a relatively high level of education,
many work in the public service sector.
Marte: is an LGA in Borno State. It is flanked by Lake Chad to the East, Dikwa LGA
to the south, Monguno LGA to the north, and Mafa LGA to the west. Most of the
settlements in Marte are either on the edge of Lake Chad or along the 33 kms of
channels constructed for irrigation purposes by the South Chad Irrigation Project of
the Chad Basin Development Authority. The latter include Kusuma, Koloram, Tumbu
Buhari, and Tubumba. The original inhabitants of this LGA are Kanuri and Shuwa,
who are farmers (producing rice, wheat and vegetables), fishermen and nomads.
More recently, Hausa have come into the area, attracted by the prospects for fishing.
Potiskum: is the capital of Yobe State, and its main urban and commercial centre.
The town is bordered by Fika LGA to the south, Nangere LGA to the north, Jakusko
LGA to the west, and to the east Bajoga LGA of Gombe State. Due to its strategic
location, Potiskum has now become a hub for surrounding communities. Today,
Potiskum is made up of the Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo, as well as its
indigenous ethnic groups namely, the Karekare, Ngizim and Bolewa. It has thus
become a melting pot of the ethnic groups in the North East geopolitical zone.
3. TYPES OF CONFLICT IDENTIFIED IN THE FIVE STUDY AREAS
In the interviews conducted in the five selected areas, the type of conflict which
people referred to most often were around land and politics. Land-related conflicts
are of various sorts, and include indigene-settler conflicts, farmer-pastoralist conflicts,
and conflicts over specific land rights and water resources. The most high-profile
political conflict is the current insurgency by Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati Wal-

71

Jihad or JAS,36 but a wide variety of other political issues are also contentious,
ranging from party politics to chieftaincy tussles. A range of social and interpersonal
conflicts, including domestic violence, was also recorded.
3.1 Indigene-settler conflict
Indigene-settler tensions are a source of conflict in Maiduguri Metropolitan, and in
Zabarmari in Lower Ngada. In Maiduguri, the tension is between the Kanuri (the
indigenes) and the Chadians who are settlers in Costain, Gwange and Gamboru
wards. This tension is over resource control and political space in Maiduguri
Metropolitan politics. The Chadians have attempted to expand their businesses and
to participate actively in local ward politics. The Kanuri, who are their hosts, resist
these attempts. Generally, the level of poverty, and the injustices perpetrated by the
leaders of the two ethnic groups, have both contributed to increasing peoples sense
of grievance. Political leaders in Maiduguri Metropolitan have tended to exploit these
conflicts between the Kanuri and the Chadians. The interview extract below
exemplifies the indigene-settler conflict in Maiduguri Metropolitan:
There is a persistent conflict between the Kanuri, who are the
original inhabitants of Maiduguri, and the Chadians, who are settlers
in one ward. The latter are hardworking and are mostly
tradesmen. the Kanuri are always jealous of these Chadians.
They always mock and look down upon the Chadians and call them
namesLet me tell you that this problem between Chadians who
are settlers and the Kanuri who are claiming the ownership of the
area may again come to the open. When it happens, we do not
know where it will end. May God forbid this conflict escalating
(C1.29).
In Zabarmari, the tension is between the Kanuri, who are the owners of Zabarmari
village, and the Hausa who are settlers. The Hausa, who are hard-working farmers,
have taken over a high proportion of agricultural land in the village, to the extent that
in some cases they are now leasing the land they have taken over back to their host
community. The Kanuri hosts are resisting this reversal, and this resistance has
often led to open conflict between indigenes and settlers.
In my community, the traditional land tenure system implies that the
land belongs to the original inhabitant of the community, shared out
among families. As the area attracted foreigners, there developed a
second group called the settlers. agriculturalists who put up huge
amount of money for them to access and use the land.37 The money is
a surety as well as granting the right to land use. It is expected that
after [the lessee] uses the land for a period of time, the owner will
return the amount advanced. The conflict usually started when the
landowner failed to return back the mortgaged money. If the settlers

36

Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati Wal-Jihad (or JAS for short) is the name the group gives to itself,
while Boko Haram is the name that others ascribe to it. NSRP refers to it by its proper name. However,
in this document, where study respondents refer to it as Boko Haram we have retained their wording.
37
In this informal mortgaging arrangement, landowners release equity by mortgaging their land. The
landowner benefits by having access to cash (which he or she must repay at the end of an agreed
period). The settler benefits by having access to land, which he or she can then farm, or even rent out.
At the end of the agreed period the land returns to its original owner, who pays back the borrowed cash.
If the money is not returned, the lender retains the right to use the land. However, this arrangement is
not recognized in customary law. Lenders who hold on to land in these circumstances cannot seek
recourse in the local courts.

72

then withhold the land, it becomes illegal, because the traditional

system does not recognize that (C2.15).
Similarly, in Marte tensions arise between indigenous fishing communities and
Hausa settlers, over what the indigenes view as unfair fishing techniques used by the
Hausa (see section 3.3 below). Indigenes accuse the Hausa of failing to respect the
regulatory role of local authorities charged with regulating fishing practice, and claim
that they are able to get away with abusive practices because of their political
connections: The Hausa and the Jukun encroached on the areas that belong to the
indigenes, and because they are influential and have considerable political
connections, they succeed in whatever they do and go away with it with impunity
(Marte FGD).
3.2 Farmer-pastoralist conflict
Farmer-pastoralist conflict is found in Lower Ngada, Marte, Biu and Potiskum LGAs.
In these communities, farmers have been obliged to encroach on existing grazing
routes as a result of population increase and the establishment of new settlements.
As a result, the pastoralists are left with one option: to take their cattle across the
new farmland, and in doing so, to risk destroying farmers crops. The result of this
development is open confrontation between pastoralists and cultivators.
In the colonial era, cattle routes were protected and nomadic groups had secured
routes through which they passed. However this system has now virtually broken
down. As a participant at a local security meeting in Marte put it: The breakdown of
governance in the country has meant that these routes have now for the most part
been cultivated, and it is becoming impossible to move animals without trespassing
cultivated land.38
In Koloram and Kusuman, rising tensions between farming communities and
nomadic Fulani pastoralists have been documented since 2006, leading to what
Nelson describes as the worst forms of homicides, evictions, [and] increased
stereotypes, among others.39 Similar incidents of farmers and pastoralists fighting
over grazing lands abound in Lower Ngada. Below is an extract from one informants
testimony:
We had a conflict with Fulani herdsmen that even led to the death of
my father I was lucky, otherwise I would have been killed. Some
teams were dispatched to search for the Fulani man whom they
brought to the village. The Fulani man was brought alive before the
villagers. After the confirmation of my fathers death, the villagers filled
with anger killed the Fulani man in revenge. The case was been
reported to the village head, who reported the matter to the appropriate
authority(C2.7).
3.3 Conflict over land and water resources
Struggles for the control of land and water resources are sources of perennial
conflicts in the North East geopolitical zone. In particular, Lake Chad basin is noted

38
th
Minutes of meeting held in Marte LGC, 16 November 2007.
39

Nelson, J. S. (2006) Fishers of the world London, John Wiley.

73

for conflicts over the free flow of water in the lake. The fishing portion of the lake is
divided into canals for easy fishing and other related activities. The people that are
involved in the fishing activities are the Shuwa Arabs and the Kanuri, the latter being
the indigenes of the Lake Basin area, while the non-indigenes include Hausa, Jukun,
Buduma, and some nationals from Cameroon. In particular, Hausa fishermen have
tried to get an edge over non-Hausa fishermen by creating new dumba (dykes),
which they use instead of the existing ones created by indigenes. This has led to
conflict between indigenous fishermen and settlers. Both the kachallas and chima
njibe (officials charged with managing the water resources) have attempted to
mediate, usually referring cases to the chairman of Marte LGA when they failed to
find an agreed solution.
since the arrival of the Hausa, who have been living with us for the
past twenty years, things are no longer the same today. What is
responsible for this ugly development is the creation of dykes when the
lake water is at its peak. The Hausa abandoned the traditional way of
fish farming and went ahead to place a dyke few metres away from
where the Kanuri and Shuwa had placed, thereby causing obstruction
and blockages. This is the usual crisis. They - the Kanuri and the
Shuwa - respected us, the lawans, but the Hausa do not (C5.1).
Climate change, as well as bad governance, may be contributing to land conflict.
These areas can no longer support the animal and human populations, and this
creates further fragility of the ecosystem, pushing the desert forwards. In fact, some
ethnic groups especially Hausa speaking peoples of Sokoto, Kano, Kaduna and even
as far as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have been forced to relocate to the area
around the Lake Chad due to the impact of desertification, generating further conflict
over ownership of land, taxation and allegiance to the traditional authorities.
3.4 Conflict between individuals over land and property
Conflict over land and property can divide families, as well as communities, pitting
brother against brother and even leading to violence:
The head of the family died in 2006 and left behind a house and
other immovable properties. The first wife has six children while
the second wife has only one child. When it came to sharing the
house, it became problematic. In its ruling, the court said that this
boy from the second wife must be given a room. the room they
gave him requires that he pass through his brothers yards before
getting to his own room. His brothers, therefore, insisted that he
shouldnt pass through their yards to his room. In order to avoid
trouble again, the boy had to create another door behind the room
to enable him enter his room (C1.8).
Look at my left hand, my brother used axe to chop it off me because
of the land we inherited from our father. He almost killed me, if not
the grace of Allah. According to him, he was not satisfied with the
way the land is shared, that is either the piece of farmland should be
sold or a bigger portion should be given to him (C2.20).
Narratives also recorded frequent cases of mis-selling of land, for example:
There is a seller who sold one plot to three people, and when the
last buyer came to develop his plot, he was confronted by the first

74

buyer. As they were quarrelling over the piece of land, the second
buyer appeared, and asked what was going on. He was told that
the two men were quarrelling over a piece of land. When he was
shown the piece of land, he quickly said that that was his land. This
was a huge embarrassment for the three men (C1.28)
Conflict between landlords and tenants is another form of land-related conflict,
especially in Maiduguri:
Landlords here in Maiduguri have rules regarding the use of toilet
facilities in the houses they have rented out. They will tell you how
many times families of tenants will go to toilet. My wife was asked
not to pour water on the ground by my landlord. When she
disobeyed his orders, we were given notice by the landlord to leave
his house. Do you know that sometimes the landlords will not
even give notice? What they will do is to start removing roof of your
rooms (C1.7).
Regulation of land access, which is the responsibility of the traditional leadership at
the local level, is itself frequently an object of conflict. This tends to arise from
misunderstandings, since the arrangements are generally not formalized.
After clearing the farmland in preparatory to harrow it towards the
rainy season, I surprisingly met a group of people harrowing the
farmlandThe case was that those people were given the land to
farm and they harvested and refuse to bring in the returns of 10% to
the lawan, so he therefore decide to sell out the land to me without
consulting them since they neglected him of his farm dues. I told
the lawan himself of the need for written agreement between the
lawan and whom the farmlands are leased to prevent similar
problems repeating themselves (C2.11).
3.5 Social and political discontents
The conflict uppermost in the minds of many respondents was the JAS insurgency.
Many respondents, especially those from Maiduguri, recounted stories of how their
brothers, husbands or sons had been killed, either by insurgents or by security forces
sent in to take control of the violence. They also described a wide variety of
personal, social and economic crises that resulted from these killings:
My son was killed by members of Boko Haram. Last year, in the
afternoon my son went to nearby cinema house to watch a football
march. In the process of watching the football march, some
gunmen sneaked into the cinema house and killed him together
with two of his friends. Since last year when he died, his father
is not himself. It seems nobody is willing to talk to these boys
that are always attacking the security forces and innocent civilians.
I am calling on the government to bring the situation under control
(C1.13).
When we heard the sound of the gun, we rushed out to see what was
happening. What we saw was our brother laying down in a pool of
blood The killing of my younger brother was devastating to me. In
fact, from the time he was killed up till this time that I am talking to you,
everything to me is hopeless. You should know that my brother left

75

one wife and three children. The wife is not employed. I do not know
how we will manage her and her three children (C1.1).
there was exchange of gunfire between the members of the sect and
the joint task force. My son, who was coming from outside the ward,
was caught up in the crossfire and he died. His death is a painful one.
The family is yet to recover from this (C1.3).
I am a helpless widow who could not take effective care of my children.
They cannot attend school because I have no financial support. My
husband was killed by the security forces. It was when some people
threw an explosive on the security forces, eventually my husband was
walking beside them. When the incident occurred, the security forces
sporadically started shooting at every direction, that was how bullet cut
my husband on the chest and he died at the spot (C1.31).
This Boko Haram is becoming a serious issue now. My husband
has stopped me and the children from going out to see friends and
relations, even my parents that are living in Hadamari, I hardly go to
see them because of the soldiers, police checkpoints all over the
place and bomb explosions we hear everyday. Two days back, the
soldiers came into our compound searching for the boys to take
away and kill. I have been indoors for long, in fact, the baby am
holding was delivered right in my room in the house. The small clinic
we go has been blast off by unknown men. I sell bean cake, but
because of what is happening around us, I stopped. Now to eat with
my children is a problem. Our men are also been attacked and get
slap by the soldiers, and even sometimes the soldiers will ask them
to do frog jump (C2.24).
As a result of business folding up a lot of people have lost their jobs
leading to high divorce. Increase in the number of widows and
orphans as a result of loss of lives especially men. Displacement of
people, increase in sexual harassment (C4.10).
Due to the insecurity challenges in the area, there is mass exit of
people, especially non-indigenes, from the area, thereby leading to
a retarded economic growth and social activities, displacement of
people and destruction of farmlands and livestock (C4.8).
A common refrain in the narratives collected in the North East is the view that the
unemployed and uneducated youth and drug addicts have become tools in the hands
of politicians, who patronize them to foment trouble. When these politicians achieve
their objectives, they abandon their clients. As the youths are no longer wanted by
their former masters, they become frustrated and therefore vent their anger on
anybody they perceived as their enemy.
These boys have no job doing but they just brought themselves
together and called their names as Ecomog. They terrorise and
molest people. They were formerly used as thugs by politicians
during elections to terrorise their opponents and win elections. But
now since they have nothing doing, they fight against one another
and even kill one another in the process of fighting (C1.30)

76

These boys are easily recruited by politicians to fight their opponent,

especially during the electioneering campaign and election period.
when elections are over, the politicians abandon them and they
(boys) begin to engage themselves in anti-social vices such as
armed robbery, drug addiction and even rape in some cases.
these boys are uneducated and cannot secure themselves better
jobs, except menial jobs, which requires a lot of energy. They are at
their prime but, still dont want such jobs and they have been
exposed to a lot of money by their political godfathers (C3.3)
Our political elites should stop recruiting youth as foot-soldiers or
political thugs, and government should ensure the creation of jobs
to address the unemployment problem in the country. Unless and
until the issues of unemployment, corruption and inequality are
addressed squarely, it may be difficult if not impossible for us to
have peace in our society (C3.1).
Many people believe that the JAS phenomenon is but one aspect of a more general
discontent arising from a range of serious problems facing the North East. However,
interpretations of this discontent vary. For some, this is a social conflict, since it
stems from social factors such as the low level of education, and high levels of
illiteracy and unemployment, that pervade the North East zone. Part of the appeal of
JAS is that it claims to seek a society which is more just.
On the other hand, some understand this problem as having a political, rather than
solely social, dimension, since injustice and blocked opportunity, which motivate JAS
membership as well as more general discontent, are at least in part the product of
governments apparent lack of response to peoples problems. Indeed, some
consider that the problem of unemployment has been exacerbated by the decision to
ban okada motorcycle transport.40 The resulting environment discourages some
citizens from collaborating with the government in order to defeat JAS.
This conflict to me is politically motivated. Politics in Nigeria is all
about greed and our political elites are very ambitious and they
could go to any length in order to maintain or attain any political
position they wish to, without restraint. These political elites have
initiated our youth into political thuggery and this thuggery has
changed into something different entirely and there is trouble
everywhere (C1.24).
My husband was shot by the unknown gunmen last three weeks,
my husband didnt do anything. Everybody knows him in this
community. Who did this? The military men of course. They
arrested my husband on what ground? My husband told me they
were asking him question he doesnt have an idea of. They have
caused me more harm than good and I detest seeing them around.
The military men should be brought to book and be removed. I
just need justice. My husband is innocent (C 2.23).
You cannot treat me as if I am an animal by molesting me and at
the same time expect me to supply you with important information
that will help get rid of your problem. The Federal Government and

40

For example, almost every respondent in Potiskum mentioned this.

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the JTF should think very well and devise other means to tackle this
problem (C1.22).
3.6 Political conflicts, modern and traditional
There have been deep rivalries between the All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) and
the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in Borno and Yobe States. In Borno State,
supporters of PDP were not happy over the 2011 governorship election, as they felt
that the PDP candidate had won the election but had been robbed of victory by the
incumbent governor (from the ANPP). There have been open clashes between the
supporters of the two political parties in Borno State. The same could be said of the
rivalry between supporters of ANPP and PDP in Yobe State. National politics also
generated conflict:
People, I mean electorates in this ward who participated in the
election, thought that General Muhammadu Buhari was going to win
the election outrightly. However, when the election result was
announced and President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan won the
presidential election, the boys here went wild, attacking people that
were associated with the election of Jonathan. This really created
enmity between the supporters of Buhari and President Jonathan
(C1.24).
Conflicts over chieftaincy have been on the increase in the North East geopolitical
zone. In Potiskum and Marte study areas, there are cases of conflict over who
should be appointed a lawan or emir and from what house, whenever a vacancy
exists as a result of the death of a particular ruler. Besides, the economic benefits
attached to traditional political offices encourage stiff competition and rivalry among
contenders.
Attempts to influence local government in favour of a particular candidate against
another have led to local governments becoming active participants in the selection
process, contrary to traditional methods of recruitment. In both Potiskum and Marte,
it is the kingmakers that are supposed to select successors to traditional political
offices. However, government interference has often led to serious conflicts between
contenders, with devastating consequences. For example, in Koshibe, Lower
Ngada, a bulama (ward head) who refused to support the Borno State Governments
choice in the appointment of another bulama was removed without regard to due
process. In spite of pleas by his subjects, the government refused to reinstate him.
The extract below may help explain succession and dethronement conflicts that exist
in the North East geopolitical zone:
A lot of crisis have happened especially during the crisis between
two lawan aspirants. I particularly even lost my position as a ward
head (bulama). As the seat of lawan was declared vacant, the
ward heads were expected to vote for a suitable candidate to fill
the post. All of us (bulama) agreed to vote the inherited lawan as
our leader, which was against the candidate that the wakili41 was
imposing on us (C2.8).
I was attacked by unknown gunmen I spend nearly a year in the
hospital, depending on relations and friends. All my properties

41

Secretary
78

and wealth are gone. Of course [those responsible were] the

opposition party, those who are opposing the turbanning of the
present lawan. They said the throne should be given to them,
since it was the politicians that chose them. The present lawan
inherited the throne from his father, and we are his followers.
When the politicians came in, they brought their candidate for the
same throne. Because we didnt support them, they want to kill us
and destroy our belongings, so that they can crown their
candidate who does not belong to the traditional group at all
(C2.17).
In Potiskum study area, succession to traditional rule by hereditary right has come
under serious challenge, with bitter conflicts between the two main ethnic groups, the
Ngizim and the Bolewa. While the Ngizim are the original inhabitants of the area, the
Bolewa originated from Fika. Although in the minority, the latter are currently the
ruling class in Potiskum and their leader currently occupies the position of emir or
Potiskum. The Ngizim ethnic groups in Potiskum, who feel that they have been
excluded from contesting the position of emir, have been challenging the status quo.
This chieftaincy conflict between Bolewa and Ngizim is likely to burst out in the near
future. Many believe that the government could solve the problem by moving the
Bolewa back to their original homes:
The relocation of the emir of Fika should be done by the
government to Fika to prevent clashes arising from the chieftaincy
tussle between the two emirates. The government should also
maintain a neutral stand in the feud between the two emirates
(C4.13).
3.8 Violence against women
The interviews conducted in all five selected communities revealed the prevalence of
violence against women. Some men refused to allow their wives their basic rights
and resist their attempts to be economically active: I am just at home doing nothing.
My husband does not allow me to trade just like other women do Whenever I
asked him, he usually slap me and abuse me (C2.25).
There are many reported cases of rape as a result of the ongoing JAS conflict.
Soldiers and police officers are themselves alleged to have raped women:
You see, these soldiers they brought here are causing a lot of
damages on our young girls. These girls help their mothers to go and
hawk. The soldiers will call them in the name of buying those things
they are hawking, but before you know what is happening, they will
rape them. You see those girls with babies sitting [pointing]? They
were raped by the so-called soldiers. The soldiers always threaten
them, that if they dont cooperate, they will shoot them, haba what is
happening? Why are these security soldiers behaving this way? They
dont want our children to live good life? Dont they [soldiers] have
mothers, sisters and wives? Wallahi we are tired of this kind of life
(C2.21).
Drug addicts and street gangs are equally reported to be involved in raping women,
and indeed respondents also reported marital rape:

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I know of a woman who is constantly being beaten by her husband

the woman initially did not love the man. I learned that the
woman refused to give herself to the man. So, he beats her up
whenever he wanted sex with her. Still, she will not yield an inch to
the man. There was a day I learnt that her husband, with the help
of his friends, tied her legs on the bed before asking her husband to
have sex with her (C1.2).
3.8 Other interpersonal conflicts
Narratives also report interpersonal conflicts in a variety of settings, ranging from
marital conflict, to disputes over girl-friends and boy-friends, to competition within and
between occupational groups.
Somebody had told his [my neighbours] wife that he is having
extra-marital affair with one woman When he told his wife, she
demanded that she must be given divorce letter right away. It took
the efforts of leaders in the community here to convince her to stay
in her matrimonial home. In fact, he is not the only one in this
community that has trouble with his wife over another woman
outside his home. There are many families who have this problem.
It is actually tearing their families apart (C1.11).
the husband to these two women loved the younger wife more
than the older woman who happened to be the first wife. The
younger wife was hard working and hardly request for things to be
given to her by her husband because she was a business woman,
and even the money she got from her sales, she gives it to her
husband to support the family. The older and first wife of this man
became jealous of the whole issue and began to pick quarrel with
the younger wife. (C1.21)
One of the boys in Baban Layi complained that his girlfriend was
snatched away from him by another boy from Layin Yan Kaji. On
hearing this, his colleagues had to mobilize themselves and
attacked this fellow from Layin yan Kaji (C1.19).
There is a serious conflict going on in this community between two
young ladies over a very young and handsome man. One of the
ladies is accusing the other for snatching her boyfriend. The two
girls are Christian girls from the South fighting over a northern
Muslim guy. They fought and wounded themselves until the elders
in this community were asked to mediate and resolve the conflict.
How can girls of tender ages begin to fight over a boyfriend? This is
terrible (C1.34).
Those transport workers union members who are at Tashan Kano
accused those at Tashan Journey for opening an illegal motor park
without taking permission from them, while that of Tashan Journey
said that they need not take permission from those at Tashan Kano
because they have their own union. This misunderstanding led to
open clash between the two unions (C1.12)
it was agreed that old rice should not be mixed up with new rice
and what have you. One man was found breaking the rule and yet

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go free sometimes. The man always sold his rice against the laid
down rules. He will mix up varieties not minding the quality, which
contravene our laws. This always led to misunderstanding between
him and other members who see it as a deliberate attempt to cause
damage (C2.1).
4. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND MEDIATION PROCESSES IDENTIFIED IN THE STUDY AREAS
A number of conflict management and mediation processes were identified In the
study areas. These include various arms of the government, traditional and religious
institutions, and non-government or civil society organizations.
In the area of conflict management, the study found that the Nigerian police have
been very active in managing conflicts. For example, police were sent to Marte in
2011 to contain conflict between Hausa and non-Hausa fishermen over dumba
(dykes in Lake Chad). They were also active in quelling conflicts between farmers
and herders in Lower Ngada in 2010, and in Biu in 2010, when the youths in the LGA
attempted to kill a mallam who was suspected of being a sponsor of JAS. However,
the problem with the police is that the force lacks the capacity to guarantee security
due to inadequate logistics, particularly mobility, which would enhance their ability to
respond to crises effectively and efficiently.
The study also found that local, state and federal governments have responded to
conflicts taking place in the study areas over the last few years. In the area of relief
response, the local, state and federal governments have provided relief materials to
the most affected in some of the conflicts studied in the North East geopolitical zone.
Government at different levels has set up panels of enquiry to identify the causes of
conflicts and how they can be mitigated or resolved. For example in 2011, the
Federal Government set up the Galtimari Commission to advise it on resolving the
conflict between members of JAS and the Nigerian State.42 Other government
institutions have mediated and resolved conflicts arising as the result of boundary
disputes, chieftaincy tussles, farm and grazing land conflicts, and various social
issues. For example: At the grassroots or community level, the social welfare office
at the local government area is majority involved in settling disputes or conflicts
particularly as it relates to families, associations and even among workers (C3.2).
The Maiduguri resident mentioned above who had been in dispute with his landlord
obtained a satisfactory resolution from the local rent tribunal:
The rent tribunal asked the landlord to give me notice of six months.
Not only that, he was asked to refund all the monies I paid to him for
the rent. So, we stayed on for six months in the house without any
disturbances. When the period expired, I was given another three
months to stay in the house without paying anything. This is how
the problem between my former landlord and me ended (C1.7).
However, the narratives also show that in general the population has lost faith in the
security forces, the police and the judiciary, saying that corruption and material greed
had distanced these institutions from the general population. Respondents gave
many examples (see above) of disproportionate responses by the security forces,
summed up by the following comment from a local peace activist:

42

The Galtimari Commission has submitted its report, which is currently being considered by the
government.

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My organization is also planning to organize a peace conference

where intellectuals like you will air out their views. I think doing this
will go a long way to reducing the tension, not only in our ward but
all over Borno State. But what we first of all want the government to
do is to stop arbitrary arrest and wanton killings of innocent citizens
(C1.5).
As far as dispute resolution was concerned, the vulnerable and the less privileged
prefer to take their cases to alternative dispute resolution rather than to the police or
the judiciary. In contrast, traditional and religious leaders have a central role in
marital and other disputes. Testimony after testimony attests to the belief that
informal mechanisms such as traditional authorities (for example the lawans and
bulamas), religious leaders, family heads, and womens groups are more effective
than the security forces and the judiciary in resolving problems. In addition to the
respect in which citizens of the North East hold their leaders, respondents also
pointed out that such mechanisms, by bringing people together to express their
viewpoints, get to the heart of the matter and thereby prevent recurrence of the
dispute. On the other hand formal mechanisms such as the court system merely
calm the situation without addressing the real causes of the problems.
the youth listen to the elders when they are on rampage. The
soldiers always use force on the youth and the youth try to resist,
which always lead to crack-down between the soldier and the youth.
The elder should be left to manage the conflict due to the
effectiveness in the town and how the youth respect them (C4.4).
Use of government institution, that is the formal way, is ineffective
because these institutions are hard on the people and they are not
used to be treated in a hard way. So our traditional, religious and
family group remains efficient because they live among us in the
community (C4.12).
The traditional rulers, family institution, religious institution is more
effective in solving the conflict because they bring people together
to get to the root of the matter while the police and the military just
scared people away for a while. After they must have left, the
conflict will emanate again so its not effective (C4.20).
Traditional leadership institutions at times resolve conflicts not only within their own
communites but also between different communities. For example, the mais of Biu
and Potiskum successfully mediated conflicts around the construction of dumba
(dykes) on Lake Chad by Hausa fishermen, and the conflict between the Hausa
settlers and the Kanuri indigenous to Zabarmari was successfully resolved by the
local lawan in 2010.
The sulhu mediation process is often used by communities in the areas under study
for settling disputes. Community leaders constitute the sulhu committee, which calls
the disputants to the negotiating table and listens to the stories on both sides of the
conflict. It is after listening to both sides that the sulhu elders offer their suggestions
for resolving the conflict.
The study also identified the alwali as an important mediator in family conflict. The
alwali is, or represents, the father of a bride and groom during marriage. The bride
and groom call on their alwali in case of misunderstandings between them
throughout their marriage, even after they have given birth to children, to prevent

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misunderstandings escalating into violent conflict. In all the study areas, the alwali
have mediated and resolved some of the family conflicts in their immediate
environment: the following story from Maiduguri is illustrative:
There was a day the woman went to her alwali to come and talk to her
husband. When the alwali came, he talked to the husband on the
need to take care of his family as admonished by the Holy Quran. He
did that in the presence of the mans alwali. In fact, after listening to
the two alwalis, the man promised that he will try his best. Since then,
he has been taking care of his family, and conflict since that time did
not take place. The man has been taking his children to school and
has also stopped beating his wife. (C1.6).
Various trades and occupational associations, such as vegetable-growers and
farmers associations, were said to have the capacity to resolve disputes between
members. Non-governmental organizations, such as the Maiduguri-based Youth
Federation for Peace, have been active in conflict management in the North East.
The organization has complemented the activities of the CPDDS with seminars and
conferences on peace and conflict resolution, and has offered to mediate between
JAS and the Federal Government. Other mediation structures mentioned in the
narratives include Miyetti Allah, a Fulani socio-cultural organization that has been
involved in mediating peace between Fulani pastoralists and farmers in Biu, Marte,
Potiskum and Lower Ngada.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS
The research team for North East geopolitical zone recommend that the conflict
management and mediation processes that are currently in place need to be
strengthened in the areas of training, capacity building and weapons handling (the
latter in the case of the Nigerian police). To reduce conflict situations in the areas of
study the NRSP should assist the government in the north-eastern states to invest
heavily in education, industry and agriculture. This is to create or expand the
possibilities of providing employment to the socially displaced, economically
disadvantaged and politically exploited people of the study areas.
There is a need for NRSP to assist the security operatives in the areas of study to
come out with robust early warning mechanisms that would involve research
institutions concerned with managing and reducing conflicts, and other stakeholders,
in the areas of study. Besides, NRSP should collaborate with the Federal
Government to work out security sector reform to enhance accountability, and ensure
truly professionalized security services by refining doctrine and improving respect for
the rule of law and human rights within the security sector. The situation whereby
the security operatives abuse the rights of the citizens of the study with impunity
should be stopped.
As for Lake Chad, there is a need to check the low level of water in the lake and
arrest it from further receding. For this reason, NRSP and the Federal Government
should jointly dredge some of the rivers which empty their waters into the lake so as
to increase the flow of water. Water levels in Lake Chad affect the lives of many
people who depend on it for livelihoods.
Many respondents made recommendations for how their situation could be
improved. These generally focused on improving employment prospects for young
people, and removing the security forces widely seen as unnecessarily harsh
from the area. One respondent summed up the general view thus:

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The truth is that once you are able to address the problem of
unemployment, corruption and injustice in our society, we shall
experience peace, security and stability and by extension economic
growth and development will take place (C3.4).

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